Preliminary Hazard Analysis and Transport Hazard Analysis - Orica

APPENDIX 9

Preliminary Hazard Analysis and Transport Hazard Analysis

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PROPOSED ANE FACILITY

KURRI KURRI TECHNOLOGY CENTRE

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

ORICA AUSTRALIA

PREPARED FOR: Richard Sheehan Orica Australia

DOCUMENT NO: J20210-004 REVISION: 1 DATE: 13 October 2009

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J20210-004 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (ABN 40 110 961 898) Phone: 61 2 9412 4555 Fax: 61 2 9412 4556 Web: www.sherpaconsulting.com

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV

DATE

DESCRIPTION

PREPARED CHECKED

APPROVED

METHOD OF ISSUE

A

3 August 2009

Draft for client comment J Polich

P Johnson J Polich

PDF

B

20 August 2009

Revised Draft for client comment

J Polich

P Johnson J Polich

PDF

0

16 September 2009 Final Issue for inclusion J Polich in EA

P Johnson J Polich

PDF

1

13 October 2009

P Johnson J Polich

PDF

Final for inclusion in EA. J Polich Reissued with minor text updates.

RELIANCE NOTICE This report is issued pursuant to an Agreement between SHERPA CONSULTING PTY LTD (‘Sherpa Consulting’) and Orica Australia which agreement sets forth the entire rights, obligations and liabilities of those parties with respect to the content and use of the report. Reliance by any other party on the contents of the report shall be at its own risk. Sherpa Consulting makes no warranty or representation, expressed or implied, to any other party with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this report and assumes no liabilities with respect to any other party‟s use of or damages resulting from such use of any information, conclusions or recommendations disclosed in this report.

Title: Proposed ANE Facility Kurri Kurri Technology Centre Preliminary Hazard Analysis

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QA Verified: D Pastuszak

Date: 13 October 2009

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CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 6 1

SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................ 7

2

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 12 2.1 Background.............................................................................................................................. 12 2.2 Objective .................................................................................................................................. 12 2.3 Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 12 2.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 13 2.5 Risk Criteria ............................................................................................................................. 14 2.6 Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 16 2.7 Links to Other Studies ............................................................................................................. 16

3

SITE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................... 17 3.1 Site Overview........................................................................................................................... 17 3.2 ANE Project Overview ............................................................................................................. 17 3.3 Location and Surrounding Land Use ....................................................................................... 17 3.4 Site Security............................................................................................................................. 18 3.5 Site Layout ............................................................................................................................... 18 3.6 Australian Standard Separation Distances .............................................................................. 18 3.7 ANE Plant Process Overview .................................................................................................. 24 3.8 ANE Manufacture, Storage and Loadout ................................................................................ 25 3.9 Technology Centre Existing Facilities...................................................................................... 26

4

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ............................................................................................................ 28 4.1 Hazardous Materials for Proposed ANE Plant ........................................................................ 28 4.2 Hazardous Materials at Existing Technical Centre Facilities .................................................. 30 4.3 External Events........................................................................................................................ 30 4.4 Bushfires .................................................................................................................................. 31 4.5 Potential Hazardous Incident Scenarios ................................................................................. 35 4.6 Scenarios for Quantitative Assessment .................................................................................. 35 4.7 Rule Sets for Incident Inclusion ............................................................................................... 35

5

QRA BASIS ..................................................................................................................................... 44

6

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 46 6.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 46

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6.2 Effect Levels of Interest ........................................................................................................... 46 6.3 Explosion Consequence Assessment Assumptions ............................................................... 48 6.4 Explosion Scenario Consequence Results ............................................................................. 51 6.5 Onsite Escalation ..................................................................................................................... 56 6.6 Toxic Effects Consequence Assessment ................................................................................ 65 7

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS AND RISK RESULTS............................................................................ 68 7.1 Individual Fatality Risk ............................................................................................................. 68

8

RISK ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................................... 70 8.1 Individual Fatality Risk ............................................................................................................. 70 8.2 Explosion Injury Risk ............................................................................................................... 70 8.3 Escalation Risk (Offsite Property) ............................................................................................ 71 8.4 Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk ...................................................................................................... 71 8.5 Risk to Biophysical Environment ............................................................................................. 73

9

CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................. 76

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

APPENDIX 2.

HIRAC INFORMATION

APPENDIX 3.

EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURES CONSEQUENCE MODELLING METHODOLOGY

APPENDIX 4.

QRA SCENARIOS

APPENDIX 5.

SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS

APPENDIX 6.

REFERENCES

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TABLES Table 1.1: Compliance with Individual Fatality Risk Criteria ...................................................................9 Table 2.1: NSW Individual Risk Criteria, New Plants ........................................................................... 14 Table 2.2: NSW Escalation Risk Criteria, New Plants ......................................................................... 15 Table 2.3: NSW Risk Criteria, Existing Plants ...................................................................................... 15 Table 3.1: Utility Chemicals .................................................................................................................. 26 Table 3.2: Existing Facilities Inventory Summary................................................................................. 27 Table 4.1: NO2 Toxicity ......................................................................................................................... 30 Table 4.2: External Events ................................................................................................................... 30 Table 4.3: Proposed ANE Production Facility Hazardous Material Properties .................................... 33 Table 4.4: Rule Set for Scenarios Considered in QRA ........................................................................ 36 Table 4.5: Hazardous Scenarios Considered in PHA, Proposed ANE production facility ................... 37 Table 4.6: Hazardous Scenarios Considered in QRA, Existing Technical Center Facilities ................ 43 Table 5.1: QRA Basis, Proposed ANE PLant ....................................................................................... 44 Table 5.2: QRA Basis, Existing Kurri Facilities ..................................................................................... 45 Table 6.1: Fatality / Overpressure Correlation ..................................................................................... 46 Table 6.2: Impact Levels For Toxic Effects .......................................................................................... 48 Table 6.3: ANS and AN Explosion Efficency ........................................................................................ 49 Table 6.4: TNT Equivalence ................................................................................................................. 50 Table 6.5: Separation Distances Between Inventories ........................................................................ 51 Table 6.6: Consequence Analysis Results – Overpressures Proposed ANE PLant ............................ 61 Table 6.7: Consequence Analysis Results – AS2187.1 Separation Distances Proposed ANE Plant . 62 Table 6.8: Consequence Analysis Results – Overpressures for Existing TEchncial Centre Inventories63 Table 6.9: Consequence Analysis Results – AS2187.1 Separation Distances Existing Kurri Facilities64 Table 6.10: Consequence Analysis Results – NO2 Dispersion ............................................................. 67 Table 7.1: Orica Frequency Scale ........................................................................................................ 69 Table 8.1: Compliance with Individual Fatality Risk Criteria ................................................................ 70 Table 8.2: Compliance with Injury Risk Criteria .................................................................................... 71 Table 8.3: Compliance with Escalation Risk Criteria ............................................................................ 71 Table 8.4: Compliance with Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk Criteria .......................................................... 72

FIGURES Figure 3.1: Figure 3.2: Figure 3.3: Figure 6.1: Figure 6.2: Figure 6.3: Figure 6.4: Figure 6.5: Figure 6.6: Figure 6.7:

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Site Location .................................................................................................................. 21 Kurri KURRI TEcHNCIAL Centre Site Layout ............................................................... 22 Proposed ANE Plant Layout .......................................................................................... 23 Proposed ANE Plant Worst Case Explosion – Aggregate Inventory ............................ 53 Proposed ANE Production Facility - ANE (maximum storage) Explosion ..................... 54 Proposed ANE Plant – ANS Storage Tank (largest inventory) Explosion ..................... 55 Research Magazine and Quarry Services Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ........................ 57 Research Laboratory Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ........................................................ 58 Mixing Laboratory Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ............................................................. 59 Test Cell Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ............................................................................ 60

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ABBREVIATIONS AEGL

Acute Emergency Guideline Level

AEMSC

Australian Explosive Manufacturers Safety Committee

AN

Ammonium Nitrate

ANE

Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion

ANS

Ammonium Nitrate Solution

APZ

Asset Protection Zone

AS

Australian Standard

BOS

(Orica) Basis of Safety

CoP

Code of Practice

DG

Dangerous Goods

DGRs

(NSW DoP) Director General‟s Requirements

DoP

(NSW) Department of Planning

EA

Environmental Assessment

ERPG

Emergency Response Planning Guideline

FRMP

Fire Risk Management Plan

HAZOP

Hazard and Operability study

HIPAP

Hazard Industry Planning Advisory Paper

HIRAC

Hazard Identification Risk Assessment and Control

KI

Kooragang Island

MAE

Major Accident Event

ML

Mixing Laboratory

MMU

Mobile Manufacturing Unit

MSDS

Material Safety Datasheet

NEQ

Net Explosive Quantity

NO

Nitric Oxide

NO2

Nitrogen dioxide

NOx

Oxides of nitrogen (includes NO, NO2 and others)

OXS

Oxidiser Solution

PHA

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PW

Protected Works

QRA

Quantitative Risk Assessment

QS

Quarry Services depot

RFS

NSW Rural Fire Service

RL

Research Laboratory

RM

Research Magazine

SHE

Safety Heath and Environment

TNT

Trinitrotoluene

UK HSE

United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive

UN

United Nations

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1

SUMMARY Background Orica Australia proposes to build a new Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) Production Facility at their existing Technology Centre site at Richmond Vale, NSW to meet the projected regional ANE demand to 2020 and beyond. The Technology Centre site currently undertakes research and commercial production of various Class 1 explosives and Class 5 ammonium nitrate emulsions (ANE‟s). The site is several kilometres from populated areas and the current explosives facilities are well separated from each other and site boundaries, as the site complies with the quantity distance rules in AS2187.1-1998 Explosives – Storage, Transport and Use Part 1: Storage. The proposed ANE Production Facilities comprise the ANE Production Facility or Plant, and associated infrastructure such as offices and access roads. The proposed ANE Production Facility will manufacture Class 5.1 ANE‟s classified as UN number 3375. Materials meeting this classification are precursor materials which behave as Dangerous Goods of Class 5 – Oxidisers, rather than as Class 1 – Explosives. These materials undergo final processing at the point of use (e.g. at a mine site) and only become explosives at that stage. The NSW Department of Planning (DoP) Director General‟s Requirements (DGRs) for the project require that a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) be prepared in accordance with the DoP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Papers No 6 Hazard Analysis Guidelines (HIPAP 6), and No 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning (HIPAP 4). Orica retained Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Sherpa) to prepare the PHA and associated report for inclusion in the project Environmental Assessment (EA). Purpose and Scope The overall objective of the PHA was to develop a comprehensive understanding of the hazards and risks associated with the facility and the adequacy of the safeguards. The PHA covered the proposed ANE Production Facilities and also potential interactions with the existing facilities on the Technology Centre site. Major Findings Hazardous Incidents The potentially significant hazardous incidents identified were: 

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ANE Production Facility - explosions involving raw materials, i.e. ammonium nitrate solutions (ANS) or ammonium nitrate, or emulsion products (ANE) due to contamination or external heating.

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

ANE Production Facility – ANS decomposition and toxic decomposition product (NOx) formation.



Existing Technology Centre facilities – explosion in existing Class 1 high explosives, ANE or AN facilities. Note there are no significant toxicity impacts associated with explosion of high explosives.

External factors were considered in the hazard identification. Bushfire was the only identified external event of potential concern. Methodology The assessment followed the methodology given in HIPAP 6 and also the DoP guideline Multi-Level Risk Assessment. For this study, sufficient quantitative analysis was undertaken to identify the events with the potential to have an offsite impact on people or property, including potential escalation effects from or to the existing site facilities. The ANE Production Facility assessment was prepared using maximum storage inventories for individual scenarios, including an assessment of an aggregated Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) to cover an escalation scenario involving all susceptible inventories in the ANE Production Facility. This is a conservative approach to the assessment, but is considered to be appropriate for a QRA conducted at the project planning stage. Assessment of the existing facilities was also conservatively based on the maximum aggregate NEQ for each area. 

Analysis of the consequences of these incidents on people or property was undertaken using a TNT equivalent model for explosion effects, and standard air dispersion packages for toxic impacts (TNO Riskcurves, BP Cirrus and US EPA ALOHA).



Evaluation of likelihood of the hazardous incidents occurring was based on the order of magnitude frequency assessments from the qualitative frequency rankings applied in Orica‟s hazard study workshops. Likelihood was assessed only for those incidents where the consequence analysis showed offsite impacts were possible.



Risk levels were compared with risk criteria given in HIPAP 4.

This is a level 2 risk assessment as defined in the Multi-Level Risk Assessment guidelines. A level 2 approach was selected as the consequence assessment indicated only a small number of scenarios with the potential to have offsite impacts. Risk Results: This study has found that there are no neighbouring hazardous inventories, infrastructure or populations that may be affected by an explosion event. Due to the large separation distances between the various hazardous inventories and the site boundaries, very few events were identified with potential to cause injury or fatality Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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outside the site boundary. For those few events, the population potentially affected is very low as the area within a one kilometre distance from the site boundary is largely unpopulated. In summary: 

No explosion events were identified associated with the ANE Production Facilities or existing Technology Centre facilities with the potential to affect offsite residential or industrial populations, or occupied buildings.



No explosion events were identified with the ANE Production facilities or existing Technology Centre facilities with potential to damage offsite property or infrastructure.



No explosion events were identified which would result in escalation incidents between the proposed ANE Production Facilities and existing facilities at the Technology Centre.



Dispersion modelling of toxic decomposition products (modelled as NO2) from a worst case decomposition occurring in the largest ANE Production Facility inventory demonstrated that there would be no offsite fatality effects. Injurious concentrations would not be exceeded in any residential areas. Irritation effects were possible in populated areas at a very low frequency (below the irritation risk criterion).

Hence the quantitative risk criteria are complied with as summarised in Table 1.1. TABLE 1.1: COMPLIANCE WITH INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK CRITERIA Land Uses

Max Risk (per year)

Comments

Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria? Proposed ANE Prod Facility

Existing Cumulative Tech Centre Facilities

No fatality impacts in this land use

Y

Y

Y

Individual Fatality Risk -6

Sensitive uses

0.5 x 10

Residential areas

1 x 10

-6

No fatality impacts in this land use

Y

Y

Y

Commercial developments, retail 5 x 10 centres, offices, entertainment centres

-6

No fatality impacts in this land use

Y

Y

Y

Sporting complexes and active open space

10 x 10

-6

No fatality impacts in this land use

Y

Y

Y

Remain within boundary of an industrial site

50 x 10

-6

Event frequency does Y not exceed risk criterion.

Y

Y

Fire / Explosion Injury risk 50 x 10 incident explosion overpressure at residential areas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year

-6

No injury impacts in this Y land use

Y

Y

Injury Risk (Explosion) Risk

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Land Uses

Max Risk (per year)

Comments

Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria?

-6

No damage impacts in this land use

Y

Y

Y

Toxic Injury - Toxic 10 x 10 concentrations in residential areas should not exceed a level which would be seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community following a relatively short period of exposure at a maximum frequency of 10 in a million per year

-6

Injurious concentrations Y not experienced in residential areas

Y

Y

Toxic Irritation - Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not cause irritation to eyes, or throat, coughing or other acute physiological responses in sensitive members of the community over a maximum frequency of 50 in a million per year

-6

Event frequency does Y not exceed risk criterion.

Y

Y

Escalation (Explosion) Risk Overpressure at neighbouring 50 x 10 potentially hazardous installations or the nearest public building should not exceed a risk of 50 per million per year for the 14 kPa overpressure contour. Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk

50 x 10

Safeguards: The ANE project has advanced to the detail design stage. Risk assessment activities have occurred throughout the design process; including completion of a HAZOP (which was used to prepare the PHA). In addition, quantitative consequence explosion overpressure results have been utilised early in the design process to identify required separation distances between inventories and site boundaries, determining the production facility location and layout. Key safeguards include:

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

Minimisation of inventories to minimise offsite consequences of potential explosion events.



Separation distances from site boundaries and existing facilities.



Separation distances between any combustible material storages and Class 5.1 inventories.



Engineering controls such as automated control of ANE manufacture batch process and high reliability low flow trips for emulsion pumps.



Asset protection zones to protect against bushfire impingement. J20210-004 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA Page 10

Recommendations As risk reduction has been integrated into the design process, no recommendations in relation to additional engineering or layout safeguards are made as part of the PHA. It is recommended that the existing site Fire Risk Management Plan be updated to cover the proposed ANE Production Facilities. This should specifically address extension of the existing site bushfire hazard reduction practices to cover the ANE Production Facility area.

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2 2.1

INTRODUCTION Background Orica Australia Pty Ltd (Orica) currently operates an Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) Production Facility at their Liddell site. Liddell is the ANE manufacturing centre for the South East Region, including the Hunter Valley, NSW and southern Australia. To meet the projected regional demand for ANE to 2020 and beyond, the ANE manufacturing capacity requires expansion. Orica proposes to meet this additional demand by closing and decommissioning the current ANE manufacturing facility at Liddell, and constructing a new ANE manufacturing facility at their existing Technology Centre site at Richmond Vale. The NSW Department of Planning (DoP) Director General‟s Requirements (DGRs) issued for the proposed ANE Production Facility as part of the Environmental Assessment (EA) require that a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) be prepared in accordance with the DoP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Papers No 6 Hazard Analysis Guidelines (HIPAP 6) (Ref 1), and No 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning (HIPAP 4) (Ref 2). Orica retained Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Sherpa) to assist in completing the risk assessment activities associated with the ANE Project, including preparation of the PHA.

2.2

Objective The objectives of the PHA were to:  Develop a comprehensive understanding of the hazards, risks, and the adequacy of the safeguards associated with the proposed ANE facility.  Establish the offsite risk levels from the proposed ANE facility, and also determine the cumulative offsite risk from all operations on the site, and compare these with the risk criteria given in HIPAP 4.  Prepare a report in accordance with HIPAP 6 for inclusion in the project Environmental Assessment (EA) that satisfies the requirements of the NSW DoP.

2.3

Scope The study covers:  the proposed ANE Plant and associated facilities (ANE Production Facilities)  the existing Technology Centre facilities at site, which will be unchanged by the project.

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2.4

Methodology The assessment generally follows the methodology given in the NSW Department of Planning (DoP) guideline Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 6 Guidelines for Hazard Analysis (HIPAP 6) (Ref 1), and is also consistent with the DoP guideline Multi-Level Risk Assessment (Ref 3). The main steps are:

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

Identification of hazards and description of potential incident scenarios. Hazard identification and development of hazardous incident scenarios was conducted using the Orica HIRAC (Hazard Identification Risk Assessment and Control) process in a workshop attended by relevant site and engineering design personnel. This included review of incidents known to have occurred at Orica‟s sites and other similar facilities in the industry. Based on the HIRAC process, scenarios with potential off-site impact were identified for further analysis. Refer to Section 4 of this report for further details.



Analysis of the consequences of these incidents on people, property and the biophysical environment. Consequences for explosion scenarios were assessed using the TNT equivalence method. Toxic emission consequences were assessed using information from the UK HSE to estimate quantities of toxic gases formed in a fire leading to decomposition of AN solutions, and a Gaussian dispersion model in the BP Cirrus software to estimate toxic gas effect distances (Refer to Section 6.3 of this report).



Evaluation of likelihood of the hazardous incidents occurring and the adequacy of the safeguards provided. Likelihood was assessed using order of magnitude estimates from the literature, supplemented by some information from the Orica Ammonium Nitrate Draft Code of Practice (v8) available in Orica‟s SHE Risk Register (Ref 4). Likelihood was assessed only for those incidents where the consequence analysis showed offsite impacts were possible. (Refer to Section 7 of this report).



The resulting risk levels were obtained by combining the frequency and consequence for each event of interest, which are then summed for all potential recognised incidents. A separate summation is carried out for each consequence of interest, e.g. injury, individual fatality etc.



Comparison of risk levels with appropriate risk criteria as detailed in HIPAP 4.



Safeguard Assessment: Using the information from the previous steps, potential risk reduction measures were identified for further assessment as part of the project process. (It is noted that these recommendations generally related to inventory reduction and have already been included in the design covered by this PHA hence are not repeated as recommendations – refer to Section 2.7). J20210-004 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA Page 13

As suggested in the Multi-Level Risk Assessment guidelines, the frequency, consequence and risk analysis can be carried out either qualitatively or quantitatively, or using a combination of techniques. For this study, sufficient quantitative analysis is undertaken to identify the events with the potential to have an offsite impact on people or property and also whether the project will comply with the risk criteria published in HIPAP 4. This approach is known as a Level 2 risk assessment. A level 2 assessment appropriate as the initial consequence modelling results were used to site the ANE Production Facilities (i.e. contain effects within the site boundary), hence minimise the number of incidents that could have offsite effects. The major assumptions made to prepare the risk assessment are discussed in the subsequent sections of this report and also summarised in APPENDIX 5. 2.5

Risk Criteria Individual risk represents the probability of a specified level of harm (usually fatality or injury) occurring to a theoretical individual located permanently at a particular location, assuming no mitigating action such as escape can be taken, hence it is considered to cover vulnerable individuals such as the very young, sick or elderly. NSW DoP quantitative individual risk criteria for new plants are given in HIPAP 4 and are summarised in Table 2.1. These criteria are expressed in terms of individual fatality risk or likelihood of exposure to threshold values of heat radiation, explosion overpressure or toxicity. Escalation criteria (i.e. likelihood of property damage to neighbouring facilities due to exceeding specified overpressure or heat radiation levels) are also provided in HIPAP 4 and shown in Table 2.2.

