Journal of Danubian Studies and Research - Danubius Journals

Journal of Danubian Studies and Research

Evolution of Euroscepticism, a Pressure for the Political DecisionMakers in the Member States of the European Union. How Were the Elections in Austria, the Netherlands and France Influenced by Euroscepticism?

Avramescu Stefanita Alin1

Abstract: Elections that took place after the moment of the Brexit in 2016 in the European Member States were emblematic in terms of the European Union's political future. Voters from several countries rejected anti-European, nationalist parties and preferred to go to “newcomers” or, in the case of the Netherlands, they chose the experience. The defeats of the nationalist and populist parties in Austria, the Netherlands and France, which have relied on an anti-European message amplifying the Eurosceptic attitude, show that citizens do not want political adventurers in state leadership, given the developments in the last two years in Europe, but want stability for the European project. However, the European Union, as an organization, could suffer serious damage because of the populist wave and, above all, the Eurosceptic. In order to survive, the European Union can and should find ways to adapt to the new methods of politics. The question that logically addresses at this point is: should it survive, the European Union needs to become more flexible? And if so, should the idea of unity for multi-level cooperation be abandoned?. Keywords: Euroscepticism; EU; political decision-makers

The Impact of Euroscepticism on the Member States' Decision-Making Process The impact of the migration phenomenon between 2015 and 2016 on Euroscepticism has encouraged, since the autumn of 2016, a reaction from some states and political leaders. It is an impact with immediate influence according to statistics provided by the Eurobarometer. Euroscepticism creates a kind of pressure for countries to take a certain course of action, often in the direction expressed by the national public.

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PhD in progress, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania, Address: Expoziției 2 Blvd., 012103 Bucharest, Romania, Corresponding author: [email protected].

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 It is obvious that the way in which political actors understand public opinion, the forms that it takes, how its useful potential is measured will influence the decision to take it or not when it shapes its decisions on certain policies or Public positions (Herbst, 1998, pp. 8 – 12). The public is, by its very nature, heterogeneous. Although the term “public opinion” is often used to refer to an unanimous viewpoint, members of the public have very different views on any issue. “The public” as a subject of research do not always have the same structure. There are several types of publics. According to Splichal, there is a “voting public” (a body of effective voters), an “attentive public” (characterized by interest in politics and at least occasionally participating in policy debates), an “active public” (representing elite of the “attentive public”) and “sectorial public” or “special public”, which, by their size (number of members), differs greatly from one to another (Splichal, 1999, pp. 7 – 17). Although there may be overlapping between different audiences, certain categories, such as the active one (those who can become directly involved in politics and/or who can vote), may be more interested in political actors than those types of audiences that can be considered passive, as Andrea D. Rounce (Rounce, 2004) points out. Opinions may change over time (and from one poll to another) and can not always be ideologically coherent. Literature shows that opinions are changing. These may not be consistent over time. Opinions may also change depending on how questions are asked or what is happening in the world. Literature on “framing” shows that people's answers to one problem or another often depend on how it is presented (Kuklinski, 2002, pp. 195-198). It is often said that political actors have more chances to respond (or to “hinder”) public opinion in the preparation of elections than to respond between the elections (Jacobs, 2000, pp. 12 – 15). Just as important as the response to public opinion is the visibility of the response. If the public does not know who made the decisions based on public opinion, then it makes no sense to make a decision that reflects the opinion. Policymakers need to be able to get credit for the decisions they take to make their reaction useful (Sharp, 1999, pp. 19 – 28). As Lippmann noted, there are other elements defining the public opinion, separated by the construction and its measurement. “The public opinion,” according to Lippmann, and later to Herbst, is also a “symbol, a rhetorical being that legislators 51

Journal of Danubian Studies and Research and journalists refer to in their discussions.” (Lippmann, 1998) Being seen consulting the “public” and paying attention to its “opinions” is an important part of symbolic democracy for political actors. Public opinion can be symbolically used to give legitimacy to actions that have not been taken (or have been taken) by the government. When convergence between politics and public opinion stems from the mobilization of public opinion by political actors rather than from their reaction, this legitimacy has been created on false premises. Evidence also suggests that elected officials in particular can avoid the political repercussions of not responding to public opinion by taking symbolic actions (Cohen, 1997, pp. 161-184)1. Benjamin Ginsberg argues that “modern governments have become so sophisticated in using public relations techniques that public opinion has been tamed and channeled through the institutionalization of opinion polls” and governments can therefore” manage, manipulate and use public sentiments. “ (Apud & Elaine, 1999 , pp. 11 – 12) Jacobs and Shapiro note: “Politicians are pursuing public opinion not to develop public policies, but rather to determine how to make their public presentations and win public support for policies that they and their supporters favor.” (Apud & Elaine, 1999 , pp. 11 – 12) It has been suggested that a strong consensus in the public opinion should be sufficient in a democratic state to ensure a change of policy towards something closer to public opinion (Petry, 1999, pg. 540-550)2. Some have argued that one of the most important functions of public opinion is to ensure that a certain political issue becomes part of the political agenda. Changes in public opinion could therefore be seen as an appeal to the government to do something about a particular issue or situation. As Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Howard Kunreuther point out, in democratic societies, deciding factors often rely on public opinion to make a political decision. Political people introduce citizens' views in their conversations and in their public speech (Oberholzer-Gee & Kunreuther, 2002, p. 2)3.

