the1uploader share the world
the1uploader 6:01 am on 2016-10-06 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/10/06/daftar-cnc-ke-19-dan-iup-yang-dicabut/)
Daftar CNC ke-19 dan IUP yang Dicabut Dear Client, Terlampir beberapa file terkait energi dan batubara: 1. Daftar isi terbaru dari buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017”. Last update: 12 Maret 2017. 2. Daftar harga buku-buku terkait energi dan batubara. Saat ini, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017. Last update: 12 Maret 2017”, ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.000 (dua ribu dollar AS), khusus untuk e-book dengan format pdf, single license. E-book dengan format flash (file *.exe) disewakan dengan harga US$ 200 (dua ratus dollar AS) per hari. Dalam prakteknya, e-book flash bisa diakses dalam rentang waktu kurang dari 48 hari. Kelonggaran diberikan karena adanya tenggang waktu (time lapse) antara pembuatan, upload, dan download file e-book flash sampai ke layar monitor pembaca yang membeli. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke email pembaca yang membeli. Beberapa direktori terkait bisnis batubara sudah tersedia: 1. direktori usaha tambang dengan status CNC, 2. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara, 3. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara dengan status CNC, 4. direktori perusahaan eksportir batubara, 5. direktori perusahaan pengangkut batubara, 6. direktori usaha batubara, dan lainnya. Setelah analisa dan peng-update-an terakhir ini selesai, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” hanya akan ditawarkan dalam bentuk cetak dan sewa e-book flash. Tidak ada diskriminasi harga antara pembeli WNI atau WNA. Buku edisi cetak “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.500 (dua ribu lima ratus dollar AS). File e-book flash berjudul “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” disewakan dengan harga US$ 250 per hari. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke e-mail pembaca yang membeli. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, saya menawarkan buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” dengan harga spesial. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, bila bapak memerlukan tabel, denah, bagan, grafis, dan gambar dalam buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017”, saya bisa memberikannya secara gratis dengan beberapa batasan tertentu. Penawaran ini ditutup sampai 31 Maret 2017. Demikian update dan penawaran dari saya. Terima kasih atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya. Salam, Sando Jakarta, 12 Maret 2017 Read the comprehensive report on “Coal Business in Indonesia” online in https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201?e=27352568/41747360 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-23 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-23___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/45029846 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-22 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-22___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/44160250 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-21 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-21___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42554502 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-20 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-20___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42093230 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-19 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free http://bit.ly/2edGH42 Daftar CNC ke-19 & IUP yang dicabut Jakarta, 5 Oktober 2016 KEMENTERIAN ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA MINERAL REPUBLIK INDONESIA DIREKTORAT JENDERAL MINERAL DAN BATUBARA JALAN PROF. DR. SUPOMO, SH. NO. 10 JAKARTA 12870 TELEPON : (021) 8295608 FAKSIMILE : (021) 8297642 E-Mail :
[email protected] KOTAK POS : 4632/KBY Web : http://www.minerba.esdm.go.id PENGUMUMAN NOMOR: 1343.Pm/04/DJB/2016 TENTANG PENETAPAN IUP CLEAR AND CLEAN KE-SEMBILANBELAS DAN DAFTAR IUP YANG DICABUT OLEH GUBERNUR/BUPATI/WALIKOTA Pada hari ini diumumkan Penetapan IUP Clear and Clean (C&C) kesembilanbelas dan daftar IUP yang dicabut oleh Gubernur/Bupati/Walikota sebagaimana terlampir yang telah memenuhi ketentuan sebagaimana yang diatur dalam Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 43 Tahun 2015 (Permen ESDM No. 43/2015) jo. Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 02 Tahun 2013 sebagai pelaksanaan dari Undang-Undang 4 Tahun 2009, dengan persyaratan IUP yang memenuhi kriteria sebagaimana berikut: 1. Administrasi; 2. Kewilayahan; 3. Teknis dan lingkungan; 4. Finansial; Penetapan IUP C&C diberikan terhadap IUP yang telah dilakukan evaluasi dan mendapatkan rekomendasi dari Gubernur/Pejabat yang diberi Kewenangan berdasarkan kriteria administrasi dan kewilayahan. Bagi IUP yang telah ditetapkan C&C-nya dan membutuhkan penerbitan sertifikat C&C wajib mendapatkan rekomendasi penerbitan sertifikat dari Gubernur/Pejabat yang diberi Kewenangan sesuai kriteria yang diatur pada Permen ESDM No. 43/2015, yaitu: 1. Tahap Eksplorasi: Menyampaikan bukti lunas iuran tetap sampai dengan tahun terakhir dan rekomendasi hasil evaluasi teknis (Laporan Eksplorasi) dari Pemerintah Provinsi; 2. Tahapan Operasi Produksi: Menyampaikan bukti lunas pembayaran iuran tetap dan iuran produksi (royalti) sampai dengan tahun terakhir dan rekomendasi hasil evaluasi teknis dan lingkungan (Laporan Eksplorasi, Studi Kelayakan, dan Dokumen Lingkungan) dari Pemerintah Provinsi; Total Rekomendasi C&C dari Provinsi berjumlah 928 IUP terdiri dari 523 IUP rekomendasi dari Gubernur/Pejabat yang diberi Kewenangan dan 405 IUP rekomendasi dari Kepala Dinas. Dari seluruh rekomendasi Gubernur/Pejabat yang diberi Kewenangan, yang memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No.43/2015 berjumlah 65 IUP, sedangkan yang belum atau tidak memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No. 43/2015 berjumlah 458 IUP. Seluruh rekomendasi Kepala Dinas sejumlah 405 IUP belum dapat dinyatakan C&C karena belum atau tidak memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No. 43/2015; Untuk IUP yang belum memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No.43/2015, pemegang IUP dapat berkoordinasi dengan Pemerintah Provinsi untuk melengkapi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No. 43/2015. Selanjutnya Gubernur dapat menyampaikan kembali hasil evaluasi dan/atau rekomendasi atas dokumen yang dievaluasi tersebut kepada DIrektur Jenderal Mineral dan Batubara; Pengumuman C&C ini berlaku sejak tanggal ditetapkan dan apabila terdapat kekeliruan dalam penentuan C&C ini dan ditemukan fakta baru yang menyatakan bahwa IUP-nya tidak memenuhi persyaratan C&C, maka akan dilakukan pembatalan pengumuman sesuai peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku. Ditetapkan di Jakarta Pada tanggal 5 Oktober 2016 Direktur Jenderal, TTD Bambang Gatot Ariyono Daftar nama pemegang IUP dalam Daftar CNC ke-19 dan IUP yang Dicabut:
Abdul Rahman Achyar, H. Acmad Fadly,Ft, H. Adhikara Andalan Pratama, PT Adidaya Ciptakarsa Anugraha Agung Putra Sakti, CV Ahmaad Sucipto, Sdr Ahmad Ardiansyah, Sdr Akram Resources, PT Alam Setiatama Jaya, PT Alfario Chaniago Perkasa, PT Alfiannoor, PT Algifari Wildan Sejahtera, PT Alunia Kusmiyati, Ny, Sdr. Alvianto, Sdr Amaq Hendra Rusnawati Amaq Kurdi Amaq Najamudin Aminudin S Amtel Indonesia, PT Ana Gajah Mada, CV Ana Konawe, CV Ananda Puteri Lestari, PT Andesit Trass Makmur, CV Andi Wijaya, Sdr Aneka Sumberbumi Jaya, PT Aneka Tambang, PT Annugerah Resources, PT Anugerah Baru, UD Anugerah Nusantara Resources, PT Anugrah Mineralindo, PT Anugrah Mining Persada, PT Anugrah Mitra Graha Mineral, PT Arbail Artha Zirkon, CV Asa Investment, PT Asia Hamilton Resources, PT Asmuni Trubus, Sdr Atma Cahya Utama, PT Ayubi Minerals, PT Azahra Resources, PT Bacom Tirta Indotama, PT Bahana Nada Gemilang, PT Bakir, Sdr Bangka Belitung Timah Sejahtera, PT Bangka Inti Selawang Segantang, PT Bangka Plasma Selawang Segantang, PT Bangka Serumpun, PT Bara Adhipratama, PT Bara Sukses Mandiri, PT Bara Wiranti Corporation, PT Baratala Tuntung Pandang, PD Bariatun Akbar Basais Sutami, Sdr Basirun Basmo Indo Mandiri, PT Batu Alam Pangsuma, PT Batu Jaya Tarahan, PT Batu Kali Welang Ampuh, PT Batu Makmur, PT Batu Mas, UD Batu Permata, CV Batu Unggul Pertiwi, PT Bejana Inti Alam, PT Benn Prima Coal, PT Berangas Prima South, PT Bersama Alam Sentosa, CV Bhumindo Tambang Jaya, PT Billitone Baginde Perkasa, CV Bima Mineral Indonesia, PT Bima Putera Minerals, PT Bimex Bengkulu, PD Bina Daya Inti Mineral, PT Bina Usaha Cipta Pratama, PT Bintang Purna Manggala, PT Bintuni Abisha Maden, PT Bintuni Steenkool Prima, PT Bitan Abadi Mining, PT Bola Dunia Mandiri, PT Borealis Petromindo, PT Borneo Persada Nusantara, PT Borneo Suktan Mining, PT Brilliant International Marble, PT Buana Mineral Harvest, PT Budhi Inti Karya Tambang, PT Budhi Wirya, CV Bukit Global Abadi, PT Bukit Resources, PT Bukit Sunur, PT Bumi Agung Annusa, PT Bumi Arya Syam & Syah Resources, PT Bumi Berkah Biliton, PT Bumi Hamilton Resources, PT Bumi Inabara Utama, PT Bumi Indo Power, PT Bumi Lestari Jaya, PT Bumi Mulia Sejati, PT Bumi Nusantara, CV Bumi Pasir Mandiri, PT Bumi Pasundan, PT Bumi Permata Hijau, PT Bumi Sentosa Jaya, PT Bunga Raya Lestari, PT Cagar Alam Lestari, PT Cahaya Bara Pratama, PT Cahaya Bumi, PT Cahaya Gham Lampung Mining, PT Cahaya Kalimantan Sejahtera, PT Cardox Coppercorn Industry, PT Cendrawasih International, PT Cipta Wana Dana, PT Ciptajaya Sulinda Perkasa, PT Cita Mineral Investindo, PT Citra Nusra Persada, PT Citra Putri, PT Dago Pasir Alam, PT Daya Bambu Sejahtera, PT Daya Maxi Gham, PT Daya Permata Delima, PT Dedi Dharmawangsa, SE, M.Si Delapan Inti Power, PT Dharma Rosadi Internasional, PT Dian Jaya, CV Dika Karya Lintas Nusa, PT Djuwarto Doro Sakonto, KUT DPA Mining Indonesia, PT Driji Kencana, CV Dua Rajawali Proenergi, PT Dwi Mitra Auwwalun, PT Dwi Sampurna, CV Dwi Tunggal, CV Eastern Global, PT Eka Praya Jaya, PT Eksa Nusa, PT Em.Abadi, Sdr Erlianti Permata Top Indonesia, PT Esa Jaya Abadi, PT Fajar Cemerlang Idaman, PT Famiaterdio Nagara Faminglevto Baktiabadi Fathimatuz Zahro Fattah Minerals, PT Fatwa Bumi Sejahtera, PT Ferto Rejang, PT Fuji H Furinamas Primantara, PT Gading Kharisma Agungraya, PT Gandapahala Taraperkasa, PT Gapura Garba Graha, PT Gerindo Laksana Karya, PT Gist Energy, PT Global Multi Karya, PT Graha Utama, CV Group Rahmat Bersama, PT Gunajaya Sejahtera Mineral, PT Gunung Agung Jati Rimba, PT Gunung Angger, CV Hakul Yakin Halil Halis Utama, CV Harapan Makmur, CV Hardiyan, Drs Harma Nusa Mineral, PT Hartono, Drs. Heryano, Sdr Hibrida, KUT Husny Lee Mining, PT I Ketut Merthadiana I Komang Darta Inarjo, Sdr Indominerals Citra Persada, PT Indomining Karya Buana, PT Indonesia Riau Sri Avantika, PT Indosin Energy Co, PT Indra Sapta Rahayu, PT Intan Hitam Synergy, PT Intergate Indonesia, PT Intermitra Selaras Unggul, PT Inti Nusa Permata, PT Inti Sukses Gemilang, PT Irwan Beny Kusnadi Jadi Jaya Coal, CV Jago, UD Kamindo Prima Unggul, CV Karunia Batara, PT Karya Duta Gemilang, PT Karya Murni, Kud Karya Putra Indotara, PT Karya Wijaya Aneka Mineral, PT Kasidik, Sdr Kasih Tata Internasional, PT Kato Do Mining, PT Kawei Sejahtera Mining, PT Kawi Aria Putra, PT Kedaro, KUD Kembang Seri Permai.Cv Kemilau Samudera Berlian, PT Kentarto Ketapang Area Investama, PT Kieraha Tambang Sentosa, PT Koperasi Aneka Tambang Koperasi Wreda Sejahtera Kotanopan Mining, PT Kresna Karya, PT La Rajin, CV Lahmudin, Sdr Lalu Aminudin Lalu Andi Putrawi Lalu Arjuna Lapindo Bumi Mineral, PT Laras Sakti Mandiri, PT Lendarwati, Hj. Lima Putri, CV Lombok Jaya Mineral, CV Lubuksandi Lentera Sakti, PT Lumbungnesia, PT Lunafa Multi Karya Utama, PT M. Azis Yakub, H. M. Sahlan, H. M. Tawaf, Sag M. Yunus Talib, Sdr Maas Natural Sentosa, PT Madina Bumi Lestari, PT Maha Bara Karya, PT Maliki Resources, PT Mandailing Mining, PT Maryani Nasution, Sdr Masindo Putra Energy, PT MBH Mining Resources, PT Medan Madani Mining, PT Mega Buana Energy, PT Mega Nusa Kramindo, PT Mensa Bara Bumi, PT Millenium Barelang Persada, PT Mineral Gading Kencana, PT Mineral Persada, Ud Mitra Bangun Cemerlang, PT Mitra Bisnis Harvest, PT Mitra Borneo Sejati, CV Mitra Media, CV Mitra Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Mitra Unggul Persada, PT Mitra Utama, CV Moenadi, Sdr Mujino, Sdr Mukomuko Maju Sejahtera, PT Mulia Jaya Mobillindo, PT Mustika, PD Nurul Faizah Zp, Sdr, Hj. Nusantara Industri Mineral, PT Ombonex, CV Ositama Suplaindo, PT Pada Idi, PT Palapa ’96, UD Pancamitra Sejahtera, PT Pandawa Lima, CV Pandu Selaras, PT Panggung Jaya, UD Papua Metalindo, PT Pasific Global Utama, PT Patmawati, Sdr Ponti Sejahtera Abadi, PT Pramana Artha Raharja, PT Prima Utama, CV Puguk Sakti Permai, PT Pusat Koperasi Nelayan Indonesia Putera Kencana Mandiri Persada, PT Putra Alam Lestari, PT Putra Dermawan Pratama, PT Putra Kedaro Sejati, PT Putra Maga Nanditama, PT Rachmat Kelantan Sakti, PT Rapolo, CV Ratu Samban Mining, PT Redi M. Ali, Sdr Rekasindo Guriang Tandang, PT Rimba Karya Utama, PT Riota Jaya Lestari, PT Risdo Maya Harun Hb, Sdr Rohanuddin SH, Sdr Rosmawati, Sdr Sadiman, Ir. Sahidun (1) Sahidun (Ii) Sakti Global Persada, PT Saliby Panorama, PT Samudera Sakti, CV Sarana Marindo, PT Sarana Transportasi Kaltim, PT Sarip, Sdr Sarno, Sdr Sarolangun Prima Coal, PT Satria Mahkota Gotech, PT Sebayak Juhar, PT Sebuku Mitra Energi, PT Sekar Kanaka Langgeng, PT Selo Moro Banyu Arto, PT Sentosa Mulia Bahagia, PT Sentra Sukses Kencana, PT Sentra Tin Indo, PT Seram Jaya Perkasa , PT Seribu Pulau Indo Mining, PT Setiakawan Makmur Bersama, PT Sigma Megasarana, PT Sinar Bali Bina Karya, PT Sinar Samudera, PT Sriwijaya Utama, CV Statika Mitra Sarana, PT Suar Harapan Bangsa, PT Sulbasri, Sdr Sumara Nikarya, PT Sumarsono, Sdr Sumbawa Batu Mulia, PT Sumber Cipta, CV Sumber Daya Energi, PT Sumber Energi Prima, PT Sumber Jaya Prima Kencana, PT Sumber Rejeki Cemerlang, PT Sumber Sejahtera Lestari, PT Sumber Sejahtera Lestari, UD Sumilir Jaya Kembar, CV Supriyanto Suratno, Sdr Surya, CV Suwito, Sdr Suyati, Sdr Swabina Gatra, PT Syabas Sumbawa Mineral, PT Syam & Syah Arya Sinergy Investment, PT Tambang Nikel Matuari, PT Tanahdo Mining, PT Tango Indah Persada, PT Taruna Perkasa, PT Tavesco International, PT Tercipta Megah, PT Tiana Perkasa Prima, CV Tiga Sejahtera, PT Tinindo Inter Nusa, PT Tri Jaya Konstruksi, PT Tri Mitra Bayany, PT Tribina Sempurna, PT Trimitra Marine, PT Trinamas Abadi, PT Triventure Armada Baruna, PT Tunas, CV Turangga Krisna Dwipa, PT Ujang Taslim, Sdr Uniserv Indonesia, PT Usaha Ketapang Mandiri, PT Usaha Setia Bersama, PT Utama Selaras Wisesa, PT Wahana Bahari Kaur, KSU Wahidi, Sdr Wavenet Westindo, PT Wibawa Luih, Ir. Ya’aman, Sdr Yatofa Gress, PT Yoda Irpan Makmur, PT Yovin Kontraktor, CV Yudi Suwarno, Sdr Zaenal Aripin Zen 99, CV Ziad Kamula Sejahtera, CV Download daftar lengkapnya di http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/daftar-cnc-ke19-iup-yang-dicabut Report this ad
Report this ad
the1uploader 5:51 am on 2016-09-27 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/09/27/to-survive-practising-bribe-fraud-and-other-sustainable-financial-crimes/)
To survive practising bribe, fraud, and other sustainable financial crimes To survive practising bribe, fraud, and other sustainable financial crimes http://www.standardchartered.com/sustainability-review09/en/our_contributions/tackling_financial_crime/combating_fraud_and_corruption.html http://sustainability.standardchartered.com/contributing-to-the-real-economy/tackling-financial-crime/
According to International Monetary Fund estimates, money laundering equates to between 2 and 5 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The World Bank estimates that corruption costs more than 5 per cent of global GDP annually (USD2.6 trillion). Globalisation is causing financial systems to become increasingly integrated. Criminals are adapting to this environment, with increases in cross-border fraud, money laundering and bribery. For example, corruption is a problem for small businesses in many countries. Transparency International has estimated that up to 50 per cent of the cost of setting up a small business can be lost in bribes to obtain licences to operate. Whilst the losses in each case may be small, they can be devastating for the individuals concerned and add up to hundreds of millions of dollars in costs across the world. As a leading international bank, we have a major role to play in the fight against these threats. Standard Chartered is fully engaged in preventing, detecting and mitigating financial crime in our markets, including money laundering, terrorist financing, bribery and corruption, market abuse and fraud. This engagement forms part of our commitment to be a law-abiding financial institution and underscores our Here for good brand promise. In 2010 a major project commenced to align the Bank’s anti-bribery programme with the specific requirements of the 2010 UK Bribery Act, building on previous work around the Group anti-corruption policy and enhance the anti-corruption element of the Group Code of Conduct. Across our international footprint of 71 markets, our staff work closely with regulators and law enforcement agencies. We tailor our approach to individual markets, while maintaining a consistent, global control of financial crime risk. Meanwhile, new or proposed legislation – in particular the 2010 UK Bribery Act and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act 2010 – are driving change in the way that we address financial crime risk. Advances in technology, including mobile phone and Internet banking, require up-to-date counter-fraud measures to combat shifting crime typologies. At the same time, technology enables us to refine and increase our ability to combat financial crime. A vital component of any programme to reduce fraud and corruption is the ability for employees to raise concerns in a confidential and secure manner. We have had a successful Speaking Up programme for several years. A new programme has been developed for launch in early 2010 that will provide greater accessibility for staff through webbased messaging systems and a global free phone service in multiple languages. As part of our commitment to best practice in anti-corruption controls, we will be extending access to the Speaking Up programme to our external service providers and vendors. http://www.standardchartered.com/sustainability-review-09/en/our_contributions/our_stories/fraud_prevention_usa.html
Case Study – Fraud prevention USA Our New York office is regularly approached by members of the public who have been contacted by criminals through the Internet as part of a variety of scams. http://www.standardchartered.com/sustainability-review-09/en/our_contributions/our_stories/korea_voice_phishing_fraud.html
Case Study – Korea ‘Voice Phishing’ fraud Criminal syndicates in Korea use telephone and text messages to entice members of the public to transfer money, through ATMs, to their accounts. http://www.standardchartered.com/sustainability-review-09/en/our_contributions/our_stories/nigeria_card_fraud.html
Case Study – Nigeria card fraud An $80,000 fraud, detected at one of our Nigerian branches, has been used in television broadcasts by the country’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)… Case Study – Combating corruption With other international banks, we presented at a conference on best practice in regulatory compliance to representatives from African banks. http://www.standardchartered.com/sustainability-review-09/en/our_contributions/our_stories/combating_corruption_in_kenya.html
Case Study – Combating corruption in Kenya Over a six-month period, our Kenya Financial Crime Risk team trained more than 80 new investigators, with a wide range of backgrounds… From the Chairman and Group Chief Executive Our approach Basics of banking Commitments Culture and values Reporting Governance Stakeholder engagement Contributing to the real economy Access to financial services Our approach and progress Microfinance Microfinance technical assistance SMEs in Pakistan Agrifinance Islamic finance Data Responsible selling and marketing Our approach and progress Governance Voice of customer Sales process Reward Data Tackling financial crime Our approach and progress Governance Anti-money laundering Identifying terrorist suspects Combating fraud and corruption Data Our stories Promoting sustainable finance Our approach and progress Governance Equator principles Position statements Implementing our position statements Renewable energy and environmental finance Data Our stories Leading the way in communities Great place to work Our approach and progress Talent attraction and engagement Learning and development Reward and recognition Employee relations Diversity and inclusion Health and safety Data Protecting the environment Our approach and progress Governance Operational impacts Internal engagement External engagement Data Community investment Our approach and progress Living with HIV Seeing is Believing Goal Nets for Life Employee volunteering Data Our stories http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/underwriting-bribery Underwriting Bribery: Export Credit Agencies and Corruption by Susan Hawley first published 15 December 2003 Corner House Briefing 30 30.ECA Underwrite Bribery http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/30ecabribe.pdf Summary The international community is adamant that corruption must be stopped. It is demanding that poorer countries eradicate corruption if they want to be considered eligible for Western aid. But there is a deep hypocrisy in the international community’s approach, at the heart of which are the export credit agencies of industrialised countries. Export credit agenices use taxpayers’ money to insure their domestic companies doing business abroad against risks such as the company not being paid. These agencies support many of the large, mainly Western, companies that continue to bribe their way into getting government contracts from poorer countries. The price of Western companies’ bribery is ultimately paid for by the people of the Southern countries in which the companies operate in the form of increased debts for overpriced and poorly planned projects that often provide little benefit to people or country. This briefing outlines measures governments export credit agencies should be taking to tighten their anti-corruption procedures. Contents Introduction Bribery – Business As Usual Export Credit Agencies Box 1: Export Credit Agencies Underwriting Bribery The UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department: Backing Industry Sectors Prone to Corruption Box 2: Subsidies and the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department: The Case of Arms Exports Subsidies to the Arms Industry Box 3: KAFCO Fertiliser Plant, Bangladesh Box 4: Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho Backing Countries With Corruption Problems Who Picks Up the Tab? Export Credit Agencies, Debt and Corruption Box 5: Dabhol Power Plant, Maharashtra, India Tackling Corporate Bribery and Corruption Box 6: Defence Equipment, South Africa Improving ECA Practices on Corruption “Best Practices” Conclusion Notes and references Introduction “Politicians and public officials from the world’s leading industrial countries are ignoring the rot in their own backyards and the criminal bribe-paying activities of multinational firms headquartered in their countries.” Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency International, May 20021 Corruption – broadly defined as “the abuse of public or private office for personal gain”2 takes many different forms, from routine bribery or petty abuse to the amassing of spectacular personal wealth through embezzlement or other dishonest means. The international community is adamant that corruption must be stopped. It is demanding that the governments of poorer countries eradicate corruption within their countries if they want to be considered eligible to receive Western aid.3 Yet there is a deep hypocrisy in the international community’s approach, at the heart of which are the taxpayer-backed export credit agencies of industrialised countries. Export credit agenices are government departments, found in most Western countries, which use taxpayers’ money to insure their domestic companies doing business abroad against risks such as the company not being paid or the whole project collapsing. These agencies support many of the large, mainly Western, companies that continue to bribe their way into getting government contracts from poorer countries. This bribery is taking place despite a major international convention on combating bribery signed by 34 countries in 1997 and in effect from February 1999. The price of Western companies’ bribery is ultimately paid for by not by Western governments but by the people of the Southern countries in which the companies operate. They pay for it in the form of increased debts incurred for overpriced and poorly planned projects that often provide little benefit to people or country. This briefing outlines the ongoing problem of bribery and corruption in international business, the role of export credit agencies in perpetuating this corruption, its cost to poorer countries, and what measures governments export credit agencies should be taking to tighten their anti-corruption procedures. Bribery – Business As Usual Between 1994 and 2001, the US government received reports of 400 international contracts worth US$200 billion signed between governments and businesses worldwide that purportedly involved bribery.4 Between May 2001 and April 2002 alone, the US government learned of 60 contracts worth a total of US$35 billion that had been affected by bribery.5 Some 70 per cent of the allegations that the US government received in 2000-2001 involved companies from countries that had signed the OECD’s 1997 anti-bribery Convention.6 Transparency International (TI), an international NGO working against corruption, found from its 2002 Bribe Payer’s Index that, of the 15 leading exporting countries that had ratified the OECD Convention, companies from Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Canada, The Netherlands and Belgium were perceived as less likely to pay bribes, while those from South Korea, Italy, Japan, the US, France, Spain and Germany were perceived as more likely to do so. Companies from the UK came right in the middle.7 But while companies from most of these exporting countries were perceived to have become slightly less likely to bribe in recent years, companies from the US and the UK were reported to have become more likely to do so. World Bank research, meanwhile, shows that one-third (35 per cent) of foreign companies operating in the countries of the former Soviet Union pay kickbacks to obtain government contracts, of which US and European companies are among the worst offenders. Despite US anti-corruption legislation,8 42 per cent of US companies reported paying bribes in these countries, compared to 29 per cent of French firms, 21 per cent of German firms, and 14 per cent of British ones.9 In those countries with particularly high levels of corruption, meanwhile, over 50 per cent of multinationals admitted to paying public procurement kickbacks.10 While companies often defend their bribes by claiming that they are the victims of greedy officials or “‘sitting ducks’ for rapacious politicians”, the World Bank research showed that foreign firms received substantial benefits from paying bribes, evidence that did not, therefore, “support the view of coercion of foreign investors to pay bribes”.11 The research also concluded that transnational laws, such as US anti-corruption legislation and the OECD anti-bribery Convention, were not leading “to higher standards of corporate conduct among foreign investors”. Meanwhile, The Economist’s report into anti-bribery laws introduced in the UK in 2002 suggested that many in the business community continue to “believe that in large parts of the world a company that does not pay bribes does not do business”.12 Gary Campkin of the Confederation of British Industry, the UK’s employers’ organisation, has confirmed this in comments to the UK’s Daily Telegraph: “British business is totally against bribery, corruption and extortion. But these sort of issues are often about the way you do business”.13 British companies appear familiar with the traditional bribery practice of making payments into offshore bank accounts, but may also use more subtle and less traceable means such as buying villas or homes for influential decision-makers, paying for children of public officials to attend private schools or universities in Britain, paying for lavish holidays, or lending the company credit card to the relevant official. They are also, according to a former chief executive officer of UK energy company Premier Oil and Gas, Roland Shaw, “very good at finding other ways of doing it [bribery] – perhaps investing in a college so that the politician can stand up and say they bought the equipment, but look at the benefit we got for the country.”14 Export Credit Agencies In their operations abroad, many of these companies are supported in various ways by Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), governmental or semi-governmental departments that use taxpayers’ money to help their country’s firms win investment and export business overseas.15 ECAs are the largest source of public finance for private sector projects in the world. ECAs typically provide export finance in the form of guarantees and insurance (although some also provide direct loans). Their main purpose is to protect companies against the key commercial and political risks of not being paid while operating abroad.16 There can be little doubt that ECAs are now large and powerful players in international business. They underwrite 10 per cent of global exports from large industrial countries, whose exports account for three-quarters of total world exports.17 Between 1982 and 2001, ECAs supported $7,334 billion worth of exports, primarily to developing countries, and $139 billion of foreign direct investment.18 In 2000, export credit agencies were providing a total of $500 billion in guarantees and insurance to companies operating in developing countries, and issued $58.8 billion worth of new export credits that year alone.19
This compares to a total of $60 billion given out globally in overseas development assistance that year and the $41 billion provided as loans by multilateral development banks (such as the World Bank or Asian Development Bank) in 2000.20 Moreover, ECAs play a crucial role in the privatisation of developing countries’ public enterprises: they provide Western companies with investment insurance when they bid to buy or run such enterprises. ECA investment insurance has rocketed from $9 billion in 1990 to $58 billion at the end of 2000 largely because of this privatisation.21 As the sole purpose of ECAs is to support their domestic companies in the export market, they have had a poor history of taking into account the potential environmental or social impacts of projects they support.22 Because their approach has been to support domestic business at any cost in the fierce world of export competition – the mantra is “if we don’t, they will” – export credit agencies have furthermore closed their eyes to large-scale bribery and corruption on the part of the companies they support in their race against other companies to win contracts. In so doing, they have, in effect, been underwriting with impunity the bribery carried out by their domestic companies. Indeed, Transparency International has suggested that export credit agency behaviour has been “close to complicity with a criminal offence”.23 Box 1: Export Credit Agencies There are now 76 export credit agencies in 62 countries; 51 of these agencies are members of the Berne Union, the international trade association for export and investment insurance business, also known as the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers. Newly-established ECAs that have not yet qualified for Berne Union membership – of which there are currently 25 – belong to a pre-membership training group called the Prague Club, all of whose members are presently Middle Eastern, Eastern European or Third World countries. The largest and most influential ECAs are: the Export Import Bank (Ex-Im) of the US, which provides $12-15 billion of loans, guarantees and insurance a year, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which provides $1-2 billion a year in loans, guarantees and insurance; Export Development Canada (EDC), which gives short-term and medium- to long-term export and investment support worth $30 billion a year; the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC – formerly JEXIM, Japanese Export Import Bank), which provides $2025 billion per year, and Nippon Export Investment Insurance (NEXI), which gives $8 billion in medium- and long-term support and $86 billion in short-term insurance per year; the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) of the UK, which issues $5-6 billion of guarantees a year for medium- to long-term business (its short-term business was privatised in 1991); Compagnie Française d’Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur (COFACE) of France which issues $5-6 billion of support for medium- and long-term business and $40-2 billion for short-term business a year; Hermes of Germany, which provides $8-10 billion in guarantees for medium- and long-term business and $5-9 billion in guarantees for short-term business a year, and KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), which provides export insurance, loans for exports and tied aid to the tune of $10-11 billion a year. (Germany also uses the company PwC Deutsche Revision, affiliated to international accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, to administer the federal government’s Overseas Investment Insurance Guarantee Scheme jointly with Hermes. PwC Deutsche Revision has an annual turnover of $5 billion.) Istituto per i Servizi Assicurativi per il Commercio Estero, formerly Sezione Speciale per l’Assicurazione del Credito all’Esportazione (SACE), of Italy, which gives $5.5 billion of support for medium- to long-term business each year and $200 million for short-term business. (Italy also has another organisation, SIMEST (Societa Italiana per le Impresse All’Estero), which is a joint stock company controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade to help raise funds to support exports and foreign investment.) Sources: “G-7 Export Credit Agencies Vary in Mission in Structure: an overview of Ex-Im Bank’s Counterparts: A Special Report”, Ex-Im Bank News, September 2002, Vol. 2, Issue 10; various ECA websites. Figures are drawn mainly from business in 2000. Underwriting Bribery “It is safe to assume that many contracts financed, insured or guaranteed by ECAs in the past have been tainted by corruption.” Michael Wiehen Transparency International24 Export credit agency complicity with corruption takes various forms, both direct and indirect. It is most direct when commissions are involved. The payment of commissions to a local agent or fixer to help win a contract has long been a legal part of business practice. But commissions have also long been used as a means of hiding bribes. A legitimate commission might be 2-3 per cent of the total cost of a project, paid to a local bank account of a respected local business person with no personal ties to decision-makers on the project. A dubious commission containing a bribe, however, might be in the region of 10-20 per cent, paid into an offshore account or secret trust, or paid to a minister or official (whether public or private) directly involved in decision-making on the contract to be awarded.25 When ECAs underwrite a company’s contracts, it has been common practice for them to include the cost of commissions the company has paid to win the contract in the overall sum underwritten. Indeed, only four ECAs (Turkey, Greece, Hungary and Poland) that are party to the OECD’s Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees26 do not underwrite commissions as part of the export contract, while only six out of the 28 countries monitored by the OECD Group set any kind of limit on the amount of agents’ commissions they can cover.27 As a former Director-General for Development at the EU, Dieter Frisch, puts it, the practice of underwriting commissions “constitutes an indirect encouragement to bribe”.28 ECAs have also been complicit with corruption when they pay out insurance claims to companies whose contracts have been cancelled by Southern governments because of allegations that the company has paid bribes. In July 1998, for instance, Canada’s export credit agency, the Export Development Corporation, reimbursed a Canadian power generation company, BC Hydro, after the Pakistani government cancelled BC Hydro’s contract for the Raiwand power plant project, alleging that bribes had been paid to officials of the previous government.29 In May 2001, the US’s public investment insurance agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), compensated MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co after the Indonesian state electricity company, PLN, reneged on buying power from one of the company’s power plants and suspended a second plant being built by the company after a new government came to power. OPIC went on to force the new Indonesian government to pay it $260 million for this compensation. MidAmerican’s contracts for the plants had been signed in the early 1990s during the notoriously corrupt regime of President Suharto without competitive tender. Indonesian officials in the new government said that the way in which the contracts were won smacked of corruption, and that the power the Indonesian government had contracted to buy from MidAmerican was overpriced.30 MidAmerican took the Indonesian government to an international arbitration court and won. The corruption allegations have never been fully investigated. In India in March 2002, meanwhile, the US export credit agency, the Export-Import Bank, called in guarantees from Indian banks after it paid out $298.2 million to the Dabhol Power Company in the Indian state of Maharashtra, set up by US energy giant Enron.31 Dabhol had long been subject to allegations of corruption and governance failure (see Box 5). ECAs have also pressured Southern governments to drop corruption investigations into companies that ECAs have backed. In Pakistan in 1998, for instance, aid donors such as the World Bank and various Western countries including Britain put pressure on the government to abandon investigations into the Hubco power plant, built in Pakistan in 1997, owned by a consortium that included British energy company National Power, and backed by the ECAs of France, Italy and Japan. Pakistan’s Accountability Bureau had claimed that Hubco’s project costs were marked up by $400 million, and there were suggestions that the companies involved had paid kickbacks to Benazir Bhutto’s government.32 Hubco has always denied the charges, which were dropped after the more pro-Western General Musharraf became President of Pakistan in late 1999. In July 1999, the ECAs of Japan, Germany, Switzerland and the US took another approach and put considerable pressure on the new post-Suharto government in Indonesia to honour contracts awarded to Western companies to supply power to Indonesia during Suharto’s regime. The total cost of these contracts had been inflated by as much as 37 per cent on average, the contracts had not been won through competitive tender, and there were strong suspicions that they were infused with corruption. If corruption was in fact involved, the Indonesian people ended up paying for it in the form of higher power tariffs.33 More indirect ways in which ECAs back corruption include turning a blind eye to the track-record of companies that have been involved in corruption scandals, failing to investigate corruption allegations made against a company, and failing to ensure that the countries awarding the contracts that ECAs underwrite have fair, public and competitive tendering systems and transparent public accounting systems. Many ECAs, for instance, do not require the contracts they back to have been won through competitive tender, despite the fact that competitive tendering can be one of the surest ways for buying or importing countries to ensure that they get value for money. Moreover, as Transparency International’s Michael Wiehen puts it, “some of the destination countries with the highest levels of ECA coverage are also well known to have necessitated … significant bribery as part of any export deal”.34 By providing export credits to companies to operate in countries in which governments have little commitment to transparency or fair procurement, ECAs are effectively undermining local attempts in these countries to stamp out corruption or to hold their governments to account. Finally, a lack of transparency and accountability within ECAs themselves has fostered an institutional culture within the agencies that tacitly accepts bribery and corruption as a necessary albeit ugly means for companies to achieve their goal of winning contracts abroad. Despite the fact that they are backed by taxpayers’ money, for instance, most ECAs are highly secretive. Most still refuse to make public information about the contracts that they back unless the companies agree. Even Members of Parliament cannot obtain this information. Most governments that have ECAs have signed up to a declaration issued in 2001 by the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, the biannual intergovernmental conference on corruption started in 1999,35 that “corruption cannot prosper in the full light of openness. Transparency and impartial forms of public control … are of the utmost importance”.36 Few governments, however, apply these criteria to ECAs. The UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department: Backing Industry Sectors Prone to Corruption The UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) illustrates many of these problems through its history and culture of institutional failure concerning corruption. The Department was set up in 1919, the first export credit agency in the world, and its original mandate was to support British exports, especially to Russia, because private banks refused to do so.37
Between 1995 and 2000, the ECGD underwrote £17 billion ($27 billion) worth of British exports – an average of £4-5 billion ($6.5-8 billion) a year.38 This compares with the UK’s Department for International Development’s annual aid budget of around £3 billion ($4.7 billion). The ECGD now covers three per cent of the UK’s total exports (down from about 30 per cent in the late 1960s). Although all industry sectors can apply for ECGD support to do business abroad, the department primarily provides support to six of them: military and defence; civil aerospace; power generation and transmission; water; energy and transport. (Only one or two per cent of ECGD support goes to education and medical projects). Several of these sectors have some of the worst records on corruption.39 Almost one-third (30 per cent) of ECGD backing goes each year to defence projects – almost half between the years 1998 and 2001.40 The defence industry has consistently been one of the worst corruption offenders, second only to construction and public works in Transparency International’s Bribe-Payers Index. According to the US Department of Commerce, half of all bribes paid between 1994 and 1999 involved defence contracts, despite the fact that arms constitute only one per cent of world trade.41 Research by the UK’s Religious Society of Friends shows that the defence part of ECGD’s business appears to be heavily subsidised by returns from the civil business it backs (see Box, 2).42 Of the civil (rather than military) projects that the ECGD supports, the highest percentage (25 per cent in 2000/01 and 41 per cent in 1999/2000) is in the power generation sector – a sector ranked sixth in Transparency International’s list of corrupt industries. Meanwhile, the oil and gas industry – another key, related area for the ECGD and the focus of its new “Good Projects in Difficult Markets”43 initiative44 – is the third most corrupt industry in Transparency International’s Index. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the ECGD has been implicated in some of the worst scandals involving British business operating abroad. In the mid-1980s, it backed the Al Yamamah deal with the government of Saudi Arabia, a deal that included the sale of Hawk and Tornado jets. British defence companies are alleged to have either agreed to pay or actually paid commissions ranging anywhere from 5 per cent to 25 per cent of the contract price to middlemen and officials in connection with the deal. Throughout the 1990s, there were persistent rumours of corruption.45 A 1992 report by the UK’s National Audit Office investigating the deal has yet to be published despite repeated requests from Parliament. Despite these unresolved allegations, the ECGD gave further support to aircraft and weapons manufacturer BAE Systems in September 2003 for a new contract under Al Yamamah, even though new evidence had emerged of excessive hospitality to Saudi officials in relation to the previous Al Yamamah contract that same month.46 In 1991, the ECGD was involved (through the UK government’s now defunct Aid and Trade Provision47) in supporting the involvement of a consortium led by UK company Balfour Beatty to build the Pergau dam in Malaysia. The construction of the dam, which was funded by the then Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the UK government, was linked to an arms deal with Malaysia worth £1 billion ($1.6 billion). Officials at the ODA described the dam as “uneconomic”, a “very bad buy” and a burden on Malaysian consumers, who would end up paying £100 million ($160 million) more for electricity than other, cheaper power generation alternatives could have supplied.48 The contract was not won through competitive tender. During the process of investigating the spiralling price of the contract, ODA officials urged Balfour Beatty to lower its fees for agency services for the project, which it regarded as excessive.49 ODA officials were effectively over-ridden by the UK’s Foreign Office, which pushed the government to keep supporting the dam. A UK NGO, the World Development Movement, successfully challenged the use of British aid money for this project in the UK courts in November 1994.50 The case set a precedent making it illegal to use British aid money for uneconomic projects.51
These high-profile cases are not just one-offs. An institutional culture has existed within the ECGD of almost completely disregarding corruption as a serious risk factor that could undermine the viability of projects backed and could increase the costs both for UK taxpayers and for the citizens of countries in which the projects are carried out. The Department has since introduced anti-corruption measures, but the extent of corruption involved in the projects is only now (in some instances) coming to light and still requires appropriate action on the part of ECGD. Box 2: Subsidies and the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department: The Case of Arms Exports The ECGD has always tried to break even; it is required by law to to do so every three years rather than every year. It claims that it does not draw on taxpayers’ money, holding its premiums at a level “sufficient to cover” risks and administration costs. But between 1995 and 2001, ECGD’s premium income usually covered only between one-third and one-half of claims paid out. In 2000-2001, for instance, the agency earned £109.5 million ($175 million) in premiums, but paid out nearly triple that, £298 million ($475 million) worth of claims. Likewise, a year later, in 2001-02, the ECGD earned £76.8 million ($122 million) in premiums and paid out £250 million ($398 million) in claims. So how does it break even? The answer is that it relies on counter-guarantees from importing countries. If the ECGD has to pay out a claim, it seeks to recover the cost from the importing country. For ECAs in general, these recoveries now account for almost double what ECAs receive in premiums from the exporter or investor in the first place. In 2001-2002, the ECGD made recoveries worth £504 million ($868 million), and in 2002-2003 recoveries of £489.4 million ($842 million). As a result, the ECGD, with the help of taxpayers in importing countries, has been able to make net contributions to the UK exchequer in the past few years. But the fact that the ECGD merely has to break even, rather than show a positive return of 8 per cent, as other public sector enterprises such as London Underground have to do, still means that the ECGD provides an implicit estimated annual subsidy to the companies it supports of around £400 million ($640 million) per year. (As a private sector enterprise, ECGD would have to make a still higher return of about 11 per cent.) It also means that the ECGD is able to keep premium charges much lower than they would be in the private sector. A January 2003 report on the economic costs and benefits of the ECGD by National Economic Research Associates concluded that ECGD support constituted an unnecessary subsidy, and that removing it would “have a negligible effect on UK capital goods exports”. There was a “strong rationale for eliminating any subsidy in ECGD’s current pricing regime,” the report concluded. Thus while UK taxpayers may not be losing money through the activities of the ECGD, they are subsidising the activities of UK companies operating abroad by providing cut-price insurance. ECGD ought, therefore, to be accountable to them for how it uses their money and be able to demonstrate a clear sustainable development purpose. Subsidies to the Arms Industry Even if an export credit agency as a whole has to break even, its activities supporting particular industries are not required to do so. ECGD’s support for Britain’s arms trade is a case in point. Since 1990, the premiums that ECGD has earned from arms exports, combined with claims recovered, has never even approached the amount that the agency has paid out in claims to arms traders. In fact, the ECGD has made a loss on the defence sector in every one of the last 12 years. As Michael Bartlett from the Religious Society of Friends states: “it is precisely by the losses that [the ECGD] makes in this sector of insurance that it is providing subsidies”. By failing to break even, and therefore to cover its losses, the ECGD is in effect providing a subsidy to the defence sector. Figures provided by the ECGD or Department of Trade and Industry to Parliament illustrate the point. Overall aggregate figures show that, for all business, premiums cover one-third to one-half of claims paid out by the ECGD. For the defence sector, however, the percentage of claims covered by premium payments drops to between one-fifth and one-quarter. In 2000-01, for instance, premiums earned in defence projects amounted to £38 million ($60 million), while claims paid out came to nearly five times this amount at £181 million ($288 million). Recoveries from the defence sector, meanwhile, have been very low. For the ten years 1990-2001, premiums earned on defence business amounted to £251 million ($410 million), and claims paid out amounted to £970 million ($1.58 billion), but only £122 million ($199.7 million) was recovered. The ECGD was left with a £597 million ($977 million) shortfall for its defence business over this ten-year period, a shortfall that in recent years it appears to have made up for by its business in other industry sectors. The subsidy that the ECGD provides the UK arms industry has been calculated in other ways as well. NGOs Saferworld and the Oxford Research Group have compared ECGD premium rates with the premiums that private lending organisations would charge to companies exporting arms. It concludes that the ECGD provides an annual subsidy of £227 million ($362 million) to the defence sector. Yet the ECGD not only applies different financial criteria to the defence export sector; it also applies different impact screening criteria. Defence exports are not subject to the ECGD impact assessment that all other sectors go through. (The ECGD argues that this is because defence exports are already subject to scrutiny through the government’s export licence process, overseen by the Department for Trade and Industry. This process is supposed to check whether the defence exports could lead to human rights violations, be used for internal repression or external aggression, or threaten regional security.) NGOs and Members of Parliament have been arguing on moral grounds for some years now that that the ECGD should not back defence exports at all. At present, the defence sector is entirely dependent on the agency’s support. Government officials and supporters of the arms industry counter by asserting that if the UK government were not to provide this kind of support, many thousands of jobs would be lost and the British economy would suffer. But analysis by the University of York Centre for Defence Economics published in November 2001 suggests that, while a halving of defence exports would lead to the loss of 49,000 jobs in the defence industry, another 67,000 new jobs would be created in the civil economy over the following five years. It also states that “the economic costs of reducing defence exports are relatively small and largely one-off”. It is not inherently wrong for the ECGD to provide subsidies, provided they are in the public interest. Subsidies could, for instance, be an appropriate tool to kick-start a domestic renewable energy export market – a market that could benefit developing countries importing crucial technology and could help the UK meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments to ensure that export credit agencies support the transfer of climate-friendly technologies. But the ECGD should not contravene its own commitments to ensure that its activities mesh with other UK government objectives on sustainable development, human rights and good governance by subsidising an industry that contributes nothing to these goals – an industry, moreover, that is generally uncompetitive, profoundly secretive and riddled with corruption. At the very least, the ECGD should broaden its current prohibition on selling arms to the 63 poorest developing countries to all developing countries. It should also ensure that its defence business, like its other activities, breaks even, and that the premium rates it charges for the sector are commensurate with the special risks involved in backing defence exports. Sources: Bagci, P., Powell, S., Grayburn, J., Kvekvetsia, V. and Venables, A., “Estimating the Economic Costs and Benefits of ECGD: A Report for the Export Credits Guarantee Department”, NERA, January 2003, pp.ii, viii; Chalmers, M., Davies, N., Hartley, K. and Wilkinson, C., “The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports”, University of York Centre for Defence Economics, November 2001, http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/rcdefence_exports_nov01.pdf; Bartlett, M., “The case against ECGD underwriting of arms sales”, paper given at “Beyond Business Principles” Seminar on Export Credit Reform, House of Commons, 23 May 2002, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/documents/subsidy.html; Ingram, P. and Davis, I., The Subsidy Trap, Saferworld and Oxford Research Group, July 2001, http://www.saferworld.co.uk/pubsubsidy.pdf; Courtney, C., “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade”, Transparency International, Policy Research Paper 001, April 2002. Box 3: KAFCO Fertiliser Plant, Bangladesh Three ECAs are involved in financing the Karnaphuli Fertiliser Company (KAFCO) Fertiliser Complex in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Japan’s former Export Import Bank (JEXIM), now the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, was the largest lender, providing $271 million; Italy’s SACE provided $32.73 million; and the UK’s ECGD gave investment insurance worth $32 million to Citibank UK for its investment in the project. KAFCO is the largest private foreign investment project in Bangladesh and the single largest industrial project in the country. The Complex produces high-grade ammonia and granular urea out of Bangladesh’s natural gas for export to the international market. The $500 million contract to build the plant, signed in 1990 between KAFCO, Japanese companies Chiyoda and Marubeni and the Italian Petro-Chemical Manufacturers Association, was hailed as the “Deal of the Year”. In early 1992, however, a government minister described it as “the most corrupt deal in Bangladesh’s history”. According to former KAFCO insiders, it was common knowledge in Bangladesh that KAFCO involved extensive bribery of government ministers and officials. One of KAFCO’s largest foreign investors, Japanese company Marubeni, allegedly continues to give personal financial support to Mosharraf Hossain, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Industries who negotiated the deal. One person familiar with the KAFCO deal concluded that “the misshapen nature of KAFCO’s contractual structure could not have come about without serious high-level corruption”. The government of Bangladesh granted KAFCO extraordinary concessions that were far more in the interests of the foreign investors than of the country. For instance, Marubeni and a US trading company, Transammonia AG, secured monopoly agreements allowing them to sell all the ammonia and urea produced by KAFCO – and to charge KAFCO a 2-5 per cent commission on each sale without being required to sell the products at any minimum price. The government of Bangladesh is one of KAFCO’s major purchasers – but it has to buy fertiliser from KAFCO in foreign exchange and at international prices, and KAFCO still has to pay the commission to Marubeni and Transamonia for these sales. Moreover, it is the government of Bangladesh that supplies KAFCO in the first place with gas from which the fertiliser is made – and supplies it at half the price of gas supplied to fertiliser companies in the public sector. Government ministers have thus called the plant “a complete sell-out of national interests”. The terms of the KAFCO deals were so unfavourable to Bangladesh that Khaleda Zia’s new government, which took over from former dictator General Ershad in 1991, concluded that the whole arrangement should be revised. But strong pressure from Japan ensured that only a few revisions were made. This pressure also led the government of Bangladesh to issue guarantees itself on the project in 1992 against $250 million of loans and guarantees to KAFCO from various export credit agencies. According to a paper produced for the government of Bangladesh in 2001, the plant was overpriced and had cost overruns of more than 26 per cent. The project did not get a green light to proceed with production until five years after it was completed because of defective machinery that caused 37 shutdowns in five years. Estimates of the net drain on Bangladesh’s resources because of the KAFCO project are now in the region of $350 million. The project can now run at a profit but only because of the gas subsidies it receives from the government of Bangladesh. ECA involvement in this project shows considerable disregard for the interests of Bangladesh and for the impact that corruption can have on the design and implementation of a project. A former KAFCO insider said of the UK’s ECGD: “I think they were half asleep when they went into this project. I think they were transfixed by the wonder of how the plant looked on paper and didn’t stop to take a look at the details”. All the ECAs involved appear not to have ensured that safeguards were built into the contract to ensure that the project would function adequately. None appear to have taken any action concerning the corruption allegations. In early 1999, meanwhile, Japan’s Eximbank threatened to seek repayments from the Bangladeshi government when KAFCO failed to pay its loans, placed pressure on the government to accept the plant even though it would not function properly, and refused to attend a key meeting of shareholders and lenders called by the government to seek a settlement to the plant’s problems. Box 4: Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho The ECAs of France, Germany, Italy and the UK (COFACE, Hermes, SACE and the ECGD respectively) were all involved in providing export credit financing for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the biggest water scheme of its kind in the world, and its associated Muela and Katse dams. The £5.5 billion ($8.7 billion) project, which is due to be completed in 2020, was designed to divert water from the mountains of Lesotho through a series of dams and tunnels to South Africa’s industrial province of Gauteng. Suspicions of bribery first surfaced in 1994, when the Lesotho government sought to suspend Masupha Sole, the chief executive of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, which was responsible for the project, and another Authority official, while it carried out a management audit prompted by irregularities in the Authority’s accounts. Major irregularities were confirmed in early 1995 following the audit, and internal disciplinary proceedings started. In 1999, the Lesotho government initiated civil prosecutions against Sole. These led to criminal proceedings, and in May 2002, Lesotho’s Judge Cullinan found Masupha Sole guilty of receiving nearly £3 million ($5 million) worth of bribes over the course of a decade from companies involved in constructing the project and sentenced him to 18 years in prison. In all, nine European companies were directly supported by their respective ECAs for their involvement in the first phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. All nine companies (Spie Batignolles, Campenon Bernard and Bouyge from France; Hochtief and Ed Zublin from Germany; Impregilo from Italy; and Balfour Beatty, Kier International and Sterling International from the UK) were involved in two main consortia: the Lesotho Highlands Project Consortium (LHPC) and the Highlands Water Venture. When convicting Sole, the Judge found that LHPC had made payments totalling $50,870.59 to Sole. These payments, according to the charges laid before the court, were made via the Swiss bank account of a Panamanian company, Universal Development Corporation, controlled by an agent, Max Cohen. The bribery charge stated that: “LHPC and/or one or more or all of its constituent members corruptly offered payment(s) to [Sole] in return for [his] exercising his influence/powers in his official capacity for the benefit of LHPC.” Sole was also found guilty of another bribery charge, which stated that the lead contractor in LHPC, French construction company Spie Batignolles, paid Sole (through the same agent, according to the charges) £6,027.02 ($11,263.00). Judge Cullinan also found that the Highlands Water Venture, headed by the Italian construction and engineering company, Impregilo, had paid $375,000 to Sole between October 1991 and September 1992. Following Sole’s conviction, the Lesothan government initiated criminal proceedings against several of the companies for paying the bribes. The Canadian company, Acres, was convicted of bribery in October 2002, and fined $2.2 million. In August 2003, the company lost its appeal against its conviction, although its fine was reduced by one-third. In that same month, the German company, Lahmeyer International, was convicted of bribery and fined $1.46 million – a sentence it is appealing – and a third company, France’s Spie Batignolles was formally charged with bribe-paying. Spie Batignolles’ sentence is due before the end of 2003. In September 2003, an intermediary who acted on behalf of the Italian company, Impregilo, was also convicted. A further seven companies face possible prosecution, including Italy’s Impregilo and the UK’s Balfour Beatty. In several instances, it is clear that the ECAs involved continued to give financial support to the companies concerned after the government of Lesotho had first raised its concerns about bribery. None of the ECAs, meanwhile, have publicly taken any action so far against the companies involved. The UK’s ECGD appears to be satisfied for the time being with “assurances from [the companies involved] that they had no involvement in any unlawful conduct”, but has said that if any of them are convicted of bribery, this may be a grounds for refusing them further cover. Germany’s Hermes has said that, in the event of a German company being convicted, it will require the company to undertake “obligatory measures to take care that similar cases will not occur in the future”, and will reject any claims for compensation should they be made. Backing Countries With Corruption Problems One major reason why export credit agencies have ignored corruption is that some of the best opportunities for their country’s exports are in those countries with serious corruption problems. In 1995, the top three recipients of export credits among developing and transition countries were Russia, China and Indonesia.52 In 2003, the top three recipients among these countries for medium- and long-term export credits were China, Turkey and Mexico; for short-term export credits China, Hong Kong and Brazil; and for investment insurance, Brazil, China and Argentina.53 Other countries that feature prominently in the portfolios of the major ECAs include Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Russia and Nigeria. Yet China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Russia and Nigeria are all countries noted for high levels of corruption in business transactions and public procurement.54 China, for instance, has consistently been in the bottom half of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, usually scoring an average of 3.5 out of 10 (where 10 indicates “highly clean” and 0 suggests “highly corrupt”). According to a report by the Hong-Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), “Graft is endemic in China: according to the most conservative estimates, the magnitude of corruption ranges from 3 to 5 per cent of GDP”.55 According to PERC’s annual survey of business opinions on corruption in Asia, China was perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in Asia, beaten only by Indonesia and India, and corruption there was only getting worse.56 Turkey, Mexico and Brazil have, likewise, tended to fall in the lower half of TI’s Index with scores of 3.1, 3.6 and 3.9 respectively. In July 2003, a Turkish parliamentary committee investigating corruption reported that corruption was costing Turkey more than $150 billion each year – five times the country’s total annual exports.57 By backing their national companies to operate in countries with corruption problems without requiring additional safeguards, ECAs could well be exacerbating corruption in these countries. World Bank research shows that corruption increases when foreign firms work in corrupt environments: “In misgoverned settings, rather than importing higher standards of governance, FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] firms would appear to magnify the problems of state capture [corrupt forms of political influence] and procurement kickbacks.”58 The World Bank concludes, in addition, that corrupt environments tend to attract “lower quality investment in terms of governance standards”. This conclusion would suggest that ECAs may be tacitly accepting not just poor corporate governance but also poor quality investment when they support corporate involvement in countries with corruption problems. Supporting investments in high corruption countries involves high risks for all parties concerned. But as the UK’s former Executive Director to the IMF and World Bank between 1994 and 1997, Huw Evans, put it to the UK Parliament’s Trade and Industry Select Committee in 2000 when it was looking into the future of the ECGD, final decisions about whether the ECGD should support projects “often owe more to political weight than to fine calculations of risk assessment.”59 A good example of this is the considerable pressure that industry groups, such as BP, the Export Group for Constructional Industries and the Engineering Employers Federation, have exerted on the ECGD to provide insurance cover to operate in oil-rich Angola. The country has been off cover for 15 years because of political and economic instability, owes the ECGD £131 million ($208.5 million) and is considered to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. It is beaten to bottom place only by Nigeria and Bangladesh in Transparency International’s 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index that surveys 102 countries.60 Despite the risks, however, the ECGD stated in November 2001 that it was considering including Angola under its new “Good Projects in Difficult Markets” scheme.61 The ECGD is not alone among ECAs as far as Angola is concerned. The US Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) provided $150 million worth of financing to politically-influential US oil and oil service companies in Angola between 1996 and 1999, despite the Angolan government’s dire corruption record and despite the fact that Ex-Im would not provide financing for any other business to operate in the country because of the high risks involved.62 Who Picks Up the Tab? “Corruption is not a charitable game; ‘winners’ have every intention of recovering their bribery costs.” Donald Strombom, former chief of procurement for the World Bank Corruption has a major impact in all countries of the world. It undermines democratic accountability, diverts resources away from the public good and into private pockets, and “redistribut[es] wealth and power to the undeserving”.63 Corruption increases inequality and poverty. A 1998 IMF study shows that an increase of just 0.78 per cent in corruption reduces the income growth of the poorest 20 per cent of the people in a country by 7.8 per cent a year.64 Indeed, it is the people of the South, particularly the poor, who have paid the heaviest price for the “business at any cost” approach of ECAs and for the bribery that ECA-backed companies engage in. Companies paying a bribe aim to recover it by charging governments more for what they provide. Corruption can add an average of 20-30 per cent to the cost of government procurement.65 In some Asian countries, according to Asian Development Bank research, it doubles the cost of goods and services.66 This means that every year governments waste millions of what little public money they do have, money that could be spent on education, health and poverty eradication. The World Bank estimates that the Philippines loses $47 million a year because of corruption, and has lost a total of $48 billion between 1977-1997.67 A recent report from the African Union68 suggests that Africa loses $148 billion a year to corruption.69 And in Latin America, in countries such as Colombia and Brazil, corruption has been estimated to cost each person some $6,000 a year.70 Recent scandals in both the US and Europe – from the bankruptcy and collapse of energy company Enron in the US to political financing scandals in Germany involving former chancellor Helmut Kohl to corruption allegations against President Jacques Chirac in France and President Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, to mention but a few – indicate that corruption is just as pervasive and institutionalised in the North as in the South, although the forms it takes may differ. Corruption is perceived to be on the increase across the world because of policies such as privatisation and public-private partnerships that give multinational corporations ever-greater access to governments and that have led to “increased interface between public officials and private business”.71 In poorer countries, however, corruption has a more devastating and immediate impact. It diverts public expenditure away from areas such as health and education in which bribery returns may be small,72 to more lucrative sectors such as construction, defence, and oil and gas.73 The poor end up paying directly for the consequences of contracts that have been signed in corrupt circumstances. They are most affected by “white elephant” projects such as power plants or dams that fail to meet their stated objectives74 and that dislocate local communities and cause environmental damage. In the energy sector, they are affected by contracts awarded in dubious circumstances that have locked governments into paying excessively high rates for electricity, which are often passed on to the consumer in the form of higher tariffs. Export Credit Agencies, Debt and Corruption Even more critically, the people of Southern countries often end up paying directly for ECA involvement in dubious, corrupt or economically-unviable projects. When ECAs give backing to a company or bank, they almost always require the importing country to offer a counter-guarantee. In the event of a default, such as if a contracting party does not pay up or if the project proves unviable, the ECA pays the affected exporter or investor, and then seeks to recover from the importing country the claims it has paid out. These recoveries account for almost double what ECAs receive in premiums from the exporter or investor in the first place and thus represent a large slice of ECA income.75 If the importing country does not or cannot pay compensation to the ECA, the amount owed is added to the importing country’s official debt as a bilateral (government to government) debt. Export credit debt is charged at commercial rates of interest, not the lower rates incurred by bilateral or multilateral loans.76 Export credit debt is therefore particularly onerous for poorer countries. One-quarter of the $2.2 trillion debt owed by developing countries and one-half of all debt owed by developing countries to official creditors (such as Multilateral Development Banks, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other governments rather than to private creditors such as banks) is owed to ECAs.77 Some 95 per cent of the debt owed to the UK government by Southern countries is export credit debt. Between one-third and one-half of this debt is interest owed on original debts and penalties.78 This build-of up debt owed by Southern countries to ECAs has been exacerbated by the “moral hazard” that lies at the heart of the export credit process.79 Companies know that they will be rescued by ECAs from “the consequences of their own decisions”80 – they will be bailed out by the public purse with few questions asked if things go wrong with their business decisions. They may not, therefore, be as prudent in their investment decisions or as cautious in their risk assessments as they might otherwise be, particularly if they do not have to consider fully whether a project is commercially viable or not because of ECA insurance. The substantial debt owed to ECAs suggests that this has indeed been the case. Southern governments would have incurred far fewer debts had companies backed by ECAs made more financially viable investment decisions.81 A decision made in July 2001 by all ECAs not to back “unproductive” expenditure – expenditure that does not contribute to social and economic development, poverty reduction or debt sustainability82 – in poorer countries in future is a tacit acknowledgement of this fact. The people of Southern countries are thus paying debts incurred for some projects that have been of little or no value to either the country or its people. Furthermore, if ECA backing for contracts includes the cost of bribes hidden in commission payments, when ECAs recover compensation from importing governments for amounts they have paid out or add this amount to official debt, ECAs are in effect requiring taxpayers of the importing country to pay for the bribes made by the exporting company. The debt that Southern countries owe to ECAs may well include hidden millions of dollars worth of bribes. Yet poorer countries have little choice but to use the financing facilities of export credit agencies. Few overseas companies will operate in poor countries without ECA support. In 2000, for instance, ECA support for exports and investment to poor countries accounted for 80 per cent of private finance to those countries.83 Some 30 per cent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to poor countries was covered by official investment insurance from ECAs, compared to a figure of 12 per cent for all developing countries. This means that export credit agencies have a huge and disproportionate say in what projects get backed in poor countries. As the World Bank puts it: “In poor countries, official guarantees are nearly always required to access external finance for large projects; every major bank commitment over $20 million over the past five years has had some official guarantee”.84 Yet, despite their dependence upon export credit for external finance, the poorest countries receive little of it. Only eight per cent of overall ECA exposure is in poor countries: the vast majority of export credit goes to a few middle-income countries such as Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines and Turkey. Public outcry over the fact that national debt is crippling many poorer countries has led to international efforts to tackle the problem. In 1999, the countries of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA) agreed to write off 90 per cent or more of export credit debt owed by the poorest countries as part of international debt relief efforts. They subsequently agreed to write off 100 per cent of these debts. But countries were eligible for such write-offs only under the World Bank and IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, which imposed strict structural adjustment programmes85 on poorer countries in exchange for helping them to reduce their debts to “sustainable” levels. And actual debt relief has been slow in coming: four years on, only 8 out of 42 countries have become eligible for debt cancellation.86 Middle-income countries that did not qualify for relief have, meanwhile, been left to struggle under their large debt burdens. Most importantly, debt relief initiatives have not ensured that ECAs accept mutual responsibility for the bad business deals they have backed. As the UK Executive Director at the IMF and World Bank for the years 1994-1997, Huw Evans, put it, genuine debt cancellation: “require[s] governments (and their export credit agencies) to admit past mistakes … [L]oans that turn out badly mean poor decisions by both lenders and borrowers.”87 Recognising such mistakes would entail the ECAs of richer countries conducting a thorough audit of their export credit debt portfolios to identify projects that failed because of corruption on the part of Western companies and because of their own negligence. ECAs should immediately write off any relevant amounts from the debt portfolios of all developing countries and not just the poorest ones. Box 5: Dabhol Power Plant, Maharashtra, India At least five ECAs were involved in the financing of the Dabhol Power Plant in India. The US OPIC and Ex-Im provided $640 million in loans and guarantees for the project, while Japan’s JBIC and Belgium’s OND also provided backing. The UK’s ECGD provided Overseas Investment Insurance for three UK banks (ANZ Bank, Standard Chartered Bank and ABN Amro) that have invested in the plant. It also provided re-insurance in early 2000 for the involvement of a UK company, Kier International, in building a liquefied petroleum gas port terminal for the Dabhol Power Plant. Other ECAs may well have given undisclosed investment insurance to banks on the project. Banks from Austria, France, The Netherlands, and Switzerland, including Erste Bank, Credit Lyonnais, BNP Paribas and PSFB, are known to have lent money to the project. The Dabhol Power Plant, a $2.9 billion project in the Indian state of Maharashtra, is the largest foreign investment project in India and one of the biggest electricity generating plants in the world. The Dabhol Power Company (DPC), which built and ran the plant until it closed in June 2001, was initially a joint venture between three US energy companies: the now collapsed Enron, General Electric and Bechtel Corporation, until the Maharashtra State Electricity Board subsequently took a stake in the project as well. Soon after a Memorandum of Understanding for the project was signed in June 1992 between Enron and the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, a World Bank review commissioned by the Maharashtra government found many irregularities and concluded that the Memorandum was very one-sided in Enron’s favour. In April 1993, the World Bank refused to provide funds for the plant, questioning its economic viability. According to documents released under the US Freedom of Information Act, staff at the US Ex-Im were not convinced about the viability of the project either. But Ex-Im came under intense pressure from the former chair of Enron, Kenneth Lay, in 1994 to provide financing. The then chair of EXIM, Kenneth Brody, personally helped to hurry through a finance package. The Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) was locked into a Power Purchase Agreement with the plant, signed in 1993, that ensured that it would pay for power even if it did not need it and even if the power was not produced by the plant. The MSEB was required to pay between $1.2 and $1.3 billion a year for Dabhol’s electricity – a tariff that the Central Electricity Authority described as more than twice as high as it should be. The haste with which the project was agreed, the lack of transparency and the absence of competitive tendering resulted in a plethora of corruption allegations surrounding the project from the outset. In May 1995, a newly elected Maharashtra government filed a court case in September 1995 against both the Dabhol Power Company and the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, alleging that bribes had taken place in the awarding of the contract and thus pleading for the contract to be declared void. But in early 1996, after extensive negotiations with Enron, the new Maharashtra government withdrew its case and accepted a renegotiated deal for an even larger power plant than that originally planned with almost equal haste and on equally, if not more, disadvantageous terms. By the end of 2000, power from Dabhol was four times more expensive than from domestic power producers. The state of Maharashtra was spending more on payments for power from Dabhol than its entire budget for primary and secondary education. It was buying power from the plant at 8 rupees per unit but selling it on for only 2 rupees. In June 2001, the Dabhol Power Company shut down the plant after the MSEB decided not to buy any more power from it because the Company had failed to provide power at full capacity and within the time-frame agreed in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). Nonetheless, the Company carried on billing the MSEB $21 million a month, and in September 2001, Enron demanded that the Indian government pay it $2.3 billion for its investment and debts on the project. After Enron’s collapse following its bankruptcy in December 2001, Dabhol was put up for sale. Among the foreign bidders were BP, British Gas, Royal Dutch/Shell and Gaz de France, alongside four Indian companies. But disputes between domestic lenders and the Indian government on the one hand and foreign lenders on the other have left the plant standing idle for over two years. Foreign banks have a total exposure on Dabhol of $372 million. Most of the foreign finance is guaranteed by domestic Indian banks, while the Indian government has given a counter-guarantee for the project. Foreign investors have been blocking ideas put forward by domestic lenders and the Indian government as to what to do with Dabhol while at the same time aggressively pursuing compensation for their investment losses. They claim that Dabhol has been effectively expropriated by the Indian government, even though the problems arose because the plant did not perform adequately and even though foreign lenders are implicated in the failure so far to find a solution to the Plant’s problems. In September 2003, a US arbitration panel ruled that OPIC should pay GE and Bechtel compensation of $28.57 million each. In November 2003, OPIC paid out compensation of $30 million to Bank of America under its political risk insurance cover. OPIC has a total exposure of $340 million on the project. Ex-Im has already paid out $298.2 million to Enron for Dabhol in March 2002. The US government, meanwhile, represented by top officials such as Vice President Dick Cheney, has been exerting strong pressure on the Indian government to come to a solution that would benefit Enron and protect US taxpayers’ money. The US government has reportedly threatened to withdraw aid to India; it has also warned that the dispute would “spell death to potential investment in India” if the Indian government did not do so. It is not just US investors who are seeking compensation. In November 2003, ANZ Bank, Standard Chartered Bank and ABN Amro filed claims for political risk insurance with the UK’s ECGD for about $60 million and six European banks, including those backed by the ECGD, filed claims worth $200 million with the Indian government. Belgium’s OND has been approached by three banks for $90.8 million worth of insurance compensation. OPIC, Ex-Im, OND, the ECGD and any other ECA involved will seek to recover any claims they do pay out from the Indian government. The Indian government, and ultimately the Indian people, now face a huge compensation bill for a project that has brought far more harm than good to India. But both the foreign investors and the ECAs that backed them were extremely negligent in making their risk assessments on this project. In consequence, they should accept mutual responsibility for the crisis now surrounding it. Tackling Corporate Bribery and Corruption Bribery is notoriously difficult and potentially expensive to prove.88 It often requires a dissatisfied party to the bribe turning whistleblower for any information to come out in the first place. Or it requires extensive forensic auditing and investigations in various places, including offshore tax havens, to come up with sufficient evidence for a prosecution. Companies, meanwhile, almost always hide behind the defence that the bribe was either a legitimate commission or, in cases in which the bribe was made through an agent or subsidiary, that they had no knowledge of the bribe. Western governments are often reluctant for investigations into bribery to go ahead for fear of upsetting trade or diplomatic relations with the country in which a foreign official is alleged to have taken a bribe. And law enforcement agencies still tend to have the attitude that bribe-giving companies are simply the victims of greedy foreigners who demand bribes – or that bribery is just the way of doing business abroad.89 In the US, the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalised the payment of bribes to foreign government officials and political parties by US businesses and individuals and required companies to keep accurate and detailed accounts reflecting all transactions. Yet the pursuit in the courts of companies paying bribes outside the US has been limited. Since the FCPA came into force, there have been 32 criminal prosecutions and 14 civil enforcement actions with 21 convictions – an average of just one conviction a year.90 Lack of funds for proper enforcement, high standards for initiating prosecutions, the self-regulation approach of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, and fluctuating political will have all been cited as reasons why the FCPA has not been as effective in bringing American companies to book as it might have been.91 On paper, the OECD anti-bribery Convention, operational since 1999, would seem to set out sufficient rules to combat Western companies’ paying bribes. The Convention requires each signatory country to enact national legislation making it a criminal offence to bribe a foreign public official.92 But it seems to have had little impact on company behaviour. The annual Bribe-Payers Index for the year 2002 collated by Transparency International shows that 42 per cent of 835 business experts interviewed had not even heard about the OECD Convention.93 Only one in five senior managers of foreign firms based in emerging market countries, where the available evidence suggests that bribery is most likely to take place, were aware of the Convention.94 Why has the OECD Convention had so little impact? Several answers suggest themselves. One reason is that no company in any OECD country has been prosecuted for or convicted of bribery since the Convention came into effect (with the exception of companies in the United States). As John Githongo, formerly of Transparency International Kenya, puts it: “Until people are brought before the courts, the OECD Convention will not make a difference to the developing world”.95 Another reason is that monitoring its implementation has been slow. The OECD was meant to have reviewed both compliance with the Convention and the effectiveness of legislation introduced by each country by the year 2005, under a process known as Phase 2.96 Between November 2001 and November 2003, however, the OECD had reviewed under Phase 2 just 7 of the 34 countries that have ratified the Convention. It is able to review only three to four countries a year. At this rate, it will be 2010 at the earliest before all signatories to the Convention have been assessed. But the main reason that the OECD Convention, and anti-corruption legislation in general, has had little effect is, in the words of The Economist, that “there are holes in the anti-bribery laws that are big enough for a half-blind elephant to blunder through.97 The biggest of those holes is that companies are not held responsible for the actions of their subsidiaries or of agents acting on their behalf.98 As a 1997 survey by Control Risks Group (a UK-based business risk consultancy specialising in providing companies and governments with political and commercial risk analysis and business intelligence) found, 56 per cent of European companies and 70 per cent of US companies said they “occasionally” used middlemen such as agents, joint venture partners or subsidiaries to make corrupt payments, while 44 per cent of European firms and 22 per cent of US ones admitted to doing so regularly.99 Even the OECD recognises that its Convention’s omission of subsidiaries is a major weakness in the agreement.100 The business world in general prefers voluntary self-regulation rather than legislation to tackle a problem. But a 2002 survey of business practice by EU firms carried out by the UK investment company Friends Ivory and Sime (FIS), found that while 87 per cent of companies responding to their survey did have internal codes of conduct governing bribery and corruption, less than 25 per cent had proper enforcement mechanisms within the company that would make such codes effective.101 Some of the codes ruled out receiving bribes but not giving them, or allowed “local customs” to take precedence over the company’s anti-corruption rules. John Bray, an anti-corruption expert at Control Risks Group, notes that “experience shows that [anti-corruption] codes will have little impact unless they are actively supported by top management.”102 But even this, he says, is not enough. As long as promotion within companies depends on winning business rather than observing company “rules”, staff will remain under considerable pressure to bring in business to the company and to win contracts – at whatever cost. Box 6: Defence Equipment, South Africa Five European ECAs – France’s COFACE, Germany’s Hermes, Italy’s SACE, Sweden’s EKN and the UK’s ECGD – were involved in financing a huge £2.88 billion defence package to South Africa signed in December 1999 that included frigates, submarines, corvettes, helicopters and fighter jets. The companies given ECA backing include France’s Thales (formerly Thomson CSF), Germany’s Thyssen and Ferostaal, Italy’s Augusta, Sweden’s SAAB and the UK’s BAE Systems. The arms deal has been highly controversial in South Africa and has been embroiled from the beginning in numerous allegations of corruption. Allegations of impropriety have surrounded nearly every contract involved and continue to do so despite an official investigation in South Africa. Critics allege that this investigation was a whitewash, not least because the country’s premier anti-corruption body, the Special Investigating Unit, was excluded from it. The German Frigate Consortium, encompassing Thyssen and Ferostaal, won the bid to supply corvettes despite the fact that its bid should, according to legal opinion, have been discounted during the initial evaluation process. Thyssen appointed Futuristic Business Solutions Ltd (FBS) as its local agent; it agreed to pay FBS a $200,000 success fee if Thyssen won the contract and an agreed percentage of any savings FBS helped it secure on its obligations to provide “offset investments” into the country. (Offset agreements require a supplier to direct some benefits back to the purchaser in the form of work, technology, counter-trade agreements, or investment in the country. They are widespread in the defence sector and have a reputation for raising the cost of a deal by around one-fifth; being difficult to monitor; failing to bring the benefits promised at the time of sale; and contributing to corruption.) FBS has shares in another company, African Defence Systems (ADS), the head of which, Shabir Shaikh, is the financial adviser to South Africa’s Vice-President, Jacob Zuma, and brother of the country’s chief of weapons acquisitions. Several criminal prosecutions are now pending in South Africa in connection with the German Frigate Consortium’s contract, and the contract for the information management system for the corvettes, which was awarded to Thomson CSF (now Thales). The South African authorities are pursuing criminal charges for receipt of gifts from bidders against the South African head of the navy responsible for overseeing the corvette programme. Shabir Shaikh of African Defence Systems is facing prosecution for corruption. The charge sheet against Shaikh alleges that Vice-President Zuma came to an agreement with Thomson CSF to receive $80,000 a year in return for protecting the company from official investigations into allegations of bribery on the defence package. Zuma is believed to have used his influence to ensure that South Africa’s Special Investigating Unit, was excluded from taking part in the official investigations. The French authorities are reportedly considering a request from the South African authorities for help with their investigation into the claims involving Thomson CSF. BAE Systems, meanwhile, in a joint venture with SAAB, won the contract for trainer jets despite the fact that its bid was $720 million more expensive than that made by Italian defence company Aermacchi for its MB339FD jet and despite the fact that senior South African airforce personnel were said to favour the Aermacchi jets. Critics of the deal have observed that in March 1998, one month before defence minister Joe Modise intervened in the negotiations in BAE’s favour, BAE Systems donated five million rand ($982,400) to the ANC’s MK Veteran’s Association, of which Modise was a founding trustee and steering committee member, through an organisation called the Airborne Trust. It was revealed in July 2003 that Modise had enjoyed a trip to the UK at the expense of the Airborne Trust. Allegations emerged a month earlier, in June 2003, that BAE Systems had paid a direct bribe of £500,000 to Modise and made secret contributions to ANC election coffers. Another contractor on the deal, EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), which had won small contracts for exocet missiles and radars, admitted to helping 30 South African public officials obtain cheap Mercedes Benz cars. In March 2003, the former African National Congress chief whip, Tony Yengeni, was sentenced to four years in jail for defrauding parliament by lying about the origin of the Mercedes Benz that he had been given by EADS. The head of EADS in South Africa, Michael Woerfel, was suspended from his post and may yet face prosecution in Germany for bribery. In South Africa, opposition to this defence deal has emphasised that South Africa did not need and cannot afford it. A South African NGO, Economists Against the Arms Race, is currently taking legal action against the South African government, seeking cancellation of the arms deal on the grounds that it is strategically, economically and financially irrational and therefore unconstitutional. Some of the ECAs involved in this deal would clearly have known about the corruption allegations that arose before it was finally signed in December 1999. The UK’s ECGD has admitted that it gave support despite knowing that an official investigation in South Africa into the allegations was pending. None of the ECAs seem to have instigated any action or investigation against the companies involved. Improving ECA Practices on Corruption Export credit agencies’ active negligence towards corruption has revealed a hypocrisy at the heart of government: Western countries are blatantly ignoring their responsibilities under international treaties, such as the OECD anti-bribery Convention, while strongly pushing a “good governance” agenda on developing countries. This policy incoherence has led to a flurry of activity at the OECD. In December 2000, the OECD’s Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG) issued an Action Statement on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits103 – a major step forward in recognising the role of ECAs in corruption. Members of the Group agree to ensure that their ECAs: Inform applicants about the legal consequences of bribery in international business transactions; “Invite” applicants seeking export credit guarantees to declare that neither they nor anyone acting on their behalf has engaged in or will engage in bribery; Refuse to approve credit, cover or other support where there is “sufficient evidence” of bribery; Take appropriate action against a company whose bribery is “proved” after credit, cover or other support has been provided, such as not making any further payments, trying to recover previous sums provided and referring evidence of such bribery to national investigation authorities. From November 2002, the ECG agreed to publish a survey it had conducted since January 1998 of member country procedures to combat bribery. The 2002 survey comprehensively covers the measures that ECAs have put in place to fulfil their requirements under the Action Statement; the procedures that they have established to deal with suspected bribery, sufficient evidence of bribery and cases of proven bribery; and details of what their actual experience with bribery has been.104 The survey shows that ECAs are beginning to take anti-corruption procedures seriously, albeit in a rather patchy and arbitrary manner.105 Out of 30 ECAs which responded to the survey from the 28 OECD member countries, all but four (Australia, New Zealand, Turkey and the UK) now inform applicants of the legal consequences of bribery in international business transactions. Only two ECAs (Turkey and Korea’s KEIC) have not taken the second step outlined in the Action Statement of introducing a warranty procedure that invites companies to state that neither they nor anyone acting on their behalf has or will engage in bribery in the transaction to be supported. But one in three of the ECAs that responded (including Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the UK)106 have yet to implement the third step of the Action Statement: to make it required institutional practice to withhold support for transactions if there is sufficient evidence of bribery. Four ECAs (Korea, Poland, Turkey and the UK) have made no institutional commitment not to support a company if a legal judgement of bribery has been passed against it. The final step of the Action Statement requires an ECA to take appropriate action if bribery is proved after an ECA has given support for a transaction. But nine ECAs (one in three of those that responded to the survey, including Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the US)107 do not yet have an institutional requirement to deny compensation to companies in instances where bribery has been proven in a legal case, while two in three ECAs (21 in total)108 would not do so even when there was sufficient evidence of bribery. Over half the ECAs that responded (16),109 meanwhile, have not yet committed themselves institutionally to seeking to recover sums provided to the company concerned when there has been a legal judgement of bribery. And just over onethird (12 of the 30 ECAs)110 have yet to be required institutionally to inform the appropriate national authorities if they have sufficient evidence of bribery after they have given support. The results of the 2002 OECD survey suggest that, while almost all ECAs have instituted the simplest and least demanding requirements of the Action Statement, they have implemented only half-heartedly those measures that would actually lead to anti-bribery policies being properly enforced. Moreover, the proof of whether any of these measures are effective or not is in the proverbial pudding. Since December 2000, only five ECAs have taken any action on bribery.111 Every other ECA claims to have had no suspicion, sufficient evidence or legal judgement concerning bribery. It lacks credibility, however, and certainly contradicts US intelligence information on bribery, that the major exporting countries have come across only one or two suspicions of bribery in the past two years in their dealings with their major exporting companies. This suggests that the ECAs’ stance against corruption may be more rhetorical than practical at present. It also seems to reflect an ongoing and deep reluctance on the part of Western governments to take bribery too seriously for fear of losing business for their country.112 A recent case involving the UK’s export credit agency provides a good example of this. In November 2003, it was revealed that the ECGD provided cover to weapons and aircraft manufacturer BAE Systems even though the company would not comply fully with the ECGD’s new anti-corruption procedures introduced earlier in April 2003. In particular, BAE Systems, ECGD’s most frequent customer and the UK’s largest defence exporter, reportedly refused to provide ECGD with documents giving details of agents and commission payments relating to a defence contract with Saudi Arabia.113 Credible information had emerged just days before ECGD supplied the cover that BAE Systems, in connection with an earlier and related Al Yamamah defence contract, had been bestowing excessive hospitality on Saudi Arabian public officials, including yachts, sports cars and prostitutes.114 ECGD, rather than denying further support unless the documents were provided, or awaiting the outcome of pending investigations by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office and National Audit Office into the hospitality allegations, asked the company to submit a new application “whereby no agents’ commission was to be paid under the project”, after which it approved cover.115 “Best Practices” In November 2003, the OECD’s Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees issued a new document on “Best practices to deter and combat bribery in officially supported export credits.” The document suggested that 11 “best practices”, many of them already adopted by some ECAs, should be made official practice within all ECAs. Some of these involve strengthening measures already agreed in the December 2000 Action Statement, for instance, requiring rather than simply inviting companies to sign a “no bribery declaration” in order to obtain ECA support. Other best practices are that ECAs should: Require companies to provide details of agents’ commissions that amount to more than five per cent of a project’s cost and should consider introducing a cap on commissions and applying enhanced due diligence for commissions over five per cent of a project’s cost; Require companies to state on application for ECA support whether they have been debarred by any multilateral or bilateral financial institution, such as the World Bank,116 from contracts with that institution, or found guilty in a national court of bribery, with a view to ECAs either withholding support or applying enhanced due diligence (investigating the history, performance and value of a company before investing in it or extending financial support to it); Require ECAs to inform national investigative authorities of any suspicion or sufficient evidence of bribery both before and after they have decided to support a company; Apply enhanced due diligence and suspend an application if suspicion or sufficient evidence of bribery arises; Suspend payments to a company and deny access to further support where there is sufficient evidence of bribery until an official investigation has been concluded; and Apply all possible measures, such as suspending payment to a company, seeking compensation from it and debarring it from further support for a certain number of years, where there is a legal judgement of bribery. In addition, the OECD Best Practices document suggests that ECAs should consider making it a prerequisite for official support that a company adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,117 apply an anti corruption company code of conduct and have won contracts to be supported through a transparent procurement process. The Best Practices document is a significant advance on the ECG’s earlier Action Statement. If accepted by ECG members in full, it could lead to much higher standards on corruption in officially-supported exports. But the document will not be discussed by ECG members until April 2004, when some ECAs may well push for weaker measures. The Best Practices document, however, is already weak in three areas. The first involves its suggestions concerning agents and commission payments. Commission payments to agents are a well-known route to disguise bribes. Given that most ECAs directly underwrite commission payments, it is essential that they have the highest standards of due diligence concerning them. The Best Practices document, however, suggests that details of agents and commissions, such as the amount paid, services rendered, purpose of the commission and name of the agent, should be required only when the commission represents more than five per cent of a contract. It also suggests that ECAs should consider introducing a cap on the proportion of commission payments in a contract that they will support – a cap that Transparency International has recommended should be five per cent. This would certainly improve existing ECA practice. According to the OECD’s 2002 survey, one-third of ECAs (11)118 do not currently require any details of agents’ commissions and just one in five ECAs (6)119 apply any kind of ceiling on commissions. Genuine best practice, however, would require ECAs to demand details of agents’ commissions on all transactions, regardless of the percentage of the contract that they represent.120 More important than introducing a cap on commission payments would be to require ECAs to: Ensure that the agents’ commission represents value for money on genuine services provided; and Establish a basic set of “red flags” for due diligence on agents’ commissions (including not supporting commission payments if they are paid offshore, if the agent does not reside in the country where the project is taking place, or if the agent has little experience in the specific industry or has relatives in a government position).121 Australia’s Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) is ahead of all other ECAs in its due diligence in this area: it requires companies to provide, in addition to information about commission payments, a written declaration of any payment and incentives given to a third party each time ECA funds are received, detailing the amount, purpose and recipient of the payments. A second area of weakness, which ECAs may well dispute in future negotiations on the Best Practices document, concerns company debarment. The threat of withdrawing future export credit support for a company for a set period of time is one of the most effective sanctions available against corporate bribery. As Kirstine Drew of the Trade Union Anti-Corruption Network UNICORN, puts it: “debarring … imposes economic costs and introduces an economic disincentive. Advancing the case for, and challenging barriers to, debarring should be a key priority”.122 The Best Practices document recommends debarring a company among its list of “all possible measures” to be applied when there is a legal judgement of bribery against a company. But nine ECAs123 say they cannot legally adopt this measure before giving support, while 13124 do not do so despite being able to when there is a legal judgement against a company. Where support has already been given, 17 ECAs125 say they are not legally able to debar a company, while 10126 do not do so despite being able to. This is despite the fact that commentaries on the OECD anti-bribery Convention, which all members of the OECD’s ECG Working Party have signed, specifically suggest that “exclusion from entitlement to public benefits” is an appropriate sanction when a company or individual is found guilty of bribery of a foreign public official.127 Moreover, the OECD’s 1997 Revised Recommendations of the Council on Combating Bribery states that “member countries’ laws and regulations should permit authorities to suspend from competition for public contracts enterprises determined to have bribed foreign public officials in contravention of that Member’s national laws.”128 Curiously, many European countries (including Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK) have stated that they are not able legally to exclude companies from ECA support. In May 2000, however, the European Commission recommended that a new European public procurement directive currently under discussion include an obligation to exclude any company that has been convicted of corruption from tending for public contracts.129 At some point in the near future, therefore, European ECAs will probably have to review their legal position. ECA unwillingness to impose the sanction of debarment on their domestic companies is illustrated by Canada’s ECA, Export Development Canada (EDC). The EDC refused to debar the Canadian construction company, Acres, a frequent recipient of EDC support, after it had been convicted of bribery in a large-scale water project in Lesotho (see Box 4). Although the EDC did not directly support Acres on the Lesotho project, its refusal is a clear breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the OECD anti-bribery Convention. Another company, Germany’s Lahmeyer, has also received a conviction (currently under appeal) of bribery in the Lesotho water project, while the French company, Spie Batignolles, is currently being prosecuted for bribery, and seven other European companies, including Italy’s Impregilo and the UK’s Balfour Beatty, also face possible prosecution. How ECAs respond to bribery convictions in Lesotho, in particular, whether they debar any companies convicted, irrespective of whether they were direct recipients of official export credit support or not, will be a crucial test of their willingness to tackle bribery. A final weakness of the Best Practices document, as Michael Wiehen of Transparency International pointed out to the OECD’s Export Credit Group in November 2003, is that it does not address disclosure. ECAs are in most instances backed by public money; it is essential, therefore, that they operate to the highest standards of transparency. Transparency International recommends that ECAs disclose publicly the name of applicants, amount applied for and country to which goods or services are to be sold at the time of application.130 At present, many ECAs do not reveal details of the projects they support; those that do usually disclose details only if the company consents. Between 2001 and 2003, for instance, 62 per cent of companies supported by the German ECA, Hermes, did not consent to disclosure. In the UK, during the financial year 2002/3, three exporters refused consent for disclosure on guarantees that represented nearly one-quarter (23 per cent) of the total value of ECGD guarantees issued that year. Besides disclosure of projects, ECAs should be encouraged, both through the OECD and at a national level, to make an annual disclosure of how many allegations of bribery they have received, and what action they have taken on them. Only if ECAs are more transparent in how they deal with bribery allegations can they be genuinely accountable to the public and the international community for their anti-corruption procedures. Conclusion ECAs are central to efforts to combat corporate bribery worldwide. They operate at the coalface of exporter behaviour abroad, and thus have enormous power to influence the companies they support. They have the power to determine the quality of investment that Southern countries receive and whether Southern countries will be saddled with debts for unviable or unproductive projects. They also have the power to influence whether companies will exacerbate corruption problems around the world, or be part of the solution. In an era of increasing international commitments to eradicate corruption,131 ECAs can no longer afford to support their domestic businesses at any cost. They are slowly beginning to take note of their responsibilities, but it seems that only under sustained pressure from NGOs, Parliamentarians, the press and the public, both at a national and international level, will real and lasting changes come about. ECAs can and must be held accountable to those that help pay their bills: ordinary people in the North and in the South. Notes and references 1 Transparency International, “Transparency International releases new Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 2002”, press release, 14 May 2002. 2 Asian Development Bank, Anti-Corruption Policy: Description and Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Manila, 1999, p.5. 3 The US has introduced a “Millennium Challenge Account”, for instance, which will give aid only to countries that prove that they are fighting corruption and introducing market-friendly policies. The UK government has also announced a new source of funding for development, the International Finance Facility, which will be accompanied by “tough conditionality – [insisting] on corruption-free regimes that pursue stable, equitable and sustainable economic growth”. See Brown, G., “An assault on poverty is vital too”, The Guardian, 13 February 2003, p.22. 4 “The Short Arm of the Law”, The Economist, 28 February 2002. The US government, as the only government that had legislation (the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) actively prohibiting bribery of foreign public officials until the 1997 OECD anti-bribery Convention, has monitored bribery in international contracts on a regular basis for many years, not least to assess how much business it loses as a result of its legislation. It produces an annual report, Battling International Bribery, which monitors other countries’ compliance with the OECD Convention and includes a classified annex listing foreign companies about which the US government has received credible information that they have engaged in bribery. 5 Control Risks Group, Facing Up To Corruption–Survey Results 2002, London, 2002, p.5. In July 2003, however, the US government reported that the number of contracts on which it had received reports of bribery had fallen to 40, the contracts worth $23 billion in total. But it concluded that it was too early to say whether this drop was a one-off dip from the annual average of 60 reports or a result of the OECD anti-corruption Convention. See US Department of Commerce, “Addressing the Challenges of International Bribery and Fair Competition, 2003”, July 2003. 6 US Government, “Third Annual Report to Congress: Implementation of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention”, 29 June 2001, http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summit01/wwwh01062905.html . The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions was signed by all 30 OECD countries as well as four non-OECD countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria and Chile) in 1997 and came into effect in February 1999 after six of the major OECD countries ratified it. The Convention now has 35 signatory countries (Slovenia signed in late 2001), of which 34 have ratified it. The Organisation for Cooperation and Development (OECD) comprises 30 of the world’s richest countries, including EU countries, the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Korea. Based in Paris, with an annual budget of $200 million, the OECD calls itself a “club of like-minded countries” that believe in market economics and pluralistic democracy. It provides a forum for discussion on economic and social policy issues for governments, as well as producing research, policy papers, and international treaties and agreements. See http://www.oecd.org/about/general. 7 Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002, Berlin, 14 May 2002. 8 The 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalises the payment of bribes to foreign government officials and political parties by US businesses. It requires companies to keep accurate and detailed accounts reflecting all transactions. But it specifically excludes facilitation payments. 9 Hellman, J., Jones, G. and Kaufmann, D., “Are Foreign Investors and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies?” Transition, May-June-July 2000, pp.5-6. 10 Hellman, J., Jones, G. and Kaufmann, D., “Far from Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?”, World Bank, draft document, August 2002, p.16. 11 Ibid., p.4. 12 The Economist, op. cit. 4. 13 “No Baksheesh please, we’re British”, The Daily Telegraph, 11 February 2002. 14 Ibid. 15 For a full analysis of export credit agencies, see Hildyard, N., Snouts in the Trough: Export Credit Agencies, Corporate Welfare and Policy Incoherence, Corner House Briefing No. 14, June 1999, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/briefing/14ecas.html See also http://www.ecawatch.org. 16 These risks include war, nationalisation/expropriation, a moratorium on external debt, break off in trade relations, foreign exchange shortages, the risk that the project will not be completed or is not commercially viable, insolvency of the buying institution, a refusal by the buying institution to pay, or importing government interference with the project. They also include political risks such as civil disturbances or actions by overseas governments affecting performance of the contract, or political, economic or administrative events occurring abroad that prevent payment. While the terms of loans supported by ECAs to developing countries are similar to commercial terms, ECAs generally provide cover for larger sums, longer periods and for higher risk countries than the private sector is willing to do. Like the private sector, they charge companies a premium, but premium charges have generally been low, and income from premiums has only ever covered a portion of the losses made by ECAs. Historically, ECAs have operated at a loss, paying out far more in claims than what they have received in the form of premiums and recoveries on claims. Between 1982 and 1997, export credit agencies lost taxpayers from their respective countries a total of $64.5 billion. Since 1995, however, ECAs have been slowly moving into the black and achieved a net operating surplus of $2.8 billion in 2001. The Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures (SCM) Agreement of the World Trade Organisation requires ECAs to break even in the long-term in order to eliminate any subsidy that their support might provide. The 1978 OECD Export Credit Arrangement (see below) sets minimum premium rate benchmarks below which ECAs cannot charge (except for military equipment and agricultural products that are exempted from the agreement). Thus while ECAs still use taxpayers’ money, they are less likely today to lose it, even though they are still providing subsidies in various ways (see Box 5). Moreover, many ECAs operate a “national interest account”, which allows them to back projects with no regard to breaking even or even to normal underwriting criteria. See S. Estrin, S. Powell, P. Bagci, S. Thornton, P. Goate, “The Economic Rationale for the Public Provision of Export Credit Insurance by ECGD: a report for the Export Credits Guarantee Department”, National Economic Research Associates, April 2000, Appendix D; OECD, “2001 cashflow report from the Export Credit Group Members”, http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00038000/M00038847.pdf. The OECD Export Credit Arrangement is an informal agreement among OECD members with export credit agencies that provides a framework for medium- to long-term officially-supported export credits. The Arrangement is intended to avoid an export credit race in which export credit agencies seek to provide the best possible terms for their domestic companies. It does this by setting minimum interest rates to be charged and maximum repayment periods, and by harmonising country classification. The Arrangement is policed through peer pressure and self-regulation. It has, however, subsequently been adopted in law via the EU and is therefore legally binding for EU countries. 17 Kohler, H., “Reforming the International Financial System”, in The Berne Union 2001 Yearbook, February 2001. 18 Brown, V., “Looking to the future”, The Berne Union Yearbook 2003, February 2003, p.5. 19 World Bank, Global Development Finance 2002, Chapter 4; OECD, “Officially supported export credits – levels of new flows and stocks”, data for 1999 and 2000. 20 Figures from OECD DAC Statistics and US Treasury note on Multilateral Development Banks, http://www.ustreas.gov/omdb/tab9.pdf. The World Bank, for instance, makes $20-25 billion of new loan commitments a year. 21 World Bank and OECD, op. cit. 19. 22 There has been some change in the last few years, however, in response to heavy criticism from NGOs and because ECAs lagged far behind development banks such as the World Bank in their social and environmental guidelines. In July 2001, the OECD’s Export Credit Group announced a set of principles for discouraging the use of official export credits for “unproductive” expenditure to Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) – defined as expenditure that does not contribute to social and economic development, poverty reduction or debt sustainability (although the definition and principles explicitly still allow expenditure on national security). OECD Export Credit Group members are now required to inform the group of all export credit transactions with HIPC countries that are monitored annually. In December 2001, meanwhile, the OECD’s Export Credit Group announced a set of proposals for common approaches to officially supported export credits and the environment to be implemented by ECAs in early 2002. These include proposals that projects should be screened for environmental impact and classified according to potential impact; that projects should be benchmarked against international standards such as those of the World Bank; and that there should be disclosure of information to relevant stakeholders. The proposals have been criticised, however, as being too weak, too reliant on host country legislation and for not being binding. The US delegation to the OECD Export Credit Group voted against the proposals because it considered them to be too weak. See Coutts, S.,”The Catastrophe Market: Export Credit Agencies”, ABC Radio National Background Briefing, 16 February 2003. 23 Frisch, D., “Export Credit Insurance and the Fight Against International Corruption”, Transparency International Working Paper, 26 February 1999. 24 Wiehen, M., “TI Working Paper: OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees”, Informal Consultation in Paris, 16 November 2000. 25 There is considerable secrecy surrounding commission payments. Businesses rarely disclose such payments, or indeed company guidelines on commission payments, because they regard them as commercially confidential. Scandals over large commission payments in the Middle East, particularly for defence equipment, have led to most Middle Eastern countries introducing laws on disclosure of commission payments or, in the case of Bahrain, seeking to phase out commission payments altogether (www.ustr.gov/pdf/1999_gcc.pdf). “Basic Rules” on combating extortion and bribery, drawn up by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1996 as a means of self-regulation by international business, state that companies should ensure that “any payment made to any agent represents no more than an appropriate remuneration for legitimate services rendered”, and that all such payments are recorded by the company (iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/rules/1999/briberydoc99.asp). An ICC manual on corruption and bribery, meanwhile, states that companies should beware of paying commissions in a third country, to a numbered bank account or to another person other than the agent, and of paying commissions either in advance of or immediately upon award of contract (Davies, M.N., “The Role of Agents and Sales Representatives”, Chapter 4, Fighting Bribery: a corporate practices manual”, International Chamber of Commerce, undated). 26 The Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG) is a subgroup of the OECD trade group focusing on and negotiating policy issues relating to OECD member country export credit agencies. 27 OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, “Responses to the 2002 Survey on Measures Taken to Combat Bribery in Officially Supported Export Credits – as of 30 April 2003”, 21 May 2003, http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00040000/M00040397.pdf. 28 Frisch, D., op. cit. 23. 29 Klein, N., “A chance to practice what we preach”, The Toronto Star, 28 January 1999, quoted in Hildyard, N., op. cit. 15; Canada Asia Commentary, No.14, July 2000, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/cac14/pdf. BC Hydro subsequently sold its share in Raiwand at a significant loss. 30 Schuman, M., “Indonesia to pay reduced claim to US in long-disputed overseas insurance case”, Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2001. 31 Giriprakash, K., “Financial Institutions pay RS 70 crore to US Exim”, India Finance, 19 March 2002; PSIRU, “Export credit agency threaten to call in guarantees to Enron”, PSIRU news item 4609, September 2001, http://www.psiru.org/news. 32 Taylor, A. and Nicholson, M., “Hubco seeks World Bank Intervention”, Financial Times special report, 14 October 1998. 33 Fried, S. and Soentoro, T., “Export Credit Agency Finance in Indonesia: Ecological Destruction and Corruption”, Environmental Defense and Bioforum, December 2000; Bosshard, P., Publicly Guaranteed Corruption: Corrupt Power Plant Projects and the Responsibility of Switzerland, http://www.eca-watch.org/bosshard7.html. 34 Wiehen, M., op. cit. 24. 35 See usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/integrity and http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2003/Anticorruption? Corruption_Integrity/default.asp. The Global Forum on Fighting Corruption brings together government ministers responsible for controlling corruption and experts from all over the world. It was initiated largely by the US government. The first Forum was held in Washington, the third in May 2003 in Korea. 36 Final Declaration, Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity II, The Hague, 28-31 May 2001. 37 Stephens, M., “The Changing Role of Export Credit Agencies”, IMF, 1999, Introduction. The Export Credit Guarantees Department is a free-standing government department, which is not answerable to the UK Parliament directly, but rather indirectly through the Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and Industry. 38 In 2000/2001, that figure had increased to £5.6 billion ($9 billion), but for 2001/02 it dropped to £3.2 billion ($5 billion). Except where stated otherwise, currency conversions in this report were calculated according to April/May 2003 exchange rates. 39 Transparency International, op. cit. 1. 40 ECGD, Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2000/01, p.40. Nearly 55 per cent of the ECGD’s defence portfolio goes to the Middle East and 38 per cent to Asia. The bulk of military cover is for aircraft (58.2 per cent), vehicles (23 per cent) radar and radios (12 per cent) and ancillary equipment (6 per cent). See Hildyard, N., op. cit. 15. 41 Courtney, C., “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade”, Transparency International, Policy Research Paper 001, April 2002, p.3; “Odd Industry Out”, The Economist, 18 July 2002. 42 Bartlett, M., “The case against ECGD underwriting of arms sales”, paper given at “Beyond Business Principles” Seminar on Export Credit Reform, House of Commons, 23 May 2002, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/documents/subsidy/html. 43 The “Good Projects in Difficult Markets” scheme is for projects in countries for which the ECGD would not usually accept projects because of the risks of non-payment by the importing government in case of default. The scheme is primarily designed for projects in Africa, the Caspian Area and the Middle East and for those in the oil and gas, petrochemical, mining, telecommunications, and airport and port construction sectors. Projects under this scheme must be financially viable, generate hard currency, use escrow accounts (special bank accounts in which money is held to pay for taxes, premium on insurance and other ongoing costs on time), and have majority private sector ownership. So far, UK company involvement in the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline between Russia and Turkey; in a £1.24 billion ($1.98 billion) Liquid Natural Gas Plant on Bonny Island in Nigeria; and in the construction of the Kotoka airport in Ghana has been funded under this scheme. 44 “Image and Reality: ECA Review”, Project Finance, 1 November 2001, p.44. 45 Campaign Against the Arms Trade, “Memorandum submitted to the International Development Committee hearing on corruption”, March 2001 (www.caat.org.uk/information/issues/corruption-submission-0900.php); Ingram, P., and Davis, I., The Subsidy Trap: British Government Financial Support for Arms Exports and the Defence Industry, Saferworld and the Oxford Research Group,July 2001, http://www.saferworld.co.uk/pubsubsidy.pdf. 46 “Millions risked on BAE Contract”, The Guardian, 27 November 2003. 47 The Aid and Trade Provision – a tied aid scheme that started in 1977 and was run jointly by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Overseas Development Administration – was specifically aimed at supporting overseas aid projects with developmental value that were of particular commercial importance to the UK. It was abolished by the New Labour Government in 1997. 48 National Audit Office, “Pergau Hydro-Electric Project”, October 1993, para 20, p.5. 49 Ibid, para 19, p.5l. The price first quoted by an Australian company for building the dam was £140-150 million ($223-240 million). The Balfour Beatty/Cementation International joint venture originally quoted for £200-300 million ($320-480 million) in 1988. By 1989, they had revised the contract proposal, first to £316 million ($503 million) and then, a couple of months later, to £397 million ($632 million). By 1991, the contract price had become £417 million ($664 million). 50 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte World Development Movement [1995] 1 All ER 611, at 617e-620h. 51 Information taken from Chaterjee, P., “British aid for Malaysian Dam”, World Rivers Review, 11 November 1993; and FIVAS (Association of International Water and Forest Studies), “Court Cases in Dam Projects”, Norway, 1999, http://www.solidaritetshuset.org/fivas/rettsskr/nyrettsindex.htm ; National Audit Office, “Pergau Hydro-Electric Project”, October 1993. 52 Drummond, P.F.N., “Recent Export Credit Market Developments”, IMF Working Paper, IMF, March 1997, p.9. 53 Information provided by the Berne Union, 26 November 2003. 54 In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2003, most of these countries come in the bottom half of the 133 countries surveyed. The Index ranks countries from 1 (the least corrupt) to 102 (the most corrupt) according to surveys that assess the perception of the degree of corruption in each country by business people, academics and risk analysts. The top country, which is perceived to be the least corrupt, has consistently been either Finland or Denmark. A country must have at least three surveys to draw on before it can be included in the list. 55 “China’s Corruption Crackdown”, 16 March 2003, http://www.friedlnet.com/news/03031602.html 56 Ibid. 57 “Turkey’s corruption bill put at $150 billion”, NTV MSNBC (Turkey), 1 July 2003 58 Hellman, J., Jones, G. and Kaufmann, D., op. cit. 10, p.21. 59 Trade and Industry Select Committee report, “The Future of the Export Credits Guarantee Department”, 11 January 2000. 60 See BP Amoco Plc, Memorandum to International Development Committee’s report “The Export Credits Guarantee Department – Developmental Issues”, 30 November 1999; Trade and Industry Select Committee, Third Report, “The Future of the Export Credits Guarantee Department”, 11 January 2000; Engineering Employers Federation, “Budget Representation to HM Treasury for 2001”. For Corruption Perceptions Index, see Transparency International’s press release, 13 September 2002. 61 Project Finance, op. cit. 44. 62 Sustainable Energy and Economy Network (SEEN), “Ex-Im Oil Dealings in Angola: Fuelling War, Poverty and Corruption,” http://www.seen.org/pages/ifis/exim/angola.shtml (accessed 26 November 2003). 63 Klitgaard, R., “Subverting Corruption”, Finance and Development, June 2000, Vol. 37, No. 2. 64 Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R., “Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?” IMF Working Paper, May 1998. 65 Strombom, D., “Corruption in Procurement”, USIA Economic Perspectives, November 1998; Asian Development Bank, op. cit. XX, Anti-Corruption Policy: Description and Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Manila, Philippines, 1999. 66 quoted in Coté-Freeman, S., “False Economies”, Developments, 4th quarter, 1999. 67 Nugent, N., “High cost of corruption in Philippines”, BBC News, 6 December 2000, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/1057716.stm . 68 The African Union, which comprises 53 African countries, was set up in 2001 to replace the Organisation of African Unity, and became operational in 2002. The Union is loosely modelled on the European Union and states that one of its main goals is to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance. 69 “African Union approves anti-corruption policy”, Reuters, 19 September 2002. 70 “Shedding light on shady dealings”, Business News Americas, 4 October 2002. 71 Brittan, S., “The Third Way is a temptation to corruption”, Financial Times, 20 June 2002. 72 With increased privatisation of health and education services, however, the possibility that companies will pay bribes to win contracts in these sectors could well increase. The health and education sectors are by no means corruption free even when in state hands. But contracts tend to be smaller than in sectors such as construction, defence, and oil and gas; in these areas, the size of the contracts means that the addition of a few million dollars to cover the cost of a bribe is less likely to attract attention. 73 Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H., Corruption, Public Investment and Growth, IMF Working Paper, October 1997. 74 For examples, see Box 3. on the KAFCO Fertiliser Complex in Bangladesh and Box 5 on the Dabhol Power Plant in India. See also Hawley, S., Turning a Blind Eye: Corruption and the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department, The Corner House, June 2003, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/document/correcgd.html and http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/document/correcgd.pdf