TABLE 2.1: NSW INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA, NEW PLANTS Risks for Different Land Uses (New Plants)

Maximum Risk (per year)

Individual Fatality Risk Sensitive uses (hospitals, schools, childcare , old age)

0.5 x 10

Residential areas

1 x 10

Commercial developments, retail centres, offices, entertainment centres

5 x 10

Sporting complexes and active open space

10 x 10

Remain within boundary of an industrial site

50 x 10

-6

-6 -6 -6 -6

Injury / Irritation - Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion Injury risk – incident heat flux radiation at residential 2 areas should not exceed 4.7 kW/m at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year or incident explosion overpressure at residential areas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year

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-6

50 x 10

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Risks for Different Land Uses (New Plants)

Maximum Risk (per year)

Injury / Irritation - Toxic Impacts -6

Toxic Injury - Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not exceed a level which would be seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community following a relatively short period of exposure at a maximum frequency of 10 in a million per year

10 x 10

Toxic Irritation - Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not cause irritation to eyes, or throat, coughing or other acute physiological responses in sensitive members of the community over a maximum frequency of 50 in a million per year

50 x 10

-6

TABLE 2.2: NSW ESCALATION RISK CRITERIA, NEW PLANTS Description

Risk Criteria (per year)

Escalation -6

Incident heat flux radiation at neighbouring potentially hazardous installations or land zoned to accommodate such use should not exceed 2 a risk of 50 per million per year for the 23 kW/m heat flux contour.

50 x 10

Overpressure at neighbouring potentially hazardous installations or the nearest public building should not exceed a risk of 50 per million per year for the 14 kPa overpressure contour.

50 x 10

-6

Additionally HIPAP 4 states that the criteria apply to new industry and surrounding land use proposals, and in theory should apply to existing situations, however it recognises that this may not be possible in practice. Individual fatality risk criteria for existing plants are also available in HIPAP 4 and are given in Table 2.3. TABLE 2.3: NSW RISK CRITERIA, EXISTING PLANTS Description

Risk from Existing Facility note 1 (per year)

Ongoing risk reduction and safety reviews of existing facility, no additional hazardous industry

≥ 10 x 10

No intensification of residential development

≥ 1 x 10

-6

-6

Notes: 1. Risk level within residential area

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2.6

Limitations The study focuses on the offsite effects of potential accident scenarios. HIPAPs 4 and 6 do not require quantification of, or provide criteria for, onsite risks to personnel / employees, hence employee risk is not covered in this PHA. The PHA does not assess any potential impacts from long-term or continuous emissions, or occupational, health and safety issues that may arise from routine plant operations. These are addressed via other mechanisms such as the Environmental Assessment process and occupational health and safety management systems.

2.7

Links to Other Studies The ANE project has advanced to the detail design stage. Risk assessment activities have occurred throughout the design process; including completion of a HAZOP in accordance with Orica‟s internal project requirements. Related studies used to prepare the PHA are listed below  A Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Control (HIRAC) study for the ANE Project, was undertaken. The HIRAC is a study undertaken in a workshop attended by relevant operations and design personnel. It included discussion of incidents known to have occurred at Orica sites and other similar facilities in the industry. Hazardous incidents and safeguards are identified and discussed, and a qualitative risk ranking applied using the Orica corporate risk matrix. The consolidated HIRAC is contained in the Orica SH&E Risk Register. The HIRAC was used to develop the incident scenarios included in the PHA.  A Preliminary QRA to cover the proposed ANE Production Facilities located at the Orica Technical Centre site. The results were used to assist in the selection of inventory limits, location and layout of the ANE Production Facilities. (Ref:5). The QRA results have been updated to reflect the current design and included in the PHA.  A HAZOP study. The HAZOP is contained in the Orica SH&E Risk Register. The HAZOP was reviewed as part of the PHA. At the planning approval stage for the Technology Centre site, a hazard analysis for the existing facilities was submitted to the NSW Department of Planning (1992, Ref 6). The 1992 hazard study is no longer directly applicable as a number of the facilities originally proposed for the site have not been installed. The 1992 report is superseded by the information contained in this PHA report.

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3

SITE DESCRIPTION

3.1

Site Overview The existing Technical Centre site is home to Orica‟s Mining Services Technical Centre and undertakes research and development activities with some commercial manufacturing. The existing facilities include: 

Mixing Laboratory (ML)



Research Laboratory (including pilot scale manufacturing plant) (RL)



Research Magazine (RM)



Quarry Services Depot (QS)



Test Cell

There is also an existing office complex housing around 150 people. The existing facilities will not be altered by the proposed ANE Production Facilities. The number of people located permanently at the site would not increase significantly. 3.2

ANE Project Overview The project will provide an ANE manufacturing facility together with associated infrastructure at the Orica Technical Centre site. The new ANE manufacturing facility will initially produce about 135,000 tonnes per annum (tpa) of ANE at the commencement of operations in 2011. ANE production is forecast to increase to a maximum production rate of 250,000tpa over 10 to 15 years depending on customer demand. The new ANE Production Facilities will be built using Orica Mining Services‟ global standard technology.

3.3

Location and Surrounding Land Use The Orica Technology Centre site is located at George Booth Drive, Richmond Vale NSW. The Technology Centre is located on Lot 2, DP 809377 and is approximately 292 hectares in area. The land is wholly owned by Orica. The surrounding area encompasses a variety of land use activities including agriculture, bushland, rural residential area, rural industrial activities and transport corridors. There are aboveground power lines in an electrical easement running northwest to south east across the front of the Orica site. An underground gas pipeline is proposed to run within the electricity easement. The land to the south, west and east of the site is predominantly bushland (Crown land). An electrical easement runs east-west through this land around 500m south of the Orica site. There are fire trails throughout the area surrounding the Orica site and it is possible that occasional recreational activities such as bushwalking or 4WD activities occur in this area.

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The nearest industrial population or industrial infrastructure is Tasman Underground Mine which is located approximately 2.5 kilometres to the south-east of the Technology Centre on George Booth Drive. The Sydney-Newcastle Freeway is around 4.5km to the south east. The nearest residential area (rural residential rather than suburban) is to the north. The nearest residence is a single house located 250 m north west of the northern site boundary, i.e. around 1.8 km from the proposed ANE Plant location. Various farms (chicken farm, flower farm) are also located in this area. The nearest residential areas are Seahampton, which is around 6 km to the southeast of the site, and Kurri Kurri, which is around 7 km to the northwest. The lots to the west of the Orica site have also been subdivided to large blocks (rural residential) though are not yet occupied. The site location is shown in Figure 3.1 with the approximate site boundary also shown. 3.4

Site Security As the site already handles security sensitive materials such as AN and Class 1 explosives, a site security plan is in place in accordance with the relevant regulations. This includes personnel security checks, security fencing, and access control, alarms and security monitoring. These arrangements are unchanged by the proposed ANE Plant. The ANE Plant will also be provided with its own security fence.

3.5

Site Layout The overall site layout is shown in Figure 3.2 (including the location of existing facilities and the proposed ANE Plant). The proposed ANE Plant will be located in the south part of the site, around 250m from the nearest site boundary. Figure 3.3 shows the proposed ANE Plant layout.

3.6

Australian Standard Separation Distances Explosives facilities are generally sited and designed in accordance with AS2187.11998 Explosives – Storage, Transport and Use Part 1: Storage, and ANEs in accordance with a Code of Practice (Ref 7) which has been developed by the Australian Explosives Manufacturers Safety Committee (AEMSC), Code of Good Practice Precursors For Explosives Edition 1 – 1999. Separation distance requirements are explained in the following sections. The quantity distance rules in AS2187.1 have been based on UK standards which were in turn based on the observed effects of damage occurring in accidental explosions that have occurred throughout the world up until the mid 20th century. It is generally accepted by the explosives industry and regulators that compliance with

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AS2187.1 and the AEMSC Code will ensure that there will be minimal offsite consequences or escalation effects from explosion events, i.e. the risk is negligible. 3.6.1 Class 1 Explosives AS2187.1 contains quantity distance rules which specify separation distances to various activities or occupied areas based on the net explosive quantity (NEQ) at the magazine or works. The separation distances are based on consequence (i.e. overpressure level or impulse) developed by explosions of NEQs. The distances are set to: 

Prevent works.



Reduce risk to acceptable level for people associated with the site.



Minimise risk at protected works (PW) and vulnerable facilities. (Vulnerable facilities are generally large populations who would be difficult to evacuate).

propagation

between

explosives

storages

and

associated

Protected works are defined as follows: (a) Class A: Public street, road or thoroughfare, railway, navigable waterway, dock, wharf, pier or jetty, market place, public recreation and sports ground or other open place where the public are accustomed to assemble, open place of work in another occupancy, river-wall, seawall, reservoir, above ground water main, radio or television transmitter or main electrical substation, a private road which is a principal means of access to a church, chapel, college, school, hospital or factory. (Known as PWA distance). (b) Class B: A dwelling house, public building church, chapel, college, school, hospital, theatre, cinema or other building or structure where the public are accustomed to assemble; a shop, factory, warehouse, store or building in which any person is employed in any trade or business; a depot for the keeping of flammable or dangerous goods; major dam. (Known as PWB distance)

Separation distances to „vulnerable facilities‟ (including but not restricted to schools, hospitals, major places of transport, significant public infrastructure) are also defined. Vulnerable facilities require the largest separation distances, with PWB the next largest distance and PWA the smallest distance. There are no vulnerable facilities within 5 kms of the Technical Centre site. The nearest PWB is a single dwelling located 1.8 km north west of the proposed ANE facility. The existing Technical Centre site layout complies with the separation distances required by AS2187.1. It is arranged so that the PWB distances are generally within the site boundary.

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3.6.2 Precursors Since they are not explosives UN3375 ANEs are outside the scope of AS2187. However a code of good practice (the AEMSC Precursor Code) covering explosives precursors has been accepted by the majority of Australian jurisdictions, including NSW. Under the AEMSC Code, storages of ANE either adopt the same quantity distances as explosives as per AS2187.1, or must be able to be evacuated in the event of an emergency which could potentially lead to an explosion. 3.6.3 Oxidisers Minimum separation distances for Class 5 materials such as ANS are given in AS4326 (2008) “The storage and handling of oxidising agents”. These are much smaller (of the order of several metres) than the AS2187.1 distances adopted by the AEMSC Code. The AS4326 distances generally are to provide separation between incompatible materials, as well as personnel and site boundaries. For Class 5 ANEs the AS4326 distances would be the minimum requirement if there were no populations or other explosives, AN or ANE inventories in the vicinity. Any installation meeting the AEMSC Code will also comply with AS4326 separation distances. 3.6.4 Proposed ANE Plant The proposed ANE Plant will be located such that all separation distances that would apply to an equivalent amount of explosives under AS2187.1 Table 3.2.3.2 will be met (i.e. the design adopts the guidance in the AEMSC Code). In this proposal there is no reliance on evacuation for any off site populations. The PHA compares the predicted consequences for identified events with the required distances as noted in subsequent sections of this report. This is to confirm that the AS2187.1 distances are adequate to minimise risk associated with the proposed ANE plant.

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FIGURE 3.1:

SITE LOCATION

Note: Figure reproduced from EA

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FIGURE 3.2:

KURRI KURRI TECHNCIAL CENTRE SITE LAYOUT

Note: Figure reproduced from EA

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FIGURE 3.3:

PROPOSED ANE PLANT LAYOUT

ANE (4 tanks)

ANS and oxidising solutions

Dry oxidiser store

Combustibles

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3.7

ANE Plant Process Overview The proposed ANE Plant will make explosives precursors. All of the precursors to be manufactured at the proposed ANE Plant will fall under the UN3375 classification for Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions (collectively referred to as ANEs), i.e. will behave as Dangerous Goods of Class 5 – Oxidisers, rather than Class 1 – Explosives. These materials undergo final processing at the point of use and only become explosives at that stage. ANE is made up of a fuel blend and an oxidiser solution (predominantly ammonium nitrate, AN). At the point of use (a mine site, not at the ANE Plant), the ANE is processed into an explosive by sensitising it, usually by the introduction of gas bubbles, microballoons or polystyrene. The gas bubbles may be generated by mixing ANE with various “gasser” and /or “companion” solutions. Companion and gasser solutions (which are weak solutions of Ammonium Nitrate or Sodium Nitrite and water) will also be made up in the new ANE plant area. These solutions are not Dangerous Goods and will be kept separated from ANE to avoid any potential contamination issues. The emulsion products and companion/gasser solutions will be loaded onto tankers in the ANE Plant. These tankers supply various Depot Plants situated close to customer sites. The Depot Plants supply Mobile Manufacturing Units (MMUs), which deliver products to customers. The ANE Plant is logically divided into the following sections: 

Raw materials, comprising: 

Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) and other oxidiser solution raw materials unloading and storage (as summarised in Section 3.7.1).



Fuel Blend Raw Material unloading and storage (as summarised in Section 3.7.1).



Oxidiser Solution (OXS) Batch Preparation (recipe based + development mode).



Emulsion Manufacture (recipe based + development mode)



Emulsion Storage and Loading



Companion Solution Manufacture



Gasser solution Manufacture



Services, including power, process water, instrument air and hot water system.

Information for each of these sections has been summarised from the process description (Ref 8).

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3.7.1 Raw Materials Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) is delivered to site by road tanker from Orica‟s Kooragang Island site and stored in bunded areas. ANS is stored in hot water jacketed tanks to ensure the AN remains in solution. A range of fuels / oils can be used at the new ANE Plant including diesel and canola to create different blends of emulsion. These are all C1 or C2 combustibles, no flammable materials will be used. They are delivered by tanker and stored in a dedicated bunded area well separated from the ANE Plant and oxidiser storage area (at least 30m away) to minimise the possibility of a fire in the fuels/oils storage areas affecting the ANE Plant. Smaller quantities of other materials (e.g. thiourea, other oxidisers, acetic acid and caustic soda) are also stored and used in the ANE process to adjust pH etc. A list of all raw materials to be used in the ANE Plant is given in APPENDIX 1. 3.7.2 Oxidiser Solution Preparation Oxidiser Solution (OXS) batches are prepared by adding the required liquid ingredients into batch tanks as defined by the product recipe. Solid material (urea) is added via forklift and screw feeder to one batch tank if required. Three batch tanks will be provided. The OXS tanks will be stainless steel, hot water heated, agitated and insulated. 3.7.3 Dry Oxidiser Store A small dry oxidiser store of 25 tonne total capacity will also be provided for ammonium nitrate (AN), calcium nitrate and/or urea. AN is a Dangerous Good Class 5.1 (total quantity 9.6 tonnes). Calcium nitrate and urea are not classed as Dangerous Goods. 3.8

ANE Manufacture, Storage and Loadout ANE will be made by blending OXS and fuel in a process mixer known as an Elk. Emulsion manufacture will be started, monitored, and shut down from the control room. The process is a recipe based batch process which will have fully automated sequence control. Routine observation and sampling for quality control will be carried out. Four overhead ANE product surge tanks will be provided, each pair of tanks providing nominally 40 tonne capacity to supply B-double tankers. As different vehicles vary in tank size, the maximum operating capacity of ANE will be limited to about 100 tonnes (out of a maximum design capacity of 120 tonnes). These tanks will generally be empty and will only be filled with a tanker load when an empty tanker is expected. Tankers (including B-doubles) and ISO containers will be filled either from the overhead ANE surge tanks or directly from the manufacturing process. ANE loadout will be observed and controlled by the tanker driver. The driver will stop the transfer of

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ANE from the overhead tank to the tanker when correct tanker weight is obtained. The tanker is provided with a high level switch to stop overfilling. The risks from an ANE spill are low as ANE will fudge almost as soon as it hits the ground, i.e. does not run freely like most liquid spills. Mobile Manufacturing Units (MMUs) will not be directly loaded in the ANE Plant. 3.8.1 Companion and Gasser Solutions The plant will also manufacture gasser solutions and companion solution and transfer these to ANE tankers for distribution. Gasser solutions are dilute mixtures of sodium nitrite and water and companion solution is a dilute AN solution. These solutions are handled in dilute form (high water content) and have only localised hazards. They are not specifically considered in the risk assessment. 3.8.2 Services Various utility and service chemicals will also be provided as shown in Table 3.1. Due to their non-hazardous properties and small quantities stored, these materials present relatively minor / localised risks and are not considered further in the risk assessment. TABLE 3.1: UTILITY CHEMICALS Material

Delivery

Storage

Comments

Various Class 8 water treatment chemicals.

Small containers by truck

~ 100L

In service storage area

Process water

Road tanker

120m

Potable water

Road tanker

30m

3

Fire water

Road tanker

to be finalised.

3

May be recycled

3.8.3 Offspec ANE Product Where possible, off spec product will be diverted to a lower specification product or mixed with on spec product. If the off spec material cannot be reused it will be sent to authorised contractors for disposal. 3.9

Technology Centre Existing Facilities The existing Technology Centre site undertakes various research and manufacturing activities in four main areas on the site. Table 3.2 summarises these, including the maximum inventories and types of explosive for each area to arrive at a Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) for each area. The information shown in Table 3.2 reflects the most recent update of the site Dangerous Good notification (August 2008). The quantity figures shown include all process and storage inventories. The combined Quarry Services / Research Magazine area has the largest NEQ (around 50 tonnes).

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TABLE 3.2: EXISTING FACILITIES INVENTORY SUMMARY Area

Activities

Research Magazine (RM) and Quarry Service Depot (QS)

Explosives / precursors used (Includes process inventory and storage)

Inventory

TNT Equiv. Factor

TNT Equiv. (kg)

(kg)

Storage - magazines

Mag 5 Mag 5A Mag 5B Mag 9 + dets TOTAL Magazines

4000 3300 2700 220

1 1 1 1

4000 3300 2700 220 10220

Storage - QS depot

EP1 AN1 TOTAL QS Depot

40000 40000

0.68 0.32

27200 12800 40000

TOTAL RM and QS Research Laboratory (RL)

Mixing Laboratory (ML)

Research activities (processing)

Research and commercial activities

50220

RL1 process

2000

0.91

1820

Depot 4 (ANE) Depot 2 (Nitrates - AN) RL1 TOTAL

5000 20000

0.68 0.32

3400 6400 11620

Mag 10

20

1

20

ML process ML Exist Building aggregated

40

1

40 60

0.32 0.68

160 340 560

1

50

Depot 1 - AN 500 Depot 1 - ANE 500 ML New Building total aggregated Test Cell

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Research activities (processing)

Test Cell

50

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4

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

4.1

Hazardous Materials for Proposed ANE Plant The hazardous materials associated with the proposed ANE Plant considered in this risk assessment are listed below. Table 4.3 summarises their main hazards from the Orica Material Safety Data Sheets and Basis of Safety (BOS) documents. 

Ammonium nitrate solution (ANS) / Oxidiser solution (OXS)



Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE)



Ammonium Nitrate (AN)



Combustibles



Sodium Nitrite

4.1.1 AN and Oxidiser solutions ANS is a class 5.1 oxidiser. The main hazard associated with handling AN solution materials (i.e. ANS, OXS) is decomposition due to excessive heating and/or contamination, and eventually explosion if the decomposition gases are sufficiently confined (e.g. in an inadequately vented storage tank, pump, process vessel etc). Additionally, most of the gaseous decomposition products are toxic. These gases can include ammonia (NH3), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitric oxide (NO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and nitric acid vapour (HNO3). NO2 is the most toxic of these. In general, assuming they are uncontaminated, ANS and OXS are highly insensitive to friction and impact and essentially insensitive to sparks (i.e. low explosion risk). 4.1.2 Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions ANEs are class 5.1. Most emulsions do not contain any self explosive ingredients but once ANE has been produced, the main hazard is decomposition due to excessive heating and/or contamination which can cause accelerating decomposition to the point where explosion or detonation can occur especially if the decomposition gases are sufficiently confined (e.g. in an inadequately vented storage tank, pump, process vessel etc). Sensitivity to accidental decomposition/detonation is increased by the presence of energetic sensitising materials or chemical contaminants (e.g. excess sodium nitrite). ANEs are insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks. 4.1.3 Ammonium Nitrate Although it is not combustible, Ammonium Nitrate (AN) is a Class 5 oxidiser, and will support combustion of other materials as it produces oxygen as one of its decomposition products. If the decomposition gases are confined (e.g. in a storage tank, process vessel etc) AN may explode. Most of the gaseous decomposition Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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products are toxic (various NOx compounds, N2O etc), with nitrogen dioxide (NO2) the most toxic of these. Solid AN may explode under confinement and high temperature, but is not readily detonated. High temperature, confinement and contamination are the main factors which affect the likelihood and severity of an AN explosion. AN explosions can be caused by a fire involving AN if there is sufficient confinement and/or contamination, or by contamination without a fire if the decomposition rate is sufficiently high (with sufficient confinement). If none of these factors are present, solid AN requires a high energy shock wave (e.g. from high explosive) to detonate. When molten it may decompose violently due to pressure or shock. 4.1.4 Combustibles C1 and C2 combustibles will be used at the ANE Plant. There will be no Class 3 (flammable) materials and all combustibles will be stored in bunded areas complying with AS1940 Storage and Handling of Flammable and Combustible Liquids separated from the ANE and ANS storage tanks by at least 30m. Combustibles are difficult to ignite in the absence of a direct flame. Pool fires are possible if a strong ignition source is present and a spill occurs, however the impact area is local to the pool fire and will not extend offsite (given the distances of at least several hundred metres from the combustible storage areas and site access road to the site boundary). Therefore the study considers combustible fires as a possible source of external heat to the AN, ANE and ANS inventories only. 4.1.5 Sodium Nitrite Similarly to AN, sodium nitrite is a strong oxidiser and will support combustion of other materials. Heat, shock, or contact with other materials may cause fire or explosive decomposition. It is incompatible with AN. It is also extremely toxic if ingested, however it has no wider toxicity impacts except to the immediately affected individual. For the assessment, sodium nitrite is treated as having the same hazards as AN. 4.1.6 Toxic Combustion / Decomposition Products As noted above, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) is the most toxic of the decomposition products formed in an AN / ANS / ANE decomposition reaction. NO2 is a respiratory irritant, however its main danger lies in the delay before its full effects upon the lungs are shown by feelings of weakness and coldness, headache, nausea, dizziness, abdominal pain and cyanosis. In severe cases, convulsions and death by asphyxia may follow exposure. Effects on people are summarised in Table 4.1, reproduced from the Acute Emergency Guideline Level (AEGL) documentation for NO2 (Ref 9). Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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TABLE 4.1: NO2 TOXICITY Table 2: Effects of acute exposure to high NO2 concentrations (from Ref 9)

4.2

NO2 Concentration (ppm)

Effect

0.4

approximate odour threshold

15-25

respiratory and nasal irritation

25-75

reversible pneumonia and bronchiolitis

150-300+

fatal bronchiolitis and bronchopneumonia

Hazardous Materials at Existing Technical Centre Facilities The existing facilities handle various high explosives of DG Class 1.1, Class 1.4 and Class 1.5, as well as AN and ANE. The main hazard associated with Class 1 high explosives is explosion with consequent overpressure and shrapnel / missile impacts. There are no significant toxicity hazards associated with the explosives stored at the site.