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https://muse.jhu.edu/book/7207. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2647516?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 3 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.200.6398&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 2

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 The migratory wave that affected the European Union was a population mobility that the Member States of the Union, affected by the immigration route, felt it significantly. Immigrant pressure has led, according to Eurobarometer data measuring confidence in the European Union and national governments, to an increase in Euroscepticism, a lack of confidence in the ability of European institutions to provide a solution to the crisis that has affected the European Union. Sharpening a Eurosceptic pressure puts the germinative bed for a reaction from the affected population. The reaction of British citizens was a rebellion of “natives” against the arrival of foreigners. Brexit was the embodiment of the increasing pressure of Euroscepticism and how it influenced public opinion. However, the referendum on Britain's exit from the European Union, as seen in Austria, was a turning point for continental euroscepticism. Brexit was a determining factor in the political developments that followed in the European Union. On the one hand, Britain's leaving European Union has created fears at the level of the European institutions that needed to find a quick solution, and among the citizens, along with the increasing fear of the European Union's disintegration, generated awareness of the importance of belonging to European construction. Public attitudes towards the European Union and the Eurosceptic trend have been different since the Brexit, which has decisively influenced the political developments in the Member States of the Union where elections were going to take place. Starting in the spring of 2015, confidence in the European institutions has been in a continuous decline. From a 40% confidence level in the European Union in the 28 Member States, this percentage declined considerably until spring 2016, when there was only 33% confidence in the European Union. Autumn 2016, which means post-Brexit temporally, has a rebound in confidence in the European Union, with a confidence level of 36%. The post-Brexit moment triggered discussions on the future of the European Union, which eventually led to the emergence of several scenarios. In order to cope with the pressure of their own citizens, political leaders have taken a position to meet the interests of their own states. This has led, from the point of view of trust in the European Union, to a radical change in terms of public perception. In the spring of 2017, after the emergence of the two-speed Europe scenario and after the clarification of each country's position, confidence in the European institutions rose to 47%.

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research Can the European Union survive the Eurosceptics? Elections that took place after the moment of the Brexit in 2016 in the European Member States were emblematic in terms of the European Union's political future. Voters from several countries rejected anti-European, nationalist parties and preferred to go to “newcomers” or, in the case of the Netherlands, they chose the experience. Since the end of 2016, Europe has the first head of state elected from a Green Party, in the person of the President of Austria, but also a French president who has not actively participated in political life. The defeats of the nationalist and populist parties in Austria, the Netherlands and France, which have relied on an anti-European message amplifying the Eurosceptic attitude, show that citizens do not want political adventurers in state leadership, given the developments in the last two years in Europe, but want stability for the European project. New parties and movements offer fresh energy in European politics that could benefit from a process of democratization by re-invigorating debates on important issues. Many anti-institutional movements at Member State level will find opportunities to develop their causes in the political system of the European Union, as long as they have transnational political objectives and government ambitions. However, the European Union, as an organization, could suffer serious damage because of the populist wave and, above all, the Eurosceptic. The objective of the Union, European integration, is a transnational project built on principles that populists and nationalists oppose the most: shared sovereignty, supranational authority, compromises between different interests and mutual tolerance. The basis of the values of the European Union, legally enshrined in its treaties, is liberal: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Abandoning these principles would ultimately weaken the credibility of the European Union. Seen years ago as a British syndrome, Euroscepticism has spread across the continent like a virus. Confidence in the European project began to decline vertiginously with the onset of the global economic crisis, and recently because of the immigration crisis. These crises have highlighted the fact that many are questioning the effectiveness of this project. Thus, old Member States of the

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 European Union suffer from an increase in Euroscepticism (Torreblanca & Mark, 2013)1. In the case of the European Union, the lack of confidence in the national governments that grew in 2015 and 2016 was translated, according to the logic of “foreign legitimacy” (Le Cacheux, 2015, p. 14), into a dramatic drop in support for the European Union and for European economic integration in particular. One of the first major efforts towards defining Euroscepticism was a 1998 article by Paul Taggart, who presented a comparative analysis of Euroscepticism in the national party systems of the 15 EU Member States and Norway (Taggart, 1998, pg. 363–388)2. Euroscepticism was defined as a “comprehensive term,” “expressing the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, and the incorporation of absolute and unequal opposition to the European integration process”. For Chris Flood, Euroscepticism “has the meaning of doubt and distrust in European integration (Flood, 2-4 September 2002).”3 This mistrust may range from moderate “European integration has gone as it should”, to “absolute rejection of EU membership.” Krouwel and Abts (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, pp. 252 – 270) suggest that Eurosceptics may differ in intensity and in their arguments to oppose the European Union by focusing their criticism on the various political objectives and/or aspects of Europeanisation. Euroscepticism must be seen as a reality at both social and political level. The opposition of the parties and governments to some policies of the European Union and to the decisions made by the European Commission in order to gain electoral percentages has made Euroscepticism more and more visible in the relationship with the European institutions. Euroscepticism is a “disease” of the European community that is taking place before joining the European space, evolving and taking shape after the moment of the integration of a state. This amplification is based on a series of internal factors, which stem from the national spirit existing in the European Union or already members of the European Union, as well as external factors, which are related to

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http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/24/continental-euroscepticism-rise. https://goo.gl/BWSf28. 3 http://uaces.org/documents/papers/0201/flood.pdf. 2

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research the geopolitical conflicts and interests that are at the center European space (Torreblanca & Mark, 2013, p. 1). At this moment, the European Union is trapped in a cross between nationalists and Europeans, populists and liberals. The eurozone crisis and migration have dramatically accelerated polarization and fragmentation of the political spectrum. Anti-system movements have gained support in many countries, as democracies move away from representative politics and focus on new forms of political engagement. Political changes affecting the European Union represent three distinct challenges. One is given by the struggle for power at Union level (Grabbe & Lehne, 2016). There is a gap between the political changes at national and Union level. The new parties gain power at Union level only after entering the national governments. As a result, they can have a huge influence in establishing a new political agenda at national level, but the old parties still represent their countries in Brussels. The second challenge is the functioning of the European Union (Grabbe & Lehne, 2016). Rapid change makes the Union harder to govern because its political system depends on transnational cooperation and a minimum level of political stability. The European Union works through negotiations that lead to a convergence of views and trust between participants. Problems at the level of national policy - such as inability to form a government - can cause paralysis at the level of the European institutions. Open confrontation also blocks consolidation of consensus, which is the main working method in the European Union. The third threat is represented by the symbolic role of the Union (Grabbe & Lehne, 2016). This ideological opposition comes from several directions. For anti-austerity movements, Brussels is seen as the one who has imposed tax rules that have stifled European states of welfare. For anti-globalization protesters, the Union is a trade liberalization agent and a friend of multinationals. For extreme conservatives, the Union means the rights of sexual and religious minorities on which their agenda of defending traditional values does not support them. Political changes in the European space have accelerated since the end of the Cold War. Over the last two and a half decades, the Union has developed different response mechanisms to meet the challenges of its integration project. Some methods are no longer credible, while others should be developed to make them