75 OECD, “2001 cashflow report from the Export Credit Group Members”, http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00038000/M00038847.pdf. 76 Multilateral debt is owed to institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or to regional development banks like the African Development Bank or Asian Development Bank. Bilateral debt is governmentto-government debt. Private debt is owed to commercial banks and other private creditors. Multilateral and bilateral debt usually incurs far lower interest rates than other types of debt. 77 Kohler, H., op. cit. 17. 78 Much of the debt now owed to the ECGD has been incurred because of a lack of hard currency with which to repay British companies, debt that the ECGD has described as incurred as a result of political, rather than commercial, risk. Often overseas companies or governments have been able to repay British companies in local currency by depositing money into a local bank, only to run into the obstacle that the bank is unable to convert the local currency into sterling or US dollars. Export credit agency activity can thus lead to a balance of payments crisis for the borrowing country and macroeconomic instability. See Joyner, K., “Export Credit and Debt”, unpublished report. 79 See Van Voorst, M., “Debt Creating Aspects of Export Credits”, Eurodad, August 1998, http://www.eca-watch.org. See also Harman, J.A., Chair of US Export Import Bank (Ex-Im), “Post-Crisis World Economic Development: lessons learned and thoughts for reform”, speech to World Economic Development Congress, 22 September 1999. 80 Stephens, M., “Export Credit Agencies, Trade Finance and South East Asia”, IMF Working Paper, December 1998, p.36. 81 Joyner, K., op. cit. 78. 82 For an explanation of “unproductive expenditure”, see footnote 22. 83 World Bank, op. cit. 19. 84 Ibid. 85 In 1999, the World Bank and IMF renamed structural adjustment programmes as Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programmes. Under these programmes, countries must prove that they are implementing a poverty reduction strategy, as well as continuing structural reforms such as liberalisation and privatisation. 86 These countries are Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. While G7 countries committed themselves to 100 per cent debt cancellation for the poorest countries, overall debts have not been 100 per cent cancelled, but rather cancelled to a level that World Bank and IMF economists deem to be “sustainable” (150 per cent of exports). In practice, this means that the World Bank and IMF will cancel only around 35 per cent of the debts owed to them by these countries. Countries receive this debt cancellation when they reach what is called “completion point” (that is, when they have fully proven that they have implemented structural reform and a poverty reduction programme). When the HIPC Initiative was first introduced in 1996, however, 19 out of 38 countries were to have received substantial debt cancellation by the end of 2002. Now 24 countries of the 38 have reached “decision point” at which stage they receive interim debt relief and a commitment from the World Bank and IMF for fuller debt cancellation if they stay on track. The HIPC Initiative has been heavily criticised for being too slow and too miserly. Critics state that World Bank and IMF estimates of “sustainable” debt levels are based on unrealistic forecasts that have not taken into account the impact of falling commodity prices and other global economic developments that are entirely beyond the control of the HIPC countries. (This criticism has been acknowledged by the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank.) See Jubilee Research press release, “Ethiopian Prime Minister says HIPC is failing”, 5 March 2003; World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, “OED Review of the HIPC Initiative”, OED Reach, 24 February 2003. 87 Evans, H., “Debt Relief for the Poorest Countries: why did it take so long?” Development Policy Review, September 1999. 88 Bribery has also become more sophisticated. Companies now are as likely to pay for the medical or educational expenses of a relative, or lend the company credit card to the foreign public official as to make a direct payment. 89 Interviews that the author conducted with various senior law enforcement officials in the UK in the autumn of 2002 regarding enforcement of the UK law on bribery confirmed that such cases are not high priority because of the expense involved in launching an investigation and the fear that the chances of prosecution are low. 90 Response of the United States, Questions Concerning Phase 2 [of OECD Convention on Bribery – monitoring], http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/phaseII.htm . 91 Goel, R., “Anti-Corruption Measures at Export Development Canada”, Independent Study Course, 22 April 2002, p.2. In 1988, amendments to the FCPA made under the Reagan administration weakened its force by raising the threshold for prosecution and redefining facilitation payments in a looser way. The fact that no other country had similar legislation has also effectively undermined political will by successive administrations to enforce the FCPA with much rigour. Ironically, US actions may be exacerbating the need perceived by companies based elsewhere in the world to bribe. US companies are also able to rely on the US government exerting heavy political pressure to win contracts for them. In some instances, the US has threatened to sever diplomatic links with a country and even development aid if it does not award a contract to a US company. In 1995, the US government threatened to cut off aid to Mozambique if its government did not award a contract to Enron for constructing a natural gas pipeline (Clifford, M., and Engardio, P., “Enron hasn’t made many friends in the Third World”, Business Week, 12 February 2001). In Uganda in 1999, the US Secretary for Trade, Denis William, warned that US-Ugandan relations would be damaged if legislation that would enable a US company to build a dam in the country was not enacted (Nganda, S., “Who reaps from new power law”, The Monitor, 29 September 2000). There is some suggestion that some European and Asian companies feel that the only way they can compete against this political pressure is to resort to bribery. See “Laws fail to halt international business bribery”, Financial Times, 15 October 2002. 92 The term “foreign official” is meant to include anyone holding a “legislative, administrative or judicial post in a foreign country” as well as anyone in public sector companies and international organisations. Bribery is prohibited not just in procuring orders but also in regulatory proceedings (including those involving environmental permits), tax and customs matters, and judicial proceedings. The Convention also requires governments to: — ensure proper punishment for bribery of a foreign official (including prison sentences and fines); — tighten accounting and auditing requirements by prohibiting “the establishment of off-the-book accounts, the making of off-the-books or inadequately-identified transactions, the recording of non-existent expenditures, the entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their object, as well as the use of false documents by companies … for the purpose of bribing foreign public officials or of hiding such bribery” (OECD Convention, article 8.1) — provide for international legal cooperation, including extradition of guilty parties; — take steps to end tax deductibility for illicit payments. 93 Transparency International, op. cit. 1. 94 Eigen, P., “Anti-bribery convention needs support”, Letter to the Editor, Financial Times, 17 October 2002. The top emerging market countries are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey. 95 Transparency International, op. cit. 1. 96 The OECD Convention is accompanied by two stages of monitoring that are carried out by “peer” review. Phase 1 monitoring assesses whether the legislation passed in each country to implement the Convention was adequate. By the end of 2002, all 31 countries that had introduced legislation had been reviewed, three countries (Brazil, Chile and Turkey) had yet to put such legislation in place, and Slovenia was yet to be reviewed. The UK’s initial stance that its existing corruption legislation was sufficient to implement the Convention was heavily criticised in this review process, leading to the hasty inclusion of clauses prohibiting bribery of foreign public officials in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which came into effect on 14 February 2002. Phase 2 of monitoring, which began in November 2001, assesses enforcement of the implementing legislation. 97 The Economist, op. cit. 4. 98 In the UK, companies can be found guilty under the law of conspiracy of “conspiring to make corrupt payments”. Juries are able to infer a shared corrupt intention between an agent or subsidiary and the company. But it is exceptionally hard for the prosecution to provide hard evidence of such a shared intention. (See Herbert Smith lawyers, “Bribery and Corruption: Oiling the Wheels: Addressing Bribery Overseas in UK and US Legislation”, Power Economics, 30 April 2002). Under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, meanwhile, a US business can be prosecuted for bribery carried out by a third party on its behalf only if it can be proved that the company might reasonably have known that the third party was going to make a corrupt payment. That knowledge is exceptionally hard to prove if the company denies it vigorously enough. 99 Bray, J., “Beyond Compliance: Corruption as a Business Risk”, paper presented to conference on Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries and Emerging Countries: the role of the private sector, Washington, February 1999. 100 OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Questionnaires on bribery acts in relation to foreign political parties, party officers and candidates, and on the role of foreign subsidiaries, 20 September 2001. 101 Friends Ivory and Sime, “Governance of Bribery and Corruption: A survey of current practice”, February 2002, http://www.friendsis.com/uploadFiles/Area%20of%20Engagement%20-%20Bribery%20%20Corruption 20Report%20Feb%2002.pdf. 33% of companies did not respond at all to the survey. 102 Bray, J., op. cit. 99. 103 Action Statement on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits, OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, December 2000, http://www.oecd.org/EN/about/0,,EN-about-355-10-no-no-no-0,00.html. Prior to this and in response to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, the ECG had agreed since January 1998 to exchange information by surveying members’ procedures to combat bribery in export credit transactions. This survey was updated following the ECG’s Action Statement. 104 OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, “Responses to the 2002 Survey on Measures Taken to Combat Bribery in Officially Supported Export Credits – As of 31 January 2003”, 10 February 2003, http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00038000/M00038795.pdf. This survey is a working document and is continually being updated. 105 For an excellent and detailed analysis of the survey, see Drew, K., “Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees. Responses to the 2002 Survey on Measures Taken to Combat Bribery in Officially Supported Export Credits – As of 3rd October 2003”, UNICORN, forthcoming (December 2003). 106 The full list is: Italy, Japan (JBIC), Japan (NEXI), Korea (KEIC), Poland, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. 107 The full list is: Japan (JBIC), Korea (KEIC), Korea (Eximbank), Poland, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and the US. 108 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan (JBIC), Japan (NEXI), Korea (KEIC), Korea (Eximbank), Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the US. 109 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Korea (KEIC), Korea (Eximbank), Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and UK. 110 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Korea (KEIC), Luxembourg, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. 111 Australia reported that it had sought clarification from exporters on more than one occasion when there were “inconsistencies between declarations and payments”; France withheld support for a specific transaction due to suspicion of bribery; Germany reported receiving a few allegations and investigating them but found insufficient evidence to take any further measures; the UK notified investigative authorities of one suspicion of bribery; and the US notified investigative authorities and sought recourse in one case of sufficient evidence of bribery. 112 High Level Panel of the Trans-Atlantic Environmental Dialogue, Brussels, May 2000, quoted in “Export Credit Agencies Explained”, ECA-Watch, http://www.eca-watch.org. This view is clearly reflected in a statement by the Minister for Trade, Richard Caborn, to the UK Parliament during a November 2000 House of Commons debate: “I understand and share the concern of business that the ECGD’s policy and process for handling sensitive cases should not get ahead of other ECAs” (Hansard, 2 November 2000, House of Commons Debate, Column 267WH, Export Credits Guarantee Department). 113 The Guardian, op. cit. 46. 114 “BAE accused of arms deal slush fund”, The Guardian, 11 September 2003. 115 The Guardian, op. cit. 46. 116 In 1998, the World Bank set up a sanctions committee to investigate cases of corruption by companies involved in bidding for or carrying out a World Bank-backed contract. The Sanctions Committee meets regularly to review investigations and to debar firms found guilty. It also publishes a comprehensive list of debarred firms, “The World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms”. In December 2002, there were 78 companies on this list, 36 of them British. See http://www.worldbank/org/html/opr/procure/debarr.html . 117 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recommendations from governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from OECD member countries, plus Argentina, Brazil and Chile. They provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, competition, taxation, and science and technology. See http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2349370_1_1_1_1,00.html
118 Canada, Germany, Hungary (MEHIB), Hungary (Eximbank), Italy, Japan (NEXI), Korea (KEIC), Korea (Eximbank), Mexico, Poland and Sweden. 119 The six that do apply ceilings are: Canada (10 per cent), Italy (5 per cent) New Zealand (decided case by case), Slovak Republic (judged according to standard practice in particular markets), Spain (5 per cent) and the US (determined according to whether they represent regular fees for services provided). 120 See Note from NGOs to the Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees on “Best Practices to Deter and Combat Bribery in Officially Supported Export Credits,” 30 October 2003; and Wiehen, M., “Implementation of the ECG’s Action Statement of December 2000 on Export Credit Support: Comments on Best Practices Proposals”, presentation by Transparency International to the ECG, 4 November 2003. 121 See Transparent Agents and Contracting Entities (TRACE), The TRACE Standard: Doing Business with Intermediaries Internationally, 2002, pp.14-15; International Chamber of Commerce, Fighting Bribery: A Corporate Practices Manual, Chapter Four: “The role of agents and sales representatives”, undated. 122 Drew, K., op. cit. 105, p.18. 123 Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Spain and the UK. 124 Canada, France, Japan (JBIC), Japan (NEXI), Korea (KEIC), Korea (Eximbank), Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. The US response to the survey is curious given that, under its new mandate of June 2002, Ex-Im, is required to hold a list of and debar for three years all companies that have violated the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or other named legislation. 125 Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (MEHIB), Hungary (Eximbank), Italy, Japan (JBIC), Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 126 Canada, France, Japan (NEXI), Korea (KEIC), Korea (Eximbank), Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. 127 OECD, “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions”, Commentaries on Article 3, para 24. 128 Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, Adopted by the Council on 23 May 1997, article IV, ii. 129 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption”, Brussels, 28 May 2003, p.17. 130 Wiehen, M., op. cit. 120. 131 In December 2003, the latest such commitment, the UN Convention Against Corruption, will be signed, coming into effect once it has been ratified by 30 countries. End Note This briefing was written by Dr Susan Hawley, a research consultant who has been working on issues of corruption for several years with The Corner House. It is an edited extract of her report, Turning a Blind Eye: Corruption and the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department, published in June 2003 by The Corner House. Printed paper copies also available. Dr. Hawley is the author of Exporting Corruption: Privatisation, Multinationals and Bribery, Corner House Briefing 19, June 2000. http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/time/asia/magazine/1999/990823/indonesia1.html Who Guards the Guards? TIME Asia story, AUGUST 23-30, 1999 VOL. 154 NO. 7/8 By ERIC ELLIS Singapore The organization created to clean up corporate Indonesia is itself tainted by a corruption scandal Every time Christovita Wiloto sits down at his computer, the 30-year-old banker is reminded of how tough his job is. His screensaver depicts hungry sharks circling their prey–a wry metaphor for the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency. Until recently, IBRA was a rare fish in Indonesia, an institution seemingly free of corruption and symbolic of a new, more professional Indonesian way of doing business. Its team of savvy young lawyers and bankers was re-shaping the country’s shattered economy with a patriotic probity that won admiration at home and abroad. “We pride ourselves on our integrity,” Wiloto says. “If we don’t have integrity and the confidence of the people, then what do we have?” That question took on a poignant significance last week following embarrassing revelations of a backroom deal that smacked of the crony culture IBRA aims to cleanse. IBRA deputy chairman Pande Lubis was suspended from duties after being accused of helping siphon funds from an institution under his care, PT Bank Bali. The money–some $77 million– ended up at PT Era Giat Prima, a company controlled by a senior official in the ruling Golkar party. The 59-year-old Lubis, an associate of senior Golkar officials, including President B.J. Habibie, allegedly arranged a cash transfer from Bank Bali, a bank under IBRA’s care, to another stricken bank via “intermediaries.” That middlemen should even be present in an everyday interbank transaction was strange enough. But when a Jakarta banking analyst, Pradjoto, revealed that a huge “commission” for the transfer was paid to a company linked to Setya Novanto, Golkar’s deputy treasurer, the implication was clear–IBRA funds may have financed Golkar’s recent parliamentary election campaign. The party insists it is innocent. “It was a pure business deal which Golkar has nothing to do with,” says party chairman Akbar Tanjung. “We are ready to be investigated.” The disclosures unsettled international investors, who had hoped that IBRA would lead Indonesia’s economic renaissance. The rupiah lost 12% of its value last week, the Jakarta stock market half that. Meanwhile, work inside IBRA has been paralyzed by a series of investigations into the affair. IBRA’s apparent stumble gives ammunition to unscrupulous businessmen whose cosy cartels were threatened by the agency’s previous work. It’s also a sad reminder for Indonesians of how hard it is to rid corruption from their country’s rotten corporate culture. This isn’t how things were meant to be. After it was set up in early 1998 as a condition of a $42 billion International Monetary Fund bailout, IBRA earned the respect of many skeptics as proof that real change was underway. The IMF was pleased, too, calling IBRA’s job–to get bankrupt Indonesian banks back on their feet–a “life and death matter” for the economy. If it were a company, IBRA would easily be Indonesia’s biggest. It controls $85 billion in assets–20% of the country’s GDP– and not just banks, but also holdings pledged for bad loans: major stakes in businesses like Indofood, the world’s largest noodle manufacturer, carmakers, hotels and property–even Suharto friend Bob Hasan’s private plane. And it’s all for sale, with the pressure to raise funds intensifying as Indonesia’s next budget draws nearer. IBRA has an Indonesians-first divestment policy though few buyers at home, which would make it a happy hunting ground for foreigners–if they could trust the system. But not many foreign deals have been concluded–one of the biggest so far is Standard Chartered Bank’s conditional purchase of a stake in Bank Bali in April. Foreign investors complain IBRA doesn’t move fast enough, while some Indonesians accuse the agency of selling national treasures. Still, the agency seemed to be getting some good work done. On Aug. 2, IBRA’s 18 months of hard work paid off with the national debut of Bank Mandiri, a superbank of 530 branches hewn from four failures. Mandiri’s snazzy outlets might look like Scandinavian furniture stores, but its real achievement is less visible: only one director of the four original banks sits on Mandiri’s board. Ironically, it was a new transparency in the system that unearthed the scandal. Standard Chartered’s auditors were poring over Bank Bali’s books when they discovered the $77 million hole. IBRA deputy chairman Arwin Rasyid admits the agency faces “huge pressure from influential politicians. With the wealth and assets we’re holding, no wonder many parties try eagerly to take advantage.” The sharks on Christovita Wiloto’s screensaver are real. Arwin says the Bank Bali affair “is an acid test of IBRA’s professionalism.” But in an Indonesia desperate for change, there’s a lot more at stake than reputations. https://www.sc.com/en/sustainability/performance-and-policies/impact-reports/indonesia-report.html SC’s impact in Indonesia Although we have a small presence in Indonesia, we have a deep history there, with our first office established in 1863. Although our presence in the country is relatively small compared with its population and size, we have one of the longest histories of any bank operating in Indonesia. Our impact Through direct, indirect and induced impacts, we generated a total of 1,029,000 jobs in the Indonesian economy in 2009 – that’s 0.9% of Indonesia’s entire workforce We supported 0.8% of Indonesia’s GDP in 2009, mostly through our bank financing schemes We provide financing to support Indonesian trade, to help connect Indonesia with world markets: in 2009 we processed over 38,000 trade transactions, valued at USD9.8 billion We support efforts to build sustainable business in Indonesia, committing to environmental targets and implementing stringent measures to tackle financial crime. Read our impact report https://www.sc.com/en/resources/global-en/pdf/Research/Indonesia_social_and_economic_impact_study.pdf https://www.sc.com/en/resources/global-en/pdf/impact_reports/Indonesia-impact-report-graphic-summary.pdf
What next? We’re aiming to create long term value for our shareholders, to support our clients and make a positive contribution to the broader community. The findings of this study also provided us with ideas for how to stimulate sustainable economic development going forward. For example, the report highlights ways in which we can work more effectively with corporate borrowers to help them strengthen their competitiveness in world markets. Our corporate financing reaches a wide range of sectors in the Indonesian economy, helping to facilitate imports and exports, and indirectly impacting areas of the Indonesian market we wouldn’t otherwise have access to. By offering trade finance and services that support Indonesian companies, as they seek to explore foreign markets, we can help support and promote economic growth. About our report We commissioned this report to gain an understanding of our economic impact in Indonesia. It’s part of a series of studies that have been commissioned to help us understand how our presence in specific markets has had an impact on their economies. We hope that its findings will help to inform our future strategy, both in Indonesia and elsewhere. http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14571 Mud and the Minister: A Tale of Woe in Java by Anton Foek, Special to CorpWatch July 20th, 2007
cartoon by Khalil Bendib It was midnight when the earth exploded in Sidoardjo in East Java, Indonesia, sending a torrent of burning hot mud pouring from the earth’s inner depths. Fadjariawan and Ibu Aisyah Sukantowere were in bed when a dull rumbling noise awoke them. The 35-year-old taxi driver and his wife took little notice at first since the area’s many active volcanoes are prone to ominous noises. But when their neighbors came screaming to their doorstep, they joined the panicked flight to safer ground, grabbing only their 8-year-old daughter Afira and a few possessions. They were lucky to have escaped what turned out to be a man-made rather than a natural disaster. The May 29, 2006 blowout of the volcano Lusi (short for Lumpur Sidoardjo) unleashed more than 1 million cubic meters of liquid mud that inundated four villages, killing almost 100 people, and sending almost 12,000 villagers for medical treatment, some for burns, and many more from the toxic effects of hydrogen sulfide gas. The river of mud destroyed lives and livelihoods, permanently displacing at least 11,000 people and closing schools, factories, mosques, churches, and many shops in the area. The subsequent explosion of a gas pipeline that collapsed under the pressure from the mud stream killed 11 more victims. “Now we sit here,” said Fadjariawan from the makeshift tent in which his family lives. “We are trying to get in touch with the government and with the company. With anybody that might help to get us out of this situation, for it looks like we live in hell.” He believes that he has no more influence with the bureaucrats, politicians and executives who have the power to salvage his family than he did with the rushing mud that savaged their lives. Indonesia’s minister for social welfare at the time, Aburizal Bakrie, first said the volcano was a “natural disaster” caused by a small earthquake that had shaken the area a few days before the mud blowout. But Bakrie, whose family firm controls the oil and gas company PT Lapindo Brantas, had reason to cling to this explanation. His company had been drilling for gas in the area of the blowout. Company Disappears At the time of the blowout, PT Lapindo-Brantas was a subsidiary of PT Energi Mega Persada, or EMP, part of the Bakrie Group and the holding company of PT Lapindo-Brantas. EMP owns a 50 percent share, Medco Energi International has 32 percent, and Santos has 18 percent. A month after the disaster, and following a visit from Indonesia’s vice president, Jusuf Kalla, Bakrie accepted some responsibility on behalf of Lapindo, after the vice president and Energy and Natural Resources Minister Punomo Yusgiantoro criticized the company for incompetence in its handling of the Sidoardjo distaster. In November Lapindo agreed to pay $106 million toward the clean up. But Lusi’s cost to the economy, the environment and the populace is mounting as scientists and engineers have failed to staunch the small volcano that sits 30 miles south of Surabaya, the second largest city in Indonesia, with over two million inhabitants. Faced with clear evidence that it was responsible, and escalating liabilities, Lapindo took another track. Four months after Lusi blew, PT Lapindo-Brantas ceased to exist. It was sold for $2 to Lyte Limited, registered on the offshore island of Jersey. Lyte is solely owned by the Bakrie Group and was soon renamed Bakrie Oil & Gas. According to the New York Times, “Energi Mega Persada, had said in an official securities filing that it was selling Lapindo because of the huge costs it faced in cleaning up after the mud flow, and it was better to use its assets for its other oil and gas projects.” Some now fear that the company Bakrie Oil & Gas will go bankrupt, making environmental restoration and compensation to the victims impossible, as the rest of the Bakrie empire has been careful to remain legally separate. Asked by Tempo magazine in October 2006 if “the Lapindo mud problem [is] affecting the Bakrie businesses,” Anindya Bakrie, the oldest son of the minister, a 32-year-old Stanford MBA graduate, answered ambiguously, “Thankfully, no. Yet we are responsible for all that has happened. However, the other Bakrie companies should not be held responsible for the Lapindo problem.” When questioned directly if the eruption was Lapindo’s fault, Bakrie hedged: “Lapindo is a contractor, not the proprietor of the oil and gas field. The contractor is tied to a revenue-sharing agreement with the government. So, if we incur losses, should Lapindo be the only one to bear the burden? We want some clarification. Otherwise, should Bakrie Telecom build a tower at volcanic Mount Merapi and it erupts, it will be responsible [for the catastrophe].” Government Ties Helped Weather Previous Crisis Shifting responsibility to the government is an interesting tactic, given that the two biggest shareholders in Lapindo — Bakrie and Medco — have senior political positions. This intertwining of business and politics is a common feature of Indonesian life. Aburizal Bakrie, the minister, shares ownership of the Bakrie Group with his younger brothers. He served as company chief executive until he became the country’s chief economic minister in 2004. After a cabinet reshuffle in 2005, he was appointed coordinating minister for People’s Welfare. Medco Energi, the second biggest shareholder in Lapindo, was founded in 1994 by Arifin Panigoro, one of Indonesia’s 40 richest men, with a net worth of $815 million. The Medco website lists him as “successively, a legislator, a Presidential Advisor to the National Business Development Council and deputy chairman of the Executive Board of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP).” Medco Group is currently headed by Arfin’s brother, Himli Panigoro, a trained geologist. Although the businesses suffered serious financial setbacks during the Asian economic crisis of the 1990s, a restructured management, capital and share ownership, and a close friendship with the Suharto family have helped it make a comeback. Since then, Lapindo has become active in agriculture, real estate, trade, shipping, banking, construction, insurance, manufacturing, media and mining. Their current holdings include the PT Bakrie plantations, Bakrie Kaisei, Bakrie Electronics, the Bali Nirwana Resort, and a 20 percent share in Arutmin coal in East Kalimantan. Its telecommunications venture is developing Indonesia’s cellular service, offering cut-price rates all over the archipelago, to a promising market of 16,000 islands with 200 million inhabitants. It is also active in another mega-project, a $1.2 billion gas pipeline from East Kalimantan to Central Java. After the Lusi disaster the group is trying to project a new image, focusing on its core business, and attempting to lure overseas rather than local investors. “The family now puts themselves at the same level as other investors, it’s just that they have more shares in each Bakrie company,” a company spokesperson says. Scientists Weigh In While the Bakrie family distances itself financially and legally from Lapindo, scientists hold the drilling company responsible for the blowout. “The (drilling) well had reached a depth of over 3,000 meters when three different mud flows started,” a United Nations report concluded. “The first and largest flow started on 29 May 2006 and is situated at 200 meters southwest of the drilling well.” Within a few days two smaller flows erupted but were stopped, but the larger one continued. The flow now averages between “7,000 and 150,000 cubic meters (245,000 and 5.25 million cubic feet, respectively) of mud every day and … will continue for many months and possibly years to come,” a report published in the magazine of the Geological Society of America, GSA Today concluded. After studying the area on the ground and through satellite imagery, scientific and engineering studies ruled out the earthquake as the cause of the disaster. The GSA Today, and U.N. reports, as well as an investigation by British scientists, all lay the blame fully and squarely on Lapindo, Bakrie’s company. They concluded that the blowout of the mud volcano was not so much an accident as the predictable result of incompetence, negligence, or both. British scientists cited in New Scientist magazine called the seepage of mud and water a preventable hazard. Since it is not unusual for mud volcanoes to result from drilling operations, international companies warned Lapindo years ago to take extra care when drilling in the geologically unstable region. According to Dr. Eddy Soedjono and Dr. Agnes Tuti, researchers at the nearby Surabaya University, the company could have averted the disaster by protecting the drilling hole with a steel casing. British scientist Richard Davies agrees: “It is standard industry procedure that this kind of drilling requires the use of steel casing to support the borehole and protect against the pressure of fluids such as water, oil or gas,” he told New Scientist. “[Lapindo] ignored the warnings,” said Soedjono. “The company was fined $360 million by the government, but appealed as they deny their responsibility, arguing that since it is a natural disaster and not man-made, the government, not the company should take care of the victims. While the quarreling is continuing the people suffer.” The toxic mud from the drilling blowout is devastating agriculture and fishing industries and polluting the environment with increased salinity and mercury. A layer of mud, rising 20 meters high in the worst hit places and covering rooftops, is growing daily around the center mouth of the eruption. Researchers fear that much of the 25 square mile area around the current mud-pool will ultimately collapse. Clean Up and Compensation Today, both the government and the company have been ineffective in either helping victims or dealing with the mud flow — despite the efforts of a presidential and national disaster relief team from Jakarta that has taken over most rooms at Surabaya’s luxurious Hotel Somerset. Government efforts to divert or bottle up the mudflow have failed. In February and March, engineers dropped around 800 half-ton-each concrete balls linked to steel cables into the mouth of the eruption. The plan failed twice, as did the construction of emergency embankments and dykes that the mud soon breached, burying more homes. In May, near the one-year anniversary of the disaster, Indonesian and Japanese engineers pitched an ambitious plan to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to build a 15-story-high concrete dam around the mud volcano at a cost of $70 million. Another scheme underway is using heavy equipment to divert the mud into pipes that eventually expel it into the Porong River seven miles away. Engineers had hoped the river would be strong enough to transport the mud to the Java Sea 50 miles upstream. But hundreds of dead fish are turning up in the river and fishermen are claiming that their livelihoods are threatened. The Bakrie Group has announced that it will not cancel the Lusi project, but will probably support local philanthropy through a foundation modeled on those formed in the United States by the Ford, Gates and Rockefeller families, where the company management is legally distinct from the foundation trustees. Meanwhile various government, corporate and citizen groups have tossed out figures about how much compensation should be paid and to whom, and how that compares to what has actually been handed out. In December 2006, Yudhoyono ordered Lapindo to pay 3.8 trillion rupiah ($421 million) in compensation and costs related to the mudflow. Some officials estimate that the costs could be double that amount. But Yudhoyono did not say whether Australia-based Santos and Medco Energi would have to share the burden. According to an October 2006 Jakarta Post article: “All of the costs will reportedly be borne by Lapindo, whose general manager, Imam Agustino, said the company would allocate US$140 million to cover all expenses. Lapindo claims to have already spent $70 million as of mid-September on operational costs and in compensation to victims. Each affected family receives Rp 300,000 ($30) in monthly meal allowances and Rp 2 million ($221) to rent a house for two years. It remains unclear how Lapindo determined the amount of the payments, or if it will offer more money in the future to help the families restart their lives.” Lapindo says it is only partially responsible, should not have to cover the full costs, and insists that it has paid out some $300,000 for lost homes. But many locals say they have received nothing but a distribution of three meals a day, which invariably consists of nasi goreng — fried rice — with fish or chicken and vegetables. “We are not beggars, we just ask for our rights,” Sudarto, a refugee living in a Porong market, told AFP, reacting to a company offer to pay some victims 20 percent of the value of their home and lands. Sudarto and the other 3,200 victims in Porong want Lapindo to buy their land so they can rebuild elsewhere. As fresh hot mud spreads daily, the number of volcano refugees mounts, with many forced to live in homemade tents or in refugee camps set up in covered markets. When a similar levee broke recently at Besuki, a small town with 5,000 inhabitants, the houses filled slowly but surely with unstoppable mud. Protests Ignored Back at Fadjariawan’s tent, a continuously shifting cast of strangers and friends drops in to discuss the situation. Some prepare for a hastily organized mass demonstration in Surabaya, the district capital. They will go there on their motorbikes to ask relief from their desperate living conditions and try to pressure the local government, the company and central authorities in Jakarta to do the right thing. From time to time groups of angry, desperate residents visit the offices of Lapindo that lie abandoned halfway between Surabaya and Sidoardjo. Security guards stand vigil over the empty building as protesters demand satisfaction, answers, compensation. A meal is not enough — what about homes, jobs, schools, churches, ask some. “What about our life? ” requests one brochure published by the protestors. Why, ask some protestors, doesn’t Lapindo take full responsibility? Recently, the company tried to placate the continuous protests by ordering their spokesperson, Asip, to distribute a brochure highlighting the lighter side of mudflows. The brochure compares Lusi to a sexy and very well-dressed young woman: fun to watch and talk to. It also informs the public that mud volcanoes are all over the world, even in the U.S., and geologists have fascinating stories to tell about them. There is also a photo display showing enthusiastic tourists viewing the disaster. The headline says: “When the mud lake becomes an attraction.” Victims can also watch a 13-episode soap opera on local television financed by Lapindo. It is the love story about a young man and a woman on the run for the mudflow who fall in love. Awi Setiawan, the director, describes it as a real humaninterest story that will grab the audience “by the balls.” Future Looks Muddy Today, Fadjariawan, Ibu Aisyah Sukanto, and eight-year-old Afira live under a blue plastic tarpaulin, pitched between railroad tracks and a highway. It is furnished with a few mattresses, a fan, a television, and some small pots and pans. The family motorbike sits out front not far from the gutter from which they draw water for washing the clothes drying in the hot air. Fadjariawan says that the fried rice from Lapindo is not even sufficient nutrition. Some people are showing symptoms including hair loss and skin rashes that could be caused by malnourishment or the lingering effects of the poisonous hydrosulfide released with the mud stream. The effects of the low levels of mercury released have yet to be assessed. Exhaling fragrant smoke from clove-flavored kretek cigarettes, he recalls the blowout and counts himself and his family as lucky to have survived. One family he knows did not react quickly enough. Their daughter is now in a hospital with severe burns. “Fresh mud is temperature hot,” he says, “and is able to cause some nasty burns.” Experts put the surface temperature at more than 200 degrees Fahrenheit. It takes about ten minutes to travel by motorbike to where the town center and Fadjariawan’s house once stood. Surveying the devastation, his eyes fill with tears he does not wipe away; his voice is thick with emotion. The stench of rotten gas is almost unbearable. “Please go tell [Lapindo] we want cash and carry,” he tells this reporter. “You go tell them. Maybe they’ll listen to you. Please. Please.” This article was made possible by a generous grant from the Hurd Foundation. http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14941 Burying Indonesia’s Millions: The Legacy of Suharto by Andreas Harsono, Special to CorpWatch February 15th, 2008 Former Indonesian ruler Suharto died last month a very wealthy man. In 1999, a year after he stepped down as Indonesia’s second president, Time magazine reported his wealth at US$15 billion. “Not bad for a man whose presidential salary was $1,764 a month when he left office,” the magazine reported. And not bad for a peasant boy born in 1921 in Kemusuk, a small Javanese village, during Dutch colonial control. Suharto’s route to power and wealth was through the military. In 1954, he took a new job in Semarang, on the north coast of Java, only a three-hour drive from his military base in Jogjakarta. It thrust the 33-year-old Javanese officer into a totally different world. Before the 1954 promotion, Suharto had been a field commander. Now, as head of the Diponegoro military command in Semarang, his immediate job was not to lead military operations, but to feed the thousands of troops under him. His new division consisted of an assortment of thugs and soldiers, bandits and militias. And like most post-independence armies, it was poorly funded. If Suharto was to succeed in the new Indonesia that was emerging after World War II, he would have to find ways to keep the army in food and equipment. He looked to the example of his wife, Siti Hartinah. Although she came from Javanese aristocracy, she was supporting the family, which already had three young children, with the small garment trade she had started. Suharto, too, turned to business — mainly smuggling such consumer goods as sugar and rice between Singapore and Java. He defended running a business out of the army as essential to feeding his men. Key to his operations from the start were two men who would remain his business associates for almost half a century. Suharto’s tie to Liem Sioe Liong, a Fujian-born Chinese merchant who had migrated to Java in 1938, was to become one of the most important alliances in his New Order regime. Suharto also befriended sportsman-cum-businessman Bob Hasan, whose godfather was an army general. The relationships were mutually beneficial. Suharto used his troops and position to protect the lucrative smuggling; Liem and Hasan helped supply the troops and provide Suharto with business opportunities. According to George J. Aditjondro, a corruption researcher who spent two decades tracing the Suhartos’ fortune, Suharto basically built his “business model” in the city of Semarang and gradually expanded it, enlisting other officers and businessmen along the way. In 1956-1957, his Diponegoro operations came crashing down. Suharto was found guilty of smuggling, and army head Colonel Abdul Harris Nasution tried to remove him. But Bob Hasan’s godfather, Colonel Gatot Subroto, defended his protégé. Army headquarters defused the scandal by sending Suharto to an officer-training program in Bandung, in West Java. Within two years, he bounced back, won another promotion, and took command of the Kostrad army reserve in Jakarta. The problem of supplying troops remained the same, as did Suharto’s solution of choice. He bought his business partners along with him to Jakarta. Suharto’s political career took another turn on September 30, 1965, when hundreds of army officers kidnapped and killed several generals. Suharto knew of the plan in advance since most of the kidnappers were his Diponegoro colleagues. They reportedly planned to bring the generals, including Nasution, who had allegedly planned a coup, to face President Sukarno. The next day, Suharto decided to move against his former colleagues. Blaming the communists, his troops began a slow purge against Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president. The ensuing maelstrom of violence killed three million people between October 1965 and March 1966, according to one of his officers, Major General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. By 1968, at 47 years old, Suharto had emerged as Indonesia’s number one man. He sidelined Sukarno and ruled the country with an iron fist for the next 30 years. Human Rights Suharto has been accused of a wide variety of human rights abuses. In 1975, he ordered his troops to invade East Timor. The estimated death toll included up to 200,000 East Timorese, 100,000 in West Papua, and tens of thousands more in Aceh, Lampung, Tanjung Priok, West Kalimantan and elsewhere. Even while partnered with Liem and other Chinese tycoons, he systematically discriminated against the Chinese minority in Indonesia. The East Timor Action Network, a New York-based human rights group, called Suharto, “one of the worst mass murderers of the 20th century.” In his official biography, Suharto admitted that in 1983-1984 he had ordered “mysterious shooters” to kill between 2,000 and 3,000 thugs, thieves and robbers. This “shock therapy,” as Suharto called the killings, earned him the nickname “Gali Pelarian Kemusuk” or “The Thug from Kemusuk.” Joining Thuggery and Profits But Suharto was no ordinary thug. He was a business-minded one. Between 1971 and 1972, he and Liem set up giant wheat flour manufacturing plants. PT Bogasari Flour Mills, the foundation of Indofood, is now the world’s largest instant noodle manufacturer. Liem also set up Bank Central Asia, one of Indonesia’s largest private banks, in which Suharto’s children owned shares. Throughout his rule, Suharto has been implicated in systemic corruption and cronyism that distorted Indonesia’s economy. When the economy boomed in the 1970s, along with increased oil prices, Suharto ordered his U.S.-trained economic ministers to issue regulations that included deducting small amounts of money from the salaries of civil servants for charity. The “donation” was automatically channeled to his Supersemar Foundation and Dakab Foundation and some of the funds did help the poor, provide student scholarships and build mosques. Suharto’s Dharmais Foundation established one of the biggest cancer hospitals in Jakarta. But from the 1980s, the recipients of the charity also included Suharto and his cronies who invested the money in dozens of companies. Later, his economic ministers issued regulations that granted monopolies to favored companies. Liem won government contracts to supply wheat flour and cloves. Hasan won millions of forest concessions and won the nickname “Raja Hutan” or “King of the Jungle.” George Aditjondro, who has tracked the family’s fortune, wrote that Suharto established at least 40 foundations since the 1950s. The family owned shares in large companies, including in the cement and fertilizer industries, toll roads and oil palm plantations. In the late 1980s, when Suharto’s six children came of age, they joined the business, helped by “Uncle Liem” and “Uncle Bob.” Hasan joined with Suharto’s eldest son, Sigit Harjojudanto, to set up PT Nusantara Ampera Bhakti, a holding company in mining and telecommunications. Supersemar, Dharmais and Dakab also own shares. The middle son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, established ties with the army-owned Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation, and shared ownership with Hasan in his international timber corporations. Hasan’s paper mill, PT Kiani Lestari, received funds from Suharto’s foundations. The youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, also linked up with a Hasan operation, Sempati Airlines. When Suharto’s wife died in 1995, “Uncle Bob” became Suharto’s main advisor on the children’s businesses. Demands For Prosecution By the time Suharto finally stepped down from power in May 1998, he was facing street protests and the Asian economic crisis. The value of the Indonesian rupiah against the American dollar fell from 2,300 to 10,000. Many civil society organizations demanded that his successors prosecute Suharto and his cronies for criminal corruption. M. Fadjroel Rachman, a former political prisoner who campaigned for prosecuting the Suhartos, said that the government should take over the Suhartos’ fortune. Rachman especially targetted the former president’s six children and one grandchild: Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, Sigit Harjojudanto, Bambang Trihatmodjo, Siti Hediati Harijadi, Hutomo Mandala Putra, Siti Hutami Endang Hadiningsih and Ari Harjo Wibowo. Ari is Sigit Harjojudanto’s son, and Suharto’s eldest grandchild. The family was protected not only by its vast wealth, but also by the network of cronies that also benefited from the Suharto fortune. Michael Backman, a researcher and business analyst in Asia, once calculated the Suhartos owned 1,247 companies. A May 1998 Asian Wall Street Journal article reported that these companies were owned by at least 20 different conglomerates, including Liem’s Salim Group and Hasan’s Kiani Lestari Group. Time magazine researched land ownerships and reported the Suharto family, on its own or through corporate entities, controlled some 3.6 million hectares of real estate in Indonesia — an area larger than Belgium. That includes 100,000 square meters of prime office space in Jakarta and nearly 40 per cent of the entire East Timor. No one knows how exactly much wealth the Suhartos accumulated. Family lawyers and children repeatedly denied allegations of vast wealth and Sofyan Wanandi, a businessman once closed to Suharto, said that the family had lost much of its fortune because of mismanagement and the weakened rupiah. When Time magazine estimated the Suhartos’ wealth at US$15 billion — of which $9 billion had been transferred from Switzerland to a nominee bank account in Austria — Suharto denied the report. He insisted that he had no bank deposits abroad and owned only 19 hectares of land plus $2.4 million in savings. In 1999, Suharto filed a lawsuit against Time magazine for defamation. After a nearly a decade of legal battles, Indonesia’s Supreme Court ordered Time to pay $106 million in damages. Time and its reporters refused to pay. A family lawyer, Juan Felix Tampubolon, told the London-based Financial Times that he had no idea how rich the Suharto children were. “Yes the children have companies but, as far as I know, these are legal,” he said. “All the accusations are merely that. There are newspaper clippings but no proof.” Nonetheless, in 2004, Transparency International, an anti-corruption watchdog, named Suharto the world’s greatest ever kleptocrat and put his fortune at up to $35 billion. The United Nations and the World Bank quoted this research when they launched an international campaign last year to help governments recoup state assets stolen by previous regimes. Efforts To Regain The Wealth Over the years there have been repeated efforts to recoup the money that critics claim Suharto stole from his country. In 2007, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration filed a civil suit for US$1.54 billion against Suharto and one of the seven major foundations he established. State prosecutors alleged he had stolen $440 million from the government. But even from beyond the grave, Suharto wields influence and loyalty. When he died in January at 86, President Yudhoyono immediately cancelled a scheduled appearance at a UN conference on retaking states’ stolen assets. Instead, he went to the Suhartos’ mausoleum to preside over the patriarch’s burial ceremony. Like most Indonesian leaders, Yudhoyono was a Suharto crony. And like his predecessors in office since 1989 — B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri — he was unlikely to be able to retake the stolen assets. Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who repeatedly asked for a pardon for Suharto, owned businesses that thrived during the Suharto rule, according to Rachman. Kalla is currently chairman of the Golkar Party whose chief patron was Suharto. Last year Kalla tried to protect Suharto’s youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, after his money was frozen in a BNP Paribas account in the popular offshore haven of Guernsey, UK. Yudhoyono and Kalla are only two of Suharto’s many cronies still in power. And hundreds, perhaps thousands, of military officers, politicians and business leaders remain loyal to the family. But critics like George Aditjondro and Fadjroel Rachman doubt that the country’s leaders have the political will to follow the money trail. Retaking the stolen assets, said Rachman, will take place only “when the young leaders of Indonesia replace the Suhartoists or the old leaders like SBY, JK and their generation.”Suharto and most of his circle escaped unscathed and rich. Suharto was never prosecuted. The public reason was that in 1999 doctors declared him too unhealthy to stand trial. But critics say the real reason is that successive administrations are still highly influenced by Suharto’s henchmen and cronies. Only one family member, Hutomo Mandala Putra, nicknamed Tommy, was prosecuted for corruption. He was convicted but acquitted on appeal. He is now facing a civil suit as part of a government bid to recover millions of dollars from Garnet Investment Limited that has been frozen by BNP Paribas. Tommy also spent four years behind bars for hiring hitmen to kill Supreme Court Judge Syafiuddin Kartasasmita. The judge had convicted Tommy for corruption and illegal possession of weapons. Hasan spent three years in prison for causing a US$244 million loss to the Indonesian government through a fraudulent forest-mapping project in the early 1990s. The military’s involvement in business also continues, prompting critics to ask if they are businessmen with weapons or soldiers with check books. In June 2006, New York-based Human Rights Watch published a 126-page report, “Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military’s Economic Activities,” describing how the Indonesian military raises money outside the government budget through a sprawling network of legal and illegal businesses. Working with many business partners, the military has provided paid services, marked up military purchases, and invested in hundreds of companies. Today Suharto is dead, Liem is living in Singapore, and Hasan is semi-retired in Jakarta where he plays golf. But the business model the three partners built in Semarang in the 1950s endures and still forms the pillars of the Indonesian economy. Whether or not anyone has the will or ability to undermine this corrupt and intertwined edifice is a question that is crucial to Indonesia’s future. Andreas Harsono is a journalist based in Jakarta, currently writing his book “From Sabang to Merauke: Debunking the Myth of Indonesian Nationalism.” http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15831 Alstom Officials Paid Bribes To Win Indonesian Coal Contracts by Pratap Chatterjee, CorpWatch Blog April 22nd, 2013
Tarahan coal power plant. Photo: Syamsurrizal Mukhtar. Used with permission. Alstom, a French engineering company, has been accused of bribing Indonesian officials to win a lucrative contract to build coal power plans in Sumatra. Frederic Pierucci, a French employee of the company, was arrested and David Rothschild, a U.S. employee, has pled guilty. Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the state-owned electricity company, awarded a $118.26 million contract to Alstom and Marubeni of Japan in 2004 to supply and install boilers at the 200 megawatt Tarahan power plant in Lampung in southern Sumatra. Pierucci and Rothschild allegedly conspired to pay bribes to PLN executives as well as to Izederik Emir Moeis, a member of the Indonesian parliament from the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Democratic Party of Struggle). “The charges allege that, in order to conceal the bribes, the defendants retained two consultants purportedly to provide legitimate consulting services on behalf of the power company and its subsidiaries in connection with the Tarahan project,” the U.S. Department of Justice says in a press release. “In reality, however, the primary purpose for hiring the consultants was allegedly to use the consultants to pay bribes to Indonesian officials.” Last year the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in Jakarta revealed that Emir spent some of the $300,000 that he alleged to have received on “adult entertainment” in Paris. “I was in Paris and invited to a dinner at Lido restaurant – the most well known restaurant on Champs Elysees, all tourists go there,” Emir admitted to Indonesian reporters. “I drank wine and smoked a cigar with them (Alstom officials), that’s all. I cannot even recall their identities now.” Emir has been accused of corruption several times – in 2006 he was alleged to have received 200 million rupiah ($22,500) for his role in the procurement of medical equipment to handle the bird flu epidemic. And in 2010, court hearings revealed that Emir had asked another politician to give out 9.8 billion rupiah ($1.02 million) in a vote-buying scandal. Alstom has also been accused of paying bribes in the past. In 2011 the company paid out €31 million ($40 million) to the Swiss government for three cases involving contracts in Latvia, Malaysia and Tunisia. The company was accused of “failing to meet the standards for an international group employing over 75,000 people” and “corporate negligence.” Pierucci, who worked as vice president of global sales for the U.S. subsidiary of Alstom, was arrested last week at New York’s John F Kennedy airport and charged by the U.S. Department of Justice with conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) while David Rothschild, a former vice president of sales for the U.S. subsidiary of Alstom, pled guilty last November to one count of conspiracy. Separately Eddie Widiono Suwondho, the former president director of PLN at the time the bribes were paid out, was sentenced last March to five years in jail for selecting PT Netway Utama to provide a computerized customer information system without proper competition, resulting in estimated losses of 46 billion rupiah. bribing Indonesian officials to win a lucrative contract to build coal power plans in Sumatra http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crm-434.html
a $118.26 million contract to Alstom and Marubeni of Japan in 2004 to supply and install boilers at the 200 megawatt Tarahan power plant in Lampung http://www.marubeni.com/news/2004/040726e.html bribes to PLN executives as well as to Izederik Emir Moeis, a member of the Indonesian parliament http://www.theindonesiatoday.com/joomla-pages-iii/categories-list/61-law-photo/law-photo/325-emir-moeis-named-graft-suspect-inalstom-related-project.html I drank wine and smoked a cigar with them (Alstom officials), that’s all. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/28/emirenjoyed-wine-entertainment-paris.html
“failing to meet the standards for an international group employing over 75,000 people” and “corporate negligence.” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1cd17286-1508-11e1-b9b8-00144feabdc0.html
sentenced last March to five years in jail for selecting PT Netway Utama to provide a computerized customer information system without proper competition http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/09/28/kppu-fines-netway-utama-rp-1-billion.html https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/20/standard-chartered-fined-300m-money-laundering-compliance Standard Chartered fined $300m by US financial watchdog Dominic Rushe in New York @dominicru Wednesday 20 August 2014 08.07 BST https://i.guim.co.uk/img/static/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2014/5/18/1400429025496/-Standard-Chartered-share-009.jpg? w=620&q=55&auto=format&usm=12&fit=max&s=ac3edecdd80483da9d9be5a5fa51d209 Standard Chartered have been fined $300m for lapses in its compliance after the Iran money-laundering scandal. Photograph: Kevin Lam/Reuters
Further penalty imposed for failing to tackle compliance problems following $340m fine in 2012 over money-laundering scandal Standard Chartered has agreed to pay $300m over lapses in its anti-money-laundering procedures, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) has announced. The settlement comes almost exactly two years after the British bank paid a $340m fine to the DFS after it was accused of scheming with Iran to hide from US authorities billions of pounds worth of transactions. The latest payment follows the bank’s failure to tackle problems with its anti-money laundering compliance that the New York regulator required following the 2012 settlement. “If a bank fails to live up to its commitments, there should be consequences. That is particularly true in an area as serious as antimoney-laundering compliance, which is vital to helping prevent terrorism and vile human rights abuses,” said Benjamin Lawsky, superintendent of the DFS. Lawsky alleged the British lender failed to catch millions of higher-risk transactions that should have triggered further investigation. He said “a significant amount” of the potentially high-risk transactions the bank failed to detect originated from its Hong Kong subsidiary (SCB Hong Kong) and branches in the United Arab Emirates (SCB UAE), among others. As well as the monetary penalty the bank agreed to keep on for a further two years an independent compliance monitor appointed by the regulator and to make enhancements to the transaction surveillance system at its New York branch. It will also suspend dollar clearing operations for high-risk retail business clients of SCB Hong Kong and start abandoning high-risk small and medium business clients at SCB UAE. The New York branch will not, without the prior approval of the DFS, open a US dollar demand deposit account for any customer who does not already have such an account there. Standard Chartered settled with Lawsky in 2012 after he released a scathing report that accused a unit of the bank of leaving the American financial system susceptible to terrorists and “drug kingpins”. The $340m fine was part of a $667m settlement with other regulators over breaches of US sanctions on Iran. Lawsky had accused the bank of helping Iran launder about $250bn, keeping false records and handling lucrative wire transfers for Iranian clients. The report found that one Standard Chartered executive caustically dismissed concerns from a US colleague about dealings with Iran, one of a number of countries under American sanction. “You fucking Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we’re not going to deal with Iranians,” Lawsky’s report quoted the banker as saying. That fine was a particular embarrassment for Standard Chartered – which is based in London but best known for its banking services in Asia and Africa – as its management had weeks earlier emphasised that it had a more conservative, “boring” culture than some rivals. The bank strongly rejected Lawsky’s portrayal of its activities, which sent its share price and management into a tailspin. In August 2012, chief executive Peter Sands agreed to settle the charges while insisting that the bank had committed only minor breaches of the rules. Announcing quarterly results this month, the bank warned it faced further US fines, saying Lawsky had uncovered “certain issues” with its efforts to block money laundering following the 2012 agreement. The alleged lapse in anti-money laundering controls was detected by Ellen Zimiles, the independent monitor installed as part of the 2012 settlement. According to the DFS the bank’s New York office had developed a transaction monitoring system, the SCB Rulebook, designed to alert the New York branch to unusual transaction patterns that would require further investigation. But when Zimiles, an authority on anti-money laundering programmes at Navigant Consulting, gathered information and attempted to test the SCB Rulebook she found it contained numerous errors and other problems. As a result, said the DFS, SCB failed to identify high-risk transactions for further review. “SCB failed to detect these problems because of a lack of adequate testing both before and after implementation of the transaction monitoring system, and failed to adequately audit the transaction monitoring system.” In a statement the bank said it “accepts responsibility for and regrets the deficiencies in the anti-money laundering transaction surveillance system at its New York branch. The group has already begun extensive remediation efforts and is committed to completing these with utmost urgency.” 31 Oct 2014 Inquiry by US authorities sees Standard Chartered shares slide https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/oct/30/standard-chartered-share-price-slump-iran-us-inquiry 28 Oct 2014 Standard Chartered shares fall after new profits warning https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/oct/28/standard-chartered-shares-sink-profits-warning 20 Aug 2014 FTSE dips on rate rise concerns but Standard Chartered shrugs off US fine https://www.theguardian.com/business/marketforceslive/2014/aug/20/ftse-dips-rate-rise-standard-chartered-fine 8 Aug 2014 Standard Chartered executive locks horns with US regulators, again https://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2014/aug/07/standard-chartered-us-regulator-money-laundering 7 Aug 2014 Standard Chartered director says bankers are being treated like criminals https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/07/standard-chartered-director-bankers-treated-like-criminals 7 Aug 2014 Standard Chartered faces fresh US fines over money laundering rule breach https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/06/standard-chartered-us-fines-money-laundering-rule-breach 3 Aug 2014 Standard Chartered and HSBC – it’s that international twosome again https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/03/standard-chartered-hsbc-uk-banks The most damning bribery allegations from the bombshell case against FIFA
nginx error! The page you are looking for is not found. Website Administrator Something has triggered missing webpage on your website. This is the default 404 error page for nginx that is distributed with EPEL. It is located /usr/share/nginx/html/404.html You should customize this error page for your The most damning bribery allegations from the bombshell case against FIFA Tony Manfred Sports, May. 28, 2015, 5:01 AM The US Department of Justice arrested nine FIFA officials and five sports marketing executives on bribery and corruption charges in a dramatic raid in Zurich on Wednesday. The indictment alleges corporate executives paid bribes and kickbacks to FIFA officials in exchange for the media and marketing rights to tournaments in North and South America. According to the DOJ, most of the major continental tournaments in the Concacaf (North America) and CONMEBOL (South America) regions in the last 20 years were associated with bribery. In a statement, Attorney General Loretta Lynch called FIFA’s alleged corruption “rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted.” At 164 pages, the indictment depicts a system where soccer officials would rise to power, sell media and marketing rights to certain tournaments to marketing companies, and then solicit bribes from people associated with those companies every time a new tournament rolled around. It also contains some allegations related to the 2010 World Cup and 2011 FIFA presidential election. Here are the most damning allegations: The sports marketing company Datisa allegedly agreed to pay $110 million in bribes to CONCACAF and CONMEBOL officials for four Copa America tournaments between 2015 and 2019, including the 2016 Copa America Centenario (which will take place in the US and include North American teams).
According to the DOJ, Datisa – a new company jointly owned by three existing sports marketing groups from across the region – agreed to pay $20 million in bribes to 11 CONMEBOL officials for each edition of the tournament. The indictment claims, “Each $20 million payment was to be divided among the bribe recipients as follows: $3 million to each of the ‘top’ three CONMEBOL officials (the president of the confederation and the presidents of the Brazilian and Argentinian federations); $1.5 million to each of the seven other CONMEBOL federation presidents; and $500,000 to an eleventh CONMEBOL official.” More from the indictment: Former Concacaf president Jack Warner allegedly bought a condo in Miami in 2005 with money from a Concacaf-affiliated fund that was partially supported by FIFA’s Financial Assistance Programme. Warner organized a special meeting of Caribbean soccer officials in Trinidad and Tobago before the FIFA presidential election in 2011. At the meeting, FIFA presidential candidate Mohamed Bin Hammam (identified in the indictment as Co-Conspirator #7) talked to the meeting and said he wanted their support. After the meeting, Warner allegedly told the officials they could pick up a “gift” at the hotel’s conference room later. In the conference room, the indictment alleges, was an envelope filled with $40,000 for each official provided by Bin Hammam. After agreeing to sell the rights to the 1993, 1995, and 1997 Copa Americas to the company Traffic Brazil, former CONMEBOL president Nicolás Leoz allegedly refused to show up at a ceremony to sign the contract. In a meeting afterward, the DOJ says “he did not think it fair that he did not also make money” and solicited a six-figure bribe from Traffic founder Jose Hawilla (identified as CoConspirator #2 in the indictment). Leoz took bribes from Hawilla until the company lost the Copa America rights in 2011, the DOJ alleges, by which time his payments had ballooned to the seven figures. Hawilla allegedly paid the Argentinian football federation “tens of millions of dollars per edition of the Copa America” in exchange for Argentina guaranteeing to use their best players. Jack Warner was one of three executive committee members who accepted a $10 million payment on the behalf of the Caribbean Football Union from the South African bid committee to “support the African diaspora,” according to the indictment, before the vote for the 2010 World Cup. Warner allegedly diverted some of the money to himself, and paid fellow Concacaf executive Chuck Blazer (identified as Co-Conspirator #1) $750,000 million. Before that, Warner allegedly once instructed a family member to fly to Paris, pick up a briefcase full of $10,000 stacks of money provided by a South African bid committee official, and then fly back to Trinidad and Tobago a few hours later. Harwilla pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, and obstruction of justice and agreed to forfeit $151 million, according to the DOJ. Blazer and Warner’s two sons also pleaded guilty to corruption charges. Traffic Sports USA, Inc., and Traffic Sports International, Inc. pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy. In a statement to the Trinidad Daily Express, Warner said, “I have been afforded no due process and I have not even been questioned in this matter. I reiterate that I am innocent of any charges.” A FIFA spokesperson welcomed the DOJ’s investigation, saying it was a “good day” for FIFA. Their full statement: FIFA welcomes actions that can help contribute to rooting out any wrongdoing in football. We understand that today’s actions by the Swiss Federal Office of Justice on behalf of the US authorities and the Swiss Office of the Attorney General (initiated by FIFA through the submission of the file on the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup bidding process) relate to different matters. Firstly, the arrest of six individuals this morning in Zurich concerns investigations by the US Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of the State of New York. The Swiss authorities, acting on behalf of their US counterparts, arrested the individuals for activities carried out in relation with CONCACAF and CONMEBOL business. The second instance follows FIFA’s initiative of presenting the file on the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup™ bidding process to the Swiss Office of the Attorney General in November 2014. The authorities are taking the opportunity of the FIFA Congress to interview those FIFA Executive Committee members who are not Swiss residents who voted back in 2010 and are still in office. Today, the Swiss Office of the Attorney General announced that it has opened criminal proceedings against persons unknown in relation to the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup™ bidding process. FIFA is fully cooperating with the investigation and is supporting the collection of evidence in this regard. As noted by the Swiss authorities, this collection of evidence is being carried out on a cooperative basis. We are pleased to see that the investigation is being energetically pursued for the good of football and believe that it will help to reinforce measures that FIFA has already taken. Read the entire indictment for yourself here. http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/450211/download http://uk.businessinsider.com/big-banks-could-be-dragged-into-the-fifa-bribery-scandal-2015-5?IR=T Some of the world’s biggest banks could be dragged into the FIFA bribery scandal Oscar Williams-Grut, May 28, 2015, 12:21 PM Nobody has come out of the FIFA bribery scandal looking good, but one group that has been overlooked could soon find itself in the spotlight: banks. The US Department of Justice’s 164-page indictment names a string of the world’s biggest lenders that reportedly held accounts that were used to pay and transfer bribes around the world. They include Barclays, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, HSBC, Citibank, Standard Chartered, and UBS. Huge sums, often in the hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions, were transferred to and from accounts held at these banks, according to the indictment. Bank of America, Barclays, HSBC, Standard Chartered, and JPMorgan all declined requests to comment from Business Insider. Citibank told Business Insider: “We have been cooperating with the Justice Department during their investigation.” We’ve reached out to UBS for comment and will update when we hear back. The DOJ writes in its indictment that football officials involved in the bribery scandal “frequently engaged in banking and investment activities with United States financial institutions” and “relied heavily on the United States financial system.” The defendants and their co-conspirators made “use of various mechanisms, including trusted intermediaries, bankers, financial advisers, and currency dealers, to make and facilitate the making of illicit payments.” The Financial Times reports that Kelly Currie, acting US attorney for the eastern district of New York, is investigating whether the banks knew they were facilitating bribe payments. If she thinks they did, the banking industry could be dragged into yet another scandal. It wouldn’t be the first time a big bank has been rapped for this type of thing. HSBC had to pay a blockbuster $1.91 billion (£1.24 billion) fine for money laundering in 2012, involving the transfer of drug money out of Mexico. The US Department of Justice’s 164-page indictment http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/450211/download Standard Chartered Private Equity invests $52m in Crystal Jade
Standard Chartered Private Equity invests $52m in
Standard Chartered Private Equity invests $52m in Crystal Jade Joji Thomas Philip, June 25, 2015
Standard Chartered Private Equity (SCPE) Thursday announced it had invested $52 million Crystal Jade Group Holdings, that operates over 100 outlets ranging from fine dining, casual and specialty restaurants to bakeries across the Asia Pacific region with a primary focus in Singapore, Hong Kong and Mainland China. Crystal Jade in turn is a portfolio company of Singapore-based private equity firm L Capital Asia that is sponsored by LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton. L Capital Asia had acquired around 90 per cent stake in his Chinese restaurant group Crystal Jade for around $100 million last year. Standard Chartered Private Equity said the investment will primarily go towards funding the growth of Crystal Jade’s existing network of outlets across Asia, as well as the expansion of its footprint internationally. In October 2014, Standard Chartered Private Equity Limited had acquired 3.8% stake in the Thai Union Frozen Products (TUF), Thailand’s leading processor and exporter of canned and frozen seafood products. Ravi Thakran, Managing Partner of L Capital Asia, said: “We have had a successful history of creating value on other assets with SCPE and warmly welcome them as our co-investors in Crystal Jade. Their investment will further strengthen the resources available to allow full exploitation of the tremendous growth opportunity for Crystal Jade.” Nainesh Jaisingh, Global Co-Head of Private Equity at SCPE, said: “Crystal Jade is an exciting business, with a strong Asian brand and significant potential across Standard Chartered’s footprint. We are delighted to join L Capital Asia – with whom we have had a very successful association – and look forward to building a great company together.” SCPE acquires 3.8% of Thai frozen food giant TUF http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/scpe-acquires-3-8-of-thai-frozen-food-gianttuf-515/ Navis Capital to buy Singapore’s Super Peking Duck restaurant chain http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/navis-capital-to-buysingapores-super-peking-duck-restaurant-chain-7428/ L Capital Asia invests $20m in Asiaray Media http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/l-capital-asia-invests-20m-asiaray-media-1935/ http://www.4-traders.com/STANDARD-CHARTERED-PLC-4003394/news/Standard-Chartered–Private-Equity-invests-USD52m-in-LCapital-Asias-Crystal-Jade-Group-20595417/ MAXpower gets equity investment from Standard Chartered PE, completes $282m financing
MAXpower gets equity investment from Standard
MAXpower gets equity investment from Standard Chartered PE, completes $282m financing Vincencia NLS, June 26, 2015: Southeast Asia based gas-to-power specialist MAXpower Group Pte Ltd, has completed a $282 million financing on June 12th. It included a $60 million structured equity investment from Standard Chartered Private Equity and a $222 million debt refinancing arranged by Standard Chartered Bank and OCBC Bank. The new equity and debt proceeds will be used to support MAXpower’s on-going development and construction program. As part of the transaction, the company will be appointing Greg Karpinski as executive chairman of the MAXpower Group, and he is expected to take up the role by the end of July 2015. Karpinski is currently managing director at Standard Chartered Private Equity. Nainesh Jaisingh (global co-head, Standard Chartered Private Equity), Benjamin Soemartopo (managing director, head, Standard Chartered Private Equity, Indonesia) and Kanad Virk (managing director, head, Standard Chartered Private Equity, Energy, Resources & Infrastructure) will be joining the board of the company. PT MAXpower Indonesia, unit of MAXpower has won two competitive tenders to supply 40 megawatt (MW) of total capacity PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the state-owned electricity producer. Also Read: Aboitiz Power unit raises $709.1m debt to fund 300 MW power plant construction Aboitiz Power unit raises $709.1m debt to fund 300 MW power plant construction
Aboitiz Power unit raises $709.1m debt to fund 300
MAXpower will develop a 30MW gas-fired power plant in New Tarahan in the Lampung region, to support the rapid industrial growth in the region. The second project, located at Tarakan, East Kalimantan to generate a capacity of 9MW. The government has recently implemented new targets to increase gas-fired power production by 11,000MW in the next four years to meet the fast growing local demand for electricity. “This is creating outstanding opportunities for MAXpower’s fast, affordable and scalable technology, and we are seeing significant growth in our development pipeline, which currently stands at 177MW of projects under construction or contract,” Arno Hendriks, CEO of MAXpower said in statement. Standard Chartered Private Equity (SCPE) has recently invested $52 million in Crystal Jade Group Holdings, that operates over 100 outlets ranging from fine dining, casual and specialty restaurants to bakeries across the Asia Pacific region with a primary focus in Singapore, Hong Kong and Mainland China. In October 2014, SCPE had acquired 3.8 per cent stake in the Thai Union Frozen Products (TUF), Thailand’s leading processor and exporter of canned and frozen seafood products. Also Read: Standard Chartered Private Equity invests $52m in Crystal Jade Standard Chartered Private Equity invests $52m in Crystal Jade
Standard Chartered Private Equity invests $52m in
https://www.ft.com/content/fd9a5eca-976f-11e5-95c7-d47aa298f769 Standard Bank to pay $25m to settle bribery case by: Jane Croft and Lindsay Fortado, December 1, 2015
https://next-geebee.ft.com/image/v1/images/raw/http%3A%2F%2Fcom.ft.imagepublish.prod.s3.amazonaws.com%2F83771780-879f11e5-9f8c-a8d619fa707c?source=next&fit=scale-down&width=700 UK Serious Fraud Office uses deferred prosecution agreement for the first time The British arm of South Africa’s Standard Bank will pay a $25.2m fine to settle accusations of bribery as part of the Serious Fraud Office’s first deferred prosecution agreement. As part of a co-ordinated global settlement, the bank will pay a further $4.2m to settle charges by the US Securities and Exchange Commission that it failed to disclose certain payments in connection with debt issued by the Government of Tanzania in 2013. Lord Justice Leveson, sitting at the High Court, said he would approve the agreement involving Standard Bank, which had failed to prevent bribery in a Tanzanian subsidiary between June 2012 and March 2013. The case is also the first prosecution for the SFO of a company under the 2010 Bribery Act. The bank will pay $6m to the Tanzanian government, plus interest of just over $1m, and £330,000 in costs to the SFO. The deal marks a UK milestone: it is the first of its kind to strike a new form of plea deal in order to avoid prosecution, a tool that is commonly used in the US. A DPA is a court-approved deal where a company admits wrongdoing, pays a fine and agrees to various other compliance measures. The tool was introduced to the UK last year. Jonny Cotton, a partner at law firm Slaughter and May, said: “This provides a much needed real world precedent, in a major case, that should assist corporates in assessing whether to self-report and to co-operate with the SFO.” The High Court heard that Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited (ST) was the lead manager in a $600m private placement to raise funds for the Tanzanian government so it could invest in infrastructure. The court was told that by the end of August 2012, the structure of the deal had changed and two executives from ST Bank brought on board a local partner – EGMA – that had close connections with the government of the African state. The bank raised fees on the deal mandate by 1 per cent to 2.4 per cent with 1 per cent going to EGMA, a Tanzanian company, even though Harry Kitilya, its chairman, was then head of the Tanzanian tax authority. Sir Edward Garnier QC, representing the SFO which was requesting the DPA, said there was no record of any detailed inquiry being made inside the bank about EGMA under the “know your customer” rules. He singled out Bashir Awale, former chief executive of ST, and Shose Sinare, former head of investment banking who brought in EGMA. Mr Awale was later fired and Ms Sinare resigned from the bank in 2013. Sir Edward said if the two had been based in this country they would have been liable for the offence of bribery itself. However the bank was being fined for its failure to prevent these individuals committing bribery. In a statement Standard Bank said it took the issue of corruption “very seriously” and “deeply regrets that this issue arose on a transaction with which it was involved”. It noted the SFO does not allege that anyone in the bank knew of the intentions of the two ST employees. Sir Edward said the bank had co-operated and conducted its own internal investigation using Jones Day, the law firm. Four of ST’s own staff had flagged suspicious payments to EGMA in 2013 when the private placement was completed. The Tanzanian anti-corruption agency was now investigating the EGMA deal and the US SEC would also announce a resolution soon, taking into account the SFO’s findings, Sir Edward said. The SEC said: “This action against Standard demonstrates that when suspicious payments made anywhere in the world result in tainted securities offerings in the United States, the SEC is fully committed to taking action against the responsible parties.” Standard Bank’s UK division is now controlled by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, although the alleged wrongdoing predates ICBC’s acquisition. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-19/standard-chartered-said-to-tell-u-s-of-alleged-maxpower-bribery Standard Chartered Said to Tell U.S. of Alleged MAXpower Bribery Chanyaporn Chanjaroen, May 19, 2016 – 7:45 AM WIB Bank said to have passed on information from MAXpower auditors Standard Chartered installed new MAXpower directors last year Standard Chartered Plc informed the U.S. Department of Justice about allegations of bribery involving MAXpower Group Pte, an Indonesian power company in which its private-equity division is a minority shareholder, according to a person familiar with the matter. The London-based bank passed on the information after MAXpower’s auditors uncovered what may be inappropriate payments totaling $750,000, said the person, who asked not to be identified as the matter is not public. Further details aren’t available, the person said. MAXpower declined to comment on the alleged bribery, according to Alastair Hetherington of Finsbury, the Indonesian company’s external public relations firm. Peter Carr, a Justice Department spokesman, declined to comment. Piers Townsend, a Standard Chartered spokesman in Singapore, declined to comment. MLex, a regulation-focused news service, reported earlier on the alleged bribery at MAXpower, saying the Indonesian company may have made payments to Indonesian government officials in violation of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits bribery of foreign officials. Standard Chartered has been operating under deferred prosecution agreements with the Justice Department and the New York District Attorney’s Office since 2012, when it settled cases related to money-laundering failures and breaches of U.S. sanctions against Iran. The bank has been enhancing its controls on money-laundering, bribery and other offenses since then. Original Investment The bank first got involved with MAXpower through the Standard Chartered IL&FS Asia Infrastructure Growth Fund, which invested $58 million in the Jakarta-based power developer in 2012. After the discovery of the alleged bribery last year, Standard Chartered removed the founding board members at MAXpower and installed its own directors with the intention of turning the company around, said the person. Greg Karpinski, a former Standard Chartered Private Equity executive, was appointed chief executive officer and executive chairman in September, according to his LinkedIn profile. He and three Standard Chartered Private Equity executives currently hold four of the six board seats, MAXpower’s website shows. Karpinski couldn’t be reached for comment, according to people answering calls at his offices in Singapore and Jakarta. Debt Restructuring MAXpower, which develops, owns and operates gas-fired power plants in Indonesia recently appointed the lawyers Clifford Chance LLP to advise on restructuring a $222 million five-year loan it received last year from a consortium of banks led by Standard Chartered and Singapore-based Oversea-Chinese Bank Corp. Standard Chartered Private Equity holds a direct equity stake in MAXpower of about 5 percent, as well as other interests through a fund and structured equity financing, the person said. MAXpower reported losses of $75.9 million in 2014, with negative operating cash flow of $13.3 million, according to the company’s latest annual report. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-30/standard-chartered-bank-of-tokyo-said-getting-new-review Board of Directors
https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-06-13/standard-chartered-faces-long-path-to-better-banking Standard Chartered’s Fraud-Busting Hashtag By Lionel Laurent, June 13, 2016 7:18 AM EDT Standard Chartered CEO Bill Winters is trying to put the lender’s past misconduct behind it — with a hashtag (what else), and an (inevitably) zero-tolerance policy for padded expense claims. Considering the amount the bank has pumped into compliance and supervision in recent years — $1 billion in 2015 alone — shareholders will be hoping there’s more to Winters’ standards drive than a breathless #knowtherules #cliché and the dismissal of a small number of staff. Regulatory oversight is only getting stricter and Standard Chartered, in particular, has a lot of ground to recover. Granted, Winters isn’t the only bank CEO battling to change a culture of high risk and lax oversight of employees. Deutsche Bank’s John Cryan is doing the same, while Credit Suisse’s Tidjane Thiam in March admitted to being blindsided by traders who had run up risky trading positions without their superiors’ knowledge. All banks are spending more on risk controls. In capital markets trading alone, firms spent about $2.6 billion overhauling their IT in 2015, up from $2.4 billion the previous year, Tabb Group estimates. But Standard Chartered has more to make up for than most: It’s still under the watchful gaze of an independent monitor following its $667 million fine in 2012 for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran — a blunder that could have cost the bank its U.S. license. It faces a more hawkish regulator at home, in particular the U.K.’s senior managers’ regime. Under those rules, executives could be thrown in jail for failing to spot serious misconduct on their watch. And the bank is also retrenching from an expansion spree that last year led to its first annual loss since 1989, a $5.1 billion rights offering and a pledge to slash the workforce by 17 percent. Discount Value Standard Chartered trades at a steeper discount to book value than many of its peers Standard Chartered trades at a steeper discount to book value than many of its peers.jpg Source: Bloomberg Intelligence All of which makes for a foul-tasting cocktail for shareholders: Standard Chartered trades at about half its book value, a discount to many in its peer group, according to Bloomberg data. This backdrop makes Standard Chartered’s missives about staff behavior underwhelming. Winters expressed his concern about a “small number” of employees. He cited undisclosed investments in unlicensed peer-to-peer lenders, money-lending among staff and over-indulgent expenses claims as example of rule-breaking. It’s certainly an impressive amount of detail about misconduct — but then again, you’d expect that, given regulatory costs totalled $243 million in the first quarter, almost half pretax profit in the period. Following the Rules Regulatory costs are accounting for a bigger share of Standard Chartered’s operating costs Regulatory costs are accounting for a bigger share of Standard Chartered’s operating costs.jpg Source: Company reports Is this low-hanging fruit easily plucked by a compliance function trying to prove its worth? Or is this a positive sign the lender is through the worst of its compliance woes? Shareholders are unlikely to find out the answer until Winters completes the bank’s internal review into misconduct. That covers more than 150 different potential cases that could lead to bonuses being clawed back, according to the company. But if Winters wants to give investors a more reassuring indication that he’s getting on top of Standard Chartered’s free-wheeling culture, he’s going to need more than an easy hashtag. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Bloomberg LP and its owners. To contact the author of this story: Lionel Laurent in London at
[email protected] To contact the editor responsible for this story: Edward Evans at
[email protected] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/standard-chartered-and-ubs-assets-seized-in-singapore-fraud-case-after-controlfailings-a7147701.html Standard Chartered and UBS assets seized in Singapore fraud case after ‘control failings’ Shamim Adam, Chanyaporn Chanjaroen, Thursday 21 July 2016
UBS are one of four banks to have had a total of £133m in assets seized by authorities Getty Images More than $3.5 billion was misappropriated and about $1 billion laundered through the US, the US Justice Department said as it launched what could be its biggest ever seizure of ill-gotten gains Singapore vowed to take action against four banks for failures in anti-money laundering controls and said it seized S$240 million (£133 million) in assets linked to alleged fraud at the Malaysian state investment company known as 1MDB. Preliminary findings uncovered “instances of control failings” at UBS Group’s Singapore branch, Standard Chartered’s local unit and DBS Group, as well as “substantial breaches” of anti-money laundering regulations at Falcon Private Bank in the city-state, the Monetary Authority of Singapore said in a statement Thursday. The regulator’s probe, which started in March 2015, is part of global investigations into 1Malaysia Development Bhd. that stretch across Abu Dhabi, Switzerland, the Caribbean, Hong Kong and the US. UBS pays $545 million to settle rigging allegations, pleads guilty http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ubs-pays-545-million-to-settle-currency-rigging-allegations-pleads-guilty-overlibor-10262349.html More than $3.5 billion (£2.64 billion) was misappropriated from the Malaysian firm, and about $1 billion (£755 million) laundered through the US banking system, the US Justice Department said on Wednesday as it launched what could potentially be its biggest ever seizure for such ill-gotten gains. “Supervisory examinations of financial institutions with 1MDB-related fund flows have revealed a complex international web of transactions involving multiple entities and individuals operating in several jurisdictions,” the Singapore central bank said. “Certain financial institutions in Singapore were among those used as conduits for these transactions” and the Money Authority of Singapore will be taking action against them, it said. Singapore authorities have been investigating various 1MDB-related fund flows through the island nation for possible money laundering, securities fraud, cheating, and other offenses committed in the city. Bank accounts belonging to various people were seized and dealings in properties belonging to them curtailed, it said. About S$120 million (£67 million) in the accounts and properties belonged to Malaysian financier Low Taek Jho and his immediate family, it said. Low has said he provided consulting to the fund that didn’t break any laws. Efforts to reach him for comment on Thursday via his Hong Kong-based company Jynwel Capital were unsuccessful, and the firm didn’t immediately reply to an e-mailed query on the asset seizure. Read more Tom Hayes Libor trial: Senior UBS staff knew about rigging’ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tom-hayes-libor-trial-senior-ubs-staff-knew-about-rigging-10295944.html London property market turned into money laundering safe haven by inadequate supervision, MPs say http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/london-property-market-real-estate-money-laundering-overseas-foreign-buyersmps-a7138176.html George Osborne intervened in HSBC money laundering probe, report says http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/george-osborne-intervened-in-hsbc-money-laundering-probe-report-saysa7132171.html The reckoning arrives for Standard Chartered’s shareholders http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/the-reckoning-arrives-for-standard-chartered-s-shareholders-a6720386.html Standard Chartered to cut 15,000 jobs after third quarter losses of $139m http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/standard-chartered-to-cut-15000-jobs-after-third-quarter-losses-of-139ma6718921.html “The law enforcement agency or regulators can only seize assets when there’s suspicion of an offence, meaning that the investigation has probably crystallised and they have identified some culpability,” said Nizam Ismail, head of regulatory practice at RHTLaw Taylor Wessing LLP in Singapore. “It’s definitely a step forward in the investigations, given the complex circumstances involved in asset tracing. They have to be sure of their legal basis.” DBS and Standard Chartered spokesmen said in separate statements that the banks were cooperating with authorities, noting that both lenders had reported the suspicious transactions to the relevant agencies. Standard Chartered had “strengthened its anti-money laundering controls,” a spokesperson said. Representatives for UBS and Falcon didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment. There were cases of weakness at DBS and at the Singapore branches of Standard Chartered and UBS in the processes for accepting clients and transaction monitoring, as well as “undue delay” in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions, MAS said. The regulator said in May that it is closing the Singapore unit of Lugano-based BSI for breaches of money-laundering rules in relation to its 1MDB probe. The lapses at the other three banks were in specific processes and by individual officers, and not “pervasive control weaknesses” nor staff misconduct as was the case with BSI, the MAS said. In its statement on Wednesday, the regulator also said: It had completed its inspections of DBS, Standard Chartered and UBS and is finalizing its assessment. Its “supervisory examination” of Falcon is still ongoing. The oversight and management of certain key client relationships were done out of the bank’s head office in Switzerland, and MAS has asked for further details. Biggest business scandals in pictures 17 show all It’s finalizing regulatory action against Raffles Money Change after an examination of the money changer and remittance agent revealed “weak management oversight, inadequate risk management practices and internal controls.” It’s still examining “certain other” financial institutions, the details of which will be provided when the inspections are completed. MAS didn’t name the firms. The alleged scheme of money laundering and misappropriation tied to the Malaysian investment firm stretched from 2009 to 2015, the US Justice Department said Wednesday. Malaysia’s government said on Thursday that it will cooperate with lawful investigations of local companies or its citizens.
1/17 Rogue trader A French court cut the damages owed by rogue trader Jerome Kerviel from €4.9bn (£4.2bn) to just €1m (£860,000). The court ruled on that Kerviel was “partly responsible” for massive losses suffered in 2008 by his former employer Societe Generale through his reckless trades. Kerviel has consistently maintained that bosses at the French bank knew what he was doing all along. AP
2/17 Lloyds chief apologises for damage caused by affair allegations – August 2016 Antonio Horta-Osorio, the chief executive of Lloyds Bank, has broken his silence over allegations about his private life admitting he regrets any “damage done to the group’s reputation”. In a message sent to the bank’s 75,000 employees, the banker said that anyone can make mistakes while insisting that staff had to maintain the highest professional standards. Getty
3/17 Christine Lagarde faces court over £340m Bernard Tapie payment – July 2016 The head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, must stand trial in France over a payment of €403 million (now £340m, then £290m) to tycoon Bernard Tapie, a France’s highest appeals court has ruled. The court rejected Ms Lagarde’s appeal against a judge’s order in December for her to stand trial over allegations of negligence in her handling of the affair. Ms Lagarde could risk a maximum penalty of one year in prison and a fine of €15,000 euros if convicted. Reuters
4/17 HSBC senior manager arrested in FX rigging investigation at JFK airport in New York – July 2016 A senior executive at HSBC has been arrested at New York’s JFK airport for his alleged involvement in a conspiracy to rig currency benchmarks, according to reports. Mark Johnson, global head of foreign exchange cash trading in London, was reportedly arrested on Tuesday. He will appear before a federal court in Brooklyn on Wednesday charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, Bloomberg said. Getty
5/17 Former PwC employees found guilty in ‘Luxleaks’ tax scandal – June 2016 Two ex- PricewaterhouseCoopers staffers were found guilty in Luxembourg of stealing confidential tax files that helped unleash a global scandal over generous fiscal deals for hundreds of international companies. Antoine Deltour and Raphael Halet face suspended sentences of 12 months and 9 months and were ordered to pay fines of €1,500 (£1,230) and €1,000 (£822) for their role in the so-called LuxLeaks scandal. Despite the minimal sentences, the ruling was described by Deltour’s lawyer as “shocking” and “a terrible anomaly.” The ruling “puts on guard future whistle-blowers,” Deltour told reporters.The LuxLeaks revelations sped beyond Luxembourg, causing European Union regulators to expand a tax-subsidy probe and propose new laws to fight corporate tax dodging, while EU lawmakers created a special committee to probe fiscal deals across the 28-nation bloc. reuters
6/17 Goldman Sachs dealmakers lavished Libyan officials with prostitutes to win contract – June 2016 A former Goldman Sachs dealmaker trying to persuade Gadaffi-era Libya to invest $1 billion with the investment bank procured prostitutes and invited Libyan officials to lavish parties in the hope of winning the business, the High Court heard on Monday June 13.The Libyan Investment Authority sovereign wealth fund is suing Goldman Sachs for inappropriately coercing its naïve staff into giving its sovereign wealth fund cash to the bank to invest in products they did not understand. The products were designed to generate big profits for Goldman, the LIA claims.Goldman denies wrongdoing and says the LIA was treated as an arms-length customer Reuters
7/17 Former boss of BHS said his life was threatened – June 2016 Darren Topp, the former boss of BHS, has said former owner Dominic Chappell threatened to kill him when he challenged him over a £1.5 million transfer out of the business. MPs on the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee asked Mr Topp about a £1.5 million transfer Mr Chappell made from BHS to a company called BHS Sweden.
8/17 Sports Direct founder Mike Ashley admits paying workers below the minimum wage – June 2016 Mike Ashley admitted paying Sports Direct employees below the minimum wage at a hearing in front of MPs. The company founder said that workers were paid less than the statutory minimum because of bottlenecks at security in an admission that could result in sanctions from HMRC. Reuters
9/17 Mitsubishi admits ‘improper’ fuel tests – April 2016 Mitsubishi has admitted to using false fuel methods dating back to 1991. The scale of the scandal is only just coming to light after it was revealed in April that data was falsified in the testing of four types of cars, including two Nissan cars. AP
10/17 Panama Papers: Millions of leaked documents expose how world’s rich and powerful hid money – April 2016 Millions of confidential documents have been leaked from one of the world’s most secretive law firms, exposing how the rich and powerful have hidden their money. Dictators and other heads of state have been accused of laundering money, avoiding sanctions and evading tax, according to the unprecedented cache of papers that show the inner workings of the law firm Mossack Fonseca, which is based in Panama.
11/17 Google’s tax avoidance Google reached a deal with the HM Revenue and Customs to pay back £130 million in so-called “back-taxes” that have been due since 2005. George Osborne championed the deal as a “major success”. But European MEPs have since called for the Chancellor to appear in front of the committee on tax rulings to explain the tax deal.
12/17 Turing Pharmaceuticals and Martin Shkreli Martin Shkreli became known as the “most hated man in the world” after his drug company, Turing, increased the price of a 62-yearold drug that treated HIV patients by 5,000% to $750 a pill. He was charged with illegally taking stock from Retrophin, a biotechnology firm he started in 2011, and using it pay off debts from unrelated business dealings. Shkreli, who maintains he is innocent, and says there is little evidence of fraud because his investors didn’t lose money.
13/17 Volkswagen emissions scandal VW admitted to rigging its US emission tests so that diesel-powered cars would looks like they were emitting less nitrous oxide, which can damage the ozone layer and contribute to respiratory diseases. Around 11 million cars worldwide were affected.
14/17 Quindell, the scandal-ridden insurance firm Quindell was once a darling of AIM but its share price fell in April 2014 when its accounting practices were attacked in a stinging research note by US short seller Gotham City. In August the group was forced to disclose that the £107 million pre-tax profit it had reported for 2013 was incorrect, and it had in fact suffered a £64million loss.
15/17 Toshiba Accounting Scandal The boss of Toshiba, the Japanese technology giant, resigned in disgrace in the wake of one of the country’s biggest ever accounting scandals. His exit came two months after the company revealed that it was investigating accounting irregularities. An independent investigatory panel said that Toshiba’s management had inflated its reported profits by up to 152 billion yen (£780m) between 2008 and 2014.
16/17 FIFA Corruption Scandal Fifa, football’s world governing body, has been engulfed by claims of widespread corruption since the summer of 2015, when the US Department of Justice indicted several top executives. It has now claimed the careers of two of the most powerful men in football, Fifa President Sepp Blatter and Uefa President Michel Platini, after they were banned for eight years from all football-related activities by Fifa’s ethics committee. A Swiss criminal investigation into the pair is ongoing. Getty Images
17/17 Libor fraudster City trader Tom Hayes, 35, has become the first person to be convicted of rigging Libor rates following a trial at London’s Southwark Crown Court. Hayes worked as a trader in yen derivatives at UBS before joining the American bank Citigroup in Tokyo. He was fired from Citigroup following an investigation into his trading methods. He returned to the UK in December 2012 and was arrested following a two-and-a-half year criminal investigation by the SFO. Getty Images MAXpower directors, founders secretly recorded discussing how to funnel cash to Indonesian officials after misuse of company cash advances foiled
MAXpower directors, founders secretly recorded discussing how to funnel cash to Indonesian officials after misuse of company cash advances foiled An MLex Anti-Bribery & Corruption Service Exclusive UPDATE Sep 2 2016 MAXpower directors, founders secretly recorded discussing how to funnel cash to Indonesian officials after misuse of company cash advances foiled UPDATE Jun 14 2016 CEO of debt-plagued MAXpower received $400,000 in bonuses since appointment in September 2015 UPDATE Jun 6 2016 Allegations against MAXpower extend to suspicious transactions with related parties UPDATE May 19 2016 MLex learns that Mitsui is concerned by MAXpower bribery allegations. UPDATE May 13 2016 SCB could be liable for books & records violations under US law, experts say. UPDATE May 10 2016 MLex learns MAXpower directors linked to firms exposed by Panama Papers. UPDATE May 5 2016 MLex learns MAXpower fired a whistleblower before failed bond issue. UPDATE May 1 2016 Standard Chartered has now acknowledged the allegations to MLex. UPDATE April 27 2016 MLex has published new details about the allegations. MLex Anti-Bribery & Corruption service was first to break the news that Standard Chartered Private Equity, the private equity and venture capital arm of Standard Chartered Bank, is embroiled in extensive bribery allegations in Indonesia. As the story develops, MLex will continue to report more exclusive details about the allegations. The Story So Far NEW: Tuesday September 6 2016 MAXpower directors, founders secretly recorded discussing how to funnel cash to Indonesian officials after misuse of company cash advances foiled The directors, CEO and founders of Indonesian power company MAXpower were secretly recorded in August last year discussing novel methods of delivering money to government officials to renew business contracts after their systematic misuse of the company’s cash advance system to pay bribes was foiled, MLex has learned. Tuesday June 14 2016 CEO of debt-plagued MAXpower received $400,000 in bonuses since appointment in September 2015 MAXpower’s chief executive officer and former Standard Chartered executive, Greg Karpinski, has been paid bonuses totaling $400,000 since his appointment to the position in September 2015 at the Indonesian power company at the center of a corruption scandal, MLex understands. Monday June 6 2016 Allegations against MAXpower extend to suspicious transactions with related parties Allegations of misconduct against MAXpower, the Indonesian power company at the center of a bribery scandal, extend to significant dealings and suspicious transactions with related parties, MLex has learned. Thursday May 19 2016 Mitsui concerned by MAXpower bribery allegations, expected to seek answers from the Indonesian power company Allegations of bribery by MAXpower executives in Indonesia have raised concerns at Japanese conglomerate Mitsui & Co., Ltd. about its relationship with MAXpower in Myanmar, MLex has learned. It is anticipated that Mitsui will contact the power company seeking an explanation about the allegations, which were first reported by MLex. Friday May 13 2016 SCB could be liable for books and records violations of private equity arm in Indonesia under US laws, experts say For prosecution purposes under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Standard Chartered Bank could be liable for any books & records violations of its wholly owned subsidiary Standard Chartered Private Equity, in relation to allegations of bribery & accounting fraud at a power company in Indonesia, FCPA experts told MLex. Tuesday May 10 2016 MAXpower directors linked to firms exposed by Panama Papers leak Directors of Indonesia’s MAXpower have been linked to firms exposed by the Panama Papers leak, MLex has learned. Among the companies with connections to MAXpower directors exposed by the leak are Crystal Jade International Ltd, Mahanusa Capital and General Electric. Thursday May 5 2016 Indonesia’s MAXpower fired whistleblower in run-up to attempted bond issue MAXpower, the Indonesian power company at the center of a major corruption scandal, fired a whistleblower in the run-up to a failed bond issue in the US, MLex has learned… Monday May 1 2016 Standard Chartered, acknowledging allegations MAXpower paid bribes, says it would disclose such allegations to regulators as a matter of course In its first acknowledgment of bribery allegations implicating an Indonesian power company in which Standard Chartered Bank has substantial interests, the bank told MLex it would usually disclose such allegations to regulators as a matter of course… Rupiah_Sepia Wednesday April 27 2016 MAXpower corruption allegations center around scheme to use company cash advances to pay bribes Corruption allegations involving an Indonesian power company in which Standard Chartered Bank, or SCB, has a substantial stake center around a scheme by company executives to obtain cash advances that were then used to bribe Indonesian officials and employees to win contracts, MLex has learned… Jakarta_Sepia Monday April 25 2016 Standard Chartered Bank’s private equity arm embroiled in bribery scandal in Indonesia Standard Chartered Private Equity, the private equity and venture capital arm of Standard Chartered Bank, is embroiled in extensive bribery allegations involving a significant investment in the power sector in Indonesia, MLex has learned… http://www.wsj.com/articles/standard-chartered-faces-u-s-probe-over-indonesian-investment-1474968604 Standard Chartered Faces U.S. Probe Over Indonesian Investment By Ben Otto in Jakarta and Margot Patrick in London Sept. 27, 2016 5:30 a.m. ET
Bill Winters, Standard Chartered’s CEO, spoke at Singapore Summit 2016 this month. Photo: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg News Internal audit at power-plant builder controlled by the international bank found evidence of possible bribery The Justice Department is investigating Standard Chartered PLC over allegations that an Indonesian power company controlled by the London-based bank paid bribes to win contracts. An internal audit at Maxpower Group Pte. Ltd., a power-plant builder in Southeast Asia, found evidence of possible bribery and other misconduct, findings that were echoed in a separate review by a law firm hired by Maxpower, according to copies of those reports reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. U.S. prosecutors are looking into whether Standard Chartered is culpable for not stopping the alleged misconduct, people with knowledge of the investigation said. Maxpower’s chief executive worked at Standard Chartered until last year, and the bank holds three seats on the power company’s board. The investigation compounds the legal concerns of the Asia-focused bank and its chief executive, Bill Winters, who was hired last year to clean up the bank’s balance sheet, governance and culture. The bank struck a deferred-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department in 2012 over alleged Iranian sanctions breaches, under which it could be prosecuted if it commits a federal crime. It admitted wrongdoing and has tripled spending on compliance. Standard Chartered is one of the world’s biggest banks for financing global trade, and it is dependent on access to the U.S. financial system. Its private-equity unit profited for years by investing directly in Asian companies, but now is facing underperforming commodities investments and higher costs from regulation. The unit lost $167 million in this year’s first half and Standard Chartered is considering ways to exit the business, people familiar with the plans said. Standard Chartered Is Trying to Get Out of Private Equity Standard Chartered bought a stake in Maxpower in 2012 and became majority shareholder last year through a cash infusion of $60 million, bringing its total investment to $143 million. It holds some of those shares on behalf of co-investors. The Justice Department probe is focusing on whether U.S. anticorruption rules were broken when Maxpower executives allegedly facilitated bribes to win power contracts and smooth relations with Indonesian energy officials, according to the people with knowledge of the investigation. The Justice Department is investigating whether Standard Chartered executives on the Maxpower board knew about or approved alleged bribes, and if the bank’s controls around its investment in Maxpower were adequate, these people said. Standard Chartered said it “proactively referred this matter to the appropriate authorities and have conducted our own review.” Maxpower said it is working with “professional advisory firms to fully investigate,” and it has enhanced internal controls and shaken up management since the audit. A Justice Department spokesman declined to comment.
The Justice Department is investigating Standard Chartered over allegations that an Indonesian power company it controlled paid bribes to win contracts. Above, the bank’s Hong Kong offices. Photo: Anthony Kwan/Bloomberg News The internal audit at Maxpower last year indicated that more than $750,000 in outstanding cash advances in 2014 and early 2015 needed to be examined as possible bribes, according to the copy reviewed by the Journal. In December, lawyers at Sidley Austin LLP hired to review the audit found what they described as strong indications that Maxpower employees made inappropriate payments to Indonesian government officials and others from at least 2012 to late 2015, often to get power contracts in Indonesia and sometimes just to get paid on time, according to the review. It found that some of the payments were funded by cash advances requested by three founders and two employees. The head of the Justice Department’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act unit reached out to Maxpower’s lawyers to ask about the bribery allegations, according to the review. News of the allegations was reported earlier this year by MLex, a global-regulatory-risk news service. Maxpower’s founders either declined to comment or didn’t respond to requests. Maxpower terminated their employment last year, which it described as part of an effort to address compliance matters. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits U.S. companies or those doing business in the U.S. from making payments or giving gifts to foreign officials in exchange for business, whether directly or through intermediaries. Violators can face both criminal and civil penalties. Maxpower is facing lower-than-expected demand for its power plants, and is seeking to restructure more than $180 million in loans, people with knowledge of the matter said. Greg Karpinski, an American who was co-head of energy, resources and infrastructure in Standard Chartered’s principal-finance business, became Maxpower’s CEO in June 2015. Not long after, he and six then-members of Maxpower’s board met at a wine bar in a downtown Jakarta mall, according to the legal review. The discussions turned to how to continue making illicit payments, according to the legal review and a recording of the conversation heard by The Journal. One participant on the recording jokingly suggested handing out soccer balls stuffed with cash to government officials. Another person is heard on the recording saying the company would stop making payments for the purposes of getting partners to pay their bills, but kept open the possibility to continue paying to get contract extensions. “I kind of feel like extensions are really critical stuff, we use an adviser. But for like getting paid on a regular basis, f- it. Enough is enough,” this person said. “We’ll find some other way. I mean, take them to karaoke, take them golfing, take them to Singapore, I don’t care.” The law firm in its review said it believed “this was surreptitiously recorded” by one of the founders. Mr. Karpinski declined to comment. The company says it “believes the allegations and attributions provide a one-sided and partial view of the operations and events at Maxpower.” Standard Chartered has disclosed at least some of the allegedly inappropriate payments to the Justice Department, the Bank of England and the Monetary Authority of Singapore, according to people familiar with the matter. The Bank of England and Monetary Authority of Singapore declined to comment. The Standard Chartered executives who sat on the board of Maxpower as of August were Nainesh Jaisingh, Kanad Virk and Benjamin Soemartopo. Mr. Virk left the bank in August and didn’t respond to requests for comment. Mr. Soemartopo said his job will end in November because of downsizing, not because of Maxpower. Mr. Jaisingh, the only one of the three who wasn’t present at the wine-bar meeting, remains at the bank. He declined to comment. Mr. Karpinski took over at Maxpower weeks before the internal audit was completed. He shook up management and took steps to cease abuse of the cash-advance system, according to disclosures made to lenders. In the legal review that followed the audit, lawyers said inappropriate payments continued until at least last October 2015. They also flagged as “a cause for concern” the recording of the wine-bar discussion. At the same time, Standard Chartered was dealing with the fallout of a decade of overexpansion in Asia. Mr. Winters, a former J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. executive, joined as CEO in June 2015 with a pledge to simplify the bank. He started scaling back businesses that were unprofitable or hobbled by higher-capital requirements, and the principal finance division was an obvious target, people familiar with the matter said. Joe Stevens, the unit’s head, is exploring a management buyout with other team members, these people said. Standard Chartered is considering ways to exit the business Standard Chartered Is Trying to Get Out of Private Equity http://www.wsj.com/articles/standard-chartered-is-trying-to-get-out-of-private-equity-1474970404 WILLIAM A TAYLOR, 2016-09-27 17:51, Jakarta time The bank clearly should have set up a charitable foundation first. That makes the bribes tax-deductible. If they spend, say 20% on actual charity, they can spend the rest on living high. Here’s how it’s done: “Risk-Free, Government-Guaranteed 2000% Return On Investment” at http://www.scragged.com/articles/risk-free-governmentguaranteed-2000-return-on-investment-can-b discusses a New York Times article which told how a Bush supporter got a 2000% return giving money to the Clinton foundation in return for a favor from then-Senator Hillary Clinton. Buying Clintons is a far better investment than buying stocks. Anyone who buys Hillary expects a lot more back from our government, and WE pay for it. The book at http://amzn.to/1KQXwhN points out that society collapses when government costs more than taxpayers can afford and gives some solutions. Michael Selden, 2016-09-27 17:05 Jakarta time The only thing that irritated the “Justice” department about this was that THEY weren’t the one’s being bribed. We don’t have a government any longer, we have an organized criminal institution, always looking for the next shakedown. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/standard-chartered-investment-in-indonesia-under-us-probe-2016-09-27?link=MW_latest_news The Wall Street Journal Standard Chartered investment in Indonesia under U.S. probe By Ben Otto and Margot Patrick Published: Sept 27, 2016 6:44 a.m. ET The Justice Department is investigating Standard Chartered PLC over allegations that an Indonesian power company controlled by the London-based bank paid bribes to win contracts. An internal audit at Maxpower Group Pte. Ltd., a power-plant builder in Southeast Asia, found evidence of possible bribery and other misconduct, findings that were echoed in a separate review by a law firm hired by Maxpower, according to copies of those reports reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. U.S. prosecutors are looking into whether Standard Chartered STAN, -2.45% is culpable for not stopping the alleged misconduct, people with knowledge of the investigation said. Maxpower’s chief executive worked at Standard Chartered until last year, and the bank holds three seats on the power company’s board. The investigation compounds the legal concerns of the Asia-focused bank and its chief executive, Bill Winters, who was hired last year to clean up the bank’s balance sheet, governance and culture. The bank struck a deferred-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department in 2012 over alleged Iranian sanctions breaches, under which it could be prosecuted if it commits a federal crime. It admitted wrongdoing and has tripled spending on compliance. the1uploader 4:00 am on 2016-09-22 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/09/22/when-cnic-scrutinise-your-web/)
when CNIC scrutinise your web Empowered with 81,360 cores and Rmax speed of 406,800 GFlop/s and Rpeak speed of 542,400 GFlop/s, it is not impossible to impersonate one’s IP, geo-location, and cities all over the world. CNIC has done it to this site. just a few seconds ago. Along with many other internet behemoths. Google is not exclusive. We can detect its impersonation, the spoofing acts through its consistent operating system being used and the browser as well. CNIC has implemented the necessary technologies to do that such as internet addressing; Autonomous System number (AS number) allocation service; cataloging databases of Internet users, web addresses, domain names, and AS numbers; surveying internet information resources; and maintains cooperative relationships with other International Internet Communities, and works closely with Network Information Centers (NICs) of other countries. The revealed identity of CNIC is known when CNIC had used 103.199.2.199 along with the same OS and internet browser, and the same url.