4.3

External Events As part of the hazard identification process, the potential for external events to affect the proposed ANE Plant was considered as summarised in Table 4.2. Given the site is surrounded by heavily vegetated Crown Land, bushfires were the only external event identified as a potential concern and are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4. TABLE 4.2: EXTERNAL EVENTS Issue

Discussion Summary

External Flooding

Site is not considered a flood prone area.

Earthquakes

According to GSHAP this area is classified as a low to moderate earthquake hazard.

Land slip/ subsidence

Mining in the area (nearest mine about 2km away). Civil design has not indentified any potential subsidence issues.

Cyclones

Not a high wind risk area. Facility structures designed in accordance with relevant codes.

Lightning

Systems complying with relevant Australian Standards to be installed to manage the risks associated with lightning.

Plane crash

Not in flight path. Risk not considered significant.

Vehicle crash

Not exposed to outside traffic. Site speed limits and plant protection for structures installed to prevent vehicle impact on critical plant. Considered as an external fire source only.

Sabotage/ vandalism

Secure site as required by AN security sensitive regulations.

Utilities failure

Loss of power results in “fail safe” condition. ANE plant operation not possible. No other significant utilities on the ANE plant site.

Bushfire

Credible risk due to surrounding environment. Safeguards discussed in further detail in Section 4.4.

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4.4

Bushfires

4.4.1 Existing facilities A comprehensive bushfire hazard reduction programme is in place for the existing facilities at the Technology Centre site. This includes: 

Cleared areas around all facilities, with further low fuel asset protection zones (APZ) in accordance with the relevant NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) Planning for Bushfire Protection (PBP) 2006 guidelines.



Provision of leafguards and appropriate windows (non-openable) for all buildings.



Provision of fire trails within and surrounding the site.



Regular programme of inspections by the RFS.



Yearly controlled hazard reduction and backburning operations undertaken by the RFS (timing and location as advised by RFS).



Manual hazard reduction (i.e. clearing of vegetation within designated APZ).

Regular maintenance is also carried out as follows: 

Low fuel zones up to 60m from facilities including lawns, planted garden strips, roads and pathways.



Fire trails checked regularly by trained site personnel with frequency increasing during fire season.



Water levels checked daily, minimum of 200,000 litres retained for fire fighting.



Fire pumps, fire hoses and equipment checked monthly by site personnel.

Bushfires would normally approach the Kurri site from the west (as has historically been the case). Fires can approach from the east but this is rare due to the terrain of the site. The last serious bushfires experienced at the site were in 1996. These approached the Kurri site on a 44oC day with westerly winds assisting the fire. The fires were extinguished as they reached cleared areas such as roads, and lawns, which form part of the site‟s fuel reduced zones but kept burning to the west of the site. Bushfire brigades and on-site crew remained onsite and no damage to facilities occurred. However it must be recognised that, if involved in a fire, the rate of decomposition and confinement conditions, hence time to explosion is extremely unpredictable with all explosives and ammonium nitrate compounds1 (including ANE, ANS, AN). Therefore 1

Historical incidents (globally) have shown that AN compounds engulfed in flames often decompose without explosion, but the fire response policy treats these as if they were explosives. Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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Orica have a policy of shutting down all operations and evacuation of all non-essential personnel if an AN manufacturing, research or bulk storage site is threatened by fire. The existing site Fire Risk Management Plan (FRMP) and Emergency Response Plan (ERP) covers bushfire in this context. It would be extremely rare that a bushfire could approach with no warning. There are several pre-planned safe egress routes available depending on the location of the fire. In the first instance a small crew of site personnel and security guards may remain on site to carry out certain functions providing they are safe and competent to do so. 4.4.2 Proposed ANE Production Facility The approach to bushfire protection for the ANE Production Facility will be similar to the approach for existing facilities and will be covered in the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) and Fire Risk Management Plan (FRMP which is an Orica internal requirement). The existing site FRMP and ERP will be updated to cover the ANE Production Facility. As required by the DGRs, a bushfire assessment (Ref 10) for the ANE Production Facility has been undertaken in accordance with the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) Planning for Bushfire Protection (PBP) 2006 guidelines. The proposed location of the ANE Production Facility complies with the asset protection zones (APZ‟s) (i.e. separation distances) required based on the slope, fire danger index (FDI) rating and the structure of surrounding vegetation. The required APZ around the ANE Production Facility is shown in Figure 3.2. The APZ is 20m on the northern, southern and eastern sides of the proposed facility, and 25m from the western edge of the proposed facility. As the ANE Plant is surrounded by a perimeter road plus an area cleared of vegetation (the APZ), sustained direct impingement by a bushfire on an ANE or ANS inventory is unlikely. A 10,000L rainwater tank (non-combustible materials of construction) dedicated to bushfire fighting purposes, fitted with suitable connections for the RFS tankers to refill, will be provided adjacent to the front perimeter gate of the ANE Production Facility.

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TABLE 4.3: PROPOSED ANE PRODUCTION FACILITY HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PROPERTIES Material

Description

State

DG Class

UN no

Hazards Refs: Orica MSDS, BOS documents

Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS)

Ammonium Nitrate solution approx 80-90% AN, balance water o Solution normally at 90 – 100 C

Liquid

5.1 PGII

2426

The main hazard associated with strong (>80 wt%) ANS is decomposition due to excessive heating or contamination and eventually explosion if decomposition gases are confined. Contaminants that increase the risk of decomposition include acids, chlorides, organics, alkali metals, nitrites. Most of the gaseous products of ANS decomposition are toxic (NOx gases). ANS does not burn, but as an oxidising agent, will support fire, even in the absence of an external source of oxygen. ANS is insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks.

Oxidiser Solution (OXS)

Ammonium Nitrate solution 70% AN with balance pH adjustment materials such as caustic, acetic acid, ammonia and water.

Liquid

5.1 PGII

2426

As per ANS

Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE)

A mixture of around 70% AN, 15% water and balance combustible liquids.

Liquid

5.1 PGII

3375

None of the ANE to be manufactured at the proposed site will contain any self-explosive ingredients but once the ANE has been produced, excessive heating can cause accelerating decomposition to the point where thermal explosion or detonation can occur.

All bulk emulsions at the proposed ANE Production Facility at Kurri will fall within the UN definition of Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE), intermediate for blasting explosives, UN number 3375.

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Sensitivity to accidental decomposition/detonation is increased by the presence of energetic sensitising materials or chemical contaminants (e.g. excess sodium nitrite). ANE‟s are insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks

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Material

Description

State

DG Class

UN no

Ammonium Nitrate (AN)

Technical grade AN. > 98% AN, other materials < 2%

Solid (prill)

5.1 PGIII

1942

Hazards Refs: Orica MSDS, BOS documents Ammonium Nitrate (AN) is a strong oxidising agent that will sustain combustion as it produces oxygen as one of its decomposition products. May explode under confinement and high temperature, but not readily detonated. When molten may decompose violently due to shock or pressure. Contaminants that increase the risk of decomposition / explosion include combustibles, hypochlorite, organics, alkali metals, nitrites.

Combustible liquids

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Various – diesel, paraffin, canola etc

Liquid

C1 or C2

various

Most of the gaseous products of AN decomposition are toxic (various NOx gases). Combustible, i.e. will ignite if sustained strong ignition source is present.

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4.5

Potential Hazardous Incident Scenarios The potential hazardous incidents associated with the ANE Production Facility were identified by: 

Review and consolidation of hazardous scenarios identified in the Orica Hazard Study 2 for the ANE Production Facility Project, the HIRAC for the existing Liddell ANE Production Facility, HIRACs for generic ANE Plants and HIRACs for other similar Orica plants



A two day workshop to review the consolidated HIRACs for the ANE Production Facility Project, which was attended by relevant Orica personnel.

The resultant HIRAC minutes for the ANE Upgrade Project are available in the SHE Risk Register. Detailed scenarios have not been provided in the PHA due to potential security concerns. However a brief description of the HIRAC process and a list of HIRAC scenarios are included in APPENDIX 2. It should be noted that some scenarios were considered to have local rather than off-site consequences. These were not carried forward for quantitative analysis in this study. 4.5.1 Proposed ANE Plant The significant hazardous incidents identified were consolidated into discrete scenarios to allow a quantitative model to be developed. The hazardous incidents (referred to as major accident events or MAEs) included in the PHA are listed in Table 4.5 for proposed ANE Production Facility. The MAEs are all very similar in terms of the physical scenario, but have been set up separately in the quantitative models as they are applicable to different production facility areas and inventories. 4.5.2 Existing Technical Centre Facilities An upper limit scenario for each existing area at the site was defined. This scenario is the explosion of the maximum NEQ in each operational area as summarised in Table 4.6. The inventories used to define the potential explosion scenarios are given in Table 3.2. 4.6

Scenarios for Quantitative Assessment APPENDIX 4 tabulates the input to the quantitative model for each scenario. The assumptions made to develop the consequence and frequency for the QRA scenarios are discussed in Sections 5 and 7 of this report.

4.7

Rule Sets for Incident Inclusion A rule set for inclusion in the risk assessment was developed based on the properties of the materials and the results of the HIRAC study. The rule set:

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

Identifies the causes which can result in an explosion in Class 1, ANS, ANE or AN materials.



Distinguishes between a scenario which develops over time (i.e. a “with warning” explosion where evacuation is possible), and a “no warning explosion” (where evacuation would not be possible).



Identifies which materials are susceptible to knock-on (i.e. sympathetic initiation) from an explosion event.

Essentially: 

External fire or contamination could cause explosion in Class1 explosives, AN, ANE or ANE inventories.



Class 1 explosives, AN and ANE are susceptible to sympathetic detonation, ANS is not.

This is summarised in Table 4.4. This is a generic rule set, hence covers some items not applicable to the proposed ANE Production Facility. AN will be handled in bags only (i.e. AN Stacked), there is no bulk AN. TABLE 4.4: RULE SET FOR SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN QRA Rev A

Date Prepared By 10-Nov-08 J Polich (Sherpa)

Project:

Proposed ANE Plant Kurri Kurri, QRA

Objective:

Rule set for determining which explosion scenarios to include in consequence modelling / QRA

Applicability:

Explosives / AN/ ANE / ANS Storage and Handling. Not manufacturing / processing of any Explosives on the ANE plant.

KEY: Yes No n/a

Checked By Ian Dennison (Orica)

Credible (even if very low likelihood) Not possible not applicable - physical configuration not relevant Without warning explosion (evacuation not possible) Warning (evacuation possible)

Material (Note 1)

Cause of explosion

Escalation potential - from another source event

Fire engulfment

Contamination

Other (undefined Explosion (blast) Projectile (Note 3) miscellaneous) (Note 3)

Propagation from pump explosion (connected)

Class 1 ANE

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes No

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

ANS AN bulk AN stacked

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

No No No

No Yes Yes

No Yes Yes

Yes Yes (Note 2) No n/a n/a

Notes: 1. Material is on spec and uncontaminated (except for "contamination" cause) 2. Except for case where diaphragm pump is used. Knock on from diaphragm pump not possible. 3. Distances required to avoid risk of knock on are specified in AS2187 for AN. The same distances apply to ANE as per AEMSC code. Ref: Scenario Rule Sets Excel 2003 ID Rev 2.xls

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TABLE 4.5: HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN PHA, PROPOSED ANE PRODUCTION FACILITY ID

Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

Causes

Controls and Safeguards

Incorporated in PHA?

1. Bushfire in surrounding environment.



Asset protection zones (APZ) maintained around all facilities as per RFS guidelines Firewater tank for RFS use Evacuation of non-essential personnel Firefighting to protect inventory (spot fire extinguishment etc)

Y

Minimal fuel / combustible material in the area – sustained fire extremely unlikely Vehicles separated by kerbing and bollards from storage areas - Vehicle fire impingement extremely unlikely Density measurement of incoming product, Option to adjust pH. Temperature monitoring and high temp alarms in storage tanks Tanks are well vented (increases available time for evacuation) Initial explosion would not have off-site impact, given the limited inventory in the pump. Propagation to ANS bulk storage not credible (where there is no contamination and concentration is below 92%).

Y

External Events All

Bushfire threatens ANS / ANE / AN inventory. Decomposition, toxic fume emission and eventual explosion

   Raw Materials Storage and Handling ANS-01

ANS-02

External fire causes decomposition in ANS storage. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

Contamination causes decomposition in ANS storage. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Human failure followed by failure to control fire.



1. Human error followed by failure to control decomp reaction.





 

ANS-03

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Heating or contamination causes decomposition in ANS unloading pump. Pump explosion.

1. Dry running or dead heading 2. Friction or impact 3. Contamination or compositional change

 

Y

N

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ID

Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

Causes

Controls and Safeguards

Incorporated in PHA?

ANS-04

Fire on board ANS delivery tanker causes decomposition of ANS. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Tyre fire 2. Engine fire followed by failure to control decomposition reaction

 

Vehicle maintenance Tyre fire more likely en-route (not parked) Fire extinguishers on tanker Driver trained in emergency procedures No offsite effects from pool fire heat radiation as site boundaries several hundred metres away. Separation distance (around 30m) means escalation to ANE / ANS storage very unlikely. Pool fire consequences not covered in QRA, however fire considered as a cause of explosion in ANE / ANS storage as per ANS-01, OXS-01, ANE-01 No offsite effects from pool fire heat radiation as site boundaries several hundred metres away from delivery road and tanker delivery location. Separation distance (around 30m) means escalation to ANE / ANS storage very unlikely. Minimal fuel / combustible material in the area – sustained fire extremely unlikely

Y

Raw material QA Operating procedures

Y

  

DSL-01

External fire impinges on fuels storage area. Failure of fuel storage tank and progression to significant fire.

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Fuel transfer pump fire. 4. Human failure 5. Chemical decomposition

DSL-02

Combustible delivery tanker fire while on site

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire



OXS-01

External fire causes decomposition in OXS batch tank. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Electrical fire followed by failure to control fire.



OXS-02

Contamination causes decomposition in OXS batch tank. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Impurities 2. Incorrect batch sequence or quantities followed by failure to control decomposition reaction.

 

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N

N

Y

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ID

Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

Causes

Controls and Safeguards

Incorporated in PHA?

OXS-03

Heating or contamination causes decomposition in oxidiser solution pump. Pump explosion.

1. Dry running or dead heading 2. Friction or impact 3. Contamination or compositional change



Y

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

Pumps trip in the event of low flow or elevated temperatures. Initial explosion would not have off-site impact, given the limited inventory in the pump. However, missiles from the explosion may knock-on to the ANE tank. Propagation to ANS bulk storage not credible (where there is no contamination and concentration is below 92%).

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ID

Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

ANE Manufacture ELK-01 External fire causes decomposition in ELK. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion. ELK-02

ANE-01

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Heating or contamination causes decomposition in ANE transfer pump. Pump explosion.

External fire causes decomposition in ANE storage. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

Causes

Controls and Safeguards

Incorporated in PHA ?

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Human failure followed by failure to control fire. 1. Dry running or dead heading 2. Friction or impact 3. Contamination or compositional change



Minimal fuel / combustible material in the area – sustained fire extremely unlikely

Y



N

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Human failure 4. Chemical decomposition followed by failure to control fire.



Pumps trip in the event of low flow or elevated temperatures. Initial explosion would not have offsite impact, given the limited inventory in the pump. However, missiles from the explosion may knock-on to the ELK. Propagation to main ANE inventory may also occur. This is one cause of explosion of ANE inventory, not covered as a separate scenario. Minimal fuel / combustible material in the area – sustained fire extremely unlikely An explosion can only be produced if there is some degree of confinement – for example, storage in a sealed container. Tanks are well vented (increases available time for evacuation)





Y

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ID

Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

Causes

Controls and Safeguards

Incorporated in PHA ?

ANE-02

Heating or contamination causes decomposition in NAPCO gear pump. Pump explosion.

1. Dry running or dead heading 2. Contamination or compositional change

Initial explosion would not have off-site impact, given the limited inventory in the pump. Note: Trials have shown that propagation to main ANE inventory not credible for gear pumps due to the relatively low energy input and high heat dissipation from the pump casing.

N

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ID

Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

Causes

Controls and Safeguards

Incorporated in PHA?

1. Electrical faults 2. Vehicle fire 3. External fire 1. Fuel spill 2. Contaminated product delivered

Minimal fuel/combustible kept in the store.

Y

Product quality tested at point of manufacture. Fuel minimised in area?

Y

Escalation Scenarios Esc-01 Explosion in ANE Plant area results in sympathetic detonation of ANE Plant aggregated inventory

All causes except ANS storage explosion

Propagation to ANS not possible, rupture of ANS storage tanks may occur, however this will result in a spill, not a net increase in NEQ as ANS is not susceptible to shock detonation

Y

Esc-02

ANS storage

AN Store AN-01 Fire in Dry Oxidiser store results in explosion in store AN-02

Esc-03

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Contaminated AN results in decomposition and store explosion

Explosion in ANS storage area results in sympathetic detonation of ANE Plant aggregated inventory including ANS initiating storage inventory. Explosion results in hot shrapnel, initiating a bushfire

All causes

Y

Refer to Biophysical Risk, Section 8.5.1

Y

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TABLE 4.6: HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN QRA, EXISTING TECHNICAL CENTER FACILITIES ID

Causes

Controls and Safeguards

RM/QS-01

Explosion in Research Magazine or Quarry Services Depot which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

All causes

Located and designed in accordance with AS 2187 series.

Y

ML-01

Explosion in Mixing Lab which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

All causes

Located and designed in accordance with AS 2187 series

Y

RL-01

Explosion in Research Laboratory which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

All causes

Located and designed in accordance with AS 2187 series

Y

TC-01

Explosion in Test Cell which involves entire inventory in this plant location

All causes

Located and designed in accordance with AS 2187 series

Y

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Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

Incorporated in PHA?

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5

QRA BASIS To carry out the QRA, a number of assumptions were made with respect to the quantities of material stored. For this study, the proposed ANE Plant is assessed as per the inventory basis given in Table 5.1. The maximum storage inventories have been adopted as the basis for the plant, with a worst case scenario represented by an aggregate NEQ including all relevant inventories in the proposed ANE Plant. This is a conservative approach to the assessment, but is considered to be appropriate for a QRA conducted for land use planning purposes. The assumptions used to estimate the NEQ shown in the last column of the table are explained in Section 6.3. TABLE 5.1: QRA BASIS, PROPOSED ANE PLANT Plant Area as used in QRA scenarios

Proposed ANE Plant

Comments

Inventory (t)

Proportion NEQ of Time (%) (t)

ANS Storage Tank

330

100

30.2

Maximum inventory of largest ANS Tank (250kL is approximately equivalent to 330t at 88.5 wt% concentration). (note 2) 100% full is conservative

ANS Tanker

26 Single 38 B-Double

n/a

4.8

Loads expected to be delivered in single Tankers or B-Doubles.

OXS Batch Tank

80

100

6.4

Maximum inventory of largest Batch Tank

ELK unit

2

100

1.4

Estimate. 100% usage is conservative.

ANE Storage Tank

120

100

81.6

4 adjacent tanks, each 30t 100% full is conservative as tanks are operated as surge capacity and total quantity will be limited to 100t procedurally.

Dry Oxidiser Stores

20

100

6.4

Rarely used ingredients for OXS. AN less than 9.6t, calcium nitrate 8t. Separate store for 8t sodium nitrite A total of 20t AN is assumed for the risk assessment to cover all dry oxidiser materials.

ANE Plant aggregate

470

n/a

118

1 x largest ANS tank (330t), ANE inventory, 4 x 30t plus Dry Oxidiser store max inventory of 20t AN (equivalent)

(note 1)

(note 3).

Notes: 1. Refer to Section 6.3 for assumptions used to calculate NEQ. 2. ANS is not susceptible to sympathetic detonation (where there is no contamination and concentration is below 92%) hence the single largest inventory rather than the aggregate inventory is considered (refer to Section 4.7). 3. ANE is susceptible to sympathetic detonation hence the aggregate inventory is considered (refer to Section 4.7).