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 more effective. Looking ahead, the Union should focus on specific ways of combating the rise of populism. Populism, which often takes Eurosceptic valences, threatens European construction in ways that national democracy can combat, but for a far-reaching structure as the European Union it is much more difficult without the contribution of state actors. In order to consolidate, the European Union needs greater resilience around its core values and greater flexibility to adapt to changing politics. Decision makers at the Union level should set priorities for what they need to adapt and defend (Chopin, 2015)1. In order to survive, the European Union can and should find ways to adapt to the new methods of politics. The politics of 2016 were characterized by the immigration wave that affected the European Union. This wave, according to Eurobarometer data in the spring of 2016, showed a major mistrust in European and national institutions. The extent of Euroscepticism between 2015 and 2016 made European political leaders speculate the moment to capitalize on the political picture. David Cameron was overtaken by the situation in the British referendum. Turning to the tense context in the European Union as a result of the immigration wave from the Middle East, Cameron has played the referendum book to gain more benefits from the European leaders for UK. So, given the political context, the threats to the European Union and the British citizens' dissatisfaction, Cameron's referendum can be seen as a form of blackmail against European officials, but also a political strategy to attract supporters. The only problem is that the conservative leader has shown inability to manage the situation. Regarding the Italian referendum, for most Italian citizens, this move of Prime Minister Renzi was an attempt to test amd measure the support he has in theory. Renzi enjoyed a high degree of confidence when he came to power in 2014, but voters were generally dissatisfied with him for a multitude of reasons, including high unemployment and concerns about the migration crisis. Renzi hoped he will be able to attract the Italian population, thanks to his speech at European level.

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http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-375-en.pdf.

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research Brexit, Awareness Regarding the Danger to the Future of the European Union What does Brexit mean? It is a word that has been used as a short way to say that the UK has left the EU combining the name of Great Britain and the exit to get Brexit, just as a possible Greek exit from the euro has been called Grexit in the past (McBride, 2017)1. Why is Britain leaving the European Union? Because of a referendum to which everyone (or almost everyone else) was able to attend and which took place on 23 June 2016. The purpose of this referendum: the decision regarding the future of Britain with or without the European Union. The votes for leaving the European Union by Great Britain were 51.9% against 48.1%, those who voted against leaving the European Union. The attendance at the referendum was 71.8%, with more than 30 million people participating2. How did the UK Get to Vote for Leaving the European Union? The departure of the UK from the European Union, given the tumultuous history since the accession to the present times, was an event that the analysts had predicted. Britain, moreover, is the state where Euroscepticism, the distrust in the European Union, has emerged. Decades of Euroscepticism and rebellion of Government Cabinets eventually led to the self-exclusion of Great Britain from a political union that British citizens have never embraced in full. Britain's outpouring in Europe is the result not only of four months of campaign but of forty years of latent euroscepticism that has never disappeared, as do British policy analysts suggest (Mason, 2016)3. Why has this Vote Been Reached? Many conservatives have never been favourable to the idea of being a member of the European Union, and discontent has increased, in particular, with regard to the

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https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brexitmeans?gclid=Cj0KCQjwhrzLBRC3ARIsAPmhsnV2DXgCizfFyUvz2UTx20bVyKgm9_FJ0UP_dRn UJm-hERW6atee3mcaAq8CEALw_wcB. 2 EU Referendum, Results in Full, BBC, Iunie 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results. 3 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/how-did-uk-end-up-voting-leave-europeanunion.

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 issue of immigration. Immigration inside the EU is a sensitive issue, as the UK is obliged to accept the free movement of European citizens. Eastern Europe's economic migration has grown since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, pushing migration to the UK to more than three hundred thousand people per year by 2015. Cameron called this situation unsustainable. “It has never been predicted that free movement would trigger such a large number of people moving on our continent,” he said in 20151. Based on this fury, in 2014, the British Independence Party (UKIP), an anti-European party, grew winning votes in the UK elections for the European Parliament with an anti-immigration platform. The wave of asylum seekers who arrived in 2015-2016 beyond the borders of the European block has caused even greater tensions. The United Kingdom has been exempted from EU plans in 2015 to relocate hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa due to the opt-out of immigration policy in the Union (Swinford & Holehouse, 2015)2. But for the eurosceptics, the Brussels response has highlighted the malfunctioning at the level of the European institutions and the UK decision-makers have rushed to suggest that the Union's asylum policy for migrants could be changed to make it harder for them to be deported to other countries of the Union, as economic analyst James McBride says (McBride, 2017)3. In November 2015, former British Prime Minister Cameron announced that before organizing a referendum he would seek to find ways to reform the European Union in four major areas: national sovereignty, immigration policy, financial and economic regulation and competitiveness. In February 2016, EU leaders agreed on a number of changes, including protection for non-EU currencies, new limits on migrant benefits, a commitment to reduce EU regulation and official recognition that the impetus for “an ever closer union” does not apply to the United Kingdom. With these reforms, Cameron hoped to diminish the level of Euroscepticism in his country, but the mass migration spectrum, combined with several major terrorist attacks in Europe, has provided additional arguments for anti-European movement. 1

BBC.com: UK net migration levels unsustainable, says David Cameron. Decembrie 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35055355. 2 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/11700336/EU-Summit-David-Cameronuses-EU-opt-out-to-refuse-migrant-quotas.html. 3 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brexitmeans?gclid=Cj0KCQjwhrzLBRC3ARIsAPmhsnV2DXgCizfFyUvz2UTx20bVyKgm9_FJ0UP_dRn UJm-hERW6atee3mcaAq8CEALw_wcB.