Some years ago, I was also known as Microsoft MVP, Most Vetted Person. I was famous enough to be scrutinised by the NNIC, Navy NIC, US Navy Network Information Center. http://english.cnic.cas.cn/rh/div/sccas/sccasintro/
Location: Home > Research & Service > Research and Service Divisions > Supercomputing Center > Introduction Supercomputing Center ——CNGrid Operation Center and the main node in North China Supercomputing Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences (SCCAS) is a subsidiary branch of Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CNIC, CAS) for providing support and services. SCCAS is the general center in the supercomputing environment of CAS, the Research and Development (R&D) service base of Beijing Municipal Capital Science and Technology Platform, and also nominated as the Operation and Management Center of China National Grid (CNGrid) and the north main node of CNGrid by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China. The center focuses on operating and maintaining super-computers, exploiting and supporting massively parallel computing, developing visualization software and other related services. Our mission is to drive the scientific innovations and industrial multiplications by applying leading-edge supercomputing technologies. CopyRight © 2009 Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences. All Rights Reserved Email :
[email protected] http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/feature_2/TourismOpenDay/Haidian/t1291189.htm Computer Network Information Center (CNIC) The Network Science Publicity and Education Center is set by the Computer Network Information Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences, with the principles of “conducting overall planning, enhancing integration, exerting advantages and serving the public”, in an effort to implement the deployment for informatization required in the “11th Five-year Plan”. It is set based on the existing infrastructures and aims to publicize the innovative knowledge of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and serve the publicity and education of science in a network environment.
The Network Science Publicity and Education Center will strive to develop into a demonstration base for network science publicity and education application, a technical and service center of the Academy for building and sharing network science publicity resources and promoting education, and a window of the Academy for publicizing knowledge innovatively and displaying achievements. It will make efforts to provide multi-layer and featured services to meet the demands of science publicity activities; provide network science education service to meet the demands of the public in improving their knowledge of science; provide network on-job training and continuous education to meet the demands of technicians for career development and science and technology innovation.
The visit course covers: 1. top-grade internet center area in China, 15min; 2D and 3D technology revelation cinema, 15min; 3. speech & virtual experience, 30min. Directions: Get off at Zhi Chun Lu Nan Li station by Bus 826, 941, 725, 735, 804, 386 or 304; or get off at Haidian Jiaotong Zhi Dui station by Bus 320 Line, 619, 630, 732 Line or 735. Open Hour: Free during 8:30–19:00 on May 19 and Sept. 27; charge at other hours, ticket price is RMB 50. Reservation: Only accept group reservation. Capacity: 50 people. Service: free on-site commentary in Chinese, brochures and souvenir. Notice: No smoking. Keep quiet. [source:eBeijing.gov.cn] https://www.top500.org/site/331 Home / Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Ac… Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Academy of Science URL http://www.sccas.cn/ Segment Academic City Beijing Country China System, Year, Vendor, Cores, Rmax (GFlop/s), Rpeak (GFlop/s) Era – TC4600H/W580I, Xeon E5-2680v3 12C 2.5GHz/ E5-2680v2, FDR, Intel Xeon Phi 5110P/NVIDIA Tesla K20 2015 Sugon 81,360 cores 406,800 GFlop/s – Rmax 542,400 GFlop/s – Rpeak DeepComp 7000, HS21/x3950 Cluster, Xeon QC HT 3 GHz/2.93 GHz, Infiniband 2008 Lenovo 12,216 cores 102,800 GFlop/s – Rmax 145,965 GFlop/s – Rpeak DeepComp 6800, Itanium2 1.3 GHz, QsNet 2003 lenovo 1,024 cores 4,193 GFlop/s – Rmax 5,324.8 GFlop/s – Rpeak https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Internet_Network_Information_Center China Internet Network Information Center From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The China Internet Network Information Center (simplified Chinese: ; traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhōngguó Hùlián Wngluò Xìnxī Zhōngxīn), or CNNIC, is the administrative agency responsible for Internet affairs under the Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of China. It is based in the Zhongguancun high tech district of Beijing. It was founded on June 3, 1997 as a non-profit organization. Responsibility areas Domain name registry service CNNIC is responsible for operating and administering China’s domain name registry. CNNIC manages both the “.cn” country code top level domain and the Chinese Domain Name system (Internationalized domain names that contain Chinese characters). As of June 2015, the total number of Chinese domain names is 22,310,000. As of January 2009, CNNIC only opens the CN domain to registered businesses, requires supporting documentations for domain registration such as business license or personal ID, and suspended overseas registrars even for domestic registrants. CNNIC denies that it mandates existing personal domain names to be transferred to businesses. Trend Micro suggests this move is still not enough to stop modern security threats from the .cn domain. IP address and Autonomous System number (AS number) allocation service CNNIC allocates Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and AS Numbers to domestic ISPs and users. CNNIC is a National Internet Registry (NIR) acknowledged by the Asia-Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC). In late 2004 CNNIC launched an “IP Allocation Alliance” which simplified the procedures for obtaining IP addresses. Catalogue Database Service CNNIC is responsible for the creation and maintenance of the state top-level network catalog database. This database provides information on Internet users, web addresses, domain names, and AS numbers. Technical research on Internet addressing CNNIC conducts technical research and undertakes state technical projects based on its administrative and practical network technology experience. Internet survey and statistics CNNIC has conducted, and continues to conduct, surveys of Internet information resources. CNNIC maintains statistics on topics such as Internet bandwidth in China, Domain Name registrations, and Internet Development in China. International liaison and policy research As the national Network Information Center (NIC), CNNIC maintains cooperative relationships with other International Internet Communities, and works closely with NICs of other countries. Secretariat of the Internet Policy and Resource Committee, Internet Society of China (ISC) CNNIC serves as the Secretariat of the Internet Society of China’s Internet Policy and Resource Committee. The Policy and Resource committee is in charge of tasks such as providing policy and legislation oriented suggestions to promote the growth of China’s internet, facilitating the development and application of Internet resources and relevant technologies, and actively participating in the research work of domestic Internet development and administration polices. Secretariat of the Anti-Phishing Alliance of China (APAC) In July 2008, a broad alliance of Chinese online commerce stakeholders, including CNNIC, all major Chinese commercial banks and web hosting companies, founded the Anti-Phishing Alliance of China (APAC) in order to tackle phishing activities that abuse .cn subdomain names. CNNIC also functions as the secretariat of APAC. In October 2009, the alliance announced its cooperation with two new members – Netcraft and Maxthon, who will help the alliance to process and verify various phishing reports, and add the confirmed phishing URLs to Netcraft’s phishing site feed and Maxthon’s phishing blacklist. Fraudulent certificates In 2015 Google discovered that CNNIC had issued an intermediate CA certificate to an Egypt-based firm that used CNNIC’s keys to impersonate Google domains. Google responded by removing CNNIC’s root certificate from the certificate store in Google Chrome and all Google’s products. Mozilla responded to the incident by stating that “The Mozilla CA team believes that CNNIC’s actions amount to egregious behaviour… CNNIC’s decision to violate their own Certification Practice Statement is especially serious, and raises concerns that go beyond the immediate scope of the misissued intermediate certificate. After public discussion… we are planning to change Firefox’s certificate validation code such that it refuses to trust any certificate issued by a CNNIC root with a notBefore date on or after 1 April 2015.” the1uploader 12:11 pm on 2016-09-01 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/09/02/directory-of-mining-companies-in-indonesia-status-of-clean-and-clear/)
Directory of Mining Companies in Indonesia: Status of Clean and Clear
Dear Client, Terlampir beberapa file terkait energi dan batubara: 1. Daftar isi terbaru dari buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” dapat dilihat dan di-download di situs ini https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201 2. Daftar harga buku-buku terkait energi dan batubara. Beberapa direktori terkait bisnis batubara sudah tersedia: 1. direktori usaha tambang dengan status CNC, 2. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara, 3. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara dengan status CNC, 4. direktori perusahaan eksportir batubara, 5. direktori perusahaan pengangkut batubara, 6. direktori usaha batubara, dan lainnya.
Have a drive test first hand to our flip book of “Directory of Coal Business in Indonesia, July 2017” on this link: http://bit.ly/2xHEEOi This e-book is accessible with Windows-based computers. This flip book is created with Adobe Flash technology.
Download the “Directory of Indonesian Mining Companies, April 2017” into your android phones Directory of Indonesian Mining Companies, April 2017 Have a drive test first hand to our flip book of “Directory of Indonesian Mining Companies, April 2017” edition on this link: http://bit.ly/2xZcbqk
The following diretory is made on the CNC Status of Mining Business Permits Owner in from the first announcement to the eightteenth announcement. Read the comprehensive report on “Coal Business in Indonesia” online in https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201?e=27352568/41747360 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-23 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-23___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/45029846 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-22 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-22___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/44160250 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-21 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-21___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42554502 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-20 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-20___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42093230 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-19 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free http://bit.ly/2edGH42 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-18 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free http://bit.ly/2aUF3nF
Directory of Mining Companies in Indonesia Status of Clean and Clear from The1 Uploader Serabdi Sakti presents
Directory of Mining Companies in Indonesia: Status of Clean and Clear Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-19 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/daftar-cnc-ke19-iup-yang-dicabut or http://bit.ly/2edGH42 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-20 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-20___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42093230 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-20 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-21___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42554502 How to order: 1. Kindly send your purchase order by SMS/texting to +62 851 0518 7118, +62 852 103 56 516 by mentioning your name, email, and mobile phone number. 2. Upon receiving your order, we shall notify you our bank account number and the name of the account holder. 3. Please notify us regarding your successful payment to our mobile number above. 4. Upon effectiveness of the fund received in our bank, we shall email the link to download the ebook you have ordered and paid. 5. The link to download shall expire in 24 hours. 6. Thank you. Should you have any inquiries or questions regarding our presentation intention or elses, please contact us on +62 851 0518 7118, +62 888 1617 440, +62 852 103 56516 You may experience the flip book version on http://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201? e=27352568/41747360 Here is the snapshot of the flip book of “Directory of Mining Companies in Indonesia: Status of Clean and Clear, September 2016” version.
Directory of Mining Business in Indonesia: Status of Clean and Clear, Sept. 2016 Buy the physical book, you’ll get access to the digital flip book for 2 weeks. or Rent the digital flip book for 2 weeks, you’ll get one copy the physical book. Either one is valid. Direktori Perusahaan Tambang di Indonesia: Status Clean and Clear Cara pemesanan: 1. Silahkan order buku elektronik ini melalui SMS ke +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 dengan menyebut nama, email, nomor identitas (KTP dan NPWP), dan nomor telpon yang bisa dihubungi. 2. Setelah order pemesanan diterima, kami akan mengirimkan nomor dan nama pemilik rekening. 3. Harap memberikan konfirmasi terhadap pembayaran melalui transfer bank. 4. Setelah dana tercatat efektif di rekening bank kami, kami akan memberikan email berisi link untuk men-download buku elektronik yang telah dipesan. 5. Link untuk men-download akan expire dalam waktu 24 jam. 6. Terima kasih. Materi yang terdapat dalam buku Direktori Perusahaan Tambang di Indonesia: Status Clean and Clear adalah sebagai berikut: Nama Pemegang IUP: Status CNC Pemegang IUP: , pengumuman ke SK Pencabutan No. SK No., Tanggal Luas konsesi (HA) ha, penambangan , tahap KEGIATAN Lokasi: Wilayah: Berakhir: Referensi provinsi SK No. Remark: Keterangan: Other contents available upon request are as follows: 1. Corporate Identification Number (Single ID Number) 2. Addresses of Headquarter, Operational Office, Working Area 3. Telephone and fax numbers 4. Contact person 5. Mining license permits: History, Prevailing, Existing, Expired, Clean and Clear Status 6. Mining info: ownership, mined minerals and resources, concession area, current activities 7. Economic data: production, sales, investment, paid taxes and non-taxes to governments, manpower, services and expertise, infrastructure, reclamation plan and deposited fund,
Beating the Low Coal Price Condition from The1 Uploader
update as of 2 October 2016 by Sando Sasako The gloomy outlook of coal industry worldwide seemed to cede and recede. Up to late August 2016, a hard coking coal contract of $120/ton seemed to be a fair value. As coal spot price rose to above $205/mt on 16 September 2016, the supply contract for Japanese steelmakers for the 4Q may climb to $140. Yet, the contract prices for JCCM (Japan Coking Coal iMport price) have been below $330, the highest one in 2011 after floods curbed the coal supply from Australia. The rise in coal price recently surely resurrects the dormant Indonesian coal market, from miners, producers, and to sellers, from its apparent dead bed for the first 8 months in 2016. Although some IUP holders may still have their coal mining concession right, some of them may have been out of business, due to the run out of its coal reserves and resources. You may not be unwilling to have a ghastly experience on first hands dealing with these ghost companies. Kindly contact us to make confirmation and verification regarding the proof of life and the existence of their business allover Kalimantan on +62 851 0518 7118, +62 852 103 56516 Tulisan di atas merupakan laporan hasil analisis dan penelitian dalam: The presentation in slideshare is one of many analysis on business research report on: “PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk: On The Road To Recovery”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/beating-the-low-price-condition
Global Trends in Energy Industry from The1 Uploader
Tulisan di atas merupakan laporan hasil analisis dan penelitian dalam: The presentation in slideshare is one of many analysis on business research report on: 1. “Energy Industry in Indonesia & World’s Renewable Energy”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/energy-industry-in-indonesia-worlds-renewable-energy 2. “Coal Mining Business in Indonesia”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/profile-of-coal-mining-business-in-indonesia-july-2016 3. “Coal Business in Indonesia”, December 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/coal-business-in-indonesia/ or https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201?e=27352568/41747360 Cara pemesanan: 1. Silahkan order buku elektronik ini melalui SMS ke +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 dengan menyebut nama, email, nomor identitas (KTP dan NPWP), dan nomor telpon yang bisa dihubungi. 2. Setelah order pemesanan diterima, kami akan mengirimkan nomor dan nama pemilik rekening. 3. Harap memberikan konfirmasi terhadap pembayaran melalui transfer bank. 4. Setelah dana tercatat efektif di rekening bank kami, kami akan memberikan email berisi link untuk men-download buku elektronik yang telah dipesan. 5. Link untuk men-download akan expire dalam waktu 24 jam. 6. Terima kasih. Table of content is available on this link http://bit.ly/2dNhXNB How to order: 1. Kindly sent your purchase order by SMS/texting to +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 by mentioning your name, email, and mobile phone number. 2. Upon receiving your order, we shall notify you our bank account number and the name of the account holder. 3. Please notify us regarding your successful payment to our mobile number above. WhatsApp account is not available at the moment. 4. Upon effectiveness of the fund received in our bank, we shall email the link to download the ebook you have ordered and paid. 5. The link to download shall expire in 24 hours. 6. Thank you.
Global Coal Trends from The1 Uploader
Tulisan di atas merupakan laporan hasil analisis dan penelitian dalam: The presentation in slideshare is one of many analysis on business research report on: The updated version is available on this site: http://bit.ly/2gIZCWK, https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/coal-business-in-
indonesia/ 1. “Energy Industry in Indonesia & World’s Renewable Energy”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/energy-industry-in-indonesia-worlds-renewable-energy 2. “Coal Mining Business in Indonesia”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/profile-of-coal-mining-business-in-indonesia-july-2016 3. “Coal Business in Indonesia”, December 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/coal-business-in-indonesia/ or https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201?e=27352568/41747360 Cara pemesanan: 1. Silahkan order buku elektronik ini melalui SMS ke +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 dengan menyebut nama, email, nomor identitas (KTP dan NPWP), dan nomor telpon yang bisa dihubungi. 2. Setelah order pemesanan diterima, kami akan mengirimkan nomor dan nama pemilik rekening. 3. Harap memberikan konfirmasi terhadap pembayaran melalui transfer bank. 4. Setelah dana tercatat efektif di rekening bank kami, kami akan memberikan email berisi link untuk men-download buku elektronik yang telah dipesan. 5. Link untuk men-download akan expire dalam waktu 24 jam. 6. Terima kasih. How to order: 1. Kindly sent your purchase order by SMS/texting to +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 by mentioning your name, email, and mobile phone number. 2. Upon receiving your order, we shall notify you our bank account number and the name of the account holder. 3. Please notify us regarding your successful payment to our mobile number above. WhatsApp account is not available at the moment. 4. Upon effectiveness of the fund received in our bank, we shall email the link to download the ebook you have ordered and paid. 5. The link to download shall expire in 24 hours. 6. Thank you.
1 of 17 How to unload the debt burdens from The1 Uploader
Tulisan di atas merupakan laporan hasil analisis dan penelitian dalam: The presentation in slideshare is one of many analysis on business research report on: “PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk: On The Road To Recovery”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/how-to-unload-the-debt-burdens Cara pemesanan 1. Silahkan order buku elektronik ini melalui SMS ke +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 dengan menyebut nama, email, nomor identitas (KTP dan NPWP), dan nomor telpon yang bisa dihubungi. 2. Setelah order pemesanan diterima, kami akan mengirimkan nomor dan nama pemilik rekening. 3. Harap memberikan konfirmasi terhadap pembayaran melalui transfer bank. 4. Setelah dana tercatat efektif di rekening bank kami, kami akan memberikan email berisi link untuk men-download buku elektronik yang telah dipesan. 5. Link untuk men-download akan expire dalam waktu 24 jam. 6. Terima kasih. How to order: 1. Kindly send your purchase order by SMS/texting to +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 by mentioning your name, email, and mobile phone number. 2. Upon receiving your order, we shall notify you our bank account number and the name of the account holder. 3. Please notify us regarding your successful payment to our mobile number above. WhatsApp account is not available at the moment. 4. Upon effectiveness of the fund received in our bank, we shall email the link to download the ebook you have ordered and paid. 5. The link to download shall expire in 24 hours. 6. Thank you.
Coal Mining Business in Indonesia, August 2016 from The1 Uploader
Tulisan di atas merupakan laporan hasil analisis dan penelitian dalam: The presentation in slideshare is one of many analysis on business research report on: 1. “Energy Industry in Indonesia & World’s Renewable Energy”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/energy-industry-in-indonesia-worlds-renewable-energy 2. “Coal Mining Business in Indonesia”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/profile-of-coal-mining-business-in-indonesia-july-2016 3. “Coal Business in Indonesia”, December 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/coal-business-in-indonesia/ or https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201?e=27352568/41747360 or The updated version as of 6 December 2016 is available on this site: https://view.publitas.com/p222-10819/coal-business-in-indonesiadecember-2016, http://bit.ly/2gIZCWK
Cara pemesanan 1. Silahkan order buku elektronik ini melalui SMS ke +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 dengan menyebut nama, email, nomor identitas (KTP dan NPWP), dan nomor telpon yang bisa dihubungi. 2. Setelah order pemesanan diterima, kami akan mengirimkan nomor dan nama pemilik rekening. 3. Harap memberikan konfirmasi terhadap pembayaran melalui transfer bank. 4. Setelah dana tercatat efektif di rekening bank kami, kami akan memberikan email berisi link untuk men-download buku elektronik yang telah dipesan. 5. Link untuk men-download akan expire dalam waktu 24 jam. 6. Terima kasih. How to order: 1. Kindly send your purchase order by SMS/texting to +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 by mentioning your name, email, and mobile phone number. 2. Upon receiving your order, we shall notify you our bank account number and the name of the account holder. 3. Please notify us regarding your successful payment to our mobile number above. WhatsApp account is not available at the moment. 4. Upon effectiveness of the fund received in our bank, we shall email the link to download the ebook you have ordered and paid. 5. The link to download shall expire in 24 hours. 6. Thank you.
Energy Industry in Indonesia & World's Renewable Energy from The1 Uploader
Tulisan di atas merupakan laporan hasil analisis dan penelitian dalam: The presentation in slideshare is one of many analysis on business research report on: “Energy Industry in Indonesia & World’s Renewable Energy”, August 2016, you may browse its table of contents in this link http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/energy-industry-in-indonesia-worlds-renewable-energy Daftar isinya bisa dilihat di sini: http://bit.ly/2dNhXNB Cara pemesanan 1. Silahkan order buku elektronik ini melalui SMS ke +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 dengan menyebut nama, email, nomor identitas (KTP dan NPWP), dan nomor telpon yang bisa dihubungi. 2. Setelah order pemesanan diterima, kami akan mengirimkan nomor dan nama pemilik rekening. 3. Harap memberikan konfirmasi terhadap pembayaran melalui transfer bank. 4. Setelah dana tercatat efektif di rekening bank kami, kami akan memberikan email berisi link untuk men-download buku elektronik yang telah dipesan. 5. Link untuk men-download akan expire dalam waktu 24 jam. 6. Terima kasih. Table of content is available on this link http://bit.ly/2dNhXNB How to order: 1. Kindly send your purchase order by SMS/texting to +62 851 0518 7118 atau +62 852 103 56516 by mentioning your name, email, and mobile phone number. 2. Upon receiving your order, we shall notify you our bank account number and the name of the account holder. 3. Please notify us regarding your successful payment to our mobile number above. WhatsApp account is not available at the moment. 4. Upon effectiveness of the fund received in our bank, we shall email the link to download the ebook you have ordered and paid. 5. The link to download shall expire in 24 hours. 6. Thank you. Daftar Perusahaan SMS Pencuri Pulsa
Daftar CNC ke-18 & IUP yang Dicabut from The1 Uploader
Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-19 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here http://www.slideshare.net/chitchatid/daftar-cnc-ke19-iup-yang-dicabut
A. Abd. Latief A. Baso Patetengi A. Muhammad Yusuf,S.Sos. Sdr A. Rasyid Aal Rizki Tadang Palie, PT Aan Sukayat Aang Harto Abacus Minerals Harvester, PT Abacus Multi Mineral, PT Abadi Buana Lestari, PT Abadi Jaya Indah, PT Abadi Ogan Cemerlang, PT Abadi Tarigan Abadil Jayatama Sakti, PT Abalong Bombana, PT Abdi Bersaudara, CV Abdi Guna Bahari, PT Abdi Negara Buana Raya, PT Abdi Pertiwi Loka, PT Abdul Aruan Abdul Fatah. Sdr Abdul Gafar Lubis, Sdr Abdul Jawat Nasution Abdul Rahman Abdul Wahid, Sdr Abdulrahman. P., Sdr Abe Jaya Perkasa, CV Abelindo Land, CV Aberta Wigadijaya, PT Abhimata Anugrah Abadi, PT Abisha Bumi Persada, PT Abrar Nusantara, PT Abu Salim Abud Suciptra, Sdr Abunain Aceh Kencana Mandiri, PT Aceh Mineral Gemilang, PT Aceh Mining Lestari, PT Aceh Poe Atra, CV Aceh Tuan Sinawari, PT Aceh Tuwan Sinarawi, PT Achiyat Ilyas Achmad Anwar, Sdr Achmad Buaethy Adani, PT Adaport Utama Mining, PT Adas Abadi, PT Adas Sejahtera, PT Addis Pratama Perkasa, PT Ade Suwarni Adella, CV Aderu, PT Adetech Engineering Indonesia, PT Adhi Borneo Lestari, PT Adhi Kartiko Pratama, PT Adhi Manunggal Perkasa, PT Adhidaya Karya Manunggal 1, PT Adhidaya Mineral Indonesia, PT Adhikara Andalan Pratama, PT Adhikara Andalan Sejahtera, PT Adhikara Cipta Mulia, PT Adhikara Energi Prima, PT Adhilancar Nusa Makmur, PT Adhim Pratama, CV Adhita Nikel Indonesia Adhitya Putra Pratama, CV Adhiyasa Utama Reka Ventura, PT Adhya Karya Gemilang, PT Adi Candra, Sdr Adi Coal Resources, PT Adi Jaya, CV Adi Mecha Kontekindo, PT Adi Permadi, Sdr Adi Putro, CV Adidaya Bara Nusantara, PT Adidaya Ciptakarsa Anugraha Adidaya Tangguh, PT Adiguna Pratama, CV Adiguna Usaha Semesta, PT Adikara, PT Adikharisma Ekalestari, PT Adimas Puspita Serasi, PT Adimegah Arata, PT Adimitra Baratama Nusantara, PT Adinaco Serasi, PT Ading Rahadian, Sdr Adis Pratama, CV Aditama Lestari, PT Aditya Bara Perkasa, PT Aditya Buana Inter Aditya Buana Inter, PT Aditya Bumi Pertambangan, PT Aditya Kirana Mandiri, PT Aditya Perkasa Mandiri, PT Adria Cipta Nugraha, PT Adrie Yohansha. Sdr Adrindo Mandrajaya, PT Aega Prima, PT Aero Mandiri, PT Aesel Indonesia, PT Afiat Wahyuni Lestari, PT Afrian Trade, PT Afrizal Afrizal Damanhuri Afta Citra Mandiri, PT Afta Sanggau Mandiri, PT Aftifani, PT Afuik Indah, PT Agam Singarimbun,Sdr Agathon Brothers, PT Aglaonema Lutha Persada, PT Aglonema Lutha Persada, PT Agogo Golden Group, CV Agra Aneka Mineral, PT Agra Budi Jasa Bersama, PT Agrabudi Baramulia Mandiri, PT Agrabudi Gas Utama, PT Agrabudi Jasa Bersama (Ajb) Agrabudi Jasa Bersama, PT (Ajb) Agrabudi Mineral Indonesia, PT Agramining Sejahtera, PT Agricom International Traading, PT Agricom International Trading, PT Agro Artha Surya Agro City Kaltim Agro City Kaltim, PT Agro Mining Expert-1, PT Agro Mining Expert-2, PT Agro Pangan Utama, PT Agro Titian Nusantara, PT Agrocare, CV Agrocare, PT Agroindo Bumi Perkasa, PT Agtika Dwi Sejahtera, PT Agung Bara Prima, PT Agung Global Bersindo, PT Agung Gugun Gurzita Agung Jaya Abadi, PT Agung Jaya Kencana, PT Agung Jaya Rezeki Mulia, PT Agung Mandiri, CV Agung Paser Naraya Utama, PT Agung Persada, CV Agung Putra Sakti, CV Agung Raya Pratama, CV Agung Sangun Jaya, CV Agung Sejahtera Indo Mineral, PT Agung Sukses Barapro, CV Agunori Radja Djaya, PT Agus Fitri Iriani, Sdr Agus Gito Hadianto Agus Hermawan, Sdr Agus Maryanto. Sdr Agus Purwanto, Sdr Agus Setiadi. Sdr Agus Sofian Lie, Sdr Agus Subandi, Sdr Agus Sudoro. Sdr Agustin Setianingrum, Sdri Agustuyu, Se Ahmaad Sucipto Ahmad Ahmad Ardiansyah, Sdr Ahmad Rif’an, Se, Sdr Ahmad Suhaimi Ahsonudin Ahud Sahudin Aidi Jaya, PT Aifa Anugrah Pratama, PT Aifa Gemilang, PT Aikes Tanjung Mandiri, PT Aimil Insam Marmer, PT Ainun Persada Sakti, PT Air Hitam Resources, PT Air Kuning Zircon, PT Air Mata Emas, PT Airys Bara Energi, PT Ajhi Putra, CV Aji Bara Selaras, CV Aji Baratama, PT Aji Budiarto, Sdr Aji Pratama, CV Ajid Aka Jaya, PT Akar Mas Internasional, PT Akarna Marindo, PT Akat Srida Amri, PT Akbar Agung Ramadhan, PT Akbar Kadir, Sdr Akbar Mitra Jaya, CV Akbar Mitra Jaya, PT Akbar, CV Akhmad Kholifan. Sdr Akram Resources, PT Akram, UD Al Amanah Tujuh-Tujuh, PT Al Amin Bersama, PT Aladin, Sdr Alam Aceh Resources, PT Alam Anugrah Perdana Sentosa, PT Alam Bahtera Barito Raya, PT Alam Bangun Cipta, PT Alam Barokah Abadi, CV Alam Bhana Jaya, PT Alam Bhana Lestari, PT Alam Bhana Raya, PT Alam Borneo Maju Sejahtera, CV Alam Bumi Dewata, PT Alam Bumi Karya Abadi, PT Alam Bumi Makmur, PT Alam Cipta Karya Bangkit, CV Alam Damai Makmur, PT Alam Duta Kalimantan, PT Alam Indah Purnama Panjang, PT Alam Indah, CV Alam Jaya Barapratama, PT Alam Jaya Energi, PT Alam Jaya Indah, CV Alam Jaya, CV Alam Jaya. Pd Alam Karunia Mineral, PT Alam Kaya, CV Alam Lestari Kencana, PT Alam Lestari, CV Alam Makassar Utama, PT Alam Megah Putih, CV Alam Mineral Lestari, PT Alam Mitra Indah Nugraha, PT Alam Mitra Mandiri, PT Alam Nusantara, Ud Alam Pangket Indah, PT Alam Papua Nusajaya, PT Alam Papua Nusantara, PT Alam Papua Nusaraya, PT Alam Perdana Zircon, PT Alam Permai Artha Utama, PT Alam Permai Bina Lestari, PT Alam Permai Manuntung, CV Alam Permai, CV Alam Persada Nusantara, PT Alam Purnama Panjang, PT Alam Raya Abadi, PT Alam Rizqi, CV Alam Sambas Sejahtera, PT Alam Setiatama Jaya, PT Alam Sinsegye Tanah Banten, PT Alam Subur Indah, CV Alam Sumber Rejeki, CV Alam Sutera, PT Alam Tabang Raya Pratama, PT Alam Takung Sejahtera, PT Alamanda Indonesia, PT Alamsyah. Sdr Alas Kusuma, PT Alasjaya Natural Resources, PT Alaska Dwipa Perdana, PT Alaska Prima Coal, CV Alaska Prima Coal, PT Alba Witama Mandiri, CV Albatros, CV Alberta Belinko, PT Albros Resources, PT Aldi Bersaudara, PT Aldiron Petra, PT Aldo Hs, PT Aldy Surya Gemilang, PT Alexander Wariki Alexis Perdana Mineral, PT Alfa Fortuna Mulia, PT Alfa Mas, CV Alfa Riung Jaya, PT Alfaco Indonesia, PT Alfara Delta Persada, PT Alfario Chaniago Perkasa, PT Al-Fazar, CV Alfian Putra Jaya, Sdr Alfiannoor, PT Alghozan, CV Algifari Wildan Sejahtera, PT Alhas Jaya Group, PT Alhasanie, PT Alhat Chemindo, PT Ali Kusnadi, Sdr Alief Multi Energi Pt Alief Multi Energi, PT Alief Multi Group, PT Alif Persada Nusantara, PT Alinki Capital Indonesia, PT Alizar Aljabri Buana Citra, PT Alkatara, PT Allied Indo Cemerlang Sentosa, PT Allied Indo Coaljaya, PT Allied Minerals, PT Allisa Paparan Energie, PT Almadani Mandiri, PT Alngit Raya, PT Aloma Wangi, PT Alor Kahayan Mining, PT Alpa Peha Prima, PT Alpan. Sdr Alpetris Phoenix Berlian, PT Alpha Inter Global, PT Alpha Mas Sejahtera, PT Alpha Peha Prima, PT Alpindo Mitra Bangsa, PT Altha Moda Sendawar, PT Altoona, PT Altra Buanatama, CV Altra Buanatama, PT Altra Kartika Sejahtera, PT Altramira Coal, CV Alu Sentosa, PT Alumagada Karya Mandiri, PT Alumuga, PT Alunia Kusmiyati, Ny, Sdr. Alvianto.Sdr Alvindo Mineral Resources, PT Alya Ananda, PT Aman Suparman Aman Toebillah Batubara, PT Aman Toebillah Putra, PT Amanah Anugerah Adi Mulia, PT Amanah Batu Alam Amanah Batu Alam, CV Amanah Batu Alam, PT Amanah Prakasa Utama, PT Amanah Sejati, CV Amanekat, PT Amaq Hendra Rusnawati Amaq Kurdi Amaq Najamudin Amar Makmur Mandiri, PT Amarecon Persada, PT Amarta Teknik Indonesia, PT Amasing Tabara, PT Amastra Perkasa, PT Amerta Alam Semesta, PT Amin Nurdin Amindo Pratama, CV Aminuddin. Sdr Aminudin S Aminy Brosindo Odhayos, PT Amir Saepudin Amma Intan, PT Amo Ngajama, PT Amran Dg Tika, Sdr Amrith Permata Prima, PT Amtel Indonesia, PT Amuy Ma’mur Amuy Ma’mur Sentosa, CV An- Nakhl, CV Ana Gajah Mada, CV Ana Konawe, CV Anak Indonesia Mining, PT Anak Sejati, PT Anaka Jaya, CV Ananda Melika, CV Ananda Puteri Lestari, PT Ananta Hemisphere Resources, PT Anco Millenium Indonesia, PT Anda, CV Andal Kirana Raya, PT Andalan Alam Semesta, PT Andalan Bahagia Utama, PT Andalan Energi Nusantara, PT Andalan Karunia Persada, PT Andalan Nusantara Permai, PT Andalan Prima Cakrawala, PT Andalan Satria Abadi, PT Andalan Terang, PT Andalan Umbul Kencana, PT Andalan Usaha Jaya Semesta, PT Andalas Bara Sejahtera, PT Andalas Maju Multimineral, PT Andalas Minang Malindo, PT Andalas Nusa Indah, PT Andalas Tetra Jaya, PT Andesit Pratama Resources, PT Andesit Trass Makmur, CV Andhika Yoga Pratama, PT Andi Andi Agussalim. Sdr Andi Azas Munandar Abijafra. Sdr Andi Darmawan Sdr Drs. Andi Roberto Andi Wijaya, Sdr Andi Zulpadli. Se Andi.M.Syafei, Sdr Andika Karya Mandiri, PT Andika Tridharma Putra, CV Andisa Karya, CV Andora Nindia Makmur, PT Andra Kurniawan, PT Andrea Multi Energi, PT Andrea Multi Energy, PT Andri Permana Andrika Sukses Pratama, PT Aneka Alam Anugerah, PT Aneka Inti Utama, PT Aneka Kaolin Utama, PT Aneka Krida Utama, PT Aneka Mineral Cipta Tambang, PT Aneka Mineral Makmur, PT Aneka Mineral Utama, PT Aneka Mining Nasional, PT Aneka Mining Sulawesi, PT Aneka Mitra Indonusa, PT Aneka Niaga Nusantara, PT Aneka Nusantara International, PT Aneka Sumber Indonesia, PT Aneka Sumber Lestari, PT Aneka Tambang , PT Aneka Tambang Tbk , PT Aneka Tambang Tbk, PT Aneka Tambang, PT Aneka Tambang, Tbk Aneka Tambang, Tbk Pt Aneka Tambang, Tbk, PT Aneka Usaha Cemerlang, PT Aneka Usaha Mustika, PT Anekatama Bumi Serasi, PT Aneuk Gampong Baroh, PT Ang And Fang Brother, PT Anggada Maharani Pratama, PT Anggana Coal, PT Anggaraksa Adisarana, CV Anggaraksa Adisarana, PT Anggi Jaya, CV Anggoro Fatwa, CV Anggrek Hitam Coalindo, PT Angkasa Bumi Sakti, CV Anglia Raksapati, PT Angsana Sukses Mandiri, CV Angsana Sukses Mandiri, PT Angsana Terminal Utama, PT Angso Duo Permai, PT Ani Sutin Animus Dharma Nusantara, PT Anindya Mitra Internasional, PT Anjas Anita Jaya, PT Anma Haikal Jazim, PT Annas.Md, Sdr Annisa Sukses Makmur, CV Annisa Sukses Mandiri, CV Annisa Sukses Mandiri, PT Annugerah Resources, PT Ansar Terang Crushindo, PT Antam Resourcindo, PT Antang Mura Perkasa, PT Antang Surya Persada, PT Antara, CV Antarnusa Persada Semesta, PT Antik Unggul Mineral, PT Anton Liaonardo. Sdr Antonuius T Pondaag Antrasit, PT Anugerah Abadi Semesta, PT Anugerah Agung Abadi, CV Anugerah Akses Bumi, PT Anugerah Alam Andalas, CV Anugerah Alam Andalas, PT Anugerah Alam Karya Bersama, PT Anugerah Alam Katingan, PT Anugerah Alam Makmur, PT Anugerah Alam Manuhing, PT Anugerah Alam, PT Anugerah Bara Hampang, PT Anugerah Bara Insan, CV Anugerah Bara Insani, CV Anugerah Bara Mustika, PT Anugerah Bara Selaras, PT Anugerah Baru, UD Anugerah Batu Alam Industri, PT Anugerah Batu Singkap, CV Anugerah Belantara Lestrai, PT Anugerah Berkah Semesta, PT Anugerah Berlian Pratama Coal, CV Anugerah Borneo Coal, CV Anugerah Buana Utama, PT Anugerah Daya Gemilang, PT Anugerah Dynasty Sakti, PT Anugerah Energi, PT Anugerah Gunung Emas, PT Anugerah Harta Alam, CV Anugerah Hasta Perkasa, PT Anugerah Himalti, PT Anugerah Inti Cemerlang Persada, PT Anugerah Jambi, PT Anugerah Jaya Buana, PT Anugerah Jaya, CV Anugerah Jaya, PT Anugerah Kartika Kencana, PT Anugerah Mahakam Sejahtera, PT Anugerah Marmer Jelita, PT Anugerah Mas, PT Anugerah Mineral Barru, PT Anugerah Mineralindo, PT Anugerah Mitra Graha, PT Anugerah Mulia Abadi, CV Anugerah Multico, PT Anugerah Nusantara Resources, PT Anugerah Nusantara Sejahtera, PT Anugerah Pancaran Bulan, PT Anugerah Patongson, PT Anugerah Permata Bumi, PT Anugerah Pertiwi Indotama, PT Anugerah Pratama, CV Anugerah Provita Pratama, PT Anugerah Rezkie Gunung, PT Anugerah Rizkie Gunung, CV Anugerah Sakti Utama, PT Anugerah Sanimardani, PT Anugerah Selaras Sejati, PT Anugerah Sentosa Illahi, PT Anugerah Sukses Gemilang, CV Anugerah Sumber Bumi, PT Anugerah Sumber Cahaya, PT Anugerah Surya Indotama, PT Anugerah Surya Pratama, PT Anugerah Tambang Raya, PT Anugerah Tompira Nikel, PT Anugerah Tujuh Sejati, PT Anugerah, CV Anugrah Agung Perkasa, CV Anugrah Alam Buana Indonesia, PT Anugrah Alam Lestari, CV Anugrah Alam Raya, CV Anugrah Batu Gunung Gerizim, PT Anugrah Batu Hirang, PT Anugrah Borneoi Lestari, PT Anugrah Buana Utama, PT Anugrah Bumi Persada, PT Anugrah Cipta Permai, PT Anugrah Dua Enam Jaya, PT Anugrah Fitria, CV Anugrah Harisma Barakah, PT Anugrah Inti Cemerlang Persada, PT Anugrah Jambi Coalindo, PT Anugrah Jaya, CV Anugrah Kartika Kencana, PT Anugrah Kuari Abadi, PT Anugrah Lestari Alam, PT Anugrah Limindo Berdikari, CV Anugrah Mapan Perkasa, PT Anugrah Marmer Abadi, PT Anugrah Mega Lestari, CV Anugrah Mineralindo, PT Anugrah Mining Persada, PT Anugrah Mitra Graha, PT Anugrah Mulia Bersama, PT Anugrah Nuansa Persada, PT Anugrah Persada, CV Anugrah Petra Sejahtera, PT Anugrah Pinang Anugrah Pratama Pertiwi, PT Anugrah Pratama, CV Anugrah Rezkie Gunung, PT Anugrah Riau Coal, PT Anugrah Rizkie Tabalar, PT Anugrah Sakti Jaya, CV Anugrah Semesta, PT Anugrah Setiajaya, PT Anugrah Sukses Gemilang, PT Anugrah Sukses Mining, PT Anugrah Sumber Alam, CV Anugrah Tenam Raya, PT Anugrah, CV Anwar Anzawara Satria, PT Aperdi Mining Pratama, PT Aplus Baja Mining, PT Apriadi Bersaudara, PT Apuy Tasak, PT Aqna, PT Aqso Pratama Energy, PT Aquila Prima, PT Ar Coal Mining 1, PT Ar Coal Mining 2, PT Ar Eka, PT Arafura Mandiri Semangat, PT Arafura Surya Alam, PT Arafura Waigeo Mandiri, PT Aragon Tambang Pertama, PT Aragon Tambang Pratama, PT Arang Penawai Seahtera, PT Arbail Arcan Makmur Utama, PT Arda Dinasty, PT Ardi Manunggal, CV Ardi Utama, CV Ardipo Global Perdana, PT Arga Kukusan Kencana, PT Arga Morini Indah, PT Argasari Pratama, PT Argo Kencono, PT Argo Makmur Pt Argo Makmur, PT Aries Iron Mining, PT Ariescont Perdana, PT Ariesitindo, PT Ariestindo, PT Arif Darmawan. Sdr Arif. Sdr Arifuddin Dg Jarung Arimbi Prima Coal, PT Arina Kotajaya, PT Arindo Antrasit, PT Arini, PT Aritra Kasih Abadi, PT Ariya Wisesa Fransnata, PT Arjuna Mandiri, CV Arjuna Perkasa Carpedia, PT Arjuna, CV Arkamira Memorial Stone, PT Arlinton Nickel Plant, PT Arma, CV Armada Hada Graha, PT Armada Inti Malfuzhat, PT Armo Commerce, PT Armyn Arni Bersaudara, PT Arnins Corporation, PT Arosuka Mandiri, PT Arrtu Cita Persada, PT Arsed Indonesia, PT Arsiwo Sisanyo, PT Arson Pacific Engineering, PT Arsy Nusantara, PT Arta Bevimdo Mandiri, PT Arta Sumba, PT Arta Usaha Bahagia, PT Arta Usaha Sarana, CV Arta Usaha Sarana, PT Artapal Perkasa, PT Artha Aneka Tambang, PT Artha Bimo Gemilang Coalindo, PT Artha Bumi Mineral, PT Artha Bumi Mining, PT Artha Cipta Langgeng, PT Artha Coal, PT Artha Indo Energi, PT Artha Indra Raya, PT Artha Jaya Mandiri, CV Artha Jaya Sendawar, PT Artha Marth Naha Kramo, PT Artha Mega Prima, PT Artha Niaga Sejahtera, PT Artha Pratama Jaya, CV Artha Prima Nusa Jaya, PT Artha Prima Nusajaya, PT Artha Pusaka, PT Artha Tunggal Mandiri, PT Artha Usaha Bahagia, PT Artha Wiguna Sembadha, PT Artha Zirkon, CV Arthaco Prima Energi, PT Arthaco Prima Energy, PT Arthaindo Jaya Abadi, PT Arthama Semesta Datu, PT Arthasia Cipta Pratama, PT Artinpro Perfekta, PT Arto Bangun Cemerlang, PT Arto Selaras Mandiri Indonesia, PT Artomoro, CV Artra Niaga Sejahtera, PT Aruba, PT Arumugam Yogas Arus Tirta Power, PT Arvindo Tech Lestari, PT Arwana Prima Coal, CV Arwana Prima Coal, PT Arwibas Trasco, PT Arya Duta Mandiri, CV Arya Duta, CV Arya Prima Sentosa, PT Arya Putra, CV Arzara Bara Indo Energi Tama, PT As Anak Sejati, PT Asa Investment, PT Asari Karya Buana Asep Gunawan Asep Suhendi Asepyuyu Asgarindo Prima Utama, PT Asia Buana Metalindo, PT Asia Fasifik Mineral Coal, PT Asia Hamilton Resources, PT Asia Kaolin Raya, PT Asia Mineral Samudra, PT Asia Mining, CV Asia Mitra Perkasatama, PT Asia Multi Investama, PT Asia Pasifik Mineral Coal, PT Asia Sahabat Indonesia, PT Asia Sumber Daya Teknologi, PT Asia Tehnikatama Mustika, PT Asia Traco, CV Asiapasifik Aristama Entebe, PT Asih Nuansa Pertiwi, PT Asindo Internasional Perdana, PT Asindo Setiatama, PT Askatindo Utama Mineral, PT Asmolan Asmuni Trubus Asnorf Hidayah, CV Aspal Buton Nasional, PT Aspirasi Widya Chandra, PT Asprom Pratama, PT Asriadi Asrijal Siming Asset Mitra Alam, PT Asta Maharanita, PT Astamas International, PT Astana Raya, PT Astani Bangun Persada, PT Astri Mining Resources, PT Astri Prima, PT Astrindo Gita Mandiri, PT Aswan,Sdr Aswin Nislam Argo Sudarsono At.Priya Sukowidodo, Sdr Atan Bara Sejahtera, PT Atang Rismawan, Sdr Atap Tri Utama, CV Atd Makmur Mandiri, PT Ateng Trenggana. Sdr Atjeh Inti, PT Atma Cahya Utama, PT Atoz Nusantara Mining, PT Atta Rilang, PT Atzebi Yatu Lensi, Sdr Aulia Agro Bersaudara, PT Aulya Firdaus, CV Aum Anugerah Kubera, PT Aura Celebes Mandiri, PT Aurium Goldenia Dengi, PT Aurium Tambang Momento, PT Aurora Hutama Jaya, PT Aurum Khatulistiwa, PT Aurum Persada Khatulistiwa, PT Ausindo Andalas Mandiri, PT Ausindo Prima Andalas, PT Autum Bara Energi, PT Autum Beringin Energi, PT Aver Mitrajasa, PT Avilla, CV Avry Raya, PT Awal Karya, CV Awang Bangkal, Kud Awang Indocoal, PT Awang Long, PT Awang Sejahtera, PT Awara, CV Axindo Arthamas, PT Axrindo Gemilang Abadi, PT Ayer Lagoona, PT Ayi Jana Ayi Jaya, CV Ayu Wulan Lestari, CV Ayubi Minerals, PT Ayus Putra Perkasa, PT Ayuta Mitra Sentosa, PT Azahra Resources, PT Aziz Rustam Dg. Nompo B. Richard B. Ginting, Sdr Babar Indah Alam Raya, PT Babar Indah Alam Raya, PT. Babel Inti Perkasa, PT Babel Silica Mining, CV Babel Sumber Pratama Mineral, PT Babel Surya Alam Lestari, PT Babel Tinindo, PT Babelindo Trijaya Perkasa, PT Babelland, PT Bacom Tirta Indotama, PT Badak Gangsur, CV Badur Khan. Sdr Bagin Sembiring Bagus Jaya Abadi, PT Bagus Karya, PT Bahana Alam Pertiwi, PT Bahana Binar Gemilang, PT Bahana Cipta, PT Bahana Multi Energi, PT Bahana Multi Energy, PT Bahana Nada Gemilang, PT Bahana Pratama Jaya, CV Bahara Mega Nusantara, PT Bahari Alam Mineral, PT Bahari Brothers Pratama, PT Bahari Jaya Abadi, CV Bahari Mega Nusantara, PT Bahari Utama, CV Baharudin. Sdr Bahitom Bara Energi, PT Bahrum Bin Dahlan Bahtera Budimining, PT Bahtera Bukit Zaitun, PT Bahtera Cipta Bara, PT Bahtera Sultra Mining, PT Baja Nusa Mandiri, PT Baja Trans Mandiri, PT Bajawa Resources, PT Bakal Maju, PT Bakal Makmur Sejahtera, PT Bakir, Sdr Bakri. Sdr Bakti Bumi Sulawesi, PT Bakti Inti Global, PT Bakti Inti Guna, PT Bakti Nugraha Yuda, PT Bakti Sarolangun Sejahtera, PT Bakti Trinanda Jaya, PT Balaji Mineral Indonesia, PT Balangan Karya Putera, PT Balanji Mineral Indonesia, PT Balengkong Mineral Resources, PT Baliem Coal Mining, PT Balikno Saraan, Sh. Balikpapan Makmur, PT Balikpapan Ready Mix, PT Bambang Hermanto, Sdr Bambang Sugiarto, Sdr Bambang Sulistyo Bambu Seribu, CV Bamega Multi Guna, PT Banda Raya Paradiso, PT Bandar Harapan Sejahtera, PT Bandawan Jumintan Kalimantan, PT Bandung Marmer, PT Banggai Kencana Permai, PT Banggai Mandiri Pratama, PT Bangka Belitung Timah Sejahtera, PT Bangka Buana Integrity Metindo, PT Bangka Bukit Jaya, PT Bangka Global Mandiri, Pd Bangka Inti Selawang Segantang, PT Bangka Jawa Mining Mills, PT Bangka Jawa Mining Milss, PT Bangka Kudai Tin, PT Bangka Plasma Selawang Segantang, PT Bangka Prima Mandiri, CV Bangka Prima Mandiri, PT Bangka Prima Tin, PT Bangka Putra Karya , PT Bangka Putra Karya, PT Bangka Sebalai, PT Bangka Serumpun, PT Bangka Solder Industri, CV Bangka Timah Makmur, CV Bangka Timah Utama Sejahtera, PT Bangka Tin Industri, PT Bangka Tin Industry, PT Bangkesakiang Bulu Ulaweng, PT Bangkit Limpoga Jaya, PT Bangkit Mitra Nusantara, PT Bangkit Sejahtera, CV Bangun Adi Sarana, CV Bangun Alam Indonesia Kita, PT Bangun Asia Mandiri, PT Bangun Bina Perkasa, PT Bangun Buana Marmer, PT Bangun Bumi Indah, PT Bangun Bumi Makmur, PT Bangun Energi Perkasa, PT Bangun Energy Indonesia, PT Bangun Energy Perkasa, PT Bangun Jaya Citra Mandiri, PT Bangun Jaya, CV Bangun Karya Pratama Lestari, PT Bangun Karya Sabumi, CV Bangun Karya Sabumi, PT Bangun Konawe Utara Sejahtera, PT Bangun Korin Utama, PT Bangun Lampung Jaya (Katibung), PT Bangun Makmur Sejahtera, PT Bangun Mineral Sakti, PT Bangun Nusantara Jaya Makmur, PT Bangun Nusantara Jaya, PT Bangun Obor Persada, PT Bangun Olah Sarana Sukses, PT Bangun Persada Energi, PT Bangun Persada Jambi Energi, PT Bangun Samudra Ratu, CV Bangun Tiara, PT Bangun Tumbuh Buana, PT Bangun Usaha Mineral Indonesia, PT Bangun Wahana Lingkungan Lestari, PT Bangun Wahana Lingkungan, PT Bangunan Agung, PT Bangunindo Tambang Perkasa, PT Bangunredja Perkasa, PT Banin Santanu, CV Baniran Alumina Cempaga, PT Baniyah, Sdr Banjar Asri, PT Banjar Bumi Persada, CV Banjar Bumi Persada, PT Banjar Global Mining, CV Banjar Global Mining, PT Banjar Jambrud Kalimantan, CV Banjar Makmur Raharta, PT Banjar Permata, CV Banjar Persada Resources, PT Banjar Satrya Putra, PT Banjarsari Pribumi, PT Banua Makmur Sejahtera, PT Banua Sanggam Lestari, PT Banua Sumber Artha, PT Banua Tuntung Pandang, CV Banuatuntung Pandang, CV Banyan Koalindo Lestari, PT Banyu Biru Sakti, PT Baoly Mineral, PT Bara Adhipratama, PT Bara Aditama Sejahtera, PT Bara Alam Rekhannusa, PT Bara Alam Utama, PT Bara Anugrah Sejahtera, PT Bara Bagas Karya Mulia, PT Bara Baliem Mining, PT Bara Barito Perkasa 1, PT Bara Barito Perkasa 2, PT Bara Barito Perkasa I, PT Bara Batu Ampar Prima, PT Bara Bintang, PT Bara Budiman Abadi, PT Bara Bumi Kalimantan, PT Bara Bumi Kartanegara, PT Bara Bumi Oktasan Bara Bumi Oktasan, PT Bara Bumi Semesta, PT Bara Centra Sejahtera, PT Bara Cipta Energy, PT Bara Dekai Mining, PT Bara Energi Kaltim, CV Bara Energi Lestari, PT Bara Energi Makmur Dua, PT Bara Energi Makmur, PT Bara Energi Sempurna, PT Bara Enim Perkasa, PT Bara Gas Indonesia, PT Bara Gas Indonesia, PT (Konsorsium Pd. Mura Energi-Pt.Mura Reksa CbmBara Gas Indonesia, PT (Konsorsium Pd. Mura Energi-Pt.Mura Reksa Cbm-Pt.Bara Gas Indonesia) Bara Hanyu Kapuas, PT Bara Harmonis Batang Asam, PT Bara Indah Lestari, PT Bara Indah, CV Bara International, PT Bara Inti Alam Indonesia, PT Bara Jaya Makmur, CV Bara Jaya Perkasa, PT Bara Jaya Utama, PT Bara Karsa Lestari, PT Bara Karya Agung, PT Bara Kayulis Sentara Abadi, PT Bara Kumala Sakti, PT Bara Kumala, CV Bara Lestari , CV Bara Lestari Makmur, PT Bara Linon Besi, PT Bara Malindo Jaya, PT Bara Mandir Perkasa Bara Mandiri Perkasa, PT Bara Manunggal Sakti, PT Bara Mega Quantum, PT Bara Melawi Kapuas, PT Bara Meratus, PT Bara Mitra Kencana, CV Bara Mitra Sejahtera, PT Bara Mulia Energi, PT Bara Mulia Kalimantan, PT Bara Naga, CV Bara Ngalik Mining, PT Bara Papua Mining, PT Bara Pasifik International, PT Bara Pelita Benua, PT Bara Petro Sakti, PT Bara Pratama Abadi, CV Bara Prima Kaltim, PT Bara Prima Kaltim_1, PT Bara Prima Mandiri, PT Bara Prima Pratama, PT Bara Putussibau, PT Bara Rangga Wirasmuda, PT Bara Raya Persada, PT Bara Sakti Resources, PT Bara Samba Prima, PT Bara Sandaran, PT Bara Selaras Resources, PT Bara Setiu Indonesia, PT Bara Sinar, CV Bara Sirat Unggul Permai, PT Bara Stone, CV Bara Sukses Jaya Makmur, PT Bara Sukses Mandiri, PT Bara Sumatera Energi, PT Bara Sumber Makmur, Kop Pertambangan Bara Sumber Rejeki, PT Bara Surya Abadi, CV Bara Tabang, PT Bara Tambang Mega, PT Bara Tanur Baja, PT Bara Tiga Putra, PT Bara Tri Santoso, PT Bara Unggul Abadi, PT Bara Utama Jaya, PT Bara Utama Persada Raya, PT Bara Utama Sejati, PT Bara Wira Utama Bara Wiranti Corporation, PT Baradimika Mudasukses, PT Barak Makmur Abadi, PT Barakat Mandiri, Kpri Barakat Usaha Bersama, Kud Barakka Dason Mallibu, PT Barakomindo Sejahtera Abadi, PT Baramega Berkah Utama, CV Baramega Berkah Utama, PT Baramega Cahaya Makmur, PT Baramega Citra Kutim Permai, PT Baramega Citra Mulia Persada, PT Baramulia Energi, PT Baramulti Suksessarana, PT Baranusa Pratama, PT Baratala Tuntung Pandang, Pd Baratama Makmur, CV Baratama Mandiri, CV Baratama Mutiara Pertiwi, PT Baratama Rezeki Anugerah Sentosa Utama, PT Baratama Sinergi, PT Baratama, CV Bariatun Akbar Barito Alam Raya, PT Barito Bangun Nusantara, PT Barito Bangun Perkasa 1, PT Barito Bangun Perkasa 2, PT Barito Bara Abadi, PT Barito Corindo Mineral, PT Barito Energi Mandiri, PT Barito Inti Perdana, PT Barito Karsa Mandiri, PT Barito Pratama, CV Barito Prima Coal, PT Barito Raya Energi, PT Barito Timur Energi, PT Barokah, CV Baroqah Bumi Abadi Barr Mega Makmur, PT Bartim Coalindo, PT Bartim Metropolitan Perkasa, PT Bartra Putra Mulia, PT Baruna Bara Kaltim, PT Baruna Inti Bara, PT Barunang Mining, PT Barut Mas, PT Baruta Abadi, PT Basais Sutami Basin Coal Mining, PT Basindo Karya Utama, PT Basirun Basmal Utama Mandiri, Pd Basmal Utama Nusantara, PT Basmo Indo Mandiri, PT Bastara Jaya Muda, PT Bastem Indonesia, PT Basthomy, CV Basuki Adika Putra, PT Basuki, CV Batang Bungo Jaya, PT Batang Hari Nergi Prima Batang Mendarang, CV Batang Semagi, PT Batanghari Coal Mining, PT Batanghari Energi Prima, PT Batanghari Persada, PT Batara Abadi Perkasa, PT Batara Bumi, PT Batara Indosurya Sejahtera Abadi, PT Batara Perkasa, PT Batara Resources, PT Batavia Cyclindo Industri, PT Batavia Mandala Putra, PT Batin Indah Tulangbawang, PT Batin Karya, PT Battoman Coal, PT Batu Alam Anugrah, PT Batu Alam Bumi Sendawar, PT Batu Alam Jayamandiri, PT Batu Alam Pangsuma, PT Batu Bara Kalimantan, PT Batu Batara Jaya, CV Batu Berlian Pratama, CV Batu Besi Kencana, PT Batu Bumi Perkasa, CV Batu Damai Sejahtera, PT Batu Dewata Alam Persada, PT Batu Gunung Haruyan, PT Batu Gunung Makmur, PT Batu Gunung Mulia, CV Batu Gunung Mulia, PT Batu Hijau Coal, PT Batu Hitam Mulia, PT Batu Honje Quarry, PT Batu Ilham, KSU Batu Jaya Makmur, PT Batu Jelita Perkasa, PT Batu Kali Welang Ampuh, PT Batu Kaya Energi, PT Batu Makmur, PT Batu Mas, UD Batu Mulia Kalimantan, PT Batu Mulia Sulawesi, PT Batu Narit, PT Batu Perdana, PT Batu Permata Hitam, CV Batu Permata, CV Batu Sajam, CV Batu Sajam, PT Batu Sampurna Makmur, PT Batu Sarana Persada, PT Batu Serasi Alam Raya, CV Batu Sirap, CV Batuah Bara Mitra Batuah Energi Prima, PT Batuah Prima Coal, CV Batuah Sapta Mineral, PT Batuah, CV Batubara Bandung Pratama, PT Batubara Bukit Kendi, PT Batubara Duaribu Lestari, PT Batubara Energy Nusantara, PT Batubara Indonesia Jaya, PT Batubara Jambi Lestari, PT (Ex, PT Globalindo Alam Lestari) Batubara Kalimantan, PT Batubara Lahat Batubara Lahat, PT Batubara Lamno Raya, PT Batubara Nagan Raya, PT Batubara Nusantara Kaltim, PT Batubesar Mega Nusantara Batubesar Mega Nusantara, PT Batubinumbun Maju Lestari, PT Batudewata Alampersada, PT Batumas, CV Batumulia Tarigan Batutama Manikam Nusa, PT Batutua Barit Wetar, PT Batutua Kharisma Permai, PT Batutua Way Kanan Minerals, PT Baula Petra Buana, PT Bawo Kekal Sejahtera Internasional, PT Bayu Kamona Karya, PT Bayu Nyohoka, PT Bayu Purnama, Sdr Bayu Respani, CV Bayung Energy Indonesia, PT Bcmg Tani Berkah, PT Bejan Bejana Inti Alam, PT Bela Kencana, PT Bela Sarana Permai, PT Belawaian Energi Prima, PT Belayan Abadi Prima Coal, PT Belayan Internasional Coal, PT Belayan Mulia, PT Belengkong Mineral Resources, PT Belindo Inti Alam, PT Belirang Kalisari, PT Beliton Tin Solder, PT Belitung Industri Sejahtera, PT Belitung Kaolin Murni, CV Belitung Sand Mining, PT Belitung Tin Industri, PT Bella, CV Bena Batu Binumbun Jaya, PT Bena Makmur Selaras Sejahtera, PT Benamakmur Selaras Sejahtera, PT Bencoolen Mining (Ex.Injatama, PT) Bende Lembaran Baru, PT Benewa Citra Putra Tabalong, PT Bengalon Limestone, PT Bengawan Readymix, PT Bengkayang Bumi Mineral, PT Bengkulu Bio Energi, PT Bengkulu Mega Steel, PT Bengkulu Utara Gold, PT Benhur Silalahi Sihaloho Bening Cipta Sejahtera, PT Benliz Pacific, PT Benn Prima Coal, PT Benni Tarigan Benny Putra, CV Bentang Terang Abadi, PT Benteng Mas Sejahtera, PT Benua Bara Lestari, CV Benua Etam Coal, CV Benua Inti Global, PT Benua Kayong Sakti, PT Benua Mineral Prima Coal, PT Beny Tunggal, Sdr Berangas Prima South, PT Berati Bina Mineral, PT Berau Bara Abadi, PT Berau Bara Energi, PT Berau Energy Persada, PT Berau Harapan Makmur, PT Berau Indobara Semesta, PT Berau Internasional, PT Berau Inti Bumi, PT Berau Jaya Energi, PT Berau Jaya Perkasa, PT Berau Kasih Energi, PT Berau Multi Pertambangan, PT Berau Prima Coal Indinesia, PT Berau Prima Energi, PT Berau Prima Mulia, PT Berau Prima Nusantara, PT Berau Punan Sejati Energi, PT Berau Pusaka, PT Berau Usaha Mandiri, PT Beri Berkat Inventaris, PT Beringin Alam Raya, PT Beringin Coal Prakasa, PT Beringin Jaya Abadi, PT Berjaya Mineral Kencana, PT Berkah Alam Sentarum, PT Berkah Alam Utama, PT Berkah Alam, CV Berkah Ananda, CV Berkah Banua Alam, PT Berkah Bhumi Abadi, PT Berkah Bumi Banua, PT Berkah Bumi Bertuah, PT Berkah Kencana Sakti, PT Berkah Kerja Bersama, CV Berkah Kutai Perkasa, PT Berkah Pertiwi, CV Berkah Puger Sejahtera, PT Berkah Resourses, PT Berkah Semesta Alam, PT Berkala International, PT Berkat Anugerah Abadi, CV Berkat Anugerah Maju Abadi (1), PT Berkat Anugerah Maju Abadi (2), PT Berkat Anugerah Tama Sejati, PT Berkat Anugrah Sukses Abadi, PT Berkat Bakaratu Jaya Berkat Banua Hampang, PT Berkat Banua Masanggu, PT Berkat Bara Bumi Borneo, PT Berkat Benua Jaya, PT Berkat Bersaudara Nusantara, PT Berkat Bersujud, PT Berkat Bhinneka Perkasa, PT Berkat Borneo Coal, PT Berkat Borneo Energy, PT Berkat Buana Coal, PT Berkat Bumi Kaltim , PT Berkat Bumi Persada, PT Berkat Bumi Waigeo, PT Berkat Cahaya Delima, CV Berkat Cahaya Safrina, CV Berkat Doa Mama, CV Berkat Duta Daya Mahakam, PT Berkat Esa Mining, PT Berkat Granite, PT Berkat Hanjuang Jaya, PT Berkat Ilahi, CV Berkat Indonesia Mandiri, PT Berkat Karya Bersama Mining, PT Berkat Karya Mineral , PT Berkat Koalindo Teweh, PT Berkat Mojang Raya, PT Berkat Mufakat Bersama, CV Berkat Murah Rejeki, PT Berkat Nanda, CV Berkat Nusantara Permai, PT Berkat Pawan Rezeki, PT Berkat Persada Raya, PT Berkat Rezeki Pawan, PT Berkat Rezeki Pawani, PT Berkat Rungan Sejahtera, CV Berkat Sadar, KUD Berkat Sahala Jaya, CV Berkat Satime Raya, PT Berkat Satriya Abadi, PT Berkat Usaha Karya, CV Berlian Cahaya Agung, PT Berlian Indosin Bara, PT Berlian Mahkota Coal, PT Berlin I Rahu Bersama Alam Sentosa, CV Bersama Bara Nusantara, PT Bersama Membangun Negeri, PT Bersama Selalu Makmur Sejahtera, PT Bersama Tapin Persada, PT Bersama, PT Bersatu, CV Bersaudara, CV Beruang Putih, PT Betania Perkasa Mining, PT Betuah, CV Bhakti Abadi Sriwijaya, PT Bhakti Kencana Mandiri, PT Bhakti Martadipura, PT Bhakti Nabila Pratama, PT Bhakti Pertiwi Nusantara, PT Bhakti Pratiwi, CV Bharatindo Minerals Mandiri, PT Bharatindo Minerals Utama, PT Bhineka Bumi, PT Bhineka Exports Intercon Bhineka Handal, PT Bhineka Tunggal Abadi, PT Bhumi Karya Utama, PT Bhumi Perdasa, PT Bhumi Pertiwi Supra Multiguna, PT Bhumi Rantau Energi, PT Bhumi Sriwijaya Perdana, PT Bhumi Swadaya Mineral, PT Bhumi Utama Resources, PT Bhumindo Satahi Marjaya, PT Bhumindo Tambang Jaya, PT Bian Niaga Batuan, PT Bianglala Semesta, PT Bijih Besi Damar Parenggean, PT Bikarindo Sejahtera, PT Billitin Makmur Lestari, PT Billiton Batubara Indonesia, PT Billiton Inti Perkasa, PT Billiton Jaya Utama, PT Billy Indonesia, PT Bima Cakra Perkasa Mineralindo, PT Bima Cakrawala Nusantara, PT Bima Estetika Lestari Tangguh, PT Bima Feroindo, PT Bima Gema Permata, PT Bima Mineral Indonesia, PT Bima Nusa, CV Bima Putera Minerals, PT Bima Putra Abadi Citranusa, PT Bimaruna Abadi, PT Bimex Bengkulu, Pd Bina Alam Karya, PT Bina Alam Sukses, PT Bina Bakti Pertiwi, PT Bina Citra Sawita, PT Bina Daya Inti Mineral, PT Bina Daya Lahan Pertiwi, PT Bina Dompak Indah, PT Bina Energy Marco, PT Bina Indo Raya, PT Bina Insan Anugrah Utama, PT Bina Insan Cipta Mandiri, PT Bina Insan Hamparan Coal, PT Bina Insan Makmur Sentosa, PT Bina Insan Rezeki Mandiri, PT Bina Insan Rezeki Sejahtera, PT Bina Insan Sukses Mandiri, PT Bina Kelinjau Sejahtera, PT Bina Lestari Jaya, CV Bina Makmur Sentosa, PT Bina Nugrahautama, PT Bina Sakti Pertiwi, PT Bina Samudera Makassar, PT Bina Silaba, CV Bina Silaba, PT Bina Usaha Cipta Pratama, PT Bina Usaha Energi, PT Bina Usaha, CV Bina Utama Surya, PT Binabara Bersama, PT Binamitra Sumberarta, PT Binanga Hartama Raya, PT Bintan Bumi Persada, PT Bintan Inti Sukses, PT Bintan Mineral Reources, PT Bintan Mineral Resource, PT Bintan Nusa Multi, PT Bintang Agung Mining, PT Bintang Awai Bersinar, PT Bintang Barito Jaya, PT Bintang Baru Mandiri, PT Bintang Bersaudara Putra, PT Bintang Bima Sakti Indonesia, PT Bintang Bina Mitra, PT Bintang Binamitra, PT Bintang Bulaeng Perkasa, PT Bintang Cahaya Terang, PT Bintang Delapan Energi, PT Bintang Delapan Mineral, PT Bintang Delapan Wahana, PT Bintang Inti Perkasa, PT Bintang Jaya Mandiri, CV Bintang Jaya Mandiri, PT Bintang Jaya Perkasa, CV Bintang Karya Mining, PT Bintang Mas Jaya, PT Bintang Mas Wisesa, PT Bintang Merpati Semesta, PT Bintang Mulia Bara, CV Bintang Mulia Bara, PT Bintang Mulia Prima, PT Bintang Perdana Mandiri, PT Bintang Prima Energi Pratama, PT Bintang Purnama Manggala, PT Bintang Puspita Bumidwipa, PT Bintang Rezeki Pratama, PT Bintang Sebalai, PT Bintang Semesta Alam, PT Bintang Sinar Perkasa, PT Bintang Sumber Semesta Alam, PT Bintang Sumberdaya, PT Bintang Tambang Makmur, PT Bintang Tambang Nusantara, PT Bintang Timur Raya, CV Bintang Timur Selaras, PT Bintang Utama (Sdr. Mohammad Asihin, St), UD Bintang Utama Abadi, PT Bintang Utama Persada, PT Bintangar Maju Abadi, PT Bintani Megahindah, PT Bintara Hardasurya, PT Bintuni Abisha Maden, PT Bintuni Barindo Persada Bintuni Barindo Persada, PT Bintuni Steenkool Prima, PT Binuang Jaya Mulia, PT Binuang Tapin Membangun, CV Binuang Tapin Membangun, PT Birawa Pandu Selaras, PT Biro Tehknik Sinar Baru, PT Bisma Tiga, CV Bismillahi Res Kaltim, CV Bitan Abadi Mining, PT Bito Tirta Anugrah Makmur, UD Biutak Jaya Bersama, PT Biutak Jaya Bersatu, PT Black Diamond Mining, PT Black Gold International, PT Blackcoalindo Alam Energi, PT Blackrock Resources, PT Blantikan Prima Raya, PT Blora Marmer Kusuma, CV Boas Mineral Bersinar, PT Bobi Surahman. Sdr Bogsco, PT Bojong Buana Mineralindo, PT Boksit Bangka Sejati, PT Bola Dunia Mandiri Bola Dunia Mandiri, PT Bolmong Timur Primanusa Resources, PT Boma Prasada, PT Bomboy Central Prima Coal, PT Bonanza, CV Bone Jaya Timor, PT Bonehau Prima Coal, CV Bonehau Prima Coal, PT Bong Soei Tjhioeng Borealis Petromindo, PT Bormas Permata Hijau, PT Borneo Alam Makmur, PT Borneo Alam Mineral, PT Borneo Anugerah Mandiri, CV Borneo Bangun Banua, CV Borneo Bara Persada, PT Borneo Bara Prima, PT Borneo Bara Timur Mandir, PT Borneo Bara Timur Mandiri, PT Borneo Bara Utama, PT Borneo Baraindo Selatan, PT Borneo Brikoks Industri, PT Borneo Cahaya Mulia, PT Borneo Coal Energy, PT Borneo Coal Jaya, PT Borneo Coal Joint Marketing, PT Borneo Daya Mineralindo, PT Borneo Edo International, PT Borneo Emas Hitam, PT Borneo Energi Etam, PT Borneo Energy Etam, PT Borneo Gracia Energi, PT Borneo Green Prima, PT Borneo Indo Mineral, PT Borneo Inter Nusa, PT Borneo Internusa, PT Borneo Inti Persada, PT Borneo Lamandau Ore, PT Borneo Lestari Coal, PT Borneo Lintas Serawak, PT Borneo Mahakam Sakti, PT Borneo Makmur Sejahtera Indocoal, PT Borneo Makmur Sejahtera, PT Borneo Mandau Sakti, PT Borneo Mandiri Mineral, PT Borneo Mega Perkasa, PT Borneo Metalindo Sentosa, PT Borneo Mineral, PT Borneo Minerals, PT Borneo Mitra Baratama, PT Borneo Mitra Sejahtera, PT Borneo Nusantara Jaya Abadi, PT Borneo Omega Jaya, PT Borneo Orbit Sukses Sejati, PT Borneo Pacific, PT Borneo Palma Resources, PT Borneo Persada Lestari, PT Borneo Persada Nusantara, PT Borneo Prima Coal Indonesia, PT Borneo Prima, CV ( Blok I ) Borneo Prima, CV ( Blok Ii ) Borneo Prima, PT Borneo Primamas, PT Borneo Raya Resources, PT Borneo Resource Utama, PT Borneo Resources Persada, PT Borneo Suktan Mining, PT Borneo Surya Abadi, PT Borneo Surya Persada, PT Borneo Tambang Makmur, PT Borneo Tiga Mandiri, PT Borneo Tuah Energy, PT Boroko Goldenia Selaras, PT Boroko Goldenia Synergi, PT Bosawa Mining, PT Bososi Pratama, PT Bosowa Mining, PT Bosowa Pasir Bara, PT Bosowa Tambang Indonesia, PT Bostin Indonesia, PT Bowong Cindea Perkasa, PT Bq Coal Mining, PT Brahma Mining Indonesia, CV Brajamusti Santika, PT Bramaco, PT Bramantio Puta Pratama, PT Bran Indah Sejahtera, PT Brawijaya Bara Abadi, PT Brawijaya Sakti, CV Brayan Bintang Tiga Energi, PT Brian Anjat Sentosa, PT Brian Utama, CV Briando Maju Perkasa, PT Bright Indonesia Perkasa, PT Brilian Alam Sejahtera, CV Brilliant International Marble, PT Brucom Hong, PT Buana Alam Teguh, PT Buana Artha Prima Selaras, PT Buana Bara Ekapratama, PT Buana Bara Indonesia, PT Buana Barakka Abadi, PT Buana Belitung Gemilang, PT Buana Bimo Cahaya, PT Buana Eltra, PT Buana Gelasi, PT Buana Inti Citraprima, PT Buana Karsatama, PT Buana Karya Mandiri, PT Buana Karya Wiratama, PT Buana Minera Harvest, PT Buana Mineral Harvest, PT Buana Rizky Armia, PT Buana Sago Prima, PT Buana Santalum, PT Buana Sarana Tama, PT Buana Sari Arta, PT Buana Sekata Resources, PT Buana Sukses Abadi, PT Buana Surya Manunggal, PT Buana Tambang Jaya, PT Buana Yartha Nickelindo, PT Bubuhan Multi Sejahtera, PT Buchori, Sdr Budhi Dharma Inti Tambang, PT Budhi Inti Karya Tambang, PT Budhi Yoehanto, S.Ph Budi Agung, UD Budi Asih Pusaka, PT Budi Gema Gempita, PT Budi Ginting Budi Luhur, CV (Sdr. H. Ali Rachmat, St) Budi Riyanto Budi Setia Kawan, CV Budiindah Mulia Coal, PT Budiman, CV Budiono, Sdr Budy Asworo. Sdr Buena Konawe Mining, PT Buena Nikelindo Mining, PT Bujang Safri Bukit Abadi Resources, PT Bukit Alam Mandiri, PT Bukit Alam Persada, PT Bukit Anugrah Indah Coal, PT Bukit Arta Makmur, PT Bukit Asam (Persero), PT Bukit Asam(Persero) Tbk, PT Bukit Asam, PT Bukit Baiduri Energi, PT Bukit Bara Alam, PT Bukit Bara Persada, PT Bukit Bara Sejahtera, PT Bukit Batu Alam Mas, PT Bukit Batu Indah, CV Bukit Belawan Tujuh, PT Bukit Betung Sejahtera, PT Bukit Bujai Makmur, PT Bukit Bunea, PT Bukit Cahayamas Indonesia, PT Bukit Damai Cahaya, PT Bukit Enim Energi, PT Bukit Enno Persada Bahari, PT Bukit Fajar Mandiri, PT Bukit Global Abadi, PT Bukit Granit Mining Mandiri, PT Bukit Harapan Utama, PT Bukit Harapan, UD Bukit Indah Borneo, PT Bukit Intan, CV Bukit Iriana Lestari, PT Bukit Kahampi, PT Bukit Lambangsari Makmur, PT Bukit Makmur Istindo Nikeltama, PT Bukit Mallawa Sejahtera, PT Bukit Marmer Indah, PT Bukit Menjangan Lestari, PT Bukit Merah Indah (Blok Iii), PT Bukit Merah Indah, PT Bukit Merah Indah, PT (Blok V) Bukit Moria, PT Bukit Mutiara Hitam, PT Bukit Niaga Nusantara, PT Bukit Nickel, PT Bukit Petai Indah, PT Bukit Pinang Bahari, PT Bukit Prima Perkasa, PT Bukit Raya Coal Mining, PT Bukit Resources, PT Bukit Sepadan Persada, PT Bukit Solasih, CV Bukit Sunur Wijaya, PT Bukit Sunur, PT Bukit Tambi, PT Bukit Telunjuk, PT Bukit Timah, PT Bukit Utama Sejahtera, PT Bukittujuh Sejahtera, PT Buko Aurium Momento, PT Buko Aurium Persada, PT Bukuan Jaya Abadi, CV Bulan Bulaeng Perkasa, PT Bulata Jaya, CV Bulawan Daya Lestari, PT Bulungan Bara Perkasa, PT Bulungan Sumber Sejahtera, PT Bumd Maju Bersama Bumen Abadi, CV Bumen Adiasih, PT Bumi Abadi Lestari, PT Bumi Agung Annusa, PT Bumi Alam Permata Indah, PT Bumi Alam Raya, PT Bumi Alam Semesta, PT Bumi Andalan Persada, PT Bumi Andalas Perkasa, PT Bumi Anugerah Perkasa, PT Bumi Anugrah Nusantara, PT Bumi Anugrah Sejati, PT Bumi Arma Sentosa, PT Bumi Artha Kutaijaya Bumi Artha Kutaijaya, PT Bumi Arya Syam & Syah Resources, PT Bumi Babahrot, PT Bumi Bangka Belitung Sejahtera, PT Bumi Bara Kalteng Energi, PT Bumi Bara Kencana, PT Bumi Bara Makmur Mandiri, PT Bumi Bara Perkasa, PT Bumi Bara Sejati, PT Bumi Barito Abadi Jaya, PT Bumi Barito Mineral, PT Bumi Barito, PT Bumi Berkah Billiton Bumi Bestari Sejahterah, PT Bumi Betuah, PT Bumi Bintang Timur, PT Bumi Borneo Abadi, PT Bumi Borneo Celebes, PT Bumi Borneo Indonesia, PT Bumi Borneo Inti, PT Bumi Buton Delta Megah, PT Bumi Cekeupeul Abadi, PT Bumi Cerah Cemerlang, PT Bumi Cipta Mandiri, PT Bumi Cipta Perkasa, PT Bumi Citra Resources, PT Bumi Coal Sejati, PT Bumi Darma Kutai Bumi Dharma Kencana Bumi Dharma Kencana, PT Bumi Emas Indonesia, PT Bumi Energi Jaya, PT Bumi Energi Kaltim, PT Bumi Energy Kaltim, PT Bumi Enggang Khatulistiwa Bumi Enggang Khatulistiwa, PT Bumi Equator Mineral, PT Bumi Etam Bebaya, PT Bumi Gemilang Perdana, PT Bumi Gunung Emas, PT Bumi Gunung Mas, PT Bumi Halmahera Sejahtera, PT Bumi Halteng Mining, PT Bumi Hamilton Resources, PT Bumi Hero Perkasa, PT Bumi Inabara Utama, PT Bumi Indah Damai Sejahtera, PT Bumi Indah Gemerlap, PT Bumi Indah Kaya Abadi, PT Bumi Indah Sultra, PT Bumi Indo Power, PT Bumi Inti Sulawesi, PT Bumi Jadi Lestari, PT Bumi Jaya Mandiri, CV Bumi Jaya Prima Etam, PT Bumi Jaya, CV Bumi Kaliman Sejahtera, PT Bumi Kalimantan Lestari, PT Bumi Kalimantan, PT Bumi Karsa, PT Bumi Karunia Pertiwi, PT Bumi Karya Indonesia, PT Bumi Kayan Mining Bumi Kayan Mining, PT Bumi Kelingkang Mining, PT Bumi Kemang Persada, PT Bumi Kencana Sentosa, PT Bumi Ketungau Mining, PT Bumi Konawe Abadi, PT Bumi Konawe Jaya, PT Bumi Konawe Minerina, PT Bumi Konawe Mining, PT Bumi Kurnia Abadi, PT Bumi Kutai Mandiri, CV Bumi Lestari Jaya, PT Bumi Makmur Indah Lestari, PT Bumi Makmur Raya, PT Bumi Makmur Sejati, PT Bumi Makmur Selaras, PT Bumi Makmur Waskita, PT Bumi Mas Lestari, PT Bumi Mas Mandiri Bumi Mas Resources, PT Bumi Mas Sejahtera, PT Bumi Matano Indah, PT Bumi Melawi Mining, PT Bumi Menci Batubara, PT Bumi Merapi Energi, PT Bumi Mineral Bersinar, PT Bumi Mineral Perindo Bumi Mineral Perindo, PT Bumi Mineralindo Jaya, PT Bumi Minerindo Ekatama, PT Bumi Morowali Utama, PT Bumi Mulia Sejati, PT Bumi Muller Kalteng, PT Bumi Mura Kalteng, PT Bumi Murau Coal, PT Bumi Natura Permata, PT Bumi Natural Persada, PT Bumi Niaga Kencana, PT Bumi Niaga Lestari, PT Bumi Nikel Bungku, PT Bumi Nusa Pratama, PT Bumi Nusantara Resources, PT Bumi Nusantara Timur Mining, PT Bumi Nusantara, CV Bumi Palong, PT Bumi Pangkep Sumber Sejahtera, PT Bumi Papua Mineral, PT Bumi Paramasari Indo, CV Bumi Pasir Mandiri, PT Bumi Perdana Sempurna, PT Bumi Perkasa Cemerlang, CV Bumi Perkasa Jaya, PT Bumi Permata Hijau, PT Bumi Permata Indonesia, PT Bumi Permata Jaya, PT Bumi Persada Surya Pratama, PT Bumi Pertiwi Energy, PT Bumi Pertiwi Kencana, PT Bumi Pertiwi Makmur Sejahtera, PT Bumi Pertiwi Makmur, PT Bumi Petangis, PT Bumi Petra Sejahtera, PT Bumi Progo Pratama, PT Bumi Raya Makmur Mandiri, PT Bumi Reksa Halmahera, PT Bumi Sakakarya, PT Bumi Sakti Prakarsa Mandiri, CV Bumi Saran Mining, PT Bumi Sarana Beton, PT Bumi Sejati, PT Bumi Sekundang Enim Energi, PT Bumi Selaris, PT Bumi Semesta Lestari, PT Bumi Sentekan, PT Bumi Sentosa Jaya, PT Bumi Sentosa Progress, PT Bumi Sentosa Sejahtera, PT Bumi Shakti, CV Bumi Siantar Pratama, PT Bumi Sintang Mining, PT Bumi Sulawesi Persada Mining, PT Bumi Sumber Berkah, PT Bumi Sumber Karya, PT Bumi Sumber Rejeki, PT Bumi Surya Kirana, PT Bumi Tala Resources, PT Bumi Tilung Persada, PT Bumi Timor Kencana, PT Bumi Timor Resources, PT Bumi Unggul Permai, PT Bumi Waigeo Lestari Jaya, PT Bumi Weda Nikel, PT Bumiartha Mulia, PT Bumiarya Syam&Sayh Resources, PT Bumiayu Karabung Permai, PT Bumiindah Damai Sejahtera, PT Buminata Bara Energi, PT Bumiraya Interasia, PT Bumiraya Utama Industries Logam, PT Bumisedimen Trashindotama, PT Bun Yan Hasanah, PT Bunda Kandung, CV Bundakandung, CV Bunga Bone, CV Bunga Jadi Lestari, PT Bunga Masamba, PT Bunga Raya Lestari, PT Bunga Tambang Nusantara, PT Bungkukan Putra, CV Bungo Bara Utama, PT Bungo Berkah Jaya, PT Bungo Mitha Sejahtera, PT Bungur, CV Burning Power, PT Busra Bersaudara, PT Busur Abadi, CV Butir Mutiara Indah, PT Buton Mulia Resources, PT Buyung Tjoeng Byna Karya, CV Cadika Utama, PT Caesar Duta Karya, PT Cagar Alam Lestari, PT Cahaya Abadi Lestari, PT Cahaya Abadi, CV Cahaya Abalong, PT Cahaya Alam Sejahtera, PT Cahaya Bara Kaltim, PT Cahaya Bara Mulia, PT Cahaya Baru Utama, PT Cahaya Baru, CV Cahaya Barunatama Cahaya Batu Limau, PT Cahaya Batu Mulia, PT Cahaya Bintan Abadi, PT Cahaya Bintang Timur Mineral, CV Cahaya Bulan Sejahtera, PT Cahaya Bumi Pratama, CV Cahaya Bumi, PT Cahaya Cendrawasih Sakti, PT Cahaya Energi Mandiri, PT Cahaya Fajar Abadi, PT Cahaya Fajar Utama, PT Cahaya Gemilang Rizki, PT Cahaya Gemilang Sentosa, PT Cahaya Guang, PT Cahaya Indah Aditya, PT Cahaya Indra Laksana, CV Cahaya Jaya Abadi, PT Cahaya Kalimantan Sejahtera, PT Cahaya Kamal, PT Cahaya Karunia, PT Cahaya Karya Prima, PT Cahaya Lembu Swana, PT Cahaya Mahakam Jaya, PT Cahaya Mandiri Lestari, PT Cahaya Manunggal Abadi, PT Cahaya Meratus Primecoal, PT Cahaya Mineral, CV Cahaya Mineral, PT Cahaya Mulia Amraeni Cahaya Murni Sejahtera, PT Cahaya Nusa Pratama, PT Cahaya Nusa Sulutarindo Cahaya Nusa Sulutarindo, PT Cahaya Permata Nusantara, PT Cahaya Pratama Mandiri, CV Cahaya Saga Utama, PT Cahaya Sakti Abadi, PT Cahaya Sebuku Coalindo, CV Cahaya Selatan Gemilang, PT Cahaya Seppang Bulukumba, PT Cahaya Shora, PT Cahaya Temiang Coal Cahaya Temiang Coal, PT Cahaya Tiara Cahaya Tiara Mineral Cahaya Tiara Mineral, PT Cahaya Tiara Perkasa, PT Cahaya Tiara, PT Cahaya Timur Energy, PT Cahaya Tirta Utama, PT Cahaya Triputra Sakti, PT Cahaya Triwiana, PT Cahaya Wahana Cahaya Wahana, PT Cahaya Wisesa Nusantara, PT Cahaya, CV Cahayaningrat Sukses Makmur, PT Cakra Andatu Sukses, PT Cakra Bara Persada Cakra Bara Persada, PT Cakra Eka Cemerlang, PT Cakra Ekacemerlang, PT Cakra Karya Pratama, PT Cakra Persada Mandiri Jaya, PT Cakra Persada Mandiri, CV Cakra Persada Mandiri, PT Cakramas Gemilang Mandiri, PT Cakrawala Bara Persada, PT Cakrawala Bumi Asri Timur, PT Cakrawala Cendana Putra, PT Cakrawala Kumala Jaya, PT Cakrawala Lintang Abadi, PT Cakrawala Mandiri Sedaya, PT Cakrawala Polaprima, PT Cakrawala Putri Bersama, PT Calidal Capital, PT Calista, CV Camel Indo Permai, PT Camindo, PT Candi Ngrimbi, PT Candiko Perkasa, CV Candra, Sdr Cantung Karya Mitra Mandiri, CV Cantung Karya Mitra Mandiri, PT Carbo Trade Inter Indonesia, PT Cardox Coppercorn Industry, PT Casanamatra Kencana, PT Casava Berkatindo, PT Cata Aspal Tama, PT Catudarsa Global Solution, PT Catur Buwana Artha Investama, PT Catur Indah Agra Sarana, PT Catur Mitra Usaha Lestari, PT Catur Satria, CV Celebes Bone Mineral, PT Celebes Indonesia Marble, PT Celebes Marmerindo, PT Celebes Nickel Indo, PT Celebes Pasific Minerals, PT Celebessi Mulia Utama Cemerlang Bumi Makmur, PT Cemerlang Prima Sukses Sejati, PT Cemerlang Sejahtera Utama, PT Cempaka Alam Bumi Baru, PT Cempaka Artha Buana, PT Cempaka Wulung, PT Cen Amin Mining, PT Cendana Bajabahari, PT Cendrawasih Anugerah Resources, PT Cendrawasih International, PT Cenko Prima Ferro International, PT Centra Bara Indonesia, PT Centra Batura Pratama, PT Central Buana Abadi, PT Central Cipta Murdaya, PT Central Coalindo Utama Central Coalindo Utama, PT Central Korporindo International, PT Central Mandiri Sukses, PT Central Mining Resources, PT Ceriya Zico Utama, PT Cetara Bangun Perkasa, PT Cetara Bangun Persada, PT C-Gong Perkasa, PT Chaido Mega Mineral, PT Chairil Anwar, Sdr Chamid Chandra Gemilang, PT Chandra Jaya, PT Chandra Pratama Sembilan Sembilan, PT Chandra Sakti, CV Chang Sheng Metal Mining Indonesia, PT Charisma Barito Coal, PT Charlie Sapa Prima, PT Chavez Mineral, PT Chemforce Mineral Mandiri, PT Chengyong Chesta Adabi Mulya, CV Chindo Duta Utama, PT Chodra Kurnia Agribindo, PT Choice Plus Energy Petroleum And Minerals, PT Choice Plus Energy, PT Christina Explo Mining, PT Chros International, PT Chuangda Mineral International, PT Cia Internasional, PT Cia International, PT Cianjur Giri Kencana, PT Cibaliung Sumberdaya, PT (Pengalihan Dari Pt. Antam Tbk) Cicatih Putra Sukabumi, PT Cikal Mas Semesta, PT Cikondang Kencana Prima, PT Cikulah Mandiri, CV Cilacap Steel, PT Cinta Jaya, PT Cinta Puri Pratama, CV Cinta Puri Pratama, PT Cipaganti Energi Resources Cipaganti Energi Resources, PT Cipta Anugerah Sakti Cipta Anugrah Permai, PT Cipta Arta Moro, PT Cipta Beton Sinar Perkasa, PT Cipta Bina Reksa, PT Cipta Buana Seraya, PT Cipta Coalindo, CV Cipta Djaya Surya, PT Cipta Hutama Maranti, PT Cipta Jaya Prima, PT Cipta Jaya Sulinda Perkasa, PT Cipta Kalimantan Energy, PT Cipta Link Sejahtera, PT Cipta Mahakam Raya Cipta Mahakam Raya, PT Cipta Mandiri Putra Perkasa, PT Cipta Mineral Bumi Selaras, PT Cipta Mitra Sentosa, PT Cipta Mulia Asia, PT Cipta Nusa Perkasa Sultra, PT Cipta Perkasa Sejati, PT Cipta Persada Mulia, PT Cipta Pilar Sejahtera, PT Cipta Puri Sejahtera, PT Cipta Purna Karya, PT Cipta Sarana Jaya, PT Cipta Tumbuh Cemerlang Mining, PT Cipta Utama Semesta, PT Cipta Wahana Artha Cipta Wahana Artha, PT Cipta Wana Dana, PT Ciptahasta Krasindo, PT Ciptajaya Sulinda Perkasa, PT Ciptarindo Gematama, PT Ciracap Sumber Prima, PT Circa Integra, PT Ciria Putra Energy, PT Cirindo Mining Utama, PT Cis Resources, PT Cita Asri, PT Cita Dasa Prima, CV Cita Mineral Investindo, PT Citatah, PT Citra Afta Perkasa, PT Citra Agung Utama, PT Citra Alam Cahaya, PT Citra Alam Gemilang, PT Citra Alam Sentosa, PT Citra Anak Negeri Gurindam, PT Citra Anugrah Tanamas, CV Citra Arya Sentosa Hutama, PT Citra Bara Prima, PT Citra Bara Raya, PT Citra Baru, CV Citra Batu Perkasa Citra Batu Perkasa, PT Citra Buana Lestari, PT Citra Budi Bina Makmur, PT Citra Bumi Minerindo, PT Citra Dayak Indah Citra Dayak Indah, PT Citra Family Mandiri, CV Citra Family Mandiri, PT Citra Global Arta, PT Citra Indah Matahari, PT Citra Inti Jaya Citra Inti Jaya, PT Citra Katulistiwa Megasawita, PT Citra Katulistiwa Sawit Perkasa, PT Citra Lampia Mandiri, PT Citra Lingga Abadi, PT Citra Manunggal Karsa, PT Citra Manunggal Sena, PT Citra Mentaya Mandiri, PT Citra Metrojaya Putra, PT Citra Mineral Magnetic, CV Citra Mineral Persada, PT Citra Mulia, CV Citra Niaga Nusantara, PT Citra Nuansa Selaras, PT Citra Nusa Jaya, PT Citra Nusantara, PT Citra Nusra Persada, PT Citra Permata, CV Citra Prawita Abadi, PT Citra Prima Kutim, PT Citra Putri, PT Citra Saga Utama, PT Citra Salassa Citra Sarah Buana, PT Citra Sebuku Nusantara, PT Citra Segara Pratama, PT Citra Sekawan Indah, PT Citra Silika Mallawa, PT Citra Sindo Utama, PT Citra Surya Makmur Perkasa, PT Citra Tambang Perkasa, PT Citra Tata Makmur, PT Citra Tobindo Sukses Perkasa, PT Citra Usaha Bersama, PT Citrabara Indonesia Abadi, PT Citrabudi Binamakmur, PT City Energy, PT Clayindo Cakra Jaya, PT Clayindo Pratama, PT Coal Energi Hi Dan Low, PT Coal Iron Synergy, PT Coal Petra Sejahtera, PT Coal Service Management, CV Coal Soil Brik, PT Coalin Intisetia, PT Coalindo Jaya Pratama Coalindo Jaya Pratama, PT Coalindo Lestari Pratama, PT Coastal Pasific Resources, PT Cocoman, PT Coing Dg. Tata, Sdr Comfortindo Bangka, CV Conbloc Indotama Quarry, PT Conisma Energi, PT Conoco Mineral Indonesia, PT Conquest Lautan Mineral, PT Core Mineral Resources Core Mineral Resources, PT Cosmos Bumi Persada, PT Cosmos Inti Mineral, PT Cosmos Inti Persada, PT Cosmos Tata Persada, PT Costal Pasific Resources, PT Cosworth International, PT Cr Indonesia Craytong, PT Crista Jaya Perkasa, CV Cristian Eka Pratama Cristian Putra Cromindo Lestari Nusantara, PT Crown Mining, PT Crystagiri Nusantara, PT Cucu Cynditama Putrindo, PT Cyril Sakti Perdana, PT D.Ratna Dewi W D5 Energy, CV D5 Energy, PT Dac & Co. Ltd Dachtraco Raya, PT Dadan Supardan Dadang Dadi Kayana Abadi, PT Dady Mulyadi. Sdr Dafassanur Utama, PT Dafen Indonusa, PT Dago Mandiri Sejahtera, CV Dagymoi Internusa, PT Dahlia Biru, PT Daka Group, PT Daksa Elang Abadi, CV Dali Anugerah Raya, PT Dallah Fosiina, PT Dallah Fosina, PT Daltu Boyo Mandiri, CV Damai, CV Damanka Prima, PT Damar Energi Wana, PT Damar Utama, PT Damasari Resources, PT Dana Buana Asia, PT Dana Ramakala, PT Danako Pratama, PT Danau Kencana Lestarindo, PT Danau Mas Hitam, PT Danau Permata Mining, PT Danawa Inti, PT Dancomair Sakti, PT Dani Sumber Riski, PT Danpac Resources, PT Dardiri, Sdr Darma Yudha, CV Dasacita Pusaka Prima, PT Dasacta Pusaka Prima, PT Dasar Karya, CV Dasrat Sarana Arang Sejati, PT Dasrat Sarana Arang Sejati, PT (Ex. Penciutan Bukit Asam) Datacon Indojaya, PT Dataran Seko Perkasa, PT Datra Katama Jaya, CV Daun Hijau Lestari, PT Dava Mulia, CV David Bumi Perkasa David Bumi Perkasa, PT Davindo Jaya Mandiri, PT Dawiwa Balantica, PT Daya Bambu Sejahtera, PT Daya Bara Energi Nusantara, PT Daya Bara Nusantara, PT Daya Bumindo Karunia, PT Daya Gumilang Lestari, PT Daya Guna Abadi, CV Daya Inti Mineral, PT Daya Jaya Raya, PT Daya Kalimantan Utama, PT Daya Karya, CV Daya Makmur Perkasa, PT Daya Mandiri Indonesia, PT Daya Mega Pelita, PT Daya Mineral Resources, PT Daya Mitra Sejati, PT Daya Mulia Prima Daya Mulia Prima, PT Daya Panca Mandiri Mulia, PT Daya Permata Delima, PT Daya Pratama Mandiri, PT Daya Sumber Mining Indonesia, PT Daya Taka Kreasi Bersama, PT Daya Utama Sakti, PT Dayacayo Asritama, PT Dayaindo Resources International, PT Dayak Bara Utama, PT Dayak Membangun Pratama, PT Dayakarsa Cakrawala Persada, PT Dayana Cipta, PT Dayat Hidayat Dayatama Mineral Jaya , PT Daypu Mandiri, CV Debora Dan Laurus, CV Dede Surya, PT Dedi Dharmawangsa, Se.M.Si Dedi Rosidi Dedi Rusnaedi Bin Supandi Dedy Mulyadi Dedysuratno, Sdr Defesna Utama, PT Degeuwo, PT Dekalindo Sumber Makmur, PT Dekky Karya Bestari, PT Deky Kreasi Mandiri, PT Delapan Inti Power, PT Delapan Paser Sejahtera, PT Deli Anugerah Raya, PT Delika Tirta Kencana, PT Delma Mineral, PT Delta Alam Sejahtera, PT Delta Bintang Sejati, PT Delta Energi, CV Delta Palma Resources Delta Palma Resources, PT Delta Samudra Delta Samudra, PT Delta Sarana Sentosa, PT Deltamas Persada, PT Dempo Maju Cemerlang, PT Dempo Mitra International, PT Dempo Multi Mineral, PT Dempo Transera Mineral, PT Denfeldo International Denfeldo International, PT Deni Ramdhan. Sdr Denichi Amina Selaras, PT Densuko Naniko, PT Derawan Berjaya Mining, PT Derlan Dermaga Energi, PT Dermaga Pratama Perkasa, PT Dersan Silica Indonesia, CV Desira Guna Utama, PT Development Bumi Energy, PT Devi, CV Dewa Ruci Mandiri, PT Dewa Ruci Mandiri_1, PT Dewa Ruci Mandiri_2, PT Dewi Karya, CV Dewi Mayang Manik, PT Dewi Mayangmanik, PT Dewo Putra, PT Dhafa Trans Line, PT Dhallah Coal Mining, PT Dharma Bintang Nusantara, PT Dharma Buana Karya, PT Dharma Bumi Kendari, PT Dharma Bumi Kolaka, PT Dharma Energi Nusantara, PT Dharma Mulia, CV Dharma Power & Energy, PT Dharma Power Brsama, PT Dharma Prima Coal, CV Dharma Putra Nusantara, CV Dharma Rosadi Internasional, PT Dharma Sejati, CV Dharma Usaha Mas Tunggal, PT Dharmatama Kencana Dharmatama Kencana, PT Dian Anugrah Persada, PT Dian Bara Genoyang, PT Dian Citra Mandiri, PT Dian Indah Perdana, PT Dian Jaya