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Assessment of the existing plant is also conservatively based on the maximum NEQ for each area. The NEQs are summarised in Table 5.2. Also see Table 3.2 for further details as to how the NEQs were calculated. TABLE 5.2: QRA BASIS, EXISTING KURRI FACILITIES Existing Area

NEQ (t) (note 1)

Proportion of Time (%)

Comments

Research Magazine (RM) and Quarry Services Depot (QS)

50.2

100

Combined inventory due to proximity of RM and QS. Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Research Laboratory (RL)

11.6

100

Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Mixing Laboratory (ML)

0.56

100

Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Test Cell

0.05

100

Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Notes: 1. Refer to Table 3.2 for assumptions used to calculate NEQ.

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6

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

6.1

Overview For this study, consequence analysis involves qualitative and/ or quantitative review of the identified hazardous scenarios to estimate the potential to cause injury/fatality. The events of interest in the study are explosions and toxic emissions due to decomposition of AN or AN solutions, ANE or Class 1 explosives that may result in injury or fatality. Explosions may be caused by a thermal event (e.g. external fire) or contamination.

6.2

Effect Levels of Interest

6.2.1 Overpressure Overpressure levels are equated to different impacts (i.e. injury or probabilities of fatality) as summarised in Table 6.1. These criteria are based on the levels given in HIPAP 4. TABLE 6.1: FATALITY / OVERPRESSURE CORRELATION Overpressure (kPa)

HIPAP 4 description

7

Damage to internal partitions and joinery but can be repaired. Probability of injury is 10%. No fatality. Houses uninhabitable and badly cracked. Reinforced structures distort. Storage tanks fail. 20% chance of fatality for a person in a building. House uninhabitable. Wagons and plant items overturned. Threshold of eardrum damage. 50% chance of fatality for a person in buildings and 15% chance of fatality for a person in open. Threshold of lung damage. 100% chance of fatality for a person in a building or in the open. Complete demolition of houses.

14 21

35

70

Probability of Fatality assumed in QRA Inside Building

Outside

-

-

1%

0.1%

20%

1%

50%

15%

100%

100%

6.2.2 Toxicity Effects The toxic decomposition products of AN (as NO2) have the potential to cause acute toxic effects. The values used to assess toxicity impacts are summarised in Table 6.2.

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Fatality Probability of fatality is usually estimated using probit equations of the form Pr = A + b ln(cnt) Pr

Probit value

A, b

Constants specific to each material.

c

concentration (ppm)

t

time exposed to concentration (min)

erf

error function (mathematical)

These can then be converted to a probability of fatality using the error function transform: Probability = 0.5(1 + erf(

Pr 5

))

2 Injury / Irritation HIPAP 4 injury and irritation risk criteria for toxic gas exposure were given in Table 2.1. The PHA makes the following interpretations: Serious Injury: occurs due to toxic exposure to the lower of the Acute Exposure Guideline Level 2 (AEGL-2) and Emergency Response Planning Guideline Level 2 (ERPG-2) concentrations. AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape. ERPG-2 is defined as the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an individual's ability to take protective action. Irritation: occurs due to toxic exposure to the lower of the AEGL-1 and ERPG-1 concentrations. AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure. ERPG-1 is defined as the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing more than mild, transient adverse health effects or without perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odour.

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TABLE 6.2: IMPACT LEVELS FOR TOXIC EFFECTS Material

Nitrogen dioxide (NO2)

Concentration 1% Fatality at 30mins exposure

Serious Injury (AEGL-2 Ref. 9 or ERPG-2 Ref. 11)

Irritation (AEGL-1 Ref 9 or ERPG-1 Ref 11)

Probit (Ref 12 n (ppm min)

ppm

ppm

Ppm

65

12

0.5

3.7

-16.19+ ln(c t)

6.2.3 Escalation Two types of escalation are considered, consequence results for both levels of interest have been generated as follows:

6.3



Third party property damage. As per the criteria in HIPAP 4 shown in Table 2.2, NSW DoP suggest 14kPa as a criterion for assessing property damage potential due to explosion overpressure.



Detonation of another explosives or ANE inventory. In this case the escalation event of concern onsite would be explosion in one area generating high energy projectiles or an impulse that then initiates an explosion in other areas with larger effects than the initial explosion. The AS2187.1 (1998) Table 3.2.3.2 separation distances (and associated formulas) are used as the threshold where shock or projectiles from an event in the ANE Plant could cause a detonation in another onsite explosives or ANE facility or vice versa, i.e. whether the existing facilities could impact the proposed ANE Plant and vice versa.

Explosion Consequence Assessment Assumptions The TNT equivalent model is used to estimate explosion overpressure effects. This method involves: 1. Equating the explosive or oxidiser of interest into an equivalent mass of TNT. This is known as the Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ). 2. Estimating the distance to the overpressure levels of interest using a scaling law known as the TNT overpressure vs. scaled distance relationship.

6.3.1 TNT Equivalent Mass for AN or ANS To equate AN or ANS to an equivalent mass of TNT, three factors are considered as follows: NEQ = x α e MassAN

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

Proportion of material present that is sensitised to explosion (x): This is set at 100% for this study for AN. High temperature, confinement and contaminants sensitise Ammonium Nitrate to explosion however are not expected to extend uniformly to the entire AN inventory (particularly for a bulk store). Therefore setting this factor to 100% for AN and ANS is considered a conservative assumption. (Note that this factor is not relevant for ANE or Class 1 explosives as an explosion will always propagate through the whole inventory, i.e. always 100% involvement).



Efficiency (α): The proportion of the sensitised material that actually detonates in the explosion. Orica‟s AN Draft Code of Practice (CoP) (Ref 4) has been based on a review of published effects of AN and ANS explosion events that have occurred. The values suggested in the CoP for AN or ANS have been adopted for this study and are summarised in Table 6.3.



TNT equivalence (e): Essentially a ratio of the blast energy produced by the explosive of interest to the blast energy produced by the same quantity of TNT. Refer to Section 6.3.2 for details for ANS and AN and Section 6.3.3 for ANE. TABLE 6.3: ANS AND AN EXPLOSION EFFICENCY

Materials

Explosion initiator

Efficiency (α) Comments

Strong (>80%) ANS Unconfined decomposition

0.3

A storage tank well vented / frangible roof etc, reactor etc that allows decomposition products to freely vent

Confined decomposition

0.6

Road tanker, storage with small vents, PSV

Fire

0.16

AN Draft Code of Practice

Contamination

0.5

AN Draft Code of Practice

High energy projectile

1

AN Draft Code of Practice

AN

6.3.2 TNT Equivalence for AN and ANS (e) The literature has a range of values for AN (solid) equivalence, ranging from around 0.32 to 0.57. Orica‟s draft AN Code of Practice (CoP) has been based on a review of published data and the equivalence values suggested in the CoP have been adopted for this study as shown in Table 6.4. (This is the value used for “e” in the equation in Section 6.3.1).

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6.3.3 TNT Equivalence for ANE Estimates for TNT equivalence of ANEs range from 0.10 to 0.70. For the types of ANEs to be produced at the new ANE Production Facility, a value of 0.68 has been selected as shown in Table 6.4. This is derived from Orica's proprietary "Ideal Detonation" modelling software IdeX. The IDeX software derives TNT equivalence from the isentropic expansion energy for the chosen explosive relative to the same energy for TNT. This software is wellvalidated as it is in routine use as the basis on which Orica conducts blast modelling and blast design on a commercial basis. TABLE 6.4: TNT EQUIVALENCE Material

Equivalence

Comments

(e) ANS

0.353

Specified in Orica Draft AN Code of practice

AN

0.32

Specified in Orica Draft AN Code of practice

ANE

0.68

Orica's Ideal Detonation code IDeX

6.3.4 TNT Equivalence for Class 1 Explosives TNT equivalence for Class 1 explosives is generally 1. However there are some materials in the existing facilities with a lower TNT equivalence. This has already been accounted for in the NEQ calculations as shown in Table 3.2. 6.3.5 Scaled Overpressure Overpressure versus scaled distance relationships are presented as equations or graphs. In this case the Kingery and Bulmash correlation is used to estimate the scaled distance (Z) from the overpressure of interest (Ref 13). The Kingery and Bulmash correlation is as follows: P = exp(A + B.Xo + C.Xo2 + D.Xo3 + E.Xo4) Xo = ln(Zo) Zo = d / NEQ0.333 Where: Zo

scaled distance (m/kg0.333)

d

distance at particular overpressure level (m)

P

overpressure (kPa)

NEQ

Net Explosive Quantity (kg)

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Refer to APPENDIX 3 for the Kingery and Bulmash coefficients (A,B,C,D,E), the overpressure (P) levels of interest, and solutions to the equation, as these coefficients vary depending on Zo. 6.4

Explosion Scenario Consequence Results Consequence modelling results for all potential explosion scenarios included in the risk assessment are detailed in APPENDIX 3 for both the proposed ANE Production Facility and existing facilities. The results include estimated distances to the overpressure levels of interest (as per the rule sets in Table 6.1) and identification of the events which cause overpressures sufficient to cause injury or fatality offsite. The separation distances between the existing explosive inventories and the proposed ANE Production Facility, have been estimated from the site layout (see Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3) and are summarised in Table 6.5. As noted in Section 3.3, the nearest residence is around 1.8km from the proposed ANE Production Facility location, the nearest industrial population and infrastructure is around 2.5km away and the nearest major road (F3 freeway) is around 4.5km away from the site boundary. TABLE 6.5: SEPARATION DISTANCES BETWEEN INVENTORIES Separation Distance (m) Source

Receptor Proposed ANE Plant (ANS areas)

Proposed ANE Plant (ANS areas) Proposed ANE Plant (Dry Oxidiser store) Research Magazine (RM) and Quarry Service Depot (QS) Research Laboratory (RL) Mixing Laboratory (ML) Test Cell

Proposed ANE Plant (Dry Oxidiser store)

Nearest Site Boundary

Direction of Nearest Site Boundary

-

30

260 South

30

-

280 South

355

325

635 East

555 850 215

525 820 185

715 North east 480 North 450 South

6.4.1 Proposed ANE Production Facility Overpressure results for the proposed ANE Plant are summarised in Table 6.6. The required separation distances to other inventories based on AS2187.1 Table 3.2.3.2 are shown in Table 6.7. The following conclusions can be made: 

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Distances to the 21 kPa level (capable of causing fatality to individuals located outside – i.e. not in a building) remain within the site boundary which is a minimum of 260m away for all scenarios except for an escalated event resulting in sympathetic detonation of the maximum aggregated NEQ in the ANE Production Facility. The escalated event 21kPa consequence distance J20210-004 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA Page 51

extends around 100m beyond the southern boundary into the unpopulated and undeveloped Crown Land. It is contained within the site boundary in all other directions. 

Distances to the 14kPa level (capable of causing fatality to individuals located inside a building) range from approximately 100 – 340m for individual inventory explosions, and up to around 520m for an escalated event involving the aggregated ANE Production Facility inventory (extending around 250m beyond the site boundary to the south, and contained within the boundary in all other directions). However the overpressure effects do not extend to any buildings or populations (industrial or residential) as the land to the South of the site is undeveloped Crown land with no buildings for at least 2km. The nearest residence (to the north) is more than 1800m away from the proposed ANE Production Facility, the rural subdivision (potential occupied buildings) to the west is at least 1000m from the proposed ANE Production Facility area.



An overpressure of 14kPa is also capable of causing property damage, however this overpressure level does not extend to any offsite infrastructure (industrial, busy roads etc). The electrical easement to the south of the site, and the power lines and (not yet installed) underground gas lines running through the Technical Centre site, are also more than 700m away from the proposed ANE Production Facility area. The maximum overpressure at the easement area in a worst case event is around 7-8kPa, hence infrastructure will not be significantly affected by an explosion in the proposed ANE Production Facility.



Distances to an overpressure of 7 kPa (capable of causing injury) for a number of scenarios including explosion in largest inventory ANS tank, an ANS tanker, OXS batch tank or ANE tank, or the escalated event involving the aggregate ANE Production Facility inventory extend offsite up to 600m beyond the southern boundary (contained within site boundary in all other directions) however do not extend to any offsite populations (industrial, busy roads or residential).

Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.3 show the results for some representative scenarios, including the worst case scenarios (i.e. aggregate inventory of proposed ANE Production Facility including all the ANE and the largest ANS inventory in Figure 6.1, and, in Figure 6.2 the aggregate inventory of proposed ANE Production Facility including the only the ANE inventory).

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FIGURE 6.1:

PROPOSED ANE PLANT WORST CASE EXPLOSION – AGGREGATE INVENTORY

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FIGURE 6.2:

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PROPOSED ANE PRODUCTION FACILITY - ANE (MAXIMUM STORAGE) EXPLOSION

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FIGURE 6.3:

PROPOSED ANE PLANT – ANS STORAGE TANK (LARGEST INVENTORY) EXPLOSION

6.4.2 Existing Facilities Overpressure results for the maximum explosives inventories in the existing facilities are summarised in Table 6.8, with AS2187.1 separation distances given in Table 6.9. The results are shown graphically in Figure 6.4 to Figure 6.7. Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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The following conclusions can be made: 

No events with potential offsite fatality effects to outdoor populations (21 kPa overpressure) were identified.



No events with potential offsite damage potential or fatality effects to populations inside buildings (14kPa overpressure) were identified.



One event with potential offsite injury impact was identified (Research Magazine/ Quarry Store Depot 7 kPa overpressure contour extends around 20m across the southern boundary in Crown Land). However the impact does not extend to any offsite populations (industrial, busy roads or residential).



Escalation to the proposed ANE Production Facility / AN storage area is extremely unlikely given the separation distances comply with AS2187.1.

These results confirm that compliance with the AS2187.1 quantity distance rules minimises offsite risks associated with explosion events. 6.5

Onsite Escalation Based on the separation distance rules in AS2187.1 it can be concluded from the consequence results presented in Table 6.9, that there is no risk of escalation from the existing facilities to the proposed ANE Production Facilities. The worst case event defined for the proposed ANE Production Facilities (i.e. sympathetic detonation of all inventories due to a decomposition in the largest ANS tank as shown in Figure 6.1) may result in a knock-on to the Test Cell area as shown in Table 6.7. The Test Cell does not have a permanent inventory and even if in use, the maximum Test Cell NEQ is 50kg (compared to an NEQ of more than 120,000kg for the worst case ANE Production Facility event). Hence including this additional inventory would have minimal impact on the worst case predicted consequence distances and not alter the conclusions of the consequence and risk assessment. This is also a “with warning” event as defined in Table 4.4 hence the Test Cell area would be evacuated if it were being used at the time an ANS decomposition occurred (protecting onsite personnel). It can therefore be concluded that the worst case event in the ANE Production Facilities does not have the potential to cause an escalated event with additive consequences between the existing and proposed facilities, i.e. the proposed ANE Plant is sufficiently separated from the existing facilities with any significant explosive inventories to ensure that there is minimal risk of escalation between the proposed and existing facilities. This conclusion remains true for all initiating causes (including bushfire).

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FIGURE 6.4:

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RESEARCH MAGAZINE AND QUARRY SERVICES EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)

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FIGURE 6.5:

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RESEARCH LABORATORY EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)

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FIGURE 6.6:

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MIXING LABORATORY EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)

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FIGURE 6.7:

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TEST CELL EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)

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TABLE 6.6: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – OVERPRESSURES PROPOSED ANE PLANT QRA Scenario

Consequence Model Parameters

Area

MAE Ref

MAE Description

Material

ANS Storage

ANS-01 ANS-02 ANS-03 ANS-04

Explosion in ANS storage tank due to contamination or external fire

ANS

330

0.885

292.05

0.353

0.3

30928

121

ANS Storage

Max storage proportion quantity (te) AN

Distance to Overpressure (kPa) (m)

Theoretical Equivalence Mass Avail for Explosion (te)

Efficiency

NEQ (kg)

70

35

21

14

Distance to Potential nearest Offsite fatality boundary (m) effect (i.e. >21kPa at boundary)

7

Potential Offsite fatality effect (i.e. >14kPa at boundary)

Potential Offsite injury effect (i.e. >7kPa at boundary)

Discuss in QRA?

2

178

247

329

564

1415

260 N

Y

Y

Y

Explosion in ANS tanker

ANS

26

0.885

23.01

0.353

0.6

4874

65

96

133

178

305

764

260 N

N

Y

Y

OXS Batch Tank OXS-01 OXS-02 OXS-03

Explosion in OXS batch tank due to contamination or external fire

ANS

80

0.83

66.4

0.353

0.3

7032

74

109

151

201

344

863

260 N

N

Y

Y

ELK Area

ELK-01 ELK-02

Explosion in ELK

ANE

2

1

2

0.68

1

1360

43

63

87

116

199

499

260 N

N

N

N

ANE Storage

ANE-01 ANE-02

Explosion in single ANE storage tank due to contamination ANE or external fire

30

1

30

0.68

1

20400

105

155

215

287

491

1231

260 N

Y

Y

Y

ANE Storage

ANE-01 ANE-02

Explosion in all (4) ANE storage tanks due to contamination or external fire

ANE

120

1

120

0.68

1

81600

167

246

341

455

780

1955

260 Y

Y

Y

Y

AN Storage

AN-01

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination

AN

20

1

20

0.32

0.5

3200

57

84

116

155

265

664

280 N

N

N

N

AN Storage

AN-02

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to fire

AN

20

1

20

0.32

0.16

1024

39

57

79

106

181

454

280 N

N

N

N

AN Storage

AN-03

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to missile / high energy shock wave

AN

20

1

20

0.32

1

6400

72

105

146

195

334

837

280 N

N

Y

Y

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination

AN (off spec)

0

1

0

0.32

0.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

280 N

N

N

N

AN Storage (offspec) ANE Plant all inventory

ESC-01

ANE plant - ANS storage tank explosion and sympathetic ANS+ANE+A detonation, aggregate inventory including largest ANS (1 x N 350 te ANS, 4 x 30te ANE and 20 te AN)

470

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

118928

190

279

387

516

884

2216

280 Y

Y

Y

Y

ANE Plant all inventory

ESC-02

ANE plant - knock on (any causes except ANS explosion) and sympathetic detonation, aggregate inventory (4 x 30te ANE and 20 te AN)

140

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

88000

171

252

350

467

800

2005

280 Y

Y

Y

Y

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TABLE 6.7: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – AS2187.1 SEPARATION DISTANCES PROPOSED ANE PLANT QRA Scenario

Consequence Model Parameters

MAE Ref

MAE Description

Material

ANS Storage

ANS-01 ANS-02 ANS-03 ANS-04

Explosion in ANS storage tank due to contamination or external fire

ANS

330

0.885

292.05

0.353

0.3

30928

151

75

251

57

465

697

697

215 N

Explosion in ANS tanker

ANS

26

0.885

23.01

0.353

0.6

4874

81

41

136

31

251

376

376

215 N

OXS Batch Tank OXS-01 OXS-02 OXS-03

Explosion in OXS batch tank due to contamination or external fire

ANS

80

0.83

66.4

0.353

0.3

7032

92

46

153

34

284

425

425

215 N

ELK Area

ELK-01 ELK-02

Explosion in ELK

ANE

2

1

2

0.68

1

1360

53

27

89

20

123

180

184

215 N

ANE Storage

ANE-01 ANE-02

Explosion in single ANE storage tank due to contamination ANE or external fire

30

1

30

0.68

1

20400

131

66

219

49

404

607

607

215 N

ANE Storage

ANE-01 ANE-02

Explosion in all (4) ANE storage tanks due to contamination or external fire

ANE

120

1

120

0.68

1

81600

208

104

347

78

642

963

963

215 N

AN Storage

AN-01

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination

AN

20

1

20

0.32

0.5

3200

71

35

118

27

204

311

311

185 N

AN Storage

AN-02

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to fire

AN

20

1

20

0.32

0.16

1024

48

24

81

18

102

180

152

185 N

AN Storage

AN-03

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to missile / high energy shock wave

AN

20

1

20

0.32

1

6400

89

45

149

33

275

412

412

185 N

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination

AN (off spec)

0

1

0

0.32

0.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

AN Storage (offspec)

Theoretical Equivalence Mass Avail for Explosion (te)

Efficiency

NEQ (kg)

Explosives Explosives (unmounded) (mounded) 1/3 D = 4.8 NEQ D = 2. 4NEQ1/3

Escalation

Area

ANS Storage

Max storage proportion quantity (te) AN

Separation distances as per AS2187.1 1998 Table 3.2.3.2 (m)

Process AN Class A PW Class B PW Class B PW building (unmounded) (unmounded) (mounded) 1/3 1/3 Note 1 Note 2 Note 2 D = 8 NEQ D = 1.8 NEQ

Distance to Nearest Existing Explosives Inventory (Test Cell)

0 n/a

Potential onsite escalation effect (AS2187)

N

ANE Plant all inventory

ESC-01

ANE plant - ANS storage tank explosion and sympathetic ANS+ANE+A detonation, aggregate inventory including largest ANS (1 x N 350 te ANS, 4 x 30te ANE and 20 te AN)

470

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

118928

236

118

393

89

728

1092

1092

215 Y

ANE Plant all inventory

ESC-02

ANE plant - knock on (any causes except ANS explosion) and sympathetic detonation, aggregate inventory (4 x 30te ANE and 20 te AN)

140

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

88000

214

107

356

80

658

987

987

215 N

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TABLE 6.8: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – OVERPRESSURES FOR EXISTING TECHNCIAL CENTRE INVENTORIES QRA Scenario