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research What were the Arguments for Leaving The EU? Recovery of sovereignty was the main argument of the campaign of those in the pro-exit group. To attract supporters, the leaders of this movement have relied on the idea that the European institutions have changed since 1973 and accused the Union of becoming a suffocating bureaucracy with more and more extensive regulation. “The laws governing citizens in this country are set by politicians from other nations that we have never chosen and can not reject”, Justice Minister Michael Gove said (Gove, 2016)1. Immigration was the main dissatisfaction. The number of migrants in the European Union almost tripled between 2004 and 2015, from about one million to more than three million, especially as a result of an influx of citizens from the new Member States, including Poland, Bulgaria and Romania2. At the same time, the terrorist attacks in different Member States of the Union have raised fears that the free movement of persons to the UK makes the state vulnerable. The issue of immigration strongly combines anxiety regarding identity, economic security and terrorism, says Matthew Goodwin, British policy expert at Kent University. “The referendum is just as important in terms of immigration as the British relationship with Europe,” he says (Goodwin, Clarke, & Whiteley, 2016)3. For some analysts, the European institutions are not prepared to respond to the economic challenges of the modern world. Economist Roger Bootle, the author of the “Problem with Europe,” argues that the European Union's emphasis on “harmonization,” (Bootle, 2015, p. 111 ) on the global standardization of everything from the regulation of labor to the size of olive oil containers, threatens Europe with steady growth of dissatisfaction. Dominic Cummings, director of the Vote Leave campaign, believes the European Union is “extraordinarily opaque, extraordinarily slow, extraordinary bureaucratic.” Supporters of the EU blockade campaign believe that, without this burden, the United Kingdom can reduce regulation, improve competitiveness, and 1http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12166345/European-referendum-

Michael-Gove-explains-why-Britain-should-leave-the-EU.html. 2 Full Fact, EU immigration to the UK, Mai 2017, https://fullfact.org/immigration/eu-migration-anduk/. 3 https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/epop/files/2016/07/Clarke-Goodwin-and-Whiteley.pdf.

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 conclude trade deals with rapidly growing emerging economies. For Cummings, Cameron's negotiated reforms were banal, leaving the UK without any choice but to leave a dysfunctional union1. Did the Government of the United Kingdom made a Mistake? This referendum was put into practice by British Prime Minister David Cameron because of the promise made in his election campaign to renegotiate the terms with the European Union and then to hold a referendum2, whose goal was to regain voters who would have gone to UKIP. Cameron seems to have underestimated the number of personalities in his party's leadership, including Justice Minister Michael Gove and former mayor of London, Boris Johnson, who joined the campaign to leave the European Union. Matthew Goodwin, the political science professor at the University of Kent, the author of a book on the rise of the UKIP, stressed that the elite failed to reach many citizens of British society (Goodwin & Ford, 2015, p. 46 ). It should not be forgotten that the referendum came at a time when populist revolts against the elites gained ground, from Eurosceptic parties in France, Germany, Austria and Scandinavia to Trump's rise in the United States. The exit campaign from the Union portrayed European officials as an outbreak of inconsistent political elites that were not democratically voted by the British people. David Cameron was overwhelmed by the situation he was in. Turning to the tense context in the European Union as a result of the immigration wave from the Middle East, Cameron relied on the referendum book to gain more benefits for Britain from European leaders. The process of negotiating the reformation of the European Union in the sense desired by Great Britain, left the impression that Brussels was inflexible and did not want to make big concessions to keep the UK in the Union. So, given the political context, the threats to the European Union and the British citizens' dissatisfaction, Cameron's referendum can be seen as a form of blackmail against European officials, but also a political strategy to attract supporters. The only problem was that the conservative leader has shown inability to manage the situation. 1

The Out campaign - An interview with Dominic Cummings, The Economist, Ianuarie 2016, https://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2016/01/out-campaign. 2 David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU, BBC, Ianuarie 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282.

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research Realizing its error, the prime minister tried to make his negotiation with the European Union on topics of interest to the UK seem like a success. This strategy was eventually unsuccessful.

Italian Referendum and its Impact on the European Project What did the Italians vote for? Italian citizens were called to the polls at the end of 2016 to vote on a package of constitutional reforms that Prime Minister Matteo Renzi proposed to make the country easier to govern, as he said. The two legislative chambers in Italy - the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies - have perfectly equal powers. The system was created after the war in response to Benito Mussolini's fascist dictatorship, but today the Senate's decision-making power over legislation is seen as timeconsuming for the country's development (Francescon & Fedele, 2016). What Matteo Renzi proposed was that the constitutional changes should put an end to paritarian bicameralism. If the referendum proposed by the prime minister had passed, only the Lower House would vote for censure motions against the government and most laws. The composition of the Senate would also have been modified: the number of Senators reduced to 100, compared to 315, elected in the 20 Italian regions and remunerated by them. Of the 100 senators, five will be appointed by the President of the Republic. Former heads of state will be senators for life. The head of state will be elected by two-thirds of the “big electors” (the ensemble of deputies, senators and regional elected representatives) during three first ballots and then by three more polls by three-fifths of the big electors, a seventh ballot to be decisive by the vote of at least three-fifths of the same voters. So far, the election of the president requires two-thirds during the two ballots, and then the simple majority of a third ballot. Regarding the law adoption, the government could have requested an accelerated procedure to the Chamber of Deputies for some laws that it considers urgent, thus obliging the elected to rule on them within 70 days or 95 days for documents with higher complexity (Larcinese, 2016). These changes would have strengthened executive power, Renzi claimed, finally releasing the Italian government to await decisions within the Senate.

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 Why was the referendum so important? Matteo Renzi said from the outset that he would resign if he did not win the referendum1. A possible resignation was an unwanted scenario for anyone in Italy, and in Europe. The fear, not only in Italy but also in European chancelleries, was that anti-European parties such as the Five-Star Movement and the North League could grow and eventually could demand a referendum on the possibility for Italy to leave the euro currency. Why the wave of opposition built against the referendum? The main concerns were that Renzi's reforms would give too much power to the prime minister. Renzi also adopted an electoral law guaranteeing the largest party 54% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This means that a weakened Senate and the majority of the lower house will give almost unlimited power to the Executive. Even former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi warned that the changes “will lead us directly to an non-democracy”. Besides targeting the opportunity to win power, the “Five Star” populist movement says Prime Minister Renzi is trying to eliminate the country's checks and balance systems. “Five stars”, founded by Beppe Grillo, a comedian, began a tour against the referendum, calling on the Italians to reject the changes2. The backstage of the vote The constitutional reform proposed has meant for Matteo Renzi his political future. For most Italian citizens, Renzi's referendum was an attempt to see the support he enjoys. Renzi enjoyed a high degree of confidence when he came to power in 2014, but voters are generally dissatisfied with him for a multitude of reasons, including high unemployment and concerns about the migration crisis. Why did he lose? Renzi played his political future into an attempt to change the hectic political system of Italy. He wanted to strengthen the central government and weaken the Senate, the upper house of Parliament. His opponents, including those within his