Artha, PT Dian Jaya, CV Dian Jaya, PT Dian Karya Sejahtera, PT Dian Paser, CV Dian Persada Primakarya, PT Dian Purnama, CV Dian Purnawiraswasta Dian Setyowati, Sdr Dianelsa Nusantara Abadi, PT Dianrana Petrojasa, PT Diaz Pratama Utama, PT Dibiya Jaya Perkasa, PT Dicky Larson Suwagio. Sdr Dicky Sondjaya Didi Eko Pramono Dieckson Chandra Dihan Putra Perkasa, PT Dijono, CV. Tri Maju Sejahtera Dika Bhaskara Cakra Indonesia, PT Dika Karya Lintas Nusa, PT Diki Setia Nugraha Dila Adi Saputra, PT Dimas Totabuan, PT Dimensi Keajaiban Global, PT Dimori Jaya, CV Dinamika Aurum Khatulistiwa, PT Dinamika Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Dinamika Selaras Jaya, PT Dinamika Selaras Sejahtera, PT Dinamis Abadi, CV Dinar Kalimantan Coal, PT Dinasty Maha Karya Dinasty Maha Karya, PT Dindin, Sdr Dini Maryani Dipta Iriana Sejahtera, PT Diptaguna Mulyatama, PT Dira Glebova Aditya, PT Dirar Duage Energi, PT Dirgabhakti Giripersada, PT Dita Pratama, CV Diva Dunia Internasional, PT Diva Kencana Borneo Diva Kencana Borneo, PT Dizamatra Powerindo, PT Dj.Putra, CV Djihad Djohar Putra, CV Djoni Ngadio. Sdr Djouw Hoi Liong (Jawandi) Djuwahir Djuwarto Dodam Coal, CV DOF (Dual Oil Field), PT Dof Mining Resources, PT Dof(Dual Oil Field) Dof(Dual Oil Field), PT Domimium Mining, PT Donaldson Filterindo Sentosa, PT Dongin Indonesia, PT Dongsi Surya Mandiri, PT Doni Andika Donna Kembara Jaya, PT Doris Hamid Doty, PT Dpa Mining Indonesia, PT Dragon Pearl International, PT Dravana Engineering, PT Dravara Engineering, PT Driji Kencana, CV Ds Jaya Abadi, PT Dua Dua Kutai Utama, PT Dua Inti Tata Nusantara, PT Dua Karya Abadi, PT Dua Rajawali Proenergi, PT Dua Sahabat Jaya, PT Dua Sekawan Jaya, PT Dua Sekawan, CV Dua Sekawan, PT Dua Tiga Empat, CV Duaji Energi Alam, PT Duaji Energy Alam, PT Dual Oil Field Mining Resources, PT Duamerah, PT Duasatu, CV Dudu Pandu Bhawana. Sdr Duhup Lestari, PT Dul Holil, Sdr Dumie Tille Duna Persada Mandiri, PT Dunia Baru, PT Dunia Mas, CV Dunia Persada Mandiri, PT Dunia Sarana Sejahtera, PT Dunia Usaha Maju, PT Duta Alam Abadi, PT Duta Alam Eka Pratama, PT Duta Alam Ekapratama, PT Duta Alam Jaya, PT Duta Alam Sumatera, PT Duta Bara Utama, PT Duta Basma Inti, PT Duta Borneo Pratama, PT Duta Buana Resources , PT Duta Citra Karindo, PT Duta Daya Kalimantan, PT Duta Daya Mahakam Duta Energy Indonesia, PT Duta Energy Mineratama, PT Duta Energy Transporter, PT Duta Gemilang, PT Duta Gloobalindo Perkasa Jaya, PT Duta Indah Pratama Mamuju, PT Duta Indonesia, PT Duta Indonusa, PT Duta Inti Perkasa Mineral, PT Duta Karya Harita Tambang, PT Duta Karya Raksa, PT Duta Kayana, PT Duta Lestari, Pd Duta Makassar Mining, PT Duta Marmer, CV Duta Mas Bahari, CV Duta Nethindo, PT Duta Nurcahya, PT Duta Nusa Gemilang, PT Duta Pribumi Batauga Duta Prima, CV Duta Putra Bangka, PT Duta Raya, CV Duta Sarana Muda, U.D. Duta Sejahtera 1, PT Duta Tambang Gunung Perkasa, PT Duta Tambang Rekayasa, PT Duta Tambang Sumber Alam, PT Duta Tujuh Bersaudara Sejati, PT Dutadharma Utama, PT Dutam Mineral, PT Dutasura Suryatama, PT Dwi Alfa Sejahtera, PT Dwi Artha Prima, CV Dwi Batu Selaras, PT Dwi Buwana, PT Dwi Ghita Karya Mandiri, PT Dwi Guna Laksana, PT Dwi Joyo, CV Dwi Karsa Mandiri, PT Dwi Karya Cemerlang Dwi Karya Mandiri, CV Dwi Karya Pratama, CV Dwi Mahakarya Pratama Dwi Mandiri Sejahtera, PT Dwi Mitra Auwwalun, PT Dwi Mitra Perkasa, PT Dwi Prima Persada, PT Dwi Putra Anjaya, PT Dwi Sampurna, CV Dwi Tunggal, CV Dwighita Karya Mandiri, PT Dwimitra Enggang Khatulistiwa, PT Dwimitra Multiguna Sejahtera, PT Dwinad Nusa Sejahtera, PT Dwipayana Semesta, PT Dwiprima Usaha Perkasa, PT Dynasti Thamier Dwi Jaya, PT Dzarbasch Indonesia, PT East Mining Indonesia, PT East Rasen Mineral, PT Eastern Global, PT Eastern Tech Global, PT Eastland Stone, PT Eddy Maknawi Edi Sampurna Edi Sultan. Sdr Edi Supriadi Edi Ukurta Ginting Edi,Sdr Edison Liga Edison Liga, Sdr Edulabin Indonesia, PT Edy Sa’ari, Sdr Edy Swanto Bong Efni Efton Nababan Eka Bara Semesta, PT Eka Bhuwana Dirgantara, PT Eka Bumi Indonesia, PT Eka Dwi Panca, PT Eka Dwi Selo Unggul, PT (Sdr. Goenawan) Eka Eksplorasi, PT Eka Gemala Borneo, PT Eka Kurnia Baru, PT Eka Makmur Alam Sejahtera, PT Eka Manunggal Jaya, PT Eka Panca Reksa, PT Eka Pratama Kolut, PT Eka Praya Jaya, PT Eka Sakti, UD Eka Samudera Nusantara, PT Eka Satya Pratama, PT Eka Tambang Utama, PT Ekanusa, PT Ekaswara Gaya Perkasa, PT Ekaswara Sentra Asia, PT Eki Suparman Eko Priyanto Eko Wahyu Prasetyo, Sdr Eko Wahyudi, Sdr Eko Wandoyo Eksa Nusa, PT Eksanusa, PT Eksimulti Guna Mandiri, PT Eksplorasi Indonusa Jaya, PT Elang Matan Aman Sentosa, PT Elang Perkasa Kencana , PT Elang Perkasa Kencana Resources, PT Elang Perkasa Kencana, PT Elang Perkasa Lestari Jaya, PT Elang Perkasa Mining, PT Elang Perkasa Resources Indonesia, PT Electra Global, PT Elga Asta Jaya, PT Elgary Resources Indonesia, PT Elgary Resources, PT Elian Indo Kalteng, CV Elian Indokalteng, CV Elida Sari, CV Elindo Jaya. CV Eling Wahuyu Gunawan Elis Irma Elit Kharisma Utama, PT Elite Bara Prima, PT Ellyas Pikal. Sdr Elok Indah Subur Jaya, PT Elon Sahlan Elsaday Mulia, PT Elsatri Putrindo, PT Eltapetro Servisindo, PT Elynda Jaya, CV Em.Abadi, Sdr Emas Bumi Persada, PT Emas Hitam Coalindo, PT Emas Mineral Murni, PT Embun Pagi, CV Emerald Consulting, PT Emitraco Bumi Nusantara, PT Emitraco Resources, PT Emitracoenergi, PT Empat Sehati, CV Empos, CV Ena Sarana Energi, PT Enam Tunggal, CV Endang Kadarfalah. Se Ende Minera Nusa, PT Endi Energi Amzal Bersama Energi Bara Artha, PT Energi Bara Bersinar, PT Energi Bara Indonesia, PT Energi Bara Lestari, PT Energi Bara Prima, PT Energi Bara Prima, PT (Konsorsium Pd. Muara Energi, PT.Muara Reksa Energi Bara Prima, PT (Konsorsium Pd. Muara Energi, PT.Muara Reksa Cbm, PT. Energi Bara Prima) Energi Batu Hitam Energi Batu Hitam, PT Energi Batubara Lestari, PT Energi Bumi Artha, PT Energi Bumi Jaya Sentosa, PT Energi Bumi Kartanegara, PT Energi Bumi Tapin, PT Energi Dua Rajawali, PT Energi Inti Bara Pratama, PT Energi Krya Kariza, PT Energi Lamandau Mining, PT Energi Mineral Kartanegara, PT Energi Penajam Mandiri, PT Energi Persada Khatulistiwa, PT Energi Prima Sentosa, PT Energi Purnama Duaji, PT Energi Sejahtera Makmur, PT Energi Sukses Makmur, PT Energi Swa Dinamika Muda, PT Energitama Bumi Arum, PT Energy Bumi Tanah Pasir, PT Energy Cahaya Industritama, PT Energy Penajam Mandiri, PT Energy Persada Nusantara, PT Energy Revolution, PT Enermine, PT Enggang Bara Mahakam Enggang Bara Mahakam, PT Enggang Minera Perkasa, PT Engkar Karnawijaya, Sdr Enim Energy, PT Enjeka Feronusa, PT Ennoida Jaya, PT Enok Suakesih Enpeka Tabukan Ferronusa, PT Ephindo Cbm, PT Equator Resources, PT Era Dasa Indonesia, PT Era Energi Mandiri, PT Era Moreco, PT Era Niaga Mandiri, CV Era Perkasa Mining, PT Erabara Persada Nusantara, PT Eramitra Sukses Mandiri, PT Eramus Energindo, PT Eremen Jaya Raya, PT Eri Patria Erlianti Permata Top Indonesia, PT Erlianti, CV Erly Suherly Erman Rasun Ernawati. Sdr Ersa Fatrisyah Pratama, PT Ersindo Pasir Pining Quarry, PT Erwin Jaya Mandiri, PT Erwin Putera Abadi, CV Es Nusantara Indonesia, PT Esa Artha Prima, PT Esa Jaya Abadi, PT Esana Rekhannusa I, PT Esana Rekhannusa Ii, PT Estamo Mandiri, PT Este Tambang Utama, PT Etam Manunggal Jaya, PT Eternal Panelindo Persada, PT Eulis Soraya Harahap Eunindo Usaha Mandiri Blok A Eunindo Usaha Mandiri Blok C Eunindo Usaha Mandiri Blok D Eximart Indonesia Sejahtera, PT Expansi Naga Abadi, CV Expertindo Solusi Pratama, PT Exsyin. Sdr Extraindo, PT Fabrik Komponen Industri Energi, PT Fabrik Komponen Industri, PT Facific Dipta Karya, PT Fadahri Cipta Kencana, PT Faddila Maira Azima, PT Fadlan Mulia Jaya, PT Fadlian Maju Sejahtera Fadlian Maju Sejahtera, PT Fahad Perkasa, PT Fajar Bawah Karaeng, PT Fajar Bhakti Lintas Nusantara, PT Fajar Bumi Sakti, PT Fajar Cemerlang Idaman, PT Fajar Cemerlang Indomulya, PT Fajar Gemilang Sejahtera, PT Fajar Matarape Mining, PT Fajar Mentaya Abadi, PT Fajar Mineral Alami International, PT Fajar Mineralalami International, PT Fajar Sakti Prima, PT Fajar Terang, UD Fajar Tribuana Mining, PT Fajar Ukir Sari, PT Fajar Usaha Sejahtera, PT Fajar Utama Mandiri, CV Fam Motor, CV Famiaterdio Nagara Famili Minera Sejahtera, PT Family Group Family Group, PT Famindo Bumi Khatulistiwa Mining, PT Famindo Dynergy Mining, PT Faminglevto Baktiabadi Fances Kurnia Pratama, PT Fanny Nasri Fanya Mining Invesment, PT Faras Pratama, CV Farhan Fadillah Lestari Farida Mulya Sejahtera, PT Faridz Soewardi. Sdr Farindo Agung, PT Farindo Bersaudara, PT Faris Motor, CV Farliningsih, PT Fasa Prima Coal, PT Fast Financindo, PT Fatah Inti Persada, PT Fatahillah Makmur Perkasa, PT Fathi Resources, PT Fathimatuz Zahro Fattah Minerals, PT Fatwa Bumi Sejahtera, PT Fawwaz Bintang Kreasi Fazar Utama, PT Fendy Gonawan Feng Li Mineral Abadi, PT Feral Anugerah Alam, PT Ferdi Lengkong Ferly Tirta Jaya, PT Feron Tambang Kalimantan, PT Ferto Rejang, PT Feryna Kana Fet Mining Indonesia, PT Feto Serena, CV Fiber Kaken Indonesia, PT Ficorp, PT Fidra Jayatama Mining, CV Fikri Deta Putra, CV Finda Makmur Abadi, PT Findisathia Jaya Makmur, PT Fino Bersaudara, PT Fira Pratama Karya, CV Firdaus Kader Firdaus Maju Sejahtera Firdaus Maju Sejahtera, PT Firma Wahidah Trading&Mining Coy Firman Bersaudara, PT Firman Ketaun, PT Firmansyah Sutrisno. Sdr Firmatama Antang Mulia, PT First Pacific Mining, PT First Target Image, PT Fisi Fernando Sejahtera, PT Fitra Mandiri, CV Fitra Mandiri, Sdr Fitria, CV Floresindo Pratama Putra, PT Fong Fong, Sdr Fontana Resources Indonesia, PT For El Shadai, PT Forel Mega Mineral, PT Formitra Enterprise, CV Formitra Karya Abadi, PT Fortuna Jaya Makmur, PT Fortuna Lateks Marta, PT Fortuna Tunas Mulya, PT Fortune Borneo Resources, PT Franciscus Ang Frans Mangasitua Simanjuntak Fransa Wikarya 2, PT Fransa Wikarya, PT Frarora Mining, PT Fridolin, CV Frilay Energy, PT Fuji H Furinamas Primantara Pt Fusion Excel, PT Futusitta Semesta, PT Gading Kharisma Agungraya, PT Gading Surya Gemilang Nusa, PT Gairah Karya, PT Gajah Mada Palapa Utama, PT Gajah Mada, KUD Gajahmada Palapa Utama, PT Gala Raya Sentosa, PT Galang Artha Buana, PT Galang Bara Nusantara, PT Galang Persada, CV Galang Satria, CV Galatta Lestarindo, PT (Sdr. Suwarto) Galena Djaja, CV Galena Sumber Energi, PT Galena Surya Gemilang, PT Galian Abadi Sejati, PT Galian Bumi Khatulistiwa, PT Galian Endapan Buana, PT Galian Raya, PT Galindo Mining, PT Galtam Sumatera Minerals, PT Galuh Bahari Lestari, CV Gam Ma Mitra Sejahtera, PT Gama Group, PT Gamacipta Prabhawa, PT Gamalama Putra Jaya, PT Gamaloka Indo Mineral Gamaloka Indo Mineral, PT Gambol, CV Gamindra Mitra Kesuma, PT Gamma Mitra Sejahtera, PT Ganda Alam Makmur, PT Ganda Alam Timur, PT Ganda Dinamika, PT Ganda Energi Indonesia, PT Gandang Garantung Mining, PT Gandesite, PT Gane Permai Sentosa, PT Gane Tambang Sentosa, PT Ganesha Delta Permata, PT Ganesha Indo Jaya, PT Ganesha Minerals Jaya, PT Ganesha Rapindo Impex, PT Gangasami Indonesia, PT Gani Mulia, CV Gani, Ms Ganti Frans Gantobi, PT Gapura Adya Sakti, PT Gapura Adyasakti, PT Gapura Alam Mineral, PT Gapura Alam Minerals, PT Gapura Garba Graha, PT Gapura Landak Mineral Gapura Mas Makmur, PT Gapura Utama Mitrajaya, PT Garda Tujuh Buana, PT Garis Emas Selaras, PT Garuda Artha Recoursess, PT Garuda Chindo Fatahillah Perkasa, PT Garuda Chindo Fatahillah, PT Garuda Chindo Makmur, PT Garuda Emas Sentosa, PT Garuda Intan, PT Garuda Sakti, CV Gasindo Karya Mandiri, PT Gasindo Sugih Mandiri, PT Gasing Sulawesi, PT Gatot. Sdr Gaung Alam Semesta, PT Gawi Manuntung, PT Gaya Abadi, CV Gaya Citra Mulia Pratama, PT Gayo Mineral Resources, PT Gea Lestari, PT Gebe Sentra Nickel, PT Gelar Karya Raya, PT Gelinggang Mandiri, Ksu Gelora Mahardika Prima, CV Gelora Muda Perkasa, PT Gema Energy Indonesia, PT Gema Eximindo Sejahtera, PT Gema Karya Kilauan Mineral, PT Gema Kreasi Perdana, PT Gema Nusa Abadi Mineral, PT Gema Nusantara Bhakti, PT Gema Rahmi Persada, PT Gema Ripah Pratama, PT Gema Tass Solution, PT Gemala Borneo Utama, PT Gemari Bumi Pusako, PT Gemilang Jambi Permai, PT Gemilang Jaya Lestari, PT Gemilang Limpah Internusa, PT (Kwartono Iriyanto) Gemilang Mandiri Perkasa, PT Gemilang Perkasa Nusantara, PT Gemilang Sakti Mandiri, PT Gemilang Sumberalam Lestari, PT Gemilang Transenergy Resources, PT Gempang Tangse Mineral, PT Gempita Energi, PT Gempita Panen Raya, PT Gemuruh Karsa Genba Indo Resources, PT Genba Multi Mineral, PT Gendewa Bima Sakti, CV General Energy Bali, PT General Energy Indonesia, PT General Mineral Resources, PT Generasi Agung Perkasa, PT Generasi Muda Bersatu, PT Genesis Berkat Utama, PT Genesis Bumi Kalimantan, PT Genesis International Genesis International, PT Genesis Mineral Borneo, PT Genesis Resources Genesis Resources, PT Genesis Sentra Mineral Genesis Sentra Mineral, PT Genli Erowanto Genta Buana, CV Genta Coal Mining, PT Geo Explo, PT Geo Mining Indonesia, PT Geo Mining Resources, PT Geo Nusantara Jaya, PT Geo Prima Sejahtera, PT Geo Sarana Resources, PT Geobara Karunia Cipta Lestari, PT Geodrill Indonesia, CV Geolava Manunggal Teknik Utama, PT Geolava Manunggal, PT Geolindo Nusa Persada, PT Geomineral Bara Perkasa, PT Geomineral Inti Perkasa Geomineral Inti Perkasa, PT Geominex Mitra Riau, PT Geominex Sapek, PT Geominex Solok Selatan, PT Geominiex Mitra Abadi, PT Geominiex Mitra Kampar, PT Geomining Marmer Alam, PT Geopersada Antonita, PT Geoxplore Indonesia, PT Gerak Kesatuan Bersama, PT Gerbang Anugrah Perdana, PT Gerbang Daya Mandiri, PT Gerbang Kencana Sukses, PT Gerbang Mitra, CV Gerbang Multi Sejahtera, PT Gerinda Laksana Karya, PT Gerindo Laksana Karya, PT Gestafo Sirait Ghanesa Wana Utama, PT Gilang Cempaka Upri, PT Gindojaya Mitra Abadi, PT Gio Kyro, CV Giri Delta Mining, PT Giri Indahandalan, PT Giri Jaya Mukti, PT Giri Manik, CV Girsang Purba Gist Energy, PT Gita Karunia, CV Gle Aceh Makmu, PT Glee Rinder Pratama, PT Global Akses Sinergi, PT Global Artha Perkasa, PT Global Artha Solusindo, PT Global Bara Mandiri, PT Global Borneo Resources, PT Global Bumi Mulia, PT Global Digital Nusantara, PT Global Indah Perkasa Global Inti Mulia, PT Global Karya Indo, PT Global Multi Energi, PT Global Multi Karya, PT Global Pratama Jaya, PT Global Prima Marmer, PT Global Promexindo, PT Global Samudera Atlantik, PT Global Sukses Makmur, PT Global Suksestama International, PT Global Suria Nusantara, PT Global, CV Globalindo Alam Lestari, PT Globalindo Dewata Agung, PT Globalindo Inti Energi, PT Glory Azzumi Internasional, PT Glory Azzumi International Gobisari Utama, PT Gold Telen River, PT Golden Dragon Resources, PT Golden Era Sentosa, PT Golden Gateway Indonesia, PT Golden Global Indonesia, PT Golden Great Borneo, PT Golden Indonesia Energi, PT Golden Pacific Gate, PT Golden Pricindo Indah, PT Golden Propindo Kreasi, PT Golden Season Coal, PT Gora Gahana, PT Gorby Energy, PT Gorby Global Energy, PT Gorby Putra Utama, PT Gored Indonesia, PT Gowa Mandiri (Holding Company), Pd Grace Coal, PT Graha Baratama Nusantara, PT Graha Benua Etam Graha Benua Etam, PT Graha Energi Utama, PT Graha Enim Energi, PT Graha Equity Investment, PT Graha Isitika Utama, PT Graha Istika Utama, PT Graha Jangkaran Mineral, PT Graha Kencana Perkasa, PT Graha Makmur Coalindo, PT Graha Makmur Pratama, PT Graha Mining Utama, PT Graha Mulia Pratama, PT Graha Mulia, PT Graha Multi Energi, PT Graha Nusa Minergi, PT Graha Panca Karsa Graha Panca Karsa, PT Graha Permata Indah, PT Graha Persada Indah, PT Graha Sejahtera Asri, PT Graha Sumber Mining Indonesia, PT Graha Surya Tambang, PT Graha Suryatama Adhicipta, PT Graha Tunggal Tata Persada, PT Graha Utama, CV Grahasetya Bina Daya, PT Gramer, PT Grand Anugrah Jaya, PT Grand Lj Fullerton Succesfull, PT Grand Marmer Alam Serasi, PT Grand Nusantara Lintas Grand Victory Resources, PT Grasada Internatonal, PT Grasada Multinatonal, PT Great Business Group, PT Green Resources Coalindo, PT Griya Citra Nusa, PT Griya Pat Petulai Asri, PT Griya Sumber Setya, PT Grop Pijar, PT Group Rahmat Bersama, PT Grup Pijar Guardian Sejahtera, CV Guci Mas Nusantara, CV Gudang Hitam Prima, CV Guguk Tinggi Coal, PT Gukusu, PT Gumay Prima Energi, PT Gumbira Putra Sejahtera, PT Guna Alam Sentosa, CV Guna Banta, PT Guna Bara Sarana, PT Guna Mulya, CV Guna Utama Indonesia, PT Gunadi Gunajaya Sejahtera Mineral, PT Gunakarya Inti Tambang, PT Gunana Berkat Sejahtera, PT Gunawan, Sdr Gunung Agung Jati Rimba, PT Gunung Angger, CV Gunung Arang Abadi, PT Gunung Bale, PT Gunung Bara Utama Gunung Bara Utama, PT Gunung Batujajar, CV Gunung Berkat Utama, PT Gunung Bintan Abadi, PT Gunung Cahaya Bersama, PT Gunung Dewa Permai, PT Gunung Emas Abadi, PT Gunung Gamelan, CV Gunung Gloria, PT Gunung Harang Sejahtera, PT Gunung Kecapi, PT Gunung Kelabat Citra Abadi, PT Gunung Kencana, CV Gunung Kendaik, PT Gunung Kijang Jaya Lestari, PT Gunung Kulalet, PT Gunung Lebak, CV Gunung Limo, PT Gunung Marmer Raya, PT Gunung Mas Barito, PT Gunung Mas Coalindo, PT Gunung Mas Jaya Indah, PT Gunung Mas Karunia Mining, PT Gunung Mas Panema, PT Gunung Mas Persada Jaya, PT Gunung Mas Persada Mulia, PT Gunung Mas Wesesa, PT Gunung Mulia Mineral, PT Gunung Nyapa, PT Gunung Padakasih, PT Gunung Patsean Sumber Rejeki, PT Gunung Patsean Sumber Rezeki, PT Gunung Persada Mulia, PT Gunung Puncak Salam, PT Gunung Sambug, CV Gunung Sambung, CV Gunung Sampurna Makmur, PT Gunung Selatan , CV Gunung Sion, PT Gunung Sugih Wijaya, PT Gunung Sungkai, PT Gunung Tabur Mas, PT Gunung Tapa Sakti, CV Gunung Timang Abadi, PT Gunung Tua Mandiri, PT Gunung Utama, CV Guruh Putra Bersama, PT Guwa Wijaya, PT H. Abd.Samad. Sdr H. Abdul Gani H. Abdul Ghofur, Sdr H. Abdul Muthalib Harris. Sdr H. Abdul Wahid. Sdr H. Achmad Syaehudin H. Achyar H. Acmad Fadly,Ft H. Adung Setiadi H. Aep Aedy Affandie, Sh, PT H. Ahmad Suhady, Be H. Ahmad Suhady,Be. Sdr H. Aman Munthe H. Amin Permana. Se. Sdr H. Amran Dalimunthe H. Asrul Asing Ngaji (Cv. Abk Mitra Mandiri) H. Aswan H. Bakhtiar Buyung Drs. H. Castono, Sag H. Cece Saepudin H. Dadang Efendi H. Dede Tatang S, Sdr H. Deny Darmatin H. Djamhur Gandapura H. Dony Wirawah, Sh H. E. Suherman, Sdr H. Encep Riyanto H. Endang Abdul Malik H. Endang Kuswan H. Ende H. Endin Zaenudin Drs. H. Ending Syamsudin. Sdr H. Epet Syamsudin. Sdr H. Epetsyamsudin. Sdr H. Habibunas H. Hamzah. Sdr H. Hanafi Tata H. Ibramsyah H. Irpan Akhmad Magental, Sdr H. Ishak Idris, Se , Sdr H. Iskandar Nasution H. Ismu Widodo, Sdr H. Iyas H. Jufri Dg. Ratte H. Juherna, Sdr H. Karnawi, Sdr H. Kaswandi,Sdr H. Khusni Mubaroch H. Kurnain H. Kuwat, Sdr H. Laenre H. Lili Holili H. M Baldut, Sdr H. M Pariyo H. M. Amin Thohari Drs. H. M. Azis Yakub H. M. Sahlan H. M. Sucipto H. M.Ahmad.Sdr H. M.Eko Djunaedi, St H. M.Karnoto H. M.Tahir Pady Drs. H. Mahmuddin. Dm. Sdr H. Marsuki. Sdr H. Masran H. Masjuhur, Skn H. Mat Yatim H. Moch Ali Akbar H. Moch.Ni’am H. Mochamad Sobandi H. Mochammad Erland Suherlan H. Muchlis Ahmad Drs. H. Muh.Arsyad. Sdr H. Muh.Tahir,Spd. Sdr H. Muhammad Taher, PT H. Najidi H. Oom Supriatna. Se H. Opendi H. Permadi H. Rochmat, Sdr H. Ruhyat, Sdr H. S. Afandi, Sdr H. S.Afandi H. Samad. Sdr H. Samsuddin Dennu H. Sasu Saja Mangki H. Soewandy Janggo H. Sudjinah H. Sulaeman. Sdr H. Syaiful H. Syaripudin Heryansyah H. Tabroni H. Tajuddin H. Taufik Hidayat H. Tb. Dasep Ips, Sh, Be, Msc Drs. H. Ujang Sutisna H. Usup H. Uyun Yudibrata, Sh H. Warno Mawardi H. Waskim, Sdr H. Yusriansyah Drs. H. Zaenal Mustafa. Sdr Hadeku Indo Jaya, PT Hadi Mulyo Hadianor, Sdr Haerana. Sh. Sdr Haeruddin Acco. Sdr Hafidah Rauf Basyuri, St Hafidz Qalam Nurjaman (Cv. Tera Sanca) Haide Jaya, PT Haini Haka Coal, PT Hakian Wellem Rumansi, PT Hakul Yakin Halaban Primavestama, PT Halil Halim Pratama, PT Halim Sanjaya. Sdr Halimon Meugah Raya, PT Halis Utama, CV Hallim Pratama, PT Halmahera International Resources, PT Halmahera Jaya Mining, PT Halmahera Sentra Mineral, PT Halmahera Sukses Mineral, PT Haltim Mining, PT Haltim Nusantara Perkasa, PT Ham Jaya, PT Hamaparan Anugrah Abadi, PT Hamparan Alam Nusantara, PT Hamparan Anugrah Abadi, PT Hamparan Arta Sentosa, PT Hamparan Batu Hitam, PT Hamparan Hijau Cemerlang, PT Hamparan Hijau Lestari , PT Hamparan Indah, PT Hamparan Karunia, PT Hamparan Mulya, PT Hamparan Pasir Besi, PT Hamparan Pasir Nusantara, PT (An Cece Kadarisman) Hamparan Rachmat, PT Hamparan Rezki Semesta, PT Hamparan Sejahtera Abadi, PT Hamparan Subur Sejahtera, PT Hamparan Sumber Energi, PT Hamrani Hamzah Dg.Masserang Han Jun Ic, PT Hanaka Farmasindo, PT Handayani Gemacitra, PT Handayani, UD Hanjaya Beltim, CV Hanson Coal Energy Hanson Coal Energy, PT Hanson Energy, PT Hanur Abadi, PT Hanusentra Argo Selo, PT Hap. Pd Happy B. Mansawan, Sdr Harapan Baru Papua Jaya, PT Harapan Binuang Muda, CV Harapan Chindo, PT Harapan Kalimantan Jaya, PT Harapan Kota Tepian, PT Harapan Makmur, CV Harapan Mandiri, PT Harapan Rimba Lestari, PT Harapan Tunggal Daya, CV Harda Nusa Abadi, PT Hardiatul Isyal, CV Hardiyan, Drs Harfa Taruna Mandiri, PT Harfia Graha Perkasa, PT Harfiah Graha Perkasa, PT Hargosari Golden Mining, PT Hari Karya. Kpp Hari Perkasa, CV Hari Pramadelima, Sdr Hari Rukun, CV Hariadi. Sdr Harindo Wahana Harindo Wahana, PT Haris Jaya, CV Haris Raya, CV Haris Subyakto. Sdr Harisa Mulia Mandiri, CV Harisindo Batu Mulia, PT Harita Multi Karya Mineral, PT Harita Prima Abadi Mineral, PT Harjo Mas Makmur, PT Harkat Bara Mulia, PT Harkat Utama Mulia Mandiri, PT Harma Nusa Mineral, PT Harmoni Stone Trading, PT Harsco Mineral, PT Harta Hadir Mining & Resources, PT Hartanto Hartati Nan Jaya, CV Hartono Drs. Hartono. Sdr Harum Cahaya Mandiri, CV Harum Cendana Abadi, PT Harum Indo Mineral, PT Harum Mukti Lestari, PT Harum Sarana Mining, PT Harum Sukses Mining, PT Harun Warsito Harun. Sdr Hasa Cipta Gemilang, PT Hasal Logam Pratama, CV Hasan Budiman. Sdr Hasanuddin Hasil Alam Gemilang Pratama, PT Hasil Alam Sukses Pratama, PT Hasil Alam Tanggam Us, PT Hasil Bumi Persada, PT Hasil Kharisma Alam, PT Hasil Tambang Raya, PT Hasil Tambang, PT Hasil Usaha Mandiri, PT Hasil Usaha Pertambangan, CV Hasilindo Sukses, PT Hasilindo, Sukses, PT Hasim Hasma Reksa Graha, PT Hasnur Jaya Utama, PT Hasrul Mega Batubara, PT Hasta Karya Mega, PT Hasta Karya Megacipta, PT Hasta Mulia Jaya, PT Hasta Mundra, PT Hasta Pasir, PT Hastabuana Mandiri, PT Hasuki, PT Haswi Kencana Indah, PT Hasyim Syailendra, Sdr Hati Raya Jaya, PT Hawila Tambara Makmur, PT Helium Tiga, PT Hendri Tjhie, Sdr Hendrik Boentoro Tonoyo, Sdr Hendrik Buntoro Tanoyo Hendro Bagiono Hendrx International Mineral, PT Hengjaya Mineralindo, PT Hengjaya Nickel Utama, PT Henhen Suhendar Hera Timor Perkasa, PT Heri Adi Cahyono. Sdr Heri Eko Junianto. Sdr Heri Sariyanto Heri Wahyono Herlina Herlina, CV Herman Sugiarto Djioen.Sdr Hermina Jaya, PT Hernas Putra Prima, PT Hero Ceramas, PT Hero Progres International, PT Herry Suwardi Heryano, Sdr Heryantana Abadi Mandiri, PT Hetty Kosim Hexo Prima Utama, PT Hi Suyono Hi. Suyono Hibualamo Jaya, PT Hidayatul Mukarramah, PT Hidup Hidayah Ilahi, CV Hidup Kumala, CV Hijrah Nusatama, PT Hikmah Hikmah Jaya Abadi, CV Hikmat Tama Usaha Mandiri, PT Himco Coal, PT Himko Coal , PT Himko Coal, PT Hiremasa Indonesia, PT Hirzan Raya, CV Hirzan Raya, PT Hiu Tjin Kian Hiyejo Indogold, PT Hj. Alimah, Sdri Hj. Bungaria Hj. Enok Wahyu Hj. Hamidah Tri Irianti, Sdri Hj. Hasmawati Dg Bau Hj. Lendarwati Hj. Lilies Tutik Andriani,Se Hj. Marlia Adriana Hj. Nurul Faizah Indra Zp Hj. Rosdiana. Sdr Hj. Siti Maysaroh Hj. Sri Mulyati, Sdri Hj. Turiah. Sdri Hj. Wida Sariningsih Hj. Yenni Heryeni Hobby Mining, PT Hoffmen International, PT Hoffmen Mineral Perkasa, PT Holcim Beton, PT Holcim Indonesia Tbk, PT Hong Tai Mining, PT Horna Inti Mandiri, PT Hoya Perkasa Sentosa, PT Hpm Beltim, CV Htn Rudi Bersaudara Berkah Sekumpul, PT Huang Bang, CV Huayu Wijaya Indonesia, PT Huma Amaz Indonesia, PT Huma Betang Indah, PT Husny Lee Mining, PT Hutama Mitra Nusantara, PT Hutamas Koado, PT (Ex Pt. Sarolangun Bara Prima) Hutan Kalimantan, PT Hwl Construction, PT I Ketut Dayuh I Ketut Merthadiana I Komang Darta I Komang Degdeg I Made Sujana, Bae / Karya Nirmala Utama, PT I Nengah Subrata I Nyoman Jangkrik I.A. Ngewa Ibnu Abbas Dt.Mangkuto Ibnu Hajar Barokah, CV Ibrahim, Sdr Icci, PT (Sdr. Erwin Kristanto) Ida Laelin Sururoh. Sdr Ida Suci Relawati, Sdr Idola Geosindo Corporation, CV Idola Geosindo Corporations Idzhar Perdana, CV Ifishdeco, PT Igasar, PT Ika Trias Serangkai, PT Ikatrio Sentosa, PT Ikhlas Jaya Karya Nusa, PT Ikhlas Membangun, KUD Ikhtiar Prima Mix, PT Iking E. Buhoy, Sdr Iksan Suganda, Sdr Ilham Fajar Pratama, PT Illumine Zirkon Indonesia, PT Imaaskojaya Bhumipersada, PT Imam Daroni, Sdr Imam Romli. Sdr Imam Sukatno, Sdr Imam Wahono Septiawan Imasco Pasific Minerals, PT Impian Cipta Bintan Sukses, PT Imporco Timur Angkasa, PT Ina Abacus Mining, PT Ina Multi Akses, PT Ina Touna Mining, PT Inarjo, Sdr Inasia Tambang Jaya, PT Indabharath, PT Indah Husada, PT Indah Jaya Abadi Pratama, PT Indah Maju Sejahtera Indah Maju Sejahtera, PT Indah Mulia Kereng Pangi, PT Indah Nambara, PT Indah Permata Hati, CV Indah Sari, CV Indah, CV Independent Capital Asia, PT Indiana Nusa Alamindo, CV Indita Pertama, PT Indo Asia Kunyu Mining, PT Indo Bahari Jaya, PT Indo Bangun Mineral, PT Indo Bara Bagas Jaya, PT Indo Bara Niaga Adhipradhana, PT Indo Bara Patria, PT Indo Bara Pratama, PT Indo Besi Energi Utama, PT Indo Bumi Nickel, PT Indo Bumi Perkasa, PT Indo Butirima, PT Indo Coal Mineral, PT Indo Coal Permata, PT Indo Display Multycreation, PT Indo Energi Alam Raya, PT Indo Energi Kaltim Indo Energi Kaltima, PT Indo Felspart, CV Indo Gastia, PT Indo Hana Mandiri, PT Indo Inti Sejahtera, PT Indo Jaya Prima, PT Indo Kurnia Mineral, PT Indo Makmur Jaya Sentosa, PT Indo Meter Abadi, PT Indo Meter Jaya, PT Indo Meter Perkasa, PT Indo Mineral Nusantara, PT Indo Mineralita Prima, PT Indo Mineratama, PT Indo Mining Resources, PT Indo Mining Resourcs, PT Indo Mining, PT Indo Mitra Mulya, PT Indo Modern Mining Sejahtera, PT Indo Multi Cipta, PT Indo Multi Niaga, PT Indo Nikel Karya Pratama, PT Indo Pal, CV Indo Pancadasa Agrotama, PT Indo Perkasa Usahatama, PT Indo Perkasa, PT Indo Putra Bersama, PT Indo Sinorang Resources, PT Indo Snl, PT Indo Solusi Utama, PT Indo Sraya Putra, PT Indo Surya Moreco, PT Indo Tai International, PT Indo Tambang Sukses, PT Indo Wana Bara Mining Coal Indo Wana Bara Mining Coal, PT Indoasia Cemerlang, PT Indobagus Lestari, PT Indobaru International, PT Indoberkah Jaya Mandiri, PT Indocement Tunggal Perkasa, PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk, PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa, PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa, Tbk Indoclay Sejati, PT Indoco Mineral Resources, PT Indocolnas Borneo, PT Indocolnasborneo, PT Indocomjaya Mulia Perkasa,Py Indocomjaya Muliaperkasa, PT Indokal Prima Jaya, PT Indoku Amiah Coal, CV Indoku Amiah Coal, PT Indoku Sebamban Coal, PT Indolama Tarzan Perkasa, PT Indolime Prima Mitra, CV Indoloma Tarzan Perkasa, PT Indomarmer Kuari Utama Indomarta Multi Mining, PT Indomas Karya Jaya, PT Indomas Mineral Utama, PT Indomas Utama Jaya, PT Indomega Dirgasakti, PT Indomin Prima International, PT Indomineral Citra Persada, PT Indomineral Multi Pratama, PT Indomineral Resources, PT Indomineral Utama Sejahtera, PT Indominerals Citra Persada, PT Indominers Sukses Pratama, PT Indomining Karya Buana, PT Indomining Pratama, PT Indonesia Batu Prima Energi, PT Indonesia Batubauksit Bajarau, PT Indonesia Bina Mineral, PT Indonesia Camcocrown Chemical Industry (Pt. Icci) Indonesia Chemical Alumina, PT Indonesia Damai, PT Indonesia Ekaristi Alpha Indonesia Ekaristi Alpha, PT Indonesia Mas Mulia, PT Indonesia Mineral Dan Energy, PT Indonesia Multi Energi, PT Indonesia New Era Internasional, PT Indonesia Pacific Energy, PT Indonesia Riau Sri Avantika, PT Indonesian Mineral & Coal Mining, PT Indonusa Inti Perkasa Tambang, PT Indonusa Prima Sentosa, PT Indopenta Jaya Sukses, PT Indoprima Alam Marmer Industri, PT Indosin Energy Co, PT Indosinga Stonepratama, PT Indostar International Indonesia, PT Indotala, PT Indotama Mineral Indonesia, PT Indotan Lombok Barat Bangkit, PT Indotan Sumbawa Barat, PT Indotex Pratama Jaya, PT Indra Indra Berjaya, CV Indra Berjuang, CV Indra Mandiri, CV Indra Putra Indra Sakti, CV Indra Sapta Rahayu, PT Indrabakti Mustika, PT Indragiri Bumi Resources, PT Indragiri Energy Lestari, PT Indragiri Energy Utama, PT Indraldhi Bumi Anoa, PT Industri Marmer Indonesia Tulungagung, PT Industri Mineral Indonesia, PT Industri Tambang Utama, PT Infiniti Pacific Mining, PT Infraenergia Buana Utama, PT Ingrid Y. Fulamri Injatama, PT Inkalindo Manunggal, PT Inkalko Agung, PT Inkobe Mitra Intra, PT Inosensius, Sdr Drs. Insan Marmeril, PT Inspirator Indonesia International, PT Intam, PT Intan Banjar Anugerah, CV Intan Bara Kaltim, CV Intan Berdikari Group, PT Intan Borneo International, PT Intan Bumi Persada, PT Intan Hitam Synergy, PT Intan Karya Mandiri, CV Intan Perkasa Lestari, PT Intan Permata Utama, PT Intan Prima Besari, PT Intan Prima, PT Intan Sari Ampo Jaya, PT Intan Sari Prakarsa, PT Intech Prima Design, PT Integra Mining Nusantara, PT Integra Prima Coal, PT Integra Service Nusantara, PT Integra Services Nusantara, PT Integra Technology Nusantara, PT Integrate Indonesia, PT Inter Niaga Graha, PT Intercon Jaya Maju, PT Intermitra Selaras Unggul, PT Internasional Coal Abadi, PT Internasional Peperla Nusantara, PT Internasional Prima Coal, PT International Mining Jaya, PT Internusa Listelindo, PT Inti Bara Nusalima, PT Inti Bara Pelita, PT Inti Bara Perdana, PT Inti Baratama Anugerah Prima, PT Inti Bisnis Utama, PT Inti Buana Indah Selaras, PT Inti Bumi Andalas, CV Inti Bumi Katingan, PT Inti Bumi Luhur, PT Inti Bumi Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Inti Bumi Selaras, PT Inti Bumi Sukses Perkasa, PT Inti Bumi, CV Inti Buton Resourch, PT Inti Cemerlang, PT Inti Cipta Jaya Tambang, PT Inti Citra Mandiri, PT Inti Dabo Energi, PT Inti Global Resources Inti Global Resources, PT Inti Jaya Nusantara Inti Jaya Nusantara, PT Inti Jaya Prima Coal Inti Jaya Prima Coal, PT Inti Kaltim Prima Mandiri, PT Inti Karya Polman, PT Inti Kreasi Abadi, PT Inti Mineral, CV Inti Murni, PT Inti Nusa Permata, PT Inti Parama Persada, PT Inti Perdana Prima Coal Inti Perdana Prima Coal, PT Inti Sari Bumi Sidenreng, PT Inti Sinergy Internasional, PT Inti Stania Prima, PT Inti Tiga Berlian Mulia, PT Intialam Buana Raya, PT Intialam Buanaraya, PT Intibuana Indah Selaras, PT Intim Jaya Karya, PT Intim Mining Sentosa, PT (Ex.Lasindo Bintang Sejahtera, PT) Intim Mining Sentosa, PT (Ex.Lasndo Bintang Sejahtera, PT) Intim Resources, PT Intiputera Bumijaya, PT Intiputera Kanaan, PT Intisuperindo, PT Intu Bara Mandiri Intu Bara Mandiri, PT Investa Pratama Intikarya, PT Investama Resources, PT Investasi Mandiri, CV Investmine Nusa Persada, PT Iqbalindo Sukses, PT Ir. Ahmad Saukani Arifin Ir. D. Sopian Nuriansyah Ir. H. Achmad Sharadin Ir. H. Sumargono. Mm Ir. I Ketut Wiadnya Ir. Jong Hana, Sdr Ir. M. Hadiyanto Ir. Pantun Aritonang Ir. Sadiman Ir. Umar Faruk Tedjasukmana Ir. Wawan Mustiawan Ir.Wibawa Luih Ira Nuraidah. Sdr Irfan Jaya Utama, CV Irja Jaya Bumi Papua, PT Irja Tambang Perkasa, PT Irpau Hero, CV Irtanaz Ferro Magnetic, PT Irvan Prima Pratama, PT Irwan Darmawan,Sdr Irwan Ritonga Irwandi Dg Lapang Isa Hidayat. Sdr Isco Iron, PT Isco Polman Resources, PT Isep Nandang Suryadi Iska Afriza, Sdr Iskandar Muda Mining, PT Iskandar Unjung Istaka Karya, PT Istana Mas Trading, PT Istarinda Utama, PT Istindo Mitra Perdana, PT Itamatra Nusantara, PT Itikurih Hastari, PT Iwan Mining, PT Iwan Ruchiyat Purnama Iwan, CV Iyet Kusmayati Jabel Tri Bersaudara, PT Jadi Jaya Coal, CV Jaenal Abidin. Sdr Jaenudin Sdr Jag Miningindo, PT Jagad Mahesa Karya, PT Jagad Raya Tama, PT Jago, UD Jailani Jaimin B.V Sihotang Jajat Sudrajat Jalahan Batubara Prima, PT Jalalindo Mulia, PT Jalan Bara Sukses, PT Jalin Inti, PT Jalunatu, CV Jalur Sutra, PT Jamalindo Indah, PT Jambi Gold, PT Jambi Prima Coal, PT Jambi Resources, PT Jamil. Sdr Jamrud Prima Citra, CV Jangkar Prima, CV Jangkar Prima, PT Jangkat Jaya Japalindo Nuansa Nusantara, PT Japinar Siburian Jara Silica, PT Jasa Alam, CV Jasa Ananda, CV Jasa Andhika Raya, PT Jasa Mitra, CV Jasa Mulia Mandiri, CV Jasa Pertiwi, CV Jasa Sarana, PT Jasa Tambang Nusantara, PT Jasman Rajaang Jasmaniah, CV Jassmas, PT Jaswadi. Sdr Jatelco, PT Jati Baru, PT Jati Kencana, CV Jati Kusuma, CV Jatikawi Group, CV Jatikawi Pramudhita, PT Jatikawi Pramuditha, PT Jatropha Bangkit Perkasa, PT Jatus Inti Persada, PT Java Hunian, CV Java Pro Tam, PT Javindo Sukses Makmur Javindo Sukses Makmur, PT Jawa Indah Indo Utama, PT Jaya Abadi Lestari, CV Jaya Abadi Lestari, PT Jaya Abadi Semesta, PT Jaya Afta Borneo, PT Jaya Agtas Utama, PT Jaya Anugerah Mandiri, PT Jaya Asih. Pd Jaya Bangun Karsa, PT Jaya Bangunan, PT Jaya Buana Mandiri, PT Jaya Cipta Pratama Mandiri, PT Jaya Gemilang Utama, PT Jaya Kanigara, PT Jaya Karya, CV Jaya Manggala Sakti Jaya Manggala Sakti, PT Jaya Mineral, PT Jaya Mining Energi, PT Jaya Mining Energy, PT Jaya Multi Usaha, PT Jaya Mulya Utama, CV Jaya Prima, CV Jaya Progo Santosa, PT Jaya Raya, CV Jaya Sakti Energi, PT Jayakhisma Globe Indonesia, PT Jayanti Prima Coal, PT Jeatrio Maroso, PT Jeconiah Jaya, PT Jeffry Tando Jeisico Jeisico, PT Jejamo Menjak Sejahtera, PT Jejamo Menjak Sengawari, PT Jelai Cahaya Minerals, PT Jelajah Maritim Nusantara, PT Jembayan Muarabara, PT Jessly Tambang Minerals Jetstar, PT Jhon Asmar Jhoni Setabudi Efendi Jhonlin Coal Mining, PT Jhonny Gandaria Jhoswa Graha Wiranusa Jhoswa Graha Wiranusa, PT Jhoswa Mahakam Mineral, PT Jhoswa Premium Energi Jhoswa Premium Energy, PT Jibra Minerals, PT Jitan Coal, PT Jo Heng Tjau (Hengkychandra) Jo Peng Thiang (Eddy Ranti) Joggi Join Mandiri Sukses, PT Jojo Bersama, PT Joko Panut Joko Santoso. Sdr Joloi Jaya Energi, PT Jombang Makmur, Ksu Jonavin Barito Abadi, PT Jong Hana . Sdr Jonson Sembiring Joppa Central Jaya, PT Jourdi Anabella, PT Joy Vyn Multi Media, CV Joyehi Indoresources, PT Juari Julaeni Juliadi, Sdr Drs. Juliadi,Sdr Juloi Gold, PT Juman Jumari. Ts Junike Somarani, Sdr Junus Haning Jupiter Mining, PT Jupri Marabunta Juraidin Aziz, Sdr Jusman. Drs Justindo, PT Juwana Utama Perkasa, PT Juya Aceh Mining, PT Juyomi Sinar Labuan, PT Jwalita, CV Kabaena Kromit Prathama, PT Kabaena Listari Utama, PT Kabina, CV Kadhaton Prima Coal, PT Kaharap Asi Anugerah, PT Kahayan Dharman Nusantara, PT Kahayan Mineral, PT Kahayan Miri Kuarsa, PT Kahayan Permai, CV Kahias Kedaton, PT Kajoran Patra Utama, PT Kalabbirang Marmer Lestari, PT Kalam, CV Kalbar Mining Indonesia, PT Kalbar Prima Coal, PT Kalbar Prima Mineral, PT Kalbar Prima Minerals, PT Kalbara Energi Pratama, PT Kalibar Energy Resources, PT Kalimantan Anugrah, PT Kalimantan Baratama Nusantara, PT Kalimantan Berkah Inti Tambang, PT Kalimantan Bovia Maloiindo, PT Kalimantan Bovia Moloiindo, PT Kalimantan Coal Resoaurce, PT Kalimantan Coal Resource, PT Kalimantan Energi Bara, PT Kalimantan Energi Utama, PT Kalimantan Heritage Coal, PT Kalimantan Heritage Coal_1, PT Kalimantan Jaya Energy, PT Kalimantan Jaya Mandiri, PT Kalimantan Kilauan Mineral, PT Kalimantan Mining And Mineral, PT Kalimantan Mining Jaya, PT Kalimantan Persada Coal, PT Kalimantan Power Stone, PT Kalimantan Prima Coal, PT Kalimantan Prima Nusantara, PT Kalimantan Prima Persada, PT Kalimantan Raya Resources, PT Kalimantan Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Kalimantan Sumber Energi, CV Kalimantan Sumber Makmur, PT Kalimantan Surya Kencana, PT Kalimantan Usaha Sejahtera, PT Kalla Arebamma, PT Kalmin Adi Makmur, PT Kalmin Lestari, PT Kalmin Sentosa, PT Kalmin, PT Kalnesia Jaya Kalnesia Tunggal Persada Kalpin Banurea Kaltara Mandiri, PT Kalteng Bara Persada, PT Kalteng Emas, PT Kalteng Megah Abadi, PT Kalteng Nalito, PT Kalteng Resources, PT Kaltim Arta Pusaka Kaltim Arta Pusaka, PT Kaltim Batu Hitam Kaltim Batu Hitam, PT Kaltim Batumanunggal, PT Kaltim Bio Energy Kaltim Bio Energy, PT Kaltim Chindo Prima, PT Kaltim Citra Alzena, PT Kaltim Global, PT Kaltim Jaya Bara, PT Kaltim Jaya Mineral, PT Kaltim Mineral, PT Kaltim Nusantara Coal, PT Kaltim Sentral Asia Kamalindo Sampurna, PT Kamaruddin Rajagukguk Kamayu Biswa Ardita, PT Kami Kawa Gawi Sabumi, PT Kamikawa Gawi Sabumi, PT Kamiruddin Kampit Tin Utama, PT Kampuri Sukses Makmur, PT Kamsidi Kana Global Energi, PT Kanaan Mineral, PT Kanaan Resources, PT Kanawa Mandiri, PT Kangkung Prima, CV Kapidis Rasyid Kapitalindo Management, PT Kapuas Bara Minerals, PT Kapuas Bara Nusa, PT Kapuas Bara Utama, PT Kapuas Energy Nusantara, PT Kapuas Energynusantara, PT Kapuas Mining Makmur, PT Kapuas Persada Prima, PT Kapuas Prima Coal, PT Kapuas Raya Energi, PT Kapuas Tunggal Persada, PT Kara Elmas Madenleri, CV Kara Elmas Madenleri, PT Karang Purnama Jati, PT Karangjuang Hijau Lestari, PT Karbala Buana Jaya, PT Karbindo Abesyapradhi, PT Karbon Mahakan, PT Kardianto Karima Siriwo Jaya, PT Karimun Mining Blok B Karimun Mining Blok C Karindangan, PT Karisma Mandiri Utama, PT Karisma, CV Kariwaya Perkasa, CV Karmini. Sdr Kars Indonesia Mandiri, PT Karsa Alam Sentosa, PT Karsa Berkah Abadi, PT Karsa Cipta Persada, PT Karsa Jaya Cemerlang, PT Karsa Karyawangi, PT Karsa Sumber Raharja, PT Karsatama Alor Prima, PT Karsono, Sdr Kartanegara Coal Mining, PT Kartanegara Inti Utama, PT Kartanegara Perkasa, CV Kartika Adijaya Lestari, PT Kartika Chandar, CV Kartika Chandra, CV Kartika Jaya Bestari, PT Kartika Mining Celebes, PT Kartika, CV Kartono Karuhei Tatau, PT Karunia Abadi, CV Karunia Akbar, PT Karunia Alam Abadi Cianjur, PT Karunia Alam Indonesia, PT Karunia Alam Waigeo, PT Karunia Batara, PT Karunia Bumi Sejahter, PT Karunia Bumi Sejahtera, PT Karunia Ilahi Insan Sejahtera, PT Karunia Indonusa, PT Karunia Karsa Widya, PT Karunia Mitra Abadi, PT Karunia Sanjaya Makmur, PT Karunia Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Karunia Semesta Raya, PT Karya Agung Pratama Megah Lestari, PT Karya Alam Raya, PT Karya Alam Sejahtera Langgeng, PT Karya Anton Perkasa, CV Karya Asta Alam, PT Karya Az-Zahra Utama, PT Karya Bara Utama, PT Karya Bersama, CV Karya Bodjong Cabe, PT Karya Borneo Agung Karya Borneo Agung, PT Karya Bukit Utama, PT Karya Bumi Sebuku, PT Karya Bungo Pantai Ceria Group, PT Karya Cemerlang Persada, PT Karya Cipta Lahanindo, PT Karya Cipta Mandiri, CV Karya Cipta Pratama, PT Karya Citra Quarindo, PT Karya Denai Amboko, PT Karya Denai Barito, PT Karya Desa, KSU Karya Duta Gemilang, PT Karya Eka Energi Persada, PT Karya Emas Multisani, PT Karya Energi Makmur, PT Karya Gemilang Kalimantan Mineral, PT Karya Gemilang Limpa Rejeki, PT Karya Gemilang Limpah Rejeki Karya Gemilang Limpah Rejeki, PT Karya Hasil Utama, PT Karya Intan Maksima, PT Karya Inti Energi, PT Karya Inti Sakti Bara, PT Karya Kanaan, PT Karya Kencana Gemilang, PT Karya Lansot Mandiri, PT Karya Lestari, KUD Karya Maju Sejati, CV Karya Maju, CV Karya Malinau Utama, PT Karya Mandala Putera, PT Karya Mandiri Makmur, PT Karya Mas, PT Karya Megah Buton, PT Karya Mitra Abadi, CV Karya Mitra Sejati, PT Karya Mulya, CV Karya Nusantara, CV Karya Nusantara, PT Karya Olindo Mandiri, PT Karya Perdana Sukses, PT Karya Perintis Sejati, PT Karya Permata Prima Karya Permata Prima, PT Karya Persada Sentosa, PT Karya Pertiwi Utama Tambang, PT Karya Putera Mandiri, CV Karya Putra Bersama, CV Karya Putra Bersama, PT Karya Putra Borneo, PT Karya Putra Kontara, PT Karya Putra Kutai, CV Karya Putra Lingga, PT Karya Sakti Purnama, PT Karya Sangjaya, CV Karya Sastra Bijaksana, PT Karya Sejati, UD Karya Sembada Utama, PT Karya Serasi Jaya, PT Karya Siaga, PT Karya Silvi, PT Karya Subur Teknik Utama, PT Karya Sukses Sahabat, PT Karya Sungai Danau Mandiri, CV Karya Tambang Abadi, PT Karya Tambang Energi, PT Karya Tambang Tolindo, PT Karya Tehnik Lahanindo, PT Karya Usaha Aneka Tambang, PT Karya Usaha Pertiwi, PT Karya Utama Banua, CV Karya Utama Banua, PT Karya Utama Tambang Jaya, PT Karya Utama Tambangjaya, PT Karya Wangi Sagara, PT Karya Wijaya Aneka Mineral, PT Karya Wijaya Utama, PT Karya Wijaya, PT Karyacipta Sukses Lestari, PT Karyacitra Mitrasejati, PT Karyamaju Jaya Sentosa, PT Karyamaju Jayasentosa, PT Karyapertama Mudajaya , PT Karyaprima Mandiri Persada, PT Karyatama Konawe Utara, PT Karyati, CV Kasidik, Sdr Kasih Energi Raya, PT Kasih Karya Agung, PT Kasih Makmur Abadi, PT Kasih Mulia, CV Kasih Semesta Raya, PT Kasih Tata Internasional Pt Kasih Tata Internasional, PT Kasih Tata International, PT Kasmar Tiar Raya, PT Kasnadi, Drs Kasongan Mining Mills, PT Kasri Kastas Batu Raya Kastas Batu Raya, PT Katingan Bersama, PT Katingan Indonesia, PT Katingan Inmas Sarana, PT Katingan Jaya, PT Katingan Kahayan Kapuasbarito, PT Katingan Kurnia Selaras, PT Katingan Mineral, PT Katingan Mulia Pratama, CV Katingan Perdana, PT Katingan Prima Sentosa, PT Katingan Ria, PT Katingan Sejahtera Mining, PT Katingan Sejahtera, PT Katingan Subur Sejahtera, PT Katingan Sumber Mineral, PT Katingan Surya Harapan, PT Kato Do Mining, PT Katrasa Mulia, PT Katrina, Sdr Katunjung Adiperdana Timber, PT Kawan Kita, CV Kawasan Alam Surya Adilestari, PT Kawasan Dinamika Harmonitama, PT Kawi Aria Putra, PT Kaya Kencana, PT Kaya Semesta, PT Kayaan Mekaam Kayaan Mekaam, PT Kayan Agung Mandiri, PT Kayan Makmur Sejahtera, PT Kayan Putra Utama Coal, PT Kayan Resources, PT Kayu Kreasi Meridian, PT Kayuadi Jaya, PT Kebersamaan, CV Kece Pratama Sukses, PT Kedap Sayaaq Kedap Sayaaq, PT Kedaung Bahtera, PT Kedurang Anugrah Abadi, PT Keinz Ventura, PT Kekal Adidaya, PT Kelapa Gading Semitunggal Kelapa Gading Semitunggal, PT Kelola Sumber Daya Nagari, PT Kelompok Delapan Indonesia, PT Kelompok Kerja Pertambangan Kelompok Kerja Pertambangan/ Ud. Subur Keluarga Abadi Mandiri, CV Keluarga Sejahtera, CV Kelumpang Hulu Energi Lestari, PT Kemakmuran Inti Utama Tambang, PT Kemakmuran Pertiwi Tambang, PT Kemang Mitraswadaya, PT Kembang Seri Permai, CV Kembang, CV Kembar Adhikara Jaya Abadi, PT Kembar Emas Sultra, PT Kembar Maiwa, CV Kembar Rezeki Bersama, CV Kemenangan Bumi Persada, PT Kemilau Nusantara Khatulistiwa Pt Kemilau Rindang Abadi, PT Kemilau Samudera Berlian, PT Kemudi Kemuning, PT Kemuning Jaya Utama, CV Kemuning Tambang Sentosa Kemuning Tambang Sentosa, PT Ken Brother Muda Satya, PT Ken Brothers Muda Satya, PT Kenali Jasa (Gotuk P. Sihombing), CV Kencana Abadi Jaya Mandiri, PT Kencana Agung Abadisentosa, PT Kencana Cita Kusuma, PT Kencana Dipa Mulia, PT Kencana Kaolin Industri, PT Kencana Makmur Mandiri, CV Kencana Mulia Jaya, PT Kencana Murni Sarana, PT Kencana Prima Invesco, PT Kencana Prima Sentosa, PT Kencana Sakti, CV Kencana Sukses Perkasa, PT Kencana Wilsa Kencana Wilsa, PT Kencana Wisto Kencana, CV Kendali Multi Guna, PT Kendawangan Putra Lestari, PT Kendi Arindo, PT Kendy T. Saiyang Kentarto Keranji Jaya Mandiri, CV Keranji Jaya Utama, PT Kereta Kencana Bangun Perkasa, PT Keritang Buana Mining, PT Kerja Sama, PT Kertawira Sera Lestari, PT Ketapang Inti Mineral, PT Ketapang Karya Tambang, PT Ketapang Karya Utama, PT Ketapang Makmur Mandiri, PT Ketapang Putra Mandiri, PT Ketopang Damai Persada, PT Ketopong Damai Persada, PT Ketungau Nusa Raya, PT Kevindo Ratu Mineral, PT Khairul Saleh Pasaribu, Sdr Khalifah Akbar, CV Kharisma Duta Mining, PT Kharisma Energi Perkasa, PT Kharisma Jaya, CV Kharisma Kreasi Abadi, PT Kharisma Luisa, CV Kharismatik Unggul Sentosa, PT Khatingan Darma Utama, PT Khatulistiwa Daya Energi, PT Khatulistiwa Makmur Persada, PT Khatulistiwa Prima Coal, PT Khatulistiwa Prima Coal_1, PT Khazana Bumi Kaliman, PT Khazana Bumi Kalimana, PT Khoirul Anwar, Sdr Khoridon, Sdr Khotai Makmur Insan Abadi, PT Kiat Sauyun Sentosa, PT Kibo Jaya, CV Kieraha Tambang Sentosa, PT Kijang Jaya Mandiri, PT Kijang Mas Putih, PT Kike, PT Kiki Wahyudi Kilau Borneo, PT Kilauan Kebahagiaan Inti Tambang, PT Kimberlite Resources, PT Kimco Armindo, PT Kimco Citra Mandiri, PT Kimia Farma, PT Kinabalu Prima Coal, PT Kindai Indaru Arai, CV Kindai Mandiri Sejahtera, PT Kindai Mineral Makmur, PT King Diamond Global, PT King Mining, PT Kintamani Bara Utama, PT Kintan Putri Mandiri, PT Kintap Bukit Mulia, PT Kiprah Kita Bersama, PT Kirana Graha Buana, PT Kiswah Perdana, CV Kitadin, PT Klang Permata Indah, PT Klenco Indonesia Klenco Mahkota Klola Tebo Energi, PT Kluet Mineralindo Mandiri, PT Kni Global, PT Kobar Prima Zircon, PT Kobexindo Limestone, PT Kodio Multicom, PT Koetaindo, PT Koin Power, PT Kokas Datu Jaya, PT Kolaka Mineral Resources, PT Kolindo Bina Nusantara, PT Kolingkas, PT Komandur Prima Tambang, PT Komar Komputer, CV Komunitas Bangun Bersama, PT Konawe Bakti Pratama, PT Konawe Nikel Nusantara, PT Konawe Utara Indo Mineral Mining, PT Konduruhan Sejati, PT Konstruktor, PT Konutara Prima, PT Konutara Sejati, PT Kop Al-Aqabah Kopasdal. Kpp Koperasi Aneka Tambang Koperasi Angkatan Darat Dim 0904 Koperasi Bangun Gandrung Sejahtera, PT Koperasi Bangun Mandiri Koperasi Banua Bersama Koperasi Batubara Bukit Kendi Koperasi Bina Jaya Koperasi Bina Rimba Bhakti Koperasi Bina Tani, PT Koperasi Bina Usaha Koperasi Bolum Buen Makmur Koperasi Cassava Koperasi Cempala Sakti, PT Koperasi Cipta Karya Tani Koperasi Gantang Koperasi Gapura Koperasi Garunggung Bersatu Koperasi Garunggung Bersatu, PT Koperasi Giri Warga Cakup Koperasi Gotong Royong Koperasi Hati’if Bara Makmur Koperasi Hutan Rakyat Koperasi Jasa Mandiri Sejahtera Koperasi Jembatan Dua Mandiri Koperasi Karya Mandiri Nunggal Sejahtera Koperasi Karyawan Rumah Makan Rangkiang Koperasi Kelompok Usaha Bersama Karya Mitra Utama Koperasi Kutai Lama Koperasi Liguin, PT Koperasi Ligun, PT Koperasi Mantohing Jaya Lestari, PT Koperasi Manuntung Koperasi Mineral Rahayu Buana, PT Koperasi Mitra Tani Koperasi Nyaik Pondo Family, PT Koperasi P2 Setia Gunung Sembung Koperasi Paser Raya Koperasi Pedagang Pasar Tangga Arung Koperasi Pegawai Maritim Koperasi Pembela Tanah Air Blitar Koperasi Perkebunan (Kopbun) Seuramoe Alue Buloh Koperasi Perkebunan Alam Sakti, PT Koperasi Pernet Gunung Nyuruk Koperasi Pernet Sijuk, PT Koperasi Pernet Tanjung Pandan Koperasi Pernet Tanjungpandan Koperasi Pertambangan Aurat Koperasi Pertambangan Bara Sumber Makmur Koperasi Pertambangan Intan Fajar Koperasi Pertambangan Komala Sakti Koperasi Pertambangan Mupakat Taka Koperasi Pertambangan Padaidi Koperasi Pertanian Amanah Bersama Koperasi Pondok Pesantern Al-Islah Koperasi Pondok Pesantren Al-Azhariyah Koperasi Pondok Pesantren Al-Ishlah Koperasi Pondok Pesantren Balerante Koperasi Pondok Pesantren Nabil Husein Koperasi Pondok Pesantren Suanan Drajat Koperasi Prima Mandiri Koperasi Primer Karyawan Perum Perhutani Koperasi Puger Indah Koperasi Putra Putri Aceh Koperasi Sabda Alam Koperasi Selo Agung Mandiri Koperasi Serba Usaha “Aqrab” Koperasi Serba Usaha “Karya Djaya” Koperasi Serba Usaha “Karya Jaya” Koperasi Serba Usaha “Muru Djaya” Koperasi Serba Usaha (Ksu) Gelinggang Mandiri Koperasi Serba Usaha (Ksu) Putra Mahakam Mandiri Koperasi Serba Usaha Grenden Koperasi Serba Usaha Tabalong Membangun Koperasi Serba Usaha Taman Caringin Sejahtera Koperasi Tahta Pokmas Idt Koperasi Tambang Rakyat (Ktr) Koperasi Tambang Salupa, PT Koperasi Tuha Redeh, PT Koperasi Tunas Baru Koperasi Tunas Dayak Gemilang, PT Koperasi Unit Desa “Bina Mina” Koperasi Warga Semen Gresik Koperasi Wreda Sejahtera Koperasi Zahra Inti Energi, PT Koperasu Serba Usaha (Ksu) Mahatidai Koperasu Serba Usaha (Ksu) Mahatidana Kopinkra ” Sepakat” Koppontren Al-Hikmah Korin Anugrah Minerals, PT Korina Jaya, PT Korinco Mitra Inkobe, PT Korindo Bintang Jaya, PT Korporindo Guna Bara, PT Kota Palu, Pd Kota Tua, PT Kotabara Mitratama, PT Kotabaru Energi International, PT Kotabesi Iron Mining, PT Kotanopan Mining, PT Koti Prima Coal, PT Koti Prima Mandiri, PT Kowioha Jaya Lestari, PT Kpn Adhiyaksa Kpn Bumi Lestari Kqeb’s Krisnian Berkati, PT Krakatau Indah, PT Kreasi Graha Wisesa, PT Kreasindo Eratek Dinamika, PT Kreative Jaya, PT Kresna Karya, PT Krg Resources, PT Krida Darma Andika, PT Krida Dharma Andika, PT Krida Makmur Bersama, PT Krisma Pusaka Sejati, PT Krista Margadata Utama, PT Kristami Rh Krueng Bajikan Mineral, PT Ksu “Rukun Lestari” Ksu Agang Saiyo Ksu Beringin Jaya Ksu Gerbang Petani Mandiri Ksu Jombang Makmur Ksu Karya Desa Ksu Lancar Bumi Perkasa Ksu Lancar Bumi Persada Ksu Makmur Jaya Mulia Ksu Mekar Indah Ksu Mutiara Karya Ksu Ni’mat Seupakat Ksu Panca Marga Ksu Paser Bolum Taka Ksu Pertahanan Benuo Adat Ksu Puger Rahayu Ksu Rerong Alam Permai, PT Ksu Serimpun Mitra Taka Jaya Ksu Sinar Batu Mulya Ksu Sipatuo Sipatokong Ksu Tana Danum Taka Ksu Tiega Manggis Ksu Tunas Karya Ksu Wahana Murni Ksu Wijaya Kusuma Ksu.Toddopuli Kuali Mas, PT Kuansing Inti Makmur 2, PT Kuansing Inti Makmur, PT Kuantan Resources, PT Kuatan Mas Perdana, PT Kuba Prima Mining, PT Kubang Mitra Sejati, CV Kubara Bumi Lestari Kubara Energindo Kud Berkat Sadar Kud Bina Kusan Maju Jaya Kud Bumi Karya Kud Dharma Tani Marisa Kud Ikhlas Membangun Kud Karya Lestari Kud Karya Meratus Kud Kopta Kud Kunangan Kud Makmur Kud Nomontang, PT Kud Nusantara Kud Pelita Kud Penerus Baru Kud Serba Guna Kud Sido Makmur Kud Sido Makmur, PT Kud. Gajah Mada Kud. Gemi Kud. Kedaro Kud. Rukun Dadi Kud. Tani Jaya Murni Kud.Sinamar Sakato Kud.Sumber Usaha Kuda Perdana Pertiwi, PT Kumala Etam Mining, CV Kumala Etam Mining, PT Kumala Jaya, CV Kumala Mining, PT Kumala Prima Coal, PT Kumala Sakti Permai, PT Kuripan Jaya Ltd, CV Kuripan Jaya, CV Kurnia Akbar, CV Kurnia Alam Investama, PT Kurnia Alam Perkasa, CV Kurnia Alam Sejati, PT Kurnia Aneka Tambang, PT Kurnia Arta Kamilin, PT Kurnia Artha Pratiwi, PT Kurnia Bara Bartim, PT Kurnia Batu Indah, PT Kurnia Cahaya Prima, PT Kurnia Dharma Alam Sejahtera, PT Kurnia Hasil, PT Kurnia Jaya Raya, PT Kurnia Lestari Bara Energi, PT (Blok I) Kurnia Lestari Bara Energi, PT (Blok Ii) Kurnia Mandiri Adiperkasa, PT Kurnia Mining Resources, PT Kurnia Persada Gemilang, PT Kurnia Surya Angkasa, PT Kurnia Teknik Jayatama, PT Kurniaaman Nusa Sentosa, PT Kurun Cerah Cipta, PT Kusan Persada, PT Kusdiono Sangadi. Sdr Kusuma Raya Utama, PT Kut Doro Sakonto Kut Hibrida Kutai Alam Prima, PT Kutai Bara Abadi, PT Kutai Energi, PT Kutai Indo Minerals, PT Kutai Kumala Energy, CV Kutai Kumala Energy, PT Kutai Maju Persada, PT Kutai Mandiri Energi, PT Kutai Multi Bara Kutai Multi Bara, PT Kutai Perkasa Coal Mining, PT Kutai Permata Nusantara, PT Kutai Prima Energi, PT Kutai Rizki Sejahtera, PT Kutai Surya Mining, PT Kutai Tamindo Bumi Sakti, PT Kutama Mining Indonesia, PT Kutim Bara Energi, PT Kutim Coal Utama Kwarsa Belitung Indonesia, CV La Rajin, CV Laas Bara Khatulistiwa, PT Labai Persada Tambang, PT Labai Pertiwi Tambang, PT Labbaika, CV Labuan Lelea Ratan, CV Labuan Putra Corp, PT Lachera, PT Ladias Enko, PT Laga, CV Laha Lahan Makmur Sejahtera, PT Lahat Pulau Pinang Bara Jaya, PT Lahei Jaya Mandiri, CV Lahmudin, Sdr Lais Coal Mine, PT Laksana Jaya, PT Laksana Kemilau Abadi, PT Laksbang Mediatama, PT Lalu Aminudin Lalu Andi Putrawi Lalu Arjuna Lalu Sahabuddin,S.Pd Lamai Jaya Chrome Mining, PT Laman Mining, PT Lamandau Putra, PT Lamin Etam Abadi, PT Lamina Interia, PT Lamindo Inter Multikon, PT Lammora Trading Company, PT Lampung Sejahtera Bersama, PT Lanang Bersatu, PT Lanay Jaya Group Lancarjaya Bara Nusantara, PT Landak Mianas Minerals, PT Langgeng Prima Sukses, PT Lanona Tama, PT Lapindo Bumi Mineral, PT Laras Mahardika Laras Padi Coal, PT Laras Sakti Mandiri, PT Laris Dua, CV Larisa Citra Mandiri, PT Lariza Citra Mandiri, PT Lasaka Palapa Timor, CV Laskar Semesta Alam, PT Latanindo Mining, PT Lati Tanjung Harapan, PT Laung Tuhup Coal, PT Laut Bara An Nabih, PT Laut Merah An-Nabih, PT Laut Paser Bersinar An-Nabih Laut Paser Bersinar An-Nabih, PT Lautan Bara Indonesia, PT Lautan Hutan Lestari, PT Lawaki Tiar Raya, PT Lawin Makmur Abadi, PT Lazuardi Cemerlang, PT Lebah Baja Rekanusa, PT Lebak Energi Nusantara, PT Ledas, PT Legowo, CV Leigerindo Utama, PT Lematang Bukit Serelo, PT Lembah Tinindo Sejati, PT Lembaran Pertama Perkasa, PT Lembuswana Perkasa, PT Lenggawa Lautan Resources, PT Lentera Emas, CV Lentera Inti Prima, PT Leo Tama Jaya, PT Leson Lestari Agung, CV Lestari Kencana Mandiri, PT Lestari Timor Jaya, PT Leuser Karya Tambang, PT Lhoong Setia, PT Lianganggang Cemerlang, PT Liberty Alam Persada Liberty Alam Persada, PT Liektucha Ciemas, PT Ligat Akses, CV Likita Makmur, PT Lili Indah Prima Karya, PT Liliana, Sdr Lima Pelita Energi, PT Lima Putri, CV Lima Serumpun, PT Lima-Lima Sepakat, PT Limbuh, CV Lindo Batu Pualamindo, PT Lindung Agung, PT Linge Mineral Resources, PT Lingga Global Mekar, PT Lingkungan Aman Sentosa, PT Lintas Artha Mining, PT Lintas Dua Bersaudara, PT Lintas Jalur Harapan, PT Lintas Raya Group, PT Lintas Utama Energi, PT Lintas Wiguna Lestari, PT Lion Global Energi, PT Lion Multi Resources, PT Lion Power Energy, PT Liquid Room Liquindo Persada, PT Lisbeth, CV Litha Pijar Cemerlang, PT Loa Haur, PT Lobe Sihaloho Lobindo Nusa Persada, PT Logindo Bejana Mulia, PT Lola Lauttimur, PT Loli Munnta, PT Lolita Sarana Jaya, CV Lombok Jaya Mineral, CV Long Nah Energi, PT Long Xin, PT Lopoly Mining Cdx, PT Lotus Sg Lestari, PT Louis Ji Investment, PT Louis Josua, PT Lovtha, CV Lubuk Katingan Perdana, PT Lubuksandi Lentera Sakti, PT Lucky Star International Luhur Abdi Lestari, PT Lumajang Pasir Mandiri, PT Lumbung Bara Abadi, PT Lumbung Inti Selaras, PT Lumbung Makmur Abadi, PT Lumbung Mineral Alam, PT Lumbung Mineral Sentosa, CV Lumbungnesia, PT Lumika Griya, PT Lumpo, PT Lunafa Multi Karya Utama, PT Lunto Bioenergi Prima, PT Lupui Indah Maju Sejahtera Lupui Indah Maju Sejahtera, PT Lusung Babassai, PT Lutarindo Surya Sentosa, PT Luwih Arta Pratama, PT Luwih Artha Pratama, PT Luwuk Anugerah Abadi, PT Lyvia F. Pandelaki M. Adrian Dwiyanto Santoso M. Dg. Buang, Sdr M. Dg. Manye, Sdr M. Jamhuri M. Tawaf, Sag M. Yunus Talib, Sdr M.Ali Hidayat M.Idris Sakka. Sdr M.Nasir M.Ramli Siddik, Sdr Maas Natural Sentosa, PT Maat Hartaman , Sdr Macan Dahan Sakti Macan Dahan Sakti, PT Maccora Tappa, CV Macika Mada Madana, PT Mada Karya, CV Mada Perkasa, CV Madani Citra Mandiri, PT Madani Sejahtera, PT Madhucon Indonesia, PT Madie Madina Bumi Lestari, PT Madina Mining, PT Madinah Madani Mining, PT Madinah Qurrata’ain, PT Madona, CV Madu Lingga Perkasa, PT Maduchon Pasir Makmur, PT Maesa Persada Jaya, PT Mag Energy Pacific Mag Energy Pacific, PT Magellanic Garuda Kencana, PT Magneto Primajaya, PT Maha Bara Karya, PT Maha Dwigarsing, PT Maha Karya Agung, PT Maha Pala Cakti Maha Phala Cakti Maha Phala Cakti, PT Maha Resources Persada, PT Mahakam 99, CV Mahakam Bara Energi Mahakam Bara Utama, PT Mahakam Energi Lestari Mahakam Indah Jaya, CV Mahakam Jaya 9, PT Mahakam Mining Resources Mahakam Multi Lestari Mahakam Prima Akbar Sejati, PT Mahakam River Coal, PT Mahakam River, CV Mahakam Sarana Abadi, CV Mahaputra Duta Persada, PT Mahardhika Anugrah Nur, PT Mahardika Novisari, PT Mahatidana, KSU Mahe, PT Mahidana Tantragata, PT Mahkota Bumi Modern, PT Mahkota Coal Mining, PT Mahkota Gelam Mulia, PT Mahkota Intan Surya Mahkota Karya Utama, PT Mahkota Mega Lestari, PT Mahkota Megah Abadi, PT Mahkotamas Bangun Prakarsa, PT Mahligai Artha Sejahtera, PT Mahmudin Mahmudin Munthe Maimun, CV Mainir Munaf Maira Alam Selaras, PT Maju Bersama, CV Maju Daya Bersama, PT Maju Jaya Abadi, PT Maju Setia, PT Majumulia Agungtama, PT Majutama Indah Lestari, PT Mak Kado International, PT Makale Toraja Minig, PT Makale Toraja Mining, PT Makara Jaya Pratama, PT Makara Kinarya Agung, PT Makarya Ekaguna, PT Makassar Indah Graha Sarana, PT Makassar Marmer Mulia Indah, PT Makassar Marmer Muliaindah Makassar Marmer Muliaindah, PT Makassar Megah Mining, PT Makdean Ray, CV Makindo Mineral Sakti, PT Makitech Indonesia, PT Makkari Tutu Abadi, CV Makmur Adil Sentosa, CV Makmur Agung Perkasa, PT Makmur Bersama, CV Makmur Jaya Lestari, PT Makmur Lestari Prima Tama, PT Makmur Lestari Primatama, PT Makmur Maju Mandiri, PT Makmur Nickel Mining, PT Makmur Palangka Lestari, PT Makmur Pratama Indonesia, PT Makmur Siarakka Abadi, PT Makmur Sintang Pratama, PT Makmur, KUD Makrus Hatta. Sdr Malatali, CV Malawa Putra Utama Maliki Resources, PT Malinau Prima Coal, PT Malindo Bara Murni, PT Malindo Energi, PT Malindo Karya Makmur, PT Malta, PT Maluku Global Masindo, PT Mamahak Coal Mining Maman Suryaman Maman Tarman, Sdr Mamat Mampala Jaya, CV Mampun Cipta Bara, PT Manakarra Multi Mining, PT Manap Hadi Martono. Sdr Manca Agung Mandiri, PT Mandah Makmur Sentosa, PT Mandailing Mining, PT Mandala Erakovic, PT Mandala Kencana, PT Mandala Marmer Indonesia, PT Mandala Usaha Tambang Utama, PT Mandara Prima Nusantara, PT Mandeu Oan Malaka, PT Mandira Mitra Coalindo, PT Mandiri Agung Jaya Utama, PT Mandiri Alam Sejahtera Mandiri Alam Sejahtera, PT Mandiri Bara Agung, PT Mandiri Dongdang Coal Mandiri Inti Lestari Jaya, PT Mandiri Jaya Bara, PT Mandiri Jaya Nickel, PT Mandiri Karya Makmur, PT Mandiri Makmur Citra Tambang, CV Mandiri Makmur Utama, PT Mandiri Marmer Indonesia, PT Mandiri Mining Corporindo, PT Mandiri Nusa Pratama, PT Mandiri Prioritas Indonesia, PT Mandiri Sejahtera Energindo Indonesia, PT Mandiri Sejahtera Sentra, PT Mandiri Supply Globaltama, PT Mandiri Tata Persada, PT Mandiri Usaha Global, PT Mandiri Utama Perkasa, PT Mandiri Utama, CV Mandiri, CV Mandor Utama Mineral, PT Mandra Ancela Kanaka, PT Manen Bumi Algha, PT Mangan Kupang Industri, PT Manggala Alam Lestari, PT Manggala Buana Prataya, PT Manggala Gita Karya, PT Manggatang Parawei, PT Manggung Jaya, CV Mangkupa Indodharama, PT Mangkupa Indodharma, PT Mangkuraja, CV Manik Jaya, PT Manis Karya, CV Manolo, PT Manoor Bulatn Lestari Manoor Bulatn Lestari, PT Manor Bulatn Lestari Mansapa Bara Makmur_1, PT Mansapa Bara Makmur_2, PT Mansurin, CV Mantangai Harakat Jaya, PT Manunggal Inti Artamas, PT Manunggal Jaya Abadi, PT Manunggal Multi Energi, PT Manunggal Sarana Surya Pratama, PT Manusela Prima Mining, PT Manuwo Sangir Jaya, PT Mappeangka, UD Marales Jaya Sentosa, PT Maranau, CV Marangkayu Bara Makarti, PT Marata Chatulistiwa, PT Marazyu R Mining, PT Mardihang. Sdri Mardjono, Sdr Marga Bara Tambang, PT Marga Mitra Manunggal, PT Marga Perkasa, PT Marga Wijaya, PT Margawisesa Pratama, PT Margo Karya Mandiri, PT Maria L.M.Simamora Marimun Bara Sejahtera Marimun Bara Sejahtera, PT Marina Bara Lestari, PT Marinda Bumi Kutai, PT Marioga, CV Mariogi Kharisma Jaya, PT Maritam Anugerah Panaan, PT Markan, Sdr Marlin Serantau Alam, PT Marmer Alam Sulawesi, PT Marmerindo Alam Semesta, PT Marmerindo Kuari Abadi, PT Marmerindo Niyarta Prima, PT Mars Mazmur Mandiri, PT Marsawa Indah Mandiri, PT Martadinata Indah, CV Martaraja Persada, PT Martik Martin Ginting Martin, Sdr Martinus Surbakti Maruco Indonesia, PT Marunda Sumber Mineral, PT Maruwai Bara Abadi, PT Maruwai Bara Prima, PT Marvelzon Indonesia, PT Marwan Putra, PT Maryadi Sugiarto Maryani Nasution, Sdr Mas Hitam Persada, CV Mas Mining Indo, PT Mas Putih Belitung, PT Mas Sari, PT Masa Irian Jaya Indah, PT Masdave Indopratama, PT Masempo Dalle, PT Masindo Artha Resources, PT Masindo Intienergy Perkasa, PT Masindo Pratama, PT Masindo Putera Energy, PT Masindo Putra Energy, PT Maslapita, PT Masran, Sdr Mas’ud Yunus, Sdr Mataan Do Nyiraang Matahari Gold Mining, PT Mataso Utama, PT Maudu Mawari Anugerah, PT Maxima Utama, PT Maya Indah, CV Maya Multi Asih, PT Mayalibit Bay Nikel, PT Mayorindo Abadi, PT Mbh Mineral Resources, PT MBH Mining Resources, PT Mbh Multi Resources, PT Medan Madani Mining, PT Medang Perdana, PT Media Artha Raharja Media Kalimantan Tenggara, PT Media Natural Energy, PT Mediar Mega Agro Persada, PT Mega Alam Sejahtera, PT Mega Borneo Abadi Mega Buana Energy, PT Mega Cipta Artistika, PT Mega Citra Abadi, PT Mega Citra Daya, PT Mega Citra Pelita, PT Mega Citra Utama, PT Mega Daya Buana, PT Mega Daya Pelita, PT Mega Daya Persada, PT Mega Daya Prima, PT Mega Daya Utama, PT Mega Energi Karyatama, PT Mega Fiume Internasional, PT Mega Fortune Equator, PT Mega Haltim Mineral, PT Mega Indah Noryadi Mega Indah Noryadi, PT Mega Inter Buana Perkasa, PT Mega Inti Ardana, PT Mega Iron Ore Mining, PT Mega Karya Chemindo, PT Mega Karya Dwipa, PT Mega Kharisma Nusantara, PT Mega Malindo, PT Mega Masindo Bara Abadi, PT Mega Masindo Bara Makmur, PT Mega Masindo Bara Sukses, PT Mega Masindo Bara Utama, PT Mega Masindo Coalindo, PT Mega Multi Cemerlang, PT Mega Multi Energi, PT Mega Nur, PT Mega Nusa Kramindo, PT Mega Prima Persada, PT Mega Putra Konstruksi, CV Mega Sarana Sejahtera, PT Mega Sinar Persada, PT Mega Tisma Perkasa, PT Megacipta Kharisma Alam, PT Megah Abadi Sentosa, PT Megah Buana Sukses, PT Megah Cipta Sawargitamas, PT Megah Makmur Mandiri, PT Megah Mulia Persada, CV Megah Permata Karya Sukses, PT Megah Prima Semesta, PT Megalindo Inti Sejahtera, PT Megapura Prima Industri, PT Megaren International, PT Megasurya Nusa Lestari, PT Megatama Abadi Sentosa, PT Megatama Power Engineering Megatop Inti Selaras, PT Megawati Marlinang Sinaga Mehad Inter Buana, PT Meiske Rori Meitha Perkasa Utama, PT Meity Tinggian Mekar Bersama, CV Mekar Mulia Mandiri, PT Mekko Metal Mining, PT Melakindo Persada, PT Melangkiki, CV Melawi Rimba Mineral, PT Meliau Harapan Mulia Abadi, PT Meliau Ratu Abadi, PT Melissa Daya Mandiri, PT Melista Karya, PT Melmonda Abadi Pratama, PT Memberamo Baraindo Energitama, PT Menara Borneo Jaya, PT Menara Indra Utama, PT Menara Padi Unggul, PT Menata Inti Alam, PT Mendawa Argapura Sentosa, PT Mendawai Mineral, PT Mensa Bara Bumi, PT Mensa Borneo Coal Mensa Borneo Coal, PT Mensa Borneo Mining, PT Mentari Bhakti Jaya Utama, PT Mentari Jaya Prima, CV Mentari Khatulistiwa, PT Mentari Subur Nusantara, PT Mentawir Resources, PT Mentaya Iron Ore Mining, PT Mepta Sapta Lestari, PT Merak Putih, CV Merapi Energi Nusantara, PT Merapi Raya Permai, PT Meratus Prima Tambang, PT Meredien Mineral Indonesia, PT Merge Continental Mining, PT Merge Mining Industri, PT Meridien Inti Energy, PT Merry Jaya, CV Merukh Flores Coal, PT Mestika Persada Raya, PT Meta Mineral Pradana, PT Metalindo Bumi Raya, PT Metalindo Karya Bersama, CV Methane Resources Indonesia, PT Metrix Elcipta, PT Metro Global System, PT Metro Sentosa, CV Meuligo Timue Mining Zhongsheng, PT Meuligou Timue Mining Zhongsheng, PT Mexxsindo Utama Mineral, PT Mibersa Polaris, PT Mier Natural Resources, PT Mifa Bersaudara Mifa Bersaudara, PT Mikgro Metal Perdana, PT Milennium Minning & Resources, PT Millenia Artha Prima, PT Millenium Barelang Perkasa Millenium Barelang Perkasa, PT Millenium Barelang Persada, PT Millenium Danatama Resources, PT Millenium Mining & Resources, PT Millenium Traco Utama, PT Millennium Mining & Resources, PT Millennium Mining Dan Resources, PT Mim Nickelindo Mulia, PT Mina Bandar Galunggung Tasikmalaya, PT Minang Mining Makao, PT Minang Pangeran Resources, PT Minatama, CV Minemex Indonesia, PT Mineral Artha Alam Semesta, PT Mineral Bangka Sejati, PT Mineral Cietung, PT Mineral Elok Sejahtera, PT Mineral Energi Indonesia Stone, PT Mineral Gading Kencana, PT Mineral General Resources, PT Mineral Indo Tambang, PT Mineral Indosin, PT Mineral Industri Sukabumi, PT Mineral Jaya Utama, PT Mineral Kencana Mandiri, PT Mineral Merangin Sejahtera, PT Mineral Nagan Raya, PT Mineral Persada Indonesia, PT Mineral Persada, Ud Mineral Sukses Makmur, PT Mineral Tambang Wahana, PT Mineral Trobos, PT Mineralindo Mandiri, PT Mineralindo Reksa Utama, PT Mining Indonesia, PT Mining Maju, PT Minselano, CV Minselano, PT Miossu Indah Abadi, PT Miracle, PT Mirah Labuhan Berlian, PT Mirbani Abadi, PT Miri Malai Jelita, PT Miri Mineral Mining, PT Misman. Sdr Misri. Sdr Mistar P.Samsul Arifin. Sdr Mitra Abadi Berkatindo, PT Mitra Adiperdana, PT Mitra Agra Mustika, PT Mitra Alam Resources, PT Mitra Anda Baratama, PT Mitra Anda, PT Mitra Anugerah Sejahtera, CV Mitra Aurum Sejati, PT Mitra Bangun Cemerlang, PT Mitra Bara Jaya, PT Mitra Bara Karya, PT Mitra Bara Makmur Jaya Mitra Bara Makmur Jaya, PT Mitra Bara Sejati, PT Mitra Barito, PT Mitra Berkarya, PT Mitra Bersama Mulia, PT Mitra Bisnis Harvest, PT Mitra Borneo Sejati, CV Mitra Bumi Sejahtera, CV Mitra Cakra Abadi, CV Mitra Daya Kalimantan, PT Mitra Dipro Coal Indonesia, PT Mitra Dua Haji, CV (An H. Wargiya) Mitra Energi Agung, PT Mitra Energi Petronusa, PT Mitra Genesaret Energi, PT Mitra Guna Alumni Teknindo, PT Mitra Handal Abadi, CV Mitra Handayani Sejahtera, PT Mitra Indomas Pertiwi, PT Mitra Investasi Artaperdana, PT Mitra Jaya Abadi Bersama, PT Mitra Jaya Timber, CV Mitra Kaili, CV Mitra Karya Agung Lestari, PT Mitra Karya Shetindo, PT Mitra Karya, CV Mitra Kreasi Sukses Bersama, PT Mitra Kurnia Bartim, PT Mitra Langgeng Lestari, PT Mitra Mahakam Perkasa, PT Mitra Mahakam Utama, PT Mitra Maju Bangun Persada, PT Mitra Mandala Mulya, PT Mitra Mandiri Cemerlang, PT Mitra Mandiri, CV Mitra Mangkunegara, CV Mitra Media, CV Mitra Mega Utama, PT Mitra Mining Mandiri, PT Mitra Mining, CV Mitra Mining, PT Mitra Multi Komindo, PT Mitra Multi Yasatama Mitra Niaga Mulia, PT Mitra Niagatama Cemerlang, PT Mitra Padjadjaran Prima, PT Mitra Perdana Sejahtera, PT Mitra Pertiwi Pratama, PT Mitra Pondasi, PT Mitra Prima Coal, PT Mitra Romarim, PT Mitra Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Mitra Sejati Jaya Makmur, PT Mitra Sejati, CV Mitra Selaras Sukses Bersama, PT Mitra Setia Tanah Bumbu, PT Mitra Sinar Sentosa, PT Mitra Stania Prima, PT Mitra Sukses Globalindo, PT Mitra Sukses, CV Mitra Tala, PT Mitra Tambang Barito, PT Mitra Unggul Persada, PT Mitra Usaha Hamita, CV Mitra Usaha Indonesia Lestari, PT Mitra Usaha, CV Mitra Utama Nusa Sangihe, PT Mitra Utama Resources, PT Mitra Utama, CV Mitrabara Adiperdana, PT Mitraco Borneo Sentosa, PT Mitracom Prima, PT Mitramega Ocean Global Indonesia, PT Miyor, CV Mizantara Wahana Mulia, PT Mmir Multi Sarana Mandiri, PT Moa Maju Kurnia Utama, PT Modang Resources, PT Modern Cahaya Makmur, PT Modern Energi Mineral, PT Modern Sinar Energi, PT Moenadi, Sdr Mofatama Bangun Nusa, PT Mofatama Bangunnusa, PT Mofatama Energy Internasional, PT Moga Cemerlang Abadi, PT Moh. Salim Waisal Qorni Moh.Yudi Junaedi Mohamad Alyudin. Sdr Mohammad Soleh. Sdr Monokem Surya, PT Monos Safaree Mekar, PT Montalat Jaya Utama, PT Montero Jaya Coal, PT Monumen Energi Nusantara, PT Morindo Bangun Sejahtera, PT Moriss, PT Morodadi. Kpp Morris, PT Morsesengi Indonesia Pratama, PT Mountas Inti Tambang, PT Mozaki, PT Mp Treashure, PT Mp Treasure, PT Mranti Mas Pratama, PT Mualraja Arfa Hutamas, PT Muara Alam Sejahtera, PT Muara Barikit Mandiri, PT Muara Beruntung, CV Muara Embau, CV Muara Enim Power Energi, PT Muara Mas Indah Muara Sari, CV Muaro Air Mas, PT Muba Batubara Persada, PT Muba Coal Mine, PT Muchsin (Usaha Mandiri) Muchtar Baso, An Muda Prima Insani, PT Mugirato Nusa Persada, PT Muh. Hasan Harun , Sdr Muh. Syarif Saud, Sdr Muh.Akib. Sdr Muh.Amiruddin. Sdr Muh.Tang Muhadi Tilam Muhamad Rais. Sdr Muhammad Akil. Sdr Muhammad Ato Muhammad Dahri. Sdr Muhammad Erwin Ardianto, Sdr Muhammad Haikal, CV Muhammad Martin Muis. Sdr Mujiari.Sdr Mujino, Sdr Mujiono, Sdr Mujur Abadi Sentosa, CV Mukhlis Matra Mukomuko Maju Sejahtera, PT Mukri, Sdr Mukti Alam Sejahtera, CV Mukti Ali Sadikin. Sdr Mulawarman Kaltim Energi, PT Mulawarman Putera Abadi Sakti, PT Mulawarman Putra Abadi Sakti, PT Mulia Abadi, CV Mulia Anugerah Sawitindo, PT Mulia Artha Jaya Utama, PT Mulia Bravo Indonesia, PT Mulia Cahaya Mas, PT Mulia Energy Resources, PT Mulia Jaya Mobilindo, PT Mulia Jaya Sepayang, PT Mulia Jaya, CV Mulia Kencana Makmur, PT Mulia Kencana Mandiri, PT Mulia Makmur Perkasa, PT Mulia Pacific Resources, PT Mulia Pasific Resources, PT Mulia Permata Coal Jaya, PT Mulia Permata, PT Mulia Persada Kartanegara, PT Mulia Putra Pertama, PT Mulia Sukses Makmur, PT Mulia Tangjong, PT Mulia Utama Nusantara, PT Muliana Jaya, CV Muliya Tambang Indo, PT Muliya Visindo, PT Muliya, CV Multi Agung Sentosa, PT Multi Artha Megatama, PT Multi Bara Persada, CV Multi Bukit Jaya, PT Multi Bumi Mineral, PT Multi Bumi Sejahtera, PT Multi Dinar Karya, PT Multi Energi Lestari, PT Multi Garmindo, PT Multi Guna Utama, CV Multi Gunatama Optima, PT Multi Husada Wahana, PT Multi Jaya Energi, PT Multi Karya Sarana Perindo, PT Multi Kreasi Persada, PT Multi Makmur Margos Multi Mineral Exploration, PT Multi Mineral Magntic, PT Multi Mineral Prima Multi Mineral Prima, PT Multi Mineral Sejahtera, CV Multi Mineral Utama, PT Multi Niaga Jaya, PT Multi Panorama Sucses, PT Multi Perkasa Lestari, PT Multi Perkasa Parts, PT Multi Pratama Sinergy, PT Multi Prima Dilfevin Indonesia, PT Multi Resources Investama, PT Multi Sarana Andalan Multi Sarana Avindo, PT Multi Sarana Mineral, CV Multi Sarana Perkasa, PT Multi Sentra Perdana, CV Multi Tambang Prima, PT Multi Tri Sempurna, PT Multi Utama Kreasindo, PT Multiartaindah Raya, PT Multidinamik Binasejahtera, PT Multigraha Istikamakmur, PT Multikarya Suksesindo Pratama, PT Multikreasi Jaya Perdana, PT Multindo Cakrawala, PT Multinusa Asiatama, PT Multiparta Kaltim Utama, PT Multisari Bumitama, CV Multitrans Jaya Abadi, PT Mulya Agung, Sdr Mulya Kencana Makmur, PT Mulyadi, Sdr Mulyani Indah, PT Mulyanto, Sdr Munarto Muncul Karya Pratama, CV Mundu Cirebon Mining, PT Mura Lima Dua, PT Mura Migas, PT Mura Perkasa, PT Mura Reka Batubara, PT Mura Reksa Cbm, PT Mura Reksa Cbm, PT (Konsorsium Pd.Mura Energi-Pt.Mura Reksa Cbm) Murante Utama, PT Murau Coal, PT Muraya Prima Coal, PT Murni Tri Mustika Gasirtub, PT Murui Jaya Perdana, PT Murung Raya Bara, PT Murung Raya Coal, PT Musafir Coal Mining, PT Musi Energi Indonesia, PT Musi Energi Indonesia, PT (Konsorsium Pd.Muara EnergiMusi Energi Indonesia, PT (Konsorsium Pd.Muara Energi-Pt.Mura Reksa Cbm-Pt.Musi Energi Indonesia) Musi Power Energi, PT Musi Prima Coal, PT Musi Rawas Gold, PT Musika Purbantara Utama, PT Musnianti. Sdr Musta, CV Mustajab Pamassangi Mustakim Mustakim, Sdr Mustika Artha Prathama, PT Mustika Chynthia Mandiri, PT Mustika Indah Abadi, PT Mustika Indah Permai, PT Mustika Indah Usindo, PT Mustika Pratama, CV Mustika Widhayaka Wisaya, PT Mustika, Pd Mutiara Abadi, CV Mutiara Alam Perkasa, PT Mutiara Bara Indah, PT Mutiara Bumi Manggilang, PT Mutiara Cahaya Mas, CV Mutiara Cempaga Sejahtera, PT Mutiara Etam Coal, PT Mutiara Faridwan Abadi, PT Mutiara Fortuna Raya, PT Mutiara Intan , PT Mutiara Kapuas, PT Mutiara Karya, KSU Mutiara Melawi Kapuas, PT Mutiara Merdeka Jaya, PT Mutiara Panca Pesona, PT Mutiara Prima Sejahtera, PT Mutiara Prima, CV Mutiara Sakti, PT Mutiara Surya Mallawa, PT Mutiara Timur Permai, PT Muturi Bara Perkasa, PT Muturi Indah Persada, PT Mykoindo Daya Gemilang, PT Naan Bara Abadi, PT Nabati Prima Kencana, PT Nabe Surya Lestari, PT Nadia Enko, PT Naga Borneo Energi, PT Naga Bumi Perkasa, PT Naga Bumi Persada, PT Naga Emas Khumaira, PT Naga Jaya Sakti Utama, PT Naja, Sdr Nakabes Indobara, PT Nakano Coal Mining, PT Nan Riang, PT Nanang Herdiana, Sdr Nanang Herlani, Sdr Nanasuharna Nanditama Bara Utama, PT Nanggroe Kuchi Puega 1, PT Nanggroe Kuchi Puega 2, PT Nantoy Bara Lestari, PT Napal Umbar Picung, PT Nariki Mitra Sejati, PT Narsudi. Sdr Naru Nuri Nikko, PT Narwastu Sumber Kasih, PT Nasfiding Nasional Mineral, PT Nasiroh, Sdr Naswin Nata Persada Makmur, PT Natanya Mitra Energy, PT Natarang Mining, PT Natarida Energy, PT Natbor Resources Surabaya, PT Natbour Resources Indonesia, PT National Mining Company, PT Native Efficient Trading Operation, PT Natriva Surya Perkasa, PT Natural Energi, PT Navara Westindo, PT Nawaksara Nawaksara, PT Nayo Beliton Mining, PT Nazli Negeri Karo-Karo Nelson Matondang Nemosia, PT Neo Fatina, CV Neoplan Muda Perkasa, PT Nesindo Abadi, CV New Energy Solution, PT New Jember Golden International, PT Newport Energy, PT Newspring Mining, PT Nexindo Resources, PT Ng Chiu Lim Akias Suyanto Ng Sui Nai Ngabdul Jalil. Sdr Ngali Sumbawa Mining, PT Ngaspanto,Sdr Niaga Inti Mineral, PT Niaga Maju Pasifik, PT Niagatama Makmur Sembada, PT Nickel Indonesia Resources, PT Nico Pratama Anugrah, PT Nikasa Multi Usaha, PT Nikel Gebe, PT Nikita Gemilang Intitambang, PT Nila Utama Nusantara, PT Nilam Jaya Buana, PT Nilam Sari, PT Nindya Karya, CV Nipa Karya Persada, PT Nipindo Prima Mesin, PT Nirmala Coal Nusantara, PT Niska, CV Nisma Abadi Sejahtera, PT Nisso Indonesia Resources, PT Nn Brothers Noor Abadi, CV Noor Tiga Bersaudara, CV Nor Alif, CV Normalawati Nova Gonawan Novita Karya Taga, CV Nuansa Cipta Coal Investm Ent, PT Nuansa Cipta Coal Investment, PT Nuansa Jasa Realtindo, PT Nuansa Sakti Kencana, PT Nuansacipta Coal Investment, PT Nuansajasa Realtindo, PT Nugraha Banua Persada, PT Nugraha Insan Kencana Mining, PT Nugraha Jorong Pratama, CV Nugraha Karya Utama, PT Nuha Nuna Suryanto Nunukan Bara Sentosa, PT Nunukan Bara Sentosa_1, PT Nunukan Bara Sentosa_2, PT Nunukan Bara Sukses, PT Nunukan Segar, PT Nur Alam Sejahtera, CV Nur Alian Sejahtera, PT Nur Eva Tina Pratama, CV Nur Indah Lestari, PT Nur Kholis, Sdr Nur Laela Nur Segi Waras, PT Nur Zamsari,Sdr Nurachmat Surya, PT Nurdin Damanik Nureco Resources, PT (An Adiyto Wicaksono, S.Mn) Nurham, PT Nurindra Ekapersada, PT Nurjanah, CV Nurlina, CV Nurmuda Cahaya, PT Nursam. Sdr Nursyamsu Nurman Nuruddin Lubis Nurul Fajjiri Makmur, UD Nurul Hamdani Harun Nurul Hikmah, UD Nurul Ida Hidayah Nuryeni, PT Nusa Alam Lestari, PT Nusa Bara Nusa Bara Raya, PT Nusa Energy Raya, PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals, PT Nusa Ina Buana, PT Nusa Indah Permai, PT Nusa Jaya Pratama, PT Nusa Lontar Karyatama, CV Nusa Lontar Resources, PT Nusa Lucky Tama, PT Nusa Luckytama, PT Nusa Palapa Minerals, PT Nusa Permata Kusuma, PT Nusa Persada Resources, PT Nusa Pratama System Consuling, PT Nusa Pratama System Consulting, PT Nusa Proteksi Energi, PT Nusa Riau Kencana Coal, PT Nusa Unggul Perkasa Nusa Unggul Perkasa, PT Nusa Wang Choong, PT Nusajaya Persadatama Mandiri, PT Nusambadha Pratama Is, PT Nusantara Alam Pasific, PT Nusantara Alam Pasifik, PT Nusantara Arta Mining, PT Nusantara Bara Resources, PT Nusantara Berau Coal, PT Nusantara Citra Jaya Abadi, PT Nusantara Energy Persada, PT Nusantara Energy, PT Nusantara Indah Lestari, PT Nusantara Indah, CV Nusantara Jaya Nusa, PT Nusantara Kaltim Coal, PT Nusantara Karya Pertiwi, PT Nusantara Megah Utama Tambang, PT Nusantara Minerals Mandiri, PT Nusantara Permai Sumber Abadi, PT Nusantara Resources Perkasa, PT Nusantara Santan Coal, PT Nusantara Swadesi Mining, PT Nusantara Wahau Coal, PT Nusantara, KUD Nusapati Satria, PT Nusaraya Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Nusha Timorindo, CV Nussa Perkasa Nusantara, CV Nv. Konstruktor Ny.W.Sarmadan Nyalindung I, PT Nyalindung Ii, PT Nyau Nyit Tjong, PT Nyemas Misdiawati Nyerebungan Energi Nyerebungan Energi, PT Nyerubungan Energi, PT Obi Power Mining, PT Obi Prima Nikel, PT Obi Putra Mandiri, PT Obiansyah, Sdr Obio Indo Energi, PT Oceanic Crust, PT Odang Suwarman Ojot Rujak Olaga Prima, PT Olat Rarang, CV Ombonex, CV Omega Cakrawala Mediatama, PT Omega Dwi Energi Omega Dwi Energi, PT Omega International Resources And Mining Services, PT Omega Prima Utama, PT Omon, Sdr Optima Tigabiru Jaya, PT Organik Semesta Subur, PT Organisasi Solidaritas Pengelola Tambang (Sptc) Penja Oriental Pratama Steel, PT Oriental Steel, CV Orkida Makmur, PT Ornament Lima Oro Kni, PT Ositama Mineral, CV Ositama Suplaindo, PT Oti Eya Abadi, PT Ousaka Marmer Indahraya, PT(Pumarin) Oyong Lizar Pacific Bina Mineral, PT Pacific Century Corporation Pacific Century Corporation, PT Pacific Coal Mining, PT Pacific Global Abadi, PT Pacific Global Utama, PT Pacific Granitama, PT Pacific Inter Mining, PT Pacific Mining Jaya, PT Pacific Ore Resources, PT Pacific Samudra Perkasa, PT Pacific Tambang Provita, PT Pada Idi, PT Padak Mas, CV Padang Anugerah 2, PT Padang Anugerah, PT Padang Bara Abadi, CV Padang Batuah, CV Padang Mas Sejahtera, PT Padang Mulia, PT Padang Sentosa, PT Paeran, Sdr Pagar Benua Borneo Pagar Benua Borneo, PT Pagar Gunung, CV Pagun Taka, PT Pahala, U.D. Paian Kudadiri Paijo Paimin Sigalingging Paino Sudiman. Sdr Paju Epat Raya, PT Pakat Dayak, PT Pakuwono Resources Mineral, PT Palampang Tarung, PT Palangka Abadi Nusa, PT Palapa ’96, UD Palapa Bumi Mineral, PT Palapa Gading Sakti, PT Palapa Sejati Indonesia, PT Palaran Coal, PT Palawan Investama, PT Palem Mineral Indonesia, CV Palem Sakti Utama, PT Palembang Power Energi, PT Palm Mineral Indonesia, CV Palma Mandiri Lestari, PT Paloan Maju Abadi, PT Palopo Indah Raya Palopo Indah Raya, PT Palu Indah Tehnik, PT Palu Rightom Conddetv Perkasa, PT Pam Alam Mineral, PT Pam Alam Resources, PT Pam Mineral, PT Pamin Kanaan Pamin Kanaan, PT Pammu M. Pampangan Palm Resources, PT Panaga Intilestari, PT Panah Emas, PT Panaikang Prima Coal, CV Panama Alam Semesta, PT Panasia Indosyntec Tbk, PT Panca Artha Mulia Serasi, PT Panca Bakti, Kud Panca Bara Sejahtera, CV Panca Bara Sejahtera, PT Panca Cipta Permai, PT Panca Datama Panca Datama, PT Panca Digital Solution, PT Panca Duta Kalteng, PT Panca Duta Karya Abadi, PT Panca Gemilang Semesta, PT Panca Jangkar Sejati, PT Panca Kalsiumindo Perkasa, PT Panca Karya Prima, PT Panca Logam Makmur, PT Panca Logam Nusantara, PT Panca Mega Persada, PT Panca Meta, PT Panca Metta, PT Panca Prima Mining Panca Prima Mining, PT Panca Putra Marga Sejahtera, PT Panca Sakti Utama, CV Panca Sona Jaya Pratama, PT Pancamitra Sejahtera, PT Pancamitra Utama Karya, PT Pancar Buana, PT Pancaran Bukit Batubara, PT Pancaran Surya Abadi, PT Pancareka Utama E Pancareka Utama Engineering, PT Pancasona Jaya Pratama, PT Pancasona Sumber Rejeki, PT Pancur Ferumhil, PT Panda Mas Sakti, PT Pandamas Sakti, PT Pandan Alam Jaya, PT Pandawa Lima, CV Pandawa Trijaya Manunggal, PT Pandawa Tujuh, CV Pandu Adi Daya, PT Pandu Aro Pacific, PT Pandu Citra Mulia, PT Pandu Putra Alampersada, PT Pandu Selaras, PT Pandu Utama, CV Panema Arta, CV Panen Kreasindo Panen Kreasindo, PT Panenga Sejahtera, CV Panggung Jaya, UD Panghegar, CV Pangkalan Mineral Perkasa, PT Pangkalan Niaga, PT Pangrango Mandiri, CV Panorama, CV Pantas Indomining, PT Papan Lestari, PT Papua Fajar Timur, PT Papua Kyriake Hemera, PT Papua Lestari Abadi, PT Papua Metalindo, PT Papua Mining Resources, PT Papua Permata Khatulistiwa, PT Papua Persada Coal, PT Papua Prima Coal, PT Papua Pusaka Nusantara, PT Papua Sinar Pelangi, PT Papuaindo Karya Mandiri, PT Papuan Rimba Nalik, PT Paradise Mining Nusantara, PT Parahita Sanu Setia, PT Paramitha Cipta Sarana, PT Paramitha Persadatama, PT Parenggean Makmur Sejahtera, PT Parikesit Tambang Jaya, PT Parisma Jaya Abadi, PT Parit Mujur Sejahtera Parmito, Sdr Parna Raya, PT Paropo Sejahtera Abadi, PT Partap Singh. Sdr Partiba Bara Energy, PT Pasaman Alam Lestari, PT Pasena Agro Mandiri, CV Paser Bara Mandiri, PT Paser Bolum Taka, KSU Paser Buen Energy, PT Paser Lestari Jaya, PT Pasific Century Corporation, PT Pasific Global Resources, PT Pasific Global Utama, PT Pasific Nickel Mining Pasific Samudra Perkasa, PT Pasific Union Indonesia, PT Pasifik Global Transindo, PT Pasifik Tambang Indonesia, PT Pasir Bara Prima, PT Pasir Berjaya Mining, PT Pasir Besi Indonesia, PT Pasir Dabo Permata, PT Pasir Hitam Perkasa, PT Pasir Luhur, CV Pasir Mas Belitong, CV Pasir Mas Putih, PT Pasir Prima Coal Indonesia, PT Pasir Rantai Mas, PT Pasir Semiru, CV Pasir Walanae, PT Pasir Walannae, PT Pasirindo Hamparan Jaya, PT Pasirindo Prima, PT Passokorang, PT Pastika Inti Sentosa, PT Pati Buana Semesta, PT Patikah Prima Coal, PT Patmawati. Sdr Patongson, PT Patran Raya, CV Patri.Sdr Patria Bersama, CV Patria Drilling Company, PT Patria Energi Biotama Jabar, PT Patria Sekarjaya, PT Patrindo Jaya Makmur, PT Patriot Tanjung Utama, PT Patriot Wira Perkasa, PT Patriot Wiraperkasa, PT Patroly Patroman Senoputra, PT Payogan Kutai Sejahtera, PT Pb.Mitra Pd. Aneka Usaha / Agung Hariyadi. St Pd. Aneka Usaha Kolaka Pd. Kota Palu Pd. Usaha Pertambangan Pd. Utama Sultra Pd. Waringin Pd.Pembangunan Poso Pd.Sua Windu Pelangi Anugrah Jaya, PT Pelangi De’je, CV Pelangi Harapan Jaya, PT Pelasakti, PT Pelita Dian Petangi, PT Pelita Harapan, CV Pelita Indah, CV Pelita Jaya Prima, PT Pelita Kharisma Kenanga, PT Pelita Lestari Kencana, PT Pelita Makmur Sejahtera, PT Pelita Sakti Semesta, PT Pelita, KUD Pembangunan Sintang Jaya, PT Pempaja Quarry Manggala, PT Penajam Baraenergi Prima, PT Penajam Makmur Abadi, CV Penajam Makmur Abadi, PT Penajam Prima Coal, PT Penamas Daya Usaha, PT Penarik Bintan, PT Pendawa Lestari Perkasa, PT Pendawa Lima Sakti, PT Penerus Baru, KUD Pengelola Limbah Kutai Kartanegara, PT Pengelola Limbah Kutai Kertanegara, PT Pengembangan Investasi Riau, PT Pengurus Mesjid Nurul Hidayah Baba Penoon Energi, PT Penta Bersama Gemilang, PT Penta Dharma Karsa, PT Penta Inti Mandiri, PT Pepen Jarkasih Perdana Bahari, CV Perdana Maju Utama, PT Perdana Sukses Mandiri, PT Perintis Bara Bersaudara, CV Perintis Moro Aditya, PT Perjuangan, PT Perkasa Alam Energy, PT Perkasa Energi, PT Perkasa Energy, PT Perkasa Petro Cendana, PT Permadi.H. Sdr Permana Patti Assetama, PT Permata Alam, CV Permata Bumi