Area

MAE Description

Material

Research Magazine RM/QS-01 (RM) and Quarry Service Depot (QS)

Explosion in Research Magazine or Quarry Services Depot which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

Explosive

n/a

Research Laboratory (RL)

Explosion in Mixing Lab Explosive which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

Mixing Laboratory RL-01 (ML)

Explosion in Research Laboratory which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

Test Cell

Explosion in Test Cell which involves entire inventory in this plant location

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MAE Ref

Consequence Model Parameters

ML-01

TC-01

Distance to Overpressure (kPa) (m)

Max storage NEQ (te) (kg)

Distance to nearest boundary (m)

Potential Offsite fatality effect (i.e. >14kPa at boundary)

Potential Discuss in Offsite QRA? injury effect (i.e. >7kPa at boundary)

70

35

21

14

7

50220

142

209

290

387

663

635 N

Y

Y

n/a

11620

87

129

178

238

407

715 N

N

N

Explosive

n/a

560

32

47

65

86

148

480 N

N

N

Explosive

n/a

50

14

21

29

39

66

450 N

N

N

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TABLE 6.9: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – AS2187.1 SEPARATION DISTANCES EXISTING KURRI FACILITIES QRA Scenario

Area

MAE Ref

Consequence Model Parameters

MAE Description

Material

Research Magazine RM/QS-01 (RM) and Quarry Service Depot (QS)

Explosion in Research Magazine or Quarry Services Depot which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

Explosive

50220

177

89

295

66

Potential onsite escalation effect (i.e. less than AS2187 process building sep distance to ANE Plant / AN Store inventory) 325 N

Research Laboratory (RL)

Explosion in Mixing Lab Explosive which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

11620

109

54

181

41

525 N

ML-01

NEQ (kg)

Separation distances as per AS2187.1 1998 Table 3.2.3.2 Escalation (m)

Explosives Explosives (unmounded) (mounded) D = 4.8 NEQ1/3 D = 2. 4NEQ1/3

Process AN Distance to building (unmounded) Proposed D = 8 NEQ1/3 D = 1.8 NEQ1/3 ANE Plant / AN Store

Mixing Laboratory RL-01 (ML)

Explosion in Research Laboratory which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

Explosive

560

40

20

66

15

820 N

Test Cell

Explosion in Test Cell which involves entire inventory in this plant location

Explosive

50

18

9

29

7

185 N

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TC-01

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6.6

Toxic Effects Consequence Assessment The impact of toxic releases was assessed using the following methodology: 1. Estimating the amount of toxic material released 2. Estimating the distances to the toxic levels of interest (as defined in Section 6.2.2) using dispersion models. Dispersion modelling assumed: Ambient temperature:

25oC

Typical stability / windspeeds:

D5m/s and F2m/s

Surface roughness:

0.1m

6.6.1 NOx Source Term Estimation The amount of NO2 likely to be released from a fire involving AN solution materials (ANS, OXS, ANE) was estimated by extrapolating the experimental results from measurements of toxic emission from fires involving solid AN conducted by the UK HSE (Ref 14). Although the results are for solid AN in a fire, there does not appear to be a similar model for ANS in the public domain. The UK HSE work has been used as the results are likely to be broadly conservative, given that the event could only occur if a sustained fire occurred as water would have to be driven off the ANS before decomposition to liberate NO2 can occur. Two AN fire scenarios were considered by the UK HSE: 

Scenario A: A large fire in combustible goods co-stored with AN. In this case, the decomposition of the AN is driven by thermal radiation from the fire. The highest emission of NO2 recorded in the experiments for this scenario was 3 g/s (for a 1m2 molten pool of AN). It was also noted that in radiant fires large enough and hot enough to initiate significant decomposition of co-stored AN, the decomposition products will become entrained into the fire combustion products. These will be hot and will generally lead to the decomposition of the NO2, with the result that NO will be the dominant emission.



Scenario B: A self-sustaining combustion reaction between AN and timber palleting on which it is stored. The experimental work indicated that 10 g/s of NO 2 was produced for a wooden pallet consumed in a fire. A correlation between the NO2 emission rate and the number of wooden pallets involved in the fire is provided in the paper.

Scenario A was considered to be more representative of the fire scenarios modelled in this QRA, i.e. there is no direct fire impingement and decomposition is the result of radiant heat from external fires. The NO2 emission rate for this QRA was estimated from the UK HSE results by assuming that the NO2 emission rate is related to source Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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area, i.e. the NO2 flux is constant. Based on a surface area of 50 m2 for the largest ANS/ANE tank, the NO2 emission rate modelled in this study is 151 g/s. Again this is thought to be very conservative as radiant heat impact from an external fire will be uneven i.e. from one side only, and a constant mass emission rate from the whole liquid surface is very unlikely. 6.6.2 Dispersion Modelling Results Dispersion of NO2 was modelled using the BP Cirrus passive release dispersion model. Although NO2 is denser than air at ambient conditions, NO2 emissions in this study are likely to be buoyant due to the radiant heat effects from the fire. NO2 temperature was assumed to be 150oC (as it decomposes to NO at 160oC). Consequence modelling results for the toxic scenarios considered in the QRA are summarised in Table 6.10. The results show:

Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:



Toxic releases do not result in concentrations off site capable of causing fatality



Injurious levels (ERPG2 or AEGL2) are not exceeded in residential areas



Irritating levels of toxic decomposition gases (evolved during extended exposure of a large ANS / ANE tank to heat radiation) may be experienced several kilometres from the site and may extend to residential areas. However it should be noted that the AEGL1 endpoint of 0.5ppm is very low and large dispersion distances (> 10km) are estimated for F2 conditions. Dispersion models such as those used in this study cannot accurately model behaviour over more than a few kilometres as they do not take into account changing terrain (slope, obstacles, channelling etc) or changes in meteorological conditions, hence tend to over-predict effect distances.

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TABLE 6.10: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – NO2 DISPERSION Scenario

Distance to Following Ground Level Concentrations – F2 (m) 1% fatality Probit Not found

AEGL-2 12ppm 1400

AEGL-1 0.5ppm > 10,000 (Note 1)

Distance to Following Ground Level Concentrations – D5 (m) 1% fatality Probit Not found

AEGL-2 12ppm 100

Toxic NOx emission from ANS decomposition in storage tank (0.151 kg/s) NOTES: 1. Dispersion distances over 10km are highly unreliable as atmospheric conditions and terrain would not remain constant.

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AEGL-1 0.5ppm 2600

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7

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS AND RISK RESULTS The frequency of an event is defined as the number of occurrences of the event over a specified time period; with the period in risk analysis generally taken as one year. Ideally statistical data would be used to estimate the likelihood of the identified hazardous events occurring. However for rare events there is often insufficient data to estimate a statistically valid frequency hence “best estimates” based on industry knowledge can be made as described below. The main focus of this QRA is to compare the offsite risk levels from the proposed ANE Production Facilty with the criteria given in HIPAP4. Therefore estimation of frequency is only carried out for the small number of events identified in the consequence analysis in Section 5 where an offsite impact was identified.

7.1

Individual Fatality Risk As per Section 5, only one event (in the proposed or existing facilities), an escalated event involving the aggregated inventory in the proposed ANE Plant, was identified with a potential offsite fatality impact (i.e. overpressure exceeding 21kPa in outdoor areas). However this impact did not extend to any residential, sensitive, recreational or commercial areas. In addition, the nearest (potentially) occupied building to the proposed ANE Production Facility is in subdivided area to the west of the Orica site more than 1100 m away, with the nearest (actually) occupied building to the north west 1800 m away from the proposed ANE Production Facility. No events (in the proposed or existing facilities) were identified with a potential offsite fatality impact (i.e. overpressure exceeding 14kPa) in any offsite buildings. It can therefore be concluded that (regardless of the event frequencies) the offsite fatality risk in the land uses where risk criteria are defined is minimal and fatality risk contours have not been prepared.

7.1.1 Boundary Risk The boundary risk criterion is 50 x 10-6 per year. This criterion is primarily aimed at minimising risk to neighbouring hazardous industries (of which there are none adjacent to the Technical Centre site). There is only one event with a fatality effect (i.e. 21kPa overpressure) at the site boundary, an escalated event involving the aggregated inventory in the proposed ANE Production Facility. 7.1.2 Escalated Event Frequency To provide a comparison with the criterion a frequency estimate needs to be made for this event. The HIRAC process included ranking of each event using the Orica frequency scale (shown in Table 7.1), and also identified any known events similar to the hazardous incident scenario under discussion. Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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Orica has stored and manufactured ANEs for over 30 years (as have other companies). Orica currently has several thousand ANE tanks at around 500 sites globally (and estimates a similar number operated by other companies). Across this large number of sites there are no known occurrences of an escalated event of this nature for sites with similar levels of control. The two potential causes of explosion in any individual inventory (hence source of a sympathetic detonation) are contamination and sustained heat source. External fires are extremely unlikely as the combustible materials are located in a separate bund at least 30m away from the ANE Production Facility area. ANS delivery and ANE collection vehicles are also in a separate sealed area and separated from the tanks by a least a few metres. Similarly to the existing facilities, bushfire risks will be controlled primarily through maintenance of an APZ around the facility. Contamination of incoming ANS is highly unlikely since it is controlled via strict manufacturing and quality assurance procedures at Orica‟s Kooragang Island site, and any serious contamination would become evident during the journey as it would cause emission of visible NOx fumes. Taking into account the safeguards included (as per the HIRACs and as summarised in Table 4.5), all large or sustained decomposition events were rated as “very unlikely”, corresponding to a frequency of around 1x10-5 per annum per event, with a subsequent explosion at least a factor of 10 lower or “extremely unlikely”. Therefore in the absence of any sound historical frequency data, a frequency of 1x10 -6 per year is judged to be applicable to an escalated explosion event. Note that a fault tree approach is also possible however would also only arrive at an order of magnitude judgement at best. It is therefore concluded that the frequency of the escalated event is well below the boundary risk criterion of 50x10-6 per year. TABLE 7.1: ORICA FREQUENCY SCALE Likelihood

Qualitative Description

Range (per annum)

Almost Certain

Will occur at least once a year

>1

Very Likely

Very likely to occur at least once during a 10 year period of operation of the facility/business

10 to 1

Likely (possible)

Has occurred at least once during the operating life of the facility/business

10 to 10

Unlikely

Known to have happened within the industry: periodically in small industries and more often in large industries

10 to 10

Very Unlikely

Has occurred somewhere in the world in all related industries

10 to 10

Extremely Unlikely

Could theoretically occur but not aware of any instances

< 10 (around 10 )

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-1

-2

-1

-4

-2

-6

-4

-6

-7

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8

RISK ASSESSMENT

8.1

Individual Fatality Risk Due to the large separation distances to populated areas and the large buffer zones between operational areas and the site boundary, very few (worst case) events have potential offsite impact. In addition, given the safeguards in place, event frequencies for worst case events are low hence the individual fatality risk criteria are complied with. Table 8.1 gives a summary of compliance with the HIPAP4 individual fatality risk criteria. TABLE 8.1: COMPLIANCE WITH INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK CRITERIA Land Uses

Max Risk (per year)

Sensitive uses

0.5 x 10

Residential areas

1 x 10

-6

Proposed Existing ANE Plant Kurri Facilities

Cumulative

Y

Y

-6

No fatality impacts in Y this land use

Y

Y

-6

No fatality impacts in Y this land use

Y

Y

-6

No fatality impacts in Y this land use

Y

Y

-6

Event frequency Y does not exceed risk criterion.

Y

Y

10 x 10

Remain within boundary of 50 x 10 an industrial site

8.2

Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria?

No fatality impacts in Y this land use

Commercial developments, 5 x 10 retail centres, offices, entertainment centres Sporting complexes and active open space

Comments

Explosion Injury Risk Overpressure injury criteria are defined only for residential areas. As noted in the results in Section 5 there were no events identified where injurious overpressures would be experienced in residential areas. Hence (regardless of frequency) the overpressure injury risk criterion (10x10-6 per year in residential areas) is satisfied as summarised in Table 8.2.

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TABLE 8.2: COMPLIANCE WITH INJURY RISK CRITERIA Land Uses

Max Risk

Comments

(per year)

Fire / Explosion Injury risk 50 x 10-6 –incident explosion overpressure at residential areas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year

8.3

No injury impacts in residential land use

Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria? Proposed Existing ANE Plant Kurri Facilities

Cumulative

Y

Y

Y

Escalation Risk (Offsite Property) Escalation criteria are defined for public buildings or neighbouring hazardous industry, (rather than general or onsite infrastructure). As noted in the results in Section 5, there were no events identified where overpressures capable of causing property damage would be experienced in neighbouring installations (which are many kilometres away). Hence the overpressure damage risk criterion (50x10-6 per year) is automatically satisfied (regardless of frequency) as summarised in Table 8.3. TABLE 8.3: COMPLIANCE WITH ESCALATION RISK CRITERIA Land Uses

Max Risk

Comments

(per year)

-6 Overpressure at 50 x 10 neighbouring potentially hazardous installations or the nearest public building should not exceed a risk of 50 per million per year for the 14 kPa overpressure contour.

8.4

No damage impacts outside the site boundary

Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria? Proposed Existing ANE Plant Kurri Facilities

Cumulative

Y

Y

Y

Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk Toxic injury and irritation criteria are defined only for residential areas. Potential toxicity effects were assessed only for the proposed ANE Production Facility as there are no significant toxicity effects associated with Class 1 explosives and existing inventories of AN and ANE are relatively small in comparison to the proposed ANE Production Facility. Assessment results compared against the risk criteria are summarised in Table 8.4 with further discussion in Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2.

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TABLE 8.4: COMPLIANCE WITH TOXIC INJURY / IRRITATION RISK CRITERIA Land Uses

Max Risk

Comments

(per year)

Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria? Proposed Existing ANE Plant Kurri Facilities

Cumulative

-6 Toxic Injury - Toxic 10 x 10 concentrations in residential areas should not exceed a level which would be seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community following a relatively short period of exposure at a maximum frequency of 10 in a million per year

Injurious concentrations not experienced in residential areas

Y

n/a

Y

-6 Toxic Irritation - Toxic 50 x 10 concentrations in residential areas should not cause irritation to eyes, or throat, coughing or other acute physiological responses in sensitive members of the community over a maximum frequency of 50 in a million per year

Event frequency Y does not exceed risk criterion.

n/a

Y

8.4.1 Injury Risk As noted in the results in Section 6.6, there were no events identified where injurious toxicity impacts due to NOx formed during ANS decomposition events would be experienced in residential areas (which are many kilometres away). Hence the toxic injury risk criterion (10x10-6 per year in residential areas) is automatically satisfied. 8.4.2 Irritation Risk As noted in the results in Section 6.6, emission of toxic decomposition products from a large ANS/ ANE storage tank due to an external fire or contamination may result in irritation due to toxic decomposition products being experienced in residential areas under some wind weather conditions (F2). To allow a comparison to the risk criteria, an estimate of frequency of decomposition (not explosion) in ANS storage is required. There are very few reported events of this nature involving ANS and ANE. The HIRAC process included ranking of each event using the Orica frequency scale (shown in Table 7.1), and also identified any known events similar to the hazardous incident scenario under discussion. As discussed in Section 7.1.1, the two potential causes of decomposition are contamination and sustained heat source, both of which are very unlikely due to the safeguards in place. Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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Taking into account the safeguards included (as per the HIRAC‟s and as summarised in Table 4.5), all large or sustained decomposition events were rated as “very unlikely”, corresponding to a frequency of around 1 x 10-5 per annum per event. Therefore in the absence of any sound historical frequency data, a frequency of 1 x10-5 per year is judged to be applicable to ANS / ANE decomposition events with a potential offsite impact. The total ANS decomposition event frequency was estimated at 50 x10-6 per year (This is based on all 5 ANS scenarios with a decomposition frequency of 1x10-5 per year each). Adjusting for wind direction (a factor of 8 – 12 in any particular direction), and probability of occurrence of F2 stability conditions (typically 20% of time or less), the likelihood of offsite irritation effects is around 1x10-6 per year. It should also be reiterated that the consequence model was conservatively developed and would be an overestimate of effect distances from most decomposition events. Hence the irritation risk criterion (50x10-6 per year in residential areas) is also satisfied. 8.5

Risk to Biophysical Environment The main concern relating to environmental risk from accident events is generally with effects on whole systems or populations. HIPAP 4 provides the following qualitative guidance for assessment of environmental risk due to accident events: 

Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural environmental areas where the effects (consequences) of the more likely accidental emission may threaten the long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it.



Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural environmental areas where the likelihood (probability) of impacts that may threaten the long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it is not substantially lower than the background level of threat to the ecosystem.

Whereas any adverse effect on the environment is obviously undesirable, there were no accidental emissions identified for the ANE Production Facilities or existing Technology Centre facilities with the potential to damage an ecosystem, or to result in any environmental effect other than a localised impact. Overpressures associated with a worst case explosion event may damage some vegetation and fauna in the vicinity, however are unlikely to affect the long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it. However as identified in Table 4.5 it is possible that an explosion could result in a bushfire with resulting adverse effects on the environment. This is discussed in Section 8.5.1.

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For completeness, potential risks to the biophysical environment due to loss of containment events, and control measures in place to prevent or reduce any impacts are also briefly summarised in the following sections. 8.5.1 Explosion events resulting in bushfire It is possible that hot shrapnel or fragments generated in an explosion could act as an ignition source, initiating a bushfire. Any bushfire could result in significant impacts to the biophysical environment (flora and fauna). As the ANE Production Facility will be surrounded by an APZ, the fuel load will be low and fire development should be slow, however the scenario cannot be entirely discounted as the ultimate effects would be heavily dependent on the environmental conditions at the time. As noted in Section 4.4, a serious bushfire was last experienced close to the site around 1996. Even with active vegetation management, bushfires are always a potential threat in the summer season, with the main causes of Australian bushfires being lightning and human initiation (either malicious or accidental, Refs 15, 16). Given past history, the background likelihood of a serious bushfire in the area would appear to be of the order of 1 in 10 to 20 years (i.e. approximately 1x 10-1 per year). The likelihood of an escalated explosion event in the ANE Production Facility is estimated at around 1x10-6 per year (as per Section 7.1). The likelihood that an explosion would also initiate a bushfire is not 100%. It can therefore be inferred that the frequency of an explosion in the ANE Production Facility initiating a bushfire is less than 1x10-6 per year. Based on the history of bushfires in the area, it is concluded that the likelihood of an explosion in the ANE plant that then initiates a bushfire is substantially lower (at least several orders of magnitude lower) than the background risk of a bushfire (and any associated impact on the environment) occurring, and that the location of the proposed development is therefore consistent with the biophysical risk criterion that: Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural environmental areas where the likelihood (probability) of impacts that may threaten the long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it is not substantially lower than the background level of threat to the ecosystem. 8.5.2 Escape of Liquid Materials Chemicals Stored in Bunded Areas: Chemicals stored include various oxidisers and corrosives (ANS, acetic acid, caustic soda etc as per APPENDIX 1). These chemical are water soluble and would affect pH if released into groundwater or surface waters. ANS contains significant amounts of nitrogen so would add to nutrient loads if released into a waterway. All chemicals are stored within concrete bunded areas which are designed to hold up to 110% of the capacity of the largest tank and 25% of the capacity of all the tanks Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

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where there are multiple tanks in a bund. All tanker deliveries occur over sealed areas with kerbing and a drainage design preventing any runoff to the environment if a spill occurs. Various combustible fuels (hydrocarbon or vegetable oils) are also stored. These are stored in self-bunded tanks and the unloading area has a drainage design to prevent any runoff to the environment if a spill occurs. Drainage systems for the combustible materials delivery areas and ANS delivery areas are separate to ensure cross contamination cannot occur in drains. Spill kits are provided to areas identified via risk assessment, enabling recovery of small quantities of spilt materials. A spill of any of these chemicals would have very localised impacts. The likelihood of any spill reaching the environment is also very low due to the onsite containment devices and sealed surfaces. Drainage systems and site grades: The plant, associated roadway and chemical storage areas are all sealed, and where appropriate, bunded. Water collected in process areas and chemical storage areas is recycled within the plant. The site grades have been designed to minimise stormwater flowing onto the site from up gradient. Rainwater collected from sealed road surfaces will be treated to remove sediment and hydrocarbons. The treated rainwater will be harvested for reuse within the process where possible. Surplus rainwater will be discharged to the environment. 8.5.3 Escape of Gaseous Materials There are no highly volatile materials handled at the ANE Plant. Acetic acid may generate odours during transfer however this would have very localised impact. The only gaseous emission would be the NOx emitted if an AN decomposition occurs. NOx compounds can contribute to air pollution/smog. However the likelihood of a decomposition event is very low due to the controls in place, and the total quantities of NOx emitted in such a decomposition event would be very small in comparison to total NOx from other sources such as power stations in the Hunter area.