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Silvia Francescon, Giovanni Fedele, idem. Italy’s constitutional referendum - Why Italy should vote no in its referendum, The Economist, Noiembrie 2016, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710816-country-needs-far-reachingreforms-just-not-ones-offer-why-italy-should-vote-no. 2

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research party, argued that the reforms would give too much power to the Prime Minister and voters agreed. It was a landslide victory of the camp “no”, a group of populist parties led by Five Star Movement, which capitalized on the lowering popularity of Renzi, years of economic stagnation and problems caused by the tens of thousands of migrants arriving in Italy . How does Europe react? The result of the referendum was seen as a blow to the European Union, although the referendum had nothing to do with the future of Italy in the European construction. Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who heads the group of 19 eurozone countries, has denied any imminent crisis1. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said that there is no reason for a euro crisis (Maurice, 2016)2. “The referendum was about a change in the Italian constitution, not Europe”, Margaritis Schinas, spokesperson for the European Commission, insisted. (Herszenhorn, 2016)3 Whether the Italians intended or not to trigger an alarm in Brussels or simply to punish an unpopular leader, the reverberations of the vote were felt throughout Europe. With regard to Renzi, he will be missed by the liberal pro-European leaders, especially Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had an ally in the person of Renzi, especially when she imposed her moral approach to the refugee crisis. Matteo Renzi, although he did not agree at European level with the Union's policies on migration and austerity, was undoubtedly a pro-European, and considered that the European Union was the place where Italy could exert its influence. The impact of political opportunism on European decisions It is noted, considering the two referendums marking the year 2016, the British and the Italian ones, that there are common elements. Both leaders became at the beginning of 2016 important voices against EU measures amid the immigration crisis. Britain's opt-out, as well as Renzi's ultimatum to European leaders, were seen as being meant to increase popular support for them and national favor, given 1

No emergency intervention needed in Italy, Dijsselbloem says, Financial Times, Decembrie 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/097f8226-ba9a-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080?mhq5j=e2. 2 https://euobserver.com/economic/136150. 3 http://www.politico.eu/article/italy-austria-brussels-eu/.

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 the extremely tense political context. Instead, the reasons behind the two referendums were different. On the one hand, in the case of Davin Cameron, the referendum was seen as a blackmail against the European Union in order to gain more benefits for the United Kingdom, while Renzi hoped to capitalize more power on the prime minister position he occupied. The attitude adopted by Renzi and Cameron is clearly explained by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, which shows that the attitude of the parties towards EU accession and, generalizing, towards European politics could represent a rather conjunctural-opportunistic position developed in response to strategic and tactical considerations in the short and medium term, such as the “agreement” that is given to the country it represents or which refers to the positioning of the party during a referendum campaign (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, p. 242). As far as the referendums in the UK and Italy are concerned, the political situation was such that the two leaders in office tried to take advantage trying to capitalize political benefits. It would not be the first time such a tactic is applied. Fallernd's concept of “Opposing Europe?” Volume 1 of 2008 on the Euroscepticism of Austrian parties describes how the Green Party agreed to join the European Union after their country voted “yes” to accession without changing it - give their fundamental attitude to the European integration project (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, p. 243). Similarly, Batory (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008), in the same volume in 2008, describes how two parties, the Justice and Life Party and the Hungarian Workers' Party, have changed their positions on this issue easily in response to the short-term tactical coalition considerations. In Poland, the Peasant Party determined its attitude to the referendum on accession to the European Union in June 2003 based on a cost-benefit analysis of the terms negotiated and whether or not the government introduced specific regulations that concern farmers and rural areas. This phenomenon Henderson calls it “false Europhilia” (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). In other words, the party's attitude to EU membership does not necessarily indicate its position on the issue of European integration, but in a much deeper sense. The Italian referendum at the end of 2016 was perceived as an attempt by Renzi to take more power for the prime minister. What he did not take into account are the reminiscences from the time of Mussolini, who had the same amount of power. 65

Journal of Danubian Studies and Research Renzi's intention, given the European migration crisis and the slow rhythm of the European Union in identifying a solution, was to be able to make decisions at the national level without going through the Senate vote. At the beginning of 2016, Matteo Renzi launched an ultimatum to the European Union telling the leaders of the member states that they are either dealing with migration or whether Italy will do it alone. In fact, Renzi tried to take advantage of the European context to facilitate decisionmaking at the national level. Renzi overestimated public support for him and the proposed reforms, and this cost him the loss of the referendum. The Italian population, unfortunately for him, did not share Renzi's vision. The shades of his move led to a resistance of the Italian population to a pro-European, pro-integration prime minister. European elections in 2017, a hit given to populism Brexit has generated a change of attitude among the European population. Breaking up the European project has made it possible to take into account at the level of decision-makers another approach to the problem, one that responds to the citizens' agenda. In order to resist, ruling parties in several states had to revise their position. At the same time, the crisis of confidence in the classic political parties, visible in Austria and France, has seen politicians who are new to the political game winning. If Emmanuel Macron had lost the election, France would have been framed as the newest state among the countries where populism gained ground in the West. But even before Macron's victory, other nationalist movements in Europe have failed, especially in the Netherlands and Austria. There are still strong forces that push Europe to extremes - immigration, the continuing threat of terrorism, the resentment of those who feel left behind by globalization. Nationalist leaders are found not only in West European countries, but also in countries such as Hungary and Poland. The next electoral confrontation that will be closely followed throughout Europe is that of September in Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel faces challenges both from the left and right of the political missile.