Makmur, PT Permata Hitam Indah, CV Permata Hitam, CV Permata Indah Perkasa, PT Permata Indah, CV Permata Indah, PT Permata Inti Makmur, PT Permata Khatulistiwa Prima, PT Permata Mulya Agung, CV Permata Mulya Agung, PT Permata Mustika Rajawali, PT Permata Putera Mandiri, PT Permata Suka, CV Permata Sumber Energi, PT Permata Tujuh Dua, PT Permata, CV Pernick Sultra, PT Persada Agung Intilestari, PT Persada Agung Sentosa, PT Persada Bahari Aditama, PT Persada Berau Jaya Sakti, PT Persada Borneo Reosurces, PT Persada Buana Gemilang, PT Persada Bumi Etam Persada Bumi Etam, PT Persada Bumi Rawas, PT Persada Handaya Wogorama, PT Persada Indo Tambang, PT Persada Kapuas Priima, PT Persada Kapuas Prima, PT Persada Karunia Sadaya, PT Persada Makmur Jaya, PT Persada Makmur Mandiri, PT Persada Makmur Sejahtera, PT Persada Mineral Pratama Persada Mineral Pratama, PT Persada Multi Bara, PT Persada Nusantara Lestari, PT Persada Pratama Cemerlang, PT Persada Shayang, PT Persada Synergy Mining, PT Persadatama Inti Jaya Mandiri, PT Persadatama Lestari Coal Mi Persadatama Lestari Coal Mining Persadatama Lestari Coalmining, PT Pertama Mina Sutra Perkasa, PT Pertambangan Bumi Indonesia, PT Pertamindo Utama, PT Pertanahan Benuo Adat, Ksu Pertiwi Adi Karsa, PT Pertiwi Inti Perkasa, PT Perusda Aneka Tambang Dan Energi Perusda Benuo Taka, PT Perusda Borneo Taka, PT Perwira Cipta, CV Pesanggrahan Inti Makmur, PT Pesawaran Buana Arta, PT Pesona Bara Cakrawala, PT Pesona Bintang, PT Pesona Deliana, PT Petak Malai Perdana, PT Petak Malaibuluh Merindu, PT Petro Mineral Jaya, PT Petro Usaba Agro Subur, PT Petrojava Indonesia, PT Petrona Mining Contractor, PT Petrus, Sdr Phoenix Kencana Sakti, CV Piala Jaya, PT Piawai Bumi Alam Perkasa, CV Pijar Bahana Sem Esta, CV Pilar Angsana, PT Pilar Nusantara Agung, PT Pilar Untung Bersama, PT Piliang Group, PT Pinang Bara Adipratama, PT Pinang Mineral Resources, PT Pinang Satu Pinang Satu, PT Pinang Sejati Wati, PT Pinapan Gali Mas, PT Pinastika Citra Pratama, PT Pingabangun Mandiri, PT Pinggan Matio, PT Pingxiang Mining Industry Group (Indonesia), PT Pion Quarry Nusantara, PT Pioner Tanjung Utama, PT Pipit Citra Perdana, PT Pipit Citra Perkasa, PT Pipit Mutiara Jaya, PT Pippo Jaya, PT Piranti Jaya Utama, PT Pista Karya Jaya, PT Pitu Babbana Binanga, PT Pk.Sinar Harapan Platinum Prima Iron, PT Ploitasi Poedjo Wardojo Pola Andhika Realtor, PT Pola Marmer Kencana, PT Polar Energi, PT Polowijo Gesari, PT Polyn Srisuryani Pondasi Alam Graha Sawmill, PT Ponti Sejahtera Abadi, PT Ponti Star, PT Popon Ponijan. Sdr Porehu Tiar Raya, PT Pormen Lingga Position, PT Potensi Bumi Energi, PT Prabayasa Energi Utama, PT Prabuco Prabuco, PT Pradana Energi, PT Pradanris, PT Prafa Coal Mining, PT Praharana Muda Parama, PT Praja Kencana Murni, PT Prajaya Prima, PT Prakarsa Mitra Abadi, PT Prakarsa Utama Sejahtra, PT Praktisindo Sarana, PT Pramana Artha Raharja, PT Prampus Inti Puspita, PT Pranata Bumi Permai, PT Prapata Prima Coal, PT Prapatan Prima Coal, PT Prasma Jaya, PT Prastowo Pratama Bersama Pratama Bersama, PT Pratama Buana Sentosa, PT Pratama Energy Alam Tujuh, PT Pratama Energy Alam, PT Pratama Energy Bersama, PT Pratama Juang Mandiri, PT Pratama Mulia Utama, PT Pratama Nusa Dharma, PT Pratama Nusa Mineral, PT Pratama Putra Sejahtera, PT Pratama Sumber Bumibara, PT Pratama Tambang Abadi, PT Prema Kencana Mitra Sejahtera, PT Premium Coal Mining, PT Priamanaya Energi, PT Pribumi Citra Megah Utama, PT Prima Andalan Mandiri, PT Prima Anugerah Resources, PT Prima Bangun Persada Nusantara, PT Prima Bara Indonesia, PT Prima Bara Mahadana, PT Prima Bara Nusantara, PT Prima Bara Perkasa, PT Prima Bumi Pratama, PT Prima Bundiarta Nusa, PT Prima Cipta Dinamika, PT Prima Citra Nusantara, PT Prima Citra Palapa Sakti, PT Prima Coal Abadi, PT Prima Coal Mining, CV Prima Didi Nusantara, PT Prima Dodo, PT Prima Energy Utama Jaya, PT Prima Internusa Energy, PT Prima Karya Duta, PT Prima Karya Nusantara, CV Prima Kemakmuran Tambang, PT Prima Lestari Persada, PT Prima Lestari, CV Prima Maju Jaya Makmur, PT Prima Mandiri Logistic, PT Prima Mandiri, CV Prima Mineral Riau, PT Prima Mulia Sarana Sejahtera, PT Prima Nusa Sentosa, PT Prima Nusa, PT Prima Perkasa Abadi, PT Prima Raissa Abadi, PT Prima Rezkilla Energy, PT Prima Sari Utama, CV Prima Tambang Indonesia, PT Prima Tambara, PT Prima Timah Utama, CV Prima Timah Utama, PT Prima Tin, PT Prima Trinanda Jaya, PT Prima Utama Lestari, PT Prima Utama Mineral, PT Prima Utama, CV Prima Warna Tama, PT Primabahagia Permai Sejati, PT Primaraya Energi, PT Primastian Metal Pertama, PT Primatama Energi Nusantara, PT Primatech Gunajaya, CV Primer Koperasi Angkatan Darat Dim 0904 Primkopad Kodim 0607 Primkoppol Resort Pasir, PT Primkoveri Primkoveri Sanga Sanga Pringgondani Berseri, PT Prinsip Manunggal, CV Prisma Bara Indonesia, PT Prisma Multi Karya, PT Pritama, CV Priven Lestari, PT Priyanka Shona, PT Prizka Riskyah, PT Pro Fe Mineral, PT Pro Fe Nusantara, PT Pro Sarana Cipta, PT Progress Sumber Metalindo, PT Proindo Plus, PT Prolindo Cipta Nusantara, PT Proman Jaya Internasional, PT Promistis, PT Prospek Bumindo Sejahtera, PT Prosper Estu Mining, PT Providensia Makmur, PT Pt Triadi Cipta Gemilang Puang Cakra Buana, CV Puang Cakrabuana, CV Publik Opsi Mandiri, PT Pudjo Wibowo Puguk Sakti Permai, PT Pujakesuma Bersimpuh, PT Pujon Mandiri Jaya, PT Pujon Sumber Artha, PT Pulau Mutiara Persada, PT Pulaurusa Tamita, PT Punakawan Sumatera Internasional, PT Punakawan Sumatera International, PT Puncak Mercusuar, PT Puncak Mulia Energi, CV Pungkas Putranto Purasutan Plantindo, PT Purbaya Agung Jaya, CV Puri Aneka Rezeki, PT Puri Sakti Perkasa, PT Purimas Sarana Sejahtera, PT Purirangga Utama, PT Purnama Surya Cipta, PT Purnama, UD Purnawira Brata Sakti, CV Puro Nusa Dinamika, PT Purple Violets, PT Pusaka Agung Makmur, PT Pusaka Decorindah, PT Pusaka Marmer Indahraya(Pumarin), PT Pusaka Marmer Indahraya, PT Pusaka Pertambangan Mina, PT Pusaka Tanah Persada, PT Puspa Sari Indah , CV Puspita Alam Kurnia Lestari, PT Puspita Alam Kurnia, PT Put Sambo Primakaltim, PT Putera Bara Mitra, PT Putera Batu Mulia Kalimantan, PT Putera Bordak Khatulistiwa, CV Putera Ciandum Mining, PT Putera Ciwulan Mining, PT Putera Jaya Kamex, CV Putera Kaltim Abadi, PT Putera Kaltim Madani, PT Putera Mandiri Abadi, CV Putera Negeri Sakti, PT Putera Sausu Membangun, PT Putera Sulung Bubujung, PT Puteri Ahdadia, PT Putindo Bintech, PT Putra 1000 Daya, CV Putra Alam Lestari, PT Putra Anugerah, CV Putra Asyano Mutiara Timur, PT Putra Baja Sentosa, PT Putra Banten Mandiri, PT Putra Banua Tapin, PT Putra Bara Jaya, PT Putra Bara Utama, PT Putra Batu Licin Membangun, PT Putra Batu Raja Sentosa, PT Putra Batulicin, CV Putra Bintan Bersama, PT Putra Bintan Bestari, PT Putra Bintang Awai, PT Putra Daerah 99, CV Putra Daya Kalimantan, PT Putra Dayak Mandiri Putra Dayak Mandiri, PT Putra Dermawan Pratama, PT Putra Derutua, CV Putra Dewa Jaya, PT Putra Djahasa, PT Putra Galunggung, CV Putra Gamalama Mandiri, PT Putra Gunung Limbung, CV Putra Hulu Lematang, PT Putra Indonesia Jaya, PT Putra Intisultra Perkasa, PT Putra Jaya Berkatindo, PT Putra Jaya Garmenindo, PT Putra Jaya Perkasa, CV Putra Jujuhan Mandiri, PT Putra Kalimantan Energy, PT Putra Kalimantan Jaya, PT Putra Kaltim Abadi, PT Putra Kantisang, PT Putra Kayangan Tirtomoyo, CV Putra Kedaro Sejati, PT Putra Kencana, CV Putra Kusuma Abadi, PT Putra Maga Nanditama, PT Putra Mahakam Mandiri, Ksu Putra Mahkota Andalas, PT Putra Maluku Perkasa, PT Putra Mandala, CV Putra Mandiri Abadi, CV Putra Mandiri, CV Putra Marpan Ros Jaya, PT Putra Mekongga Sejahtera, PT Putra Muba Coal, PT Putra Nasa Mineral, PT Putra Nusantara Mining, PT Putra Oi Putra Oi, PT Putra Pangestu, PT Putra Parahyangan Mandiri, CV Putra Perkasa Indah, PT Putra Prima Sejahtera, PT Putra Sabui, PT Putra Samudra Padjajaran Ii, PT Putra Samudra, PT Putra Sandindo Raya, PT Putra Sarko Mining, PT Putra Sen Boking, PT Putra Solok Sejahtera, PT Putra Sulawesi Mining, PT Putra Sungai Kapuas, PT Putra Surya Kencana, PT Putra Tangguh Niagatama, PT Putra Tanjung Energy, PT Putra Timor Industri, PT Putra Timur Setia, CV Putra Tunggal Bersama, PT Putra Unggul, PT Putra Waehetu Mineral, PT Putra Wali Sejati, PT Putrajaya Garmenindo, PT Putrakencana, CV Putramas Bumi Agung , PT Putrasurya Kencana, PT Putri Ahdadia, CV Putri Lamahala, PT Putri Surya Pratama Natural, PT Putri Tunggal, PT Putri Wulandari, CV Putrimas Sejahtera, PT Putu Budi Harijane/ Ud. Harapan Jaya Putussibau Power Plan, PT Qadarmukti, CV Quality Sukses Sejahtera, PT Quantum Multi Mineral, PT Quarryndo Bukit Barokah, PT Quary Agung Sigigiran, CV Quasar Inti Nusantara, PT R.Dt.Rajo Pahlawan Rabani Corporindo, PT Rachmad Irianto Rachmat Kelantan Sakti, PT Rachmat, CV Rade Simamora Raden Bagus Cilik, CV Raden Pandji Soeparto, PT Radiance Energy, PT Radjawali Mega Prima, PT Rafala Silica International, PT Ragam Tata Mandiri Mas, PT Ragam Usaha Mineral, PT Rahayu Sejahtera, PT Rahayu Takka, CV Rahma Rahman, CV Rahma, CV Rahma., CV Rahmad Barajaya Utama, PT Rahmad Raya, CV Rahman, S.Pd Rahmat Illahi, CV Rahmat Indah Sukses Quarry, PT Rahmat Nikmat, CV Rahmat Prima Coal, CV Rahmat Tepian Utama, PT Rahmat, CV Ra’i, Sdr Raidi Plus Raihan Catur Putra, PT Raistama Wirakarya, PT Raja Ampat Putera Unggul, PT Raja Girsang Energi, PT Raja Kutai Baru Makmur, PT Raja Mineral Sejahtera, PT Rajaa Naufal Mandiri, PT Rajasa Agro Mandiri, PT Rajasa Perkasa Energy (Ex, PT Rajasa Agro Mandiri) Rajawali Agro Perkasa, PT Rajawali Rimba Perkasa, PT Rajawali Terbang Tinggi, PT Rajawali Wisnu Kencana, PT Rajehan Ariq, PT Rajib Xanana, PT Rajwa International, PT Rakhsa Internasional Mining, PT Rama Emerald Multi Sukses, PT Ramli. Sdr Ranah Tigo Luhak, CV Ranaspi Aryanori, PT Randu Hijau Lestari, PT Ranhill., PT Rani Aznanda Pratama, PT Rantaupanjang Utama Bhakti, PT Raodah Bumi Sultra, PT Rapak Anugerah Prima Coal, PT Rapolo, CV Rar Mineral, CV Rasmalan Landjaya, PT Rasuma Bersaudara, PT Ratih Utama, CV Ratna Sejahtera Mandiri Ratna Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Ratna Utama Karya, PT Ratok Mining, PT Ratu Alam Subur, PT Ratu Ayu, PT Ratu Ratna Mulya, PT Ratu Samban Mining, PT Ratu Sejagat, PT Ratu, CV Razana Shora, PT Razio Setia Mukti, PT Razza Nugraha Agro, CV Realita Jaya Mandiri, PT Recky Bari Red Dragon Energi Red Dragon Energi, PT Redi M. Ali, Sdr Redjo Santosa, CV Refined Bangka Tin, PT Rega Dan Refaldy Perkasa Rehoboth Pratama Internusa, PT Reinha Rosari, CV Rejeki Kurnia Alam, PT Rejeki Sukses, PT Rekasindo Guriang Tandang, PT Rekayasa Utama Interland, PT Relasi Lestari, PT Remaong Perkasa Mamdiri, PT Rembah Rembayu, CV Renaldy Tandy Kwee, Sdr Rencana Mulia Baratama, PT Rendo Mando, CV Reo Wahyudi Ardi,Se. Sdr Repindo Graha Nusa Sejati, PT Replay, PT Replika Citra Adhigraha, PT Republik Energi Nusantara, PT Rerong Alam Permai, PT, KSU Resky Utama, CV Resources Bumi Kelinjau, PT Resources Development Indonesia, PT Restu Abadi Mineral, PT Restu Azzahra, CV Restu Family, CV Restu Ibu Sejahtera, PT Restu Ibu, CV Restu Insan Sejahtera, PT Restu Mulia Kencana, PT Restu Putra, PT Resun Tenam Blok I, PT Resun Tenam Blok Ii, PT Rezeki Alam, PT Rezeki Kurnia Alam, PT Rezky Utama, CV Rheinline Bhakti Kencana, PT Rheno Resources, PT Rianti Riau Alam Anugerah Indonesia, PT Riau Bumi Mineral, PT Riau Bumi Resources, PT Riau Coalindo Energy, PT Riau Muara Berlian, PT Riau Multi Investama, PT Riau Paragon, CV Ribas Melawi Kapuas, PT Rich Marvellous Mineral Resources, PT Ricky Rasli Rida Jaya Mandiri, PT Ridlatama Nickelindo, PT Ridlatama Tambang Minerals, PT Ridlatama Trade Powerindo, PT Ridwan Dg. Sutte Rihendy Tri Jaya, PT Rikadi Sentosa, PT Rima Mining, PT Rimau Energy Mining, PT Rimau Tangguh Perkasa, PT Rimba Cahaya, PT Rimba Djaya Raya Rimba Karya Utama, PT Rimba Kurnia Alam, PT Rimba Subur Lestari, PT Rimbaka Mining Makmur, PT Rimbunan Karya Sukses Rimbunan Karya Sukses, PT Rimbunan Nusantara Abadi, PT Rinda Kaltim Anugerah , CV Rinda Kaltim Anugerah, CV Rinda Kaltim Anugerah, PT Rinda Putera Sejahtera Rinda Putra Sejahtera, CV Rindu Alam Lestari, PT Rindu Alam Raya, PT Rinjani Angkawijaya Lestari, PT Rinjani Indonesia, PT Rinjani Kartanegara, PT Rinsa, CV Rio Jaya Persada, PT Riota Jaya Lestari, PT Ripa Aba Karya Utama, PT Risda Utama Bersatu, PT Risdo Maya Harun Hb, Sdr Riski Belu, PT Risky Mulya Sejahtera, CV Risma Konstruksi Geotama, PT Risna Karya Wardhana Mandiri, PT Risul Sudarmadi. H. Sdr Riumamba Prima Nikel, PT Riva Global Mining, PT Rivatama Minerals, PT Rivurio, PT Riyan Pratama Sahapi, PT Riyanta Jaya, PT Riyanto,St. Sdr Rizka Jaya, CV Rizki Agung Pratama, PT Rizki Baratama Mandiri, PT Rizki Bintang, CV Rizki Bintang, PT Rizki Dinda, CV Rizki Indo Alam, CV Rizki Jabal Bara, CV Rizki Mulia Bara, CV Rizki Tambang Selaras, PT Rizky Baratama, CV Rizky Barito Timur, PT Rizky Dwi Utama, CV Rizky Mulya Sejahtera, CV Rizky Perdana Transport, CV Rizky Rahman, CV Rizky Rahman, PT Rizky Usaha Mandiri, PT Rizqi Awlad, PT Rizqi Cahaya Makmur, PT Rizqi Utama Indobara, PT Robert Kennedi, Hsb Rocco Merilla Barkah, PT Rock Republic, PT Rock Star International, PT Roda Dunia Abadi, PT Roda Niaga, PT Roda Nusantara, PT Rodamandala Asiamakmur, PT Rofenty Karsa Tama, PT Rohani Sirait, S.Pd. Rohanuddin S, H, Sdr Roheti Rohmat, Sdr Rohul Energi Indonesia, PT Romatech Internasional, PT Rony Putra, CV Roomel Energi, PT Roomell Energi, PT Ros Indopratama, PT Roshini Indonesia, PT Roslaeni Rasyid. Sdr Rosmawati, Sdr Royal Borneo, PT Royal Bumi Utama, PT Royal Buton Energy, PT Royal Inti Pertama, PT Royal Prima Coal, PT Royalti Mineral Bumi, PT Royalty Mineral Bumi, PT Rudi Hartono, Sdr Rudi Sutanto, Sdr Rudianto Kudadiri Rudiyanto Pei, Sdr Rudy Jaya Mandiri, CV Rudy Jaya Mandiri, PT Ruehno Cipta Persada, CV Rukun Dadi, Kud Rukun Sentosa, Kud Rumaju Energi Utama, PT Rungan Perkasa Jaya, CV Rungan Ria, PT Rusadi. Sdr Rusli/Helmi Musim Ryng Multitrada Asia, PT Ryng Multitrada, PT Sabadan Pitmas Lestari, PT Sabar Ginting Sabarudin, Sdr Sabina Ltd, PT Sadik Sadili Saepudin Safari Utama, PT Saferto Adhimanta, PT Saferto Adhitama, PT Saffaruddin Gassing, Sdr Safira, PT Sagita Berau Energi, PT Sagita Energi, PT Sago Prima Pratama, PT Sahabat Baru Century, PT Sahabat Mulia Sakti, PT Sahabu Sahbana Krisna Putra, PT Saheroi Mineral Perkasa, PT Sahidun (1) Sahidun (Ii) Sahnudin Bin Sahna Saijaan Bangun Banua, PT Saijaan Prima Coal, PT Sajam, CV Sajan Prima Coal, PT Saka Putra Perkasa, PT Sakari Lestari, PT Sakban Manik Sakti Global Persada, PT Sakum Sakura Ria, CV Sakura Ria, PT Sakura, CV Salaf Mulia, PT Saliby Panorama, PT Salimun. Sdr Salma. Sdr Salomo Mining, PT Salundik Sawang, PT Sam Mining, PT Sama Indah Prima, PT Sama Itah, CV Saman Hudi. Sdr Samana Citra Agung, PT Samantaka Batubara, PT Samarinda Berlian Utama, PT Samawa Mitra Abadi, PT Sambaki Tambang Sentosa, PT Sambas Minerrals Mining, PT Samboja Perdana Agung, PT Samiliar Group, CV Samindo Adi Perkasa, PT Samodera Pasir, CV Sampang Malem Sukatendel, Sdr Samsuddin Samsuddin Noor, St Samsul Samudera Banten Jaya, PT Samudera Dharma Hutama, PT Samudera Megah Abadi, PT Samudera Rejeki Perkasa, PT Samudera Sakti, CV Samudra Dharma Hutama, PT Samudra Hindia Jaya, PT Samudra Kencana Berlian, PT Samudra Raya Prima, PT Samuel Abadi, CV San Abacus Minera, PT Sanaman Mantikei Mandiri, PT Sandai Inti Jaya Tambang, PT Sandai Karya Utama, PT Sandeir Setia Brothers, PT Sandiego Multi Resource, PT Sandika, CV Sanex Resources Iternational, PT Sanga-Sanga Perkasa, CV Sangatta Gunung Mineral, PT Sangatta Kutai Makmur, PT Sangga Borneo, CV Sanggam Inti Perkasa, PT Sanggan Inti Perkasa, PT Sangkala Persada Sakti, PT Sangkot Siregar, Sdr Sangkuriang Perkasa, CV Sanmas Mekar Abadi 2, PT Sanmas Mekar Abadi 3, PT Sanmas Mekar Abadi, PT Santi Abadi Mandiri, PT Santika Alam, CV Santika Raya Perkasa, PT Santy Permatasari, PT Sany.Y.Y.Mesah Sapan. Sdr Saparudin, Sdr Saphire Mega Persada, PT Sapphire Mega Persada, PT Sapta Cipta Kencana, PT Sapta Jaya Menjak Sengewari, PT Sapta Mitra Nusantara, PT Sapta Persona Dinamika, PT Sapta Pesona Dinamika, PT Saptawirasta Mandiri, PT Sapto Raharjo, Sdr Saputra Kusuma Karya Saraburi Prima Coal, PT Sarana Baru, CV Sarana Bumi Minerindo, PT Sarana Cipta Gemilang, PT Sarana Daya Hutama, PT Sarana Emaesa Jaya Abadi, PT Sarana Energi Resources, PT Sarana Energy Resources, PT Sarana Jaya Manunggal, PT Sarana Karya, PT Sarana Kencana Mineral, PT Sarana Logam Unggul, PT Sarana Mandiri Utama, PT Sarana Marindo, PT Sarana Marine Perkasa Sarana Marine Perkasa, PT Sarana Mineral Indo Perkasa, PT Sarana Mineralindo Perkasa, PT Sarana Persada Raya, PT Sarana Putra Perdana, PT Sarana Sandmas Jaya Sakti, PT Sarana Sumber Daya Utama, PT Sarana Tambang Utama, PT Sarana Transportasi Kaltim, PT Sarana Usaha, CV Sarantau Karya, CV Sarara Formosa Perkasa, PT Sarasah Dinamika, PT Sari Agrindo Andalas Sari Agrindo Andalas, PT Sari Agung Semeru. Kpp Sari Alvilla Makmur, PT Sari Bumi Katingan, PT Sari Bumi Pertiwi, PT Sari Bumi Sejati, CV Sari Bumi Sejati, PT Sari Bumi Timur, PT Sari Bumi, PT (H. Marjono) Sari Hutan, CV Sari Nongko, PT Sari Semesta Utama, PT Sari Sri Bunga, PT Sari Utama, CV Sariagrindo Andalas, PT Sariangai Saribumi Sinar Karya, PT Saribumi Sinarkarya, PT Sarikin, CV Sariman Sarinur Surya Gemilang, PT Sarip Jepri, Sdr Saripratama Indo Resources, PT Saripratama Indoresources, PT Sariwiguna Binasentosa, PT Sariz Andatu Utama, PT Sarko Bungo Sedayu, PT Sarman, Sdr Saroha Mitra Perkasa, PT Sarolangun Bara Coal, PT Sarolangun Bara Prima, PT Sarolangun Karang Mendapo, PT Sarolangun Ketalo Coal, PT Sarolangun Prima Coal, PT Sarwidi, Sdr Saryono Sasana Sahabat Kompak Jaya, PT Sasangga Banua Banjar, PT Satanger Mineral Energy, PT Sato Mining (Ex.Injatama, PT) Satria Bara Mas, PT Satria Fajar Intim, PT Satria Gilang Mandiri, PT Satria Kartanegara Energi, PT Satria Lestari, PT Satria Lima Utama, PT Satria Mahkota Gotech, PT Satria Mahkota Gotek, PT Satria Mayangkara Sejahtera, PT Satria Perkasa Coal, PT Satria Perkasa Sandaran, PT Satria Pratama Mandiri, PT Satria Putera Agung, PT Satria Tapak Nawala, PT Satria, CV Satriati Jaya Sukses, PT Satrio Agro Foresto, PT Satriya Nurtami Satui Bina Usaha, CV Saturiah Sukses, PT Satwa Lestari Permai, PT Satya Mahatidana Utama Satya Mahatidana Utama, PT Satya Mitra Persada, PT Saudara Afif Khumaeni Saudara Agus Bayu Setiyawan, Se Saudara Asep Wawan Irawan Saudara Dandy Gustiar Saudara David Wijaya Sasmita Saudara Djemakir Hadi Sumarno Saudara Karwan Saudara Muksin Saudara Saiful Bahri M. Zein Saudara Sakino Saudara Sarno Saudara Sukainah Saudara Suroso Saudari Ika Yuliatina Hasmar Saudari Indrianti Saudari Siti Aminah Saudari Sugi Hastuti Saudari Sukainah Saude. Sdr Savannah Jaya Coal, PT Sawitto Mandiri, CV Sbi Energy Indonesia, PT Scord Mining (Ex.Injatama, PT) Sdr Junaidi Sdr Omon Sdr Suhada Sdr Titen Baskoro Sdr. Abdul Gani Sdr. Abubakari Sdr. Ahmaad Sucipto Sdr. Amri Sdr. Anton Anwar Pramana Sdr. Anwar Ramli Sdr. Ariyanto Sdr. Asmuni Trubus Sdr. Azharuddin Sdr. Azwar Zubir Sdr. Budianto Sdr. Bun Min Sdr. Buyung Sdr. Cairul Caniago Sdr. Damri Sdr. Dapa Sdr. Darsami Ismail Sdr. Dirman Sdr. Djong Fon Mie Sdr. Dudu J.N Sdr. Een Tarliah Sdr. Empeng Nuhung Sdr. Endang Ahyar Sdr. Fahrur Rozie Sdr. Ferdinan Pitoi Sdr. Feri Agung Sdr. Fong Fong Sdr. H. Agung Sujadi Sdr. H. B. Gondo Kustariadi Sdr. H. Muhammad Yunus (Yayasan Al Muhajirin) Sdr. H. Rahmat Sdr. H. Wawan Budiawan Sdr. Hadi Suryono, Se Sdr. Hakim Wibowo Sdr. Hakimuddin Sdr. Hamzah Sdr. Handi Susanto Sdr. Handy Halim Sdr. Hendri Sdr. Hendri Tjhie Sdr. Hendrik Sdr. Hi. Sibron Azis Sdr. Hm Rusly Hr (Cv. Stena Jaya) Sdr. Ho Soei Kian Sdr. Husen Is Sdr. Ir. Hi. Triyono Arifin., Mm Sdr. Iskandar Suhud Sdr. Kamidan Sdr. Karyono Sdr. Kasidik Sdr. Lie Kim Li Sdr. Linajantin Sdr. M. Jamil Ishka Sdr. Mansur B. Mahmud Sdr. Mardiansyah Sdr. Marsito Sdr. Martin Sdr. Masi Sdr. Masran Sdr. Moenadi Sdr. Muhibuddin Sdr. Mujino Sdr. Mursalim Kasim Sdr. Nasrudin. M Sdr. Nur Muhammad Sdr. Oman Suherman Sdr. Paniran Sdr. Paulus Ipik Fatah Hidayat Sdr. Pijiawan Sdr. Puji Siswoyo Sdr. Rasyidin Hasan Sdr. Razali Insya Sdr. Riduwan Sdr. Ridwan Sdr. Ridwan Ali Sdr. Rohmawati Sdr. Rusli Jamil Sdr. Sadirun Sdr. Sahrul Sdr. Saiful Cilik Sdr. Saksiong Sdr. Sandri Sdr. Saparudin Sdr. Sarip Sdr. Sayed Khairuzzaman Sdr. Septono Sdr. Sitir Sdr. Sofyan Sdr. Sofyan Pekerja Pengemudi Sdr. Sudarto Sdr. Sugiyono Sdr. Suharsono Sdr. Sukarna Sdr. Sumadi, S. Sos Sdr. Sumarjo Sdr. Sumarno Sdr. Sumarsono Sdr. Suparman Sdr. Suparto Sdr. Suwarno Sdr. Syamsu Duha Sdr. Syarbini Ibrahim Sdr. T. Abubakar Sdr. T. Muhibuddin Sdr. Tajudin Sdr. Tarjono Sdr. Tb. Lilik Azhar Sdr. Teuku Ammusri, Se Sdr. Tgk. Abdul Manan Sdr. Tgk. Muhammad Isa Sdr. Tjai Men Kho Sdr. Tjhie Tjiap Sdr. Tjhie Tjiap Hie Sdr. Tji Mentjong Sdr. Tukiman Sdr. Tumadji Sdr. Usman Sdr. Yahya Sdr. Zainal Abidin Sdr.Asan Saputra Sdr.Sutopo Sdr.Syapran Sdr.Syarbaini Abbas Sdri Hj.Sulmiati Sdri.Herlina Sebamban Indo Coal, PT Sebamban Terminal Coal, PT Sebayak Juhar, PT Sebo Agung, PT Sebukit Energy, PT Sebuku Batubai Coal, PT Sebuku Iron Lateritic Ores, PT Sebuku Karambu Coal, PT Sebuku Mitra Energi, PT Sebuku Sejaka Coal, PT Sebuku Selaru Coal, PT Sebuku Suwangi Coal, PT Sebuku Tanjung Coal, PT Sederhana Jaya Abadi, PT Sederhana Karya Jaya, PT Sedulang Raya, PT Sega Bara Persada, PT Segara Prima Coal Mining Segara Prima Coal Mining, PT Segoro Global Mandiri, PT Segumas Jabal Barokah, PT Sehati Jaya Pratama, PT Seia Mitra Mandiri, PT Seirama Tim Investment, PT Sejahtera Abadi Jaya Sejahtera Abadi Jaya, PT Sejahtera Utama Powerindo, PT Sejahtera Utama, CV Sejati 555 Sampurna Nuswantara, PT Sekadau Membangun, PT Sekar Abadi Nusantara, PT Sekar Arum Setyo Abadi, PT Sekar Pratama Mandiri, PT Sekar Sari, CV Sekhinah Raya, PT Seko Bukit Mas, PT Sekti Rahayu Indah, PT Sela Bara Sela Bara, PT Selama Indah, PT Selamat, CV Selaras Bumi Banua, PT Selatan Arc Minerals, PT Selatan Jaya Melawi, PT Selatan Jaya, CV Selatan Selabara, PT Selatnasik Indokwarsa, PT Sele Raya Mining, PT Sele Raya, PT Selo Agung, PT Selo Amalia, CV Selo Giri Mulya Raya, PT Selo Makmur Sentosa, CV Selo Moro Banyu Arto, PT Selo Putro, CV Selomukti Baru, CV Seluma Prima Coal, PT Semangat Bangun Wijaya , PT Semangat Inti Sukses Sejahtera, PT Semarang Mineral Pembangunan, PT Sembada Bina Persada, PT Sembilan Setia Mitra, PT Sembilan Sumber Mas, PT Sembilan Tiga Perdana, PT Semen Baturaja (Persero), PT Semen Baturaja, PT Semen Bosowa Maros, PT Semen Bosowa Sukabumi, PT Semen Cibinong Tbk, PT Semen Dwima Agung, PT Semen Gresik (Persero), PT Semen Gresik, PT Semen Grobogan, PT Semen Padang, PT Semen Tonasa, PT Semeru Jaya Abadi, CV Semesta Alam Barito, PT Semesta Berjaya, PT Semesta Centra Mas, PT Semesta Raya Mineral, PT Semoi Prima Lestari, PT Senamas Energindo Mineral, PT Senamas Energindo Mining, PT Sendawar Jaya Sendawar Jaya, PT Sendawar Sumber Coalindo Sendawar Sumber Coalindo, PT Seneca Indonesia, PT Seng Wha, PT Senjaya Rejekimas, PT Senopati Indo Perkasa, PT Sentekan Jaya, PT Sentika Mitra Persada, PT Sentosa Bara Jaya Utama, PT Sentosa Kurnia Energi Bahagia, PT Sentosa Kurnia Energi, PT Sentosa Laham Bara Sentosa Laham Bara, PT Sentosa Mulia Bahagia, PT Sentosa Sukses Makmur, PT Sentra Tin Indo, PT Sentral Labuan Tegar Mandiri, PT Sentral Maxindo Selaras, PT Sentratama Karya Cemerlang, PT Senutuk Indah, CV Senyiur Sukses Pratama, PT Sepiak Jaya Kaltim, PT Sera Mukti Lestari, PT Sera Uni Gati, PT Seram Jaya Perkasa , PT Serandil Makmur, CV Serangkai Jaya, PT Seribu Pulau Indo Mining, PT Serimpun Mitra Taka Jaya, KSU Serinding Sumber Makmur, PT Serongga Sumber Lestari, PT Serumpun Sebalai, CV Serviam Resources, PT Servo Buana Resources, PT Setia Gunung Benuan Setia Indah Abadi, PT Setia Karya, UD Setia Maju Pratama, PT Setia Mineral Resources, PT Setia Tunggal Abadi, PT Setiakawan Makmur Bersama, PT Setianegara Sejahtera Abadi, PT Setiawan Budhiarto, St Setiawan Kumalagiri, PT Setya Buana, CV Seulawah Jaya, PT Shaka , CV Shaka, CV Shana Tova Anugerah, PT Shandi Jaya Akbar Shanindo Indah, PT Shantung Mineral Resources, PT Sharan Sumber Makmur, PT Shekinah Glory, CV Shenmao Gotongroyong Jaya, PT Shenniu Mining Indonesia, PT Sherena Daywa Abadi, CV Sherena Daywa Abadi, PT Shoka Lestari, PT Shore, PT Shuka Bhuana Investindo, CV Si Nar Jaya Sultra Utama, PT Si Nar M Utiara Sejahtera, PT Siadjoeng Raya, CV Siam Karya Silika, CV Siarakka Sejahtera Abadi, PT Siarakka Udan Berkat, PT Siaw Fut Hiong Siba-Safa Kayang Abadi, PT Sibau Equatorial Mining, PT Sidanawa Maju, PT Sido Makmur, PT, KUD Sidodadi Indah Sentosa, CV Siemon Damai Sejahtera Siger Mineral, PT Sigma Cemerlang Sinergi, PT Sigma Megasarana, PT Sigmadaya Arthaguna, PT Sihapas Bara Utama, PT Silangkop Nusa Raya, PT Silau Kencana, PT Silica Mining Industry, CV Silika Tiga Mas, PT Silikka Agung, CV Silva Andia Utama, PT Simanarinda Lintas Nusantara, PT Simaskaubelind, PT Simpang Rupat Sejahtera Simpang Rupat Sejahtera, PT Simpangpesak Indokwarsa, PT Simson P.Sianipar Drs. Sinamarinda Lintas Nusantara, PT Sinar Agung, CV Sinar Alam, CV Sinar Amurang Abadi, PT Sinar Anugerah Sukses, PT Sinar Anugrah Gemilang, CV Sinar Asia Fortuna, PT Sinar Asia, CV Sinar Aurin, PT Sinar Bahri Ceria, PT Sinar Bali Bina Karya, PT Sinar Banten Utama, PT Sinar Bara Abadi, PT Sinar Bara Manik, CV Sinar Bara Nusantara, PT Sinar Bara Papua Cemerlang, PT Sinar Barito Global, CV Sinar Barito Global, PT Sinar Batu Sakti Lestari I, PT Sinar Batu Sakti Lestari Ii, PT Sinar Bumi Baratama, PT Sinar Bumi Persada, PT Sinar Fajar Persada, PT Sinar Gemini, CV Sinar Global, PT Sinar Graha Segara, PT Sinar Gunung Moile, PT Sinar Hakiki Multi, PT Sinar Harapan Batuah, PT Sinar Inti Bersama, PT Sinar Jaya Nusantara, CV Sinar Jaya, CV Sinar Kalimantan Inti Tambang, PT Sinar Kapuas Mining, PT Sinar Karisma Terang, PT Sinar Kartika, CV Sinar Karya Mandiri Lestari, PT Sinar Karyagamma Primatama, PT Sinar Kembar Lestari, PT Sinar Kemilau Abadi, PT Sinar Khatulistiwa Energi Jaya, PT Sinar Kumala Naga, PT Sinar Kusuma Kalimantan, PT Sinar Logindo Alam, PT Sinar Lutung, CV Sinar Mahakam Utama Mining, PT Sinar Makmur Cemerlang, PT Sinar Makmur Gemilang, CV Sinar Mandiri, CV Sinar Mega Selaras, PT Sinar Mentari, CV Sinar Mentari, PT Sinar Mestika Nusantara, PT Sinar Morokarta Perkasa, PT Sinar Motor, UD Sinar Mulia Coal, CV Sinar Mulia Pratama, PT Sinar Mulia, CV Sinar Mutiara Abadi Lestari, PT Sinar Mutiara Kubar Sinar Mutiara Kubar, PT Sinar Mutiara, CV Sinar Pagi, CV Sinar Pelita Group, CV Sinar Persada, CV Sinar Persada, PT Sinar Putra Pratama, PT Sinar Putra Sejahtera, PT (An Betty Donna Christina S) Sinar Rejeki Ekonomi, PT Sinar Samudera, PT Sinar Sejahtera Perkasa, PT Sinar Sepauk Mining, PT Sinar Super Indah, PT Sinar Tambang Arthalestari, PT Sinar Tambang Nusantara, PT Sinar Tempunak Mining, PT Sinar Terang Lestari, PT Sinar Terang Mandiri, PT Sinar Timur Utama Indonesia, PT Sinar Usaha Sejati, PT Sinar Wetabua, CV Sinar Wijaya Pratama, PT Sinarma Sakato, KUD Sindo Mandiri, PT Sindo Resources, PT Sino Indocoal Perkasa, PT Sino Indocoal Permata, PT Sino Indocoal Pratama, PT Sinomast Mining, PT Sinosteel Indonesia Mining, PT Sinsantuk, CV Sinta Mani, PT Sintang Jaya Coal, PT Sintang Sumber Mineral, PT Sintika, CV Sinto Makmur, CV Sipatuo Sipatokong, Ksu Sirajuddin. Sdr Sirih Mas Pratama, PT Sirih Merah Rejeki, PT Sirtu Karya Utama, PT Sirtu Pratama Usaha, PT Sischo Artha, PT Siswoyo, Sdr Sitasa Energi, PT Siti Maju Sejahtera, PT Siti Naula Skyland Energy Power, PT Skylyne Flores Adijaya, PT Slamet Barjono, Sdr Slamet Haryanto, Sdr Slamet Raharjo. Sdr Smalco Dwiputra, PT Soe Makmur Resources, PT Soeria Persada Sakti, CV Soetrisno Sofira Sukses Marmeril, PT Sokki Prima Coal, PT Soko Joyo Makmur, PT Solaris Tridaya Niaga, PT Soleh Solindo Makmur Pratama, PT Songo Abadi Inti, PT Sonokeling Buana Sotomo South Pasific Resources, PT Spirit Jaya, PT Spison Brajo , PT Sri Kencana Wungu, PT Sri Mulyani, Sdri Sri Pandawa Makmur, PT Sri Widayati, Sdr Sribangun Jaya Persada, PT Srijunta Bharata Yudha, PT Sriwijaya Bara Priharum, PT Sriwijaya Bintang Tiga Energi, PT Sriwijaya Bintangtiga Energi, PT Sriwijaya Energi Persada, PT Sriwijaya Mineral, PT Sriwijaya Prima Energi, PT Sriwijaya Raya, PT Sriwijaya Utama, CV Sriyudi Alam Perkasa, CV Sriyudi Globalindo Perkasa, PT St Nickel Resources, PT St. Resources, PT St. Zulkarnaen Stagen Indah Borneo Stanika Gempika, PT Stanika Gempita, PT Stanindo Inti Perkasa Star Green Resources, PT Stargate Pasific Resources, PT Stasiunkota Sarana Permai, PT Statika M Itrasarana, PT Statika Mitra Sarana, PT Station Kota Sarana Permai, PT Stebers, CV Stepa Wirausaha Adiguna, PT Stone House, CV Stone Valley Energy, PT Sua Windu, PD Suar Harapan Bangsa, PT Suardi Solo. Sdr Subakas Makmur Subardan, Sdr Subaru Duta Makmur, PT Subhan Maulana, Sdri Subur Alam Kalimantan Utama, PT Suchai & Krish Internatonal, PT Suchai Krish International, PT Suchrodi.H. Sdr Suci Ayu Putri, CV Suci Karya Badinusa, PT Suda Miskin, PT Sudamanik, PT Sudarman Sudarman. M/ Perusda ‘sari Gunung’ Ponorogo Drs. Sudarno. Sdr Sudi Bangun Persada, PT Sudin Sudir. Sdr Sudirman Abdurachman Sudirman, Sdr Sudirman.Sdr Sugico Development Sugico Development, PT Sugico Graha, PT Sugico Mintindo Indonesia Sugico Mintindo Indonesia, PT Sugico Pendragon Energi, PT Sugih Bara Selaras, PT Sugihono, CV Sugiyarti Untung Suhardi Tahir. Sdr Suhardi, Sdr Suhartono, S.E Suhendro, Sdr Suhyad. Sdr Sujud Bumi Berkah, PT Suka Ayu Persada, CV Sukadamai Teletjike. Sdr Sukamto S. Darsono, Sdr Sukarame, CV Sukendras Sukirno Sukma Abadi, CV Sukses Bara Kaltim, PT Sukses Indo Resources, PT Sukses Jaya Mandiri Perkasa, PT Sukses Mendulang Mas, PT Sukses Mentaya Jaya, PT Sukses Usaha Mandiri, CV Suksesprima Graha Mandiri, PT Sulaksaana Watinsa Indonesia, PT Sulawesi Bumi Mineral, PT Sulawesi Bumi Prima, PT Sulawesi Cahaya Mineral, PT Sulawesi Resources, PT Sulbasri, Sdr Sulemandara Konawe, PT Sulindra Perkasa Sakti, PT Sulistia, CV Sultan Adam, CV Sultan Rafli Mandiri, CV Sulteng Mineral Harvest, PT Sulteng Mineral Prima, PT Sultra Jembatan Mas, PT Sultra Raya Tambang, PT Sultra Sarana Bumi, PT Sultra Timbel Mas, PT Sultra Utama Nikel, PT Suma Heksa Sinergi, PT Suma Wira Mineral, CV Sumagud Sapta Sinar, PT Sumaindotim, PT Sumara Nikarya, PT Sumardi. Sdr Sumarjo,Sdr Sumarlin Sumarsono, Sdr Sumartono Sumasaka Luban Abadi, PT Sumatera Coal Persada, PT Sumatera Ina Mineraindo, PT Sumatera Tenggara Minerals, PT Sumatera Timurindonesia, PT Sumatra Timur Indonesia, PT Sumatra Timurindonesia, PT Sumawijaya. Be. Sdr Sumba Granit Industri, PT Sumbar Calcium Pratama, PT Sumbar Perkasa Jaya, PT Sumbawa Barat Sejahtera Bersama, PT Sumbawa Batu Mulia, PT Sumbawa Jutaraya, PT Sumber Agro Lestari, PT Sumber Agung Budi Mulia, PT Sumber Alam Abadi Semesta, PT Sumber Alam Antarnusa, PT Sumber Alam Borneo, CV Sumber Alam Cipta Nusantara, PT Sumber Alam Dirgamaju, PT Sumber Alam Gemilang, CV Sumber Alam Inti Mandiri, PT Sumber Alam Makmur Utama, PT Sumber Alam Megakarya, PT Sumber Alam Murni Sejahtera, PT Sumber Alam Resources, PT Sumber Alam Timor, PT Sumber Andesit Raya, PT Sumber Anugerah Timor Sumber Api, PT Sumber Ardi Swarna, PT Sumber Arum Energi, PT (Blok I) Sumber Arum Energi, PT (Blok Ii) Sumber Bara Abadi Mineral, PT Sumber Bara Abadi, PT Sumber Bara Persada, PT Sumber Batu Berkah, PT Sumber Batu Niaga, CV Sumber Bumi Group, PT Sumber Bumi Kalbar, PT Sumber Bumi Mining, PT Sumber Bumi Perkasa, PT Sumber Cipta Abadi, CV Sumber Cipta, CV Sumber Daya Alam Abadi, PT Sumber Daya Energi, PT Sumber Daya Kumala, PT Sumber Daya Persada, PT Sumber Energi Alam Lestari, PT Sumber Energi Jaya, PT Sumber Energi Kalimantan, PT Sumber Globalindo Mining, PT Sumber Griya Permai, PT Sumber Gunung Maju, PT Sumber Harapan Energy, PT Sumber Hidup Kekal Abadi, PT Sumber Ilmu Pratama, PT Sumber Inti Jaya, PT Sumber Jaya Asia Makmur Sumber Jaya Asia Makmur, PT Sumber Jaya Asia, PT Sumber Jaya Indah, PT Sumber Jaya Prima Kencana, PT Sumber Jenjang Abadi, PT Sumber Kalbar Lestari, PT Sumber Katingan Mineral Makmur, PT Sumber Kencana Bumi Kaya, PT Sumber Kiat Sejahtera, PT Sumber Laut Perkasa, CV Sumber Makin Mulia, PT Sumber Makmur Alammindo, PT Sumber Mangaan Sakti, PT Sumber Mas, CV Sumber Minera Bersama, PT Sumber Mineral Indonesia, PT Sumber Mineral Nusantara, PT Sumber Mineral Perdana, PT Sumber Mineral Raya, PT Sumber Mineral Utama, CV Sumber Mineral Utama, PT Sumber Mining Sampuraga, PT Sumber Mitra Jaya, PT Sumber Murni, CV Sumber Permata Hitam, PT Sumber Permata Selaras, PT Sumber Prima Energi Buana, PT Sumber Prima Lestari, PT Sumber Rahayu Indah, PT Sumber Rejeki Cemerlang, PT Sumber Rejeki Ekonomi, PT Sumber Rejeki, CV Sumber Rejeki, UD Sumber Rezki Lestari, PT Sumber Rizki Mulya Abadi, PT Sumber Saran Sempurna Sumber Sarana Kencana, PT Sumber Sejahtera Lestari, PT Sumber Sejahtera Lestari, UD Sumber Setia Budi, PT Sumber Surya Gemilang, PT Sumber Surya Mineral Balocci, PT Sumber Suryadaya Prima, PT Sumber Swarna Pratama, PT Sumber Usaha, Kud Sumber Wahau Jaya, PT Sumber Wahyu Agung, PT Sumber Wahyu Mulyo, PT Sumbergas Sakti Prima, PT Sumberjati Pratama Selatan, PT Sumberpelita Timurnusantara, PT Sumilir Jaya Kembar, CV Summitama Intinusa, PT Sumo Folde Energi, PT Sumo Papua Energi, PT Sumono Sun Indo Bahana, PT Sun Indo Bara Bahana, PT Sunanto Sunarko. Sdr Sunfan Jaya Persada, CV Sung Putera Persada, PT Sungai Belati Coal, PT Sungai Berlian Bhakti, PT Sungai Berlian Jaya, CV Sungai Danau Jaya, PT Sungai Mas Prima, PT Sungai Pangean Jaya, PT Sungroup Managemen Indonesia, PT Sunta Simorangkir Sunur Sumber Rejeki, PT Suparamaian Suparjo Suparman Paseng, Sdr Suparman, Sdr Supendi. Sdr Super Indah, PT Super Latex Concentrate, PT Super Star Beton Supra Bara Energi Supra Bara Energi, PT Supraco, CV Supratama Mandiri, PT Supreme Alam Resource, PT Supriyanto Supriyono. Sdr Surahman Suraindo Bara, CV Suraindo Bara, PT Suratman, CV. Wonojoyo Suratno, Sdr Suraya Megah Cemerlang, PT Suri Harsya Sejahtera, PT Suriah. Sdr Suriansyah, Sdr Suruk Bara Perkasa, PT Surya Abadi Gemilang, CV Surya Abadi Gemilang, PT Surya Abadi, CV Surya Alam Indostone, PT Surya Amindo Perkasa, PT Surya Anugrah Sejahtera, PT Surya Bangun Sarana, PT Surya Berlian Jaya, CV Surya Bersaudara, PT Surya Borneo Sejahtera, PT Surya Borneo, PT Surya Bumi Wangi, CV Surya Cipangeran, CV Surya Citra Mulia Surya Citra Mulia, PT Surya Eden, PT Surya Gemilang, CV Surya Global Makmur, PT Surya Harapan Baru, CV Surya Ichsan,Se Surya Indah Khatlistiwa, PT Surya Indo Global, PT Surya Indonesia Mineral Bersaudara, PT Surya Intan Kubu Raya, PT Surya Jaya Sejahtera. Sdr Surya Kalimantan Sejati, PT Surya Kemilau Perkasa, PT Surya Kencana Pertiwi Tambang, PT Surya Kencana, PT Surya Kirana Dutamas, PT Surya Kutim Mining, PT Surya Kuttim Mining, PT Surya Labuan Sari, PT Surya Lestari, CV Surya Lintas Express, PT Surya Megah Alam, PT Surya Mineral Resources, PT Surya Perdana Sakti, PT Surya Prima Artha, CV Surya Prima Mining, PT Surya Putra Banua, CV Surya Rahmadina Bersaudara, PT Surya Ronna Internusa, PT Surya Saga Utama, PT Surya Sakti Darma Kencana, PT Surya Seruni, PT Surya Sunfan Dwi Bahtera, CV Surya Tam Bang Tolindo, PT Surya Tambang Perkasa, PT Surya Tambang Tolindo Surya Teknik, CV Surya Wilardo, PT Surya, CV Suryabara Tambang Andalas, PT Suryabara Tambangandalas, PT Suryandi Mulia, CV Suryang Pati, PT Suryanti Suryaraya Cahaya Cemerlang, PT Suryaraya Permata Khatulistiwa, PT Suryaraya Pusaka, PT Suryatiara Nusa Wahana, PT Suryawarsika Putra, PT Susanti Megah Perkasa, CV Susanto Rusli, Sdr Susrini, Sdr Suswanto. Ir Sutakrim. Sdr Sutari Suwardana Praptama, PT Suwarno Suwira Pastika Mining, PT Suwito, Sdr Suwon Prima Pratama, PT Suyanti Suyati, Sdr Suyitno, Sdr Svarna Interloka Landcore, PT Swabina Gatra, PT Swadana Puranugraha, PT Swadaya Hutani Alam, PT Swakarya Pandugraha, PT Swara Kaltim Abadi, PT Swarna Harsa Sejahtera, PT Swasembada Mineral Indonesia, PT Swaskarya Idial Bhuana, PT Swi Mineralindo Utama, PT Syabas Sumbawa Mineral, PT Syafriadi Syah Alam, CV Syahid Berau Bestari, PT Syahid Indah Utama, PT Syahnur, PT Syahrir, S. Ag Syahrol, Sdr Syahru Melawi Mineral, PT Syam & Syah Arya Sinergy Investment, PT Syam & Syah Aryasynergy Investment, PT Syam Kalimantan Putera, PT Syamsinar Syamsudin.Sdr Syamsul Bahri Syamsul Jaya Syamsuri Syarief Syarifudin Herryansyah.Sdr Sylva Sari, PT Synergy Kemala Asia, PT Synergy Maju Bersama, PT Synergy Mining, PT Synergy Silica Asia, PT Synfuels Indonesia Synfuels Indonesia, PT System Tata Anugrah Resources, PT Tabalar Coal Mining, PT Tabalong Makmur, PT Tabalong Pratama Mineral, PT Tabalong Prima Resources, PT Tadjahan Antang Mineral, PT Taha Ambe Kadang Tahiti Coal, CV Taido Borneo Makmur, PT Tajur Wahyu Pratama Takaras Intilestari, PT Takengon Mineral Resources, PT Takindo Artha Pratama Matahari, PT Tala Mineral Resources, PT Talang Ubi Coal, PT Talawi Jaya Coal, PT Talawi Pangkalan Permata, PT Talenta Bina Persada, PT Talenta Bumi Makmur, PT Talenta Bumi, PT Talenta Kapuas Raya, PT Talenta Pujon Lestari, PT Talenta Sena Mulia, PT Talenta Utama, CV Taliabu Mineralindo Sejahtera, PT Talilo, CV Talugon Roma Mining Taman Damai, CV Taman Indah Makmur Sejahtera, PT Taman Indah, PT Tamarindo Karya Resources, PT Tamarona Mas International, PT Tambang Aneka Mineral, PT Tambang Barat Nusantara, PT Tambang Batu Cikubang, PT Tambang Batubara Harum, PT Tambang Benua Alam Raya, PT Tambang Berkah Utama, PT Tambang Buana Andalan, PT Tambang Bumi Sulawesi, PT Tambang Emas Cemerlang, PT Tambang Indonesia Sejahtera, PT Tambang Indrapuri Jaya, PT Tambang Inti Prima, PT Tambang Island Nusantara, PT Tambang Jaya Inadah, CV Tambang Jaya Indah, PT Tambang Jaya Raya, PT Tambang Lestari, PT Tambang Melawi, PT Tambang Mineral Andalas, PT Tambang Mineral Maju, PT Tambang Mulia, PT Tambang Nikel Matuari, PT Tambang Nusantara Perdana, PT Tambang Orbit Prima, PT Tambang Rejeki Kolaka, PT Tambang Sejahtera Bersama, PT Tambang Sekarsa Adadaya, PT Tambang Semen Sukabumi, PT Tambang Sungai Suir, PT Tambang Timah, PT Tambangindo Makmur Sentosa, PT Tambulan Pangian Indah, PT Tambulun Pangian Indah, PT Tambulun Panual Jaya, PT Tambunan Tamiang Alam Mulia, PT Tamiang Jaya Perkasa, PT Tamiang Jaya, PT Tamiang Petroleum Taminarta Kencana, PT Tamindo Mutiara Perkasa, PT Tamiyang Jaya Perkasa, PT Tampaure Jaya Mandiri, CV Tampilan Sakti, PT Tampomas, CV Tamtama Perkasa, PT Tanah Bumbu Resources, PT Tanah Kayo, CV Tanah Putih, UD Tanah Siang Gold, PT Tanahdo Mining, PT Tanakay Prima, CV Tanggamus Karya Alam, PT Tangguh Wanareka, PT Tango Indah Persada, PT Tangse Gunong Pusaka, PT Tani Jaya Murni, KUD Tanito Bara Sukses, PT Tanjung Air Berani, PT Tanjung Bartim Kurnia, PT Tanjung Batang Asam, PT Tanjung Eka Raya, CV Tanjung Idola, PT Tanjung Kemala Raya, PT Tanjung Kurung Sakti, PT Tanjung Mas Sentosajaya, PT Tanjung Mas, PT Tanjung Mulia Persada, PT Tanjung Nusantara Bahari, PT Tanjung Prima Mining, PT Tanjungbelit Bara Utama, PT Tanjungmas Sentosajaya, PT Tansri Madjid Energi, PT Tantra Energy, PT Tantra Mining Development, PT Tantra Mining Resources, PT Tantri Majid Energi, PT Tanur Jaya, PT Tapak Bara Indonesia, PT Tapak Emas, PT Tapak Resources Persada, PT Tapanuli Selatan Membangun, PT Tapin Membangun, CV Tapin Sarana Jaya Tapin Sarana Jaya, PT Tara Indonusa Coal, PT Tarrent Prabu Perkasa, PT Taruna Abadi, PT Taruna Perkasa, PT Taruna Wahana, CV Tarungin Membangun, CV Tasan, Sdr Tasig Bahari Pratama, PT Tasman Mulia Kencana, PT Tasripin Muntohari. Sdr Tata Borneo Wikajaya Tata Borneo Wikajaya, PT Tata Buana Kharisma Tata Buana Kharisma, PT Tata Cipta, CV Tata Fajar Transtama, PT Tatanan Indah Fajar Cemerlang, PT Tatang Tamyid Supriadi, Sdr Tatanugraha Bina Mandiri, PT Taufik Sofyan, Sdr Taufiq Saputra, CV Taupik, Sdr Tawabu Mineral Resources, PT Tawang Mineral Indonesia, PT Tayan Alumina Abadi, PT Tebet Mas Indah, PT Tebo Agung Internasional, PT Tebo Bara Prima, PT Tebo Inti Batubara, PT Tebo Tunggal Lestari, PT (Ex. Globalindo Alam Lestari) Tech Drilling International, PT Technokarya Utama Prima, PT Techserve Solusitama, PT Teguh Agung Sejahtera, PT Teguh Iman Surya Indah, PT Teguh Solawat. Sdr Teguh Supriyanto, Sdr Teja Sekawan, PT Teja, CV Tekad Bakti Banua, PT Tekindo Energi, PT Teklin Utama Futura Teklin Utama Futura, PT Teknik Alum Service, PT Tekno Marina Cipta, PT Tekno Orbit Persada Pt Tekno Orbit Persada, PT Tekonindo, PT Teladan Mandiri, PT Telaga Bintan Jaya , PT Telaga Bintan Jaya, PT Telaga Indah Mining, PT Telaga Kencana Prima, PT Telaga Makmur Abadi, PT Telawang Megah Jaya, PT Telen Eco Coal, PT Telen Orbit Prima, PT Telen Paser Prima, PT Teluk Buli Sentosa, PT Teluk Kijing Energi, PT Tembesi Coalindo, PT Tempirai Energi Resources, PT Tempirai Energy Resources, PT Tenaga Perkasa Nasional, PT Teophila Abadi, PT Tepian Indah Sukses Tepian Indah Sukses, PT Teramahkota Megah Kreasi (Blok I), PT Teramahkota Megah Kreasi, PT Terang Gemilang (Sixjen Siboro), CV Terang Guna Sentosa, PT Terang Prakarsa Cipta, PT Teras A.Anggen Teras Purai Tanajaya, PT Teratai Bindo Utama, PT Teratai Putih, CV Teratai Sakti Abadi, PT Terbanggi Subing Batu Betuah Terbit Rencana Pa, Se Tercipta Megah, PT Tering Coal Mining Tering Coal Mining, PT Terminalindo Idaman Permai, PT Terrarex Lumins Jaya, PT Tersanjung, CV Terus Jaya, CV Teteng Sukendar Thailand, CV Thamara Bara, CV The Grand Lj Fullerton Succesful, PT Thomas Jaya Trecimplant Abadi, PT Thomas Jaya Trecimplant, PT Thomy Group, CV Thousand Flower Blossom, PT Tiang Bulaeng Perkasa, PT Tiar Daya Sembada, PT Tiara Alam Raya, PT Tiara Bara Borneo, PT Tiara Basama, PT Tiara Gading, CV Tiara Graha Sejati, CV Tiara Utfar Mandiri, PT Tiardo Jaya, PT Tibawan Energi Indonesia, PT Tiga Baji, PT Tiga Berlian Abadi, PT Tiga Mandiri, CV Tiga Mas Nusantara, PT Tiga Perkasa, CV Tiga Puteri, CV Tiga Samudra Perkasa, PT Tiga Sejahtera, PT Tiga Serangkai Banuang, CV Tiga Utama, CV Tigadaya Minergi, PT Tigadaya Utama, PT Tiger Root, PT Tilongkabila Nusantara Indonesia, PT Timah (Persero) Tbk, PT Timah Eksplomin, PT Timah Nusantara, PT Timah Tbk, PT Timor Generasi, PT Timor Indah Abadi, PT Timor Makmur Resources, PT Timor Makmur, CV Timor Mangan Abadi, PT Timor Marmer Industri Timor Mineral, CV Timor Nusa Cendana, PT Timor Sejahtera , CV Timor Tambang Lestari, PT Timur Raya Mas, PT Timur Raya Mining, PT Tina Yusuf, PT Tingang Kuai Abadi, CV Tinindo Inter Nusa, PT Tinindo Internusa, PT Tira Tangka Balang, PT Tiramana, PT Tiran Indonesia, PT Tirta Buana Pratama, PT Tirta Madu Sawit Jaya, PT Tirta Mining Kahuripan, CV Tirta Utama, CV Tirtobumi Adyatunggal, PT Tirtomoyo Murni Abadi, PT Tirus Putra Mandiri, PT Tirwan Suwanto. Sdr Tisma Global Nusantara, PT Titan Aneka Tambang, PT Titan Bumi Artha, PT Titan Prawira Sriwijaya, PT Titan Ventures, PT Titian Emas Sejati, CV Titian Makmur Persada, PT Titian Reski, PT Titian Utama Tanah Bumbu, PT Titiek Widjayanti Titisan Mangan Resources, PT Tiuh Mas, PT Tiwa Abadi, PT Tjan Lan Hiong Tjipto Hadi, Sdr Tms Artha Marth, PT Toba Tin Sejahtera, PT Tobas Kaula Kencana, PT Togu Sihombing Tomafed Karya Mandiri, PT Tomarindo Dwi Mulia, PT Tombu Sabora, CV Tomini Surya Lestari, PT Tommy Utama, CV Tomy Marannu, PT Tong Li Tambang Utama, PT Tonia Mitra Sejahtera, PT Tony Sundowo Hartono. Sdr Top Mineral Indonesia, PT Toshida Indonesia, PT Tossa Multi Tambang, PT Total Prima Indonesia, PT Toya Mas Sejahtera, PT Toyamas Artomoro Jaya, PT Trans Mega Media, PT Trans Power Indonesia, PT Trans Sulawesi Tenggara, PT Transcoal Energy Indonesia, PT Transcoal International, PT Transcoal Minergy, PT Transindo Bara Cemerlang, PT Transisi Energi Satu Nama, PT Transisi Energy Satunama, PT Tras Jaya Utama, PT Trasindo Sumber Mineral, PT Trasindo Sumber Mineral, PT Industry (Pt. Icci) Tri Astami Jaya, PT Tri Bakti Sarimas, PT Tri Bintang Abadi, PT Tri Daya Jaya, CV Tri Dinasti Pratama, PT Tri Esti Karya Utama, PT Tri Hegar Sakti, PT Tri Hikmah, CV Tri Jaya Bara Makmur, PT Tri Jaya Konstruksi, PT Tri Kencana Mulia, PT Tri Lintas Okitse Indonesia, PT Tri Lintas Usaha, PT Tri Mandiri Perkasa, PT Tri Merah Sentosa, PT Tri Mitra Bayany, PT Tri Oetama Persada, PT Tri Panuntun Persada, PT Tri Pilar Jaya Utama, PT Tri Safri Family, PT Tri Saktie, CV Tri Saktie, PT Tri Sasana Kencana, PT Tri Star Mandiri, PT Tri Tunggal Priati, PT Tri Unggul Anugerah, PT Tri Usaha Baru, PT Tri Wahyuni, Sdr Triadat Quantum, PT Triagung Daya Mandiri, PT Triantama Mitra Persada, PT Triaryani, PT Trias Jaya Abadi, PT Trias Jaya Agung, PT Trias Jaya Mandiri, CV Trias Patriot Sejahtera, PT Tribina Sempurna, PT Tribuana Krida Yudha, PT Trieka Bangun Persada, PT Trijaya Bara Makmur, PT Trikarsa Manunggal Jaya, PT Trikarsa Manunggal, PT Trikarya Cipta Sarana, PT Trimata Benua, PT Trimata Coal Perkasa, PT Trimatama Coal Perkasa, PT Trimegah Bangun Persada, PT Trimenara Larasindo, PT Trimitra Energi, PT Trimitra Marine, PT Trimitra Sejati, PT Trimitra Sembada, PT Trimix Sulut Sejati, CV Trimus, PT Trinamas Abadi Trinamas Abadi, PT Trinergy Jambi Coal Trinergy Jambi Coal, PT Trinergy Pauh Coal Trinergy Pauh Coal, PT Trinity Grandee International, PT Trinusa Aneka Tambang, PT Trinusa Dharma Utama, PT Trinusa Resources, PT Trio Kencana, PT Tripabara, PT Tripilar Globalindo, PT Triple Eight Energy, PT Tripurwita Jaya Abadi, PT Trisakti Muliautama, PT Trisakti Panca Sakti, PT Trisakti Persada, PT Trisensa Mineral Utama, PT Trisigma Coal, PT Trisno Sudarso. Sdr Tristaco Mineral Makmur, PT Tristar Beliton Kusuma, PT Trisula Kencana Sakti 2, PT Trisula Kencana Sakti, PT Trisuma Atika Jaya, PT Triventure Armada Baruna, PT Triwira Adhipermana Pratama, PT Troika Mining Industrial, PT Trowells Energy, PT Trowells, CV Truba Bara Banyu Enim, PT Try Nanda, PT Tsawaab Mining, PT Tts Makmur Resources, PT Tuah Globe Mining, PT Tuah Sakato Mambangun Nagari, PT Tuban Raya, PT Tuberki, PT Tubindo Energi, PT Tubindo, PT Tugas Siswanto, Sdr Tuginem Tuhup Coal Mining, PT Tuhup Coal Minng, PT Tuhup Gold, PT Tuju Wali-Wali, PT Tujuh Bara Sejahtera, PT Tujuh Saudara, PT Tujuh Sw, CV Tujuh Tiga Grup Tujuh Tujuh, CV Tujuh-Tujuh, CV Tukadmas General Contractors, PT Tulus Mulyono Tumbak Mas, PT Tumbang Olong Bara, PT Tunas Alaska, PT Tunas Artha Perkasa, PT Tunas Artha Pratama, PT Tunas Baru Lampung, PT Tunas Damai Sejahtera, PT Tunas Inti Abadi, PT Tunas Jaya Tamamas, PT Tunas Jaya, Ksu Tunas Mandiri, CV Tunas Mas, CV Tunas Muda Jaya, PT Tunas Prima Coal, PT Tunas Prima Raya, PT Tunas Sejati Mandiri, PT Tunas Sesawi Indah, PT Tunas Tambang Perkasa, PT Tunas, CV Tunggal Cipta Karya, PT Tunggal Firdaus Kaltim , CV Tunggal Mulia Banua Jaya, PT Tunggal Putra Nusantara, PT Tunggal Utama Lestari, PT Tunggul Ulung Makmur, PT Turangga Krisna Dwipa, PT Turianto. Sdr Uanini Multika Sejahtera, PT Uci Jaya, PT Ud Selomas Jaya Ud. Abnur Abadi Uden Arby, Se, Sdr Udin Rohaedin Ugi Julian Ugi Julian (Hnr) Ujang Suherman Ujang Taslim.Sdr Ulin Nusa Raya, PT Ultratech Mining Indonesia, PT Uludaya Karya, PT Umpu Kakah Partama, PT Unaaha Bakti Persada, CV Unggul Bangun Harmonis, PT Unggul Jaya, CV Unggul Nusantara, PT Unggul Pratama Sakti, PT Unindo Prima Sarana, PT Union Prakarsa Abadi, PT Unirich Mega Persada, PT Uniserv Indonesia, PT United Coal Indonesia United Coal Indonesia, PT United Mineral Kalimantan, PT United Smelting, CV Unitrade Daya Mandiri, PT Universal Mining Prima, PT Universal Satindo Nusantara, PT Untung Hadianor Ur, CV Urike Hidayat, St. Mm Urip Tagang Urip Tagang, PT Usaha Alam Mandiri, CV Usaha Andir Usaha Bangun Nusantara, PT Usaha Baratama Jesindo, PT Usaha Benget (Hotler Lumban Gaol) Usaha Berkat Tenaga, CV Usaha Ikhlas Usaha Jaya Abadi Bersama, PT Usaha Kawan Bersama, CV Usaha Kawan Bersama, PT Usaha Kawan Sejati, PT Usaha Ketapang Mandiri, PT Usaha Kita Kinerjatama, PT Usaha Lina Usaha Maju, CV Usaha Pertambangan.Pd Usaha Pulibu Usaha Remaja Mandiri, PT Usaha Risnah Usaha Ryan Jaya Usaha Setia Bersama, PT Usaha Tiga Generasi, PT Usahamaju Mitraperkasa, PT Usep Sukarna. Sdr Uspri Pulung Kencana, PT Ut Murung Mineral, PT Utama Bintang Cemerlang, PT Utama Daya Energi, PT Utama Granitindo Mandiri, PT Utama Mandiri Sesayap, PT Utama Nusa Sejahtera, PT Utama Selaras Wisesa, PT Utama Sentosa Abadi Flobamora, PT Utama Sentosa Abadi, CV Utamacemerlang Adhitya Utami Jaya Mulia, PT Utia Ilma Jaya, CV Utomo Konstrindo, PT Utomo Kostrindo, PT Uu Haerudin. Sdr Uudi Utomo. Sdr Vacation International Indonesia, PT Vanda Prima Listri Jakarta, PT Vanda Prima Listri, PT Vano Anugrah Sentosa, PT Vans Saudara Persada, PT Varda, CV Vardila Buana Sakti Vardila Buana Sakti, PT Vari Prima Coal, PT Varia Gemilang, CV Vasco Nusantara, PT Vaya Asa Prima, CV Venus Inti Perkasa, CV Veronika Mariani Taslin, PT Victor Dua Tiga Mega, PT Victori Prima Buana, PT Victory Prima Buana, PT Vigura Bersaudara, CV Vipronity Power Energy, PT Viracon Primer Coal, PT Virgo Benua Jaya, CV Virgo Megah Jaya, PT Visi Debtindo, PT Visi Hutani Mandiri, PT Visi Utama Mandiri, PT Visitama, PT Viska Perkasa, PT Vivi Irina Wadah Rezeki Alam, PT Wadi Al Aini, CV Wadon Mitra Raharja, PT Waduk Mas Persada, PT Waegeo Mineral Mining, PT Wahab Sya’roni. Sdr Wahana Agung Sejahtera, PT Wahana Alam Lestari, PT Wahana Bumi Selatan, PT Wahana Chindo Sentosa, PT Wahana Indah Karya, PT Wahana Inti Bumi, PT Wahana Karya Suksesindo Utama, PT Wahana Kutai Energi Wahana Kutai Energi, PT Wahana Mitra Perdana, PT Wahana Multi Cipta, PT Wahana Perkit Jaya, PT Wahana Persada Raya, PT Wahana Petra Sejahtera, PT Wahana Rimba Lestari, PT Wahana Sumber Makmur, PT Wahana Surya Abadi, PT Wahana Surya Nusantara 1, PT Wahana Surya Nusantara 2, PT Wahana Tanggamus Berkah, PT Wahau Bara Mulia, PT Wahidi. Sdr Wahyu Eka Perkasa, PT Wahyu Karya Mandiri, CV Wahyu Manunggal, CV Wahyu Murti Garuda Kencana, PT Wahyu Nada Nugraha Putra, PT Wahyu Pradana Binamulia Wahyu Putra Mulya, PT Wahyu Sejahtera, CV Wahyu Taruna Bakti, CV Wahyu, CV Wahyuni Waja Inti Lestari, PT Waja Niaga, PT Waja Sakti Mandiri, PT Waja Shakti Mandiri, PT Wajok Inti Lestari Mineral, PT Walalindo, PT Walinusa Energi, PT Wana Adiprima Mandiri, PT Wana Artha, CV Wana Batara Karya Lestari, PT Wana Halmahera Barat Permai Unit Ix, PT Wana Halmahera Barat Permai Unit Vii, PT Wana Halmahera Barat Permai Unit Viii, PT Wana Kencana Mineral, PT Wanatiara Persada, PT Wanda Jaya Utama, PT Wandi Putra Makin Jaya, CV Wanyang Gayoindo, PT Wara Kirana Bakti, PT Wargono Purbo, Sdr Waringin Jaya Raya, CV Warjo Sumarjono. Sdr Warnidalisma Wartam Wastika Guna Corp, PT Watu Agung Jaya, CV Wavenet Westindo, PT Wawan Hernawan Way Enim Sumatera Timur, PT Way Lunik, CV Welarco Subur Jaya, PT Welindo Inti Pratama, PT Well Putri Mandiri, PT Wellsum Mineral Nusantara, PT Wendi Maryunandi Wendy Priandani Wesbor Energy Resources, PT West Borneo Sentosa, PT West Kutai Resources West Kutai Resources, PT Wetar Prima Berkat Abadi, PT Wetar Prima Cahaya Lestari, PT Wetar Prima Daya Mandiri, PT Wetar Prima Karya Mulia, PT Wetar Prima Kurnia Utama, PT Wetar Prima Putera Sakti, PT Wibawa Bangkit Mandiri, PT Widiawati Widodo Widya Tanjung Barito, PT Widya Utama, CV Widyantoro Untung Nugroho/Pt. Indonesia Bentonit Wiijaya Nikel Nusantara, PT Wijanna Hamita Cipta, PT Wijaya Coal Mining, PT Wijaya Eka Sakti, PT Wijaya Indo Mining, PT Wijaya Inti Nusantara, PT Wijaya Lestari Abadi Wijaya Lestari Abadi, PT Wijaya Mandiri Teknik Kreasi, PT Wijaya Niaga Bakti, CV Wijaya Utama Abadi, PT Wijaya Warman, PT Wika Abadi, CV Wildan. Sdr Wilson Citra Mandiri, PT Wilton Wahana Indonesia, PT Windika Karya Prima, PT Windoe Andesit Utama, PT Winner Prima Sekata, PT Winpac Timor Energy, PT Winspec Indonusa, PT Winstar Resources, PT Wintaindo Mineral & Industry Wira Bara Sakti, CV Wira Bara Sakti, PT Wira Bhumi Sejati, PT Wira Kresna Pratama, PT Wira Penta Kencana, PT Wira Penta Kencana, PT (Eks, CV Mandiri) Wira Prakarsa Mitra, PT Wira Usaha Abadi Wira Usaha Abadi, PT Wirabahana Perkasa, PT Wirabudi Putra Perkasa, PT Wiraco, CV Wiraduta Sejahtera Langgeng, PT Wirapatriot Sakti, PT Wirok I. Sdr Wiwirano Mandiri, PT Wulu Bumi Sakti, CV Wutama Tri Makmur, PT X Dareh, CV Xavier Shangrila Sejati Sejahtera, PT Ya’ Dul Awalin Ya’ Marjono, Sdr Ya’aman, Sdr Ya’hasbiansyah Gandi Yakin Citra Mandiri, PT Yakin Setia Mulia, CV Yakin Timber Jaya, PT Yamabhumi Persada, PT Yamabhumi Pratama, PT Yamas Permata Nusantara, PT Yamin Mineral, PT Yani Rs, Sdr Yansen Wijaya, Sdr Yanuar Perkasa, CV Yapirman Sihotang, Sdr Yappe. Sdr Yasmeja. Sdr Yastra Energy, PT Yatofa Gress, PT Yaya Hitayati, Sdr Yayasan Kesejahteraan Pegawai Pemerintah Prov. Sulsel Yayasan Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hikmah Yayat Sunaryat Yazid Kanca Surya. Sdr Yesaya D.Pella Yetty Dharmawan, PT Yeyen Bintan Permata, PT Yilufa Mining Eximaromatics, PT Yinchen Tinindo Belitung, PT Yiwan Mining, PT Yo Seng Long Yobel Pratama, PT Yoda Irpan Makmur, PT Yoehanto,S.Ph Yohanes Joey, Sh ,Sdr Yongki Hadiwinata Yorim, CV Yorim, UD Yosef Efendi, Sdr Yoswan Ristanto Yovin Kontraktor, CV Yu Xin, PT Yudi Mulya, CV Yudi Suwarno, Sdr Yudian Sejahtera, PT Yudith Laurence, Sdri Yulan Pratama, CV Yulia Chandra Yulia Raya Energi, CV Yulifan Pratama, CV Yulius Nikson Yulivan Pratama, CV Yuman Jaya Tama, PT Yuni Nur Has, PT Yus Ralaeni Yohan Rosma, Sdr Yusma Karya, CV Yusman Logam, Sdr Yusroni Tuge. Sdr Yustina Prima, PT Yusuf Wibisono, Sdr Zaenal Aripin Zaenudin Zaenudin Isro’i, St Zafir Mitra Serasi, PT Zamrud Khatulistiwa Berjaya, PT Zebe Abisha, PT Zefina Bara Energi, PT Zen 99, CV Zeta Bersaudara Zhong Hai Metal Mining Indonesia, PT Ziad Kamula Sejahtera, CV Zircon Indonesia, PT Zirkonia, PT Zoneyee International Invesment, PT Zoneyee International Investment, PT Zouk, PT Zuhriah Bersinar, CV Zumwecth, PT Zuster, CV
Untuk informasi lebih lanjut, silahkan hubungi kami di +62 851 0518 7118 or +62 21 4027 8375 or +62 852 103 56516 We are hiring. Please submit your application letter and the updated curriculum vitae to serabdi.sakti @ gmail.com the1uploader 8:40 am on 2016-09-01 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/09/01/beating-the-low-price-condition/)
Beating the Low Price Condition PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk: On the Road to Recovery
This book is available on a print-on-demand basis. The flip-book version is for browsing demo purpose only and available only to be served in Greater Jakarta, Indonesia. You may reach the publisher for demo request, inquiries, and purchase order from this number: +62 851 0518 7118 or +62 21 4027 8375. Get the pdf file on http://bit.ly/2bU9DiP For more info, please check this link: https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/pt-borneo-lumbung-energi-metal-tbk-on-the-road-to-recovery/ Beating the Low Price Condition by Sando Sasako Jakarta, 1 September 2016 20.40 The price of any goods will always low as long as there are no demand or there are too much supply in the market. No demand can mean there may be a demand, but it is weak and may have lower priority than any other products and services that consumers are willing to pay for it. Consumer preferences, expectations, and purchasing power are other perspectives that the sellers should consider. Let’s take a look at price mechanism below. A price will fall as: 1. too much supply. 2. there are too many sellers offering the same products. 3. fire sale. 4. supplying companies are in (desperate) need of liquidity (cash-strapped / -starved). 5. too little demand, or lack of demand. A price will rise as: 1. too little supply. 2. there are not many sellers (offering the same products). 3. short of supply. 4. consumers are in (desperate) need of the goods. 5. too much demand. To deal with any price levels in the market equilibrium, we are also encouraged to see things with their own perspectives and capabilities of producers and sellers. The low price will discourage producers and sellers to produce and sell goods with a larger volume, but for survival. Lack of incentives surely turns down the appetite to grab a bigger share of the market. In other words, a shrinking market size makes it less attractive for producers to agressively to pursue their own agenda. Create a product that will provide another potential profit margin. To do so, the product has to have some specialties beyond the competing products. Product creation through innovation will be available as there are sufficient fund to finance some R&D. It shall prevail as it is up to the market to decide. However, government is another significant player in the market. They will offer some incentives for producers to expand and accelerate the speed to market. At the opposite direction, some government will make some restrictions and constraints for the players to enter the market. Some agenda deemed necessary to apply are environmental impacts and protection, clean coal technology to reduce the acceleration of global warming that leads to drastic climate change. Some tax and royalties, even prohibition, may also reduce the product supplies to the market. Some hikes on the financial interest may curb the supply as well. Above all, there’s nothing more challenging to raise the price immediately. Assume the global fears are felt worldwide. Create some intense ambient that will make market supply short, disappear, or won’t continue to exist regularly or periodically. Particularly the product that is essential in day to day life. The price will surely jump to the sky, above any roof policy available. They used to call it as a threat of war. 20160223 1008 17 Coal’s Collapse Scorches Miners’ Profit Margins 2016-08-15 12:43 PM http://www.wsj.com/articles/coals-collapse-scorches-miners-profit-margins-1456228748 Coal’s Collapse Scorches Miners’ Profit Margins Coal prices fall to their lowest levels since early 2007 By Biman Mukherji Updated Feb. 23, 2016 10:08 a.m. ET An excavator loads coal onto a truck at a coal port in Lianyungang, eastern China’s Jiangsu province. Photo: Agence FrancePresse/Getty Images HONG KONG-A coal glut has hurt profit margins at some of the world’s largest trading and mining companies, including Noble Group Ltd. and Glencore PLC, as Chinese consumption of the commodity continues to slow. Coal prices have fallen 9% more since hitting an eight-year low in September, touching their lowest levels since early 2007. In inflation-adjusted terms, coal prices are back down near average 1990s levels, said Paul Bloxham, HSBC ‘s chief economist for Australia and New Zealand. “Thermal coal prices are now historically low in real terms.” c. The fallout of that is showing up on company balance sheets. Noble Group said Tuesday it expects to report a net loss for the fourth quarter and all of 2015 after lowering its long-term forecasts for coal prices, setting the stage for the commodities trader’s worst annual performance since its 1997 Singapore listing. The thermal-coal market remains oversupplied despite cutbacks of around 70 million metric tons in global exports over the past year, Mr. Bloxham said. He expects some consolidation in Australia’s thermal-coal industry over time. The outlook worsened after China’s government pledged last year to cut pollution, introducing a measure that placed restrictions on certain types of highly polluting coal. Slowing power demand in the country has exacerbated a drop in coal-fired electricity generation, said Georgina Hayden, a senior energy and infrastructure analyst at BMI Research. “We maintain our view that coal-fired power generation [in China] contracted by 3.05% over 2015, but are now forecasting coal to contract further over 2016 and 2017, by 2.2% and 2.1%, respectively,” she said. Newcastle coal, the main pricing benchmark in Asia, is expected to trade in a range of $40 to $60 a ton through 2020, compared with $140 a ton in 2011 and $78 a ton from 2012 to 2015, BMI Research said. Coal imports by China, which accounts for around half the global demand, dropped nearly 30% in 2015 from the previous year, according to Platts. “Oversupply is expected to persist this year amid limited supply cuts seen at major producing regions like Indonesia and Australia,” the price-reporting service said. Indonesia, the world’s largest exporter of coal, and its producers have been struggling since China clamped down on certain grades of coal. But it isn’t easy to adjust. ‘Although India is a big market, there is no ‘new China’ to shore up demand.’ -Marius Toime, a legal partner at Berwin Leighton Paisner “Cutting production is not a simple exercise for the Indonesian coal miners. The government may try to keep exports high to support royalty levels, which have taken a big hit,” said Marius Toime, a legal partner at Berwin Leighton Paisner who specializes in the resources sector. “China’s demand for coal continues to wane, in line with slowing growth and climate commitments to the U.N. Although India is a big market, there is no “new China to shore up demand,” he said. China’s declining consumption of coal is also affecting domestic companies. A worker clears a conveyor belt used to transport coal in China’s northern Shanxi province in November. ENLARGE A worker clears a conveyor belt used to transport coal in China’s northern Shanxi province in November. Photo: Greg Baker/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images Twenty out of 28 coal companies listed on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges that released results recently have reported losses, according to a Fitch Ratings report, with 10 of them reporting losses of more than 10 billion yuan ($1.5 billion) last year, compared with 3 billion yuan in 2014. The limited success of the Chinese government’s supply-side reform to reduce overcapacity is partly to blame for the lingering oversupply problem, the ratings company said. “Massive funding and coordination will be required to settle the employment and social-stability issues arising from mine closures. Coupled with weak demand arising from the coal-fired power-generation sector and heavy industries, we believe a price recovery is unlikely in 2016,” Fitch said. One positive for coal-mining companies has been the drop in crude-oil prices to multiyear lows, lowering operation costs. Oil prices have plunged from more than $100 a barrel in mid-2014 to about $30 a barrel today. “Falling crude prices are a net positive for miners by reducing operational costs. Specifically, the cost of fuels for operating machinery and mobile power units,’ said John Davies, London-based head of commodities research at BMI Research. “However, it is not a game-changer and not enough to offset the negative impact of lower coal prices on their profitability over the past 18 months.” Write to Biman Mukherji at
[email protected] Monday, 15 August 2016 20160531 1658 16 China’s Coal-Plant Binge Deepens Overcapacity Woes 2016-08-15 12:31 PM http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-coal-plant-binge-deepens-overcapacity-woes-1464692337 China’s Coal-Plant Binge Deepens Overcapacity Woes By Brian Spegele, May 31, 2016 6:58 a.m. ET Chinese companies are binge-building thermal power plants, compounding an oversupply of power. Photo: Getty Images China is building power plants it doesn’t need amid low coal prices and local efforts to create jobs SHOUGUANG, China-In a whir of hammering and welding, construction crews in the industrial town of Shouguang put finishing touches on a new coal power plant that testifies to a building binge by Chinese companies-one that is compounding an oversupply of power. For companies and local officials eager to prop up growth with new jobs, the availability of low-cost financing is combining with coal prices that are half the level of five years ago to make power projects attractive. Tens of billions of dollars will be spent over the next two years. Investment in thermal power projects jumped 20% last year even as China’s power demand fell. Workers at the new coal plant in Shouguang, 200 miles southeast of Beijing, say they’ve been at it for two and half years. The project could have been ready earlier, says one, but the electricity “wasn’t urgently needed.” Power Siurge
While Chinese leaders are eager to recharge flagging economic growth, the pace of building and investment has started to worry them, frustrating key goals to restructure the economy and clean up the nation’s polluted skies. This raises the question as to whether state companies’ investments are “being used to drive short term GDP numbers with no regard for market demand or investment returns,” said Lauri Myllyvirta, a coal campaigner at the environmental group Greenpeace. Beijing has promised to reduce overcapacity in the coal sector and other industries sucking up investment that could be better spent elsewhere. It has set aside 100 billion yuan to resettle laid-off workers, some 1.8 million of them from the coal and steel sectors. Cutting coal demand is also a necessary step for China to meet its pledge to begin reducing its carbon emissions by about 2030, if not earlier. The National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic planning agency, has banned approvals for new coal-fired power projects in oversupplied regions. While the move may help curb planned projects, many already under construction appear to be pushing ahead. The commission and the National Energy Administration didn’t respond to requests for comment. China already has more power-generating capacity than any other country. It is projected to add nearly 200 gigawatts worth of new thermal power capacity between 2015 and 2017, according to an analysis by Fitch Ratings Inc. That is more than the entire electrical capacity of Canada. While some capacity would be for natural gas, most will be coal-powered. Unmatched Growth
Building unneeded thermal power plants underscores the difficulties President Xi Jinping and other leaders face in effecting their pledge to downshift the economy to a more sustainable track. State-led investment is still a mainstay to generate growth, and, industry analysts say, local governments are valuing the short-term over longer term financial health. “Local governments are focused on regional jobs,” said Ranping Song, a China energy expert at the Washington-based World Resources Institute. “There’s no question” power overcapacity stands to get worse in the coming years. The mismatch between electricity demand and investment is evident in Shandong, where the Shouguang plant is forging ahead. The province is among those where the NDRC, the government agency, banned new project approvals. Operational coal-fired plants already dot Shandong’s industrialized coastline. Heavy emissions from chemical plants and oil refineries cause a thick pall of smog. As more power-generating capacity comes online, utilization rates at power plants are falling. The Shenhua Guohua power plant-as the Shouguang plant is known and which is controlled by Hong Kong-listed energy giant China Shenhua Energy Co. -has created thousands of jobs, say company officials and workers. The consortium that owns the plant, which includes investment from companies backed by the local government, declined a request for an interview. City and provincial economic planning officials didn’t respond for comment. A Shenhua Guohua official confirmed the project will enter service in June. Authorities in recent years justified new power plants in Shouguang and elsewhere by saying they would replace older, less efficient ones. But capacity growth is outpacing the decommissioning of older units. Construction crews put final touches on a new coal-fired power plant in Shouguang, Shandong province, amid growing concerns about overcapacity in China’s electricity sector. ENLARGE Construction crews put final touches on a new coal-fired power plant in Shouguang, Shandong province, amid growing concerns about overcapacity in China’s electricity sector. Photo: Brian Spegele An analysis by Greenpeace’s Mr. Myllyvirta estimates that by 2020, Shandong could have over 30 gigawatts of excess power capacity. One force behind the build out is plunging coal prices. Prices for one coal type at the northern port of Qinhuangdao plummeted to less than $60 per metric ton this month from around $130 per metric ton in 2011. Low fuel prices help keep projects profitable, given that state-set electricity prices haven’t been adjusted downward as much as the price-drop for coal. Meanwhile, benchmark commercial borrowing rates for loans of five years or longer fell to 4.9% by the end of 2015, compared with 7.05% in early 2012. Risk lies in whether Beijing pushes ahead with reform plans that include letting electricity consumers such as factories negotiate power supply agreements with producers. Added competition could bring down electricity tariffs, pressuring operators. Even as they compete, thermal power plants have to contend with the cleaner sources of energy coming online: nuclear plants along China’s coast, wind farms across the northern plains and hydropower in the south. Kiah Wei Giam, an analyst at energy consultancy Wood Mackenzie forecasts a drop in thermal coal demand of 50-100 million metric tons annually for the next few years. “When nuclear comes online and hydro comes online you can’t stop them from displacing coal.” Kersten Zhang contributed to this article. Write to Brian Spegele at
[email protected] Power Down
Monday, 15 August 2016 20160602 1538 14 As Coal Prices Fall, Miners Cut Output 2016-08-15 12:23 PM http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-coal-prices-fall-miners-cut-output-1433269071 As Coal Prices Fall, Miners Cut Output By Rhiannon Hoyle, June 2, 2015 3:38 p.m. ET China imports less for steelmaking, and India has yet to fill the gap China is importing less coking coal. Above, a mine in Russia. Photo: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg News SYDNEY-China’s appetite for coal used in steelmaking is faltering, deepening a market downturn miners say is the worst in recent memory. The price of steelmaking coal shipped from Australia, the world’s biggest exporter, has fallen 23% this year to roughly $86 a metric ton, its lowest level in nearly a decade. The slide extends a decline begun in 2011, during which the fuel’s value has slumped by around three-quarters. The prolonged dive is now compelling miners to move beyond cutting costs, their first line of defense in hard times. Major suppliers Glencore PLC and Canada’s Teck Resources Ltd. are reducing production, blaming the chronic global oversupply of coal. But analysts caution that prices will recover only if more cuts are made. The consultancy Wood Mackenzie doesn’t expect the oversupply of steelmaking coal, or coking coal, to clear up until about 2022. China, whose breakneck economic growth has been the engine for most global commodity markets, won’t need as much steelmaking coal in future, analysts now project. That leaves miners who rushed to open new pits in the boom years to struggle. Coal Hole
Chinese sectors such as heavy industry and real estate are growing less quickly or slowing, causing a moderation in steel demand. China’s imports of coking coal plunged more than 40% in April from a year earlier, to 3.75 million tons. Over the first four months of 2015, imports were down by roughly a quarter from a year earlier, according to customs data. The world’s No. 2 economy is now tilting toward growth driven by consumer-led sectors. In turn, the country’s appetite for commodities is evolving. Metals used to make electronic products are becoming relatively more popular. Copper is in, while coal is out. “Driving much of this slowdown [in coal] is China’s transition,” said Citigroup Inc. analyst Ivan Szpakowski. “It is a transition we think there is no going back from.” The coal-market downturn has even outpaced the collapse in prices of iron ore, the other key steelmaking ingredient. China is less reliant on imported coal than on iron ore from overseas, so as demand ebbs, it can meet more of its needs domestically. Coal Piles
For sure, rising Indian demand may help compensate eventually. The country’s large coal reserves contain little quality coking coal. Citigroup forecasts India’s imports will overtake China’s net imports by the end of the decade, moving past purchases by Japananother major buyer-shortly after. But in the short term, the gloomy price environment is changing the coal industry’s economics. At current spot prices, more than half of the coal produced is being dug up at a loss, Citigroup estimates. Many miners do lock in sales each quarter at fixed prices-exporters are selling at around $109.50 a ton for the current quarter-but buyers are likely to drive a harder bargain for the rest of the year. “The third quarter will be tough, and the fourth quarter even tougher,” said Wood Mackenzie coal-market analyst Kiah Wei Giam. Even giants such as Australia’s BHP Billiton Ltd. , which is the world’s No. 1 coking-coal exporter, in partnership with Japan’s Mitsubishi, are under pressure, at a time when shareholders are demanding greater returns. While BHP’s coal division, which also produces thermal coal, generates around 15% of the company’s revenue, it contributed only 2% of its operating profit in the six months through December. U.S. producers have been the hardest hit. A stronger greenback means U.S. shipments struggle to compete against cargoes from elsewhere. China is also taking considerably less coal from Canada and Russia. Australia, too, has seen the amount of coal shipped to China decline, although local miners have succeeded in driving down operating costs, limiting the damage. Producers have been reluctant to reduce output due to so-called take-or-pay contracts, which have locked them into paying for access to ports even if they don’t have enough material to ship. “Coal producers have so far been slow to make closure decisions,” said Stewart Butel, managing director of midsize coal producer Wesfarmers Resources, a unit of Australian conglomerate Wesfarmers Ltd. “The [coking] coal market remains in oversupply.” Attitudes may now be changing. Glencore, whose chief executive, Ivan Glasenberg, has long been critical of miners failing to cut excess production, said it plans to pare back output at its Collinsville open pit in Queensland state by as much as 40% and eliminate up to a quarter of the mine’s workforce. “The situation at Collinsville reflects the challenges being faced by all Australian coal mines in one of the most difficult markets in the industry’s recent history,” the company said in a statement. Smaller producers are feeling the squeeze elsewhere. Vancouver-based Teck Resources slashed its dividend after reporting lower-than-expected profit in April. Last week, Teck said it would briefly idle six Canadian coal operations, reducing its planned third-quarter output by 22%. Write to Rhiannon Hoyle at
[email protected] Monday, 15 August 2016 20160609 1422 06 Unloved coal rides commodities rebound 2016-08-15 11:42 AM http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2463e5fc-2e4d-11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95.html#axzz4HNAtrPA0 Unloved coal rides commodities rebound Neil Hume, Commodities Editor June 9, 2016 4:22 pm A rising tide lifts all boats – even it seems seaborne thermal coal, possibly the least loved major commodity. Raw materials are enjoying their best start to a year since 2008 aided by a weaker US dollar and better supply and demand fundamentals. Iron ore, oil, gold, soybeans and zinc have led the advance but other less favoured commodities have also seen gains, including coal. All of the major thermal coal benchmarks have pushed above $50 a tonne in recent weeks. The price of coal shipped from the Australian port of Newcastle – marker for the Asian market – has risen almost 5 per cent over the past month and headed close to $54 a tonne this week, according to Argus, a price reporting agency. However, it remains well below the 2008 peak of more than $180 a tonne. The rally has surprised analysts who had been expecting another tough year for seaborne, or exported, thermal coal, which is used in power stations to generate electricity and is a major source of income for mining companies such as Glencore . Prices fell around 20 per cent last year as global consumption of coal plunged by the biggest amount since at least 1980, according to BP’s latest review of world energy, hit by weaker Chinese demand and switching to gas. While the recent recovery in prices owes much to a weaker dollar and rising oil prices, which has eased some of the deflationary pressures that have plagued the industry, other factors have also been at work. These include output cuts from producers in Australian and Indonesia as well as a significant fall in domestic supplies in China. “Sentiment in the coal market is better than it has been in years,” said analysts at Citi in a report this week. After a major accident at Datong Coal, a major Chinese producer, in mid-March local authorities ordered the closure of large mines in Shanxi, the country’s third largest thermal coal producing province. At the same time, the government in Beijing has told producers to cut capacity by 16 per cent and reduce statutory working days for coal miners to 276 days from 330 days per year. “We expect the enforcement will be strict,” said Citi, which forecasts Chinese raw coal production to fall 9 per cent this year, more than compensating for an expected 3.4 per cent decline in demand. All of this has lifted domestic prices in China and made imported coal more attractive. Data released earlier this week showed Chinese coal imports hit 19m tonnes in May, up 34 per cent from the same month a year ago. On top of this there also been significant disruption to Indonesian shipments because of heavy rains. “Trading sources report that vessels were delayed in loading for an average of 10 days to 2 weeks, catching Chinese traders with power plant contracts short and scrambling for spot volume,” said Macquarie analyst Stefan Ljubisavljevic in a note to clients this week. Port stocks at northern Chinese ports are currently at a five-year low of 13m tonnes. In spite of the recent rebound, most analysts remain bearish on thermal coal, saying the long-term outlook remains bleak because of environmental concerns and the growth of the liquefied natural gas market. “Global demand continues to fall, production discipline will be tough to enforce if prices continue to rise, the Chinese government is unlikely to tolerate rising imports?.?.?.?and there’s still that glut of LNG on the horizon,” said Mr Ljubisavljevic. He added: “Once significant LNG volumes enter the market, we are likely to see an aggressive market share battle between fossil fuels with negative price implications.” Monday, 15 August 2016 20160621 0618 15 BHP Sticks With Coal in Hard Times 2016-08-15 12:29 PM http://www.wsj.com/articles/bhp-sticks-with-coal-in-hard-times-1466504386 BHP Sticks With Coal in Hard Times By Rhiannon Hoyle, June 21, 2016 6:19 a.m. ET Company sounds a bullish note on expected demand Coal prices plunged in recent years amid a global glut. Shown, coal being stockpiled at a mine near the town of Moranbah, Australia, in 2012. Photo: Reuters SYDNEY-Amid the misery in a market strained by bankruptcies, mine closures and mass worker layoffs, coal still has at least one major supporter. BHP Billiton Ltd. , the world’s biggest mining company, on Tuesday sounded a bullish note on future demand and its role as a major exporter. In an investor briefing, it said the world’s appetite for coking coal, used in steelmaking, and thermal coal, which is burned to generate electricity, will rise as developing economies demand more steel and energy. “We expect that thermal coal will remain front and center in Asia’s energy portfolio into the foreseeable future because it is the cheapest and most readily available source for power generation,” said Mike Henry, BHP’s head of Australian mining. — ADVERTISEMENT — The mining company said thermal-coal demand will increase 10% to 15% from 2015 levels by the mid-2020s, aided by robust buying in India and Southeast Asia, even as the fuel accounts for a declining share of global electricity generation. It expects demand for coking coal to be robust as well, as it predicts that steel output in China won’t peak until the middle of the next decade. This isn’t a universally accepted view, even within the mining industry. Coal markets have been in decline since 2011 thanks to a global glut caused by supplies from new mines and expansions that were planned when prices were booming. Appetite from China, the main engine for coal demand in the 21st century, has meantime ebbed as officials there work to curb industrial overcapacity and clean up the country’s polluted skies.