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9

CONCLUSIONS A hazard analysis for the proposed ANE Plant has been completed. The risk assessment took a conservative approach to quantifying the consequences of the event scenarios by assuming worst case inventories. This is appropriate for a land use planning assessment. The area directly around the site is largely unpopulated and there are no offsite hazardous inventories, vulnerable infrastructure or populations that may be affected by an explosion event. The nearest residential property is located approximately 1.8 km from the proposed new plant. Due to the large separation distances between the explosives, ANE or ANS inventories and the site boundaries, very few events were identified with potential to cause injury or fatality outside the site boundary. The results demonstrate that the existing site facilities and proposed ANE Plant individually comply with all NSW land use planning risk criteria for new plants as published in HIPAP 4. There are very few scenarios with any offsite fatality, injury or irritation effect for either the existing or proposed facilities when measured against the relevant screening thresholds, hence cumulative risk will also be within the HIPAP 4 criteria. The ANE project has advanced to the detail design stage. Risk assessment activities have occurred throughout the design process; including completion of a HAZOP and HIRACs (which were used to prepare the PHA). Quantitative consequence explosion overpressure results were used to identify required separation distances between inventories and site boundaries, hence determine plant location and layout. Key safeguards include: 

Minimisation of inventories to minimise offsite consequences of potential explosion events.



Separation distances from site boundaries and existing facilities.



Separation distances between any combustible material storages and Class 5.1 inventories.



Engineering controls such as automated control of ANE manufacture batch process and high reliability low flow trips for emulsion pumps.



Asset protection zones and associated maintenance to protect against bushfire impingement.

Therefore no recommendations in relation to additional engineering or layout safeguards are made as part of the PHA. However it is recommended that the existing site FRMP and ERP be updated to cover the ANE Plant.

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APPENDIX 1. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS This Appendix summarises the inventories of materials to be used at the ANE Plant. As noted in the comments column, due to their properties and / or the small quantities stored, some of these materials present relatively minor / localised risks and are not considered further in the PHA. TABLE A1.1:

OXIDISERS (FEEDS TO ANE PLANT)

Material

DG Class

Delivery

Max quantity (t)

Storage

Comments

80% - 88% ANS

5.1

from Kooragang Island (KI) in road tankers

890

2 x 250 kL tanks 2 x 60 kL tanks 1 x 20 kL tank

Nominally 80-90% ANS. 250kL of ANS is approximately 330 tonnes ANS. All tanks have temp maintenance using hot water.

Weak ANS (30% - 55%)

5.1

from Kooragang Island (KI) in road tankers

90

1 x 60kL tank 2 x 10 kL tanks

Ammonium nitrate

5.1

From Kooragang Island by truck

9.6

Covered store, bulk bags

Calcium nitrate

n/a

By truck

8

Covered store, bulk bags

Thiourea (solid)

6.1 PGIII

dry thiourea will be supplied in 1000 kg bags.

8

Covered store

Localised hazards. Combustible dust, may decompose (NOx, SOx if heated). Not considered in QRA – hazards similar to other materials and is stored in much smaller quantities. .

10% Thiourea solution

n/a

Made from dry thiourea in hot water-heated dissolving tank, to make 10% thiourea solution.

Not yet defined

Batch tank

Localised hazards. Not considered in QRA.

Urea

n/a

In 1000 kg bags

10

Covered store, bulk bags

Localised hazards. Not considered in QRA.

75% Acetic Acid

8 PGII

by 20 te tanker

30

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Localised hazards. Odours if spilled . Not considered in QRA. It has a flash point of 67°C and so is a combustible liquid. Orica has selected a concentration of 75% as concentrations of acetic acid over 80% are Class III flammable liquids.

Material

DG Class

Delivery

Max quantity (t)

50% Caustic Soda

8 PGII

by 20 te tanker

30

Sodium Nitrite

5.1

In 25 kg bags

8

Weak sodium nitrite solution

n/a

TABLE A1.2:

Storage

Comments Localised hazards. Not considered in QRA.

Covered Store

Dedicated store area.

2 x 10 kL tanks

Localised OHS hazards. Not considered in QRA.

FUELS (FEEDS TO ANE PLANT)

Material

DG Class

Delivery

Storage

Comments

Diesel

C1

Tanker

100,000 L

bunded storage tank

Canola

C2

Tanker

100,000 L

bunded storage tank

Paraffin

C2

Tanker

80,000 L

bunded storage tank

E26-66

C2

Tanker

60,000 L

bunded storage tank

SFBHP90

C2

Tanker

80,000 L

bunded storage tank

Fuel Dye

C1

Truck

300 L in total

concentrate diluted with paraffin

Development fuel blends

C1

Truck

1 x 3000 L tank

Mixed on site

Fuel IBCs

C1, C2

Truck

Up to 4,000 L total in 4 off 1,000 L IBCs

Waste oil, small batch trial fuel ingredients, stored in Fuel Blend bund.

TABLE A1.3:

TANK INVENTORIES FOR QRA

Tank Name

Concentration

Capacity

ANS Storage Tank 1 (33-4301)

88.5 % AN

330 tonne (239 m ) - 88.5 % AN

ANS Storage Tank 2 (33-4302)

88.5 % AN

330 tonne (239 m ) - 88.5 % AN

3 3

3

Weak ANS Storage Tank (33-4303) 35 % AN

75 tonne (66 m ) - as 35% AN

OXS Batch Tank 1 (33-4218)

83 % AN (maximum)

26 tonne (19 m ) as 83% AN

OXS Batch Tank 2 (33-4201)

83 % AN (maximum)

80 tonne (58.8 m ) as 83% AN

OXS Batch Tank 3 (33-4202)

83 % AN (maximum)

80 tonne (58.8 m ) as 83% AN

ANE Surge Tank 1 (33-4540)

Emulsion

30 tonne (23 m ) - as emulsion

ANE Surge Tank 2 (33-4541)

Emulsion

30 tonne (23 m ) - as emulsion

ANE Surge Tank 3 (33-4542)

Emulsion

30 tonne (23 m ) - as emulsion

ANE Surge Tank 4 (33-4543)

Emulsion

30 tonne (23 m ) - as emulsion

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3

3 3

3 3 3 3

APPENDIX 2. HIRAC INFORMATION HIRAC Overview HIRACs have been carried out independently of the PHA as part of Orica‟s normal risk assessment activities. The HIRAC methodology is broadly based on AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management. A team of experienced site engineering, operations and maintenance personnel is convened to carry out the HIRAC on a particular scenario, such as “Explosion in the ANS Tank”. A HIRAC comprises the following steps for each scenario: 

Hazardous event identification



Identification of potential causes



Establishment of potential consequences (safety, health, environment and business) and the severity of those consequences both onsite and offsite



Identification of existing controls (both hardware and procedural) and review of their probable effectiveness



Estimation of likelihood of initiating events based on plant knowledge and experience, historical incident reviews and generic frequency data



Estimation of the reliability of the existing controls in preventing and/or mitigating the hazardous event



Using the above data, estimation of the final likelihood of each of the various consequences identified earlier (in some cases this requires fault tree or similar analysis)



Comparison of the likelihood and severity (risk) of each of the consequences against Orica‟s standard risk matrix



Determination as to whether additional controls are required to reduce risks further or whether the existing risks are acceptable



Recommendation for additional controls if required and if so, a timeline for their implementation.

The estimate of the final likelihood of the major consequence event (i.e. explosion with offsite effects) is the value used in the PHA. HIRAC Scenarios A list of the HIRAC scenarios extracted from the SHE Risk Register is given on the following pages. For security reasons complete details of the scenarios have not been provided.

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HIRAC SCENARIOS (as extracted from Orica’s Lotus Notes Explosives Risk Register 15/9/09) P01 1.

2.

3.

P01.1 4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

EXTERNAL FIRE / EXPLOSION Potential for external fires (from various mechanisms) to result in burning embers entering the fuel compound with ignition of combustible materials and vapours and progression to a significant fire with radiant heat.

Inclusion in PHA? Fuel fire source of heat to ANE / ANS inventories only. No offsite effects from fire radiant heat Exposure to ANE from radiant heat from an external fire from other external processes to the ANE storage causes Yes – see Table 4.5 thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate generating toxic fumes. A section of fixed pipe work with enclosed emulsion heated under confinement could cause an explosion possibly escalating to adjacent equipment. Exposure to AN from radiant heat from an external fire from other external processes to the AN storage causes Yes – see Table 4.5 thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate generating toxic fumes. EXTERNAL FIRE Potential for external fires from human failing leading to introduction of ignition sources to the fuel compound with ignition of combustible materials and vapours and progression to a significant fire with radiant heat. Potential for external vehicle fire to result in burning embers entering the fuel compound with ignition of combustible materials and vapours and progression to a significant fire with radiant heat. Potential for external fires from chemical decomposition due to mixing of incompatible materials in waste bins etc. leads to burning embers entering the fuel compound with ignition of combustible materials and vapours and progression to a significant fire with radiant heat. Potential for external fires from electrical source to result in ignition of combustible materials and vapours and progression to significant fire with radiant heat. Major leak of fuel oil into the fuel compound which ignites

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Fuel fire source of heat to ANE / ANS inventories only. No offsite effects from fire radiant heat

P01 9.

10. 11.

12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

EXTERNAL FIRE / EXPLOSION External fire engulfs ANE storage due to human failure. Leading to exposure of ANE to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fumes with potential propagation to detonation (under confinement). External vehicle fire leads to exposure of ANE to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fumes and potential propagation to detonation (under confinement). External fire caused by chemical decomposition of incompatible materials leads to exposure of ANE to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fume and potential propagation to detonation. Section of fixed pipe work with enclosed emulsion heated under confinement could cause explosion possibly escalating to adjacent equipment. External fire engulfs ANE storage or transfer equipment due to electrical fault. Leading to exposure of ANE to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fumes with potential propagation to detonation (under confinement) possibly resulting in significant damage to plant , with potential for people in the localised area to be seriously injured. Collapse or catastrophic failure of ANE Surge Bin resulting in loss of containment of emulsion phase ammonium nitrate which ignites causing injury \ fatality to personnel and a pool fire. External fire engulfs AN storage due to human failure. Leading to exposure of AN to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fumes with potential propagation to detonation (under confinement). External vehicle fire leads to exposure of AN to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fume and potential propagation to detonation (under confinement). External fire caused by chemical decomposition of incompatible materials leads to exposure of AN to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fume and potential propagation to detonation. External fire engulfs AN storage due to electrical fault. Leading to exposure of AN to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fume with potential propagation to detonation (under confinement).

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Inclusion in PHA? Fuel fire source of heat to ANE / ANS inventories only. No offsite effects from fire radiant heat

No. Local impact only Yes – see Table 4.5

P01 18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

EXTERNAL FIRE / EXPLOSION Inclusion in PHA? Exposure to AN from radiant heat from an external fire due to natural causes to the AN storage causes thermal Yes – see Table 4.5 decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate generating toxic fume. External fire engulfs Sodium Nitrite being handled within gasser manufacture building leading to thermal No – smaller case decomposition of Sodium Nitrite with release of noxious gases. than ANS decomp – see Section 0 Vehicle fire or accident causes external heating of gasser storage resulting in ignition of combustible material with No – smaller case consequential fire and combustion products from thermal decomposition of gasser solution. than ANS decomp – see Section 0 External fire engulfs Sodium Nitrite being unloaded or stored causing heating leading to thermal decomposition of No – smaller case Sodium Nitrite with release of noxious gases. than ANS decomp – see Section 0 Chemical contamination of spilled gasser residue causes thermal decomposition and external fire in proximity of No –local impact only gasser storage. Exposure to heat from a fire leading to generation of noxious fumes and potential violent rupture of container. Radiant heat from an external fire heats the acetic acid tank and the contents reach the flashpoint (67 C for 75 % No solution)

P02 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

INTERNAL FIRE / EXPLOSION Fire inside workshop caused by poor control of hot work or electrical fault. Combustible or flammable materials No – OHS present. Fuel fed into Hot Water Generator combustion chamber creating fuel rich atmosphere which later ignites violently. No –local impact only Fire in fuel unloading or transfer pumps with progression to significant fire with radiant heat. No – local heat radiation only Chemical unloading errors leading to the mixing of caustic and acetic acid. Heat of reaction, no hazardous products Thiourea dust explosion No –local impact only

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P01 29.

30. 31. P04 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

40.

EXTERNAL FIRE / EXPLOSION Inclusion in PHA? Internal fire/ heating caused by chemical decomposition of incompatible materials leads to exposure of AN to radiant Yes – see Table 4.5 heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fume and potential propagation to detonation. No flow in hot water recirculation pump. No – operational upset, ANS blockages Loss of feed water to HWG. Tubes overheated and melt causing fire. No –local impact only EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION / DETONATION Incompatible chemicals contaminate the emulsion which starts to decompose in the surge bin with the potential to raise the temperature and detonate. Incompatible chemical (or contaminated water – domestic or process) added to concentrated ANS (ANS Storage or OXS) or overheating of solution resulting in explosive decomposition / detonation Dead heading or dry running ammonium nitrate solution pumps leading to overheating of ammonium nitrate and internal explosion in the pump and\or pipe work. Dead heading or dry running emulsion phase coarse and\or fine hopper mono pumps leading to overheating of ammonium nitrate emulsion phase and internal explosion in the pump and\or pipe work Thermal heating by dry running or dead heading the ANE Unloading pump (NAPCO gear pump). Heating of emulsion under confinement can lead to thermal decomposition. Dry running of plant sump pumps resulting in potential fire or explosion. Local or spot heating caused by friction or impact in Progressive Cavity transfer pump leading to decomposition of the enclosed material .Heating of emulsion under confinement can lead to thermal decomposition. Pump casing may fail due to pressure build-up. Compositional change could lead to sensitisation or heating of pump contents. This could be caused by air entrainment leading to sensitisation by density reduction, compression ignition or dry running of pump caused by trying to pump crystalline product/ more viscous product. Tanker unloading ANS explodes due to cook-off from external fire

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Inclusion in PHA? No – smaller inventory Yes – see Table 4.5 Yes – see Table 4.5 Yes – see Table 4.5 Yes – see Table 4.5 No Yes – see Table 4.5

Yes – see Table 4.5

Yes – see Table 4.5

P04 41.

EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION / DETONATION Inclusion in PHA? AN contamination inside heating coils decomposes when heated in Hot Water Generator causing damage to No – asset damage equipment.

P05

TOXIC / HARMFUL EXPOSURE Accidental Operator exposure (splash) to harmful process chemicals (e.g. ANS, Caustic, Acetic Acid, Gasser, Fuel Dye Concentrate, hydrocarbons) Accidental ingestion of Gasser solution (poison) Accidental Operator exposure (inhalation) of Thiourea and Sodium Nitrite dusts (poisons) Decomposition of ANS leading to emissions of NOx (low pH) or Ammonia (high pH) from ANS and OXS Batch Tanks. Addition of Thiourea to Oxidiser Solution (at low pH) can form Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S). The H2S can then react to form NOx provided nitric acid is present. H2S has a low STEL limit.

42. 43.

P06 44. 45.

PHYSICAL OVER OR UNDER PRESSURE Failure of air receiver or connecting components due to overpressure causes injury. Contamination of Gasser with Comsol (or vice versa) by incorrect loading of truck tanks could lead to a reaction and over pressure of truck tank.

P07.1

VIOLENT RELEASE OF ENERGY Catastrophic failure of a storage tank while operator in bund. Failure of air hose connection on air driven diaphragm pump used for emptying bunds causes "whipping" of air lines.

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No - OHS No - OHS No - OHS Yes – see Table 4.5 No – small quantities – local impact only

No - OHS No – asset damage

No - OHS No - OHS

P07.2 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

P08 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

EXPOSURE TO DAMAGING ENERGY Failure of transfer hose/line under pressure leads to operator being sprayed with process liquids (eg. Caustic, acetic acid, diesel, emulsion, AN solution) causing injury Vehicle impact to process storage and handling equipment (in particular Emulsion Surge Tanks) Vehicle impact to pedestrian Operator injured by fall from height during operation of fuel storage, emulsion tanker loading Contact with moving parts can cause operator injury. Contact with hot surfaces can cause operator injury Operator injured by residual pressure in compressor air receiver and lines Operator injured by bag/ IBC falling from height. Operator 1. electrocuted by electrical fault.

No - OHS No – asset damage No - OHS No - OHS No - OHS No - OHS No - OHS No - OHS No - OHS

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION Loss of containment of process chemicals either during tanker unloading or during transfer to the process. Storage No – local impact. Minor environmental tanks are bunded therefore any loss of containment is restricted to unloading hose and transfer lines. Loss of containment of emulsion from Surge Tank or associated process lines, valves and other fittings. Loss of No – local impact. Minor environmental containment from tanker, or associated lines, valves and fittings during loading. Loss of containment of solid raw materials during unloading, storage and addition to the process No – local impact. Minor environmental Gaseous emissions from Hot Water Generator Stack No – local impact. Minor environmental Gaseous emissions from Thiourea and Sodium Nitrite dust extraction systems No – local impact. Minor environmental

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P09 59. 60.

WASTE PRODUCTS AND MATERIALS Badly contaminated storm water or bund water captured and recycled into the process. Disposal of contaminated packaging materials.

61.

Fire and fume from mixing of incompatible waste raw material packaging.

62.

Disposal of contaminated/offspec emulsion product (if process upset occurs).

63.

Disposal of contaminated/offspec oxidiser solution.

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No – operations No – local impact. Minor environmental No – local impact. Minor environmental No – local impact. Minor environmental No – local impact. Minor environmental

APPENDIX 3. EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURES CONSEQUENCE MODELLING METHODOLOGY Ref:

Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board Alexandria, VA2 February 2007 TP no 14 Rev 3 APPROVED METHODS AND ALGORITHMS FOR DOD RISK-BASED EXPLOSIVES SITING

Objective:

Use Kingery-Bulmash TNT correlation to estimate effect distances to set overpressure levels for AN explosions

Method:

This worksheet solves the K-B equations for a range of overpressure levels to determine the equivalent effective hazard factor (Z o) The estimated Z is then used to calculate impact distance from the NEQ on worksheets "Explosions".

P d Y Z

psi feet pounds ft/lbs1/3

Zo =

d/NEQ 0.333

Xo =

ln (Zo )

Ref: pg 22, and pg A-3, Table A-3 e (A + B.Xo + C.Xo2 + D.Xo3 + E.Xo4) P= Z (ft/lbs1/3) 0.5 - 7.25 7.25 - 60 60 - 500

A

B

P (kpa) P (psi) ln(P) psi

C

D

E

6.9137 8.8035 5.4233

-1.4398 -3.7001 -1.4066

-0.2815 0.2709 0

-0.1416 0.0733 0

0.0685 -0.0127 0

70 10.15

35 5.075

21 3.045

14 2.03

7 1.015

2 0.29

2.317473705 1.6243265 1.1135009 0.7080358 0.0148886 -1.2378744

Use Excel Solver to solve for Xo (ft): Upper X 1.9810 4.0943 6.2146

2.2937 2.2715 2.2080

2.8903 2.6585 2.7008

2.8903 2.9852 3.0640

2.8903 3.2728 3.3522

2.8903 3.8112 3.8450

2.8903 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit 4.7304 4.7357

Excel solver ln(P) recalc

2.3175 2.3175 2.3175

1.7621 1.6243 1.6243

1.7621 1.1135 1.1135

1.7621 0.7080 0.7080

1.7621 0.0149 0.0149

1.7621 -1.2379 -1.2379

solver check (aim: diff in ln(P) ~ 0)

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

0.1377 0.0000 0.0000

0.6486 0.0000 0.0000

1.0540 0.0000 0.0000

1.7472 0.0000 0.0000

3.0000 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit 0.0000 0.0000

Z (ft/lbs1/3)

Z (m/kg1/3)

Z range 0.5 - 7.25 7.25 - 60 60 - 500

9.911749761 17.998674 17.998674 17.998674 17.998674 17.998674 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit 9.69395392 14.274424 19.790032 26.384216 45.2041 113.34265 9.097840801 14.891939 21.412668 28.5667 46.759795 113.93812

Z range 2.882924057 23.85868185 198.8223487

3.941354735 7.1570772 7.1570772 7.1570772 7.1570772 7.1570772 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit 3.854749374 5.6761492 7.8694012 10.491544 17.97517 45.070104 Use this one to calculate d (m) - covers Z range 3.617708153 5.9217006 8.514634 11.359397 18.593784 45.306889

Conversion: ft/lb^.333 to m/kg^.333

Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

0.397644697

J20210-004 APPENDIX 3 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

APPENDIX 4. QRA SCENARIOS

Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

J20210-004 APPENDIX 4 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

Rev A B C D E

Date Description 10/10/2008 Initial Issue for comment 4/12/2008 Revised draft 22/12/2008 Updated quantities, ANE storage, ANE plant escalation event 26/06/2009 Updated ANS concentrations 5/08/2009 Updated ANS concentrations back to 0.885

By J Polich

Checked -

J Polich J Polich

P Johnson -

J Polich J Polich

P Johnson P Johnson

QRA Scenario

Consequence Model Parameters

Area

MAE Ref

MAE Description

Material

ANS Storage

ANS-01 ANS-02 ANS-03 ANS-04

Explosion in ANS storage tank due to contamination or external fire

ANS

330

0.885

292.05

0.353

0.3

30928

121

ANS Storage

Max storage proportion quantity AN (te)

Distance to Overpressure (kPa) (m)

Theoretical Equivalence Mass Avail for Explosion (te)

Efficiency

NEQ (kg)

70

35

21

14

Separation distances as per AS2187.1 1998 Table 3.2.3.2 (m)

7

2

Explosives Explosives (unmounded) (mounded) D = 4.8 NEQ1/3 D = 2. 4NEQ1/3

Distance to nearest boundary (m)

Process AN Class A PW Class B PW Class B PW building (unmounded) (unmounded) (mounded) Note 2 Note 2 D = 8 NEQ1/3 D = 1.8 NEQ1/3 Note 1

Potential Offsite fatality effect (i.e. >21kPa at boundary)

Potential Offsite fatality effect (i.e. >14kPa at boundary)

Potential Offsite injury effect (i.e. >7kPa at boundary)

Discuss in QRA?