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 Austrian elections, the turning point of Euroscepticism Post-war Austria was a politically dominated country by social democrats. Since 1970, the Austrian state has had a social-democratic leadership, with the exception of seven years. In all this political context, there were also extreme right parties. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) was set up by former SS officers in 1956, and in each 1990 parliamentary election it managed to get a two-digit result. (Terry, 2014)1 The year 2016 represented a great opportunity for this party to change the political face of Austria and Europe. Norbert Hofer, the FPÖ candidate for the presidency of Austria, managed to get to the second round of the presidential election against the candidate of the Green Party, Alexander van der Bellen. The elections were somewhat a hasty ones. Although van der Bellen had won in May 2016, the vote resumed in December 2016 due to problems with postal voting. (Oltermann, 2016)2 But why, in a country with a long history of this kind of politics, could these elections mean a turning point for Austria, Europe and the whole world? For FPÖ it could be a cornerstone for something bigger. Hofer is regarded as a puppet for Heinz-Christian Strache, the party's leader, and has suggested he could call early parliamentary elections if the ruling left-right coalition does not require immigration controls. (Oltermann, 2016)3 And regardless of its internal impact, a victory for Hofer would also have been a blow to Europe's political mainstream. It would mean a grim stone: the first chief of state of a continental country elected from the extreme right since 1945. It would also mean a possible isolation of Austria by its neighbors. Opinion polls held before the December elections showed a very small difference between the two counter-candidates, which made the predictions difficult to do. Although the role of the Austrian President is largely a ceremonial one, the vote is viewed at European level as a barometer of the level of populism in the upcoming elections. France, the Netherlands and Germany are the states that will have

1

http://www.demsoc.org/2014/02/03/freedom-party-of-austria/. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/austrian-presidential-election-result-overturnedand-must-be-held-again-hofer-van-der-bellen. 3 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/19/norbert-hofer-austria-presidential-hopefulrightwing. 2

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research elections after Austria, where anti-system and anti-immigration parties have won ground. The direction that Austria was going to take on the European Union was also closely followed. Hofer campaigned on an anti-immigration platform and initially said that Austria could follow the British vote to leave the Union. Van der Bellen told Austrians that it is proof that Hofer is in favor of Oexit. During the summer months when the campaign took place, significant developments took place regarding the European political landscape. The most important change was Brexit, which suddenly led to the reconsideration of Euroscepticism by many Austrians. As the European Union became more and more popular, the Van der Bellen campaign picked up and attacked Hofer for officially opening an Öexit referendum. 61% of Austrians considered after Brexit that Austria should remain a member of the EU. 23% in favor of leaving the EU. 16% do not take a position1. Alexander van der Bellen is expected to be a pro-European president and a trusted partner for other heads of state. In domestic politics, the predictions are to support traditional models that focus on ceremonial and moral roles, and not to use the constitutional powers of the federal president. In Austria, however, political actors in governmental parties will have to analyse what happened. They will have to assess how a 47 percent electorate voted for Hofer2 to be prevented from making the FPÖ the strongest party in Austria in the next federal election. The pitch between the vote for Van der Bellen and the vote for the Greens could be quite high. The step between voting for Hofer and voting for the FPÖ is much smaller. The importance of the elections in the Netherlands in the context of migration and the escalation of Euroscepticism The Netherlands organized parliamentary elections on March 15th. Opinion polls have estimated for a good time that the party led by Geert Wilders, PVV, known as

Austrian Society for European Politics (ÖGfE), ÖGfE-Survey: After the Brexit-vote – Desire to leave the EU is decreasing in Austria, Iulie 2016, http://oegfe.at/wordpress/2016/07/oegfe-surveyafter-the-brexit-vote-desire-to-leave-the-eu-is-decreasing-in-austria/. 2 Austria election: Far Right leader Norbert Hofer concedes defeat to Alexander Van der Bellen, The Telegraph, Decembrie 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/04/austria-election-norberthofer-cusp-becoming-europes-first-far/. 1

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 anti-Islamist, anti-European Union, could win most votes, despite being unlikely that this party could also be found in the government. After the British referendum on leaving the EU and the election of Donald Trump in the US, a PVV victory was seen as appropriate for a developing narrative of national and anti-constitutional movements. Functioning of the Dutch electoral system In the Dutch Parliament there are 150 seats, which means that a government needs 76 parliamentarians to form a majority. No party has succeeded to form a majority on its own, and the Netherlands has been governed by coalitions for more than a century. Parliament is elected by proportional representation in a single constituency at national level - which means that any party gaining 0.67% of the national vote has a place in the Parliament. (Teffer, 2017)1 Dutch politics have been marked in the last decades by the strong decline in support for the three main ruling parties from center to right and left. Their share of votes has fallen from over 80% in the 1980s to an estimated 40% this year2. This is a visible trend in Europe. In the Netherlands, it was parallel to the appearance of smaller parties with specific interest: not less than 28 of them contested the elections. A total of 14 were predicted to win seats, including eight with ten or more MPs. Fragmentation of vote can be an explanation for PVV share, more than a significant increase in support. The moves that produced Brexit and the election of Donald Trump won almost half of the votes. Wilders was projected to be under 20%. Who is Wilders and why is it an interest? Wilders was elected to parliament on the lists of liberal party VVD 19 years ago, after that became independent before setting up the PVV in 2006 - a party largely defined by his virulent opposition to Islam and what he described as the Islamization of Holland. 1

https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/136905. Politics in the Netherlands, ProDemos –House for Democracy and the Rule of Law, Haga, 2013, pp. 19 – 24, https://www.prodemos.nl/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/04/Politics-in-theNetherlands-2013.pdf. 2

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research Wilders was found guilty of incitement to discrimination against the Dutch Moroccan in December 2016, and at the launch of the campaign denounced the “Moroccan break that makes the streets unsafe.” He lives under police protection. PVV is a different kind of party, Wilders being his only member. The single-page election manifesto promises anti-Muslim measures, such as shutting down the Islamic mosques and schools, the ban on sales of the Koran and the blocking of Muslim migrants. It also undertakes to withdraw the Netherlands from the European Union, close the Dutch border and spend more on security and defense and less on wind and foreign aid. More proposals violate international law and the Dutch constitution. (Traub, 2017)1 What are the problems of the Dutch society? Unemployment is low for five years and economic growth is 2.3%, which means that the Dutch economy is recovering positively after the economic crisis. (Morks, 2016)2 However, refugees remain a concern, but less than at the peak of the European immigration crisis in 2015. About 31,000 asylum seekers registered in the Netherlands in 2016, far less than the 90,000, the prediction made by the government.3 Immigration and integration of immigrants is an important issue. Wilders talks about Henk and Ingrid, an imaginary Dutch couple suffering in the hands of a corrupt, despotic political elite of the EU and - of course - because of Muslim immigrants. The fact that Rutte urged migrant communities to comply with the Dutch rules and Europe's current political climate made dominant themes inevitably include multiculturalism, globalization, sovereignty, Dutch values and the advantages of belonging to the European Union for the Netherlands. Why did Rutte win? Rutte, who, for much of his campaign, seemed to be in the electoral race to keep up with Geert Wilders, would have taken advantage, as the political analysis that 1