Many miners including Glencore PLC, the world’s No. 1 thermal-coal shipper, have cut coal output or closed unprofitable mines. Others including Peabody Energy Corp., the U.S.’s biggest coal miner, have filed for bankruptcy. Meantime, analysts project that global oversupply will take several years to clear. Over the past five years, the value of thermal and coking coals has declined about 60% and 70%, respectively. Their outlook has been muddied by evolving climate-change policies and doubts about how quickly China will pursue its goals to restructure the economy and reduce air pollution. “There is a considerable degree of uncertainty about how global energy demand will evolve, and the further you look into the future, the greater that uncertainty becomes,” said Alexandra Heath, the Reserve Bank of Australia’s head of economic analysis, in a speech on Tuesday. “We do know the growth in energy demand over the past couple of decades is unlikely to be sustained, partly because the drivers of that growth are likely to diminish and partly because energy efficiency increases over time.” Ms. Heath said coal’s low cost and reliability should help support the market, but she said “demand for coal is not likely to increase significantly from current levels.” Environmental policies world-wide are favoring lower-emission fuels, such as natural gas and renewables, she said. In China, the country’s top economic planning agency banned approvals for new coal-fired plants in some provinces and Beijing has pledged to begin reducing its carbon emissions by 2030. For its part, BHP-a major supplier of thermal coal and the world’s No. 1 exporter of coking coal-signaled it would stick by the beleaguered business and raise output by working the mines it runs harder. It will also consider buying rival mines, or spending cash on new projects “when the time is right,” Mr. Henry said. He declined to comment on whether BHP is pursuing Anglo American PLC’s Australian coking coal operations, which the U.K.-listed miner recently put up for sale. BHP would be “the natural owner” of several of the mines, according to brokerage CLSA Ltd. BHP said it is optimistic about the outlook for coking coal due largely to rising demand in India, where companies are investing billions of dollars in new steel mills. A government official last year estimated that steel production capacity there could triple by 2025. “The developing world needs steel, steel needs coking coal,” Mr. Henry said. “Short-run dynamics belie this long-term positive outlook.” But BHP’s competitors have been more downbeat. Earlier this month, Glencore said it would close its Tahmoor coking coal operation in eastern Australia, saying it is no longer worth mining given continued price weakness. Write to Rhiannon Hoyle at
[email protected] Monday, 15 August 2016 20160711 1750 02 Seaborne thermal coal price rises to highest level in 10 months 2016-08-15 11:25 AM http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8a140564-477d-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c.html#axzz4HMvqCnhh Seaborne thermal coal price rises to highest level in 10 months Neil Hume, Commodities Editor July 11, 2016 5:50 pm The price of seaborne thermal coal for the vast Asian market has risen to its highest level in more than 10 months, boosted by a flurry of purchases from Chinese buyers eager to secure supplies because of a government-led clampdown on surplus capacity. Thermal coal is used in power stations to generate electricity and is a major source of income for mining companies such as Glencore, the world’s biggest exporter. Tagged the “least loved major commodity” by many analysts, it has out been favour for years because of tumbling prices and an environmental backlash. Sentiment has improved this year as prices have rebounded because of a weaker US dollar and the near doubling of the oil price, which has eased some of the deflationary pressures weighing on the coal industry. Oil is also important because it helps set the price of natural gas, which competes with thermal coal across Asia in power generation. “The least loved part of the energy complex is looking in better shape than it has for several years,” said analysts at Citi in a report. From a low of $49 a tonne in January, high-grade Australian thermal coal – the benchmark for the Asia market and the huge Chinese market – has gained 20 per cent to more than $59 a tonne, according to Argus, a price reporting agency. High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. Email
[email protected] to buy additional rights. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8a140564-477d-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c.html#ixzz4HN7Zrn2Q In the past week, Chinese buyers have started to snap up cargoes of thermal coal in the spot market, fearing a move to rationalise domestic supplies will prove successful. The government in Beijing recently ordered coal mines to cut capacity by 16 per cent and operate for 276 days annually versus 330 days previously. At the same time, shipments from Indonesia have been disrupted and utility companies in South Korea and Taiwan have also started seeking cargoes of high-grade Australian thermal coal. “There are so many cuts coming through domestically that China’s consumers will probably need to engage the seaborne [or import] market,” said Tom Price, analyst at Morgan Stanley. The bank expects China to import around 145m tonnes of coal this year, equivalent to 17 per cent of the global seaborne trade. Analysts are divided on the outlook for prices after the recent rebound. Some believe prices could push upwards if China strictly enforces its new rules and the la Niña weather phenomenon leads to increased rainfall and affects Australian and Indonesian output. In such a scenario Citi thinks prices could rise to as much as $90 a tonne. However, Morgan Stanley reckons prices are unlikely to push beyond $60 a tonne because it would lead to higher shipments from Colombia, another major producer, and encourage miners to restart mothballed projects. On top of that, Mr Price said China’s electricity use was “flat” and “uninteresting” and it was only raw materials used in steel production such as coking coal and iron ore that were seeing increased demand. This is widely perceived to be the result of a government-engineered credit surge earlier this year that led to a pick-up in construction activity and ultimately consumption of steel. On this topic China province to roll over $60bn coal loans http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b244b36-5d39-11e6-a72a-bd4bf1198c63.html Analysis An ugly year to be a coal bear http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5791c4e2-500f-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc.html Analysis EDF looks to future without coal trading http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f78f7e14-49af-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c.html Coal sector tries to counter green lobby http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb0513fe-8f9d-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b.html IN Commodities Glencore bumps up copper forecast http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a821af0-6066-11e6-ae3f-77baadeb1c93.html Noble highlights scale of turnround task http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b336712e-5fc0-11e6-ae3f-77baadeb1c93.html Monday, 15 August 2016 20160714 0910 01 Coal prices bounce back this year, but not for good 2016-08-15 11:24 AM http://www.reuters.com/article/us-coal-prices-idUSKCN0ZU1JC Coal prices bounce back this year, but not for good By Nina Chestney | LONDON Thu Jul 14, 2016 9:10am EDT A rally in thermal coal prices over the past few months, after years of decline, should continue into next year but a cloud still hangs over the market in the form of weakening global demand due to more clean energy and increased energy efficiency. All major benchmarks for thermal coal have risen above $60 a ton in the past few weeks, an increase of around 50 percent since record lows earlier this year, due to output cuts, supply disruptions, and increases in demand in some parts of the world. Many analysts expect prices to keep gaining for the rest of this year and into some of next year, but they will then likely go back into decline because the overall trend is one of global demand falling and production cuts could be difficult to enforce when prices are on their way up. The coal market has been oversupplied for years, which dragged prices down by around 80 percent between 2008 and early this year, forcing producers to cut back investment into new capacity and close unprofitable mines. China, the world’s biggest coal producer, is restricting output to reduce a supply glut, lowering output by 280 million tonnes this year as part of a wider plan to close 500 million tonnes of production in three to five years. Analysts at Citigroup expect Australia’s thermal coal, the Asian benchmark, to rise further as the Pacific Basin market tightens due to Chinese output cuts and weak Indonesian exports. Falling European demand may also divert more coal to Asia. “Adding fuel to the fire would be if rainfall due to La Niña was larger than expected, affecting production in Australia and Indonesia, quickly tightening the market,” they said. “Prices could even surge by 25 to 50 percent, or up to $90/ton based on current prices.” In late 2010/early 2011, a strong La Niña drenched coal production areas in Australia and Indonesia, disrupting output and driving up prices to around $145/ton from $90/ton. CLOUD OVER COAL Demand for coal from India, Bangladesh, South Africa, Russia, South Korea, Indonesia and Australia is forecast to rise into next year as coal remains a cheaper alternative for producing energy but U.S. and European demand in particular will wane, mainly due to cheaper gas. “We remain bearish on the thermal coal market … Demand has deteriorated further, led by the seasonal decline of our EU Coal Burn Index. The profitability of coal-burning power stations in Europe (rather than gas), is now negative,” said Georgi Slavov, global head of energy, iron ore and shipping research at Marex Spectron. In Europe, demand is falling due to environmental regulations. In EU some countries, such as Britain, cheaper gas is squeezing coal out of the market. This is expected to continue and could drag European coal prices down around $40-50 a ton, analysts said. “In a counter-intuitive way, the market is showing persistent tightness whereas coal demand is falling in most parts of the world,” said Guillaume Perret, director of coal, iron ore, steel and freight consultancy Perret Associates. “We think the current rally is overshooting, in a similar way as prices overshot on the way down in January 2016. It is not fueled by a genuine increase in demand but rather by a short- to medium-term delay for spare supply capacity to adjust to demand,” he added. (Editing by David Evans) Monday, 15 August 2016 20160714 1549 18 CSX Results Hurt by Sagging Demand for Coal — WSJ 2016-08-15 12:47 PM http://www.nasdaq.com/article/csx-results-hurt-by-sagging-demand-for-coal–wsj-20160714-00049 CSX Results Hurt by Sagging Demand for Coal — WSJ By Ezequiel Minaya 2016-07-14 02:49:00-05:00 July 14, 2016, 02:49:00 AM EDT By Dow Jones Business News Read more: http://www.nasdaq.com/article/csx-results-hurt-by-sagging-demand-for-coal–wsj-20160714-00049#ixzz4HNSHflY1 CSX Corp. said Wednesday that revenue for its second quarter fell 12% as falling coal shipments — a key business for freight lines — continued to pressure the railroad operator. Shares of CSX, though, rose 4.4% to $28.21 on Wednesday as the company’s earnings topped expectations. The stock is up 9% for the year. A spokeswoman for CSX said in an email message that the posting, which went up on the social media site at about 2 p.m. ET, was removed “immediately.” She didn’t specify what the message said but added that CSX officials moved ahead with an early release of their earnings report to provide “investors the correct information as quickly as possible.” CSX has struggled over the past two years as sagging demand for coal, amid plunging energy prices and a strong U.S. dollar, has cut into rail traffic. For the latest quarter, coal volume for CSX was down 30%. The company has said it expects the market to remain challenging, with coal volumes down about 25% for the year. “The environment that we see is really typified by low natural-gas prices, low commodity prices and a strong U.S. dollar, and we expect those to continue even though we had seen some small moderation in those in the past few weeks,” CSX Chief Financial Officer Frank Lonegro said in May at an industry conference, according to a FactSet transcript. On Wednesday, CSX said it expects 2016 full-year earnings per share to decline. The company, though, didn’t provide a specific forecast. CSX has met or exceeded earnings expectations over the past three quarters, having responded to sector turmoil with efficiency moves that included layoffs and the mothballing of trains. For the quarter ended June 24, CSX reported a profit of $445 million, or 47 cents a share, down from a year-ago profit of $553 million, or 56 cents a share. Revenue fell 12% to $2.7 billion. Analysts surveyed by Thomson Reuters expected earnings to decline to 44 cents a share on revenue of $2.7 billion. According to the Association of American Railroads, U.S. carloads through the past six months fell 12.5% compared with the same period last year, with coal carloads plunging 30.2%. Petroleum and associated products also dragged on the traffic tally, falling 21.6%. Hopes that intermodal traffic — the hauling of shipping containers — would help offset the drop-off in other categories, haven’t quite been met. Total intermodal units fell a modest 2.7%. Write to Ezequiel Minaya at
[email protected] (END) Dow Jones Newswires 07-14-160249ET Copyright (c) 2016 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Monday, 15 August 2016 20160714 1719 12 China reaffirms plan to cut steel and coal production 2016-08-15 12:09 PM http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1989796/china-reaffirms-plan-cut-steel-and-coal-production China reaffirms plan to cut steel and coal production Maggie Zhang PUBLISHED : Thursday, 14 July, 2016, 5:19pm UPDATED : Thursday, 14 July, 2016, 11:08pm China will use all means to meet its goal to cut steel and coal capacity this year despite local reluctance to reduce output as prices rise, China’s top economic planner said on Thursday. “As state leaders have stressed, we must fulfil the plan to cut overcapacity of steel and coal this year,” said Zhao Chenxin, a National Development and Reform Commission spokesman, in Beijing. “The pledge made by local governments will be checked at year end and those who fail to accomplish their targets will be held accountable.” EU and Beijing to mount joint watch on Chinese steel cutbacks China planned to trim its steel production capacity by 45 million tonnes this year and cut coal output capacity by 280 million tonnes, Xu Shaoshi, head of the top economic planner said on June 26. So far, the plan to stem overcapacity is starting to bear fruit with improving operations of coal and steel mills, expectations of better performance and increased bank loan payments, Zhao said. In the first five months of this year, China’s crude steel output dipped 1.4 per cent from the same period a year earlier and its coal production dropped 8.4 per cent. As state leaders have stressed, we must fulfil the plan to cut overcapacity of steel and coal this year Zhao Chenxin, National Development and Reform Commission spokesman According to data from the China Iron and Steel Association, its member mills, which are the industry’s major players, reported combined profits of 8.74 billion yuan (HK$10.49 billion) in the first five months, up 738 per cent from a year earlier. About 28.28 per cent of member mills reported losses, down 13.13 percentage points from a year earlier. The mills started to report profits for three straight months since from March, the association said. In comparison, in 2015, the mills reported a combined loss of 64.53 billion yuan, with 50.5 per cent of them reporting losses. For China’s coal and steel cities, drive to cut overcapacity casts pall over future However, the improving market conditions have also deterred some manufacturers from further trimming capacity, Zhao said. “All relevant parties should keep a clear head to firmly press ahead with the plan to reduce excess capacity,” he said. Premier Li Keqiang agreed with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on Wednesday that China and the EU would set up a team to monitor the steel trade and track Beijing’s efforts to address overcapacity, which Juncker said is clearly tied to the Brussels deliberation on granting China market economy status. Chinese steelmakers report huge losses amid plunging prices and overcapacity Vice-commerce minister Wang Shouwen said on Sunday that China reduced steel capacity by 90 million tonnes in the five years to the end of 2015 and promised to cut another 1 trillion to 1.5 trillion tonnes in the five years to the end of 2020. The nation’s two top state-owned mills, Baosteel Group and Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group), plan to merge as the industry consolidates. China will announce its second quarter GDP data on Friday, together with indicators on investment, industrial output and retail sales. China’s economy grew 6.7 per cent in the first quarter. This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: China in all-out drive to cut excess steel and coal output Monday, 15 August 2016 20160725 04 An ugly year to be a coal bear 2016-08-15 11:34 AM An ugly year to be a coal bear
An ugly year to be a coal bear
An ugly year to be a coal bear On July 25, 2016
Beijing’s decision to ease production has sent prices higher and wrongfooted traders If the first rule of macro trading is “don’t fight the Fed” then the first rule of raw materials must be “don’t fight Beijing”. It is a truth coal traders are discovering after China upended the market with plans to impose a five-day week working week for domestic mines in a bid to cut overcapacity. Since the policy was announced in March, the price of thermal coal has risen by 20 per cent as Chinese traders have been forced to chase after cargoes in the seaborne market or to draw down stocks. The rally has wrongfooted many market participants who were betting on another year of falling prices for thermal coal, which is used to generate electricity in power stations and is a source of profits for global mining houses likes Glencore and Rio Tinto. At least one big participant, traders say, has been caught on the wrong side of a major position that was designed to protect the company against falling prices. Beijing’s directive has also turned on its head the widely held view that Chinese imports of thermal coal would dwindle from the 140m tonnes purchased last year. “Thermal coal bears, among which we were one of the biggest, have been reminded this year that it is not wise to fight the Chinese government,” says Colin Hamilton, head of commodity research at Macquarie. “As long as China remains a meaningful thermal coal importer, it will act as a price setter.” For years China has been trying to put its bloated coal industry on a more stable footing, but latest reforms are some of the first to have an immediate impact on the broader market. Mines normally operate 24 hours a day and seven days a week. The benchmark price for Asia – thermal coal shipped from the Australian port of Newcastle – is up by more than a quarter since its lows in January and is now trading above $ 61 a tonne. Other coal markers have seen similar gains but remain well their 2008 peaks of nearly $ 200 a tonne. Analysts estimate domestic production in China was down per cent 10 to 15 per cent in May from a year ago, while the latest official data point toward rising imports. “Before China announced its ‘de-capacity’ efforts, we thought seaborne imports would fall to about 110m tonnes [this year]. But now, we think they’ll hold at 140m tonnes or maybe even get a bit higher,” says Andy Roberts, head of thermal coal research at Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy. Analysts say the decline in domestic production has coincided with increased demand in China, as power consumption picks up over the hot summer months. Morgan Stanley reckons coal-fired power production rose nearly 5 per cent month-on-month in June and will rise further through July and August. “The combination of rising demand growth and impaired supply has prompted an inventory drawdown,” says Morgan Stanley analyst Tom Price. Globally, thermal coal production has been declining for more than a year as the collapse in prices has forced miners to scrap new projects and expansions plans. More recently heavy rainfall has hit supplies from Indonesia, the world’s biggest exporter, intensifying the impact of the policy changes in China. But traders who handle millions of tonnes of coal a year say the recovery in prices cannot be solely explained by decisions taken China. A weaker US dollar and the oil price, which has almost doubled from its January low, have also contributed. Another influence has been the derivatives market. Traders say a large coal producer had been selling call options to banks in the over-the-counter market. These trades, known as covered positions, were profitable as long as price kept declining. But that is no longer true. A seller of a call option pockets a premium upfront but is obliged to deliver an asset at a specified price or time if it exercised by the holder. Faced with growing losses on the call options as coal prices rallied through June, traders say the producer has been forced to buy futures contracts to hedge its position. But the volume of futures it has been trying to buy has been so big that it has pushed up prices. “The market didn’t turn because of this position but it is responsible for the ferocity of the move upwards,” says one coal trading executive. “It would have rallied much less quickly without it.” It is not clear how many futures contracts the producer needs to buy but the view among market participants is that the call options expire in September and December. That is one reason why traders believe prices might have peaked for 2016. They also fears private sector miners in China, attracted by higher margins, might ignore the government rules. “We do not expect this China induced tightness to hold beyond the next couple of months, but it is tough to be sure,” says Mr Hamilton. Others are not so sure. Analysts at Citigroup reckon prices could surge to $ 90 a tonne if the La Niña weather phenomenon that is expected to develop later brings heavy rain to Australia and Indonesia. Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2016. Monday, 15 August 2016 20160725 1558 07 Thermal coal bears gripped by Chinese capacity squeeze 2016-08-15 11:44 AM http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5791c4e2-500f-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc.html#axzz4HNAlmcau Thermal coal bears gripped by Chinese capacity squeeze Neil Hume, Commodities Editor Last updated: July 25, 2016 3:58 pm Beijing’s decision to ease production has sent prices higher and wrongfooted traders If the first rule of macro trading is “don’t fight the Fed” then the first rule of raw materials must be “don’t fight Beijing”. It is a truth coal traders are discovering after China upended the market with plans to impose a five-day week working week for domestic mines in a bid to cut overcapacity. Since the policy was announced in March, the price of thermal coalhas risen by 20 per cent as Chinese traders have been forced to chase after cargoes in the seaborne market or to draw down stocks. The rally has wrongfooted many market participants who were betting on another year of falling prices for thermal coal, which is used to generate electricity in power stations and is a source of profits for global mining houses likes Glencore and Rio Tinto. http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/bc279c32-5277-11e6-9664-e0bdc13c3bef.img At least one big participant, traders say, has been caught on the wrong side of a major position that was designed to protect the company against falling prices. Beijing’s directive has also turned on its head the widely held view that Chinese imports of thermal coal would dwindle from the 140m tonnes purchased last year. “Thermal coal bears, among which we were one of the biggest, have been reminded this year that it is not wise to fight the Chinese government,” says Colin Hamilton, head of commodity research at Macquarie. “As long as China remains a meaningful thermal coal importer, it will act as a price setter.” For years China has been trying to put its bloated coal industry on a more stable footing, but latest reforms are some of the first to have an immediate impact on the broader market. Mines normally operate 24 hours a day and seven days a week. The benchmark price for Asia – thermal coal shipped from the Australian port of Newcastle – is up by more than a quarter since its lows in January and is now trading above $61 a tonne. Other coal markers have seen similar gains but remain well their 2008 peaks of nearly $200 a tonne. Analysts estimate domestic production in China was down per cent 10 to 15 per cent in May from a year ago, while the latest official data point toward rising imports. “Before China announced its ‘de-capacity’ efforts, we thought seaborne imports would fall to about 110m tonnes [this year]. But now, we think they’ll hold at 140m tonnes or maybe even get a bit higher,” says Andy Roberts, head of thermal coal research at Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy. Analysts say the decline in domestic production has coincided with increased demand in China, as power consumption picks up over the hot summer months. Morgan Stanley reckons coal-fired power production rose nearly 5 per cent month-on-month in June and will rise further through July and August. “The combination of rising demand growth and impaired supply has prompted an inventory drawdown,” says Morgan Stanley analyst Tom Price. Globally, thermal coal production has been declining for more than a year as the collapse in prices has forced miners to scrap new projects and expansions plans. More recently heavy rainfall has hit supplies from Indonesia, the world’s biggest exporter, intensifying the impact of the policy changes in China. But traders who handle millions of tonnes of coal a year say the recovery in prices cannot be solely explained by decisions taken China. A weaker US dollar and the oil price, which has almost doubled from its January low, have also contributed. Another influence has been the derivatives market. Traders say a large coal producer had been selling call options to banks in the over-the-counter market. These trades, known as covered positions, were profitable as long as price kept declining. But that is no longer true. A seller of a call option pockets a premium upfront but is obliged to deliver an asset at a specified price or time if it exercised by the holder. Faced with growing losses on the call options as coal prices rallied through June, traders say the producer has been forced to buy futures contracts to hedge its position. But the volume of futures it has been trying to buy has been so big that it has pushed up prices. “The market didn’t turn because of this position but it is responsible for the ferocity of the move upwards,” says one coal trading executive. “It would have rallied much less quickly without it.” It is not clear how many futures contracts the producer needs to buy but the view among market participants is that the call options expire in September and December. That is one reason why traders believe prices might have peaked for 2016. They also fears private sector miners in China, attracted by higher margins, might ignore the government rules. “We do not expect this China induced tightness to hold beyond the next couple of months, but it is tough to be sure,” says Mr Hamilton. Others are not so sure. Analysts at Citigroup reckon prices could surge to $90 a tonne if the La Niña weather phenomenon that is expected to develop later brings heavy rain to Australia and Indonesia. Monday, 15 August 2016 20160731 2006 11 Chinese coal-fired power firms to post weaker profits amid capacity glut 2016-08-15 12:06 PM http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1996668/chinese-coal-fired-power-firms-post-weaker-profits-amid-capacity Chinese coal-fired power firms to post weaker profits amid capacity glut Eric Ng PUBLISHED : Sunday, 31 July, 2016, 8:06pm UPDATED : Sunday, 31 July, 2016, 10:30pm Coal-fired power producers on average suffered an 11 per cent year-on-year fall in power prices. Photo: AFP Weak power demand and rapid growth in new generation capacity to hurt profits of key players Huaneng Power International is expected to kick off on Tuesday the reporting season for Hong Kong-listed mainland Chinese firms that focus on coal-fired power generation, whose interim profits are expected to have fallen due to lower power prices and falling plant utilisation. This is despite the fact that savings on fuel costs and interest expenditure from weaker coal prices and interest rate cuts have helped soften the blow. “For players with more [coal-fired generation] exposure, we expect profit to be … hurt by lower tariffs as a result of both tariff cuts in January [this year] and higher direct power [sales to big end-users that attract lower tariffs], and lacklustre output,” Michael Tong head of Hong Kong and China research at Deutsche Bank said in a research report. China’s largest power producer sees 8.6pc drop in output in first half According to Tong, Huaneng, the listed flagship of China’s largest power producer China Huaneng Group, is likely to report a 26 per cent year-on-year decline in first-half recurring net profit to 6.76 billion yuan, while rival China Resources Power (CRP) may see a 23 per cent drop to 5.81 billion yuan. Huadian Power International, another key player, could slide 16 per cent to 3 billion yuan. Simon Lee, head of Morgan Stanley’s Asia Pacific utilities research, expects milder profit declines of 18.5 per cent for Huaneng, 15 per cent for CRP and 15.1 per cent for Huadian. He said that a 9 per cent year-on-year decline in utilisation hours of the entire fleet of the mainland’s coal-fired plants, due to weak power demand growth and rapid new generation capacity growth, has played a big role in the profit squeeze. Power demand on the mainland grew 2.7 per cent year-on-year during the first six months of this year, which was far outstripped by a 11.3 per cent year-on-year increase in installed power generation capacity as at the end of June. This happened amid a construction boom of coal-fired, nuclear, wind and solar projects, as investors were encouraged by higher industry profits in earlier years, thanks to sharp falls in coal prices and higher subsidised power tariffs for clean energy. Chinese power producers face multi-year profit down-cycle amid excesses and market reform But the building boom, coupled with sharply weaker demand caused by China’s economic transition away from energy-intensive industries into service sectors, has led to major surplus capacity and the lowest plant utilisation in 38 years. Low utilisation is bad for a plant’s profitability since more fixed costs like asset depreciation and maintenance have to be absorbed by each unit of power sold. Analysts expect the glut to result in much lower capacity addition in the years ahead. Lower coal prices, with the average price of coal shipped through Qinhuangdao – China’s largest coal port – declining 16 per cent year-on-year in the year’s first half, were insufficient to offset the impact from lower plant utilisation and power prices. Coal costs typically accounts for around two-thirds of a power plant’s total operating cost. Coal-fired power producers on average suffered an 11 per cent year-on-year fall in power prices, as a result of an average 7 per cent cut in state-stipulated prices in January and rising direct sales to large industrial users at cheaper prices, according to calculations by Morgan Stanley and Citi’s analysts. Such sales are encouraged by Beijing as part of industry reform to enhance efficiency via competition and reduce power costs for manufacturers, since such sales allow users and generators to directly negotiate volumes and prices, bypassing the power distributors. Li Ka-shing’s Power Assets posts higher interim profit due to disposal loss last year The distributors, which used to earn fat profit margins on state stipulated buying and selling prices with no incentives to cut costs, have been forced to lower operating costs under power pricing reform. According to Morgan Stanley’s analysts who recently met with industry officials in Guangdong province, which has limited energyintensive industries, is aiming for direct power sales to account for half of its total power sales by 2020, up from 8 per cent this year. This applies to electricity generated from both fossil fuel and renewable energy. “Using power reforms to reduce corporate costs via power tariff cuts is a consensus among central and provincial governments,” Morgan Stanley’s analysts said, adding larger tariff discounts are expected this year as more sales are subject to competition and direct negotiations between buyers and generators. Meanwhile, CLP Holdings, the larger of Hong Kong’s two power utilities, is tipped by Citi’s head of Asia utilities research Pierre Lau to post on Monday a 5 per cent year-on-year rise in first-half net profit to HK$6 billion, with higher profits from Hong Kong and India more than offsetting declines in Australia and mainland China. This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Power firms face earnings squeeze Monday, 15 August 2016 20160808 05 China coal and steel: stop the rot 2016-08-15 11:41 AM http://nicosiamoneynews.com/2016/08/08/china-coal-and-steel-stop-the-rot/ China coal and steel: stop the rot August 8, 2016 For the past couple of decades, business professors have spun price deflation as a result of “innovative disruption”. In fact, the old economy – heavy industry – has been slowly killing itself for years. The economic slowdown in China has brought the latest example: overcapacity in steelmaking and coal mining depressing prices. Though the Chinese government understands the problem full well, its latest solution will not work. China’s coal companies carry a lot of debt; some as much as their entire asset value. The banking regulator, China Banking Regulatory Commission, has had to get involved. To cut banks’ loan exposure to coal (and steel as well), the CBRC reportedly has plans to encourage local governments to aid the most indebted steel and coal companies by participating in debt-for-equity swaps with the banks. Banks could use the help. In a worst-case scenario, non-performing loans could jump fivefold from the current 1.7 per cent of the total, thinks Credit Suisse. The coal and steel companies are even more needy. Shanghai-listed miners, such as Shanxi Coking Coal, jumped on the reports on Monday. The promise of intervention in the coal and steel industries has coincided with a big rally in the prices of the underlying commodities. Thermal coal prices in China have jumped by nearly a third from the lows of late last year. Meanwhile, the proportion of Chinese steel mills losing money has dropped to a fifth; a year ago almost all were in the red. All of this eases the pressure on bloated industries and does nothing to remedy overcapacity. Steel production continued to rise in July, and exports are up more than 8 per cent this year. Finance can provide pain relief but only harsh medicine – shutting uneconomic factories down – can offer a cure. Extending the lives of zombie coal and steel companies will only prolong the “disruption” in these markets. Email the Lex team at
[email protected] Monday, 15 August 2016 20160808 2011 13 China’s Coal-Market Reforms Fuel Rebound in Prices 2016-08-15 12:19 PM http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-coal-market-reforms-fuel-rebound-in-prices-1470654404 China’s Coal-Market Reforms Fuel Rebound in Prices Benchmark prices for thermal coal in both Asia and Europe have climbed by more than a third since April By Dan Strumpf and Rhiannon Hoyle Updated Aug. 8, 2016 8:11 p.m. ET A coal depot in China’s Heilongjiang province last October; production curbs in China have given prices a lift this summer. Photo: Jason Lee/Reuters One of the world’s most maligned commodities is staging a comeback. Coal prices have soared this summer, after new mining restrictions curbed production in China, the world’s biggest producer and consumer. Benchmark prices for thermal coal in Asia, Europe and the U.S. have climbed by more than a third since April, while the price of coal used in steelmaking is up 20% from its 2016 nadir in May. The rally is a stark reversal for the coal market, which has been in a protracted slide for much of the past five years. Ample production and waning demand in developed countries have pummeled prices for thermal coal, used in power generation. Demand for coking coal, used in steel production, has also softened as global growth has cooled and China reins in its industrial sector. But efforts to overhaul China’s coal-mining sector-burdened for years by overcapacity-have perked up the market. In April, China’s State Administration of Work Safety introduced new coal-production caps, limiting the number of working days for its coal miners to 276 a year from 330 previously. “That is massive,” said Robin Griffin, a coal analyst at commodities consultancy Wood Mackenzie, based in Australia’s resource-rich Queensland state. The curtailment has sent production tumbling 14% to 809.3 million metric tons in the second quarter of this year, according to an analysis of government data by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. Official data show imports rising 17% year-over-year to just under 60 million tons in the same period. “People got over their skis that demand for coal, being the dirtiest fuel, would just plummet,” said Harish Sundaresh, a portfolio manager who oversees commodity investments at the $240 billion fund manager Loomis Sayles. “What has actually happened is that Chinese production cuts have actually been larger than the consumption declines.” Mr. Sundaresh said he has been buying shares of coal producers and mining-equipment manufacturers. The recent recovery offers a reprieve to the world’s beleaguered coal miners. In the U.S., the coal-mining sector has been buffeted by bankruptcies, amid competition from cheap natural gas and tighter emissions standards. To be sure, coal prices remain far from their recent highs. In 2011, Asia thermal coal breached $140 a metric ton, according to Platts. Coking coal traded at more than $160 a ton when the Steel Index started tracking prices in 2013. At the start of August, a ton of each traded at $66.50 and $101.10, respectively. In the U.S., benchmark thermal coal traded at $43.80 per short ton at the start of the month, according to Platts. Despite their recent lift, analysts say several forces are likely to keep prices in check. China, like other big coal consumers, is trying to reduce its coal dependency has imposed limits on new coal-fired plant construction. India, another top coal user, is boosting domestic production with the long-term goal of phasing out coal imports. Fired Up After a long slump, coal prices are rebounding this summer as Chinese production slides and imports pick up. Asia coal prices
China’s coal production
China’s coal imports
Sources: The Steel Index, Platts (prices); ANZ (production); CEIC (imports) The coal rally is coinciding with the peak demand period for the fuel. Thermal-coal demand typically runs hot at this time of year as summer heat in the northern hemisphere keeps air conditioners active. In the market for coking coal, the cuts to Chinese production coincided with an energized steel market. Rising Asian steel prices gave production mills more cash to restock inventories of raw materials, including coal. In addition, flooding in China has sparked speculation about extra steel demand to repair or rebuild damaged infrastructure and buildings. These factors have helped to mop up a lot of the surplus cargoes sloshing around the seaborne market that resulted from an expansion of coal mining in places such as Australia, the world’s No. 1 exporter of steelmaking coal. “It has brought the markets almost back into balance for hard coking coal,” said Mr. Griffin. In the first half of 2016, the value of high-ash Australian thermal coal-a particularly “China-centric market,” says Mr. Griffin-rose 22% versus a 5% to 12% rise in the price of various types of Indonesian thermal coal. Wood Mackenzie forecasts prices for steelmaking coal to hold up over the coming months during what is a typically strong period for steel demand in Asia-China’s peak construction season-before slipping back to the high $80s a ton in 2017. It projects Australian thermal-coal benchmark prices to hold flat near US$60 a ton until the first quarter of next year before easing. Chinese coal production peaked in 2012, and the country has been pushing to shrink its huge coal and steel sectors. The country has about 9,000 coal mines and as many as 1,200 will be closed in the coming years, according to Platts. The U.S., by contrast, has 833 active coal mines. “One of the reasons why [China’s] reform plan was put in place was to reduce the number of smaller high-cost coal-miners in the country,” said Gareth Carpenter, editorial director for coal at Platts. Traders said they are starting to feel anxious about how quickly prices have risen. Some worry that China could loosen the rules on its own coal output to support local industry. “It’s definitely taken the market-and we include ourselves in that-by surprise over the last few weeks,” said Daniel Hynes, commodity strategist at ANZ. “The market suddenly realized that they were following through on their stated goals, and because expectations were so low, it may have just forced some buyers back into the market.” Write to Dan Strumpf at
[email protected] and Rhiannon Hoyle at
[email protected] Monday, 15 August 2016 20160808 2015 03 Chinese province to extend maturity on $60bn in coal loans 2016-08-15 11:30 AM http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b244b36-5d39-11e6-a72a-bd4bf1198c63.html#axzz4HN2DpoB3 Chinese province to extend maturity on $60bn in coal loans Don Weinland in Hong Kong and Lucy Hornby in Beijing Last updated: August 8, 2016 8:15 pm China’s most coal-dependent province has moved to ease rising pressure on seven of its largest coal miners by extending the maturity on up to Rmb400bn ($60bn) in loans, in a sign of the severity of the bad-debt crisis gripping the country’s depressed coal sector. The move by Shanxi province marks the first time a local regulator has asked banks for leeway on loans for a select group of companies. It is the latest in a series of tactics employed by the country as it tries to pare bad debt, which by some analysts’ estimates has reached epidemic levels. The central government last year launched a Rmb4tn-and-counting programme that pushed banks to swap debt from many local government businesses for longer-maturity bonds. This year, Beijing announced a controversial plan in which banks would trade corporate debt for equity in companies. Corporate debt is a concern across China but the situation is particularly desperate in Shanxi. A four-year slump in coal prices has left miners in the red and private companies unable to repay high-interest-rate shadow-banking loans that date back to a boom in coal prices a decade ago. A collapse in the chain of credit in the shadow-banking sector is reverberating through the province, which accounts for about one-quarter of coal production in China, itself the world’s largest coal industry. The Shanxi branch of the China Banking Regulatory Commission will allow the province’s seven biggest coal companies to restructure short-term debt into medium and long-term loans, the state-run Xinhua news agency reported. Shares in the seven state-owned companies soared on Monday – several by their 10 per cent daily trading limit – with a weekend report by respected business news magazine Caixin that Beijing was considering debt-to-equity swaps for the beleaguered sector adding a tailwind. Pain relief is not the same as medicine The CBRC did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The move comes after the deputy provincial government led the seven coal miners on a road show to Beijing this summer in an attempt to convince investors to subscribe to their bonds. One company in May offered five-year bonds at nearly double the yield on comparative notes but the initiative on the whole showed few positive results. “Coal is an important industry to Shanxi therefore the government has to step in to alleviate the problem,” said Fitch Ratings analyst Alvin Cheng, noting that companies kept on life support worsen China’s glut of coal and other industrial capacity. At the end of last year, Shanxi’s seven largest coal groups had Rmb1.18tn in debt, almost as much as the province’s Rmb1.28tn gross domestic product in 2015, according to Everbright Securities. Fitch estimates current combined debt stands at Rmb1.1tn, and according to Chinese media the companies have about Rmb600bn in short-term debt. “If the banks support this, they may be able to get back some of these loans. If not, then most of it will become non-performing loans,” said DBS analyst Chen Shujin. Some 21 per cent of all bank lending in Shanxi has gone to the province’s seven top coal companies, Zhang Anshun, the head of the province’s CBRC, was quoted as saying by Xinhua. Official figures put China’s bad debt at Rmb4.6tn as of end-March, or 1.75 per cent of total commercial banking debt in the system. Analysts say the real ratio could be as high as 15 per cent. China coal and steel: stop the rot http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8a6e8226-5d7d-11e6-a72a-bd4bf1198c63.html http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/669e9660-f820-4ee3-af5e-f8d029462dd6.img TO GO WITH China-economy-environment-coal-climate,FOCUS by Tom HANCOCK In this photo taken on November 20, 2015, Chinese flags fly as a worker clearing a conveyer belt used to transport coal, near a coal mine at Datong, in China’s northern Shanxi province. For decades coal has been the backbone of the northern province of Shanxi, providing livelihoods for millions of miners, while private jet owning bosses became notorious for their nouveau riche lifestyles. AFP PHOTO / GREG BAKER / AFP / GREG BAKER (Photo credit should read GREG BAKER/AFP/Getty Images) Monday, 15 August 2016 20160812 1059 10 China’s Crude Oil, Coal Output Declines Deepen Amid Cutbacks 2016-08-15 12:03 PM http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-12/china-s-crude-oil-coal-output-declines-deepen-amid-cutbacks China’s Crude Oil, Coal Output Declines Deepen Amid Cutbacks Bloomberg News August 12, 2016 – 10:59 AM WIB Updated on August 12, 2016 – 6:38 PM WIB With assistance by Jing Yang A worker conducts maintenance work on oil pipes at an oil delivery point operated by Bashneft PAO near Neftekamsk, Russia, on Thursday, March 3, 2016. Bashneft is an upstream and down stream oil & gas provider which explores, produces and refines its own oil and gas which it extracts from brownfield reserves in the Russian Federation. Photographer: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg Daily crude output in July falls to lowest since October 2011 Nation’s coal mining output drops 10% from January-July China’s crude oil and coal production declines deepened as the nation’s oil companies cut spending amid low prices and coal miners slashed output to meet government-set targets. Crude production last month in the world’s largest energy consumer dropped 8.1 percent to 16.7 million metric tons from a year ago, according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics on Friday. That’s about 3.95 million barrels a day, sliding to the lowest since October 2011. Output is down 5.1 percent during the first seven months of the year. Coal mining during that period slowed 10 percent to 1.9 billion tons.
Chinese oil majors are estimated to have cut capital spending by 10 percent in the first half of the year from the same period in 2015, resulting in a drop in domestic crude production, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. analysts said in an Aug. 1 report. Meanwhile, coal output is contracting as President Xi Jinping’s government seeks to shut overcapacity and use cleaner fuels. Coal mining fell 13 percent to 270 million tons, the slowest year-on-year decline rate in three months and helping push up spot coal prices at the port of Qinhuangdao to the highest level in 16 months. “Crude and coal production will post on-year drops throughout 2016 on cost concerns and government efforts to cut industrial overcapacity,” Tian Miao, an analyst with policy researcher North Square Blue Oak Ltd., said by phone before the data were released. “The decline rate of coal production may have narrowed last month with peak demand from the power sector in summer.” Too Slow Brent crude rallied almost 90 percent to a peak in June from its 12-year low in January, before sinking into a bear market. Prices are still about 60 percent below where they were two years ago. The nation’s refinery runs averaged 10.7 million barrels a day last month, slipping 2.7 percent from June’s record 11 million, while apparent oil demand fell to the lowest since October 2014. Natural gas output slipped 3.3 percent from the previous year to 10.3 billion cubic meters, Friday’s data show. Authorities have cautioned that coal mines are shutting too slowly to meet year-end targets. Reductions during the first seven months of 2016 equaled about 95 million tons, or about 38 percent of this year’s goal, according to a statement this week by the National Development and Reform Commission, the country’s top planner. Six state-owned coal miners in Shanxi province, the largest coalproducing region, will shut down 21 mines this year, according to the 21st Century Business Herald. Oil Bulls Take Heart as OPEC Rekindles Hopes of Output Freeze Oil drums containing lubricant oil sit on a conveyor belt as they are prepared for shipping at the Royal Dutch Shell Plc lubricants blending plant in Torzhok, Russia, on Tuesday, March 1, 2016. Royal Dutch Shell Plc has surpassed Chevron Corp. as the world’s second-biggest non-state oil company after completing the acquisition of BG Group Plc. Photographer: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg Oil Extends Gain Above $44 After Biggest Weekly Jump Since April A Singapore-flagged cargo ship arrives in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Exploiting Singapore’s regional familiarity could help Chinese companies navigate local politics complicated by tensions over China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. It could also help them avoid pitfalls from prior investment in Africa and Latin America, where China has faced criticism at times for a heavy-handed approach. Why China’s Plan to Build a New Silk Road Runs Through Singapore Oil Posts Best Week Since April Monday, 15 August 2016 20160812 2323 08 China to use tougher environmental standards to tackle capacity glut 2016-08-15 11:47 AM http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-overcapacity-idUSKCN10O065 China to use tougher environmental standards to tackle capacity glut Fri Aug 12, 2016 11:23pm EDT http://s3.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20160813&t=2&i=1149499133&w=780&fh=&fw=&ll=&pl=&sq=&r=LYNXNPEC7C065 An employee works at a steel factory in Dalian, Liaoning Province, China, June 27, 2016. Picture taken June 27, 2016. REUTERS/Stringer China will use the stricter enforcement of environmental, safety and energy efficiency standards as well as tougher credit controls to help fight against overcapacity in key industrial sectors, the government said. The world’s second-largest economy has identified overcapacity as one of its key challenges and it has already pledged mass closures in the steel and coal sectors, but it has so far fallen behind on its targets. The Ministry of Industry and Information said on Friday in a draft policy document published on its website (www.miit.gov.cn) it would “normalize the stricter implementation and enforcement of mandatory standards” to tackle overcapacity in sectors such as steel, coal, cement, glassmaking and aluminum. It would implement a “differential credit” policy that would allow lenders to extend loans to help firms restructure while cutting off funding for poorly performing enterprises targeted for closure. Firms that fail to comply with new energy efficiency targets would be given six months to rectify and would be closed if they fail to make progress. Those that continue to exceed air and water pollution standards would be fined on a daily basis and in serious cases ordered to shut. It said authorities would cut off power and water supplies, and even demolish the equipment of firms that fail to meet environmental and safety standards. Facilities could also be sealed off to prevent them from going back into operation. The ministry also repeated a previous pledge to implement differential and punitive power pricing policies to force firms to toe the line. Beijing is concerned that some local governments have not been acting with enough urgency when it comes to dealing with overcapacity problems. On Thursday, the state planning agency singled out regions such as Inner Mongolia, Fujian and Guangxi for failing to make progress. China plans to close 45 million tonnes of annual crude steel capacity this year, and 250 million tonnes of coal production, but only a third of the closures were completed by the end of July, the National Development and Reform Commission said. (Reporting by David Stanway; Editing by Jacqueline Wong) Monday, 15 August 2016 20160814 1425 09 China’s output cuts fuel demand for coal, trims inventories 2016-08-15 11:49 AM http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2003022/chinas-output-cuts-fuel-demand-coal-trims-inventories China’s output cuts fuel demand for coal, trims inventories Sarah Zheng PUBLISHED : Sunday, 14 August, 2016, 2:25pm UPDATED : Sunday, 14 August, 2016, 10:07pm China’s coal industry has been facing a torrid time since 2012 as demand weakened due to the slowing economy. Photo: Reuters Rapid production of coal has led to an oversupply in the market, causing miners to incur significant losses and prices slumping to sixyear lows. Photo: Reuters Top firms set to post lower profit declines for the first six months of this year, say analysts Though China’s embattled coal industry is enjoying a windfall of sorts on the back of rising demand and shrinking inventories, leading coal firms are still expected to post losses for the first six months of the year, analysts said. According to a research report published by Bank of China (BOC) International last week, coal prices will continue to climb in China, the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, this month. The report said coal prices have been bolstered by supply cuts, shrinking overcapacity and increased demand for thermal coal in summer months. Evidence that prices are picking up is already visible on the ground with China Shenhua Energy, the world’s largest state-owned coal supplier, increasing its contract prices for August by 18 yuan (HK$21) per tonne to 435 yuan (HK$508) per tonne, according to China Coal Resource Net. According to analysts, the company is expected to make further increases subsequently as its contract price is 20 yuan lower than the spot price, or current market price, which allows room for further growth. Chinese coal-fired power firms to post weaker profits amid capacity glut “We may see contract prices surging in the low seasons of September and October and catching up with the spot prices,” BOC International analysts Maggie Sheng and Lawrence Lau said in the report. “Such moves will benefit Shenhua and the whole coal sector in the long run,” they said. Spot prices of other categories have also seen an increase. Prices of Shanxi high grade thermal coal at the Qinhuangdao port rose by 50 yuan per tonne in July, while in Guangzhou, thermal coal jumped by 55 yuan per tonne to 500 yuan per tonne during July. That is good news for China’s coal industry which has been facing a torrid time since 2012 as demand weakened due to the slowing economy, China increased its use of clean fuels and the Chinese government renewed efforts to reduce carbon emissions, according to a report from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. In recent years, the rapid production of coal has led to an oversupply in the market, causing miners to incur significant losses and prices to fall to six-year lows, a Wall Street Journal article said. The government responded to this by taking steps to curb overcapacity like lower output targets, regulations limiting working days for miners and curbs on construction of new plants. Unnecessary and unprofitable mines were forced to shutter operations, a Bloomberg report said. China reaffirms plan to cut steel and coal production The measures yielded fruit with inventories of six major coal producers falling to the lowest in 32 months in late July, the BOC International report said. In Qinhuangdao, inventories dropped 20 per cent from July to August to 2.7 million tonnes, its lowest level in eleven years. But despite these historically low supply levels, coal miners this year are actually behind schedule to cut overcapacity, having only met 38 per cent of their targeted reduction of 250 million tonnes by the end of July, a National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) statement on its website said. Supply reductions and higher prices have helped soften profit declines for major coal companies this year. China Coal is expected to report a 13 per cent decrease in profits, or a net loss of 73 million yuan (HK$85.3 million), in the first half of the year by International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS), a lower profit decline than in 2015. By Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) – a standard measuring inventory of assets available to companies – China Coal will actually end up with a net profit of 350 to 520 million yuan in the first half, the BOC International report said. Shenhua Energy is predicted to see profit fall by 27 per cent in the first half to 9.5 billion yuan under IFRS and 9.4 billion yuan under CAS from the same period a year ago, according to the report. Yanzhou Coal is likely to report profits of 166 million yuan under IFRS, up from its 51 million yuan loss in the first half of 2015. Its recovery has been helped by stringent cost control measures, Sheng and Lau said. Shougang Fushan Resources Group is expected to incur a net loss in the first half of the year, as a result of lower raw coal output and an 18 per cent drop in the price of its No. 4 raw coking coal in Liulin. The Chinese government has been wary about the coal market rebound, Sheng and Lau said. “If coal prices surge too much too soon, it will be difficult to strictly implement the supply-side reform,” the analysts said, referring to China’s economic growth strategy of capital investment and decreased production barriers. China prefers to have gradual recovery over rapid surges, they added. the1uploader 8:59 pm on 2016-07-31 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/08/01/daftar-perguruan-tinggi-terbaik-di-indonesia-menurut-webometrics-juli-2016/)
Daftar Perguruan Tinggi Terbaik di Indonesia menurut Webometrics, Juli 2016 Daftar Perguruan Tinggi Terbaik di Indonesia menurut Webometrics, Juli 2016 http://s6.postimg.org/zc9bame75/978_602_73508_0_9_back.jpg Webometrics Ranking of World Universities The Webometrics Ranking of World Universities is produced by Cybermetrics Lab (CCHS), a unit of the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), the main public research body in Spain. It offers information about more than 12,000 universities according to their web presence (an assessment of the scholarly contents, visibility and impact of universities on the web). The ranking is updated every January and July. The Webometrics Ranking or Ranking Web is built from a database of over 20,000 higher education institutions. The top 12,000 universities are shown in the main ranking and more are covered in regional lists. The ranking started in 2004 and is based on a composite indicator that includes both the volume of the Web contents and the visibility and impact of web publications according to the number of external links they received. A wide range of scientific activities appears exclusively on academic websites and is typically overlooked by bibliometric indicators. Webometric indicators measure institutional commitment to Web publication. Webometric results show a high correlation with other rankings. However, North American universities are relatively common in the top 200, while small and medium-size biomedical institutions and German, French, Italian and Japanese universities were less common in the top ranks. Possible reasons include publishing via independent research councils (CNRS, Max Planck, CNR) or the large amount of non-English web contents, which are less likely to be linked. Daftar Jurnal Ilmiah di Indonesia, Feb. 2018 https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/20180220053542_issn.aio_v3.lipi.dik http://bit.ly/2BCcMzf https://view.joomag.com/directory-of-scientific-journals-in-indonesia-feb-2018/0448934001519131415 https://joom.ag/zYaY Webometrics Ranking of World Universities: Metodologi Milyaran halaman web dipublikasi setiap harinya. Termasuk didalamnya halaman twitter, facebook, dan berbagai media sosial lainnya. Akibatnya, SERPs (search engine results pages) bersifat sangat rentan dalam hal urutan dan prioritas untuk ditampilkan oleh (semua) search engine. Oleh karena itu, Webometrics menggunakan domain mirror dari google.com di Spanyol yang berbahasa Inggris. Webometrics melakukan peringkat web terhadap lebih dari 24.000 institusi pendidikan tinggi (HEI) di seluruh dunia sejak tahun 2004. Pengumpulan data dilakukan pada minggu-minggu pertama bulan Januari dan Juli, antara tanggal 1-20, khususnya data publik pada akhir bulan. Publikasi dilakukan sebanyak 2 kali setahun, yakni tidak sebelum tanggal 28. Walau demikian Webometrics tidak berkenan mempublikasikan dan berdialog tentang figur atau nilai mentah (raw values) yang mendasari (kriteria) pemeringkatan tertentu. Pemeringkatan bertujuan memotivasi institusi dan ilmuwan untuk hadir di internet (web presence) sebagai bentuk dan refleksi aktivitas mereka secara akurat. Internet sebagai sarana komunikasi perlu dimanfaatkan semaksimal mungkin bagi institusi dan ilmuwan yang merasa memiliki keunggulan akademis. Kebijakan open access dan transparansi menjadi salah satu cara promosi kenaikan volume dan mutu publikasi elektronik. Beberapa praktek, manipulasi, dan upaya peningkatan peringkat yang dinilai buruk oleh Webometrics, antara lain: 1. Pemanfaatan konten eksternal dan inlink secara masif. Penyediaan link terhadap materi pihak lain dinilai memberikan akses bagi kejahatan pembajakan dan pelanggaran hak cipta, pemberian izin, dari pengarang, editor, institusi penerbit. 2. Duplikasi dan/atau pemecahaan file dalam repository dalam format berbeda. 3. Pihak admin menampilkan prilaku buruk yang serius. Webometrics menihilkan raw value atas indikator yang dimanipulasi dan langsung mendowngrade ke peringkat 99999. Pengecualian pemeringkatan institusi perguruan tinggi dilakukan atas dasar beberapa kriteria berikut: 1. Legalitas dan keberadaan institusi dinilai meragukan. 2. Institusi tidak mengoperasikan webserver selama 24/7. Webometrics melakukan ping selama 2 bulan berturut-turut. 3. Institusi memiliki dua pusat domain web atau lebih. Webometrics menilai praktek ini tidak baik dan memberikan penalti yang lebih berat. Walau tetap diperingkat, hanya 1 domain yang dipublikasikan, yakni yang memiliki indikator web lebih baik, walau domain lama atau yang ditinggalkan tersebut sudah tidak dijadikan acuan utama. Prosedur ini berlaku bagi domain yang independent satu sama lain. 4. Administrasi dan domain berada di bawah lembaga non-pendidikan seperti gereja dan tidak bersifat independent dalam artian dicampur-aduk dengan aktivitas non-pendidikan lainnya. 5. Indikator PRESENCE diberi bobot 10% pada jumlah halaman web yang diindeks Google, tidak termasuk file pdf. 6. Indikator OPENNES diberi bobot 10% pada jumlah file pdf yang diindeks Google. Webometrics tidak lagi menggunakan Google Scholar sebagai patokan. 7. Indikator VISIBILITY diberi bobot 50% pada rata-rata 2 inlink (ahrefs & Majestic). Webometrics tidak menghitung Top-10 linking domains dan korespondensi backlinks. 8. Indikator EXCELLENCE diberi bobot 30% pada data Scimago (10 besar makalah yang paling banyak dikutip menurut disiplin ilmu) selama periode 5 tahun (2009-2013). http://s6.postimg.org/etef5k09t/978_602_73508_0_9_front.jpg Buku “Direktori Perguruan Tinggi di Indonesia” berisi daftar akreditasi program studi dan daftar perguruan tinggi di seluruh Indonesia. Buku setebal 1.060 halaman ini berisi daftar 18.600 program studi yang telah diakreditasi oleh BAN-PT di 4.476 perguruan tinggi di seluruh Indonesia. Perguruan tinggi di Indonesia dibagi menurut kelompoknya, yakni akademi, institut, politeknik, sekolah tinggi, dan universitas. Berikut rinciannya: Buku – 1. AKADEMI 1.185 program studi terakreditasi 1.255 AKADEMI 111 halaman isi 20 halaman daftar AKADEMI Buku – 2. INSTITUT 1.385 program studi terakreditasi 118 INSTITUT 58 halaman isi 2 halaman daftar INSTITUT Buku – 3. POLITEKNIK 906 program studi terakreditasi 237 POLITEKNIK 46 halaman isi 4 halaman daftar POLITEKNIK Buku – 4. SEKOLAH TINGGI 5.092 program studi terakreditasi 2.331 SEKOLAH TINGGI 316 halaman isi 38 halaman daftar SEKOLAH TINGGI Buku – 5. UNIVERSITAS 10.032 program studi terakreditasi 535 UNIVERSITAS 395 halaman isi 9 halaman daftar UNIVERSITAS Dapatkan bukunya sekarang juga. Cover price : Rp 300.000 per eksemplar. Harga grosir berlaku untuk pembelian minimal 2 eksemplar. Harga tidak termasuk ongkos kirim. Pesan bukunya di: +62 851 0518 7118 +62 21 4027 8375 Perpustakaan Nasional RI: Katalog Dalam Terbitan (KDT) Direktori Perguruan Tinggi di Indonesia / disusun oleh Sando Sasako. — Jakarta : CV Serabdi Sakti, 2015. lxxxiii, 973 hlm, 21 cm ISBN 978-602-73508-0-9 1. Perguruan tinggi — Indonesia — Direktori. I. Sando Sasako. 378.598 025 Copyright © Sando Sasako Hak Cipta dilindungi Undang-Undang. Dilarang memperbanyak isi buku ini, baik sebagian maupun seluruhnya, dalam bentuk apa pun, tanpa izin tertulis dari pemilik hak cipta dan penerbit. Keterangan:,, ID: Indonesia, SEA: Southeast Asia; *: semakin kecil nilainya, semakin baik peringkatnya; detil per universitas dapat dilihat dengan menggantikan “http://www.”atau “http://”pada kolom url dengan “http://www.webometrics.info/en/detalles/”,contoh: 1. “http://www.una.ac.id”dengan “http://www.webometrics.info/en/detalles/una.ac.id” tanpa tanda petik.,, 2. “http://ugp.ac.id/”dengan “http://www.webometrics.info/en/detalles/ugp.ac.id” tanpa tanda petik.,, Daftar Perguruan Tinggi Terbaik di Indonesia menurut Webometrics, Juli 2016 Untuk mengetahui ranking-nya di Indonesia, silahkan hubungi kami di: +62 851 0518 7118 +62 21 4027 8375 untuk tampilan terbaik, silahkan di-blok tabel berikut di bawah, +copy, dan +paste di Excel. Presence,Impact,Openness,Excellence,University,Url 1798,3124,4121,5824,Akademi Telkom Jakarta,http://www.akademitelkom.ac.id/ 13070,16363,4121,5824,Bali Tourism Institute Sekolah Tinggi Pariwisata Nusa Dua Bali,http://www.stpbali.ac.id/ 11890,15572,4121,5824,Bandung Polytechnic for Manufacturing,http://www.polman-bandung.ac.id/ 309,3541,3281,4172,Bina Nusantara BINUS University,http://binus.ac.id/ 106,1020,2240,2514,Bogor Agricultural University,http://ipb.ac.id/ 205,484,2081,3204,Brawijaya University,http://www.ub.ac.id/ 14696,21397,4121,5824,De La Salle Catholic University Manado,http://www.unikadelasalle.ac.id/ 4296,5365,3671,5824,Electronic Engineering Polytechnic Institute of Surabaya,http://www.pens.ac.id/ 22383,23700,4121,5824,Fakultas Kesehatan Masyarakat Universitas Nusa Tenggara Barat,http://www.fkm-untb.com/ 18255,16436,4121,5824,Gajayana University,http://unigamalang.ac.id/ 287,405,3354,5824,Gunadarma University,http://www.gunadarma.ac.id/ 5567,2890,4121,5824,IAIN Antasari Banjarmasin,http://www.iain-antasari.ac.id/ 11506,23700,4121,5824,IAIN Zawiyah Cot Kala Langsa,http://www.iainlangsa.ac.id/ 11117,21840,4121,5824,IKIP PGRI Madiun,http://www.ikippgrimadiun.ac.id/ 474,3444,4121,5824,Indonesia University of Computer UNIKOM,http://www.unikom.ac.id/ 2435,2505,4028,5824,Informatics and Computer College Stmik Amikom,http://www.amikom.ac.id/ 4335,8317,4121,5824,Institut Agama Islam Negeri IAIN Salatiga,http://iainsalatiga.ac.id/ 18332,21023,4121,5824,Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Jakarta,http://www.iisip.ac.id/ 7788,14006,4121,5824,Institut Informatika & Bisnis Darmajaya Lampung,http://www.darmajaya.ac.id/ 14858,15847,4121,5824,Institut Kesenian Jakarta ,http://www.ikj.ac.id/ 3075,3227,4121,5824,Institut Sains & Teknologi Akprind,http://www.akprind.ac.id/ 6196,9814,4121,5824,Institut Seni Indonesia Denpasar,http://www.isi-dps.ac.id/ 7061,9476,4121,5824,Institut Seni Indonesia Surakarta,http://isi-ska.ac.id/ 3724,7927,4121,5824,Institut Seni Indonesia Yogyakarta,http://isi.ac.id/ 13107,12873,4121,5824,Institut Teknologi Adhi Tama Surabaya,http://itats.ac.id/ 10699,19037,4121,5824,Institut Teknologi Harapan Bangsa School of Telematics,http://ithb.ac.id/ 14634,18501,4121,5824,Institut Teknologi Indonesia,http://www.iti.ac.id/ 7445,3022,4121,5824,Institut Teknologi Nasional,http://www.itenas.ac.id/ 13296,13820,4121,5824,Institut Teknologi Nasional Malang,http://www.itn.ac.id/ 10745,19205,4070,5824,Institut Teknologi Padang,http://itp.ac.id/ 522,1622,2236,4060,Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember,http://www.its.ac.id/ 18308,15740,4121,5824,Institut Teknonogi Medan,http://www.itm.ac.id/ 331,489,1406,1914,Institute of Technology Bandung,http://www.itb.ac.id/ 21610,23372,4121,5824,International University Liaison Indonesia,http://www.iuli.ac.id/ 20106,20240,4121,5824,IPMI Graduate School of Business,http://www.ipmi.ac.id/ 2653,5341,3837,5824,Islamic University of Sultan Agung,http://unissula.ac.id/ 12831,15147,4121,5824,Jayabaya University & Academy,http://www.jayabaya.ac.id/ 11969,20525,4121,5824,Kwik Kian Gie School of Business (Institute Business and Informatics of Indonesia) / Institut Bisnis dan Informatika Kwik Kian Gie,http://www.kwikkiangie.ac.id/ 8075,13726,4121,5824,Lembaga Pendidikan Perkebunan,http://www.lpp.ac.id/ 7722,13260,4121,5824,Malangkucecwara School of Economics,http://www.stie-mce.ac.id/ 16904,23700,4121,5824,Manajemen Informatika Universitas Muhammadiyah Metro,http://mi-ummetro.ac.id/ 4872,13693,3741,5824,Merdeka University Malang,http://unmer.ac.id/ 11053,12334,4121,5824,Panca Bhakti University,http://upb.ac.id/ 7663,12357,3978,5824,Perbanas Institute,http://perbanas.id/ 11198,15268,4121,5824,Perguruan Tinggi Raharja,http://www.raharja.ac.id/ 4236,17071,4121,5824,Perguruan Tinggi Teknokrat,http://www.teknokrat.ac.id/ 792,2358,3630,3887,Petra Christian University,http://www.petra.ac.id/ 8122,18307,4121,5824,Politeknik Informatika Del,http://www.del.ac.id/ 23474,23487,4121,5824,Politeknik Katolik Saint Paul Sorong,http://www.poltekstpaul.ac.id/ 20899,9381,4121,5824,Politeknik Keuangan Negara STAN,http://www.pknstan.ac.id/ 14129,15535,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Bali,http://pnb.ac.id/ 3763,8875,3968,5824,Politeknik Negeri Bandung,http://www.polban.ac.id/ 15582,16600,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Banjarmasin,http://www.poliban.ac.id/ 7142,14580,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Batam / Batam State Polytechnic,http://www.polibatam.ac.id/ 13095,13580,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Jakarta,http://www.pnj.ac.id/ 5597,15849,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Jember,http://www.polije.ac.id/ 9146,18860,4089,5824,Politeknik Negeri Lampung,http://www.polinela.ac.id/ 9879,16575,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Lhokseumawe,http://pnl.ac.id/ 6414,14609,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Malang,http://www.polinema.ac.id/ 13744,7637,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Manado,http://www.polimdo.ac.id/ 10012,16239,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Medan,http://www.polmed.ac.id/ 7973,17894,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Media Kreatif,http://www.polimedia.ac.id/ 10113,3008,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Padang (previously Politeknik Universitas Andalas),http://www.polinpdg.ac.id/ 5197,4014,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Pontianak,http://www.polnep.ac.id/ 10368,3398,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Samarinda ,http://www.polnes.ac.id/ 13211,12273,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Semarang / Semarang State Polytechnic,http://www.polines.ac.id/ 4222,6588,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Sriwijaya,http://www.polsri.ac.id/ 14339,14233,4121,5824,Politeknik Negeri Ujung Pandang,http://www.poliupg.ac.id/ 12361,14971,4121,5824,Politeknik Perkapalan Negeri Surabaya,http://ppns.ac.id/ 21763,19642,4121,5824,Politeknik Seni Yogyakarta,http://poliseni.ac.id/ 14735,13236,4121,5824,PPM School of Management,http://ppm-manajemen.ac.id/ 10580,9753,4121,5824,Prasetiya Mulya Business School,http://pmbs.ac.id/ 6804,11912,4121,5824,President University,http://www.president.ac.id/ 15800,18959,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri Parepare,http://www.stainparepare.ac.id/ 25808,18774,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri Purwokerto ,http://stainpurwokerto.ac.id/ 13418,19514,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi Kesuma Negara,http://www.stieken.ac.id/ 8194,7884,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Informatika dan Komputer Indonesia,http://www.stiki.ac.id/ 23628,22538,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Kesehatan Banten,http://www.stikesbanten.ac.id/ 18286,22687,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Informatika & Komputer TIME Medan,http://www.stmik-time.ac.id/ 21564,22047,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Informatika dan Komputer,http://www.likmi.ac.id/ 17429,23700,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Informatika dan Komputer Indo Global Mandiri,http://www.stebisigm.ac.id/ 3941,4505,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Informatika dan Komputer Jakarta,http://jak-stik.ac.id/ 8910,16320,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Informatika dan Teknik Komputer Bali ,http://www.stikom-bali.ac.id/ 15990,11896,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Risiko Dan Asuransi,http://www.stimra.ac.id/ 10096,9552,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia Bandung,http://www.stsi-bdg.ac.id/ 19623,17945,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Teknik PLN,http://www.sttpln.ac.id/ 10198,14600,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Teknik Surabaya,http://www.stts.edu/ 13157,5300,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Teknologi Garut,http://sttgarut.ac.id/ 18187,22998,4121,5824,Sekolah Tinggi Teknologi Jakarta,http://www.sttj.ac.id/ 21548,22628,4121,5824,Stads Asmi School of Administrative Sciences,http://www.asmi.ac.id/ 7405,16986,4121,5824,STAIN Kudus Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri Kudus,http://www.stainkudus.ac.id/ 5644,17252,4121,5824,STAIN Ponorogo,http://www.stainponorogo.ac.id/ 12104,22337,4121,5824,STIE Ekuitas,http://www.ekuitas.ac.id/ 7647,12597,3723,5824,STIE Perbanas Surabaya,http://www.perbanas.ac.id/ 9836,14729,4121,5824,STIE YKPN Yogyakarta,http://stieykpn.ac.id/ 11749,4851,4121,5824,”STIKes, AKPER & AKBID Helvetia”,http://helvetia.ac.id/ 4821,5703,4121,5824,STIKOM Surabaya,http://www.stikom.edu/ 13744,10084,4121,5824,STMIK & AMIK Logika,http://logika.ac.id/ 5590,4868,4121,5824,STMIK Akakom Yogyakarta,http://www.akakom.ac.id/ 11530,19496,4121,5824,STMIK Atma Luhur,http://www.atmaluhur.ac.id/ 10321,21524,4121,5824,STMIK Duta Bangsa Surakarta,http://www.stmikdb.ac.id/ 5159,7546,4121,5824,STMIK MDP & STIE MDP,http://www.mdp.ac.id/ 20183,21765,4121,5824,STMIK STIE Asia,http://asia.ac.id/ 12396,17706,4121,5824,STMIK STIE Mikroskil,http://www.mikroskil.ac.id/ 7405,3208,4121,5824,STT Telematika Telkom Purwokerto (Akademi Teknik TELKOM),http://st3telkom.ac.id/ 11834,10096,3216,5824,Surya University,http://www.surya.ac.id/ 8110,8952,3479,5824,Swiss German University,http://www.sgu.ac.id/ 25614,16255,4121,5824,Teknologi Pendidikan Universitas Negeri Malang,http://tep.ac.id/ 631,1311,3231,5824,Telkom University,http://www.telkomuniversity.ac.id/ 10729,18255,4120,5824,Ubudiyah Indonesia University / Universitas UBudiyah Indonesia,http://www.uui.ac.id/ 11580,17625,4121,5824,UIN Ar-Raniry Banda Aceh,http://www.ar-raniry.ac.id/ 11192,21752,4121,5824,Universitas 17 Agustus 1945,http://uta45jakarta.ac.id/ 11539,22045,4121,5824,Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Banyuwangi,http://untag-banyuwangi.ac.id/ 19520,23700,4121,5824,Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Cirebon,http://www.untagcirebon.ac.id/ 6021,2161,4121,5824,Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Samarinda,http://www.untag-smd.ac.id/ 2126,18708,4121,5824,Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Semarang ,http://www.untagsmg.ac.id/ 7838,12811,4121,5824,Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Surabaya,http://www.untag-sby.ac.id/ 17811,23700,4121,5824,Universitas 45 Surabaya,http://univ45sby.ac.id/ 17582,20770,4121,5824,Universitas Abdurachman Saleh Situbondo,http://www.unars.ac.id/ 19031,18458,4121,5824,Universitas Abulyatama,http://abulyatama.ac.id/ 11400,14879,4121,5824,Universitas Advent Indonesia,http://www.unai.edu/ 2083,1707,3267,4706,Universitas Ahmad Dahlan Yogyakarta,http://uad.ac.id/ 395,1068,2800,3746,Universitas Airlangga,http://www.unair.ac.id/ 12910,18637,4121,5824,Universitas AKI,http://www.unaki.ac.id/ 25433,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Al Asyariah Mandar,http://www.unasman.ac.id/ 8870,10624,4007,5824,Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia,http://uai.ac.id/ 21739,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Al Washliyah Labuhan Batu,http://www.univalabuhanbatu.ac.id/ 17222,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Al Washliyah Medan,http://univamedan.ac.id/ 23703,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Al-Ghifari,http://www.unfari.ac.id/ 21127,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Alkhairaat,http://unisapalu.ac.id/ 11850,9209,4121,5824,Universitas Almuslim,http://www.umuslim.ac.id/ 554,1779,3277,5824,Universitas Andalas,http://www.unand.ac.id/ 24376,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Asahan,http://www.una.ac.id/ 10947,7039,4121,5824,Universitas Atma Jaya Makassar,http://www.uajm.ac.id/ 3492,8425,3402,5824,Universitas Atma Jaya Yogyakarta,http://www.uajy.ac.id/ 17690,6636,4121,5824,Universitas Azzahra,http://universitasazzahra.ac.id/ 5722,3373,3392,5824,Universitas Bakrie,http://www.bakrie.ac.id/ 18226,12765,4121,5824,Universitas Bale Bandung,http://unibba.ac.id/ 8754,5123,4121,5824,Universitas Balikpapan,http://www.uniba-bpn.ac.id/ 8390,13079,4121,5824,Universitas Bandar Lampung,http://www.ubl.ac.id/ 22793,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Bandung Raya,http://www.unbar.ac.id/ 8259,9291,4121,5824,Universitas Bangka Belitung,http://ubb.ac.id/ 15273,22338,4121,5824,Universitas Bangun Nusantara Sukoharjo,http://veteranbantara.ac.id/ 15310,22080,4121,5824,Universitas Batam,http://univbatam.ac.id/ 11073,21402,4121,5824,Universitas Batanghari,http://unbari.ac.id/ 9900,22133,4121,5824,Universitas Baturaja,http://www.unbara.ac.id/ 4566,2392,3543,5824,Universitas Bengkulu,http://www.unib.ac.id/ 16496,18678,4121,5824,Universitas Bhayangkara Jakarta Raya,http://ubharajaya.ac.id/ 12637,19381,4121,5824,Universitas Bhayangkara Surabaya,http://www.ubhara.ac.id/ 4262,5777,3791,5824,Universitas Bina Darma,http://www.binadarma.ac.id/ 19395,22005,4121,5824,Universitas Bojonegoro,http://www.unigoro.ac.id/ 6672,7792,4121,5824,Universitas Borneo Tarakan,http://www.borneo.ac.id/ 19755,22178,4121,5824,Universitas Borobudur,http://borobudur.ac.id/ 17666,22391,4121,5824,Universitas Bosowa,http://universitasbosowa.ac.id/ 9600,3562,4121,5824,Universitas Boyolali,http://uby.ac.id/ 10952,7237,4121,5824,Universitas Budi Luhur,http://www.budiluhur.ac.id/ 14565,15408,4121,5824,Universitas Bunda Mulia Jakarta,http://www.ubm.ac.id/ 6148,15086,4121,5824,Universitas Bung Hatta,http://www.bunghatta.ac.id/ 19672,21947,4121,5824,Universitas Bung Karno,http://www.ubk.ac.id/ 25952,14651,4121,5824,Universitas Cenderawasih,http://www.uncen.ac.id/ 6385,13664,4121,5824,Universitas Ciputra,http://www.uc.ac.id/ 16803,22106,4121,5824,Universitas Cokroaminoto Makassar,http://uncp.ac.id/ 19389,21609,4121,5824,Universitas Cokroaminoto Yogyakarta,http://ucy.ac.id/ 14381,16670,4121,5824,Universitas Darma Agung ,http://www.uda.ac.id/ 5658,10153,4121,5824,Universitas Darma Persada,http://www.unsada.ac.id/ 12607,22132,4121,5824,Universitas Darul Ulum,http://www.undar.ac.id/ 11110,7671,4121,5824,Universitas Darussalam Ambon,http://www.unidar.ac.id/ 12441,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Darwan Ali,http://unda.ac.id/ 18850,23625,4121,5824,Universitas Dayanu Ikhsanuddin,http://www.unidayan.ac.id/ 11792,11638,4121,5824,Universitas Dehasen Bengkulu,http://unived.ac.id/ 13915,12854,4121,5824,Universitas Dharmawangsa,http://www.dharmawangsa.ac.id/ 25128,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Dian Nusantara,http://www.untara.ac.id/ 1759,4927,3981,4172,Universitas Dian Nuswantoro,http://www.dinus.ac.id/ 242,527,1820,3689,Universitas Diponegoro,http://www.undip.ac.id/ 10081,12155,4121,5824,Universitas Djuanda,http://unida.ac.id/ 23380,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Dumoga Kotamobagu,http://www.udk.ac.id/ 19247,22765,4121,5824,Universitas Dwijendra,http://undwi.ac.id/ 22830,20919,4121,5824,Universitas Ekasakti,http://univ-ekasakti-pdg.ac.id/ 1967,1365,4121,5824,Universitas Esa Unggul (Universitas Indonusa),http://www.esaunggul.ac.id/ 17009,17067,4121,5824,Universitas Fajar,http://unifa.ac.id/ 19551,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Flores,http://uniflor.ac.id/ 95,245,1131,1990,Universitas Gadjah Mada,http://www.ugm.ac.id/ 25952,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Gajah Putih,http://ugp.ac.id/ 8847,19746,4121,5824,Universitas Galuh,http://www.unigal.ac.id/ 7619,22082,4121,5824,Universitas Garut,http://uniga.ac.id/ 20074,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Gorontalo,http://unigo.ac.id/ 23868,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Gresik,https://unigres.ac.id/ 12549,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Gunung Rinjani,http://univgunungrinjani.ac.id/ 17506,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Halmahera,http://www.uniera.ac.id/ 8088,10485,4121,5824,Universitas Halu Oleo,http://www.uho.ac.id/ 13773,12818,4121,5824,Universitas Hang Tuah,http://www.hangtuah.ac.id/ 495,2872,3172,2984,Universitas Hasanuddin,http://unhas.ac.id/ 13972,18134,4121,5824,Universitas Hindu Indonesia,http://www.unhi.ac.id/ 12502,22526,4121,5824,Universitas HKBP Nommensen,http://uhn.ac.id/ 13788,3420,4121,5824,Universitas IBA Palembang,http://www.iba.ac.id/ 11288,4042,4121,5824,Universitas Ibn Khaldun Bogor,http://www.uika-bogor.ac.id/ 22240,23583,4121,5824,Universitas Ibnu Chaldun,http://www.ibnuchaldun.ac.id/ 13644,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Ichsan Gorontalo,http://www.unisan.ac.id/ 15850,23583,4121,5824,Universitas Indo Global Mandiri,http://www.uigm.ac.id/ 120,342,1818,1877,Universitas Indonesia,http://www.ui.ac.id/ 21188,19026,4121,5824,Universitas Indraprasta,http://unindra.ac.id/ 16327,22222,4121,5824,Universitas Informatika Dan Bisnis Indonesia,http://www.unibi.ac.id/ 10205,21112,4121,5824,Universitas Internasional Batam,http://www.uib.ac.id/ 26220,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Iqra Buru,http://uniqbu.ac.id/ 15416,14136,4121,5824,Universitas Islam 45 Bekasi,http://www.unismabekasi.ac.id/ 18725,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Al-azhar Mataram,http://unizar.ac.id/ 18165,22988,4121,5824,Universitas Islam As Syafiiyah,http://www.uia.ac.id/ 17357,21965,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Attahiriyah,http://www.uniat.ac.id/ 3229,5113,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Bandung,http://www.unisba.ac.id/ 13019,19998,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Batik,http://uniba.ac.id/ 20766,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Blitar,http://unisbablitar.ac.id/ 23237,21944,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Darul Ulum,http://unisda.ac.id/ 13466,20268,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Djakarta,http://www.uid.ac.id/ 718,884,2877,5824,Universitas Islam Indonesia,http://www.uii.ac.id/ 18362,22338,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Indragiri,http://www.unisi.ac.id/ 15027,21786,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Kadiri,http://www.uniska-kediri.ac.id/ 12685,20849,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Kalimantan Banjarmasin,http://www.uniska-bjm.ac.id/ 14050,18658,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Lamongan,http://unisla.ac.id/ 17244,22439,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Madura,http://www.uimadura.ac.id/ 19719,17802,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Majapahit,http://unim.ac.id/ 12981,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Makassar,http://uim-makassar.ac.id/ 13203,16228,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Malang,http://www.unisma.ac.id/ 6691,11474,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar,http://www.uin-alauddin.ac.id/ 1503,1833,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang,http://www.uin-malang.ac.id/ 4026,5258,3977,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim,http://uin-suska.ac.id/ 1740,1111,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya,http://www.uinsby.ac.id/ 6376,5038,3911,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung,http://www.uinsgd.ac.id/ 2229,5326,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta,http://uin-suka.ac.id/ 783,3432,1839,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta,http://www.uinjkt.ac.id/ 2293,2900,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Negeri Walisongo Semarang,http://www.walisongo.ac.id/ 6231,10271,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Nusantara,http://www.uninus.ac.id/ 8110,5831,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Riau,http://uir.ac.id/ 14551,7811,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Sumatera Utara,http://www.uisu.ac.id/ 20833,19442,4121,5824,Universitas Islam Syekh Yusuf Tangerang ,http://unistangerang.ac.id/ 15044,21348,4121,5824,Universitas Jabal Ghafur,http://www.unigha.ac.id/ 2148,3545,3923,5824,Universitas Jambi,http://www.unja.ac.id/ 12754,16731,4121,5824,Universitas Janabadra ,http://www.janabadra.ac.id/ 567,3362,2834,5824,Universitas Jember,http://unej.ac.id/ 11784,13268,4121,5824,Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani,http://www.unjani.ac.id/ 1306,3403,3379,3529,Universitas Jenderal Soedirman,http://www.unsoed.ac.id/ 15338,23152,4121,5824,Universitas Kader Bangsa Palembang,http://www.ukb.ac.id/ 17535,22318,4121,5824,Universitas Kadiri,http://unik-kediri.ac.id/ 8910,19557,4121,5824,Universitas Kanjuruhan Malang,http://unikama.ac.id/ 21960,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Kapuas Sintang,http://www.unka.ac.id/ 25758,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Karimun,http://www.universitaskarimun.ac.id/ 19111,22812,4121,5824,Universitas Katolik Darma Cendika,http://www.ukdc.ac.id/ 853,3605,4121,4706,Universitas Katolik Indonesia Atma Jaya,http://www.atmajaya.ac.id/ 5404,3206,3596,4512,Universitas Katolik Parahyangan,http://unpar.ac.id/ 19923,23026,4121,5824,Universitas Katolik Santo Thomas,http://www.ust.ac.id/ 3484,9498,4121,5824,Universitas Katolik Soegijapranata,http://www.unika.ac.id/ 18653,15883,4121,5824,Universitas Katolik Widya Mandira,http://unwira.ac.id/ 12693,12844,4121,5824,Universitas Khairun,http://www.unkhair.ac.id/ 19325,16491,4121,5824,Universitas Klabat ,http://www.unklab.ac.id/ 24122,17821,4121,5824,Universitas Krisnadwipayana,http://unkris.ac.id/ 5322,5767,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana,http://www.ukdw.ac.id/ 18044,21027,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Immanuel,http://www.ukrimuniversity.ac.id/ 11356,14058,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Indonesia,http://www.uki.ac.id/ 13644,23684,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku,http://ukim.ac.id/ 23214,15577,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Indonesia Paulus,http://www.ukipaulus.ac.id/ 22003,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Indonesia Tomohon,http://www.uki-t.ac.id/ 19755,20095,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Indonesia Toraja,http://ukitoraja.ac.id/ 10175,8177,3941,5824,Universitas Kristen Krida Wacana,http://www.ukrida.ac.id/ 2293,3898,4121,5269,Universitas Kristen Maranatha,http://www.maranatha.edu/ 1929,7157,3156,4512,Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana,http://www.uksw.edu/ 14676,21775,4121,5824,Universitas Kristen Surakarta,http://www.uks.ac.id/ 9998,12969,4121,5824,Universitas Kuningan,http://uniku.ac.id/ 19755,23583,4121,5824,Universitas Kutai Kartanegara,http://unikarta.ac.id/ 7254,7886,3336,5824,Universitas Lambung Mangkurat,http://unlam.ac.id/ 861,1606,3498,3689,Universitas Lampung,http://www.unila.ac.id/ 5432,7730,4121,5824,Universitas Lancang Kuning,http://www.unilak.ac.id/ 2894,17181,4121,5824,Universitas Langlangbuana,http://www.unla.ac.id/ 12926,14584,4121,5824,Universitas Ma Chung,http://www.machung.ac.id/ 14495,21393,4121,5824,Universitas Madura,http://www.unira.ac.id/ 5057,5042,4121,5824,Universitas Mahammadiyah Purwokerto,http://www.ump.ac.id/ 21098,22422,4121,5824,Universitas Mahaputra Muhammad Yamin,http://www.ummy.ac.id/ 9058,10531,4121,5824,Universitas Mahasaraswati Denpasar,http://unmas.ac.id/ 17543,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Mahasaraswati Mataram,http://unmasmataram.ac.id/ 10596,17369,4121,5824,Universitas Malahayati,http://malahayati.ac.id/ 3899,5128,4121,5824,Universitas Malikussaleh,http://www.unimal.ac.id/ 8821,14389,4121,5824,Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji,http://umrah.ac.id/ 7647,9654,3706,4361,Universitas Mataram,http://unram.ac.id/ 9921,22614,4121,5824,Universitas Mathla’ul Anwar,http://www.unmabanten.ac.id/ 7722,4798,4121,5824,Universitas Medan Area,http://uma.ac.id/ 754,1100,4121,5824,Universitas Mercu Buana,http://www.mercubuana.ac.id/ 6769,6151,4121,5824,Universitas Mercu Buana Yogyakarta,http://mercubuana-yogya.ac.id/ 14809,10052,4121,5824,Universitas Merdeka Pasuruan,http://unmerpas.ac.id/ 23113,17242,4121,5824,Universitas Merdeka Surabaya,http://umer.ac.id/ 23135,22287,4121,5824,Universitas MPU Tantular,http://www.mputantular.ac.id/ 17479,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Muara Bungo,http://www.universitasmuarabungo.ac.id/ 10125,6176,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Aceh,http://unmuha.ac.id/ 15438,16315,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Bengkulu,http://umb.ac.id/ 15722,9574,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Buton,http://www.umbuton.ac.id/ 20065,19600,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Cirebon,http://www.umc.ac.id/ 10729,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Gorontalo,http://umgo.ac.id/ 7174,17073,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Gresik,http://www.umg.ac.id/ 8041,13141,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta,http://www.umj.ac.id/ 4854,12880,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Jember,http://www.unmuhjember.ac.id/ 24584,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Lampung,http://umlampung.ac.id/ 7533,7189,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Luwuk Banggai,http://www.unismuhluwuk.ac.id/ 11379,16894,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Magelang,http://ummgl.ac.id/ 12781,16896,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar,http://www.unismuh.ac.id/ 195,2487,3694,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang,http://www.umm.ac.id/ 17682,20489,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Mataram,http://ummat.ac.id/ 4587,1367,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Metro,http://www.ummetro.ac.id/ 7491,19823,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Palangka Raya,http://umpalangkaraya.ac.id/ 10168,1627,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Palembang,http://umpalembang.ac.id/ 24411,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Parepare,http://spmb-umpar.ac.id/ 7209,15481,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Ponorogo,http://www.umpo.ac.id/ 15890,20693,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Pontianak,http://unmuhpnk.ac.id/ 5488,11081,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Prof Dr Hamka,http://uhamka.ac.id/ 7310,13083,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Purworejo,http://www.umpwr.ac.id/ 9649,8795,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Riau,http://umri.ac.id/ 2979,9098,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Semarang ,http://unimus.ac.id/ 9460,2271,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Sidoarjo,http://www.umsida.ac.id/ 8992,20644,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Sukabumi ,http://www.ummi.ac.id/ 21919,19615,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Barat,http://www.umsb.ac.id/ 7955,2498,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara,http://www.umsu.ac.id/ 10113,17603,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Surabaya,http://www.um-surabaya.ac.id/ 420,2629,3573,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta,http://www.ums.ac.id/ 26220,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Tapanuli Selatan,http://www.umts.ac.id/ 1577,1213,2999,5824,Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta,http://www.umy.ac.id/ 2761,10212,4032,5269,Universitas Mulawarman,http://www.unmul.ac.id/ 7520,14037,4121,5824,Universitas Multimedia Nusantara,http://umn.ac.id/ 4577,8277,4035,5824,Universitas Muria Kudus,http://www.umk.ac.id/ 15063,9665,4121,5824,Universitas Musamus Merauke,http://www.unmus.ac.id/ 13107,13355,4121,5824,Universitas Muslim Indonesia,http://www.umi.ac.id/ 12869,3852,4121,5824,Universitas Muslim Nusantara Al Washliyah,http://www.umnaw.ac.id/ 22170,23220,4121,5824,Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama,http://www.unu.ac.id/ 21043,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Nahdlatul Wathan,http://unwmataram.ac.id/ 2030,1549,4074,5824,Universitas Narotama,http://www.narotama.ac.id/ 8122,9362,4121,5824,Universitas Nasional Jakarta,http://www.unas.ac.id/ 21672,21758,4121,5824,Universitas Nasional PASIM,http://www.pasim.ac.id/ 2282,6478,4008,5824,Universitas Negeri Gorontalo,http://www.ung.ac.id/ 3188,5303,3777,5824,Universitas Negeri Jakarta,http://www.unj.ac.id/ 4848,4575,4011,5824,Universitas Negeri Makassar,http://www.unm.ac.id/ 445,1806,2996,5824,Universitas Negeri Malang,http://www.um.ac.id/ 16885,10522,4121,5824,Universitas Negeri Manado,http://www.unima.ac.id/ 1382,5628,4092,5824,Universitas Negeri Medan,http://www.unimed.ac.id/ 2843,5826,3682,5824,Universitas Negeri Padang,http://www.unp.ac.id/ 14129,4299,4121,5824,Universitas Negeri Papua,http://www.unipa.ac.id/ 600,1158,3533,5824,Universitas Negeri Semarang,http://unnes.ac.id/ 2020,5005,3272,5824,Universitas Negeri Surabaya,http://www.unesa.ac.id/ 620,1761,2430,5824,Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta,http://www.uny.ac.id/ 20415,22590,4121,5824,Universitas Ngurah Rai,http://www.unr.ac.id/ 21513,21271,4121,5824,Universitas Nurtario Bandung,http://unnur.ac.id/ 19654,19514,4121,5824,Universitas Nusa Bangsa,http://www.unb.ac.id/ 3417,5385,4121,5824,Universitas Nusa Cendana,http://www.undana.ac.id/ 22131,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Nusa Nipa,http://www.nusanipa.ac.id/ 20739,15040,4121,5824,Universitas Nusantara,http://www.nusantara.ac.id/ 8410,13527,4121,5824,Universitas Nusantara PGRI Kediri,http://unpkediri.ac.id/ 952,708,2259,3032,Universitas Padjadjaran,http://www.unpad.ac.id/ 7923,4454,4121,5824,Universitas Pakuan,http://www.unpak.ac.id/ 14735,11175,4121,5269,Universitas Palangka Raya,http://www.upr.ac.id/ 20216,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Palembang,http://unpal.ac.id/ 2517,18246,4121,5824,Universitas Pamulang,http://www.unpam.ac.id/ 16769,10548,4121,5824,Universitas Panca Marga,http://www.upm.ac.id/ 5130,11436,4121,5824,Universitas Pancasakti Tegal,http://www.upstegal.ac.id/ 9711,9714,4121,5824,Universitas Pancasila,http://www.univpancasila.ac.id/ 13040,22300,4121,5824,Universitas Pandanaran,http://www.unpand.ac.id/ 5783,8966,4121,5824,Universitas Paramadina,http://www.paramadina.ac.id/ 3481,6939,4121,5824,Universitas Pasundan,http://www.unpas.ac.id/ 5007,3773,3734,5824,Universitas Pattimura,http://unpatti.ac.id/ 10464,18358,4121,5824,Universitas Pekalongan ,http://unikal.ac.id/ 2083,99999,3032,5824,Universitas Pelita Harapan,http://www.uph.edu/ 12396,18905,4121,5824,Universitas Pembangunan Jaya,http://www.upj.ac.id/ 5984,11859,4121,5824,Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta,http://www.upnvj.ac.id/ 3672,10366,4121,5824,Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur,http://www.upnjatim.ac.id/ 3506,5276,3945,5824,Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Yogyakarta,http://www.upnyk.ac.id/ 6857,15604,4121,5824,Universitas Pembangunan Panca Budi Medan,http://www.pancabudi.ac.id/ 19214,23164,4121,5824,Universitas Pembinaan Masyarakat Indonesia,http://www.upmi.ac.id/ 3174,5557,3338,5824,Universitas Pendidikan Ganesha,http://undiksha.ac.id/ 19767,11672,4121,5824,Universitas Pendidikan Nasional,http://www.undiknas.ac.id/ 544,1092,1702,5824,Universitas Pendikan Indonesia / Indonesia University of Education,http://www.upi.edu/ 6345,13025,4121,5824,Universitas Pesantren Darul Ulum,http://www.unipdu.ac.id/ 11286,12022,4121,5824,Universitas PGRI Adi Buana Surabaya ,http://www.unipasby.ac.id/ 18872,23700,4121,5824,Universitas PGRI Banyuwangi,http://uniba-bwi.ac.id/ 6004,10116,4121,5824,Universitas PGRI Palembang,http://www.univpgri-palembang.ac.id/ 14913,21873,4121,5824,Universitas PGRI Ronggolawe,http://unirow.ac.id/ 11808,15296,4121,5824,Universitas PGRI Semarang,http://www.upgris.ac.id/ 6615,14932,4121,5824,Universitas PGRI Yogyakarta,http://upy.ac.id/ 24554,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Pramita Indonesia,http://www.unpri.ac.id/ 20392,21178,4121,5824,Universitas Prima Indonesia,http://unprimdn.ac.id/ 18243,23254,4121,5824,Universitas Prof Dr Hazairin SH,http://www.unihaz.ac.id/ 16653,17707,4121,5824,Universitas Prof Dr Moestopo,http://moestopo.ac.id/ 12253,19299,4121,5824,Universitas Putera Batam,http://www.upbatam.ac.id/ 24887,21753,4121,5824,Universitas Putra Indonesia YPTK Padang,http://www.yptk.ac.id/ 12090,3501,4121,5824,Universitas Respati,http://www.urindo.ac.id/ 10054,18417,4121,5824,Universitas Respati Yogyakarta,http://www.respati.ac.id/ 1334,99999,3260,3116,Universitas Riau,http://unri.ac.id/ 13868,12638,4121,5824,Universitas Riau Kepulauan,http://unrika.ac.id/ 8512,18061,4121,5824,Universitas Sahid Lokasi,http://www.usahid.ac.id/ 10989,19810,4121,5824,Universitas Sahid Surakarta,http://usahidsolo.ac.id/ 10382,8773,4121,5824,Universitas Sains Al Quran,http://www.unsiq.ac.id/ 2116,6586,3668,4512,Universitas Sam Ratulangi,http://www.unsrat.ac.id/ 26220,11353,4121,5824,Universitas Samawa,http://www.universitas-samawa.ac.id/ 17213,18974,4121,5824,Universitas Samudra Langsa,http://www.unsam.ac.id/ 2217,7089,3347,4952,Universitas Sanata Dharma,http://www.usd.ac.id/ 22721,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Sang Bumi Ruwa Jurai,http://www.saburai.ac.id/ 18214,23349,4121,5824,Universitas Sangga Buana,http://www.usbypkp.ac.id/ 10253,16535,4121,5824,Universitas Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa,http://www.ustjogja.ac.id/ 15890,18771,4121,5824,Universitas Satya Negara Indonesia,http://www.usni.ac.id/ 23276,21485,4121,5824,Universitas Satyagama,http://www.satyagama.ac.id/ 23417,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Sawerigading Makassar,http://www.unsamks.ac.id/ 472,99999,3179,4706,Universitas Sebelas Maret,http://uns.ac.id/ 8172,14451,4072,5824,Universitas Semarang,http://usm.ac.id/ 16479,21559,4121,5824,Universitas Sembilanbelas November,http://www.usn.ac.id/ 10789,19730,4121,5824,Universitas Serambi Mekkah,http://serambimekkah.ac.id/ 14203,18406,4121,5824,Universitas Serang Raya,http://www.unsera.ac.id/ 9383,13479,4121,5824,Universitas Setia Budi Surakarta,http://www.setiabudi.ac.id/ 8870,12995,4121,5824,Universitas Siliwangi,http://unsil.ac.id/ 18337,22929,4121,5824,Universitas Simalungun,http://www.usi.ac.id/ 12441,7696,4121,5824,Universitas Singaperbangsa,http://www.unsika.ac.id/ 16922,23509,4121,5824,Universitas Sintuwu Maroso,http://www.unsimar.ac.id/ 26220,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Sjakhyakirti,http://sjakhyakirti.ac.id/ 20886,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Soerjo,http://www.unsoer.ac.id/ 350,1766,3053,5824,Universitas Sriwijaya,http://www.unsri.ac.id/ 5102,11819,3787,5824,Universitas Stikubank Semarang,http://www.unisbank.ac.id/ 19684,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Subang,http://www.unsub.ac.id/ 5644,4301,3915,5824,Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa,http://www.untirta.ac.id/ 19961,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Sultan Fatah,http://www.unisfat.ac.id/ 226,2752,3613,5824,Universitas Sumatera Utara,http://usu.ac.id/ 22200,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Sunan Giri,http://www.ppsunsuri.ac.id/ 1293,5107,3075,4274,Universitas Surabaya,http://www.ubaya.ac.id/ 24141,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Surapati,http://www.surapati.ac.id/ 17678,21873,4121,5824,Universitas Suryadarma,http://universitassuryadarma.ac.id/ 9917,18636,4121,5824,Universitas Suryakancana,http://www.unsur.ac.id/ 12869,21450,4121,5824,Universitas Swadaya Gunung Djati,http://unswagati.ac.id/ 619,3268,2981,2514,Universitas Syiah Kuala,http://www.unsyiah.ac.id/ 3574,99999,4121,5824,Universitas Tadulako,http://untad.ac.id/ 20497,17284,4121,5824,Universitas Tama Jagakarsa,http://jagakarsa.ac.id/ 14948,19569,4121,5824,Universitas Tamansiswa Padang,http://www.unitas-pdg.ac.id/ 1293,4282,3416,5269,Universitas Tanjungpura,http://www.untan.ac.id/ 9631,10592,3917,5824,Universitas Tarumanagara,http://untar.ac.id/ 11991,14760,4121,5824,Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta,http://uty.ac.id/ 2450,1035,3919,5269,Universitas Terbuka,http://www.ut.ac.id/ 18719,19264,4121,5824,Universitas Teuku Umar Meulaboh,http://www.utu.ac.id/ 15285,18968,4121,5824,Universitas Tidar Magelang,http://untidar.ac.id/ 22240,21997,4121,5824,Universitas Timbul Nusantara,http://utira-ibek.ac.id/ 21750,13582,4121,5824,Universitas Timor,http://www.unimor.ac.id/ 26220,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Tompotika,http://www.untika.ac.id/ 25866,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Tri Tunggal,http://tritunggal.ac.id/ 12464,19014,4121,5824,Universitas Tribhuwana Tunggadewi,http://unitri.ac.id/ 13450,5993,4121,5824,Universitas Tridinanti,http://www.univ-tridinanti.ac.id/ 14074,22590,4121,5824,Universitas Trilogi,http://www.universitas-trilogi.ac.id/ 2398,1819,3317,5824,Universitas Trisakti,http://www.trisakti.ac.id/ 4473,7344,3818,5824,Universitas Trunojoyo,http://www.trunojoyo.ac.id/ 19644,22442,4121,5824,Universitas Tulungagung,http://unita.ac.id/ 13625,19619,4121,5824,Universitas Tunas Pembangunan,http://www.utp.ac.id/ 1201,1674,2919,3204,Universitas Udayana,http://www.unud.ac.id/ 23894,23700,4121,5824,Universitas W R Supratman,http://unipra.ac.id/ 7561,4366,4121,5824,Universitas Wahid Hasyim,http://www.unwahas.ac.id/ 11792,12228,4121,5824,Universitas Warmadewa,http://www.warmadewa.ac.id/ 13823,21142,4121,5824,Universitas Widya Dharma,http://unwidha.ac.id/ 13174,10843,4121,5824,Universitas Widya Kartika,http://www.widyakartika.ac.id/ 14511,19875,4121,5824,Universitas Widya Mandala Madiun ,http://unika.widyamandala.ac.id/ 17976,21194,4121,5824,Universitas Widya Mataram,http://widyamataram.ac.id/ 2450,6843,3853,5824,Universitas Widyatama,http://www.widyatama.ac.id/ 7636,13552,4121,5824,Universitas Wijaya Kusuma Surabaya,http://www.uwks.ac.id/ 11103,14603,4121,5824,Universitas Wijaya Putra,http://uwp.ac.id/ 17037,16029,4121,5824,Universitas Wijayakusuma Purwokerto,http://unwiku.ac.id/ 18276,23372,4121,5824,Universitas Winaya Mukti,http://winayamukti.ac.id/ 17811,21959,4121,5824,Universitas Wiralodra Indramayu,http://unwir.ac.id/ 12034,22883,4121,5824,Universitas Wiraraja,http://wiraraja.ac.id/ 19684,23013,4121,5824,Universitas Wiraswasta Indonesia,http://www.uwin.ac.id/ 14735,19788,4121,5824,Universitas Wisnuwardhana Malang,http://www.wisnuwardhana.ac.id/ 7215,12395,3786,5824,Universitas Yarsi,http://www.yarsi.ac.id/ 25519,23700,4121,5824,Universitas Yos Soedarso,http://www.uniyos.ac.id/ 13885,20065,4121,5824,Universitas Yudharta Pasuruan,http://yudharta.ac.id/ 15063,13742,4121,5824,University Dr Soetomo Surabaya,http://www.unitomo.ac.id/ 18841,19120,4121,5824,UP45 University of Petroleum,http://www.up45.ac.id/ 10682,13714,4121,5824,Widya Gama University Malang,http://widyagama.ac.id/ 20642,18030,4121,5824,Widya Karya Catholic University / Unika Widya Karya Malang,http://widyakarya.ac.id/ 3785,10967,4121,3821,Widya Manadala Catholic University,http://www.wima.ac.id/ 9370,14598,4121,5824,Yayasan Administrasi Indonesia (Universitas Persada),http://www.yai.ac.id/ the1uploader 2:42 pm on 2016-07-29 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/30/daftar-cnc-ke-18-iup-yang-dicabut/)
Daftar CNC ke-18 & IUP yang Dicabut Dear Client, Terlampir beberapa file terkait energi dan batubara: 1. Daftar isi terbaru dari buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017”. Last update: 12 Maret 2017. 2. Daftar harga buku-buku terkait energi dan batubara. Saat ini, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017. Last update: 12 Maret 2017”, ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.000 (dua ribu dollar AS), khusus untuk e-book dengan format pdf, single license. E-book dengan format flash (file *.exe) disewakan dengan harga US$ 200 (dua ratus dollar AS) per hari. Dalam prakteknya, e-book flash bisa diakses dalam rentang waktu kurang dari 48 hari. Kelonggaran diberikan karena adanya tenggang waktu (time lapse) antara pembuatan, upload, dan download file e-book flash sampai ke layar monitor pembaca yang membeli. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke email pembaca yang membeli. Beberapa direktori terkait bisnis batubara sudah tersedia: 1. direktori usaha tambang dengan status CNC, 2. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara, 3. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara dengan status CNC, 4. direktori perusahaan eksportir batubara, 5. direktori perusahaan pengangkut batubara, 6. direktori usaha batubara, dan lainnya. Setelah analisa dan peng-update-an terakhir ini selesai, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” hanya akan ditawarkan dalam bentuk cetak dan sewa e-book flash. Tidak ada diskriminasi harga antara pembeli WNI atau WNA. Buku edisi cetak “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.500 (dua ribu lima ratus dollar AS). File e-book flash berjudul “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” disewakan dengan harga US$ 250 per hari. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke e-mail pembaca yang membeli. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, saya menawarkan buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” dengan harga spesial. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, bila bapak memerlukan tabel, denah, bagan, grafis, dan gambar dalam buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017”, saya bisa memberikannya secara gratis dengan beberapa batasan tertentu. Penawaran ini ditutup sampai 31 Maret 2017. Demikian update dan penawaran dari saya. Terima kasih atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya. Salam, Sando Jakarta, 12 Maret 2017 Read the comprehensive report on “Coal Business in Indonesia” online in https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201?e=27352568/41747360 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-23 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-23___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/45029846 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-22 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-22___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/44160250 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-21 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-21___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42554502 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-20 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/daftar_cnc_ke-20___iup_yang_dicabut? e=27352568/42093230 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-19 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free http://bit.ly/2edGH42 Get the latest announcement of CNC status of mining business in Indonesia and the revoked mining permits (Daftar CNC Ke-18 dan IUP yang dicabut) in here for free http://bit.ly/2aUF3nF Daftar CNC Ke-18 & IUP yang dicabut Jakarta, 29 Juli 2016 Lihat juga “Daftar CNC ke-19 dan IUP yang dicabut” di sini https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/10/06/daftar-cnc-ke-19-daniup-yang-dicabut/ dan “Direktori Usaha Tambang di Indonesia: Status Clean and Clear” di sini https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/09/02/directory-of-mining-companies-in-indonesia-status-of-clean-and-clear/ KEMENTERIAN ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA MINERAL REPUBLIK INDONESIA DIREKTORAT JENDERAL MINERAL DAN BATUBARA JALAN PROF. DR. SUPOMO, SH. NO. 10 JAKARTA 12870 TELEPON : (021) 8295608 FAKSIMILE : (021) 8297642 E-Mail :
[email protected] KOTAK POS : 4632/KBY Web : http://www.minerba.esdm.go.id PENGUMUMAN NOMOR: 1115.Pm/04/DJB/2016 TENTANG PENETAPAN IUP CLEAR AND CLEAN KE-DELAPANBELAS DAN DAFTAR IUP YANG DICABUT OLEH GUBERNUR/BUPATI/WALIKOTA Pada hari ini diumumkan Penetapan IUP Clear and Clean (C&C) ke-delapanbelas dan daftar IUP yang dicabut oleh pemberi izin sebagaimana terlampir yang telah memenuhi ketentuan sebagaimana yang diatur dalam Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 43 Tahun 2015 (Permen ESDM No. 43/2015) jo. Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 02 Tahun 2013 sebagai pelaksanaan dari Undang-Undang 4 Tahun 2009, dengan persyaratan IUP yang memenuhi kriteria sebagaimana berikut: 1. Administrasi; 2. Kewilayahan; 3. Teknis dan lingkungan; 4. Finansial; Penetapan IUP C&C diberikan terhadap IUP yang telah dilakukan evaluasi dan mendapatkan rekomendasi dari Gubernur berdasarkan kriteria administrasi dan kewilayahan. Bagi IUP yang telah ditetapkan C&C-nya dan membutuhkan penerbitan sertifikat C&C wajib mendapatkan rekomendasi penerbitan sertifikat dari Gubernur sesuai kriteria yang diatur pada Permen ESDM No. 43/2015, yaitu: 1. Tahap Eksplorasi: Menyampaikan bukti setor iuran tetap sampai dengan tahun terakhir dan rekomendasi hasil evaluasi teknis (Laporan Eksplorasi) dari Pemerintah Provinsi; 2. Tahapan Operasi Produksi: Menyampaikan bukti setor pembayaran iuran tetap dan iuran produksi (royalti) sampai dengan tahun terakhir dan rekomendasi hasil evaluasi teknis dan lingkungan (Laporan Eksplorasi, Studi Kelayakan, dan Dokumen Lingkungan) dari Pemerintah Provinsi; Total Rekomendasi C&C dari Provinsi berjumlah 1083 IUP terdiri dari 453 IUP rekomendasi dari Gubernur dan 630 IUP rekomendasi dari Kepala Dinas. Dari seluruh rekomendasi Gubernur yang memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No. 43/2015 berjumlah 121 IUP, sedangkan yang belum atau tidak memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No. 43/2015 berjumlah 332 IUP; Untuk IUP yang belum memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No. 43/2015, pemegang IUP dapat berkoordinasi dengan Pemerintah Provinsi untuk melengkapi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM No. 43/2015. Selanjutnya Gubernur dapat menyampaikan hasil evaluasi dan/atau rekomendasi ulang atas dokumen yang dievaluasi tersebut dan disampaikan kembali kepada Direktur Jenderal Mineral dan Batubara; Pengumuman C&C ini berlaku sejak tanggal ditetapkan dan apabila terdapat kekeliruan dalam penentuan C&C ini dan ditemukan fakta baru yang menyatakan bahwa IUP-nya tidak C&C, maka akan dilakukan pembatalan pengumuman sesuai peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku. Ditetapkan di Jakarta Pada tanggal 29 Juli 2016 Direktur Jenderal, TTD Bambang Gatot Ariyono Coal Mining Business in Indonesia July 2016
http://bit.ly/2bFzmtz PT Borneo Lumbung Energi Metal Tbk: On the Road to Recovery
http://bit.ly/2bU9DiP Krisis Finansil Cina: Perspektif Kebijakan Moneter, Corporate Finance (Analisa Laporan Keuangan), dan Investment Banking (Valuasi Nilai)
http://bit.ly/29FtUbw http://koran.bisnis.com/read/20160805/451/572391/pencabutan-iup-terus-berlanjut PENERTIBAN PERIZINAN BERMASALAH Pencabutan IUP Terus Berlanjut Lucky Leonard, Jum’at, 05/08/2016 09:32 WIB Editor : Mia Chitra Dinisari JAKARTA — Pemerintah telah mencabut 575 izin usaha pertambangan (IUP) bermasalah, yang belum berstatus clear and clear hingga 29 Juli 2016. Pencabutan perizinan bermasalah itu dipastikan akan terus bertambahBerdasarkan pengumuman laporan penetapan IUP yang berstatus clear and clean (C&C) dari Direktorat Jenderal Mineral dan Ba tubara Kementerian ESDM, pencabutan IUP bermasalah dilakukan dengan berpedoman pada Peraturan Menteri ESDM No. 43/2015. Direktur Jenderal Mineral dan Batubara Kementerian ESDM Bambang Gatot Ariyono mengatakan, penetapan IUP C&C diberikan terhadap perizinan yang telah dievaluasi dan mendapatkan rekomendasi dari gubernur berdasarkan kriteria administrasi dan kewilayahan. Bagi IUP yang telah ditetapkan bebas dari masalah dan menbutuhkan penerbitan sertifikat C&C, maka wajib mendapatkan rekomendasi penerbitan sertifikat dari gubernur. Untuk IUP yang masih dalam tahap ekplorasi, katanya, harus menyampaikan bukti setoran iuran tetap sampai dengan tahun terakhir dan rekomendasi hasil evaluasi teknis dari pemerintah provinsi. Sementara itu, untuk IUP Operasi Produksi, harus menyampaikan bukti setoran iuran tetap dan royalti sampai dengan tahun terkahir dan rekomendasi hasil evaluasi teknis dan lingkungan dari pemerintah provinsi. Kementerian ESDM mencatat ada 10.331 IUP yang terdaftar. Sebanyak 6.365 IUP telah berstatus C&C, sedangkan 3.966 perizinan dianggap masih bermasalah, karena belum memperoleh sertifikat C&C. Bambang memaparkan, sudah ada 1.083 IUP yang direkomendasikan mendapat status C&C. Jumlah tersebut terdiri dari 453 IUP rekomendasi gubernur dan 630 IUP rekomendasi kepala dinas. “Dari seluruh rekomendasi gubernur yang memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM 43/2015 berjumlah 121 IUP,” katanya, Kamis (4/8). Sebanyak 65 IUP berasal dari Bangka Belitung, 14 IUP dari Jambi, 16 IUP dari Kalimantan Barat, dan 12 IUP dari Kalimantan Tengah Sementara itu, sebanyak 332 IUP dianggap belum atau tidak memenuhi persyaratan sesuai Permen ESDM 43/2015. DIBERI KESEMPATAN Kementerian ESDM masih memberikan kesempatan bagi IUP yang belum memenuhi persyaratan tersebut. Para pemegang izin itu dipersilakan berkoordinasi dengan pemerintah provinsi untuk memenuhi persyaratan yang diperlukan. Selanjutnya, gubernur dapat merekomendasi ulang dan menyampaikan hasil evaluasi kepada Dirjen Minerba. Sebelumnya, Kepala Biro Hukum Ditjen Minerba Heriyanto mengungkapkan, sudah ada beberapa IUP yang dicabut melakukan somasi kepada pemerintah. “Sudah ada beberapa yang somasi, tapi memang belum masuk ke proses hukum.” Proses penataan IUP bermasalah seharusnya sudah selesai pada 12 Mei 2016. Namun, target tersebut tidak dapat terpenuhi lantaran masih banyak data perizinan tambang dari kabupaten/kota yang belum disampaikan keprovinsi untuk dievaluasi. Berdasarkan UU No. 23/2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, bupati/walikota memiliki waktu hingga Oktober 2016 untuk menyerahkan dokumen IUP kepada gubernur. Alhasil, proses evalusi IUP tersebut bisa mundur hingga Januari 2017, karena gubernur memiliki waktu 90 hari setelah tanggal penyerahan dari bupati/waikota untuk menyampaikan hasil evaluasinya kepada Kementerian ESDM http://industri.bisnis.com/read/20160721/44/568085/pemerintah-cabut-534-izin-usaha-pertambangan Pemerintah Cabut 534 Izin Usaha Pertambangan Martin Sihombing Kamis, 21/07/2016 18:37 WIB Bisnis.com, JAKARTA – Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral (ESDM) Sudirman Said mengatakan ada 534 izin usaha pertambangan (IUP) yang dicabut karena tidak memiliki status “clean and clear” (CnC) Pencabutan izin tersebut terkait dengan upaya penertiban IUP dalam Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 43 Tahun 2015 tentang Tata Cara Evaluasi Penertiban Izin Usaha Pertambangan Mineral dan Batubara. “Setelah Permen itu diundangkan, kami menerima dari sejumlah gubernur bahwa dari 1.079 IUP non CnC yang direkomendasikan, selebihnya sudah ada pencabutan sebanyak 534 IUP,” kata Menteri Sudirman Said dalam konferensi pers di Kementerian ESDM Jakarta, Kamis (21/7/2016). Sudirman mengatakan tujuan utama pencabutan IUP tersebut adalah menyehatkan industri mineral dan batu bara (minerba) sehingga diisi oleh badan usaha taat hukum secara legal serta memenuhi persyaratan. IUP dinyatakan CnC jika memenuhi aspek administrasi dan kewilayahan. Dari sisi administrasi, IUP harus memiliki kelengkapan dokumen cadangan, penerbitannya sesuai dengan peraturan dan perundangan, serta memiliki izin usaha yang masih berlaku. Sementara itu dari sisi kewilayahan, IUP tidak boleh memiliki wilayah yang tumpang tindih, baik wilayah eksplorasi maupun produksi. Direktur Jenderal Minerba Kementerian ESDM Bambang Gatot Ariyono mengatakan sejumlah IUP yang dicabut umumnya karena tidak diperpanjang atau “expired”. “IUP yang 500an itu umumnya sesuai prosedur, tidak ada gejolak karena memang waktunya (izin usaha) sudah habis atau expired kemudian tidak diperpanjang,” kata Bambang. Ia menjelaskan sebelumnya Kementerian ESDM sudah membahas tentang penataan lisensi usaha pertambangan dengan Kepala Dinas Pertambangan dari 24 Provinsi. Dari pertemuan tersebut, pihaknya menerima ada sekitar 4.023 IUP non-CnC, namun yang dilaporkan pada Kementerian ESDM baru mencapai sekitar 1.500 IUP. “Yang baru disampaikan sekitar 1.500an IUP, 500 di antaranya dicabut. Sisanya kami tanyakan sekitar 2.500an kepada Kepala Dinas. Mereka masih belum mendapat data masukan dari Bupati sehingga belum bisa dikatakan dapat dievaluasi atau tidak,” ujar Bambang. Source : ANTARA Editor : Martin Sihombing the1uploader 7:08 am on 2016-07-22 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/pt-borneo-lumbung-energi-metal-tbk-just-another-worthless-paper-company/)
PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk: Just another worthless paper company
PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk: Just another worthless paper company by : Sando Sasako Jakarta, 22 July 2016 19:08:19 Last Update: 7 November 2017 Last Update: 14 August 2016 21:49:18 Last Upload: 14 August 2016 20:37:32 https://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/public/42001c/Terminasi-PT-Asmin-Koalindo-Tuhup/ http://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/library/upload/dokumen/756642628001516.png http://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/library/upload/dokumen/564711713389955.png http://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/library/upload/dokumen/909857925852099.png This book is available on a print-on-demand basis. The flip-book version is for browsing demo purpose only and available only to be served in Greater Jakarta, Indonesia. You may reach the publisher for demo request, inquiries, and purchase order from this number: +62 851 0518 7118 or +62 888 1617 440. Get the pdf file with a lowered quality printing and paper size on http://bit.ly/2bU9DiP Foreword In less than 2 months before Linc Energy Ltd filed for voluntary administration on 30 March 2016, Linc Energy had signed an MOU with at least 2 Indonesian companies regarding the UCG projects in Indonesia, that is 18 February 2016. However, on 23 May 2016, Linc Energy just had confirmed its status as a liquidating company, but not its US subsidiaries as they had filed for relief and seek bankruptcy protection (Chapter 11) on 29 May 2016. The MOUs were the one of many heydays that UCG projects have been accepted worldwide as an alternative to mine the primary energy coal in terms of syngas. Scotland, Australia, Vancouver, and Nova Scotia were the few names that had been offering and approving coal companies to try and implement the UCG technologies. As coal companies can never be aware of what beneath the earth surface, they failed to convince that they already have the required technologies and resources to protect the environment. They are doomed to fail before it’s begun. As a consequences, lenders and creditors participating as investors in the proposed UCG projects surely stop funding and began to demand a payback. Even worst, they wanted to liquidate their assets invested in the troubled coal companies. Some companies may weather the storm and sail unscathedly. Some others may have to sink and scuttle their ships to the bottom of ocean floor. Nevertheless, what may have saved the ships from sinking is the captain and skipper of the ship. Should the captain know exactly the weights and worth of the ship, the cargoes, and the crews, they shall bargain to salvage what’s worth saving. Indeed, in the beginning, it hurts. A lot. To many parties. Corporate retrenchment, layoffs, shrinking assets are some desperate measures to be taken in desperate times. These inevitable corporate actions are unload some burdens in preserving cashflows and contain cash drains. Some assets are indeed liabilities. Especially when the assets are failing to perform and generate revenues that profitable enough to cover the incurred and embedded expenses. Jakarta, 31 August 2016 Sando Sasako Email: sandosako @ yahoo.com Mobile: +62 812 8056 516 Contents Foreword iii Contents v List of Tables ix List of Figures x Global Trends in Energy Industry 1 Global Coal Trends 2 Energy Business in Indonesia in a brief 3 Coal 5 Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal 11 Has Samin Tan lost his bets in Bumi plc and BORN? 11 The Company Named Borneo Lumbung Energi 12 The Road to Highly Indebted BORN 14 The Awkward and Ugliness in 2011 17 The Teasing Dreams and Illusion of Interest in Bumi plc 21 The $1b Debt Traps for Lending Stanchart and Borrowing BORN 23 The End of Bumi plc 25 Tony Blair 26 REDD+ 27 Heart of Borneo 28 Samin Tan 29 Recapital Advisors 30 Borneo Lumbung Energi and Energi Megah Persada 31 Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal: The Brief Profile 33 Shareholders 33 Management 34 Related Parties and Financial Transactions 35 Third Parties & Transaction Types 37 IPO Proceeds 39 Financials 40 Surviving on Debt Burdens, Theoretically 40 The Walk-Through 43 The Road So Far 44 Troubles with the Crown Jewel Holding the Bargain Chip 45 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup 48 AKT in Brief, Legally 50 Concession Area 51 Coal Deposits 52 Mining Operations 53 Production 54 Product Specifications 55 Coal 101 55 Coking Coal Grades 56 Infrastructure 57 Transportation 58 Marketing & Sales 60 Customers 60 Management 61 Shareholders 61 Financials 61 References 63 Directory of Coal Mining Companies in Indonesia 67 Abadi Batubara Cemerlang 67 Abadi Coal Cemerlang 67 Aceh Resources and Mineral 67 Aceh Resources and Mineral Core 67 Adaro Indonesia 67 Adimas Baturaja Cemerlang 67 Allied Indo Coal , PT 68 Andhika Mutiara Etam 68 Andhika Mutiara Lestari 68 Andhika Mutiara Sejahtera 68 Antang Gunung Meratus 68 Anugerah Jatimulia 69 Anugerah Jatimulya 69 Arutmin Indonesia 69 Asmin Bara Bronang 69 Asmin Bara Jaan 69 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup 69 Astaka Dodol 70 Bahari Cakrawala Sebuku 70 Bangun Banua Persada Kalimantan 70 Bara Mutiara Prima 70 Bara Pramulya Abadi 71 Bara Sentosa Lestari 71 Bara Utama Unggul 71 Baradinamika Mudasukses 71 Baramarta, PD 71 Baramarta 71 Baramulti Sukses Sarana 72 Baramulti Suksessartana 72 Baramutiara Prima 72 Barasentosa Lestari 72 Batu Alam Selaras 72 Batubara Duaribu Abadi, PT 72 Batubara Selaras Sapta, PT 72 Baturona Adimulya 73 Benakat Energi 73 Benakat Energy 73 Bentala Coal Mining 73 Berau Coal 73 Bharinto Ekatama 73 Bima Duta Batubara Sakti 74 Borneo Bhaktibara Utama 74 Borneo Indobara 74 Buana Bara Utama 74 Bukit Baiduri Enterprises 74 Bukit Sunur 75 Bumi Laksana Perkasa 75 Bumi Panen Sukses 75 Bumi Sukse Mandiri 75 Buntok Perdana Coal Mining 75 Calicari 75 Coal Duaribu Abadi 75 Coal Selaras Sapta 76 Danau Mas Hitam 76 Daya Lapan 76 Delma Mining Corporation 76 Dhamar Tejokencono 76 Dharma Puspita Mining 76 Dutaputra Tanaratama 77 Ekasatya Yanatama 77 Energi Batubara Sumatera 77 Energy Batubara Sumatra 77 Fajar Bumi Sakti 77 Firman Ketaun Perkasa 77 Galicari 77 General Sakti Kreasindo 78 Generalindo Prima Coal 78 Gunung Bayan Pratama 78 Gunung Bayan Pratama Coal 78 Hulubalang Inti Bumi 78 Indexim Coalindo 78 Indominco Mandiri 79 Insani Bara Perkasa 79 Interex Sacra Raya 79 Intitirta Prima Sakti 79 Intitirta Primasakti 80 Jorong Barutama Greston 80 Juloi Coal 80 Kadya Caraka Mulia 80 Kalimantan Energi Lestari 80 Kalteng Coal 81 Kaltim Prima Coal 81 Kartika Selabumi Mining 81 Karunia Poladaya Bumi 81 Karya Bumi Baratama 81 Kendilo Coal Indonesia 82 BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia 82 Kideco Jaya Agung 82 Kitadin 82 Kodeco Horna Mandiri 82 Kurnia Sarana Lestari 82 Kutai Kertanegara Prima Coal 82 Lahai Coal 83 Lanna Harita Indonesia 83 Lianganggang Cemerlang 83 Mahakam Sumber Jaya 83 Mandiri Intiperkasa 83 Mantimin Coal Mining 84 Marunda Graha Mineral 84 Marunda Grahamineral 84 Maruwai Coal 84 Maruai Coal 84 Meulaboh Energitama 84 Meullaboho Energitama 85 Mitrajaya Timuragung 85 Multi Harapan Utama 85 Multi Tambangjaya Utama 85 Nusa Minera Utama 85 Nusantara Termal Coal (D/A Nusantara Thai Coal) 86 Nusantara Thai Coal 86 Pari Coal 86 Pendopo Energi Coal 86 Pendopo Energy Batubara 86 Perkasa Inakakerta 86 Persada Permata Mulya 87 Persada Permata Mulia 87 Pesona Khatulistiwa Nusantara 87 Pinang Jaya Sarana Bara 87 Pinangjaya Sarana Bara 87 Ramdany Coal Mining 87 Ratah Coal 87 Restubara Karya Pratama 88 Riau Bara Harum 88 Salamindo Coalindo 88 Salamindo Pahala 88 Santan Coal 88 Santan Batubara 88 Sarwa Sembada Karya Bumi 88 Selatan Selabara 89 Selo Argodedali 89 Selo Argokencono Sakti 89 Senamas Energindo Mulya 89 Senamas Energindo Mulia 89 Sinar Benua Prima 90 Sinarindo Barakarya 90 Singlurus Pratama 90 Solok Bara Adipratama 90 Sumber Barito Coal 90 Sumber Kurnia Buana 91 Suprabari Mapanindo Mineral 91 Tambang Damai 91 Tanito Harum 91 Tanjung Alam Jaya 92 Tanjung Alam Raya 92 Taraco Mining 92 Teguh Persada Coal 92 Teguh Reksa Daya 92 Teguh Sinar Abadi 92 Tempayang Cemerlang 93 Timah Batubara Utama 93 Torah Antareja Mining 93 Trimarta Coal Perkasa 93 Trimata Buana 93 Trimata Benua 93 Trimata Coal Perkasa 94 Trubaindo Coal Mining 94 Wadung Mas Tambang Mulia 94 Wadungmas Tambang Mulia 94 Wahana Baratama Mining 94 Whirakaneo Coalindo 94 Whiratama Bina Perkasa 94 Yamabhumi Palaka 95 List of Tables Table 1 – Coal reserves in Indonesia, 2014 (million ton) 6 Table 2 – Coal supply in Indonesia, 2000-2014 7 Table 3 – Existing coal terminals in Indonesia 8 Table 4 – The most vital financial figures of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2006-2014q3 14 Table 5 – BORN’s debts by signing dates and terms, 2005-2010 16 Table 6 – BORN’s loans, 2007q4 -2012q1 17 Table 7 – Underwriters at BORN’s IPO 18 Table 8 – Corporate actions of Bakrie & Brothers regarding Bumi plc and BORN, late 2011 19 Table 9 – BORN’s IPO proceeds: Planned vs Reported in 2012 Annual Report (IDR mn) 19 Table 10 – Subsidiaries of Bumi plc, June 2012 22 Table 11 – ARMS company financials, 2011-2014 £(M) 26 Table 12 – BORN’s Shareholders, March 2006 – Sept. 2014 (shares) 33 Table 13 – Trading suspension dates of BORN’s stock in IDX, 20130701-20160801 33 Table 14 – BORN’s Board of Commissioners, Dec. 2007 – Sept. 2014 34 Table 15 – BORN’s Board of Directors, Dec. 2007 – Sept. 2014 34 Table 16 – Corporate Officers in BORN group of companies, 2010 35 Table 17 – Related companies of BORN and transaction types, 2011-201409 (US$) 35 Table 18 – Related companies of BORN and transaction types, 2007-2011 (IDR mn) 37 Table 19 – Third parties of BORN 37 Table 20 – BORN’s IPO underwriting fees detailed 39 Table 21 – BORN’s IPO proceeds: Planned vs Reported in 2012 Annual Report (IDR mn) 39 Table 22 – BORN’s outstanding loans, 20100630 40 Table 23 – The most vital financial figures of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2006-2014q3 40 Table 24 – The financial structure of BORN (share of liabilities components to assets), 2009-2014q3 41 Table 25 – Coal mineable reserves of BORN, March 2013 (mt) 52 Table 26 – Coal resources of BORN, March 2013 (mt) 52 Table 27 – BORN’s coal deposits in Kohong and Telakong blocks, 30 June 2010 (mt) 52 Table 28 – BORN’s performance in coal productions, sales, and price, 2007-2013 54 Table 29 – Tuhup coal product specification, 30 June 2010 55 Table 30 – Grades of coking coal 57 Table 31 – Utilisation of installed capacity of BORN, 2007-2010H1 57 Table 32 – Third parties contracted in relation to barging and loading in ISP 59 Table 33 – Coal sales by marketers, 2011-2012 ($) 60 Table 34 – BORN sales by country, 2009-2013 60 Table 35 – Management Boards of Asmindo Koalindo Tuhup, 1 Sept. 2010 61 Table 36 – Changes in AKT shareholders, 1993 – 20091220 61 Table 37 – The financials of AKT acquisition in 2008 and 2012 62 Table 38 – The financials of AKT, 2007 – 2010H1 ($) 62 List of Figures Figure 1 – Gasification-based system concepts 5 Figure 2 – Gasification chemistry 5 Figure 3 – Coal distribution in Indonesia by calory class, 2014 6 Figure 4 – Supply and export of Indonesian coal, 1997-2014 7 Figure 5 – Export share over coal production in top producing countries 7 Figure 6 – Coal seaports in Indonesia, 2015 9 Figure 7 – UK banks involvement in Indonesian coal companies 10 Figure 8 – Share price of Vallar plc, Bumi plc, and Asia Resource Minerals plc, 9 July 2010 – 10 August 2015 11 Figure 9 – The owners of BLE 13 Figure 10 – The net debt maturities of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2012q1 14 Figure 11 – The debt burdens of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2012q1 14 Figure 12 – The flows of debts and stakes within companies related with PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk (BORN), Nov.2010 15 Figure 13 – The interests of BNBR and LHHL in Bumi plc, December 2011 20 Figure 14 – The interests of BORN and Samin Tan in Bumi plc, June 2012 21 Figure 15 – Bumi plc related companies, from shareholders to subsidiaries, June 2012 22 Figure 16 – The interests of BORN and Samin Tan in Bumi plc, prior to March 2014 24 Figure 17 – Heart of Borneo: Three countries, One conservation vision 28 Figure 18 – Transfers of $15m loan of AKT 36 Figure 19 – Transfers of $50m loan of BMS 36 Figure 20 – Transfers of $75m loan of BORN 36 Figure 21 – Transfer of advance and receivable of ETU in BMS and BORN to REM 36 Figure 22 – Classification of asset structure, financial structure, and capital structure 41 Figure 23 – AKT’s coal deposit, 200511-201109 48 Figure 24 – BORN’s coal specification, worldwide comparation 48 Figure 25 – Indonesian coal producers by mine sites 49 Figure 26 – Sea access of AKT as BORN’s asset 50 Figure 27 – The site map of Muara Tuhup and Damparan in Central Kalimantan 51 Figure 28 – Mining activities cycle of AKT 53 Figure 29 – BORN monthly production, Oct.2008 – June 2010 (000 ton) 54 Figure 30 – Coal classification by energy content 56 Figure 31 – Bulk carriers compared by size, from Handysize to Capesize 58 https://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/public/41981c/Tandatangani-Amandemen-13-PKP2B,-Menteri-ESDM:-Ini-Semata-MataMelaksanakan-Amanat-Undang-Undang-Minerba/ Tandatangani Amandemen 13 PKP2B, Menteri ESDM: Ini Semata-Mata Melaksanakan Amanat Undang-Undang Minerba KEMENTERIAN ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA MINERAL REPUBLIK INDONESIA SIARAN PERS NOMOR: 00150.Pers/04/SJI/2017 Tanggal: 14 November 2017 Tandatangani Amandemen 13 PKP2B, Menteri ESDM: Ini Semata-Mata Melaksanakan Amanat Undang-Undang Minerba Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral (ESDM), Ignasius Jonan, hari ini, Selasa (14/11), menandatangani 13 Naskah Amandemen Kontrak Perjanjian Karya/Kerja Sama Pengusahaan Pertambangan Batubara (PKP2B). Penandatangangan ini merupakan pelaksanaan dari amanat Pasal 169 Undang-Undang Nomor 4 Tahun 2009 Tentang Pertambangan Mineral dan Batubara. Sejak tahun 2010, pemerintah telah melakukan negosiasi terhadap 68 PKP2B. Dengan penandatanganan amandemen 13 PKP2B pada hari ini, maka sebanyak 50 PKP2B telah diamandemen, sehingga tersisa 18 PKP2B yang akan amandemen. “Masih ada 18 lagi yang belum. Saya harapkan sebelum akhir tahun 2017 sudah selesai, sesuai dengan amanah dari Undangundang Minerba,” ujar Jonan. Selain hal tersebut, Menteri ESDM juga menyatakan bahwa setiap dokumen Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran perusahan yang ditandatangani, haruslah memiliki jaminan pasca tambang. “Kalo tidak ada saya kembalikan. Ini penting sekali untuk menjaga melestarikan lingkungan hidup untuk kegiatan tambang sebagaimanapun besar dan kompleksnya,” tegas Menteri Jonan. Pimpinan daerah juga diharapkan segera menyelesaikan proses Clear and Clean (CnC) perusahaan pertambangan mineral dan batubara yang ada di wilayahnya. “Kami juga mohon Bapak Gubernur, Bapak-Bapak yang mewakili Pemerintah Provinsi dan Kabupaten, agar kerja sama yang baik untuk bisa melanjutkan proses Clean and Clear (CnC) yang mungkin masih tender. Ini menurut saya penting sekali,” terang Menteri Jonan. Dalam renegosiasi amandemen PKP2B ini, dua isu penting yang berhasil disepakati yaitu Wilayah Perjanjian dan Kelanjutan Operasi Pertambangan, serta penerimaan Negara. Penerimaan negara dari 13 perusahaan yang menandatangani naskah amandemen secara agregat meningkat sekitar 68 juta USD. “Ada penerimaan negara yang meningkat sekitar 68 Juta USD, dan tentunya semoga ini tidak memberatkan pengusaha. PKP2B karena ini semata-mata betul-betul untuk menjalankan amanat Undang-Undang”, terang Menteri Jonan. Sementara itu, Direktur Jenderal Mineral dan Batubara Kementerian ESDM, Bambang Gatot Ariyono menjelaskan bahwa 13 PKP2B yang ditandatangani tersebut, terdiri dari 4 PKP2B Generasi I; 1 PKP2B Generasi II; dan 8 PKP2B Generasi III. Untuk PKP2B Generasi I, terdapat peningkatan penerimaan negara dari iuran tetap semula US$ 1/Ha menjadi US$ 4/Ha, Dana Hasil Produksi Batubara (DHPB) sebesar 13,5% yang sebelumnya diterima dalam bentuk batubara (in kind) menjadi tunai (in cash) dan Iuran Pembangunan Daerah/IPEDA (lumpsum payment) dengan peningkatan yang signifikan dari kondisi eksisting. Untuk PKP2B Generasi II terdapat peningkatan penerimaan negara dari DHPB sebesar 13,5% yang sebelumnya diterima dalam bentuk batubara (in kind) menjadi tunai (in cash) dan seluruh kewajiban keuangan mengikuti ketentuan peraturan perundangundangan. “Untuk PKP2B Generasi III terdapat peningkatan penerimaan negara dari Dana Hasil Produksi Batubara sebesar 13,5% dalam bentuk tunai (in cash) dan seluruh kewajiban keuangan mengikuti ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan,” ujar Bambang. Proses penandatanganan naskah Amandemen PKP2B ini dihadiri oleh Gubernur Kalimantan Timur, Bupati Kutai Timur dan Paser serta Direksi Perusahaan PKP2B. Kepala Biro Komunikasi, Layanan Informasi Publik, dan Kerja Sama Dadan Kusdiana Untuk keterangan lebih lanjut dapat menghubungi Kepala Biro Komunikasi, Layanan Informasi Publik dan Kerja Sama Dadan Kusdiana (08121002705) http://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/library/upload/dokumen/896415979663545.png the1uploader 5:43 pm on 2016-07-20 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/21/directory-of-coal-businesses-in-indonesia/)
Directory of Coal Businesses in Indonesia Directory of Coal Businesses in Indonesia, July 2017
https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/201801_20dcbi_20cover Have a drive test first hand to our flip book of “Directory of Coal Business in Indonesia, July 2017” on this link: http://bit.ly/2xHEEOi This e-book is accessible with Windows-based computers. This flip book is created with Adobe Flash technology.