Vulnerable facilities D = 44 NEQ1/3

Escalation

Distance to Nearest Existing Explosives Inventory (Test Cell)

Potential onsite escalation effect (AS2187)

178

247

329

564

1415

151

75

251

57

465

697

697

1381

260 N

Y

Y

Y

215 N

Explosion in ANS tanker

ANS

26

0.885

23.01

0.353

0.6

4874

65

96

133

178

305

764

81

41

136

31

251

376

376

746

260 N

N

Y

Y

215 N

OXS Batch Tank OXS-01 OXS-02 OXS-03

Explosion in OXS batch tank due to contamination or external fire

ANS

80

0.83

66.4

0.353

0.3

7032

74

109

151

201

344

863

92

46

153

34

284

425

425

843

260 N

N

Y

Y

215 N

ELK Area

ELK-01 ELK-02

Explosion in ELK

ANE

2

1

2

0.68

1

1360

43

63

87

116

199

499

53

27

89

20

123

180

184

487

260 N

N

N

N

215 N

ANE Storage

ANE-01 ANE-02

Explosion in single ANE storage tank due to contamination ANE or external fire

30

1

30

0.68

1

20400

105

155

215

287

491

1231

131

66

219

49

404

607

607

1202

260 N

Y

Y

Y

215 N

ANE Storage

ANE-01 ANE-02

Explosion in all (4) ANE storage tanks due to contamination or external fire

ANE

120

1

120

0.68

1

81600

167

246

341

455

780

1955

208

104

347

78

642

963

963

1908

260 Y

Y

Y

Y

215 N

AN Storage

AN-01

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination

AN

20

1

20

0.32

0.5

3200

57

84

116

155

265

664

71

35

118

27

204

311

311

648

280 N

N

N

N

185 N

AN Storage

AN-02

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to fire

AN

20

1

20

0.32

0.16

1024

39

57

79

106

181

454

48

24

81

18

102

180

152

443

280 N

N

N

N

185 N

AN Storage

AN-03

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to missile / high energy shock wave

AN

20

1

20

0.32

1

6400

72

105

146

195

334

837

89

45

149

33

275

412

412

817

280 N

N

Y

Y

185 N

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination

AN (off spec)

0

1

0

0.32

0.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

280 N

N

N

N

AN Storage (offspec)

n/a

N

ANE Plant all inventory

ESC-01

ANE plant - ANS storage tank explosion and sympathetic ANS+ANE+A detonation, aggregate inventory including largest ANS (1 x N 350 te ANS, 4 x 30te ANE and 20 te AN)

470

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

118928

190

279

387

516

884

2216

236

118

393

89

728

1092

1092

2164

280 Y

Y

Y

Y

215 Y

ANE Plant all inventory

ESC-02

ANE plant - knock on (any causes except ANS explosion) and sympathetic detonation, aggregate inventory (4 x 30te ANE and 20 te AN)

140

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

as per individual scenarios

88000

171

252

350

467

800

2005

214

107

356

80

658

987

987

1957

280 Y

Y

Y

Y

215 N

Notes: 1. PWA D = NEQ2/3 D = 3.6NEQ1/2 D = 14.8NEQ1/3

ANE + AN

NEQ <= 2500kg 2500 kg < NEQ <= 4500kg NEQ > 4500kg

2. PWB NEQ <= 2500kg D = 1.5 NEQ2/3 2500 kg < NEQ <= 4500kg D = 5.5NEQ1/2 NEQ > 4500kg D = 22.2NEQ1/3 Minimum of 180m for unmounded magazines 3. "n/a" means the event is not credible or is the result of an escalation and does not further escalate as all inventories already involved (i.e. NEQ is aggregate inventory)

20210 QRA scenarios KURRI Rev E Explosions proposed ANE plant Print Date: 20/08/2009 Page 1 of 1

Rev A

Date

Description 10/10/2008 Initial Issue for comment

B

4/12/2008 Revised draft

By J Polich

Checked -

J Polich

QRA Scenario

Area

MAE Ref

MAE Description

Consequence Model Parameters

Material

Max storage (te)

% AN

Distance to Overpressure (kPa) (m)

Theoretical Equivalence Efficiency NEQ Mass Avail (ref Orica AN (ref Orica AN (kg) for Explosion CoP v8) CoP v8) (te)

70

35

21

14

Separation distances as per AS2187.1 1998 Table 3.2.3.2 (m)

7

2 Explosives (unmounded)

Explosives (mounded) D = 4.8 NEQ1/3 D = 2. 4NEQ1/3

Process building

AN Class A PW (unmounded) D = 8 NEQ1/3 D = 1.8 NEQ1/3 Note 1

Class B PW (unmounded) Note 2

Distance to nearest boundary (m)

Class B PW (mounded) Note 2

Potential Offsite fatality effect (i.e. >14kPa at boundary)

Potential Discuss in Offsite QRA? injury effect (i.e. >7kPa at boundary)

Vulnerable facilities D = 44

Base Case

Comments re frequency

Frequency (per yr)

NEQ1/3

Escalation

X

Y

Distance to Proposed ANE Plant / AN Store

Potential onsite escalation effect (i.e. less than AS2187 process building sep distance to ANE Plant / AN Store inventory)

Research Magazine RM/QS-01 (RM) and Quarry Service Depot (QS)

Explosion in Research Magazine or Quarry Services Depot which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

Explosive

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

50220

142

209

290

387

663

1663

177

89

295

66

546

819

819

1623

635 N

Y

Y

1.00E-06 Upper boundary of "extremely unlikely"

325 N

Research Laboratory (RL)

Explosion in Mixing Lab Explosive which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

11620

87

129

178

238

407

1021

109

54

181

41

335

503

503

997

715 N

N

N

1.00E-06 Upper boundary of "extremely unlikely"

525 N

Mixing Laboratory RL-01 (ML)

Explosion in Research Laboratory which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

Explosive

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

560

32

47

65

86

148

371

40

20

66

15

68

180

102

363

480 N

N

N

1.00E-06 Upper boundary of "extremely unlikely"

820 N

Test Cell

Explosion in Test Cell which involves entire inventory in this plant location

Explosive

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

50

14

21

29

39

66

166

18

9

29

7

14

180

20

162

450 N

N

N

1.00E-06 Upper boundary of "extremely unlikely"

185 N

ML-01

TC-01

20210 QRA scenarios KURRI Rev D Explosions Existing Kurri Print Date: 2/07/2009 Page 1 of 1

APPENDIX 5. SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS The key assumptions made at each stage of the risk assessment are summarised in the table below. Stage

Assumption

Comments

Hazard ID

Hazards from ANE Plant are associated with ANS, ANE or AN. Other chemicals not significant.

All other chemicals either oxidizers or corrosives (stored as per relevant codes with bunding etc). Localised risks only.

Hazards from existing facilities are associated with Class 1 explosives, ANE and AN. Other chemicals are not significant. Pool fires from combustible storage present localised heat radiation risks only. Consequence Assessment

100% maximum inventory (NEQ) for each storage (proposed ANE plant and existing facilities) is assumed to be involved in any explosion event.

Refer to main report for inventory basis for proposed ANE plant and existing facilities.

Orica Draft AN Code of Practice (version 8) assumptions for TNT equivalence estimates for AN, ANS. ANE assumptions based on Orica's ideal detonation (IDEx) code.

Refer to main report for consequence results.

Kingery and Bulmash scaled distance correlation for overpressure impact distance estimates. (Ref: US DoD Technical Paper no 14 Rev 3 Feb 2007).

Frequency Assessment

Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

HIPAP 4 endpoints for overpressure vs probability of fatality calculation for base case as follows for receptors located indoors and outdoors Probability of fatality: indoors outdoors 70kPa 100% 100% 35kPa. 50% 15% 21kPa 20% 1% 14kPa 1% 0.1%

Inside risk results are more conservative than outside.

Upper end of Orica qualitative risk matrix frequency band for all ANS / ANE explosion events. (Generally each decomposition event involving a particular ANS / ANE inventory was rated as “very unlikely” and the frequency has been set -5 at 1 x10 per year). Explosions are set a factor of ten lower -6 (i.e. 1 x 10 per year) This approach does not account for factors such as delivery frequency, numbers of tanks etc.

NOTE: Publicly available frequency data is very poor. Fault tree approach is an alternative however would be order of magnitude at best

J20210-004 APPENDIX 5 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

Stage

Assumption

Comments

Escalation Risk

Escalation risk between the proposed ANE plant and existing facilities has been assessed by comparing the layout with the separation distances required in Table 3.2.3.2 in AS2187.1 - 1998. If the required separation distance is met, escalation is not credible for the purposes of the risk assessment.

Knock on events affecting the AN store or ANE storage (i.e. part of ANE plant) or existing Class1 explosives, ANE or AN inventories are assumed to contribute to escalation risk (as AN, ANE and Class1 explosives may detonate if subjected to a high energy shock wave).

Worst case escalated event within the ANE plant is aggregated inventory NEQ (i.e. ANE and AN, also ANS only if ANS is initiating inventory).

ANS is not susceptible to impact / shock detonation therefore an external explosion may result in a loss of containment of AN solution due to storage vessel damage, but not a subsequent explosion event.

-

NOTE: Risk contours not prepared for site due to very low number of scenarios with potential offsite effects.

Risk Calculation

Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

J20210-004 APPENDIX 5 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

APPENDIX 6. REFERENCES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Document: Revision: Revision Date: Document ID:

NSW Department of Planning (Reprinted 1997) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 6 Guidelines for Hazard Analysis NSW Department of Planning (Reprinted 1997) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning NSW Department of Planning (1997) Multi-Level Risk Assessment Orica Draft Ammonium Nitrate Code of Practice (v8) available in the SHE Risk Register Sherpa Consulting 20210-001 Rev A June 2007 Liddell Site ANE Upgrade Project Quantitative Risk Assessment ICI Engineering (16 April 1992) Updated Hazard Analysis ICI Mining Services Technology Park Australian Explosives Manufacturers Safety Committee (AEMSC), Code of Good Practice Precursors For Explosives Edition 1 – 1999 Orica Liddell ANE Plant Uprate Process Description Doc Ref: KIEG1150-02-26001_A Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for Nitrogen Dioxide, October 2006. Bushfire Consulting Specialists 090201 Orica Kurri http://www.aiha.org/Committees/documents/erpglevels.pdf , http://www.eh.doe.gov/chem_safety/teel.html TNO Purple Book, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, , Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, 1st edition 1999 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board Alexandria, VA TP no 14 Rev 3 Approved Methods And Algorithms For DOD Risk-Based Explosives Siting (IMESAFR) Adams, W.D. UK HSE, Hazardous Installation Directorate The Toxic Effects from a Fire Involving Ammonium Nitrate. Geoscience Australia What Cause Bushfires? http://www.ga.gov.au/hazards/bushfire/causes.jsp http://www.bushfirecrc.com/research/downloads/Fire%20Bugged%20-%20MW.pdf

J20210-004 APPENDIX 6 1 13 October 2009 J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

Transport Hazard Analysis

Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (ABN 40 110 961 898) Phone: 61 2 9412 4555 Fax: 61 2 9412 4556 Web: www.sherpaconsulting.com

TECHNICAL NOTE ANE and ANS Transport Hazard Analysis Input to Environmental Assessment

Prepared for: Prepared by:

Richard Sheehan, Orica Jenny Polich, Sherpa Consulting

Rev

Date

Description

Prepared By

Checked By

A

8 Jan 2009

Draft for client comment

Jenny Polich

-

B

2 Oct 2009

Updated draft for client comment

Jenny Polich

Phil Johnson

0

8 Oct 2009

Final Issue for inclusion in EA

Jenny Polich

Phil Johnson

RELIANCE NOTICE This report is issued pursuant to an Agreement between SHERPA CONSULTING PTY LTD (‘Sherpa Consulting’) and Orica which agreement sets forth the entire rights, obligations and liabilities of those parties with respect to the content and use of the report. Reliance by any other party on the contents of the report shall be at its own risk. Sherpa Consulting makes no warranty or representation, expressed or implied, to any other party with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this report and assumes no liabilities with respect to any other party’s use of or damages resulting from such use of any information, conclusions or recommendations disclosed in this report.

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 1

1

BACKGROUND

1.1

Project Description Orica Australia (Orica) proposes to build a new Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) Production Facility at their Kurri Kurri Technical Centre located off George Booth Drive, Richmond Vale NSW. The new plant will meet the projected Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion demand in the South East Region to 2020 and beyond. The plant is expected to manufacture up to 250,000 tonnes per annum of ANE at maximum production, using Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) from Orica’s Kooragang Island manufacturing facility as the main feed. Umwelt Australia Pty Ltd is preparing an Environmental Assessment for the Project, on behalf of Orica which will be submitted to the approval authority, the NSW Department of Planning (DoP), under Part 3A of the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act. Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Sherpa) has been retained to assist in completing the risk assessment activities associated with the transport of the product and the raw materials for the project.

1.2

Scope and Objectives Orica has determined that the Environmental Assessment (EA) should include some consideration of transport risks associated with project, specifically ANE and ANS transport to and from the site. Both ANE and ANS are classed as Dangerous Goods (DG) Class 5.1 oxidiser materials. Transport of these goods is regulated under the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADGC). As ANE contains over 45% Ammonium Nitrate (AN), it is also classified as Security Sensitive AN (SSAN) and is also regulated under the NSW Explosives Regulations 2005. A brief technical note has been prepared summarising the potential transport incident scenarios involving ANE or ANS, and identifying the safeguards in place. This technical note will be included as an appendix in the Project EA.

1.3

Limitations Various other chemicals including DG Class 8 corrosives (such as acetic acid and caustic soda) and combustible liquids (e.g. diesel, canola) will be used in the facility, but are not covered by this technical note. It should be noted that large quantities of these types of materials are routinely transported in most areas of Australia including the Newcastle region. Review of any changes in heavy vehicle numbers and implications for the existing roads is addressed in the Traffic Impact section of the Environmental Assessment. However it is noted that the traffic impact assessment concludes that the overall increase in heavy vehicle numbers can be easily accommodated within the existing road network. J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 2

2

TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ANS and ANE transport quantities anticipated for the Project are summarised in Table 2-1. Note that these reflect the final capacity of the facility at maximum capacity. Initially, ANE plant operations are expected to be at lower capacity, hence require a smaller number of vehicles. The roads on the routes to and from the Technology Centre site at Richmond Vale are well maintained, and are currently used for transport of Dangerous Goods, including Class 5.1 materials. ANE is currently transported from Orica’s Liddell site to the Kurri Kurri site in small quantities (averaging one single tanker per week for the existing Quarry Services business at Kurri Kurri). The route is confirmed Bdouble capable by the NSW RTA. TABLE 2-1: ANS AND ANE HEAVY VEHICLE TRANSPORT SUMMARY Route

Material

Load size (tonnes)

No of Comments vehicles per day

Orica Kooragang Island to Orica Technology Centre site

ANS (88% at o 110 C)

B-Double - 38

16

Based on 250,000tpa max capacity and average load size for tankers/ISO’s.

22

Based on 250,000tpa max capacity and average load size for tankers/ISO’s.

Orica ANE Technology Centre site to various existing Depot sites in Hunter region and South Eastern Australia.

2.1

ISO/ Single - 23

B-Double - 38 ISO/ Single - 23

Routes ANS: Currently hot ammonium nitrate solution (88% ANS at 110oC) is transported via dedicated tankers from Kooragang Island (KI) via Maitland and Singleton to the Orica Liddell manufacturing site in both single tankers and B-Doubles. The majority of the route is along the New England Highway. The latter part of the route will change as shown in Table 2-2 when ANS is transported to the proposed ANE Production Facility at the Technology Centre. The tankers will turn off the New England Highway at the John Renshaw Drive junction, travelling along John Renshaw Dr until the intersection with George Booth Dr, where they will turn onto George Booth Drive continuing to the site approximately 5 km to the east at Richmond Vale. The vehicles will enter the J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 3

Orica Technical Centre using an existing entrance on George Booth Drive and travel to the proposed ANE Production Facility using a new internal access road. TABLE 2-2: ANS ROUTE ANS Current Route (KI to Liddell)

ANS Modified B-Double route (KI to Kurri Kurri Site)

Cormorant Rd

Cormorant Rd

Tourle St

Tourle St

Industrial Dr

Industrial Dr

Maitland Rd

Maitland Rd

Pacific Highway

Pacific Highway

New England Highway (via Maitland and Singleton)

New England Highway

Pikes Gully Rd

John Renshaw Dr

Liddell site.

George Booth Dr Technical Centre site

ANE: ANE will be manufactured at the Kurri Kurri site and transported via tanker to various existing Orica Depot Sites in the Hunter Valley and South East Australia region. From the depot sites Mobile Manufacturing Units (MMUs) operate to transport the ANE to the mine site where it is sensitised prior to use. The Project will have no effect on the MMU transport activities from the depot sites. The ANE route from Technology Centre site to the Depot sites is summarised in Table 2-3. The likely variation to the route following the planned construction of the F3 Freeway extension is also detailed. The ANE tankers are dedicated and do not carry any other materials. Various tanker configurations which are able to carry either 20, 22 or 38 tonne of ANE are used. Small quantities (250L each) of gasser solution (dilute sodium nitrite / water solution) and companion solution (low concentration ANS) may also be carried on the ANE tankers in separate tanks on the vehicles.

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 4

TABLE 2-3: ANE ROUTE ANE Route (Kurri to Depot sites)

ANE Route (Kurri to Depot sites after F3 Freeway extension)

George Booth Dr

George Booth Dr

John Renshaw Dr

John Renshaw Dr Hunter Expressway on-ramp

Mulbring St, Kurri Kurri

Hunter Expressway extension)

Tarro St, Kurri Kurri

New England Hwy at Branxton

Lang St, Kurri Kurri

New England Hwy (Singleton)

Main Rd

Depot Sites (South East Region)

Cessnock Rd

(F3

Freeway

Or

New England Hwy at Maitland

F3 Freeway Northbound or Southbound

New England Hwy (Singleton)

Depot Sites (South East Region)

Depot Sites (Hunter area) Or As above to John Renshaw Dr F3 Freeway Northbound or Southbound

2.2

Legislation, Codes and Standards Transport of Dangerous Goods such as ANE and ANS is regulated under the ADG7 (Australian Dangerous Goods Code, version 7) managed by WorkCover NSW and for substances classified as SSAN under the NSW Explosives Regulations 2005. In summary for ANE and ANS, the regulations require that 

A road vehicle transporting dangerous goods should wherever practicable avoid heavily populated or environmentally sensitive areas, congested crossings, tunnels, narrow streets, alleys, or sites where there is, or may be, a concentration of people.



Routes should be pre-planned wherever possible.



Routes should be selected to minimise the risk of personal injury, of harm to the environment or property during the journey.



A risk assessment in accordance with AS4360 Risk Management be prepared. (This is undertaken on a route specific basis by the transport company).



Both drivers and vehicles are Dangerous Goods licensed.



Vehicles carrying Dangerous Goods adhere to design standards.



For SSAN materials, the appropriate security clearance for the drivers has been obtained. J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 5

2.3

Internal Orica standards, policies, procedures Orica have corporate standards applicable to transport generally and ANE specifically. The Orica Model Procedures (specifically MP-SF-014: Selection and Management of Transport & Storage Contractors and MP-SF-016: Transport of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Goods) require the following general measures relevant to DG transport be adopted: 

Driver training and accreditation



Carrier accreditation



Disciplinary procedures



Carrier maintenance programs



Orica site and customer site procedures



Reporting and investigation of incidents

Internal engineering guidelines specifically applicable to ANE and ANS transport and design of road tankers include Bulk Distribution Tankers For Emulsion Phase And Oxidiser Liquors, Orica (23/9/98) This outlines Orica’s commitments under the legislation listed below to ensure safe and effective operation of ANE and ANS delivery units, ensuring that they are constructed to applicable regulatory and engineering design requirements. 

Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (Australian Dangerous Goods Code). Specifically: -

Section 3.4

Marking of Road Vehicles

-

Section 3.7

Requirements for Emergency Information Panels

-

Section 6.3

Application for approval and notification requirements

-

Section 6.5

Road Standards

-

Section 6.8

Approval

-

Section 6.9

Alternative Design Criteria

-

Section 6.10

Maintenance



Australian Design Rules for Motor Vehicles and Trailers (ADR’s).



AS1210

Pressure Vessels.



AS1554.1

Structural Steel Welding - Welding of Steel Structures.



AS1841.5 Portable Fire Extinguishers - Specific Requirements for Dry Powder Type Extinguishers



AS2809.1 Road Tank Vehicles for Dangerous Goods - General Requirements. J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 6



AS2809.2



AS2809.4 Road Tank Vehicles for Dangerous Goods - Tankers for Toxic and Corrosive Cargoes.



AS4326

Road Tank Vehicles for Dangerous Goods

The Storage and Handling of Oxidising Agents

As per the guideline ANS and ANE tankers are designed with emergency venting capacity based on experimentally measured vapour generation in a decomposition event.

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 7

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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION Both ANS and ANE are classified as Dangerous Goods and an assessment of the potential hazards associated with the transport of these products has been undertaken to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place.