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/13/the-geert-wilders-effect/. https://www.cpb.nl/en/pressrelease/balanced-budget-under-continuing-economic-recovery. 3 Focus Migration – Netherlands, http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/The-Netherlands.2644.0.html?L=1. 2

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 emerged in the post-election period have shown, of the rather critical diplomatic situation regarding the relationship with the Turkish state . The diplomatic crisis between the Netherlands and Turkey has gained momentum. Turkish Family Minister Fatma Betul Sayan Kaya was prevented by the Police from entering the Turkish Consulate in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, after the former Dutch Government had forbidden the landing of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu's plane in that country. Turkish Minister of Family arrived at the Rotterdam office by car, but when he came down he was stopped by the police. The Dutch authorities have sent Betul Sayan Kaya back to Germany, the mayor of Rotterdam informed the media. The Dutch police escorted the Turkish Minister to the border with Germany. The Turkish Minister for Family intended to take part in a rally of the Turks in the Netherlands to promote constitutional changes undergoing the referendum of April 16, changes that enhance the power of Recep Erdogan. (Gumrukcu & Escritt, 2017)1 The scandal has given Rutte the opportunity to refuse to lean on foreign pressure, a position that has given him broad support to the nation. Andre Krouwel, a political scientist at the Free University of Amsterdam, said the clash with Ankara allowed the prime minister to tell the electorate: “We are the ones who really protect your interests, we are the ones who enter the trenches to defend the Netherlands. (Corder, 2017)2 Mabel Berezin, professor of sociology at Cornell University in the United States, said Wilders's defeat, which has been in parliament for nearly two decades, should not be considered a sign that European populism is shrinking. (Valli, 2017)3 “He is not a populist wave but is part of the political landscape, and his party's results do not tell us much about European populism,” she said. The Role and Importance of Elections in France Voters in France have rejected the two major political parties that governed for decades and who were at a crossroads before the presidential election.

1

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-europe-netherlands-idUSKBN16I07O. https://apnews.com/0398d384c7fc4604a81ef41360bf1ac1/turkey-dispute-timing-could-be-plusdutch-pm-mark-rutte. 3 http://mediarelations.cornell.edu/2017/03/15/dutch-election-not-bellwether-for-populist-rise-ineurope/. 2

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research The vote in France was a novelty, being a choice between a pro-European liberal who had never been elected in advance and an extreme right politician who promised to rediscuss France's relationship with the EU.1 What's new about these choices? The Socialists and those at the center have ruled France since the 1950s, but the old model has been destroyed. A socialist, unpopular and split party, and a Republican candidate that was targeted by the judicial investigation paved the way for a president who had never been elected to the National Assembly of France. No matter who would have won, centrist Emmanuel Macron or the populist Marine Le Pen, France would have had a president with a change-based agenda. What were the stakes in the French election? The voters' decision was not about the nomination of the future president, but one about the future direction of France and its place within the European Union. Emmanuel Macron's option means that they will support a candidate seeking EU reform, as well as a deeper European integration, in the form of a euro area budget and eurozone finance ministers. Instead, the Marine Le Pen option is exactly the opposite. She wants a Europe of nations to replace the EU. The political context in which the French the elections took place and the electoral system The French system is one with two rounds, also used in parliamentary, local and regional elections, which was introduced in 1962 by Charles de Gaulle and proved to be effective in keeping extremists out of power: first vote with heart, the French say, then with the mind. (Murphy & Chassany, 2017)2 The presidential election in France was a novelty because none of the center-right and center-left traditional parties were represented in the final round of presidential elections. The political situation in France showed a National Front led by Marine Le Pen steadily advancing. The 28% score of 2015 in the regional elections was an French Presidential Election 2017, Results – 1st Round, http://graphics.france24.com/results-first-round-french-presidential-election-2017/. 2 https://www.ft.com/video/74656cb6-fbe3-369d-9072-df0529ed7d48?mhq5j=e2. 1

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France24.com,

Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 impetus for Le Pen's party. The tense situation in the socialist party of President Francois Hollande, as well as the revelations made on the Republican candidate, Francois Fillon, have created the path of a rise of the National Front. Both Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen hoped to capitalize on the nationalist and populist feeling that has been created in France over the last few years, especially in the context of the vote for Brexit and Donald Trump. Macron was not a political insider, he did not take part in any other elections. This has helped him successfully channel some of the anti-government sentiment that has been found in Western Europe. Supporting Macron, the French voters rejected the representatives of the traditional political class, starting with Marine Le Pen and continuing with much more experienced centrist opponents who suffered from politics and a practiced speech. It should also be kept in mind that Macron broke up at the right time from his political mentor, Socialist President Francois Hollande, who had reached a very low level of trust, and created his own political mission instead of seeking to inherit Socialist cloak (Barbière, 2016)1. After his election, Macron faces great challenges in terms of immigration and assimilation of these people, and the likelihood of facing more terrorist attacks. Approach to the future of the European Union The European unit was a central theme of Emmanuel Macron's campaign, while Le Pen promised a referendum to leave the European Union. But the path to follow can be unclear. Macron and Merkel have to seek a common basis for the future of the Union. Le Pen is likely to continue to sway the anti-European feeling and will probably continue to use issues such as immigration and terrorist attacks to keep her nationalist message home.

Conclusions The events that took place in the European Union during 2016, the most important for European construction being Brexit, have generated discussions on the future of the Union. This is not the first time such a discussion is taking place, but this time the European Union is facing a new situation, because we don’t talk anymore about 1

https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/emmanuel-macron-officially-enters-the-frenchpresidential-race/.