This directory is available on an individual basis or can be embedded inside the research report of: Coal Business in Indonesia by Sando Sasako Jakarta, 20 July 2016 Last update: Jakarta, 12 April 2017 xvii + 313 pages, comprising of 214 tables and 98 charts You may experience the flip book version on http://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201? e=27352568/41747360 Call us for more inquiries and order on +62 851 0518 7118 +62 888 1617 440 https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/20171128145036_dfc Abadi Batubara Cemerlang, 23 Abadi Coal Cemerlang, 23 Abadi Jaya Indah, 23 Abang Resource Indonesia, PT, 23 Abdi Pertiwi Loka, PT, 23 Abterra Resources Indonesia, PT, 23 Aceh Mineral Gemilang, PT, 23 Aceh Resources and Mineral (Core, 23 Adani Global Coal Trading, PT (d/h Aneka, 23 Adani, PT, 23 Adaro Indonesia, PT, 23, 159 Ade Kantari, CV, 24 Adi Coal Resources, PT, 24 Adi Putro, CV, 24 Adidaya Bara Nusantara, PT, 24 Adimas Baturaja Cemerlang, 24 Adimas Puspita Serasi, PT, 24 Adimitra Baratama Nusantara, PT, 24 Adimitra Mega Perkasa, PT, 25 Advance Marketing & Services, PT, 25 Aero Mandiri, PT, 25 Agang Saiyo, KSU, 25 Agrabudi Jasa Bersama, PT, 25 Agro City Kaltim, PT, 25 Agung Bara Prima, PT, 25 Agung Mandiri, CV, 25 Agunori Radja Djaya, PT, 25, 86 Air Mata Emas, CV, 25 Akat Srida Amri, PT, 25 Akbar Mitra Jaya, CV, 25 Akbar Mitra Jaya, PT, 25 Al Amoudi Natural Resources Tradmin, PT, 26 Al-Aqabah, Koperasi, 26, 88 Al-Fazar, CV, 26 Alam Jaya Barapratama, PT, 26 Alam Jaya Indah, CV, 26 Alam Karunia Mineral, PT, 26 Alam Mitra Mandiri, PT, 26 Alam Permai Artha Utama, PT, 26 Alam Sinsegye Tanah Banten, PT, 26 Alaska Prima Coal, CV, 26 Aldiron Petra, PT, 26, 96 Alfara Delta Persada, PT, 26 Alhasanie, PT, 27 Alief Multi Group, PT, 27 Allied Indo Cemerlang Sentosa, PT, 27 Allied Indo Coal , PT, 27 Allied Indo Coaljaya, PT, 27 Almer Deas Cargoz, PT, 27 Almindo Jaya Abadi, PT, 27 Alton International Resources, PT, 27 Altra Buanatama, CV, 27 Aluna Kusumah Lestari, PT, 27 Aman Toebillah Putra, PT, 27, 146 Amanah Anugerah Adi Mulia, PT, 28 Amanah Anugrah Adi Mulya, PT, 28 Amanah Batu Alam Persada, PT, 28 Amanah Bersama, Koperasi Pertanian, 28 Anco Millenium Indonesia, PT, 28 Andalan Usaha Jaya Semesta, PT, 28 Andalas Coal Persada, PT, 28 Andhika Mutiara Etam, 28 Andhika Mutiara Lestari, 28 Andhika Mutiara Sejahtera, 28 Andhika Yoga Pratama, PT, 29 Aneka Krida Utama, PT, 29 Aneka Sumber Bumi, PT Õ Adani Global, 29 Angin Jaya Solusi, PT, 29 Angsana Jaya Energi, PT, 29 Angso Duo Permai, PT, 29 Aninditha Kaharya Anugrah, PT, 29 Anjas Anita Jaya, PT, 29 Ansaf Inti Resources, PT, 29 Antang Gunung, 43, 83 Antang Gunung Meratus, PT, 27, 29, 42, 62 Antang Surya Persada, PT, 30 Antik Unggul Mineral, PT, 30 Anugerah Alam Andalas, PT, 30 Anugerah Bara Kaltim, PT, 30 Anugerah Berlian Pratama Coal, CV, 30 Anugerah Borneo Coal, CV, 30, 169 Anugerah Borneo Community, PT, 30 Anugerah Daya Gemilang, PT, 30 Anugerah Jambi Coalindo, PT, 30 Anugerah Jatimulya, 30 Anugerah Karya Raya, PT, 30 Anugerah Lancar Indo Makmur, PT, 30 Anugerah Sukses Gemilang, CV, 31, 69 Anugerah Tujuh Sejati, PT, 31 Anugrah Cipta Permai, PT, 31 Anugrah Energi Mas, PT, 31 Anugrah Prima Coalindo, PT, 31 Anugrah, CV, 31, 137 Anzawara Satria, PT, 31, 33 Apple Coal & Minerals Indonesia, PT, 31 Aquarius Mineral Utama, PT, 31 AR Coal Mining 1, PT, 31 Aragon Tambang Pratama, PT, 31 Arang Penawai Seahtera, PT, 31 Archipelago, PT, 32 Ardafrora Duta Arbaraya, CV, 32 Ardipo Global Perdana, PT, 32 Arini, PT, 32 Ariya Duta, CV, 32 Ariya Wisesa Fransnata, PT, 32 Arjuna, CV, 32, 138 Armada Pelayaran Rakyat Indonesia, PT, 32 Armada Rock Karunia Transshipment, PT, 32 Arona Perkasa Pratama, PT, 32 Arsy Nusantara, PT, 32 Arta Banua Resources, PT, 32 Arta Usaha Bahagia, PT, 32 Arta Usaha Sarana, PT, 33 Artha Bimo Cemerlang Coalindo, PT, 33 Artha Daya Utama Resources, PT, 33 Artha Marth Naha Kramo, PT, 33 Artha Pratama Jaya, CV, 33 Artha Satria Piningit, PT, 33 Artha Tunggal Mandiri, PT, 33 Arthaco Prima Energy, PT, 33 Artono Coalindo, PT, 33 Arutmin Indonesia, PT, 33, 92, 153 Aruza Mandiri Pratama, PT, 34 Arwana Prima Coal, PT, 34 Arzara Baraindo Energitama, PT, 34 Asia Multi Investama, PT, 34, 160 Asia Triperkasa, PT, 34 Asian Bulk Logistics, PT, 34 Asmin Bara Bronang, PT, 34 Asmin Bara Jaan, 34 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup, 34 Astaka Dodol, 35 Astani Bangun Persada, PT, 35 Astri Mining Resources, PT, 35 Astrico Nu Energi, PT, 35 Astrindo Gita Mandiri, PT, 35, 149, 167 Atap Tri Utama, CV, 35 Atlas Citra Selaras, PT, 35 Atoz Nusantara Mining, PT, 35 ATUBARA DI, 4 Avantika, PT, 70 Avindo, PT, 30 Awang Sejahtera, PT, 36 Ayu Wulan Lestari, CV, 36, 102 Bahari Cakrawala Sebuku, PT, 36 Bahitom Bara Energi, PT, 36 Bahtera Alam Tamiang, PT, 36 Bahtera Bukit Zaitun, PT, 36 Bakti Inti Guna, PT, 36 Bakti Nugraha Yuda, PT, 36 Bakti Sarolangun Sejahtera, PT, 36 Bangun Banua Persada, 124 Bangun Banua Persada Kalimantan, PT, 36 Bangun Energy Indonesia, PT, 37, 45 Bangun Kalimantan, PT, 37 Bangun Karya Pratama Lestari, PT, 32, 37 Bangun Karya Sabumi, PT, 37 Bangun Nusantara Jaya Makmur, PT, 37 Bangun Olah Sarana Sukses, PT, 37 Bangun Wahana Lingkungan Lestari, PT, 37 Banjar Persada Resources Mining Coal, PT, 37 Banjar Persada Resources, PT, 37 Banjar Satrya Putra, PT, 37 Banjarsari Pribumi, PT, 38 Banua Tuntung Pandang, CV, 38 Bara Adhipratama, PT, 38, 134 Bara Aditama Sejahtera, PT, 38 Bara Alam Energi, PT, 38 Bara Alam Utama, PT, 38 Bara Anugrah Sejahtera, PT, 38, 144, 149 Bara Batin Pratama, PT, 38 Bara Buana Persada, PT, 38 Bara Bumi Kartanegara, PT, 38, 96 Bara Bumi Oktasan, PT, 38 Bara Bumi Semesta, PT, 38 Bara Energi Lestari, PT, 39 Bara Energi Sempurna, PT, 39 Bara Indah Global, PT, 39 Bara Indah Lestari, PT, 39 Bara Indah, PT, 39 Bara Indotama Sukses, PT, 39 Bara Jaya Perkasa, PT, 39, 166 Bara Jaya Utama, PT, 39 Bara Kumala Sakti, PT, 39 Bara Mandiri Perkasa, PT, 39 Bara Mega Quantum, PT, 40 Bara Meratus, PT, 40 Bara Mitra Energi, PT, 40 Bara Mulia Kalimantan, PT, 40 Bara Mutiara Prima, 40 Bara Pasifik International, PT, 40 Bara Pramulya Abadi, 40 Bara Prima Mandiri, PT, 40 Bara Prima Pratama, PT, 40 Bara Rangga Wirasmuda, PT, 40 Bara Selaras Resources, PT, 41 Bara Sentosa Lestari, 41 Bara Sinergi Pradana, PT, 41 Bara Sumber Rejeki, PT, 41 Bara Tabang, PT, 41 Bara Utama Jaya, PT, 41 Bara Utama Persada Raya, PT, 41 Bara Utama Unggul, 41 Baradinamika Muda Sukses, PT, 41 Baradinamika Mudasukses, PT, 43, 83 Baraguna Inti Mandiri, PT, 42 Baramarta, PD, 42, 132 Baramega Berkah Utama, CV, 42, 118 Baramega Cahaya Makmur, PT, 42 Baramega Citra Mulia Persada, PT, 42 Baramulia Energi, PT, 42 Baramulti Energi Indojaya, PT, 42 Baramulti Energi Indonesia, PT, 42 Baramulti Sugih Sentosa, PT, 42 Baramulti Suksessarana Tbk, PT, 43 Baramutiara Prima, PT, 43 Barasentosa Lestari, 43 Baratama Mandiri, CV, 31, 43 Baratama Rezeki Anugerah Sentosa Utama, PT, 43 Barhind, PT, 43 Barito Corindo Mineral, PT, 43 Barito Inti Perdana, PT, 43 Bartim Coalindo, PT, 43 Baruna Dirga Dharma, PT, 44 Baruta Abadi, PT, 44 Basin Coal Mining, PT, 44 Basindo Karya Utama, PT, 44 Basmal Utama Mandiri, PD, 44 Basmal Utama Nusantara, PT, 44 Basthomy, CV, 44 Batang Semagi, PT, 44 Batanghari Energi Prima, PT, 44 Batu Alam Selaras, 44 Batu Gunung Mulia, PT, 45, 94 Batu Jelita Perkasa, PT, 45 Batu Unggul Pertiwi, PT, 45 Batuah Abadi Lines, PT, 45 Batubara Bukit Kendi, PT, 45 Batubara Duaribu Abadi, PT, 45 Batubara Duaribu Lestari, PT, 45 Batubara Energy Indonesia, PT, 45 Batubara Global Energy, PT, 45 Batubara Kalimantan, PT, 45 Batubara Nusantara Kaltim, PT, 45 Batubara Selaras Sapta, PT, 45 Batubinumbun Maju Lestari, PT, 46 Baturona Adimulya, PT, 46, 109 Bayan Resources, PT, 46 Bel Mining Services, PT, 46 Belayan Internasional Coal, PT, 46 Belgi Energy, PT, 46 Bena Batu Binumbun Jaya, PT, 46 Benakat Energy, 46 Bencoolen Mining, PT, 46 Bengkulu Bio Energi, PT, 46 Bengkulu Mandiri, PT, 47 Bening Anugerah Semesta, PT, 47 Bening, CV, 47 Benn Prima Coal, PT, 47 Bentala Coal Mining, 47 Bentan Energy Sakti, PT, 47 Bentang Terang Abadi, PT, 47 Berau Bara Abadi, PT, 47 Berau Coal, PT, 47 Berau Jaya Energy, PT, 47 Berau Jaya Perkasa, PT, 48 Berau Prima Coal Indonesia, PT, 48 Berau Usaha Mandiri, PT, 48, 85 Berdikari Inti Mandiri, PT, 48 Beringin Alam Raya, PT, 48 Beringin Citra Makmur, PT, 48 Beringin Coal Prakasa, PT, 48 Beringin Jaya Abadi, PT, 48 Beringin Utama, PT, 48 Beringinmas Jaya Abadi, PT, 48 Beringinmas Sukses Abadi, PT, 48 Berkah Ananda, CV, 49 Berkah Anugerah Abadi Sejahtera, PT, 49 Berkah Anugerah Abadi, CV, 49 Berkah Anugerah Abadi, PT, 49 Berkah Bumi Leluhur, PT, 49 Berkah Tanah Bumbu, CV, 49, 138 Berkala Internasional, PT, 67, 108, 115, 147 Berkala International, PT, 49, 67 Berkat Bersaudara Nusantara, PT, 49 Berkat Bersujud, PT, 49 Berkat Bumi Persada, PT, 49 Berkat Hanjuang Jaya, PT, 49 Berkat Murah Rejeki, PT, 49, 72 Berkat Nanda, CV, 49 Berkat Usaha Karya, CV, 50 Berlian Inti Surya, PT, 50 Bersama Bara Nusantara, PT, 50 Bersama Tapin Persada, CV, 50, 66 Bersama, PT, 125 Beruang Putih, PT, 50 Betuah, CV, 50 Bhakti Abadi Sriwijaya, PT, 50 Bhara Rosa Energi Coal, CV, 50 Bharinto Ekatama, 50 BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia, 101 Bhumi Perdasa, PT, 51 Bhumi Rantau Energi, PT, 51, 97, 157 Bhumi Sriwijaya Perdana Coal, PT, 51 Billy Indonesia, PT, 51 Bima Duta Batubara Sakti, 51 Bima Gema, 123 Bima Gema Permata, PT, 51 Bima Putra Abadi Citranusa, PT, 51 Bimaruna Abadi, PT, 51 Bina Equator Indonesia, PT, 51 Bina Insan Sukses Mandiri, PT, 51, 139, 144 Bina Mitra Sumberarta, PT, 52 Binamitra Sumberarta, PT, 170 Bintang Alam Serindai, PT, 52 Bintang Kartika Segara, PT, 52 Bintang Mahakam Energy, PT, 52 Bintang Mulia Bara, CV, 52 Bintang Prima Energy Pratama, PT, 52 Bintang Timur Selaras, PT, 52 Bintuni Abisha Maden, PT, 52 Binuang Mitra Bersama (Blok II), PT, 52 Binuang Mitra Bersama, PT, 52 Binuang Tapin Membangun, CV, 52, 66 Birawa Pandu Selaras, PT, 52 Birutani Jaya Semesta, PT, 53 Bismillahi Res Kaltim, CV, 53 Bita Enarcon Engineering, PT, 53 Bitumen Alam Indonesia, PT, 53 BK Global Lestari, PT, 53 Boas Mineral Bersinar, PT, 53 Boma Sumber Anugerah, PT, 53 Borneo Anugerah Energi, PT, 53 Borneo Anugerah Mandiri, CV, 53 Borneo Bara Timur Mandiri, PT, 53 Borneo Bhaktibara Utama, 53 Borneo Brother, PT, 53 Borneo Bumi Batu Bara Grup, PT, 53 Borneo Coal Energy, PT, 53 Borneo Coalindo Anugerah, PT, 54 Borneo Indobara, 54 Borneo Indogama, PT, 54 Borneo Inti Lestari, PT, 54 Borneo Orbit Sukses Sejati, PT, 54 Borneo Prima Coal Indonesia, PT, 54 Borneo Prima Resources, CV, 54 Borneo Prima, PT, 54 Borneo Surya Abadi, PT, 54, 150 Borneo Tala Utama, PT, 54 BQ Coal Mining, PT, 54 Buana Adiguna, PT, 55 Buana Bara Ekapratama, PT, 55 Buana Bara Utama, 55 Buana Eltra, PT, 55 Buana Jaya Pratama, PT, 55 Buana Perkasa Sukses, PT, 55 Buana Rizky Armia, PT, 55 Buana Sekata Resources, PT, 55 Budi Gema Gempita, PT, 55 Budiindah Muliacoal, PT, 56 Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk., PT, 56 Bukit Asam (Persero), PT, 47 Bukit Asam Prima, PT, 56 Bukit Baiduri Energi, PT, 56 Bukit Baiduri Enterprises, 56 Bukit Bara Alam, PT, 57 Bukit Enim Energi, PT, 57 Bukit Enno Persada Bahari, PT, 57 Bukit Kalimantan Sarana, PT, 57 Bukit Mallawa Sejahtera, PT, 57 Bukit Menjangan Lestari, PT, 57 Bukit Raya Coal Mining, PT, 57 Bukit Resources, PT, 57 Bukit Sunur, 57 Bukit Tambi, PT, 57 Bukuan Jaya Abadi, CV, 57 Bumen Abadi, CV, 57, 121 Bumi Alam Raya, PT, 57 Bumi Alam Sejahtera, PT, 58 Bumi Artha Jaya, PT, 58 Bumi Bara Makmur Mandiri, PT, 58 Bumi Bara Perkasa, PT, 58, 73, 167 Bumi Barito Mineral, PT, 58 Bumi Berdikari Jaya, PT, 58 Bumi Enggang Khatulistiwa, PT, 58 Bumi Kaliman Sejahtera, PT, 58 Bumi Karunia Pertiwi, PT, 30, 58 Bumi Kasih Jaya, CV, 58 Bumi Kumala Sakti, PT, 34, 58-59, 129, 131 Bumi Laksana Perkasa, 59 Bumi Makmur Sejati, PT, 59 Bumi Mas Resources, PT, 59 Bumi Merapi Energi, PT, 59 Bumi Mineral Bersinar, PT, 59 Bumi Mineralindo Jaya, PT, 59 Bumi Murau Coal, PT, 59 Bumi Niaga Lestari, PT, 59 Bumi Panen Sukses, 59 Bumi Paramasari Indo, CV, 59, 62 Bumi Pertiwi Energy, PT, 60 Bumi Raya Makmur Mandiri, PT, 60 Bumi Resources Tbk, PT, 60 Bumi Riau Cemerlang, PT, 60 Bumi Sakti Prakarsa Mandiri, CV, 60 Bumi Sekundang Enim Energi, PT, 60 Bumi Sukse Mandiri, 60 Bumi Unggul Nasional, PT, 60 Bumi Utama Perkasa, PT, 60 Bumiartha Mulia, PT, 60 Bumindo Inti Cemerlang, PT, 60 Bunda Kandung, CV, 60 Bungo Mitha Sejahtera, PT, 60 Buntok Perdana Coal Mining, 61 Caesar Mulia, PT, 61 Cahaya Alam Sejahtera, PT, 61, 160 Cahaya Energi Lestari, PT, 61 Cahaya Energi Mandiri, PT, 61 Cahaya Lembusuana, PT, 61 Cahaya Marhan Naya, PT, 61 Cahaya Mulia Amraeni, 61 Cahaya Tiara Mandiri, PT, 61 Cahaya Transportasi, PT, 61 Cakra Andatu Sukses, PT, 61 Cakra Bumi Energi, PT, 61 Cakramas Gemilang Mandiri, PT, 62 Cakrawala Bara Persada, PT, 62 Cakrawala Energi Nusantara, PT, 62 Cakrawala Investama Semesta, PT, 62 Calicari, 62 Cantung Karya Mitra Mandiri, CV, 62 Catur Mitra Usaha Lestari, PT, 62 Cemerlang Abadi Indonesia, CV, 62 Cempaka Alam Bumi Baru, PT, 29, 62 Cenko Prima Ferro International, PT, 62 Centra Nusa Indonesia, PT, 62 Central Cipta Murdaya, PT, 62 Central Mandiri Sukses, PT, 62 Central Mining Resources, PT, 62 Cequal Teknologi Indonesia, PT, 63 Charisma Barito Coal, PT, 63 Choice Plus Perkasa, PT, 63 Cinta Puri Pratama, CV, 63 Cipaganti Inti Resources, PT, 63 Cipta Anugrah Permai, PT, 63 Cipta Buana Seraya, PT, 63, 119 Cipta Mitra Sentosa, PT, 63 Cipta Sarana Jaya, CV, 63 Ciracap Sumber Prima, PT, 63 Cita Multiline Anugrah, PT, 63 Citra Bara Raya, PT, 63 Citra Buana Lestari, PT, 63 Citra Budi Bina Makmur, PT, 64 Citra Tobindo Sukses Perkasa, PT, 64, 160 Citrabudi Binamakmur, PT, 81 CJ GLS Resources Indonesia, PT, 64 Coal Duaribu Abadi, 64 Coal Petra Sejahtera, PT, 64 Coal Selaras Sapta, 64 Coal Trading, PT, 29 Coeclerici Indonesia, PT, 64 Commodities & Energy Resources, PT, 64 Conisma Energi, PT, 64 Conoco Mineral Indonesia, PT, 64 Contents, 7 Coromandel Minerals Resources, PT, 64 CPAZ Resources, PT, 65 Crista Jaya Perkasa, CV, 65 Cristian Putra, PT, 65 Daaz Bara Lestari, PT, 65 Dahlia Biru, PT, 65 Damasari Resources, PT, 65 Danako Pratama, PT, 65 Danau Kencana Lestarindo, PT, 65 Danau Mas Hitam, PT, 65 Dancomair Sakti, PT, 65 Dangau Airnalhady, PT, 65 Dasacita Pusaka Prima, PT, 66 Datra Katama Jaya, CV, 66 Daya Bumindo Karunia, PT, 66 Daya Enerji Lestari, PT, 66 Daya Lapan, 66 Daya Nusantara Mining, PT, 66 Dekalindo Sumber Makmur, PT, 66 Delapan Belas Sanghyang, PT, 66 Delapan Inti Power, PT, 66 Delapan Paser Sejahtera, PT, 66 Delima Mustika Kencana, PT, 67 Delma Mining Corporation, 66 Delta Samudra, PT, 67 Deltamas Persada, PT, 67 Dermaga Perkasapratama, PT, 67 Dermaga Pratama Perkasa, PT, 67 Devina Raja Batubara, PT, 67 Dewa Ruci Mandiri, PT, 67 Dewata Bahtera Internasional, PT, 67 Dewi Putri Asean, CV, 67 Dewi Ruci Mandiri, PT, 68, 119 Dhamar Tejokencono, 68 Dharma Puspita Mining, 68 Dharmalancar Sejahtera, PT, 68 Diamond Trading Company, CV, 68 Dian Citra Mandiri, PT, 68 Dian Jaya, CV, 68 Dian Rana Petrojasa, PT, 68 Dinamika Selaras Jaya, PT, 68 Dinar Kalimantan Coal, PT, 68, 84, 113 Dinasty Maha Karya, PT, 69 Diptaguna Mulyatama, PT, 69 Dirar Duage Energi, PT, 69 Dizamatra Powerindo, PT, 69 Draya Resources, PT, 69 Dua Kota Laut, PT, 69 Dua Samudera Perkasa, PT, 69 Duaji Energi Alam, PT, 69 Dumons Bara Multi, PT, 69 Dunia Sarana Sejahtera, PT, 69 Dunia Usaha Maju, PT, 69 Duta Alam Sumatera, PT, 69 Duta Bara Utama, PT, 70 Duta Batola, PT, 70 Duta Buana Mandiri, PT, 70 Duta Daya Mahakam, PT, 70 Duta Energi Mineratama, PT cnc, 70 Duta Nurcahya, PT, 70 Duta Tambang Rekayasa, PT, 70 Duta Tambang Sumber Alam, PT, 70 Dutadharma Utama, PT, 70 Dutaputra Tanaratama, 70 Dwi Ghita Karya Mandiri, PT, 70 Dwi Guna Laksana, PT, 62, 71 Dwijaya Prima Energi, PT, 71 Dwijaya Prima Energy, CV, 71 Dwikarya Sukses, PT, 71 Eastern Mining Resources Indonesia, PT, 71 Eastern Mining Resources, PT, 71 Eka Bhuwana Dirgantara, PT, 71, 135 Eka Bima Pamula Sakti, PT, 71 Ekapusaka Mahardhika, PT, 71 Ekasatya Yanatama, 71 Ekonomi, PT, 56 Eksa Nusa, PT, 71 Electra Global, PT, 71 Elida Sari, CV, 72 Elok Indah Subur Jaya, PT, 72 Elynda Jaya, CV, 72 Emin Subenco, PT, 72 Ena Sarana Energi, PT, 72 Eneralindo Energy, PT, 72 Energatama, CV, 72 Energi Batu Hitam, PT, 72 Energi Batubara Lestari, PT, 72 Energi Batubara Sumatera, 72 Energi Bumi Kartanegara, CV, 72, 80 Energi Bumi Tanahpasir, PT, 73 Energi Cahaya, 165 Energi Dua Rajawali, PT, 73 Energi Nusa Mandiri, PT, 73 Energi Penajam Mandiri, PT, 73 Energi Persada Khatulistiwa, PT, 73 Energi Surya Persada, PT, 73 Energy Cahaya Industritama, PT, 73, 111, 124 Energy Puri Tujuh, PT, 73 Energy Resources, PT, 73 Energy Tujuh Ribu, PT, 73 ENGUSAHA, 4 Enimex Power Energi, PT, 73 Equity Commodities, PT, 73 Era Energi Mandiri, PT, 74 Era Niaga Mandiri, CV, 74 Erabara Persada Nusantara, PT, 74 Erwin Jaya Mandiri, PT, 74 Eta Star Coal, PT, 74 Excel Regal Mineral Trading, PT, 74 Fabrik Kompenen Industri Energi, PT, 74 Fajar Bumi Sakti, 74 Fajar Darwin, PT, 74 Fajar Mineralalami International, PT, 74 Fajar Sakti Prima, PT, 46, 74 Fajar Usaha Sejahtera, PT, 74 Fajar Utama, CV, 26, 75 Faris Motor, CV, 75 Fazar Utama, CV, 75, 84, 148 Febrian Putra Pratama, CV, 75 Ferly Tirta Jaya, PT, 75 Fet Mining Indonesia, PT, 75 Firman Bersaudara, CV, 48, 75, 149 Firman Ketaun Perkasa, PT, 75 Firman Ketaun, PT, 75, 160 Fisi Fernando Sejahtera, PT, 76 Fontana Resources Indonesia, PT, 76 FORMULIR PENGIKLANAN, 5-6 Fortuna Lateks Marta, PT, 76 Fu Woo Mining Indonesia, PT, 76 Gajah Mada, KUD, 76 Gala Raya Sentosa, PT, 76 Galatia Mas, PT, 76 Galicari, 76 Ganda Alam Makmur, PT, 76 Ganesha Rapindo Impex, PT, 76 Gapura, Koperasi, 76 Garda Tujuh Buana, PT, 76 Gardatama Mulia Kencana, PT, 77 Garis Emas Selaras, PT, 77 Garuda Mineral Energy, PT, 77 Garuda Perkasa Nusantara, PT, 77 Garuda Sapta Perkasa Coal, PT, 77 Gaung Alam Semesta, PT, 77 GCPR Hong Tai Resources, PT, 77 Gea Lestari, PT, 77 Gelora Muda Perkasa, PT, 77 Gema Indonesia Baru, PT, 77 Gemari Bumi Pusako, PT, 77 Gemilang Garden Flower, PT, 77 Gemilang Jambi Permai, PT, 78 Gemilang Sakti Mandiri, PT, 78 General Sakti Kreasindo, 78 Generalindo Prima Coal, 78 Gerbang Anugrah Perdana, PT, 78 Gerbang Daya Mandiri, PT, 78 Gerbang Petani Mandiri, KSU, 78 Ghina Hayati, PT, 78 GIG Choice Plus, PT, 78 Global Bara Mandiri, PT, 78 Global Borneo Resources, PT, 78 Global Cahaya Energy, PT, 79 Global Indonesia Mandiri, PT, 79 Global Multi Coal, PT, 79 Global Multi Energi, PT, 79 Global Sukses Makmur, PT, 79 Global Suria Nusantara, PT, 79 Global Trans Energy International, PT, 79 Globalindo Alam Lestari, PT, 79 Globalindo Inti Energi, PT, 79 Glory Azzumi International, PT, 79 Glory Mitra Investex, PT, 79 Golden Arrow Energy, PT, 79 Golden Great Borneo, PT, 80 Gorby Energy, PT, 80 Gorby Putra Utama, PT, 80 Grace Coal, PT, 80 Graha Nusa Minergi, PT, 80 Graha Panca Karsa, PT, 80 Graha Sarana Gresik, PT, 80 Griya Pat Petulai Asri, PT, 80 Griya Sumber Setya, PT, 80 Group Rahmat Bersama, PT, 80 GS Global Resources, PT, 80 Gudang Hitam Prima Coal Mining, PT, 80 Gudang Hitam Prima, CV, 80 Gumay Prima Energi, PT, 81 Guna Sarana Mas, PT, 81 Gunung Bara Utama, PT, 81 Gunung Bayan Pratama Coal, PT, 81 Gunung Berkat Utama, PT, 81 Gunung Cahaya Bersama, PT, 81, 100 Gunung Emas Abadi, PT, 81, 128, 143, 154 Gunung Lawoe Mercu Buana, PT, 81 Gunung Limo, PT, 81 Gunung Sambung, CV, 67, 81 Gunung Sungkai, PT, 82 Gunungbayan Pratama Coal, PT, 46 Guruh Putra Bersama, PT, 82 Habco Primatama, PT, 82 Hamparan Anugrah Abadi, PT, 82 Hamparan Mulya, PT, 82 Hamparan Sumber Energi, PT, 82 Hanson Energy, PT, 82, 159 Harapan Bahtera Internusa, PT, 82 Harapan Bara Energy, PT, 82 Harapan Binuang Muda, CV, 30, 66, 82, 136 Harapan Kota Tepian, PT, 82 Harda Nusa Abadi, PT, 82 Harisa Mulia Mandiri, CV, 82, 121 Harkat Utama Mulia Mandiri, PT, 83 Harma Nusa Mineral, PT, 83 Harsco Mineral, PT, 83 Harta Bumi Resources, PT, 83 Hasil Alam Indonesia, CV, 83 Hasil Bumi Kalimantan, PT, 83 Haskoning Indonesia, PT, 83 Hasta Selaras Sakti, PT, 83 Hastabuana Mandiri, PT, 83 Haswi Kencana Indah, PT, 83 Hatch, PT, 83 Henchi Arira Sata, PT, 83 Herlina Gemerlap, PT, 83 Hidup Bahagia Sentosa, PT, 84 Hidup Hidayah Ilahi, CV, 65, 84 Hijau Bumi Energi, PT, 84 Hikmah Albros, PT, 84 Himadri Energy, PT, 84 HMS Bergbau Indonesia, PT, 84 Hong Da Mining Indonesia, PT, 84 Hua Long International, PT, 84 Huashia Resources, PT, 84 Hulubalang Inti Bumi, 84 Huma Amaz Indonesia, PT, 84 Huma Betang Indah, PT, 84 Ikhlas Membangun, KUD, 85, 90 Inasia Tambang Jaya, PT, 39, 85 Indah Bumi Nusantara, PT, 85 Indah Jaya Abadi Pratama, PT, 85 Index, 171 Indexim Coalindo, PT, 85, 138 Indika Logistic & Support Services, PT, 85 Indo Bara Patria, PT, 85 Indo Bara Pratama, PT, 85 Indo Besi Energi Utama, PT, 85 Indo Energi Alam Resources, PT, 85 Indo Jaya Anugrah, PT, 85 Indo Mining Resources, PT, 85 Indo Mitra, CV, 86 Indo Pancadasa Agrotama, PT, 86 Indo Wana Bara Mining Coal, PT, 86 Indoasia Cemerlang, PT, 48, 86, 116 Indobeta, PT, 86 Indocom Trade, PT, 86 Indogati Resources, PT, 86 Indomarta Multi Mining, PT, 86 Indomas Karya Jaya, PT, 86 Indominco Mandiri, PT, 86 Indomineral Mega Perkasa, PT, 86 Indomining, PT, 87 Indonesia, 92 Indonesia Batu Prima Energi, PT, 87 Indonesia Energi Prima, PT, 87 Indonesia Kangxin International Investment, PT, 87 Indonesia Multi Energi, PT, 87 Indonesia Pasti Jaya, PT, 87 Indonesia Riau Sri, 70 Indonesia Riau Sri Avantika, PT, 87 Indonesian Minerals & Coal, 84 Indonesian Minerals & Coal Mining, PT, 87 Indonusa Prima Sentosa, PT, 87 Indoraya Megah Tehnik, PT, 87 Indotex Pratama Jaya, PT, 87 Indra Sakti, CV, 87, 114 Industritama, PT, 165 Infinite Coal Resources, PT, 87 Injatama, PT, 76, 88 Inkalindo Manunggal, PT, 88 Inkatama Resources, PT, 88 Inkor Prima Coal, PT, 88 Inmas Energy, PT, 88 Insam Batubara Energy, PT, 88 Insani Bara Perkasa, PT, 88 Instant Engineering Services Indonesia, PT, 88 Intan Bumi Persada, PT, 88 Intan Karya Mandiri, CV, 89 Intan Permata Utama, PT, 89 Integra Prima Coal, PT, 89 Integrito Glonex Pratama, PT, 89 Inter Niaga Graha, PT, 89 Interex Sacra Raya, PT, 89, 148 Internasional Prima Coal, PT, 89, 138 Interwell Indonesia, PT, 89 Inti Alam Murni, PT, 89 Inti Bara Mandiri, PT, 90 Inti Bara Perdana, PT, 90 Inti Baratama Anugerah Prima, PT, 90 Inti Bisnis Utama, PT, 90 Inti Bumi Selaras, PT, 90 Inti Bumi Sukses Perkasa, PT, 90 Inti Karya Cipta Nusantara, PT, 90 Inti Tiga Berlian Mulia, PT, 90, 170 Intiputera Kanaan, PT, 31, 74, 90 Intitirta Prima Sakti, 90 Intra Wahana Putra Nusantara, PT, 91 Invesment, PT, 93 Investment, PT, 71, 113, 138, 144, 162 IREKTORI, 4 Itikurih Hastari, PT, 91 J Resources Nusantara, PT, 91 JA Nusantara, PT, 91 Jakarta, July, 1 Jalahan Batubara Prima, PT, 91 Jalalindo Mulia, PT, 91 Jamalindo Indah, PT, 91 Jambi Prima Coal, PT, 91 Jambi Resources, PT, 91 Jamrud Prima Citra, CV, 46, 91 Jangkar Prima, PT, 92 Jasa Mandiri Sejahtera, Koperasi, 92 Jaya Coal Perkasa, PT, 92 Jaya Manggala Sakti, PT, 92 Jembatan Dua Mandiri, Koperasi, 92, 161 Jembayan Muarabara, PT, 92 Jesindo, PT, 165 Jhonlin Group, PT, 92 Jhonlin Group, PT (Penambahan PT Arutmin, 92 Jhoswa Mahakam Mineral, PT, 92 Join Aditama Sukses, PT, 92, 113 Jorong Barutama Greston, PT, 93 Juloi Coal, 93 Kadya Cakra Mulia, PT (Kadya Caraka, 132 Kadya Caraka Mulya, PT, 93 Kadya Carakamulya, PT, 138 Kaisheng Energy, PT, 93 Kalidanau Megah Abadi, CV, 93 Kalimantan Energi Lestari, PT, 93 Kalimantan Persada Coal, PT, 94 Kalimantan Prima Coal, PT, 94 Kalimantan Prima Nusantara, PT, 94 Kalimantan Prima Persada, PT, 94 Kalimantan Sejahtera Mandiri, PT, 94 Kalimantan, PT, 124 Kalteng Coal, 94 Kaltim Batu Hitam, PT, 94 Kaltim Batumanunggal, PT, 94 Kaltim Global, PT, 94 Kaltim Jaya Bara, PT, 94 Kaltim Jaya Mineral, PT, 95 Kaltim Nusantara Coal, PT, 95 Kaltim Prima Coal, PT, 95 Kamalindo Sompurna, PT, 95 Kana Global Energi, PT, 95 Kangkung Prima, CV, 95 Kapuas Bara Utama, PT, 95 Kapuas Tunggal Persada, PT, 95 Karbindo Abesyahpradhi, PT, 85, 95 Karbon Mahakam, PT, 95 Karida Makmur, 125 Karida Makmur Bersama, PT, 96 Karsa Jaya Cemerlang, PT, 96 Kartika Jaya Baratama, PT, 96 Kartika Selabumi Mining, 96 Karunia Agung Infiniti, PT, 96 Karunia Alam Indonesia, PT, 96 Karunia Bumi Sejahtera, PT, 96 Karunia Ilahi Insan Sejahtera, PT, 96 Karunia Mutiara Lestari, PT, 96 Karunia Persada Kalimantan, PT, 96 Karunia Poladaya Bumi, 96 Karunia Prima Minerals, PT, 97 Karya Anugerah Tritunggal, CV, 97 Karya Borneo Agung, PT, 80, 97 Karya Bumi Baratama, 97 Karya Bunga Pantai Ceria, PT, 97 Karya Bungo Pantai Ceria Group, PT, 97 Karya Cemerlang Persada, PT, 97 Karya Desa, KSU, 97 Karya Gemilang Limpah Rezeki, PT, 55, 97 Karya Hasil Utama, PT, 98 Karya Indo Energi, PT, 98 Karya Lestari, KUD, 31, 66, 98 Karya Lima Maritim, PT, 98 Karya Megah Buton, PT, 98 Karya Perintis Sejati, PT, 98 Karya Putra Bersama, CV, 98 Karya Putra Borneo, PT, 98, 123 Karya Silvi, PT, 98 Karya Sungai Danau Mandiri, CV, 98, 107, 129, 166-167 Karya Tangguh Perkasa, PT, 98 Karya Usaha Pertiwi, PT, 98 Karya Utama Banua, CV, 49, 79, 98 Karyamaju Jaya Sentosa, PT, 99 Karyapertama Mudajaya, PT, 99 Karyati, CV, 57, 99, 106 Kasih Anugerah Mulia, PT, 99 Kasih Energi Raya, PT, 99 Kasih Industri Indonesia, PT, 99 Kasih Karya Agung, PT, 99 Kasih Tata International, PT, 99 Kasongan Mining Mills, PT, 99 Katingan Ria, PT, 99 Kawasan Alam Surya Adilestari, PT, 99 Kayaan Mekaam, PT, 99 Kayan Kaltara Coal, PT, 100 Kayan Putra Utama Coal, PT, 100 KCC Mining Services Indonesia, PT, 100 KDM Argo Energy, PT, 100 Kedap Sayaaq, PT, 100 Keluarga Sejahtera, CV, 100 Kelumpang Hulu Energi Lestari, PT, 100 Kemilau Rindang Abadi, PT, 100 Kemilau Samudera Berlian, PT, 100 Kemudi Kemuning, PT, 100 Kemuning Tambang Sentosa, PT, 101 Ken Brother Muda Satya, PT, 101 Kendilo Coal Indonesia, 101 Kenkim Energi, PT, 101 Keritang Buana Mining, PT, 101 Khalifah Akbar, CV, 101, 148 Kharisma Jaya Bersama, PT, 101 Kharisma Jaya, CV, 101 Khazana Bumi Kaliman, PT, 101 Khotai Makmur Insan Abadi, PT, 102 Kideco Jaya Agung, PT, 88, 102 Kimco Armindo, PT, 102 Kinarum Coal Indonesia, PT, 102 Kintap Bukit Mulia, PT, 102 Kirana Graha Buana, PT, 102 Kitadin, PT, 102 Klola Tebo Energi, PT, 103 Kodeco Horna Mandiri, 103 Komunitas Bangun Bersama, PT, 73, 103 Kresna Inti Cipta, PT, 103 Kresna Mandiri Energi Cipta, PT, 103 Krida Makmur Bersama, PT, 43, 103, 114, 130 Kubara Bumi Lestari, PT, 103 Kuda Perdana Pertiwi, PT, 103 Kumala Etam Mining, CV, 103 Kumala Sakti Permai, PT, 104 Kuripan Jaya, CV, 104 Kurnia Alam Investama, PT, 104 Kurnia Hasil, PT, 104 Kurnia Sarana Lestari, 104 Kurnia Surya Angkasa, PT, 104 Kusuma Raya Utama, PT, 104 Kutai Bara Abadi, PT, 104 Kutai Energi, PT, 104 Kutai Enviro Energi, PT, 104 Kutai Kertanegara Prima Coal, 104 Kutai Kumala Energy, CV, 105 Kutai Lama, Koperasi, 105 Kutama Mining Indonesia, PT, 105 Kutim Coal Utama, PT, 105 Laas Bara Khatulistiwa, PT, 105 Labbaika, CV, 105 Lahai Coal, 105 Lahat Centra Coalindo, PT, 105 Lambung Karang Sakti, PT, 105 Lamindo Inter Multikon, PT, 29, 105 Lancarjaya Bara Nusantara, PT, 106 Langkah Iman, PT, 106 Lanna Harita Indonesia, 106 Lanna Harita Mineral, PT, 106 Laskar Semesta Alam, PT, 106 Lati Tanjung Harapan, PT, 48, 106 Lautan Berkah Nusantara, PT, 106 Lazuardi Cemerlang, PT, 106 Leban Mutiara Hitam, PT, 106 Lembuswana, 64, 160 Lembuswana Perkasa, PT, 88, 107, 160 Lestari Bara Abadi, PT, 107 Lianganggang Cemerlang, PT, 29, 107 Lima Pelita Energi, PT, 107 Limbuh, CV, 107 Lingga Satria, CV, 107 Lintas Asia Resources, PT, 107 Lintas Jalur Harapan, PT, 107 Lion Multi Resources, PT, 107 Lion Power Energy, PT, 107 Loa Haur, PT, 108 Luhur Indo Energy, CV, 108 Lumika Griya, PT, 108 Lumina Internastional, PT, 108 Madani Citra Mandiri, PT, 108 Madhucon Indonesia, PT, 108 Madhucon Pasir Makmur, PT, 108 Mahakam Bara Energi, PT, 108 Mahakam Bara Lestari, PT, 108 Mahakam Bara Utama, PT, 108 Mahakam Energi Lestari, PT, 108 Mahakam Indah Jaya, CV, 108 Mahakam Mining Resources, PT, 108 Mahakam Multi Lestari, PT, 108 Mahakam Prima Akbar Sejati, PT, 109 Mahakam River Coal, PT, 109 Mahakam Sumber Jaya, PT, 109, 160 Mahkota Megah Abadi, PT, 109 Mahkotamas Bangun Prakarsa, PT, 42, 109, 135, 153 Maju Bersama Sejahtera, PT, 109 Maju Lestarijaya Abadi, PT, 109 Makira Nature, PT, 109 Makkari Tutu Abadi, CV, 109 Makmur Bersama, CV, 96, 109 Makmur Membara, PT, 109 Makmur, KUD, 109 Malinau Berkat Sejahtera, PT, 110 Mamahak Coal Mining, PT, 110 Mamb Energy, PT, 110 Mampala Jaya, CV, 110 Manambang Muara Enim, PT, 110 Mandira Mitra Coalindo, PT, 110 Mandiri Intiperkasa, PT, 110 Mandiri Makmur Citra Tambang, CV, 110 Mandiri Nusa Pratama, PT, 111 Manggala Alam Lestari, PT, 111 Mangkuraja, CV, 111 Manoor Bulatn Lestari, PT, 111 Mantimin Coal Mining, 111 Manunggal Inti Artamas, PT, 111 Manunggal Jaya Abadi, PT, 111 Manunggal Multi Energi, PT, 69, 111, 159 Maple Natural Resources, PT, 111 Mareta Persada, PT, 112 Marga Bara Tambang, PT, 63, 112, 131, 149 Marga Perkasa, PT, 112 Marina Bara Lestari, PT, 112 Mariogi Kharisma Jaya, PT, 112 Maritim Barito Perkasa, PT, 112 Maritim Prima Mandiri, PT, 112 Marlin Serantau Alam, PT, 112 Marsawa Indah Mandiri, PT, 112 Marunda Graha Mineral, PT, 112 Maruwai Bara Abadi, PT, 112 Maruwai Coal, 113 Masa Jaya Perkasa, PT, 113 Massion Energy Internasional, PT, 113 Maxima Mitra Mandiri, PT, 113 MBH Mining Resources, PT, 113 Mega Alam Sejahtera, PT, 113 Mega Coal Trading, PT, 113 Mega Fiume Internasional, PT, 113 Mega Karya Sakti, PT, 113 Mega Multi Cemerlang, PT, 113 Mega Multi Energi, PT, 113 Mega Nusa Kramindo, PT, 114 Mega Prima Persada, PT, 45 Megah Mulia Persada, CV, 114 Megaprima Persada, PT, 114 Menara Rukun International Trading, PT, 114 Mentari Bara Jaya, PT, 114 Mentari Bhakti Jaya Utama, PT, 114 Merapi Energi Nusantara, PT, 114 Meratus Advance Maritim, PT, 114 Meratus, PT, 43, 83 Merge Mining Industry, PT, 114 Mery Jaya, CV, 87, 114 Mesra Prima Coal, PT, 114 Metalindo Bumi Raya, PT, 114 Methane Resources Indonesia, PT, 115 Meulaboh Energitama, 115 Mifa Bersaudara, PT, 115 Millenium Mining and Resources, PT, 115 Minemex Indonesia, PT, 115 Mineral Tambang Wahana, PT, 115 Mining, PT, 84 Mirah Agung Raya, PT, 115 Mirza Utama International, PT, 115 Mitra Anugerah, 116 Mitra Anugerah Sejahtera, CV, 164 Mitra Anugerah Sejahtera, CV (–> PT, 115 Mitra Anugerah Sejahtera, PT, 116 Mitra Asia Cemerlang, PT, 116 Mitra Asia Coal, PT, 116 Mitra Bara Cindo, PT, 116 Mitra Bara Jaya, PT, 116 Mitra Barito, PT, 116 Mitra Bersama Prima, PT, 116 Mitra Bumi Sejahtera, CV, 115-116 Mitra Cakra Abadi, CV, 71, 116 Mitra Dipro Coal Indonesia, PT, 116 Mitra Genesaret Energi, PT, 116 Mitra Jaya Abadi Bersama, PT, 101, 116 Mitra Jaya Bangun Sejati, PT, 116 Mitra Lingkungan Dutaconsult, PT, 117 Mitra Maju Bangun Persada, PT, 117 Mitra Maju Sukses, PT, 117 Mitra Makmur Sejati, PT, 117 Mitra Multi Komindo, PT, 117 Mitra Nasional Pratama, PT, 117 Mitra Niaga Mulia, PT, 23, 110, 117 Mitra Setia Tanah Bumbu, PT, 117 Mitra Sinamar Perkasa, PT, 117 Mitra Tala, PT, 117 Mitrabahtera Segara Sejati, Tbk., PT, 117 Mitrabara Adiperdana, PT, 43, 83, 117 Mitrada Sinergy, PT, 118 Mitrajaya Timuragung, 118 MMIR Multi Sarana Mandiri, PT, 79, 109, 118 Moa Maju Kurnia Utama, PT, 118 Mofatama Bangunnusa, PT, 45, 118 Muara Alam Sejahtera, PT, 43, 83, 118 Muara Enim, PT, 129 Muara Sari, CV, 118 Muji Lines, PT, 118 Mulawarman Putera Abadi Sakti, PT, 118 Mulia Abadi, CV, 118 Mulia Persada Kartanegara, PT, 118 Multi Bara Persada, CV, 66, 118 Multi Energi Barutama, PT, 118 Multi Energy Sumber Artha, PT, 119 Multi Guna Maritim, PT, 119 Multi Harapan Utama, PT, 119 Multi Indo Mineral, PT, 119 Multi Jaya Energi, PT, 119 Multi Mineral Sejahtera, CV, 117, 119-120, 165, 168 Multi Sarana, 30 Multi Sarana Avindo, PT, 119 Multi Sarana Perkasa, PT, 119 Multi Sinar Kencana, PT, 119 Multi Tambangjaya Utama, PT, 119 Multi Tri Sempurna, PT, 120 Multikarya Artha Megah, PT, 120 Multiparta Kaltim Utama, PT, 120 Mulya, PT, 132 Mundra Coal, PT, 120 Mupakat Taka, Koperasi Pertambangan, 120 Mura Reka Batubara, PT, 120 Murung Raya Bara, PT, 120 Musi Prima Coal, PT, 120 Mustika Indah Permai, PT, 120 Mutadindo Taman Bumi, PT, 120 Mutiara Bumi Persada, PT, 120 Mutiara Etam Coal, PT, 120 Mutiara Merdeka Jaya, PT, 120 Mutiara Timur Laut, PT, 121 Naan Bara Abadi, PT, 121 Naga Borneo Energi, PT, 121 Nan Riang, PT, 121 Nantoy Bara Lestari, PT, 121 Nanyang Dahua Mining Investment, PT, 121 Natarida Citra Energy, PT, 121 Natuna Energi Indonesia, PT, 121 NDONESIA, 4 Nemoasia, PT, 121 Niaga Samudra, PT, 121 Nokano Coal Mining, PT, 121 Novem Coal Mining, PT, 121 Nuansa Sakti Kencana, PT, 121, 123 Nuansacipta Coal, 71, 93, 113, 138, 144, 162 Nuansacipta Coal Investment, PT, 64, 122 Nugraha Jorong Pratama, CV, 122 Nusa Minera Utama, 122 Nusa Persada Resources, PT, 122 Nusa Riau Kencana Coal, PT, 122 Nusantara Alam Pasific, PT, 122 Nusantara Berau Coal, PT, 122 Nusantara Citra Lestari, CV, 122 Nusantara Kaltim Coal, PT, 123 Nusantara Santan Coal, PT, 123 Nusantara Termal Coal, PT, 97, 107, 131, 146 Nusantara Termal Coal, PT (D/A Nusantara, 123 Nusantara Thai Coal, 123 Nusantara Trade Net, PT, 123 Nusantara Wahau Coal, PT, 123 Nusantara, KUD, 27, 122, 153 Nusantara, PT, 73 Oorja Indo KGS, PT, 123 Orb Energy Indonesia, PT, 123 Orpheus Energy, PT, 123 Pacific Global Abadi, PT, 123 Pacific Global Utama, PT, 123 Pacific Samudra Perkasa, PT, 123 Pada Idi, PT, 118, 124 Padang Alam Energi, PT, 124 Padang Anugerah, PT, 117, 124, 145 Padang Mulia, PT, 124, 129 Padangbara Sukses Makmur, PT, 124 Pagun Taka, PT, 124 Pakuwono Resources Mineral, PT, 124 Palaran Jasa Utama, PT, 124 Palma Mandiri Lestari, PT, 124 Palopo Indah Raya, PT, 124 Pan Indo Resources, PT, 124 Panca Bara Mandiri, PT, 124 Panca Prima Mining, PT, 72, 124 Panca Putra Sejahtera, PT, 125 Pancar Caraka, PT, 125 Pancaran Samudera Transport, PT, 125 Pancaran Surya Abadi, PT, 63, 125, 160 Pandu Aro Pacific, PT, 125 Paradise Indonesia Perkasa, PT, 125 Param Mitra Coal Resources, PT, 125 Paramitha Cipta Sarana, PT, 125 Pari Coal, 125 Parna Raya, PT, 125 Paropo Sejahtera Abadi, PT, 126 Paser Bolum Taka, KSU, 63, 126 Paser Buen Energy, PT, 126 Pasir Bara Prima, PT, 126 Pasir Prima Coal Indonesia, PT, 126 Patria Drilling Company, PT, 126 Patria Maritime Lines, PT, 126 Patriot Wira Perkasa, PT, 126 Peabody Coaltrade Indonesia, PT, 126 Pelabuhan Tiga Bersaudara, PT, 126 Pelampung Jaya, PT, 126 Pelayaran Bintang Laut Kalimantan, PT, 126 Pelayaran Borneo Karya Swadiri, PT, 126 Pelayaran Kartikasamudra Adijaya, PT, 126 Pelayaran Logistik Konversi Indonesia, PT, 126 Pelayaran Marindo Pacific, PT, 127 Pelayaran Mitra Delta Pratama, PT, 127 Pelayaran MitraBahari Sentosa, PT, 127 Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia (PELNI), PT, 127 Pelayaran Segara Niaga Utama, PT, 127 Pelayaran Trans Sarana Makmur, PT, 127 Pelita Berkah Makmur, PT, 127 Pelita Samudra Shipping, PT, 127 Pelnas Bahari Tembesi, PT, 127 Penajam Makmur Abadi, CV, 127 Penajam Prima Coal, PT, 127 Pendopo Energi Coal, 127 Pendopo Energy Batubara, 127 Perdana Maju Utama, PT, 127, 132 Perkasa Inakakerta, PT, 128 Perkasa, PT, 64, 160 Permata Alam Abadi, PT, 128 Permata Resources Borneo Makmur, PT, 128 Permata, PT, 123 Perpustakaan Nasional RI: Data Katalog dalam, 2 Persada Kapuas Prima, PT, 128 Persada Makmur Jaya, PT, 128 Persada Makmur Sejahtera, PT, 128 Persada Multi Bara, PT, 128 Persada Permata Mulia, 128 Persada Sumber Mineral, PT, 128 Persadatama Lestari Coal Mining, PT, 129 Perusahaan Daerah Sarana Pembangunan, 129 Perusahaan Pelayaran Rusianto Bersaudara, PT, 129 Perusda Benuo Taka, 129 Pesona Bara Cakrawala, PT, 129 Pesona Khatulistiwa, 73 Pesona Khatulistiwa Nusantara, PT, 129 Petro Mineral Jaya, PT, 129 Petrona Mining Contractor, PT, 129 Philip Caesar Jaya, CV, 129 Pinang Ekspor Indonesia, PT, 129 Pinang Jaya Sarana Bara, 129 Pinapan Gali Mas, PT, 130 Pinta Karya Makmur, PT, 130 Pipit Citra Perdana, PT, 130 Pipit Mutiara Jaya, PT, 130 Piranti Jaya Utama, PT, 130 Planet Resources, PT, 130 Posco Resources Indonesia, PT, 130 PPR Indonesia, PT, 130 Prabayasa Energi Utama, PT, 130 Praharana Muda Parama, PT, 80, 130 Prasto Energy, PT, 130 Pratama Sumber Bumibara, PT, 131 Premier Resources Indonesia, PT, 131 Priamanaya Energi, PT, 131 Pribumi Citra Megah Utama, PT, 131 Prima Bara Nusantara, PT, 131 Prima Buana Alami, PT, 131 Prima Coal Mining, CV, 131, 169 Prima Didi Nusantara, PT, 131 Prima Dodo, PT, 131 Prima Energytama, PT, 131 Prima Jaya Indah, PT, 131 Prima Lazuardi Nusantara, PT, 131 Prima Mandiri, CV, 131 Prima Mulia Sarana Sejahtera, PT, 131 Prima Multi Mineral, PT, 132 Prima Multitrada, PT, 132 Prime Star Resources Indonesia, PT, 132 Primkopad Dim, 132 Pro Sarana Cipta, PT, 132 Prolindo Cipta Nusantara, PT, 132 Provisit Asia Selaras, PT, 132 Puncak Mulia Energi, CV, 132 Puri Green Resources, PT, 132 Puro Nusa Dinamika, PT, 132 Putera Bara Mitra, PT, 132 Putera Batu Mulia Kalimantan, PT, 132 Putindo Bintech, PT, 132 Putra Asyano Mutiara Timur, PT, 133 Putra Bara Jaya, PT, 133 Putra Batulicin Membangun, PT, 25, 78, 133 Putra Bintan Bestari, PT, 133 Putra Borneo Mandiri, PT, 133 Putra Derutua, CV, 133 Putra Hulu Lematang, PT, 133 Putra Mahakam Mandiri, KSU, 60, 93, 131, 133, 147 Putra Muba Coal, PT, 133 Putra Parahyangan Mandiri, CV, 133, 144 Putra Parahyangan Mandiri, PT, 133 Putra Sungai Kapuas, PT, 133 Putra Tujuh Sebelas, PT, 133 Putra Wali Sejati, PT, 134 Putramas Bumi Agung, PT, 134 Putri Ahdadia, CV, 96, 134 Putri Tunggal, CV, 66, 84, 134 Qilu Mining Group Indonesia, PT, 134 QR Tambang Makmur, PT, 134 Quasar Inti Nusantara, PT, 41, 134 Rabani Corporindo, PT, 134 Radiant Guna Persada, PT, 134 Rahma Rahman, CV, 134, 159 Rahmad Barajaya Utama, PT, 134, 143 Rahmat Prima Coal, CV, 135 Rahmawati Suryamas, PT, 135 Raja Girsang Energi, PT, 135 Raja Kutai Baru Makmur, PT, 135 Rajasa Perkasa Energy, PT, 135 Rajawali Bara Makmur, PT, 135 Rajawali Putra Angkasa, PT, 135 Ramadha Kolaka Nickel, PT, 135 Ramdany Coal Mining, 135 Rantaupanjang Utama Bhakti, PT, 52, 135 Ratah Coal, 135 Ratu Ayu, PT, 136 Ratu Samban Mining, PT, 136 Regent International Resources, PT, 136 Rencana Mulia Baratama, PT, 73, 77, 125, 136 Resources Bumi Nusantara, PT, 136 Restubara Karya Pratama, 136 Riau Bara Harum, 136 Rich Coal Indonesia, PT, 136 Rig Tenders Indonesia, Tbk, PT, 136 Rima Mining, PT, 136 Rimau Energy Mining, PT, 137 Rimba Subur Lestari, PT, 137 Rimbaka Mining Makmur, PT, 137 Rinda Kaltim Anugerah, CV, 74, 137 Rinjani Kartanegara, PT, 137 Riski Pratama Putra, CV, 137 Riyanta Jaya, PT, 137 Rizki Anugrah Pratama, PT, 137 Rizki Bintang, CV, 137 Rizki Dinda, CV, 137 Rizki Mulia Bara, CV, 137 Rizki Tambang Selaras, PT, 137 Rizkia Putri Membangun, CV, 138 Rizky Baratama, CV, 26, 138 Rizky Barito Timur, PT, 138 Rizqi Utama Indobara, PT, 138 RMK Energy, PT, 138 Roundhill Capital Indonesia, PT, 138 Rudhra Global Energi, PT, 138 Rukun Dadi, KUD, 138 Rukun Sentosa, KUD, 138 Sagita Energi, PT, 138 Saijaan Prima Coal, PT, 138 Saka Putra Perkasa, PT, 138 Sakti Nusantara Bakti, PT, 138 Salamindo Coalindo, 138 Salamindo Pahala, 139 Sam Mining, PT, 139 Samantaka Batubara, PT, 139 Samudra Hindia Jaya, PT, 139 Samudra Pacific Marine, PT, 139 Sando Sasako, 2 Sangkala Persada Sakti, PT, 139 Sanmati Natural Resources, PT, 139 Santan Batubara, PT, 139 Santan Coal, 139 Sapphire Mega Persada, PT, 139 Sapta Persona Dinamika, PT, 139 Sarana Cipta Gemilang, PT, 139 Sarana Cipta Intinusa, PT, 140 Sarana Daya Hutama, PT, 140 Sarana Karya (Persero), PT, 89, 140 Sarana Marine Perkasa, PT, 140 Sarana Putra Perdana, PT, 140 Sarana Tambang Utama, PT, 140 Sarana Usaha, CV, 140 Sariagrindo Andalas, PT, 140 Sarolangun Bara Coal, PT, 140 Sarolangun Bara Prima, PT, 140 Sarolangun Karang Mendapo, PT, 140 Sarolangun Ketalo Coal, PT, 141 Sarwa Sembada Karya Bumi, 141 Sasangga Banua Banjar, PT, 141 Sato Mining, PT, 141 Satria Gilang Mandiri, PT, 141 Satria Mahkota Gotek, PT, 141 Satria Mayangkara Sejahtera, PT, 141 Satria Putera Agung, PT, 141, 170 Satria Tapak Nawala, PT, 141 Satu Enam Sembilan, PT, 141 Satui Bina Usaha, PT, 141 Satui Terminal Umum, PT, 141 Saudagar Mutiara Hitam, PT, 142 Segara Gloria Anugrah Marine, PT, 142 Sejahtera, PT, 116 Sekar Arum Setyo Abadi, PT, 142 Selamat Group Perkasa, PT, 142 Selatan Selabara, PT, 42, 100, 142 Selo Argodedali, 142 Selo Argokencono Sakti, 142 Seluma Prima Coal, PT, 142 Sembawang Indonesia, PT, 143 Sembilan Saudara, CV, 143 Semesta Alam Barito, PT, 143 Semesta Andalan Energi, PT, 143 Semesta Centramas, PT, 143 Semoi Prima Lestari, PT, 143 Senamas Energindo Mineral, PT, 143 Senamas Energindo Mulia, 143 Sentosa Inti Prima Coal, PT, 143 Sentosa Kurnia Energi Bahagia, PT, 143 Sentosa Laju Energy, PT, 144 Sentral Batubara Jawa, PT, 144 Serangkai Jaya, PT, 144 Serongga Sumber Lestari, PT, 107, 144, 146 Servo Buana Resources, PT, 144 Setenco Investa Niaga, PT, 144 Setia Usaha Primaenergy, PT, 144 Setyawan Mahakarya Prima, PT, 144 SEW Trisula Batubara, PT, 144 Shaka, CV, 144 Shasi Kirana International, PT, 144 Siarakka Udan Berkat, PT, 144 Siba-Safa Kayang Abadi, PT, 144 Sido Makmur, KUD, 32, 54, 108, 116, 134, 144 Sinamar Sakato, KUD, 117, 145 Sinamarinda Lintas Nusantara, PT, 60, 138, 145 Sinar Anugerah Sukses, PT, 145 Sinar Aurin, PT, 145 Sinar Bara Abadi, PT, 145 Sinar Batumas Makmur, PT, 145 Sinar Benua Prima, 145 Sinar Bumi Baratama, PT, 145 Sinar Energi Alam, PT, 145 Sinar Gunung Moile, PT, 145 Sinar Indo Energy, PT, 145 Sinar Jaya Nusantara, CV, 123, 145 Sinar Kemilau Abadi, PT, 146 Sinar Krakatau Utama, PT, 146 Sinar Kumala Naga, PT, 82, 146 Sinar Layan Mitra, PT, 146 Sinar Mawalinda Jaya, PT, 146 Sinar Mulia Coal, PT, 146 Sinar Prima Sejahtera, PT, 146 Sinar Super Indah, PT, 146 Sinar Wijaya Pratama, PT, 146 Sinarbaru Wijaya Perkasa, PT, 146 Sinarindo Barakarya, 146 Sinergi Buana Perkasa, PT, 147 Sinergy Coal International, PT, 147 Singlurus Pratama, PT, 147 Sino Capatalindo, PT, 147 Sino Resources, PT, 147 Sinta Mani, PT, 147 Sion Anugrah Mandiri, CV, 147 Sipatuo Sipatokong, KSU, 147 Sipatuwo Energi, PT, 147 Sistima Solusindo, PT, 147 SK Networks Indonesia, PT, 147 SK Pelayaran Indonesia, PT, 148 Skord Mining, PT, 148 SMS Minerals International, PT, 148 Solaris Tridaya Niaga, PT, 84, 148 Solok Bara Adipratama, 148 Solusi Coalindo, PT, 148 Soma Resources Indonesia, PT, 148 SPG Indonesia, PT, 148 Sriwijaya Bara Logistic, PT, 148 Sriwijaya Bara Priharum, PT, 148 Sriwijaya Energi Persada, PT, 148 Sriwijaya Mandiri, CV, 148 Stagen Indah Borneo, PT, 148 Stenkole Nusantara, PT, 148 Suar Harapan Bangsa, PT, 149 Subur Alam Rezeki, PT, 149 Sudan Prima Coal, PT, 149 Sugico Pendragon Energi, PT, 149 Sulistia, CV, 23, 149 Sumara Nikarya, PT, 149 Sumatera Bahtera Raya, PT, 149 Sumatera Bara Energi, PT, 149 Sumber Alam Inti Mandiri, PT, 149 Sumber Alam Resources, PT, 149 Sumber Bara Abadi, PT, 150 Sumber Bara Jaya, PT, 150 Sumber Bara, PT, 150 Sumber Barito Coal, 150 Sumber Bumi Perkasa, PT, 150 Sumber Bumi, PT, 23 Sumber Daya Energi, PT, 150 Sumber Daya Persada, PT, 150 Sumber Energi Kalimantan, PT, 70, 150 Sumber Global Energy, PT, 150 Sumber Kurnia Buana, PT, 43, 83, 150 Sumber Mineral Perdana, PT, 151 Sumber Mitra Jaya, PT, 151 Sumber Permata Hitam, PT, 151 Sumber Prima Energi Buana, PT, 151 Sumber Rejeki, 56 Sumber Rejeki Ekonomi, PT, 151 Sumber Surya Gemilang, PT, 151 Sumber Surya Pratama, PT, 151 Sumber Suryadaya Prima, PT, 151 Sumber Wahyu Agung, PT, 151 Sumber Wahyu Mulyo, PT, 151 Sunfan Jaya Persada, PT, 151 Sungai Berlian Bhakti, PT, 151 Sungai Berlian Jaya, CV, 113, 151 Sungai Danau Jaya, PT, 152 Sunhub Mining International, PT, 152 Sunway Indo Mining, PT, 152 Supra Bara Abadi, PT, 152 Supra Bara Energi, PT, 152 Suprabari Mapanindo Mineral, 152 Surya Anugrah Sejahtera, PT, 152 Surya Bangun Sarana, PT, 152 Surya Banua Energi, PT, 153 Surya Bersinar, CV, 89, 153 Surya Global Makmur, PT, 153 Surya Harapan Baru, CV, 153 Surya Indo Global, PT, 153 Surya Inti Global, PT, 153 Surya Jaya Energy, PT, 153 Surya Kalimantan Sejati, PT, 153 Surya Mas Jaya Sakti, PT, 153 Surya Mega Adiperkasa, 153 Surya Megah Abadi, CV, 153 Surya Rahmadina Bersaudara, PT, 153 Surya Sakti Darma Kencana, PT, 153 Surya Sunfan Dwi Bahtera, CV, 67, 69, 153 Suryamas Makmur Pratama, PT, 154 Suryaraya Cahaya Cemerlang, PT, 154 Suryaraya Permata Khatulistiwa, PT, 154 Suryaraya Pusaka, PT, 154 Suwira Pastika Mining, PT, 88, 154 Swadana Puranugraha, PT, 154 SWI Energi Kalimantan, PT, 154 Syah Alam, CV, 154 Syam Kalimantan Putera Energi, PT, 154 Synergi Mega Nusantara, PT, 154 Tabalong Makmur, PT, 154 Tabalong Prima Resources, PT, 154 Tahiti Coal, CV, 154 Talang Segoro, PT, 154 Talenta Bumi, PT, 155 Talenta Utama, CV, 155 Taman Indah Makmur Sejahtera, PT, 155 Tambang Aneka Mineral, PT, 155 Tambang Batubara Harum, PT, 155 Tambang Bukit Tambi, PT, 155 Tambang Damai, PT, 155 Tambang Nusantara Perdana, PT, 155 Tambang Sejahtera Bersama, PT, 155 Tambulun Panual Jaya, PT, 155 Tamiang Jaya, PT, 155 Tamtama Perkasa, PT, 156 Tana Danum Taka, KSU, 156 Tanah Bumbu Resources, PT, 156 Tani Jaya Murni, KUD, 156 Tanito Harum, PT, 79, 144, 156 Tanjung Alam Jaya, PT, 42, 83, 94, 156 Tanjung Alam Raya, 156 Tanjung Belit Bara Utama, PT, 157 Tansri Madjid Energi, PT, 157 Tantra Mining Development, PT, 157 Tanur Jaya, PT, 157 Tapin Sarana Jaya, PT, 157 Tapin Suthra Berjaya, PT, 157 Tara Energy Resources, PT, 157 Tara Indonusa Coal, PT, 157 Taraco Mining, 157 Tech Drilling International, PT, 157 Teguh Agung Sejahtera, PT, 157 Teguh Persada Coal, 157 Teguh Reksa Daya, 158 Teguh Sinar Abadi PT, 158 Tekno Orbit Persada, PT, 158 Teknoplan Energi Nusantara, PT, 158 Telen Eco Coal, PT, 158 Telen Indoclay, PT, 158 Telen Orbit Prima, PT, 138, 158, 163 Tembesi Coalindo, PT, 158 Tempayang Cemerlang, 159 Tempirai Energy Resources, PT, 159 Terbitan (KDT, 2 Terminal Batubara Indah, PT, 159 Terra Resources, PT, 159 Thai Coal, 123 Tian Long International, PT, 159 Tiara Bara Borneo, PT, 159 Tiara Graha Sejati, CV, 134, 159 Tiardo Jaya, PT, 159 Tiga Berlian Abadi, PT, 159 Tiga Serangkai Binuang, CV, 44, 159 Tiga Serangkai Mulia, CV, 159 Tiga Tiga Tujuh Bersaudara, PT, 159 Tigadaya Minergy, PT, 159 Timah Batubara Utama, 159 Tiramana, PT, 160 Titan Daya Persada, PT, 160 Titan Wijaya, PT, 160 Titian Reski, PT, 160 Tiwa Abadi, PT, 160 Tobajaya, PT, 160 Tobindo Anugrah Persada, PT, 160 Torah Antareja Mining, 160 Trafigura, PT, 160 Trans Power Marine, Tbk, PT, 161 Transco Prima Indonesia, PT, 161 Transcoal Minergy, PT, 161 Transcoal Pacific, PT, 161 Transindo Bara Cemerlang, PT, 161 Transisi Energy Satunama, PT, 65, 125, 161 Tri Kencana Mulia, PT, 161 Tri Mandiri Perkasa, PT, 161 Tri Noosa Jasada, PT, 161 Tri Oetama Persada, PT, 161 Tri Panuntun Persada, PT, 161 Tri Prakarsa Buana, PT, 161 Tri Sakti Muliatama, PT, 53, 128, 161 Tri Tunggal Pitriati, PT, 161 Triadat Quantum, PT, 162 Triaryani, PT, 162 Triasmitra Multi Tambang, PT, 162 Trieka Bangun Persada, PT, 162 Trimaran Setia Utama, PT, 162 Trimarta Coal Perkasa, 162 Trimas Mayang Jaya, PT, 162 Trimata Benua, 162 Trimata Buana, 162 Trimata Coal Perkasa, 162 Trimukti Ajipratama, PT, 162 Trinamas Abadi, PT, 162 Trinity Mulia Energy, PT, 163 Trinusa Resources, PT, 163 Tripabara, PT, 105, 143, 163 Trisakti Energy, PT, 163 Trisensa Mineral Utama, PT, 163 Truba Bara Banyu Enim, PT, 163 Trubaindo Coal Mining, PT, 163 Tuah Bumi Etam, CV, 147, 163 Tuah Globe Mining, PT, 163 Tuah Turangga Agung, PT, 163 Tubindo, PT, 163 Tuhup Coal Mining, PT, 164 Tujuh Saudara, PT, 164 Tunas Inti Abadi, PT, 164 Tunas Jaya, KSU, 164 Tunas Karya, KSU, 37, 133, 164 Tunas Muda Jaya, PT, 98, 164 Tunas Multi Anugrah, PT, 164 Tunas Prima Coal, PT, 164 Tunggal Firdaus Kaltim, CV, 89, 164 Tunggal Putra Nusantara, PT, 77, 164 Tunggal Utama Lestari, PT, 164 Turangga Energy Nuswantara, PT, 165 Turangga Krisna Dwipa, PT, 165 Tutui Batubara Utama, PT, 165 Uci Jaya, PT, 165 Ulet Bulu Mining, PT, 165 Union Perkasa Abadi, PT, 165 Unirich Mega Persada, PT, 122, 165 United Coal Indonesia Trading, PT, 165 United Supplies Agency, PT, 165 Urip Tagang, PT, 165 Usaha Baratama, 165 Usaha Baratama Jaya, PT, 165 Usaha Baratama Jesindo, PT, 84, 165 Usaha Kawan Sejati, PT, 166 Utama Wira Karya, PT, 166 Utami Jaya Mulia, PT, 166 Utomo Kostrindo, PT, 166 Vano Anugrah Sentosa, PT, 166 Vastasia Devon Resources, PT, 166 Victor Dua Tiga Mega, PT, 166 Viracon Primer Coal, PT, 166 Virgo Benua Jaya, CV, 166 Virgo Benua Jaya, PT, 167 Visage Energy & Coal, PT, 167 Wadungmas Tambang Mulia, 167 Wahana Agung Sejahtera, PT, 167 Wahana Alam Lestari, PT, 167 Wahana Baratama Mining, PT, 167 Wahana Energy Lestari, PT, 167 Wahana Kutai Energi, PT, 167 Wahana Surya Abadi, PT, 167 Wahyu Murti Garuda Kencana, PT, 168 Wahyu Taruna Bakti, CV, 168 Wana Adiprima Mandiri, PT, 168 Wana Batara Karya Lestari, PT, 168 Wara Kirana Bakti, PT, 168 Warga Semen Gresik, Koperasi, 168 Wasita Energy, CV, 168 Wasita Energy, PT, 168 Welarco Subur Jaya, PT, 30, 103, 136, 150, 168 Whirakaneo Coalindo, 168 Whiratama Bina Perkasa, 168 Wijaya Indo Mining, PT, 168 Windu Bentalanusa, PT, 169 Winner Prima Sekata, PT, 169 Wira Bara Sakti, PT, 169 Wira Multi Karya, PT, 169 Wira Usaha Abadi, PT, 169 Wiraduta Sejahtera Langgeng, PT, 169 Wirama Entiti Nusantara, PT, 169 Wulu Bumi Sakti, CV, 76, 169 X Dareh, CV, 169 Yamabhumi Palaka, 169 Yasiga Sarana Utama, PT, 170 Yastra Energy, PT, 92, 170 Yudirain Rizki Buana Saijaan, PT, 170 Yulia Raya Energi, CV, 117, 170 Yuman Jaya Tama, PT, 170 Zafir Mitra Serasi, PT, 170 Zed Resources, PT, 170 Zuhriah Bersinar, CV, 77, 170 the1uploader 5:22 am on 2016-07-20 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/energy-industry-in-indonesia-worlds-renewable-energy/)
Tags: ccow ( 2 ), coal ( 2 ), coal-bed methane ( 3 ), electricity, energy ( 2 ), gas, LNG, lpg, mining ( 2 ), oil, renewables Energy Industry in Indonesia & World’s Renewable Energy Energy Industry in Indonesia & World’s Renewable Energy by: Sando Sasako Jakarta, 20 July 2016 Last Update: 1 September 2016 03:36:21 This book is a part of an on-going research on energy business in Indonesia, including a near exhaustive profile of renewable energy in the world and its increasing trends. This book is available on a print-on-demand basis. You may reach the publisher for demo request, inquiries, and purchase order from this number: +62 851 0518 7118. This book is available on a print-on-demand basis. The flip-book version is for browsing demo purpose only and available only to be served in Greater Jakarta, Indonesia. Coal Mining Business in Indonesia July 2016
http://bit.ly/2bFzmtz PT Borneo Lumbung Energi Metal Tbk: On the Road to Recovery
http://bit.ly/2bU9DiP Krisis Finansil Cina: Perspektif Kebijakan Moneter, Corporate Finance (Analisa Laporan Keuangan), dan Investment Banking (Valuasi Nilai)
http://bit.ly/29FtUbw Contents Foreword in Coal Mining Business in Indonesia iii Foreword in PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk: On the Road to Recovery v Contents vii List of Tables xiii List of Figures xv Why do we need renewables? 1 Lesser Lead Times 2 Higher Capital Recovery 3 Increased Trends in Renewable Power Generation 5 Shifting costs to use renewables 9 Share of Renewables Consumption 10 Total Energy Consumption 12 Renewable Energy Applications 13 Renewables vs Non-Renewables 14 Why Liquid Fuels Matter 16 Energy Industry Defined 18 Forms of Energy 19 Investments in Renewables 21 Capacity in Renewable Energy 23 Renewable Electricity 24 Capacity in Renewable Electricity 28 Energy Technology Costs 31 Supports to Renewable Energy Industry 35 Input and Output in Energy Industry 38 Global Trends in Energy Industry 44 The Saudi Factor 44 The Revolutionary US Shale 46 Global Coal Trends 49 Fracking Coalmines 50 Coal Gasification 51 Underground Coal Gasification 54 Kincardine UCG, Scotland, UK 55 Raven and Hat Creek Coalfield, BC, Canada 58 Global Warming or Global Heating 60 Greenhouse Gas 62 CO2 as One of GHGs 64 Oxygen Carriers 65 CO2 Recovery 67 Underwater Coalmines 68 Hashima Coal Mine, Japan 69 Okinoyama Coal Mine, Japan 70 Beizao Coal Mine, China 70 Bomlo Coal Mine, Norway 72 Cape Breton Coal Mines, Nova Scotia, Canada 74 Solway Coal Mines, Cumbria, UK 78 North Sea Coal Mines, NE England 79 Forth Coal Mines, Scotland, UK 80 The End of Deep Coal Mines in the UK 81 Energy Business in Indonesia in a brief 85 Oil 86 Oil Infrastructure 87 Oil Production 88 Gas 89 Chemical Characteristics of Gas 92 Liquefied Natural Gas 92 Liquefied Petroleum Gas 97 Coal-Bed Methane 101 The Milestone of CBM Commercialisation 103 CBM Asia @ Kutai West PSC 104 Dart Energy & IGas 106 Dart Energy & NuEnergy 107 Coal 115 History of Coal Business in Indonesia 120 Regulatory Frameworks 123 The Dutch Colonialism 123 The Mining Law of 1967 123 The Production Sharing Contract in Coal Mining of 1975 125 The Coal Contract of Work of 1981 125 Forced Localisation 126 Issues on Enviromental and Decentralisation 128 Ministerial Regulations (Permen ESDM) 129 Ministerial Decrees (Kepmen ESDM) 131 Clean and Clear: The Causes 134 The Non-CNC Status 136 Unclear DMO System 139 Forestry Land Use Permit 143 Korsup Minerba 144 CCoW Companies: The First Generations 147 BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia 152 BHP Businesses in Indonesia 154 Rio Tinto 154 Tata Power 155 Arutmin Indonesia 157 Kaltim Prima Coal 157 Bumi Resources 159 The IndoCoal Deals 159 Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal 162 Has Samin Tan lost his bets in Bumi plc and BORN? 162 The Company Named Borneo Lumbung Energi 163 The Road to Highly Indebted BORN 165 The Awkward and Ugliness in 2011 168 The Teasing Dreams and Illusion of Interest in Bumi plc 172 The $1b Debt Traps for Lending Stanchart and Borrowing BORN 174 The End of Bumi plc 176 Tony Blair 177 REDD+ 178 Heart of Borneo 179 Samin Tan 180 Recapital Advisors 181 Borneo Lumbung Energi and Energi Megah Persada 182 Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal: The Brief Profile 184 Shareholders 184 Management 185 Related Parties and Financial Transactions 186 Third Parties & Transaction Types 188 IPO Proceeds 190 Financials 191 Surviving on Debt Burdens, Theoretically 191 The Walk-Through 194 The Road So Far 195 Troubles with the Crown Jewel Holding the Bargain Chip 196 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup 199 AKT in Brief, Legally 201 Concession Area 202 Coal Deposits 203 Mining Operations 204 Production 205 Product Specifications 206 Coal 101 206 Coking Coal Grades 208 Infrastructure 208 Transportation 209 Marketing & Sales 211 Customers 211 Management 212 Shareholders 212 Financials 213 Allied Indo Coal 215 References 217 Directory of Coal Mining Companies in Indonesia 221 Abadi Batubara Cemerlang 221 Abadi Coal Cemerlang 221 Aceh Resources and Mineral 221 Aceh Resources and Mineral Core 221 Adaro Indonesia 221 Adimas Baturaja Cemerlang 221 Allied Indo Coal , PT 222 Andhika Mutiara Etam 222 Andhika Mutiara Lestari 222 Andhika Mutiara Sejahtera 222 Antang Gunung Meratus 222 Anugerah Jatimulia 223 Anugerah Jatimulya 223 Arutmin Indonesia 223 Asmin Bara Bronang 223 Asmin Bara Jaan 223 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup 223 Astaka Dodol 224 Bahari Cakrawala Sebuku 224 Bangun Banua Persada Kalimantan 224 Bara Mutiara Prima 224 Bara Pramulya Abadi 225 Bara Sentosa Lestari 225 Bara Utama Unggul 225 Baradinamika Mudasukses 225 Baramarta, PD 225 Baramarta 225 Baramulti Sukses Sarana 226 Baramulti Suksessartana 226 Baramutiara Prima 226 Barasentosa Lestari 226 Batu Alam Selaras 226 Batubara Duaribu Abadi, PT 226 Batubara Selaras Sapta, PT 226 Baturona Adimulya 227 Benakat Energi 227 Benakat Energy 227 Bentala Coal Mining 227 Berau Coal 227 Bharinto Ekatama 227 Bima Duta Batubara Sakti 228 Borneo Bhaktibara Utama 228 Borneo Indobara 228 Buana Bara Utama 228 Bukit Baiduri Enterprises 228 Bukit Sunur 229 Bumi Laksana Perkasa 229 Bumi Panen Sukses 229 Bumi Sukse Mandiri 229 Buntok Perdana Coal Mining 229 Calicari 229 Coal Duaribu Abadi 229 Coal Selaras Sapta 230 Danau Mas Hitam 230 Daya Lapan 230 Delma Mining Corporation 230 Dhamar Tejokencono 230 Dharma Puspita Mining 230 Dutaputra Tanaratama 231 Ekasatya Yanatama 231 Energi Batubara Sumatera 231 Energy Batubara Sumatra 231 Fajar Bumi Sakti 231 Firman Ketaun Perkasa 231 Galicari 231 General Sakti Kreasindo 232 Generalindo Prima Coal 232 Gunung Bayan Pratama 232 Gunung Bayan Pratama Coal 232 Hulubalang Inti Bumi 232 Indexim Coalindo 232 Indominco Mandiri 233 Insani Bara Perkasa 233 Interex Sacra Raya 233 Intitirta Prima Sakti 233 Intitirta Primasakti 234 Jorong Barutama Greston 234 Juloi Coal 234 Kadya Caraka Mulia 234 Kalimantan Energi Lestari 234 Kalteng Coal 235 Kaltim Prima Coal 235 Kartika Selabumi Mining 235 Karunia Poladaya Bumi 235 Karya Bumi Baratama 235 Kendilo Coal Indonesia 236 BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia 236 Kideco Jaya Agung 236 Kitadin 236 Kodeco Horna Mandiri 236 Kurnia Sarana Lestari 236 Kutai Kertanegara Prima Coal 236 Lahai Coal 237 Lanna Harita Indonesia 237 Lianganggang Cemerlang 237 Mahakam Sumber Jaya 237 Mandiri Intiperkasa 237 Mantimin Coal Mining 238 Marunda Graha Mineral 238 Marunda Grahamineral 238 Maruwai Coal 238 Maruai Coal 238 Meulaboh Energitama 238 Meullaboho Energitama 239 Mitrajaya Timuragung 239 Multi Harapan Utama 239 Multi Tambangjaya Utama 239 Nusa Minera Utama 239 Nusantara Termal Coal (D/A Nusantara Thai Coal) 240 Nusantara Thai Coal 240 Pari Coal 240 Pendopo Energi Coal 240 Pendopo Energy Batubara 240 Perkasa Inakakerta 240 Persada Permata Mulya 241 Persada Permata Mulia 241 Pesona Khatulistiwa Nusantara 241 Pinang Jaya Sarana Bara 241 Pinangjaya Sarana Bara 241 Ramdany Coal Mining 241 Ratah Coal 241 Restubara Karya Pratama 242 Riau Bara Harum 242 Salamindo Coalindo 242 Salamindo Pahala 242 Santan Coal 242 Santan Batubara 242 Sarwa Sembada Karya Bumi 242 Selatan Selabara 243 Selo Argodedali 243 Selo Argokencono Sakti 243 Senamas Energindo Mulya 243 Senamas Energindo Mulia 243 Sinar Benua Prima 244 Sinarindo Barakarya 244 Singlurus Pratama 244 Solok Bara Adipratama 244 Sumber Barito Coal 244 Sumber Kurnia Buana 245 Suprabari Mapanindo Mineral 245 Tambang Damai 245 Tanito Harum 245 Tanjung Alam Jaya 246 Tanjung Alam Raya 246 Taraco Mining 246 Teguh Persada Coal 246 Teguh Reksa Daya 246 Teguh Sinar Abadi 246 Tempayang Cemerlang 247 Timah Batubara Utama 247 Torah Antareja Mining 247 Trimarta Coal Perkasa 247 Trimata Buana 247 Trimata Benua 247 Trimata Coal Perkasa 248 Trubaindo Coal Mining 248 Wadung Mas Tambang Mulia 248 Wadungmas Tambang Mulia 248 Wahana Baratama Mining 248 Whirakaneo Coalindo 248 Whiratama Bina Perkasa 248 Yamabhumi Palaka 249 List of Tables Table 1 – World primary energy demand by fuel and scenario (Mtoe) 10 Table 2 – World renewables consumption by scenario 11 Table 3 – Share of global final energy consumption by end-use, 2014 13 Table 4 – Distributed renewable energy for productive energy services and economic development 14 Table 5 – Energy characteristics of energy-intensive industries, 2013 19 Table 6 – Forms of energy 19 Table 7 – Energy units with conversion factors and energy equivalents 20 Table 8 – Energy conversion efficiencies 21 Table 9 – Global trends in renewable energy new investment by technology, 2004-2014 (US$ bn) 21 Table 10 – Renewable energy indicator, 2014 22 Table 11 – Global trends in renewable energy new investment by stage, 2004-2014 (US$ bn) 23 Table 12 – Global renewable energy capacity and biofuel production, 2014 23 Table 13 – Top-5 countries in annual investment / net capacity additions / production, 2014 24 Table 14 – World electricity generation by source and scenario (TWh) 25 Table 15 – Power system flexibility options and characteristics 27 Table 16 – Renewable electric power global capacity, top regions/countries, 2014 (GW) 29 Table 17 – Top-5 countries in total capacity or generation as of end-2014 30 Table 18 – Status of renewable technologies: characteristics and costs in power generation and hot water/heating/cooling 33 Table 19 – Status of renewable technologies: characteristics and costs: Distributed renewable energy in developing countries 34 Table 20 – Status of renewable technologies: characteristics and costs: Transport fuels 35 Table 21 – Relevant comparisons for evaluating competitiveness of renewable energy technologies by scale and role played 36 Table 22 – Coal In-Place Resources for Upper Limestone Fm + Limestone Coal Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 56 Table 23 – Coal In-Place Resources for Upper Limestone Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 56 Table 24 – Coal In-Place Resources for Limestone Coal Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 56 Table 25 – Coal In-Place Resources, Kincardine, Nov.2014 57 Table 26 – Estimates of trace chemicals abundance in the global atmosphere, 1980. 64 Table 27 – Overview of existing chemical-looping combustors 67 Table 28 – Some undersea coalmines in Solway Firth, Cumbria, UK 78 Table 29 – Oil refineries in Indonesia, 2014 87 Table 30 – Crude oil supply and demand in Indonesia, 2000-2014 89 Table 31 – Crude oil refinery production in Indonesia, 2000-2014 89 Table 32 – Natural gas production in Indonesia, 2000-2014 90 Table 33 – LNG Plants in Indonesia 93 Table 34 – Regasification terminals in Indonesia, existing and planned, 2014 94 Table 35 – LPG supply and sales in Indonesia, 2000-2014 97 Table 36 – CBM Resources in Indonesia 101 Table 37 – The 20 largest shareholders of Dart Energy Limited, 20100914 106 Table 38 – Some subsidiaries of IGas which were held through subsidiaries, 30 June 2015 107 Table 39 – Coal reserves in Indonesia, 2014 116 Table 40 – Coal supply in Indonesia, 2000-2014 117 Table 41 – Existing coal terminals in Indonesia 118 Table 42 – Coal mining companies in Indonesia by permits, March 2015 120 Table 43 – CNC status of IUP by announcements, 20110630-20160104 135 Table 44 – Problems of Non-CNC IUPs by category and regions, 20140203 136 Table 45 – Clean and Clear IUPs by province, 2014 – April 2016 138 Table 46 – Coal Domestic Market Obligations in Indonesia, 2010-2015 139 Table 47 – Coal Domestic Market Obligations in Indonesia, by CCoW and KP/IUP companies, 20100419-20150427 (mt) 141 Table 48 – Overlay of IUP, COW, and PKP2B with Forest Area Map and IPPKH 143 Table 49 – IUP within conservation forests in 12 provinces, 2014-2015 143 Table 50 – The First Generation CCoW Companies: The dates, area, and resources/reserves 147 Table 51 – The second generation of CCoW Companies: 17 of 19 147 Table 52 – Coal produced from Kalimantan, 1997-2000 (1000 ton) 148 Table 53 – The third generation of CCoW Companies: 106 of 114 149 Table 54 – Coal production from CCoW companies, 2005-2012 (1,000 ton) 151 Table 55 – Financial profile of 3 direct subsidiaries of Tata Power on coal business in Indonesia, 2015q1 ( crore) 155 Table 56 – Subsidiaries of Tata Power related with coal mining business in Indonesia, 2015q1 ( crore) 155 Table 57 – Tata Power companies in Indonesia, 2015 156 Table 58 – The most vital financial figures of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2006-2014q3 165 Table 59 – BORN’s debts by signing dates and terms, 2005-2010 167 Table 60 – BORN’s loans, 2007q4 -2012q1 168 Table 61 – Underwriters at BORN’s IPO 169 Table 62 – Corporate actions of Bakrie & Brothers regarding Bumi plc and BORN, late 2011 170 Table 63 – BORN’s IPO proceeds: Planned vs Reported in 2012 Annual Report (IDR mn) 170 Table 64 – Subsidiaries of Bumi plc, June 2012 173 Table 65 – ARMS company financials, 2011-2014 £(M) 177 Table 66 – BORN’s Shareholders, March 2006 – Sept. 2014 (shares) 184 Table 67 – Trading suspension dates of BORN’s stock in IDX, 20130701-20160801 184 Table 68 – BORN’s Board of Commissioners, Dec. 2007 – Sept. 2014 185 Table 69 – BORN’s Board of Directors, Dec. 2007 – Sept. 2014 185 Table 70 – Corporate Officers in BORN group of companies, 2010 186 Table 71 – Related companies of BORN and transaction types, 2011-201409 (US$) 186 Table 72 – Related companies of BORN and transaction types, 2007-2011 (IDR mn) 188 Table 73 – Third parties of BORN 188 Table 74 – BORN’s IPO underwriting fees detailed 190 Table 75 – BORN’s IPO proceeds: Planned vs Reported in 2012 Annual Report (IDR mn) 190 Table 76 – BORN’s outstanding loans, 20100630 191 Table 77 – The most vital financial figures of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2006-2014q3 191 Table 78 – The financial structure of BORN (share of liabilities components to assets), 2009-2014q3 192 Table 79 – Coal mineable reserves of BORN, March 2013 (mt) 203 Table 80 – Coal resources of BORN, March 2013 (mt) 203 Table 81 – BORN’s coal deposits in Kohong and Telakong blocks, 30 June 2010 (mt) 203 Table 82 – BORN’s performance in coal productions, sales, and price, 2007-2013 205 Table 83 – Tuhup coal product specification, 30 June 2010 206 Table 84 – Grades of coking coal 208 Table 85 – Utilisation of installed capacity of BORN, 2007-2010H1 209 Table 86 – Third parties contracted in relation to barging and loading in ISP 210 Table 87 – Coal sales by marketers, 2011-2012 ($) 211 Table 88 – BORN sales by country, 2009-2013 212 Table 89 – Management Boards of Asmindo Koalindo Tuhup, 1 Sept. 2010 212 Table 90 – Changes in AKT shareholders, 1993 – 20091220 212 Table 91 – The financials of AKT acquisition in 2008 and 2012 213 Table 92 – The financials of AKT, 2007 – 2010H1 ($) 214 List of Figures Figure 1 – Degrees of capital requirement and asset life time in oil industry 1 Figure 2 – Risk-return investment profile in oil industry 1 Figure 3 – Average lead times between final investment decision and first production for different oil resource types 2 Figure 4 – Supply response of US tight oil based on oil price in 2020. 3 Figure 5 – Cellulosic ethanol breakeven crude oil price for competitiveness with gasoline 3 Figure 6 – Components of total power generation costs, 2020 4 Figure 7 – Components of total power generation costs, 2040 4 Figure 8 – Components of electricity price, by regions and time frame 5 Figure 9 – Lowered costs in power generation by renewables 5 Figure 10 – Share of renewables consumption in sector demand, 2005-2014, and forecast to 2020 6 Figure 11 – Renewable power net additions to capacity under main and accelerated cases by countries 6 Figure 12 – Breakdown of global renewable energy use in 2010 7 Figure 13 – Primary energy generation by supply and consumption in the US, 2014 7 Figure 14 – Breakdown of global renewable energy use in 2030 8 Figure 15 – Primary energy supply and consumption in the US, 2014 8 Figure 16 – Average weighted substitution cost and benefits by sector 9 Figure 17 – Technology cost curve by primary energy source, 2030 10 Figure 18 – Renewable energy share in global energy consumption, 2013 11 Figure 19 – World energy consumption by end-use in 2012 & projection in 2040 (quadrillion Btu) 12 Figure 20 – World energy consumption by source in 2012 & projection in 2040 (quadrillion Btu) 12 Figure 21 – Conversion process from shale to fuel oil and byproducts 15 Figure 22 – Liquid fuels classified 15 Figure 23 – Trends in oil intensity and GDP per capita in selected countries and regions 17 Figure 24 – Early signs of commercialisation in the advanced biofuels sector 17 Figure 25 – World Energy Model 18 Figure 26 – Energy forms 20 Figure 27 – Global New Investment in Renewable Power and Fuels, Developed and Developing Countries, 2004–2014 22 Figure 28 – Renewable Energy Share of Global Electricity Production, End-2014 24 Figure 29 – Global renewables-based electricity generation by technology in the New Policies Scenario 25 Figure 30 – World net electricity generation by source in 2012 & projection in 2040 (trillion kWH) 25 Figure 31 – World net electricity generation from renewables by source in 2012 & projection in 2040 (trillion kWH) 26 Figure 32 – World net electricity generation from renewables by country in 2040 (billion kWH) 26 Figure 33 – Power mix of renewable electricity in 24 hours 27 Figure 34 – Natural gas prices and the share of non-hydro renewables in the US power mix 28 Figure 35 – Average Annual Growth Rates of Renewable Energy Capacity and Biofuels Production, End-2009–2014 29 Figure 36 – Renewable Power Capacities* in World, EU-28, BRICS, and Top Seven Countries, 2014 30 Figure 37 – Energy-related CO2 emissions and economic growth, 2005-2014 31 Figure 38 – World energy-related carbon dioxide emissions (billion metric tons) 31 Figure 39 – Evolution of energy technology costs per unit in the New Policies Scenario, 2014-2040 32 Figure 40 – Extent of global mandatory efficiency regulation of final energy consumption by sector and region 35 Figure 41 – Enabling policy in supporting the renewable energy industry 36 Figure 42 – Milestones on the road to competitiveness for renewables 37 Figure 43 – Energy input–output cross-paths from primary sources to consumption sectors and energy losses. 38 Figure 44 – US energy use, 2014, The Sankey Diagram of energy resources (left) flow to end-use sectors (right) 39 Figure 45 – US Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2014 39 Figure 46 – U.S. Energy Flow, 2014 (Quadrillion Btu) 40 Figure 47 – World energy demand by fuel and sector in the New Policies Scenario, 2040 (Mtoe) 41 Figure 48 – Power generation by fuel and demand by sector in the US (TWh) 42 Figure 49 – Power generation by fuel and demand by sector in the EU (TWh) 42 Figure 50 – Power generation by fuel and demand by sector in China (TWh) 43 Figure 51 – Power generation by fuel and demand by sector in India (TWh) 43 Figure 52 – Potential future global oil projects by average breakeven prices 46 Figure 53 – Various technologies implemented during power generation process 51 Figure 54 – Some chemical reactions in converting syngas 52 Figure 55 – Some routes of coal to chemicals from methane via syngas 52 Figure 56 – Coal cycle and its derived products schematics, from liquid (CTL), to gas (CTG), and chemicals (CTC) 53 Figure 57 – Potential UCG in the UK, 2004 54 Figure 58 – Kincardine UGC project area of interest, 20141105 56 Figure 59 – Kincardine UCG licenses in the Firth of Forth, 20150402. 57 Figure 60 – Kincardine area of interest in Midland Valley of Scotland, 20141105 58 Figure 61 – Coalmines in British Columbia, Canada 59 Figure 62 – Selected significant climate anomalies and events, July 2016 60 Figure 63 – Earth’s Annual Global Mean Energy Budget, July 1987 – Dec. 1988 61 Figure 64 – Earth’s Global Energy Budget, March 2000 – March 2004 61 Figure 65 – Monthly mean atmospheric carbon dioxide at Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii, March 1958 – July 2016 (ppm) 65 Figure 66 – Oxygen transport capability of different MeO/Me systems. 66 Figure 67 – The effective aquifuge in Beizao Coalmine 71 Figure 68 – TBU Underwater coal mining in The Baltic Union 72 Figure 69 – TBU Coal Island 73 Figure 70 – TBU Sandisle structure 73 Figure 71 – Coal mines in Nova Scotia, Canada 75 Figure 72 – Donkin coal resource block 75 Figure 73 – Solway Firth, Irish Sea, UK 78 Figure 74 – The map of Tynemouth-Boldon-Sunderland, NE England 80 Figure 75 – Deep coal mining closures in the UK, 2010-2015 82 Figure 76 – Deep coal mining closures in the UK, 1960-1969 82 Figure 77 – Onshore coal distribution in the UK by depth, 2014 83 Figure 78 – Oil reserves in Indonesia, 2014 86 Figure 79 – Installed capacity of oil refineries in Indonesia, 2014 88 Figure 80 – Natural gas reserves in Indonesia, 2014 90 Figure 81 – LNG plants in Indonesia, 2015 93 Figure 82 – LNG plants infrastructure in Indonesia, 2015 94 Figure 83 – LNG Applications 95 Figure 84 – Gas transmission and distribution in Indonesia, 2010-2025 96 Figure 85 – Bottling plants of LPG in Indonesia, 2015 99 Figure 86 – LPG supply scheme from import and 3 PSCs to 3 main terminals 100 Figure 87 – CBM Basins in Indonesia 101 Figure 88 – Coal bed methane (CBM) resources in Indonesia, 2010 102 Figure 89 – CBM PSC terms in Indonesia 102 Figure 90 – Some CBM PSCs in East Kalimantan 105 Figure 91 – CBM basin in South Sumatera, Nov. 2011 108 Figure 92 – Tanjung Enim CBM PSC 109 Figure 93 – Muralim CBM PSC 110 Figure 94 – Sangatta West CBM PSC 112 Figure 95 – The CBM PSCs of NuEnergy in Sumatera 113 Figure 96 – Gasification-based system concepts 115 Figure 97 – Gasification chemistry 115 Figure 98 – Coal distribution in Indonesia by calory class, 2014 116 Figure 99 – Supply and export of Indonesian coal, 1997-2014 117 Figure 100 – Export share over coal production in top producing countries 117 Figure 101 – Coal seaports in Indonesia, 2015 119 Figure 102 – UK banks involvement in Indonesian coal companies 120 Figure 103 – Mining permits in Indonesia, 20140203 121 Figure 104 – Mining problems in Indonesia, 20140203 134 Figure 105 – JORC’s general relationship between exploration results, mineral resources, and ore reserves 134 Figure 106 – Problems of Non-Clean & Clear Status of IUPs classified and mapped 137 Figure 107 – Adding value to the coal by implementing clean coal technology 139 Figure 108 – Coal DMO mechanism in Indonesia 140 Figure 109 – Monitoring and reporting system on the implementation of coal DMO mechanism in Indonesia 141 Figure 110 – Clean & Clear Status of IUPs, May 2011 – April 2016 144 Figure 111 – The mechanics of $600m structure finance (fixed rate note) of IndoCoal in 2005 160 Figure 112 – The mechanics of unrated $900m structured export notes (FRN) of IndoCoal in 2006 160 Figure 113 – Share price of Vallar plc, Bumi plc, and Asia Resource Minerals plc, 9 July 2010 – 10 August 2015 162 Figure 114 – The owners of BLE 164 Figure 115 – The net debt maturities of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2012q1 165 Figure 116 – The debt burdens of PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk, 2012q1 165 Figure 117 – The flows of debts and stakes within companies related with PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal Tbk (BORN), Nov.2010 166 Figure 118 – The interests of BNBR and LHHL in Bumi plc, December 2011 171 Figure 119 – The interests of BORN and Samin Tan in Bumi plc, June 2012 172 Figure 120 – Bumi plc related companies, from shareholders to subsidiaries, June 2012 173 Figure 121 – The interests of BORN and Samin Tan in Bumi plc, prior to March 2014 175 Figure 122 – Heart of Borneo: Three countries, One conservation vision 179 Figure 123 – Transfers of $15m loan of AKT 187 Figure 124 – Transfers of $50m loan of BMS 187 Figure 125 – Transfers of $75m loan of BORN 187 Figure 126 – Transfer of advance and receivable of ETU in BMS and BORN to REM 187 Figure 127 – Classification of asset structure, financial structure, and capital structure 192 Figure 128 – AKT’s coal deposit, 200511-201109 199 Figure 129 – BORN’s coal specification, worldwide comparation 199 Figure 130 – Indonesian coal producers by mine sites 200 Figure 131 – Sea access of AKT as BORN’s asset 201 Figure 132 – The site map of Muara Tuhup and Damparan in Central Kalimantan 202 Figure 133 – Mining activities cycle of AKT 204 Figure 134 – BORN monthly production, Oct.2008 – June 2010 (000 ton) 205 Figure 135 – Coal classification by energy content 207 Figure 136 – Bulk carriers compared by size, from Handysize to Capesize 209