3.1

ANS Properties Hot ammonium nitrate solution (88% ANS at 110oC) will be transported from Orica’s Kooragang Island site to the Technology Centre site via tanker as discussed in Section 2.1. ANS is a class 5.1 PGII oxidiser, UN number 2426. The main hazard associated with handling AN solutions is decomposition due to excessive heating and/or contamination, and eventually explosion if the decomposition gases are sufficiently confined (e.g. in an inadequately vented storage tank). Contaminants such as acids, chlorides, organics, alkali metals, and nitrites increase the risk of decomposition. Most of the gaseous decomposition products from a decomposition event are toxic. These gases can include ammonia (NH3), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitric oxide (NO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and nitric acid vapour (HNO3). NO2 is the most toxic of these. Assuming ANS is uncontaminated, it is highly insensitive to friction and impact and essentially insensitive to sparks (i.e. low explosion risk). ANS does not burn, but as an oxidising agent, will support fire, even in the absence of an external source of oxygen. ANS also poses an environmental hazard if it reaches a waterway due to its high nitrogen content. High concentrations of nitrogen can be toxic to aquatic life and grazing animals if ingested.

3.2

ANE Properties ANE is a mixture of around 70% ammonium nitrate (AN), 15% water and the balance hydrocarbon based materials. All bulk emulsions manufactured at the proposed ANE plant will fall within the UN definition of Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) Intermediate for Blasting Explosives, Class 5.1 PGII, UN number 3375. Bulk emulsions produced at the Technology Centre site will not contain any self explosive ingredients. However once ANE has been produced, the main hazard is decomposition due to excessive heating and/or contamination which can cause accelerating decomposition to the point where explosion or detonation can occur.

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 8

Sensitivity to accidental decomposition/detonation is increased by the presence of energetic sensitising materials such as fuel oil or chemical contaminants. ANE’s are insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks. While ANE’s are liquids, they are extremely viscous, and solidify quickly when cooled, hence do not pose a significant environmental hazard in the event of a spill. 3.3

Hazardous Incidents The event of most concern during transport of ANE or ANS is explosion. Potential causes of an explosion for either ANS or ANE are: 

Decomposition of contaminated load and confinement of gases, resulting in explosion en-route.



Vehicle fire engulfs load resulting in decomposition, confinement of gases and explosion. A fire could be initiated by various causes including electrical or mechanical faults, a tyre fire or a vehicle accident or collision.

Note that impact alone is not a credible cause of ANE or ANS explosion in a vehicle accident as: 

ANS and ANE is insensitive to impact (i.e. does not explode on impact / shock).



Impact in a vehicle accident is not of sufficiently high energy to cause explosion of ANE. A high energy explosive charge (such as a detonator) is required to initiate an explosion.

A review of transport incidents within Orica and within the industry indicates that vehicle fires and accidents involving ANE and ANS transport vehicles do occur. However escalation to involve the ANE or ANS load is extremely uncommon and takes a period of time to escalate to conditions which could potentially result in an explosion, providing time to isolate the accident area. There is only one incident in Orica’s records (globally) where escalation to an ANE load and explosion occurred involving an MMU unit carrying class 1 explosive ANFO material. The ANS and ANE vehicles from the Kurri site will not be carrying any class 1 dangerous goods (explosive) materials.

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 9

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CONTROLS AND MITIGATION Orica has implemented a number of measures to ensure that the risk associated with the transport of ANS and ANE is minimised, with a summary of these controls detailed in the sections below. These controls are audited at least annually in accordance with Orica model procedures. In addition, in the event of a transport related incident there are procedures in place to prevent escalation of the event and minimise the risk to the community and the environment. These are described in the following sections and also summarised in the Hazard Identification Word Diagram in APPENDIX A.

4.1

Product Contamination Controls To prevent risks associated with the contamination of ANS and ANE with other products the following controls have been implemented.

4.2



Quality control processes at Kooragang Island to ensure that the ANS is suitable for transport from the site;



Quality control processes at the Technology Centre Kurri site to ensure that the ANE product is suitable for transport;



Dedicated ANS and ANE Tankers for the transport of each product, ensuring that non compatible materials are not introduced during transport;



Filling nozzles and loading facilities for the ANS, ANE and other chemicals are of different configurations and sizing to prevent incorrect loading; and



Separate, dedicated tanks for the small loads of gasser and companion solution transported with the ANE.

Truck Controls To minimise the potential for escalation of an incident as a result of an accident or vehicle fire the following controls are incorporated into transport arrangements for ANE and ANS: 

As required by state legislation, all vehicles carrying ANE and ANS are licensed by the relevant body, which in NSW is the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water (DECCW). The licensing process requires that the tank component of the vehicle be constructed in accordance with an approved design and that the tank comply with the requirements of the Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (ADG Code). J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 10



4.3

Activities such as maintenance and pre-start checks are undertaken in accordance with manufacturer requirements and the National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation Scheme requirements.

Driver Training, Education, and Licensing All drivers who carry Dangerous Goods are required to be licensed by state regulatory agencies, in NSW the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water is the responsible agency. To obtain a licence, drivers must complete an accredited training course, complete a medical and meet the driving history requirements. In addition, Orica requires that drivers complete specific training including information on Orica’s Safety Management Systems, information on the products being transported and the controls in place to ensure safe transport of the product.

4.4

Route Risk Analysis Route risk analysis is undertaken by the transport contractor in accordance with the following documents;  

AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail

Issues considered in the transport route risk analysis include the physical conditions experienced along the route, the impact of changing conditions and other factors such as speed and fatigue (Table 4-1). TABLE 4-1: Route Risk Analysis

Physical Conditions Restricted View – especially at intersections and ‘blind corners’ Roundabouts – size, location, condition, alternative route to avoid these Pedestrian Crossings and islands Intersections and concealed roadways Bridges – esp. if small or one way

Changing Conditions

Other Issues

Oncoming traffic – known passing areas

Speed – yours and other traffic on the road

Other heavy vehicle movement

Fatigue Management

School and public bus route

First time travel on the route

Congestion Road works – scheduled and unscheduled

Roadway shoulders / known pull over areas

Detours – scheduled and unscheduled

Concealed crest, sharp curves, poor camber

Weather – rain, high wind areas

Over / Underpass clearance

Known flood areas

Emergency Response Procedure in place Safety Management Plan in place Media reports – cultural events, sporting events, protest action, political activity Maintain communication with base

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 11

Physical Conditions

Changing Conditions

Rail crossings

Livestock / farm areas

Floodways, culverts, water courses

Bush fires – usually seasonal

Overtaking lanes

Transport Vehicle fire

Other Issues

Designated rest areas and Road house locations Recreational areas and Industrial areas Locations of Protected Works A & B type areas

The outcome of the transport risk analysis is incorporated into the driver training for the route being travelled. An example risk assessment prepared by the transporter (Toll) is contained in APPENDIX B. 4.5

Emergency Plans All drivers undergo emergency response training for incidents such as vehicle accidents or vehicle fires. The training includes: 

Mitigation measures in the event of a vehicle fire, such as battery isolation and extinguishing of fires;



Measures to ensure the safety of the public, including, in the event of a large fire the implementation of an exclusion zone around the vehicle.



Activation of the Orica Emergency Response Systems to assist in the management of the incident. The general public are also able to activate the Orica Emergency Response System, with the contact details for the co-ordinating group detailed on the vehicle Dangerous Goods placarding.

Each vehicle carries an Emergency Procedure Guide which summarises the actions to be undertaken in the event of a vehicle fire and also a guide for each type of product being carried (i.e. ANS or ANE).

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 12

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Given the existing regulatory requirements, Orica’s internal requirements, the nature of the roads to be used, and the engineering controls in place in relation to tanker design, no additional recommendations have been identified in relation to managing the hazards of ANE or ANS during transport to or from the Technology Centre site.

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 Page 13

APPENDIX A: Event

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORD DIAGRAM Cause/Comments

Decomposition of 1. Contamination occurs during contaminated load manufacture of ANE or ANS resulting in explosion enroute

Prevention Controls

Possible Consequences

Manufacturing process quality control

Decomposition and explosion With warning event. en-route. Potential fatality for driver and 1. Driver training other road users 2. Emergency response procedures define evacuation distance

2. Tanker is contaminated Vehicle fire engulfs load resulting in decomposition, confinement of gases and explosion

1. Dedicated tankers 2. Tanker maintenance programme 1. Tyre fire, ignited by binding brakes, 1. Vehicle maintenance programme faulty bearings, deflated tyres 2. Pre-use vehicle checks 3. Driver competence

Mitigation Controls

2. Electrical / mechanical fault / driver smoking etc resulting in cabin or engine fire 3. Vehicle accident / collision

1. Vehicle maintenance programme 2. Pre-use vehicle checks 3. Driver competence 1. Vehicle maintenance programme 2. Pre-use vehicle checks 3. Driver competence 4. Route risk assessment as per ADG7 conducted by transporter 5. Well signed road, approved B double route 6. Daylight transport operation as far as practicable

Fire engulfs load. With warning event Decomposition and explosion. Potential fatality for driver and 1. Purpose built ANS and ANE tankers designed with other road users emergency venting capacity based on experimentally measured vapour generation in a decomp event (Ref: Orica document BULK DISTRIBUTION TANKERS FOR EMULSION PHASE AND OXIDISER LIQUORS 9/98) 2. No combustible / flammables in load area. Diesel with prime mover only. 3. Driver training 4. Emergency response procedures define evacuation distance

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 ATTACHMENTS

APPENDIX B:

EXAMPLE ROUTE RISK ASSESSMENT BY TRANSPORTER

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003 8 October 2009 ATTACHMENTS

1

Risk Assessment Report What was assessed: Transport of Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) from Orica Manufacturing facility Kooragang Island to Orica Technology Centre Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) Facility site via road. Product is carried in B-double and single semi trailers. Area in which assessment was conducted: Distribution Operations by Toll Resources Date of assessment:

Date to be reviewed:

28/05/09

28/05/10

Assessment Team

Position

Lead Assessor

Michael Bonadio

Compliance Manager – Supply Chain, OMS

Assessor

Paul McGrath

SSDS Security and Compliance Manager Toll Resources NSW

Assessor

Paul Nicou

Compliance Officer

Special notes  

Areas Assessed: 1. Egress from OMS facility at Kooragang Island 2. Route via New England Highway, John Renshaw Drive and George Booth Drive to Orica Technology Centre, Richmond Vale. 3. Right hand turn into Echidna Drive, Orica’s Technology Centre entrance 4. Alert security for access

2

Job Safety Environment Risk Assessment 1

PURPOSE

Risk assessment aids in the control of safety associated with the transportation of product by road to customer sites located throughout Australia. The performance of a risk assessment is mandatory in order to protect:     

Our customers Our employees and contracted carriers Our shareholders The community The environment

The purpose of this procedure is to document the OMS processes for performing a risk assessment and implementing controls for the road transport of OMS product from manufacturing and storage facilities within Australia.

2

SCOPE

The risk assessment process forms part of our structured approach to managing risk. It includes the identification, analysis and evaluation of risks, and also incorporates the first stage of controls on how to mitigate the risks. Formal risk assessments will be performed for: 

3   

Transportation of product within Australian

REFERENCES AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk management standard AS/NZS 2187.1 Explosives – Storage, Transport & Use Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road & Rail - 7th Edition

3

4

RESPONSIBILITY 41057

Logistics Manager Compliance Manager Distribution Officer

5

 Overall responsibility  Setting Master assessments  Performing assessments when delegated to do so

ACTION / METHOD

Making assessments A new Risk Assessment form will be created for each transport route.

Communication Risk assessment results will be communicated to the carrier/s involved with the physical transportation of product, the applicable Account Manager associated with the customer and the business management team.

Matrix values In order to assess severity, consequence or risk level, a clear understanding of the accepted meanings is needed. The following tables are provided for guidance:

 Risk Assessment Matrix MP-SG-030B - SH&E RISK MANAGEMENT - APPENDIX C: QUALITATIVE RISK TABLES  RISK APPLICATION: Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis (JSERA) applications refer to the following risk matrix and probability of occurrence descriptors.  Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis: The following simplification of the Orica Risk Matrix is intended to facilitate the application of risk assessment in Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis (JSERA) applications. It is consistent with MP-SG-033(2).

4

Table 1: SH&E Category Issues for Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis Consequence Categories

Notable Event Cat 1

Significant Event Cat 2

Highly Significant Cat 3.1

Serious Event MHF Cat 3.2

Extremely Serious MHF Cat 4.1

Catastrophic Event MHF Cat 4.2

SAFETY & HEALTH

1 Minor Injury, First Aid

Single MTI

Single LWC or Multiple MTI

Permanent Disability; Multiple LWC

Single Fatality

Multiple Fatalities

ENVIRONMENT

Very minor pollution

Minor local pollution

Evident pollution local concern

Significant local pollution

Major local pollution

Extremely severe pollution

Table 2: Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis Risk Matrix Likelihood of Occurrence

Notable Event Cat 1

Significant Event Cat 2

Highly Significant Cat 3.1

Serious Event MHF Cat 3.2

Extremely Serious MHF Cat 4.1

Catastrophic Event MHF Cat 4.2

[A] Almost Certain

Level II

Level II

Level I

Level I

Level I

Level I

[B] Very Likely

Level III

Level II

Level II

Level I

Level I

Level I

[C] Possible (Likely)

Level III

Level III

Level II

Level II

Level I

Level I

[D] Unlikely

Level IV

Level IV

Level III

Level III

Level II

Level I

[E] Very Unlikely

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level III

Level II

[F] Extremely Unlikely

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level III

5

Table 3: Event Likelihood of Occurrence Descriptors for Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis For Use in JSERA Descriptor

Example or detailed description Description

A. Almost Certain

It is expected to occur in most circumstances

B. Very Likely

Has occurred in some circumstances (known to have happened)

C. Possible (Likely)

Might have occurred at some time but details not known

D. Unlikely

Could occur here at some time but has not as yet happened

E. Very Unlikely

Has occurred somewhere (heard of it happening)

F. Extremely Unlikely

Could theoretically occur but not aware of any instances 

NOTE: Range of descriptors used should reflect the needs of the activity under review.



Almost certain would mean at least once per year i.e. a common event.



Extremely Unlikely would be used where the event is virtually impossible.

Table 4: Risk Level Descriptors for Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis For Use in JSERA

Interpretation and detailed description of Risk Level

Risk Level 1

Unacceptable risk. Job should not proceed without resolving this risk issue, for example by adding more risk controls or substituting existing controls with more effective ones.

Risk Level II

Risk may tolerable where further risk reduction is not practicable. Take action to reduce risk where possible.

Risk Level III Risk Level IV

Acceptable level of risk where further risk reduction is not practicable. Review risk on subsequent jobs to determine whether further action is appropriate. Generally considered to be a trivial risk. Further risk reduction should always be considered but may not be practicable.

6

Table 5: Suggested issues to consider / address in the Risk Assessment Physical Conditions

Changing Conditions

Other Issues

Restricted View – especially at intersections and ‘blind corners’

Oncoming traffic – known passing areas

Speed – yours and other traffic on the road

Roundabouts – size, location, condition, alternative route to avoid these

Other heavy vehicle movement

Fatigue Management

Cross Walks and Pedestrian islands

School and public bus route

First time travel on the route

Intersections and concealed roadways

Congestion

Emergency Response Procedure in place

Bridges – esp. if small or one way

Road works – scheduled and unscheduled

Safety Management Plan in place

Roadway shoulders / known pull over areas

Detours – scheduled and unscheduled

Media reports – cultural events, sporting events, protest action, political activity

Concealed crest, sharp curves, poor camber

Weather – rain, high wind areas

Maintain communication with base

Over / Underpass clearance

Known flood areas

Rail crossings

Livestock / farm areas

Floodways, culverts, water courses

Bush fires – usually seasonal

Overtaking lanes

Transport Vehicle fire

Designated rest areas & Road house locations Recreational areas & Industrial areas Locations of Protected Works A & B type areas

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Table 6: JSERA

Risk Action Plan Task Steps 1.

Egress from Kooragang Island

Hazard & Effect

Vehicle not to standard may result in vehicle accident and personal injury

Right turn onto Industrial Drive then onto the Maitland Road (Pacific Highway)

Conduct daily Spot Checks at KI weighbridge Vehicles and equipment purpose built for task and approved load restraints used

Left turn out of KI onto Greenleaf Road

Vehicle travels along Cormorant Drive, which become Tourle Street and across the Tourle St bridge.

Controls

Poor vehicle selection / maintenance could result in LOC and / or personal injury

Visibility is good coming out of weighbridge gate, delivers occur during day time hours

All drivers are DG safety awareness trained Driving to conditions on known heavy vehicle route

Follow onto the New England Highway at Hexham

Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible Interaction with other traffic causing property damage or personal injury

Contractor Safety Management Plan in place

Communication with drivers maintained at all times

Contracted carrier / sub-contractor management program in place

Driver behaviour, training and experience continually assessed Poor roadway conditions may contribute to an accident resulting in personal injury

Additional Controls / Comments

Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction

Drivers stay with their vehicles at all times

Carrier audited at regular intervals Well signed road, well maintained road

8

Movement along the Route Task Steps

Hazard & Effect

2. Route via New England Highway, John Renshaw Drive and George Booth Drive to Echidna Dr at Orica Technology Centre site

Heavy traffic congestion at F3 round about during various and unpredictable times.

Merge left at John Renshaw Dr interchange continuing onto John Renshaw Drive to F3 round about. Cross the round about continuing along John Renshaw Drive toward Kurri Kurri for approximately 9KM. Left turn onto George Booth Drive. (100 meters after the Buchanan Rd intersection on right hand side.) Intersection is moderately sharp and although a turning lane exists long vehicles will require the use of the left lane.

F3 round about at the bottom of a moderately steep hill requiring additional breaking effort. Poor road conditions could result in damage to property and personal injury Delays or diversions due to road works possibly through built up or congested areas increased risk of incident or accident in unfamiliar area Interaction with other traffic causing property damage or personal injury Light vehicle passing on left using turning lane. Risk of vehicle rollover if speed is not sufficiently reduced. Vehicle suffers mechanical failure resulting in vehicle being stopped along the roadway Emergency situation resulting in Exposure to Protected Works A or Protected Works B which might pose a threat to the public or public property

Controls

Additional Controls / Comments

Driving to conditions

Maintain auditing programs

Well signed road, Well maintained road

Contracted carrier / sub-contractor management program in place

Known heavy vehicle route

Safety Management Plan in Place

Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible

Toll has a dedicated VHF channel for communication to the transport vehicles

Diversion from designated route only permitted under instruction from Police, Emergency services or DG supervisor

Transport vehicles do not make fuel stops during this route

Communication maintained with other vehicles

Alternative route must be communicated to DG supervisor and any concern addressed before proceeding

Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button

Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction

Carrier maintenance regimes New England Highway, John Renshaw Dr and George Booth Dr are well maintained roadways and well known to drivers Emergency Response Plan in place and well understood by the driver

Emergency information and procedures folder carried in all vehicles

9

Movement along the Route (ctd.) Task Steps 3. Approach Orica Technology Centre entrance on Echidna Dr. approximately 5Km from George Booth Drive.

Right hand turn into Orica Kurri Kurri entrance, approach gate and alert reception/security of your arrival. (Follow directions given by Orica personnel or security personnel at all times.)

Hazard & Effect

Controls

Interaction with other traffic causing property damage or personal injury

Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible

Intersection is soon after slight RH bend and requires turning across oncoming traffic.

Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction

Poor road conditions could result in damage to property and personal injury Emergency situation resulting in Exposure to Protected Works A or Protected Works B which might pose a threat to the public or public property

Additional Controls / Comments Maintain auditing programs Contracted carrier / sub-contractor management program in place Safety Management Plan in Place

Driving to conditions reduced speed through industrial area, poor road conditions and moderate traffic flow through Racecourse Rd UHF radio’s fitted to all trucks for communication with trucks in close proximity Well signed road, Well maintained road

Vehicle suffers mechanical failure resulting in vehicle being stopped along the roadway

Known heavy vehicle route

Theft – loss of product

Emergency Response Plan in place and well understood by the driver Safety Management plan in place Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button

. No need for driver to leave truck unattended during trip, loaded and unloaded in secure areas

Dedicated VHF channel for communication to the transport vehicles Carrier audited at regular intervals Vehicle fitted with security seals preventing load tampering or theft.

10

Security on the Public Roadway Task Steps 4.

Security

Hazard & Effect Theft – loss of product

Controls

Additional Controls / Comments

Well signed road

Maintain auditing programs

Good, well maintained road

Contracted carrier sub-contractor management program

Speed signs provided Carrier maintenance regimes

Driver behaviour training and follow up

Container approved for use on road and rail by Competent Authority

Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button

Driving to conditions

Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction

Known heavy vehicle route Solid product only carried

Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible

Driver stays with vehicle at all times

Safety Management plan in place

Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button

Dedicated VHF channel for communication to the transport vehicles

Emergency Response Plan in place and known to drivers

11

REPORT SUMMARY: The route is a well travelled roadway and is well known to the transport vehicle drivers. The distance allows the vehicle to complete the return journey without the need for a fuel stop. All vehicles are fitted with GPS equipment and a contractor dedicated VHF channel to maintain communication and control over vehicle movement. There are a number of small schools, residential areas, small businesses and small to medium sized industrial operations that must be manoeuvred around during travel to complete the route safely. The condition of the roadway, traffic controls in place and the controls on the vehicles allow for the route to be travelled safely. It is considered that the existing controls are appropriate and adequate to ensure the risks are managed in a safe and professional manner.

12

Sign off Record Record of participants in the original JSERA Participants: Name

Signature

Date

Name

Signature

Date

Record of others who have read the JSERA Communications Log: Name

Signature

Date

Name

Signature

Date