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Journal of Danubian Studies and Research enlargement, but about a European Union after the loss of a Member State. Brexit and political developments at European level, including the rise of populism and Euroscepticism, have prompted European officials to discuss the need for institutional reform and, on another level, to reform the entire European structure. For all EU Member States in the EU 27, the European Union remains an indispensable project, which has been set by the officials of these states in the meetings that took place after Brexit. However, Member States are calling for special attention to be given to the consolidation of the European Union, while maintaining the essential objectives of strengthening relations with external partners, immediate neighborhoods and global ones. The events of the last two years (immigration crisis, Brexit, scenarios on the future of the European Union), together with Donald Trump's election as President of the United States of America, are the main signs that we are entering a new era characterized by instability, uncertainty, frustration, deepening of the system vs. anti-system, the intensification of the disputed movements, increased violence, very rapid changes in the political and economic context, disintegration tendencies at European and national level, as well as a recurrence of the nationalist currents and identity flaws. The crises that affected the European Union in terms of migration and its threats, as well as terrorist attacks, created a sense of instability and insecurity, which is reinforced by geopolitical uncertainties, especially by Brexit. On 1st of March 2017, the European Commission presented a White Paper on the future of Europe, which presents challenges and opportunities for Europe in the next decade. This Paper also proposes five scenarios, one of which refers to Europe with more speeds. Analyzing citizens' confidence in national and European institutions is a way to explain some of the decisions taken by the EU Member States in the context of discussing the future of the European bloc. What can be seen from the Eurobarometer data released in April 2017 is that almost half of respondents tend to trust the European Union (47%), 11 percentage points more than in autumn 2016. Also, four out of ten respondents (40%) tend to trust their national government, and this time it recorded an increase of nine points compared to autumn 2016.

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 It can be noticed that confidence in the EU has gradually increased since autumn 2015. However, the autumn trend of 2016 is somewhat spectacular: an increase of 11 percentage points in the proportion of those who trust the European Union and a fall of eight points in the share of respondents who do not trust. Looking at the figures for confidence in their own governments and the European Union in the autumn of 2016 Eurobarometer, it was clear that in the Member States, officials in leading positions had to guide their decisions according to citizens' attitudes. At the same time, mistrust had to be transformed into trust by decisions taken to satisfy citizens. The political context in which the Member States are located must not be overlooked. In the last year, elections took place in Austria, the Netherlands, France and will take place in Germany. Therefore, the influence of the electoral factor can not be neglected as part of building decisions on the position adopted by a state within the European Union. Which are the preferences behind decisions on the European Union - those of voters or those of political parties? Political parties respond acoording to the attitude of the public regarding the European integration and this makes the decision in some areas have a number of constraints on the part of the citizens. Political parties have a broad audience. Stefano Bartolini argued and showed empirically that the structure of party competition is both strong and strong in shaping party positioning. In the first decades of European integration, Euroscepticism had its roots in opposition to market integration. Since the Treaty of the Masstricht, he has taken an extra dimension: the defense of the national community. Changing the character of European integration can also affect the different national context. Analysis of party/voter engagement and party positioning are interdependent. Simon Hix argues that euroscepticism is best designed as a rational answer by citizens (and parties) for whom centralized EU power is a threat to their interests not as a profound dissident in the political system. (Liesbet, 2007, pp. 5-12) The level of mistrust in the European Union and in national governments shows that in the Member States of the European Union the immigration crisis, together with its consequences, including the Brexit, has created among citizens a high 75

Journal of Danubian Studies and Research degree of mistrust and insecurity regarding the functioning of European bodies and their ability to make the right decisions on the future of the European Union. We can therefore assume that the low level of trust along with the political and electoral context in some states, including the Netherlands, France, Germany, has led national governments to make decisions that satisfy the national interest, ignoring the general interest of the European Union. The Eurobarometer data released in April 2017 are presented to the public in a political context in which waters have been separated on the future of European construction. Thus, we see spectacular increases in confidence in the European Union and in national governments in states that have firmly positioned themselves in line with public opinion sentiment. The Netherlands, the country with the highest growth of confidence in the European Union, is the state that held elections earlier this year, where a state-of-the-art ruling of the ruling party, VVD, against the Turkish leader, Recep Erdogan, to reconfirm the party first on the Dutch political scene. Moreover, the Netherlands is also one of the Benelux states that has declared itself in favor of a Europe with more speeds, this positioning taking place even before the Eurobarometer was published. Also, the next places as the level of confidence building in the European Union in 2017 as compared to 2016 are Germany and France, the two countries that have intensively promoted the idea of a Europe with more speeds and the creation of a nucleus around them. The Rome Declaration, signed by the leaders of the 27 EU Member States on March25th, marked the 60th anniversary of ratification of the Treaty of Rome, with the promise of continued unity after the UK leaves the European Union. But what the Rome Declaration is in fact, is what politicians have nominated since the beginning of 2017 as a “multi speed” Europe. With the exception of Great Britain, which did not attend the Rome meeting, all EU Member States signed the Declaration, saying they would “act together with different steps and intensities, if necessary, as they move in the same direction”. Even the statements after the Rome Summit have given the prospect that the European Union will follow. Luxembourg Prime Minister Xavier Bettel said “we will have a Europe with two speeds rather than one without results and no speed”.

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Vol. 7, No. 2/2017 The question that logically addresses at this point is: should it survive, the European Union needs to become more flexible? And if so, should the idea of unity for multi-level cooperation be abandoned? Threats to Europe are both external and internal. Internally, the weaknesses that have become apparent in the euro crisis have not yet been established. Prolonged economic problems have contributed to a decrease in support for the European Union. Populism, anti-European parties are attacking the very existence of the Union. The most dramatic outcome of the anti-EU reaction so far is Brexit. Loss of such an important member is a huge blow to the influence and credibility of the Union. External pressures are just as serious. The refugee crisis has diminished, but mainly due to a delicate deal with Turkey. A recently aggressive Russia under Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, an American president who is not an enthusiast of the European and North Atlantic project, makes it a terrible time for Europe to be weak and divided. Because a project created to support Europe's post-war security should fade away even when this security is threatened is a bitter irony. It is also a reminder of how much it is at stake if Europe fails to fix itself.

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