the1uploader 1:50 pm on 2016-07-19 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/coal-business-in-indonesia/)
Tags: carbon capture utilisation storage, carbon dioxide, clean coal technology, co2 recovery, coal combustion, coal fracking, coal gasification, coal leaching, coal liquefaction, coal policy, coal statistics, coal trade policy, coal-bed methane ( 3 ), mine mouth power plant, pollutants emission of coal, underwater coalmines Coal Business in Indonesia Dear Client, Terlampir beberapa file terkait energi dan batubara: 1. Daftar isi terbaru dari buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017”. Last update: 12 Maret 2017. 2. Daftar harga buku-buku terkait energi dan batubara. Saat ini, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017. Last update: 12 Maret 2017”, ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.000 (dua ribu dollar AS), khusus untuk e-book dengan format pdf, single license. E-book dengan format flash (file *.exe) disewakan dengan harga US$ 200 (dua ratus dollar AS) per hari. Dalam prakteknya, e-book flash bisa diakses dalam rentang waktu kurang dari 48 hari. Kelonggaran diberikan karena adanya tenggang waktu (time lapse) antara pembuatan, upload, dan download file e-book flash sampai ke layar monitor pembaca yang membeli. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke email pembaca yang membeli. Beberapa direktori terkait bisnis batubara sudah tersedia: 1. direktori usaha tambang dengan status CNC, 2. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara, 3. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara dengan status CNC, 4. direktori perusahaan eksportir batubara, 5. direktori perusahaan pengangkut batubara, 6. direktori usaha batubara, dan lainnya. Setelah analisa dan peng-update-an terakhir ini selesai, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” hanya akan ditawarkan dalam bentuk cetak dan sewa e-book flash. Tidak ada diskriminasi harga antara pembeli WNI atau WNA. Buku edisi cetak “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.500 (dua ribu lima ratus dollar AS). File e-book flash berjudul “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” disewakan dengan harga US$ 250 per hari. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke e-mail pembaca yang membeli. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, saya menawarkan buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” dengan harga spesial. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, bila bapak memerlukan tabel, denah, bagan, grafis, dan gambar dalam buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017”, saya bisa memberikannya secara gratis dengan beberapa batasan tertentu. Penawaran ini ditutup sampai 31 Maret 2017. Demikian update dan penawaran dari saya. Terima kasih atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya. Salam, Sando Jakarta, 12 Maret 2017 Coal Business in Indonesia by Sando Sasako Jakarta, 20 July 2016 Last update: Jakarta, 12 March 2017 xlii + 432 pages, comprising of 214 tables and 98 charts http://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/coal_business_in_indonesia__dec_201?e=27352568/41747360 You may download it from here: https://www.hashdoc.com/documents/437044/coal-business-in-indonesia Published by CV Serabdi Sakti Graha Anggrek Jl. Anggrek Rosliana VII No.63 Jakarta Barat 11480, Indonesia Tel. +62 851 0518 7118 +62 888 1617 440 Copyright © Sando Sasako All rights reserved. You may not reproduce the content of this book, in part or in whole in any form with or without the written permission of the copyright owner and publisher, as long as you cite this reference as your ultimate one. https://www.hashdoc.com/documents/437044/coal-business-in-indonesia Foreword Coal deposits all around the world may have been declining. It’s on the surface, but not in deep underground. Extracting coal physically beneath the earth, majorly under the deep seabed, is not an easy task to fulfill and complete. Some advantages may have come for digging coal out of the underwater. Coal washing doesnot need special water resources and treatment, but from the sea or ocean. Every thing must have a plus and a minus. It depends on what perspectives you’ve taken all along. The choice then lend it to the tasks of extracting the coal ores, that is the molecular carbons in gas, namely CO, CH4, and H2. Syngas, they used to call it as the term. But not the CO2. CO2 is mostly considered as the public enemy number one to be captured and imprisoned in a dungeon, deep underground, for good. Various CO2 absorbents have been sought and developed, along with the technologies to filter out the impurities embedded with coal, namely SOx and NOx. Many have mixed up inappropriately the understandingness between coal gasification and coal combustion. Even FoE. Those two coal treatments are different things. The first is heating the coal, while the second is burning the coal. Both process involves massive thermal chain reactions. The problems with UCG is that how can you guarantee that it is the coal seam and the intended ones that has been gasified. How about the walls, the roofs, the floors, and the layers buffering the coal seams? How about if the words of collapse and/or cracks applied to those layers? Won’t they initiate a flow of the unexpected such as a mud flow for example as in Porong, Sidoarjo, East Java, Indonesia, that hasn’t stopped since it began to erupt on 29 May 2006. Even worse is how the earth is burning the coal seams underground. Burning Mountain of Mount Wingen in New South Wales has been burning for 6000 years, Brennender Berg in German since 1688, Smoking Hill in NW Canada since its discovery in 1826, Emalahleni in South Africa since 1953, and Centralia in Pennsylvania since 27 May 1962. The list doesnot include the burning of methane in Derweze, Turkmenistan since 1971, known as door to hell; Baba Gurgur oilfield nearby Kirkuk, Irak for 2500 years, known as eternal fire; Yanar Dag near Baku, Azerbaijan since 1950s, known as land of fire. The unanswered questions to protect the environment underground and the surrounding area has left many UCG projects to be terminated, cancelled, withdrawn, neglected, abandoned, forbidden. They are all due to lack of environmental protection technologies, and most of all understandingness how to deal and cope it before hand. Therefore, UCG is not an option to exploit coal deposits underground. At least for now, and some decades to come. Jakarta, 31 August 2016 Sando Sasako Email: sandosako @ yahoo.com Mobile: +62 812 8056 516 Contents Foreword iii Contents v List of Tables xxxiii List of Figures xl Global Trends in Energy Industry 1 The Saudi Factor 2 The Revolutionary US Shale 4 Primary Energy Consumption in the World 6 Global Coal Trends 9 World’s Coal Proved Reserves by Country, 2015 10 World’s Coal Production by Country, 2005-2015 11 World’s Coal Consumption by Country, 2005-2015 12 World’s Coal Prices, 1987-2016q2 13 Some Basic Knowledges 16 The Classes of Coal 17 Coal Resources and Reserves 19 Applications of Thermal Coal 21 Applications of Met Coal 22 The Typical Consumers 24 The Hidden Costs of Coal: From Mining to Firing 25 How Coal Pollutes and Damages the Air Quality 27 How Coal Damages the Human Health 30 Calculating and Accounting the Coal Costs 32 Global Warming or Global Heating 34 Greenhouse Gas 37 CO2 as One of GHGs 39 The GHG Effects on Humans 41 Weighing the Costs of Pollutants Emissions of Coal 42 Non-Coal Input 44 Resource Consumption 45 Energy Consumption 47 Non-Electricity Output: The Pollutants 49 Solid Waste Pollution 50 Water Pollutants Emissions 52 Air Pollutants Emissions 53 Carbon Dioxide Emissions 54 Non-Carbon Dioxide Emissions 56 Unintended Methane Emissions & Methane Mining Practices 57 Pollutants Emissions in CFPP 58 The Stressors in Coal Businesses 59 Underwater Coalmines 60 Hashima Coal Mine, Japan 61 Okinoyama Coal Mine, Japan 62 Beizao Coal Mine, China 63 Bomlo Coal Mine, Norway 65 Cape Breton Coal Mines, Nova Scotia, Canada 68 Solway Coal Mines, Cumbria, UK 72 North Sea Coal Mines, NE England 74 Forth Coal Mines, Scotland, UK 76 The End of Deep Coal Mines in the UK 78 Coal Processing Technologies in Coal Mines 80 Coal Liquefaction 82 Coal Gasification 85 Coal Combustion 87 Underground Coal Gasification 89 Kincardine UCG, Scotland, UK 91 Raven and Hat Creek Coalfield, BC, Canada 94 Coal Leaching 96 Coal Fracking 99 Clean Coal Technologies 101 Flue Gas Clean-up Technologies 102 Carbon Dioxide Technologies 106 Carbon Dioxide Applications 108 The Supercritical Carbon Dioxide Applications 109 Working fluid to transfer heat 110 The hydrocarbon solvents 111 The non-toxic solvents 112 Carbonation 113 Calcination 114 Carbon Capture Utilisation Storage Technologies 115 Oxygen Carriers 117 Carbon Dioxide Recovery 119 Technologies to Capture Carbon Dioxide 121 Carbonatation 123 Metal Carbonatation 124 Metal Organic Frameworks 127 Carburising 128 Energy Business in Indonesia in a brief 130 Coal Businesses in Indonesia 133 History of Coal Business in Indonesia 135 Regulatory Frameworks 137 The Dutch Colonialism 137 The Mining Law of 1967 138 The Production Sharing Contract in Coal Mining of 1975 140 The Coal Contract of Work of 1981 141 Forced Localisation 142 Coal Mining Permits 143 Issues on Enviromental and Decentralisation 146 Ministerial Regulations (Permen ESDM) 148 Ministerial Decrees (Kepmen ESDM) 151 Coal Trade Policy 154 Coal Trade Control 156 Coal Export Restriction 158 The Peak Production and The Depletion 161 The Domestic Market Obligation System 163 Coal Transport 165 Coal Handling 165 Coal Terminals / Seaports 172 Coal Shipping Vessels and Freight Rates 174 Coal Pricing System 177 Coal Price Dynamics 179 The Mechanic and System of Price 180 Pricing Policy 181 Taxing Policy 183 Transfer Pricing Policy 185 The Tax Havens 187 Coal Pricing System in Indonesia 191 HBA (Indonesian Coal Reference Price) 192 HPB (Indonesian Coal Benchmark Price) 193 The Six Coal Price Indices 200 Indonesian Coal Index (ICI) 200 Platts Index 202 Newcastle Export Index (NEX) 203 globalCoal Index 204 IHS Markit Index 206 Energy Publishing Coking Coal Index 208 The Clean and Clear Status 209 The CNC Status of Coal IUP (Coal Mining Business Permit Holders) 212 The CNC Status of IUP by Province 213 The Non-CNC Status 215 Clean and Clear: The Causes 218 Clearance of Forestry Land Use Permit 220 Korsup Minerba 222 Coal Statistics 224 Coal Reserves and Resources 225 Coal Supply 229 Coal Production 231 Domestic Coal Sales 234 Coal Exports 236 Coal Imports 240 Coal Consumption 242 CCoW Companies: The First Generations 245 BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia 250 BHP Businesses in Indonesia 252 Rio Tinto 253 Tata Power 254 Arutmin Indonesia 256 Kaltim Prima Coal 257 Bumi Resources 259 The IndoCoal Deals 260 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup 262 Allied Indo Coal 264 Coal-Bed Methane 265 The Milestone of CBM Commercialisation 268 CBM Asia @ Kutai West PSC 269 Dart Energy & IGas 271 Dart Energy & NuEnergy 273 Mine Mouth Power Plant 280 The Willing To Be MMPP Operators 281 Coal Fired Power Plants in Indonesia 283 The MMPPs of PTBA 285 PLTU Asam-Asam: One of Many MMPPs of PLN 286 References 287 Attachment – 1. Profile of Coal Basins in Indonesia 292 Attachment – 2. Coal Statistics of Indonesian Coal Companies, 2006 – Jan. 2017 296 Directory of Coal Mining Companies in Indonesia 314 Directory of Coal Exporting Companies in Indonesia 343 Directory of CNC Certified Coal IUP Holding Companies in Indonesia 365 List of Tables Table 1 – Primary Energy Consumption in the World by Countries, 2005-2015 (mtoe) 6 Table 2 – Primary Energy: Consumption in the World by Countries and by Fuel Type, 2014 (mtoe) 7 Table 3 – Primary Energy: Consumption in the World by Countries and by Fuel Type, 2015 (mtoe) 8 Table 4 – World’s coal proved reserves by country, 2015 (Million tonnes) 10 Table 5 – World’s coal production by country, 2005-2015 (mtoe)* 11 Table 6 – World’s coal consumption by country, 2005-2015 (mtoe) 12 Table 7 – World’s coal prices, 1987-2015 ($/tonne) 13 Table 8 – US coal export price, 2010q1-2016q1 ($/short tons) 14 Table 9 – Coal reserves in India and the world, 2015 (mt) 22 Table 10 – India’s coal consumption and production, 2005-2015 (mtoe) 22 Table 11 – The health effects of power plant pollutants 27 Table 12 – Coal’s contributions to major health effects: The US case 30 Table 13 – The life cycle impact of the U.S. coal industry 32 Table 14 – Estimates of trace chemicals abundance in the global atmosphere, 1980. 39 Table 15 – Predicted health effects of global warming 41 Table 16 – Resource consumption to produce electricity from coal in 3 systems of CFPP 45 Table 17 – Power Plant Resource/Input Requirements (Base Case) in 3 systems of CFPP 45 Table 18 – Average Resource Consumption per kWh of Net Electricity Produced in CFPP Average System in 3 main coal activities 45 Table 19 – Energy Efficiency and Energy Ratio Definitions 47 Table 20 – Efficiencies and Energy Ratio Results in 3 CFPP systems (%) 47 Table 21 – Average Energy Requirements per kWh of Net Electricity Produced – Average System in 3 CFPP systems 48 Table 22 – Share of energy consumption by non-coal energy and total system energy in 3 CFPP systems (%) 48 Table 23 – Breakdown of Non-Coal Energy for Lime and Limestone in 3 CFPP systems (%) 48 Table 24 – Average Solid Waste Generation per kWh of Net Electricity Produced – Average System (surface mining & average user by river) 51 Table 25 – Average Water Pollutants Emissions per kWh of Net Electricity Produced – Average System (surface mining & average user by river) 52 Table 26 – Average Air Pollutants Emissions per kWh of Net Electricity Produced – Average System (surface mining & average user by river) 53 Table 27 – CO2 output 54 Table 28 – Measuring CO2 Emissions – Definitions and Numbers (%) 54 Table 29 – Breakdown of Non-Coal CO2 Results for Lime and Limestone 55 Table 30 – Air Pollutants Emissions, excluding CO2 56 Table 31 – Applications and Requirements for Recovered Methane 57 Table 32 – Power Plant Air Pollutants Emissions in 3 CFPP systems (kg/GWh of net electricity produced) 58 Table 33 – Power Plant Trace Element Emissions in 3 CFPP systems (kg/kWh of net electricity) 58 Table 34 – Power Plant Solid Waste Emissions in 3 CFPP systems (kg/GWh of net electricity produced) 58 Table 35 – Impacts Associated with Stressor Categories in Coal Businesses 59 Table 36 – Some undersea coalmines in Solway Firth, Cumbria, UK 72 Table 37 – Coal In-Place Resources for Upper Limestone Fm + Limestone Coal Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 91 Table 38 – Coal In-Place Resources for Upper Limestone Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 91 Table 39 – Coal In-Place Resources for Limestone Coal Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 92 Table 40 – Coal In-Place Resources, Kincardine, Nov.2014 92 Table 41 – EDAX analysis and ultimate analysis of coal leaching 96 Table 42 – Exhaust flue gas emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels measured in its properties & molecular weights 102 Table 43 – FGC waste and ash from the 3 power plants systems (g/kWh) 103 Table 44 – Coal analysis of design coal and check coals on Indonesian coal and Chinese coal 103 Table 45 – Ash analysis of design coal and check coals on Indonesian coal and Chinese coal 104 Table 46 – Thermal decomposition of metal carbonates 114 Table 47 – Large scale Power Plant Carbon Capture and Storage Projects Worldwide, June 2016 116 Table 48 – Overview of existing chemical-looping combustors 118 Table 49 – Principal metal oxides of Earth’s Crust 123 Table 50 – A list of Government Regulations on Mining from PP No.32/1969 to PP No.23/2010 138 Table 51 – A list of Government Regulations regarding the coal mining and the related ones that revoked by PP No.23/2010 138 Table 52 – A list of some other important Government Regulations (PP) regarding mining area and supervision 139 Table 53 – Other Government Regulations regarding (state-owned companies in) coal mining in Indonesia 139 Table 54 – A list of presidential decrees regarding the CCoWs in Indonesia 141 Table 55 – Coal mining companies in Indonesia by permits, March 2015 143 Table 56 – A list of some general regulations of Dirjen Mineral dan Batubara (DMB, Director General of Minerals and Coal) regarding a more detailed and technicals on coal. 144 Table 57 – Some regulations of DMB regarding coal pricing system in Indonesia. 145 Table 58 – A list of laws regarding the regional government in Indonesia. 146 Table 59 – A list of laws regarding forestry in Indonesia. 146 Table 60 – A list of some implementing rules on forestry in Indonesia. 146 Table 61 – A list of some implementing rules in terms of Government Regulations (PP) on forestry in Indonesia. 146 Table 62 – A list of some laws regarding enviroment in Indonesia. 147 Table 63 – A list of some implementing rules on environment in Indonesia. 147 Table 64 – A list of some international laws and rules ratified by the Indonesian government. 147 Table 65 – A list of Regulations of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Permen ESDM) on coal investments and divestments in the Contracts of Work and Coal Contracts of Work. 148 Table 66 – A list of Regulations of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Permen ESDM) on coal mining activities 148 Table 67 – A list of Regulations of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Permen ESDM) on coal mining permits and concessions 148 Table 68 – A list of Regulations of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Permen ESDM) on competency education and training on coal mining 149 Table 69 – A list of Regulations of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Permen ESDM) regarding required in-country processing and/or refining prior to export abroad 149 Table 70 – A list of Regulations of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Permen ESDM) on coal domestic market obligation (DMO), consumption, and price 149 Table 71 – A list of Regulations of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Permen ESDM) on coal used to generate electricity 150 Table 72 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on coal used to generate electricity 151 Table 73 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on authority delegations 151 Table 74 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on Coal Domestic Market Obligations (DMO) 151 Table 75 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on coal mining permits 152 Table 76 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on Coal Contracts of Work 152 Table 77 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on Coal Bed Methane (CBM) PSCs 152 Table 78 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on revenue sharing schemes 153 Table 79 – A list of Decrees of Energy and Resource Mineral Minister (Kepmen ESDM) on safety, health, environment friendly awards 153 Table 80 – Coal and coal products whose export is restricted and calories calculated by HS Number 159 Table 81 – Production and depletion in Indonesian coal basins estimated through Gompertz Curve 161 Table 82 – Coal basins in Indonesia: The reserves, production & its cumulation, and depletion, 2013 (mt) 161 Table 83 – General quality (AR, as received) of Indonesian coal based on setting of tectonic platesa 162 Table 84 – Coal Domestic Market Obligations in Indonesia, 2010-2015 163 Table 85 – Coal mines in Kalimantan and the proposed railway lines, 2002 170 Table 86 – The coal cost structure up to formation of the FOB price 170 Table 87 – Existing coal terminals in Indonesia, 2009 172 Table 88 – Proposed coal terminals in Indonesia, 2014 172 Table 89 – Rules related with transfer pricing regulations 185 Table 90 – Some transfer pricing regulations in Indonesia 186 Table 91 – The tax haven countries (the Financial Secrecy Index) of Tax Justice Network, 2015 188 Table 92 – Some regulations of DMB regarding coal pricing system in Indonesia. 191 Table 93 – Indonesian coal reference price (HBA) of CV-6322 kcal/kg GAR, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 192 Table 94 – The determining factors in HPB formulation, 2017 193 Table 95 – The 8 coal products used as the benchmark prices (HPB) 193 Table 96 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-7000 kcal/kg GAR: Gunung Bayan I coal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 195 Table 97 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-6700 kcal/kg GAR: Prima Coal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 196 Table 98 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-6150 kcal/kg GAR: Pinang Coal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 196 Table 99 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-5700 kcal/kg GAR: Pinang Indominco IM East coal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 197 Table 100 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-5400 kcal/kg GAR: Melawan Coal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 197 Table 101 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-5000 kcal/kg GAR: Enviro Coal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 198 Table 102 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-4400 kcal/kg GAR: Jorong J-1 Coal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 198 Table 103 – Indonesian coal benchmark price (HPB) of CV-4200 kcal/kg GAR: EcoCoal, Jan. 2009-Jan. 2017 (US$/ton) 199 Table 104 – Five classes of coal in ICI 200 Table 105 – The eight classes of coal in Platts Index, Jan. 2017 202 Table 106 – Australian thermal coal Monthly Price – US Dollars per Metric Ton 203 Table 107 – FOB Indo Specification in SCoTA 204 Table 108 – CNC Status of IUPs: Recommended and Approved, From 18th to 23rd Announcement, March 2017 209 Table 109 – CNC status of IUPs: From Announcements I to XXIII, 20110630-20170222 210 Table 110 – Mining permits relinquished from DMB to BKPM, August 2015 211 Table 111 – Mineral and Coal IUPs with CNC certification by mining activities (CNC-22), 20170130 212 Table 112 – IUPs of mineral and coal that revoked and cancelled (CNC-22), 20170130 213 Table 113 – Clean and Clear IUPs by province, 2014 – February 2017 214 Table 114 – Problems of Non-CNC IUPs by category and regions, 20140203 215 Table 115 – Overlay of IUP, COW, and PKP2B with Forest Area Map and IPPKH 220 Table 116 – IUP within conservation forests in 12 provinces, 2014-2015 220 Table 117 – Indonesian Coal by Resources and Reserves types and quality, 2015 (mt) 225 Table 118 – Indonesian Coal by Resources and Reserves types and quality, 2014 (mt) 225 Table 119 – Indonesian coal by resources and reserves types and provinces, 2015 (million ton) 225 Table 120 – Indonesian coal by resources and reserves types and provinces, 2014 (million ton) 226 Table 121 – Indonesian coal by resources and reserves types, quality, and provinces, 2015 (million ton) 226 Table 122 – Indonesian coal by resources and reserves types and provinces, 2014 (million ton) 228 Table 123 – Coal supply in Indonesia, 2000-2015 (ton) 229 Table 124 – Coal production by quality, domestic sales, export, 2005-2015 229 Table 125 – Coal companies supplying domestic and export markets by license, 2012-2014 (ton) 230 Table 126 – Coal production in Indonesia and the World, 2005-2015 (mtoe) 231 Table 127 – Coal production by companies and license, 2005 – Jan. 2017 (000 ton) 231 Table 128 – Coal production by CCoW and IUP companies and province, 2011-2014 (ton) 232 Table 129 – Domestic coal sales by company and province, 2011-2014 (ton) 234 Table 130 – Domestic coal sales by companies and license, 2005 – Jan. 2017 (000 ton) 235 Table 131 – Coal export sales by companies and license, 2005 – Jan. 2017 (000 ton) 236 Table 132 – Indonesian coal export by companies and province, 2011-2014 (ton) 237 Table 133 – Coal export sales by destination countries, 2006 – Jan. 2017 (000 ton) 238 Table 134 – Indonesian coal export by major countries of destination, 2000-2015 (000 ton) 238 Table 135 – Coal exports by major destination countries, 2002-2014 (000 ton) 238 Table 136 – The FOB value of coal exports by major destination countries, 2002-2014 (US$ mn) 239 Table 137 – Consumption of primary energy and coal in Indonesia vs the World, 2005 – 2015 (mtoe) 242 Table 138 – Coal consumption in Indonesia by industrial sector and import, 2015 242 Table 139 – Domestic coal sales by consumer type, 2001-2015 (ton) 242 Table 140 – Coal Domestic Market Obligations in Indonesia, by CCoW and KP/IUP companies, 20100419-20150427 (mt) 243 Table 141 – The CCoW-1 Companies: The signing dates, location, initial and retained area, area code, resources and reserves, 2015 245 Table 142 – The 17 of 19 CCoW-2 Companies: The signing dates, status of investment and activities, location, initial and retained area, area code, 2015 245 Table 143 – Coal produced from Kalimantan, 1997-2000 (1000 ton) 246 Table 144 – The 108 of 114 CCoW-3 Companies: The signing dates, status of investment and activities, location, initial and retained area, area code, 2015 247 Table 145 – Financial profile of 3 direct subsidiaries of Tata Power on coal business in Indonesia, 2015q1 ( crore) 254 Table 146 – Subsidiaries of Tata Power related with coal mining business in Indonesia, 2015q1 ( crore) 254 Table 147 – Tata Power companies in Indonesia, 2015 255 Table 148 – CBM Resources in Indonesia 265 Table 149 – The 20 largest shareholders of Dart Energy Limited, 20100914 271 Table 150 – Some subsidiaries of IGas which were held through subsidiaries, 30 June 2015 272 Table 151 – The Willing To Be MMPP Operators in Indonesia, June 2016 281 Table 152 – Independent Power Producers of PLN, June 2016 283 Table 153 – The 17 of of the 34 troubled projects of FTP-1 284 Table 154 – Ombilin’s basin coal profile: CV, price, cost, and profit, 1998-2013 292 Table 155 – Bengkulu’s basin coal profile: CV, price, cost, and profit, 1998-2013 292 Table 156 – Central Sumatera’s basin coal profile: CV, price, cost, and profit, 1998-2013 293 Table 157 – South Sumatera’s basin coal profile: CV, price, cost, and profit, 1998-2013 293 Table 158 – Tarakan’s basin coal profile: CV, price, cost, and profit, 1998-2013 294 Table 159 – Kutai’s basin coal profile: CV, price, cost, and profit, 1998-2013 294 Table 160 – Barito’s basin coal profile: CV, price, cost, and profit, 1998-2013 295 Table 161 – Adaro Indonesia, Tbk: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 296 Table 162 – Bearu Coal: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 296 Table 163 – Kaltim Prima Coal: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 296 Table 164 – Kideco Jaya Agung: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 297 Table 165 – Arutmin Indonesia: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 297 Table 166 – Trubaindo Coal Mining: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 297 Table 167 – Indominco Mandiri: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 298 Table 168 – Gunung Bayan Pratama Coal: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 298 Table 169 – Mahakam Sumber Jaya: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 298 Table 170 – Insani Bara Perkasa: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 299 Table 171 – Mandiri Intiperkasa: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 299 Table 172 – PD Baramarta: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 299 Table 173 – Bukit Asam, PT: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 300 Table 174 – Perkasa Inakakerta: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 300 Table 175 – Tanito Harum: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 300 Table 176 – Bahari Cakrawala Sebuku: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 301 Table 177 – Antang Gunung Meratus: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 301 Table 178 – Borneo Indobara: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 301 Table 179 – Jorong Barutma Greston: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 302 Table 180 – Wahana Baratama Mining: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 302 Table 181 – Pesona Khatulistiwa Nusantara: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 302 Table 182 – Sumber Kurnia Buana: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 303 Table 183 – Baturona Adimulya: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 303 Table 184 – Indexim Coalindo: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 303 Table 185 – Kadya Caraka Mulia: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 304 Table 186 – Nusantara Termal Coal*: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 304 Table 187 – Bharinto Ekatama: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 304 Table 188 – Kartika Selabumi Mining: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 305 Table 189 – Lanna Harita Indonesia: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 305 Table 190 – Riau Bara Harum: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 305 Table 191 – Suprabari Mapanindo Mineral: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 306 Table 192 – Tanjung Alam Jaya: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 306 Table 193 – Allied Indo Coal: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 306 Table 194 – Asmin Bara Bronang: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 307 Table 195 – Asmin Coalindo Tuhup: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 307 Table 196 – Bangun Banua Persada Kalimantan: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 307 Table 197 – Bara Sentosa Lestari: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 308 Table 198 – Batu Alam Selaras: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 308 Table 199 – Buana Bara Utama: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 308 Table 200 – Firman Ketaun Perkasa: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 309 Table 201 – Interex Sacra Raya: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 309 Table 202 – Kalimantan Energi Lestari: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 309 Table 203 – Karya Bumi Baratama: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 310 Table 204 – Lahai Coal: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 310 Table 205 – Marunda Graha Mineral: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 310 Table 206 – Multi Harapan Utama: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 311 Table 207 – Multi Tambang Jaya Utama: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 311 Table 208 – Pendopo Energi Batubara: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 311 Table 209 – Santan Batubara: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 312 Table 210 – Senamas Energindo Mulia: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 312 Table 211 – Singlurus Pratama: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 312 Table 212 – Tambang Damai: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 313 Table 213 – Teguh Sinar Abadi: Coal produced, sold domestic and abroad (export), 2006 – Jan 2017 (000 ton) 313 Table 214 – Coal companies with no activity in production, sales, and export. 2006 – Jan. 2017 313 List of Figures Figure 1 – Potential future global oil projects by average breakeven prices 4 Figure 2 – Australian monthly thermal coal price, Jan. 1980 – July 2016 (US$/metric ton) 13 Figure 3 – Monthly coal prices from Australia, Colombia, South Africa, Jan. 1970 – July 2016 ($/mt) 14 Figure 4 – American weekly coal prices, 20080506-20160812 (US$) 15 Figure 5 – Applications of thermal coal and met coal 16 Figure 6 – JORC’s general relationship between exploration results, mineral resources, and ore reserves 19 Figure 7 – Power mix in non-OECD Asia, The IEA outlook for electricity generation (TWh, share) 21 Figure 8 – The routes in the steel making process 22 Figure 9 – Crude steel proportion by process route globally and India (Mt) 23 Figure 10 – Selected significant climate anomalies and events, July 2016 34 Figure 11 – Earth’s Annual Global Mean Energy Budget, July 1987 – Dec. 1988 35 Figure 12 – Earth’s Global Energy Budget, March 2000 – March 2004 35 Figure 13 – Monthly mean atmospheric carbon dioxide at Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii, March 1958 – July 2016 (ppm) 40 Figure 14 – Coal extraction from the mines to its transportation to the power plant, the coal cycle assessments on the pollutants production to consumptions of energy, materials, and raw materials 43 Figure 15 – Coal transportation from the mines to the power plants, the coal cycle assessments on the pollutants production to consumptions of energy, materials, and raw materials 43 Figure 16 – The periodic table of elements on earth in the form of solid, gas, liquid, and unknown; from non-metals in the left to posttrans metals in the right. 50 Figure 17 – The effective aquifuge in Beizao Coalmine 63 Figure 18 – TBU Underwater coal mining in The Baltic Union 65 Figure 19 – TBU Coal Island 66 Figure 20 – TBU Sandisle structure 66 Figure 21 – Coal mines in Nova Scotia, Canada 68 Figure 22 – Donkin coal resource block 69 Figure 23 – Solway Firth, Irish Sea, UK 72 Figure 24 – The map of Tynemouth-Boldon-Sunderland, NE England 74 Figure 25 – Onshore coal distribution in the UK by depth, 2014 78 Figure 26 – Deep coal mining closures in the UK, 2010-2015 79 Figure 27 – Deep coal mining closures in the UK, 1960-1969 79 Figure 28 – Coal cycle and its derived products schematics, from liquid (CTL), to gas (CTG), and chemicals (CTC) 80 Figure 29 – Some routes of coal to chemicals from methane via syngas 82 Figure 30 – Some chemical reactions in converting syngas 83 Figure 31 – Simplified Direct Coal Liquefaction (DCL) Process Scheme 84 Figure 32 – Gasification-based system concepts 85 Figure 33 – Gasification chemistry 85 Figure 34 – Various technologies implemented during power generation process 88 Figure 35 – Potential UCG in the UK, 2004 89 Figure 36 – Kincardine UGC project area of interest, 20141105 91 Figure 37 – Kincardine UCG licenses in the Firth of Forth, 20150402. 92 Figure 38 – Kincardine area of interest in Midland Valley of Scotland, 20141105 93 Figure 39 – Coalmines in British Columbia, Canada 94 Figure 40 – The relation between leachate pH and whole-ash chemistry 98 Figure 41 – Typical chemical additives used in frac water 100 Figure 42 – The metaphormosis diagram of CO2 between elevated pressures and temperatures 106 Figure 43 – States of crystalline and amorphous materials as a function of connectivity 106 Figure 44 – The phase diagram (of CO2) showing dehydration processes, including ordinary drying (green), freeze drying (blue), and supercritical drying (red) 110 Figure 45 – Chemical bonds in CO2 atoms 113 Figure 46 – Oxygen transport capability of different MeO/Me systems. 117 Figure 47 – Structures assumed by hydrogen (H) and carbon (C) molecules in 4 common hydrocarbon compounds 122 Figure 48 – Carbonates compounds in periodic table of elements 124 Figure 49 – Relative abundance of elements in the Earth’s upper crust. Not shown: Noble Gases, Tc(43), Pm(61), and all elements after Bi(83), except for Th(90) & U(92) 125 Figure 50 – Elements of the periodic table with known carbon compounds with other elements 127 Figure 51 – Iron-carbon phase diagram under atmospheric pressure, with pure iron on the left and iron carbide on the right 128 Figure 52 – UK banks involvement in Indonesian coal companies 134 Figure 53 – Mining permits in Indonesia, 20140203 143 Figure 54 – Procedure to export from Indonesia 158 Figure 55 – Coal DMO mechanism in Indonesia 164 Figure 56 – Monitoring and reporting system on the implementation of coal DMO mechanism in Indonesia 164 Figure 57 – Typical transportation flow of coal in Indonesia 165 Figure 58 – Coal concessions mapped in Kalimantan 166 Figure 59 – Coal routes in Kalimantan by hauling trucks, conveyor belts, barges, vessels 167 Figure 60 – Coal routes in Kalimantan: Railways and New Coal Terminals, 2002 168 Figure 61 – Coal routes in Kalimantan: Proposed Railways, 2002 169 Figure 62 – Indonesian coal terminals mapped 173 Figure 63 – Coal seaports in Indonesia, 2015 173 Figure 64 – Dry cargo shipping vessels by type 174 Figure 65 – Causality diagram of coal price 179 Figure 66 – System flow diagram of coal price 179 Figure 67 – Abuse of Transfer Pricing through reinvoicing practices 187 Figure 68 – Indonesian coal reference price (HBA) of CV-6322 kcal/kg GAR, Jan. 2009 – Jan. 2017 192 Figure 69 – ICI Formulation Mechanism 200 Figure 70 – ICI Methodology 200 Figure 71 – Institutional shareholders of ICI, Jan. 2017 201 Figure 72 – Some institutional shareholders of globalCOAL, Jan. 2017 205 Figure 73 – The C&C Progress and Development up to the 19th Announcement, Nov. 2016 209 Figure 74 – Coal IUPs with CNC certification and expired licenses (CNC-22), 20170130 212 Figure 75 – CNC recommendations from governors and local mining offices (Kantor Dinas Pertambangan Daerah) (CNC-22), 20170130 213 Figure 76 – Problems of Non-Clean & Clear Status of IUPs classified and mapped 216 Figure 77 – Adding value to the coal by implementing clean coal technology 217 Figure 78 – Mining problems in Indonesia, 20140203 218 Figure 79 – Clean & Clear Status of IUPs, May 2011 – April 2016 222 Figure 80 – Coal distribution in Indonesia by calory class, 2014 225 Figure 81 – Supply and export of Indonesian coal, 1997-2014 229 Figure 82 – Export share over coal production in top producing countries 236 Figure 83 – Monthly exports and imports of coal in Indonesia: Anthracite (HS: 2701110000), Jan. 1999-Nov.2016 240 Figure 84 – Monthly exports and imports of coal in Indonesia: Bituminous Coal: Coking Coal (HS: 270112000 and 2701121000), Jan. 1999-Nov.2016 240 Figure 85 – Monthly exports and imports of coal in Indonesia: Bituminous Coal: Other than Coking Coal (HS: 2701129000), Jan. 1999-Nov.2016 240 Figure 86 – Monthly exports and imports of coal in Indonesia: Other Coal (HS: 270119000 and 2701190000), Jan. 1999-Nov.2016 241 Figure 87 – Monthly exports and imports of coal in Indonesia: Briquettes, Ovoids & Similar Solid Fuels Manufactured from Coal (HS: 270120000 and 2701200000), Jan. 1999-Nov.2016 241 Figure 88 – The mechanics of $600m structure finance (fixed rate note) of IndoCoal in 2005 260 Figure 89 – The mechanics of unrated $900m structured export notes (FRN) of IndoCoal in 2006 261 Figure 90 – CBM Basins in Indonesia 265 Figure 91 – Coal bed methane (CBM) resources in Indonesia, 2010 266 Figure 92 – CBM PSC terms in Indonesia 266 Figure 93 – Some CBM PSCs in East Kalimantan 269 Figure 94 – CBM basin in South Sumatera, Nov. 2011 273 Figure 95 – Tanjung Enim CBM PSC 274 Figure 96 – Muralim CBM PSC 275 Figure 97 – Sangatta West CBM PSC 277 Figure 98 – The CBM PSCs of NuEnergy in Sumatera 278 Directory of Coal Mining Companies in Indonesia, April 2017 Directory of Coal Exporting Companies in Indonesia, April 2017 Directory of Coal Freight and Selling Companies in Indonesia, April 2017 Directory of CNC-Certified Coal IUP Holding Companies in Indonesia, April 2017 Directory of Coal IUP Holding Companies whose Permits Revoked, April 2017
Abadi Batubara Cemerlang Abadi Coal Cemerlang Aceh Resources and Mineral Aceh Resources and Mineral Core Adaro Indonesia Adimas Baturaja Cemerlang Allied Indo Coal , PT Andhika Mutiara Etam Andhika Mutiara Lestari Andhika Mutiara Sejahtera Antang Gunung Meratus Anugerah Jatimulia Anugerah Jatimulya Arutmin Indonesia Asmin Bara Bronang Asmin Bara Jaan Asmin Koalindo Tuhup Astaka Dodol Bahari Cakrawala Sebuku Bangun Banua Persada Kalimantan Bara Mutiara Prima Bara Pramulya Abadi Bara Sentosa Lestari Bara Utama Unggul Baradinamika Mudasukses Baramarta, PD Baramarta Baramulti Sukses Sarana Baramulti Suksessartana Baramutiara Prima Barasentosa Lestari Batu Alam Selaras Batubara Duaribu Abadi, PT Batubara Selaras Sapta, PT Baturona Adimulya Benakat Energi Benakat Energy Bentala Coal Mining Berau Coal Bharinto Ekatama Bima Duta Batubara Sakti Borneo Bhaktibara Utama Borneo Indobara Buana Bara Utama Bukit Baiduri Enterprises Bukit Sunur Bumi Laksana Perkasa Bumi Panen Sukses Bumi Sukse Mandiri Buntok Perdana Coal Mining Calicari Coal Duaribu Abadi Coal Selaras Sapta Danau Mas Hitam Daya Lapan Delma Mining Corporation Dhamar Tejokencono Dharma Puspita Mining Dutaputra Tanaratama Ekasatya Yanatama Energi Batubara Sumatera Energy Batubara Sumatra Fajar Bumi Sakti Firman Ketaun Perkasa Galicari General Sakti Kreasindo Generalindo Prima Coal Gunung Bayan Pratama Gunung Bayan Pratama Coal Hulubalang Inti Bumi Indexim Coalindo Indominco Mandiri Insani Bara Perkasa Interex Sacra Raya Intitirta Prima Sakti Intitirta Primasakti Jorong Barutama Greston Juloi Coal Kadya Caraka Mulia Kalimantan Energi Lestari Kalteng Coal Kaltim Prima Coal Kartika Selabumi Mining Karunia Poladaya Bumi Karya Bumi Baratama Kendilo Coal Indonesia BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia Kideco Jaya Agung Kitadin Kodeco Horna Mandiri Kurnia Sarana Lestari Kutai Kertanegara Prima Coal Lahai Coal Lanna Harita Indonesia Lianganggang Cemerlang Mahakam Sumber Jaya Mandiri Intiperkasa Mantimin Coal Mining Marunda Graha Mineral Marunda Grahamineral Maruwai Coal Maruai Coal Meulaboh Energitama Meullaboho Energitama Mitrajaya Timuragung Multi Harapan Utama Multi Tambangjaya Utama Nusa Minera Utama Nusantara Termal Coal (D/A Nusantara Thai Coal) Nusantara Thai Coal Pari Coal Pendopo Energi Coal Pendopo Energy Batubara Perkasa Inakakerta Persada Permata Mulya Persada Permata Mulia Pesona Khatulistiwa Nusantara Pinang Jaya Sarana Bara Pinangjaya Sarana Bara Ramdany Coal Mining Ratah Coal Restubara Karya Pratama Riau Bara Harum Salamindo Coalindo Salamindo Pahala Santan Coal Santan Batubara Sarwa Sembada Karya Bumi Selatan Selabara Selo Argodedali Selo Argokencono Sakti Senamas Energindo Mulya Senamas Energindo Mulia Sinar Benua Prima Sinarindo Barakarya Singlurus Pratama Solok Bara Adipratama Sumber Barito Coal Sumber Kurnia Buana Suprabari Mapanindo Mineral Tambang Damai Tanito Harum Tanjung Alam Jaya Tanjung Alam Raya Taraco Mining Teguh Persada Coal Teguh Reksa Daya Teguh Sinar Abadi Tempayang Cemerlang Timah Batubara Utama Torah Antareja Mining Trimarta Coal Perkasa Trimata Buana Trimata Benua Trimata Coal Perkasa Trubaindo Coal Mining Wadung Mas Tambang Mulia Wadungmas Tambang Mulia Wahana Baratama Mining Whirakaneo Coalindo Whiratama Bina Perkasa Yamabhumi Palaka Adaro Indonesia, PT Adimitra Baratama Nusantara, PT Al Amoudi Natural Resources Tradmin, PT Alamjaya Bara Pratama, PT Aman Toebillah Putra, PT Amanah Anugrah Adi Mulya, PT Antang Gunung Meratus, PT Anugerah Bara Kaltim, PT Anugerah Borneo Community, PT Anugerah Karya Raya, PT (Permohonan baru) Arini, PT Arjuna, CV Artha Pratama Jaya, CV Arutmin Indonesia, PT Asia Triperkasa, PT Asmin Bara Bronang, PT Bahari Cakrawala Sebuku, PT Bangun Nusantara Jaya Makmur, PT Bangun Olahsarana Sukses, PT Banjar Persada Resources Mining Coal, PT Bara Alam Utama, PT Bara Energi Lestari, PT Bara Kumala Sakti, PT Bara Prima Mandiri, PT Bara Prima Pratama, PT Bara Rangga Wirasmuda, PT Bara Tabang, PT Baradinamika Mudasukses, PT Baraguna Inti Mandiri, PT Baramega Citra Mulia Persada, PT Baramulti Sugih Sentosa, PT Baramulti Suksessarana Tbk, PT Baramutiara Ptima, PT Barasentosa Lestari, PT (permohonan baru) Batubara Global Energy, PT Bayan Resources, PT Belayan International Coal, PT Berau Bara Abadi, PT Berau Coal, PT Berau Usaha Mandiri, PT Beringin Jaya Abadi, PT Beringin Utama, PT Berkat Bumi Persada, PT Berkat Murah Rejeki, PT Bharinto Ekatama, PT Bhumi Rantau Energi, PT Bhumi Sriwijaya Perdana Coal, PT Bina Insan Sukses Mandiri, PT Bina Mitra Sumberarta, PT Binuang Mitra Bersama, PT Borneo Indobara, PT Borneo Surya Abadi, PT (Permohonan baru) Budi Gema Gempita, PT Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk, PT Bukit Asam Prima, PT Bukit Baiduri Energi, PT Bumi Artha Jaya, PT Bumi Karunia Pertiwi, PT Bumi Merapi Energi, PT Bunda Kandung, CV Cahaya Energi Mandiri, PT Cakra Andatu Sukses, PT Citra Budi Bina Makmur, PT Citra Tobindo Sukses Perkasa, PT Commodities & Energy Resources, PT Coromandel Minerals Resources, PT Dewa Ruci Mandiri, PT Dinar Kalimantan Coal, PT Dunia Usaha Maju, PT Duta Alam Sumatera, PT Duta Buana Mandiri, PT Duta Nurcahya, PT Duta Tambang Rekayasa, PT Dutadharma Utama, PT Dwi Ghita Karya Mandiri Dwijaya Prima Energi, PT Energatama, CV Energi Batubara Lestari, PT Energi Nusa Mandiri, PT Energy Cahaya Industritama, PT Fajar Sakti Prima, PT Fazar Utama, CV Firman Ketaun Perkasa, PT Gajah Mada, KUD Garda Tujuh Buana, PT Globalindo Inti Energi, PT Gudang Hitam Prima Coal Mining, PT Gunung Bara Utama, PT Gunung Limo, PT Gunungbayan Pratamacoal, PT Hamparan Mulya, PT Hasil Bumi Kalimantan, PT Hidup Bahagia Sentosa, PT Indexim Coalindo, PT Indo Energi Alam Resources, PT Indoasia Cemerlang, PT Indominco Mandiri, PT Indomining, PT Indonesia Riau Sri Avantika, PT Injatama, PT Insam Batubara Energy, PT Insani Bara Perkasa, PT Internasional Prima Coal, PT Inti Bara Perdana, PT Intiputera Kanaan, PT Jambi Prima Coal, PT Jambi Resources, PT Jembayan Muarabara, PT Jhonlin Group, PT Jhonlin Group, PT (Penambahan PT Arutmin Indonesia) Jorong Barutama Greston, PT Kadya Caraka Mulya, PT Kaisheng Energy, PT Kalimantan Energi Lestari, PT Kaltim Batumanuggal, PT Kaltim Jaya Bara, PT Kaltim Prima Coal, PT Kapuas Tunggal Persada, PT Karya Cemerlang Persada, PT Karya Desa, KSU Karya Putra Borneo, PT Kayan Putra Utama Coal, PT Site Malinau Kayan Putra Utama Coal, PT Site Separi Kedap Sayaaq, PT Keritang Buana Mining, PT Khotai Makmur Insan Abadi, PT Kideco Jaya Agung, PT Kitadin, PT Komunitas Bangun Bersama, PT Koperasi Jasa Mandiri Sejahtera Kresna Mandiri Energi Cipta, PT (Permohonan Baru) Krida Makmur Bersama, PT Kusuma Raya Utama, PT Kutai Bara Abadi, PT Kutai Energi, PT Kutai Kumala Energy, CV Lamindo Inter Multikom, PT Lanna Harita Mineral, PT Lati Tanjung Harapan, PT Lembuswana Perkasa, PT Limbuh, CV Madhucon Indonesia, PT Mahakam Sumber Jaya, PT Makmur, KUD Mampala Jaya, CV Manambang Muara Enim, PT Mandira Mitra Coalindo, PT Mandiri Intiperkasa, PT Mandiri Makmur Citra Tambang, CV Marunda Grahamineral, PT Massion Energy Internasional, PT Maxima Mitra Mandiri, PT Mega Alam Sejahtera, PT Mega Multi Energi, PT Megaprima Persada, PT Metalindo Bumi Raya, PT Mifa Bersaudara, PT Minemex Indonesia, PT Mitra Anugerah Sejahtera, PT Mitra Asia Cemerlang, PT Mitra Maju Sukses, PT Mitra Niaga Mulia, PT Mitra Setia Tanah Bumbu, PT Mitrabara Adiperdana Tbk, PT Muara Alam Sejahtera, PT Multi Harapan Utama, PT Multi Tambangjaya Utama, PT Mutiara Etam Coal, PT Nan Riang, PT Nantoy Bara Lestari, PT Nuansacipta Coal Investment, PT Nusantara Berau Coal, PT Oorja Indo KGS, PT Pada Idi, PT Padangbara Sukses Makmur, PT Param Mitra Coal Resources, PT (Permohonan baru) Penajam Prima Coal, PT Perkasa Inakakerta, PT Pesona Khatulistiwa Nusantara, PT Pinang Ekspor Indonesia, PT Pipit Mutiara Jaya, PT (1) Pipit Mutiara Jaya, PT (2) Premier Resources Indonesia, PT Prima Multi Mineral, PT Prolindo Cipta Nusantara, PT Putera Batu Mulia Kalimantan, PT Putra Asyano Mutiara Timur, PT Putra Muba Coal, PT Putra Parahyangan Mandiri, CV Rahma Rahman, CV Rantaupanjang Utama Bhakti, PT Regent International Resources, PT Rencana Mulia Baratama, PT Rimau Energy Mining, PT Rinjani Kartanegara, PT Rizki Mulia Bara, CV RMK Energy, PT Sakti Nusantara Bakti, PT Santan Batubara, PT Sarana Cipta Gemilang, PT Semesta Centramas, PT Senamas Energindo Mineral, PT Sentosa Laju Energy, PT Sinar Indo Energy, PT (Permohonan baru) Sinar Kumala Naga, PT Sinarbaru Wijaya Perkasa, PT Singlurus Pratama, PT Sipatuo Sipatokkong, KSU Sumber Bara Abadi Sumber Global Energy, PT Sumber Kurnia Buana, PT Sungai Berlian Bhakti, PT Sungai Berlian Jaya, CV Supra Bara Energi Suprabari Mapaindo Mineral, PT (Permohonan baru) Surya Mega Adiperkasa Surya Sakti Darma Kencana, PT Tambang Bukit Tambi, PT Tambang Damai, PT Tamtama Perkasa, PT Tanito Harum, PT Tanjung Alam Jaya, PT Tantra Mining Development, PT Tapin Suthra Berjaya, PT Teguh Sinarabadi, PT Telen Orbit Prima, PT Terminal Batubara Indah, PT Tigadaya Minergy, PT Trafigura, PT Trafigura, PT (permohonan baru penambahan kerjasama) Tri Tunggal Pitriati, PT Trimas Mayang Jaya, PT Trisensa Mineral Utama, PT Trubaindo Coal Mining, PT Tuah Turangga Agung, PT Tunas Inti Abadi, PT Unirich Mega Persada, PT United Coal Indonesia Trading, PT Usaha Baratama Jaya, PT Victor Duta Tiga Mega, PT Viracon Primer Coal, PT Wahana Baramarta Mining, PT Winner Prima Sekata, PT Yastra Energy, PT Abadi Jaya Indah Adi Coal Resources, PT Adi Putro, CV Adidaya Bara Nusantara, PT Adimas Puspita Serasi, PT Aero Mandiri, PT Agang Saiyo, KSU Agrabudi Jasa Bersama, PT Agro City Kaltim, PT Agung Bara Prima, PT Air Mata Emas, PT Akat Srida Amri, PT Akbar Mitra Jaya, CV Akbar Mitra Jaya, PT Alam Jaya Barapratama, PT Alam Jaya Indah, CV Alam Karunia Mineral, PT Alam Mitra Mandiri, PT Alam Sinsegye Tanah Banten, PT Alaska Prima Coal, CV Alfara Delta Persada, PT Al-Fazar, CV Alhasanie, PT Allied Indo Cemerlang Sentosa, PT Allied Indo Coaljaya, PT Altra Buanatama, CV Amanah Anugerah Adi Mulia, PT Amanah Batu Alam Persada, PT Amanah Bersama, Koperasi Pertanian Anco Millenium Indonesia, PT Andalan Usaha Jaya Semesta, PT Andhika Yoga Pratama, PT Angsana Jaya Energi, PT Anjas Anita Jaya, PT Antang Surya Persada, PT Anugerah Alam Andalas, PT Anugerah Berlian Pratama Coal, CV Anugerah Daya Gemilang, PT Anugerah Jambi Coalindo, PT Anugerah Tujuh Sejati, PT Anzawara Satria, PT Ar Coal Mining 1, PT Aragon Tambang Pratama, PT Ardipo Global Perdana, PT Ariya Duta, CV Arsy Nusantara, PT Arta Usaha Bahagia, PT Arta Usaha Sarana, PT Artha Bimo Cemerlang Coalindo, PT Artha Marth Naha Kramo, PT Artha Tunggal Mandiri, PT Arthaco Prima Energy, PT Arwana Prima Coal, PT Arzara Baraindo Energitama, PT Astri Mining Resources, PT Atap Tri Utama, CV Atoz Nusantara Mining, PT Awang Sejahtera, PT Bahitom Bara Energi, PT Bahtera Bukit Zaitun, PT Bakti Nugraha Yuda, PT Bakti Sarolangun Sejahtera, PT Bangun Energy Indonesia, PT Bangun Karya Sabumi, PT Bangun Olah Sarana Sukses, PT Banjar Persada Resources, PT Banjar Satrya Putra, PT Banjarsari Pribumi, PT Banua Tuntung Pandang, CV Bara Adhipratama, PT Bara Aditama Sejahtera Bara Aditama Sejahtera, PT Bara Anugrah Sejahtera, PT Bara Batin Pratama, PT Bara Bumi Oktasan, PT Bara Bumi Semesta, PT Bara Indah Lestari, PT Bara Jaya Utama, PT Bara Mandiri Perkasa, PT Bara Mega Quantum, PT Bara Meratus, PT Bara Mulia Kalimantan, PT Bara Selaras Resources, PT Bara Sumber Rejeki, PT Bara Utama Jaya, PT Bara Utama Persada Raya, PT Baradinamika Muda Sukses, PT Baratama Rezeki Anugerah Sentosa Utama, PT Barito Corindo Mineral, PT Barito Inti Perdana, PT Bartim Coalindo, PT Baruta Abadi, PT Basin Coal Mining, PT Basthomy, CV Batanghari Energi Prima, PT Batu Jelita Perkasa, PT Batubara Bukit Kendi, PT Batubara Duaribu Lestari, PT Batubara Kalimantan, PT Batubara Nusantara Kaltim, PT Belayan Internasional Coal, PT Bencoolen Mining, PT Bengkulu Bio Energi, PT Berau Jaya Energy, PT Berau Jaya Perkasa, PT Berau Prima Coal Indonesia, PT Beringin Alam Raya, PT Berkah Ananda, CV Berkat Bersaudara Nusantara, PT Berkat Bersujud, PT Berkat Hanjuang Jaya, PT Berkat Nanda, CV Berkat Usaha Karya, CV Berlian Inti Surya, PT Betuah, CV Billy Indonesia, PT Bima Gema Permata, PT Bima Putra Abadi Citranusa, PT Bimaruna Abadi, PT Binamitra Sumberarta, PT Bintang Mulia Bara, CV Bintang Prima Energy Pratama, PT Bintang Timur Selaras, PT Binuang Mitra Bersama Blok Dua, PT Birawa Pandu Selaras, PT Bismillahi Res Kaltim, CV Bitumen Alam Indonesia, PT Borneo Anugerah Mandiri, CV Borneo Bara Timur Mandiri, PT Borneo Bumi Batu Bara Grup, PT Borneo Coal Energy, PT Borneo Orbit Sukses Sejati, PT Borneo Prima Coal Indonesia, PT Borneo Prima, PT Borneo Surya Abadi, PT Borneo Tala Utama, PT Bq Coal Mining, PT Buana Bara Ekapratama, PT Buana Eltra, PT Buana Rizky Armia, PT Budiindah Muliacoal, PT Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk., PT Bukit Bara Alam, PT Bukit Enim Energi, PT Bukit Enno Persada Bahari, PT Bukit Menjangan Lestari, PT Bukit Raya Coal Mining, PT Bukit Tambi, PT Bukuan Jaya Abadi, CV Bumi Alam Raya, PT Bumi Bara Makmur Mandiri, PT Bumi Barito Mineral, PT Bumi Enggang Khatulistiwa, PT Bumi Kaliman Sejahtera, PT Bumi Makmur Sejati, PT Bumi Mas Resources, PT Bumi Murau Coal, PT Bumi Niaga Lestari, PT Bumi Paramasari Indo, CV Bumi Raya Makmur Mandiri, PT Bumi Sakti Prakarsa Mandiri, CV Bumi Sekundang Enim Energi, PT Bumindo Inti Cemerlang, PT Cahaya Lembusuana, PT Cakra Bumi Energi, PT Cakramas Gemilang Mandiri, PT Cakrawala Bara Persada, PT Cantung Karya Mitra Mandiri, CV Cempaka Alam Bumi Baru, PT Central Cipta Murdaya, PT Central Mandiri Sukses, PT Central Mining Resources, PT Charisma Barito Coal, PT Cinta Puri Pratama, CV Cipta Buana Seraya, PT Cipta Mitra Sentosa, PT Cipta Sarana Jaya, CV Ciracap Sumber Prima, PT Citra Bara Raya, PT Citra Buana Lestari, PT Conoco Mineral Indonesia, PT Crista Jaya Perkasa, CV Cristian Putra, PT Dahlia Biru, PT Damasari Resources, PT Danako Pratama, PT Danau Mas Hitam, PT Dasacita Pusaka Prima, PT Datra Katama Jaya, CV Daya Bumindo Karunia, PT Delapan Inti Power, PT Delapan Paser Sejahtera, PT Delta Samudra, PT Dermaga Pratama Perkasa, PT Dianrana Petrojasa, PT Dinamika Selaras Jaya, PT Dinasty Maha Karya, PT Dirar Duage Energi, PT Dizamatra Powerindo, PT Duta Bara Utama, PT Duta Daya Mahakam, PT Duta Energi Mineratama, PT Duta Tambang Sumber Alam, PT Dwi Ghita Karya Mandiri, PT Electra Global, PT Elida Sari, CV Elok Indah Subur Jaya, PT Elynda Jaya, CV Ena Sarana Energi, PT Energi Batu Hitam, PT Energi Bumi Kartanegara, CV Energi Bumi Tanahpasir, PT Energi Dua Rajawali, PT Energi Penajam Mandiri, PT Energi Persada Khatulistiwa, PT Era Energi Mandiri, PT Era Niaga Mandiri, CV Erabara Persada Nusantara, PT Fabrik Kompenen Industri Energi, PT Fajar Mineralalami International, PT Faris Motor, CV Ferly Tirta Jaya, PT Fet Mining Indonesia, PT Firman Bersaudara, CV Firman Ketaun, PT Fisi Fernando Sejahtera, PT Fontana Resources Indonesia, PT Fortuna Lateks Marta, PT Gala Raya Sentosa, PT Ganda Alam Makmur, PT Ganesha Rapindo Impex, PT Gapura, Koperasi Garis Emas Selaras, PT Garuda Perkasa Nusantara, PT Gaung Alam Semesta, PT Gea Lestari, PT Gerbang Anugrah Perdana, PT Gerbang Daya Mandiri, PT Gerbang Petani Mandiri, KSU Global Bara Mandiri, PT Global Borneo Resources, PT Global Multi Energi, PT Glory Azzumi International, PT Golden Great Borneo, PT Gorby Energy, PT Gorby Putra Utama, PT Graha Nusa Minergi, PT Graha Panca Karsa, PT Griya Pat Petulai Asri, PT Griya Sumber Setya, PT Group Rahmat Bersama, PT Gudang Hitam Prima, CV Gumay Prima Energi, PT Gunung Berkat Utama, PT Gunung Sambung, CV Gunung Sungkai, PT Guruh Putra Bersama, PT Hamparan Anugrah Abadi, PT Hanson Energy, PT Harapan Kota Tepian, PT Harda Nusa Abadi, PT Harsco Mineral, PT Haswi Kencana Indah, PT Herlina Gemerlap, PT Hidup Hidayah Ilahi, CV Huma Amaz Indonesia, PT Huma Betang Indah, PT Indah Jaya Abadi Pratama, PT Indo Bara Pratama, PT Indo Besi Energi Utama, PT Indo Mining Resources, PT Indo Pancadasa Agrotama, PT Indo Wana Bara Mining Coal, PT Indomarta Multi Mining, PT Indomas Karya Jaya, PT Indonesia Batu Prima Energi, PT Indonesia Multi Energi, PT Indonusa Prima Sentosa, PT Indotex Pratama Jaya, PT Intan Bumi Persada, PT Intan Karya Mandiri, CV Intan Permata Utama, PT Integra Prima Coal, PT Inti Baratama Anugerah Prima, PT Inti Bumi Selaras, PT Inti Bumi Sukses Perkasa, PT Jalahan Batubara Prima, PT Jamrud Prima Citra, CV Jangkar Prima, PT Jasa Mandiri Sejahtera, Koperasi Jhoswa Mahakam Mineral, PT Kalimantan Persada Coal, PT Kalimantan Prima Nusantara, PT Kalimantan Sejahtera Mandiri, PT Kaltim Batu Hitam, PT Kaltim Batumanunggal, PT Kaltim Global, PT Kaltim Jaya Mineral, PT Kaltim Nusantara Coal, PT Kamalindo Sompurna, PT Kangkung Prima, CV Kapuas Bara Utama, PT Karbon Mahakam, PT Karunia Alam Indonesia, PT Karunia Ilahi Insan Sejahtera, PT Karya Bunga Pantai Ceria, PT Karya Hasil Utama, PT Karya Megah Buton, PT Karya Perintis Sejati, PT Karya Putra Bersama, CV Karya Silvi, PT Karya Usaha Pertiwi, PT Karyamaju Jaya Sentosa, PT Karyati, CV Kasih Karya Agung, PT Kasongan Mining Mills, PT Katingan Ria, PT Kayaan Mekaam, PT Kayan Kaltara Coal, PT Kayan Putra Utama Coal, PT Keluarga Sejahtera, CV Kelumpang Hulu Energi Lestari, PT Kemilau Rindang Abadi, PT Kemuning Tambang Sentosa, PT Kharisma Jaya, CV Khazana Bumi Kaliman, PT Kimco Armindo, PT Kintap Bukit Mulia, PT Klola Tebo Energi, PT Kubara Bumi Lestari, PT Kuda Perdana Pertiwi, PT Kumala Etam Mining, CV Kumala Sakti Permai, PT Kuripan Jaya, CV Kurnia Alam Investama, PT Kurnia Hasil, PT Kurnia Surya Angkasa, PT Kutai Lama, Koperasi Kutama Mining Indonesia, PT Kutim Coal Utama, PT Laas Bara Khatulistiwa, PT Labbaika, CV Lamindo Inter Multikon, PT Lancarjaya Bara Nusantara, PT Laskar Semesta Alam, PT Lautan Berkah Nusantara, PT Lazuardi Cemerlang, PT Lintas Jalur Harapan, PT Lion Power Energy, PT Loa Haur, PT Lumika Griya, PT Madani Citra Mandiri, PT Madhucon Pasir Makmur, PT Mahakam Bara Energi, PT Mahakam Bara Utama, PT Mahakam Energi Lestari, PT Mahakam Indah Jaya, CV Mahakam Mining Resources, PT Mahakam Multi Lestari, PT Mahakam Prima Akbar Sejati, PT Mahakam River Coal, PT Mahkota Megah Abadi, PT Makkari Tutu Abadi, CV Makmur Bersama, CV Mamahak Coal Mining, PT Mandiri Nusa Pratama, PT Manggala Alam Lestari, PT Mangkuraja, CV Manoor Bulatn Lestari, PT Manunggal Inti Artamas, PT Manunggal Jaya Abadi, PT Marina Bara Lestari, PT Mariogi Kharisma Jaya, PT Marlin Serantau Alam, PT Marsawa Indah Mandiri, PT Maruwai Bara Abadi, PT Mega Multi Cemerlang, PT Megah Mulia Persada, CV Mentari Bhakti Jaya Utama, PT Merge Mining Industry, PT Methane Resources Indonesia, PT Millenium Mining And Resources Mineral Tambang Wahana, PT Mitra Anugerah Sejahtera, CV (–> PT) Mitra Bara Jaya, PT Mitra Barito, PT Mitra Bumi Sejahtera, CV Mitra Genesaret Energi, PT Mitra Tala, PT Mitrabara Adiperdana, PT Moa Maju Kurnia Utama, PT Muara Sari, CV Mulawarman Putera Abadi Sakti, PT Mulia Abadi, CV Mulia Persada Kartanegara, PT Multi Jaya Energi, PT Multi Sarana Avindo, PT Multi Sarana Perkasa, PT Mura Reka Batubara, PT Murung Raya Bara, PT Musi Prima Coal, PT Mustika Indah Permai, PT Mutiara Merdeka Jaya, PT Naan Bara Abadi, PT Naga Borneo Energi, PT Nemoasia, PT Nokano Coal Mining, PT Nuansa Sakti Kencana, PT Nugraha Jorong Pratama, CV Nusa Persada Resources, PT Nusa Riau Kencana Coal, PT Nusantara Kaltim Coal, PT Nusantara Santan Coal, PT Nusantara Wahau Coal, PT Pacific Global Abadi, PT Pacific Global Utama, PT Pacific Samudra Perkasa, PT Padang Anugerah, PT Padang Mulia, PT Pakuwono Resources Mineral, PT Palma Mandiri Lestari, PT Palopo Indah Raya, PT Pancaran Surya Abadi, PT Pandu Aro Pacific, PT Paramitha Cipta Sarana, PT Parna Raya, PT Paser Buen Energy, PT Pasir Bara Prima, PT Pasir Prima Coal Indonesia, PT Patriot Wira Perkasa, PT Penajam Makmur Abadi, CV Persada Kapuas Prima, PT Persada Makmur Jaya, PT Persada Makmur Sejahtera, PT Persada Multi Bara, PT Persadatama Lestari Coal Mining, PT Pertambangan Mupakat Taka, Koperasi Perusda Benuo Taka Pesona Bara Cakrawala, PT Petro Mineral Jaya, PT Pinapan Gali Mas, PT Pipit Mutiara Jaya, PT Piranti Jaya Utama, PT Prabayasa Energi Utama, PT Praharana Muda Parama, PT Pratama Sumber Bumibara, PT Priamanaya Energi, PT Pribumi Citra Megah Utama, PT Prima Bara Nusantara, PT Prima Lazuardi Nusantara, PT Prima Mandiri, CV Prima Mulia Sarana Sejahtera, PT Primkopad Dim 0904 Pro Sarana Cipta, PT Puncak Mulia Energi, CV Putindo Bintech, PT Putra Bara Jaya, PT Putra Bintan Bestari, PT Putra Derutua, CV Putra Hulu Lematang, PT Putra Mahakam Mandiri, KSU Putra Parahyangan Mandiri, PT Putra Wali Sejati, PT Putramas Bumi Agung, PT Putri Ahdadia, CV Rabani Corporindo, PT Rahmat Prima Coal, CV Raja Kutai Baru Makmur, PT Rajasa Perkasa Energy, PT Rajawali Putra Angkasa, PT Ratu Ayu, PT Ratu Samban Mining, PT Rima Mining, PT Rimba Subur Lestari, PT Riyanta Jaya, PT Rizki Bintang, CV Rizki Dinda, CV Rizki Tambang Selaras, PT Rizky Barito Timur, PT Rizqi Utama Indobara, PT Rukun Dadi, KUD Rukun Sentosa, KUD Sagita Energi, PT Saijaan Prima Coal, PT Saka Putra Perkasa, PT Sam Mining, PT Samantaka Batubara, PT Samudra Hindia Jaya, PT Sapphire Mega Persada, PT Sapta Persona Dinamika, PT Sarana Daya Hutama, PT Sarana Karya (Persero), PT Sarana Marine Perkasa, PT Sarana Putra Perdana, PT Sarana Tambang Utama, PT Sarana Usaha, CV Sariagrindo Andalas, PT Sarolangun Bara Prima, PT Sarolangun Karang Mendapo, PT Sarolangun Ketalo Coal, PT Sasangga Banua Banjar, PT Sato Mining, PT Satria Mahkota Gotek, PT Satria Mayangkara Sejahtera, PT Satui Bina Usaha, PT Satui Terminal Umum, PT Selatan Selabara, PT Seluma Prima Coal, PT Semesta Alam Barito, PT Semoi Prima Lestari, PT Sentosa Kurnia Energi Bahagia, PT Serangkai Jaya, PT Shaka, CV Sinamar Sakato, KUD Sinar Anugerah Sukses, PT Sinar Aurin, PT Sinar Bara Abadi, PT Sinar Batumas Makmur, PT Sinar Kemilau Abadi, PT Sinar Mulia Coal, PT Sinar Wijaya Pratama, PT Sinta Mani, PT Sipatuo Sipatokong, KSU Skord Mining, PT Sriwijaya Bara Priharum, PT Sriwijaya Energi Persada, PT Stagen Indah Borneo, PT Suar Harapan Bangsa, PT Sumber Alam Inti Mandiri, PT Sumber Bara Abadi, PT Sumber Daya Energi, PT Sumber Mineral Perdana, PT Sumber Permata Hitam, PT Sumber Rejeki Ekonomi, PT Sumber Surya Gemilang, PT Sunfan Jaya Persada, PT Sungai Danau Jaya, PT Supra Bara Energi, PT Surya Anugrah Sejahtera, PT Surya Bangun Sarana, PT Surya Banua Energi, PT Surya Global Makmur, PT Surya Harapan Baru, CV Surya Kalimantan Sejati, PT Surya Rahmadina Bersaudara, PT Surya Sunfan Dwi Bahtera, CV Suryaraya Cahaya Cemerlang, PT Suryaraya Permata Khatulistiwa, PT Suryaraya Pusaka, PT Syah Alam, CV Syam Kalimantan Putera Energi, PT Tabalong Makmur, PT Tabalong Prima Resources, PT Tahiti Coal, CV Talenta Bumi, PT Talenta Utama, CV Tambang Aneka Mineral, PT Tambang Batubara Harum, PT Tambang Sejahtera Bersama, PT Tamiang Jaya, PT Tana Danum Taka, KSU Tanah Bumbu Resources, PT Tani Jaya Murni, KUD Tanjung Belit Bara Utama, PT Tansri Madjid Energi, PT Tanur Jaya, PT Tapin Sarana Jaya, PT Tara Indonusa Coal, PT Tech Drilling International, PT Tekno Orbit Persada, PT Telen Eco Coal, PT Tempirai Energy Resources, PT Tiara Bara Borneo, PT Tiwa Abadi, PT Transcoal Minergy, PT Transisi Energy Satunama, PT Tri Kencana Mulia, PT Tri Mandiri Perkasa, PT Tri Oetama Persada, PT Tri Panuntun Persada, PT Triaryani, PT (Penggabungan) Truba Bara Banyu Enim, PT Tuah Globe Mining, PT Tubindo, PT Tuhup Coal Mining, PT Tujuh Saudara, PT Tunas Jaya, KSU Tunggal Putra Nusantara, PT Tunggal Utama Lestari, PT Turangga Krisna Dwipa, PT Uci Jaya, PT Union Perkasa Abadi, PT Urip Tagang, PT Usaha Baratama Jesindo, PT Usaha Kawan Sejati, PT Utami Jaya Mulia, PT Vano Anugrah Sentosa, PT Victor Dua Tiga Mega, PT Virgo Benua Jaya, CV Wahana Agung Sejahtera, PT Wahana Alam Lestari, PT Wahana Kutai Energi, PT Wahana Surya Abadi, PT Wahyu Murti Garuda Kencana, PT Wahyu Taruna Bakti, CV Wana Batara Karya Lestari, PT Wara Kirana Bakti, PT Welarco Subur Jaya, PT Wijaya Indo Mining, PT Wira Bara Sakti, PT Wira Usaha Abadi, PT Wiraduta Sejahtera Langgeng, PT X Dareh, CV Yuman Jaya Tama, PT Abang Resource Indonesia, PT Abterra Resources Indonesia, PT Adani Global Coal Trading, PT (d/h Aneka Sumber Bumi, PT) Adani, PT Ade Kantari, CV Adimitra Mega Perkasa, PT Advance Marketing & Services, PT Agung Mandiri, CV Alam Permai Artha Utama, PT Almer Deas Cargoz, PT Almindo Jaya Abadi, PT Alton International Resources, PT Aluna Kusumah Lestari, PT Andalas Coal Persada, PT Aneka Sumber Bumi, PT ? Adani Global Coal Trading, PT Angin Jaya Solusi, PT Aninditha Kaharya Anugrah, PT Ansaf Inti Resources, PT Anugerah Lancar Indo Makmur, PT Anugrah Energi Mas, PT Anugrah Prima Coalindo, PT Apple Coal & Minerals Indonesia, PT Aquarius Mineral Utama, PT Archipelago, PT Ardafrora Duta Arbaraya, CV Armada Pelayaran Rakyat Indonesia, PT Armada Rock Karunia Transshipment, PT Arona Perkasa Pratama, PT Arta Banua Resources, PT Artha Daya Utama Resources, PT Artha Satria Piningit, PT Artono Coalindo, PT Aruza Mandiri Pratama, PT Asian Bulk Logistics, PT Astrico Nu Energi, PT Atlas Citra Selaras, PT Bahtera Alam Tamiang, PT Bangun Kalimantan, PT Bara Alam Energi, PT Bara Buana Persada, PT Bara Indah Global, PT Bara Indah, PT Bara Indotama Sukses, PT Bara Mitra Energi, PT Bara Sinergi Pradana, PT Baramega Cahaya Makmur, PT Baramulia Energi, PT Baramulti Energi Indojaya, PT Baramulti Energi Indonesia, PT Barhind, PT Baruna Dirga Dharma, PT Batu Unggul Pertiwi, PT Batuah Abadi Lines, PT Batubara Energy Indonesia, PT Bel Mining Services, PT Belgi Energy, PT Bengkulu Mandiri, PT Bening Anugerah Semesta, PT Bening, CV Bentan Energy Sakti, PT Berdikari Inti Mandiri, PT Beringin Citra Makmur, PT Beringinmas Jaya Abadi, PT Beringinmas Sukses Abadi, PT Berkah Anugerah Abadi Sejahtera, PT Berkah Anugerah Abadi, CV Berkah Anugerah Abadi, PT Berkah Bumi Leluhur, PT Bhara Rosa Energi Coal, CV Bina Equator Indonesia, PT Bintang Alam Serindai, PT Bintang Kartika Segara, PT Bintang Mahakam Energy, PT Birutani Jaya Semesta, PT Bita Enarcon Engineering, PT BK Global Lestari, PT Boma Sumber Anugerah, PT Borneo Anugerah Energi, PT Borneo Brother, PT Borneo Coalindo Anugerah, PT Borneo Indogama, PT Borneo Inti Lestari, PT Borneo Prima Resources, CV Buana Adiguna, PT Buana Jaya Pratama, PT Buana Perkasa Sukses, PT Bukit Kalimantan Sarana, PT Bumi Alam Sejahtera, PT Bumi Berdikari Jaya, PT Bumi Kasih Jaya, CV Bumi Pertiwi Energy, PT Bumi Resources Tbk, PT Bumi Riau Cemerlang, PT Bumi Unggul Nasional, PT Bumi Utama Perkasa, PT Caesar Mulia, PT Cahaya Energi Lestari, PT Cahaya Marhan Naya, PT Cahaya Tiara Mandiri, PT Cahaya Transportasi, PT Cakrawala Energi Nusantara, PT Cakrawala Investama Semesta, PT Cemerlang Abadi Indonesia, CV Cenko Prima Ferro International, PT Centra Nusa Indonesia, PT Cequal Teknologi Indonesia, PT Choice Plus Perkasa, PT Cipaganti Inti Resources, PT Cita Multiline Anugrah, PT CJ GLS Resources Indonesia, PT Coeclerici Indonesia, PT CPAZ Resources, PT Daaz Bara Lestari, PT Dangau Airnalhady, PT Daya Enerji Lestari, PT Daya Nusantara Mining, PT Delapan Belas Sanghyang, PT Delima Mustika Kencana, PT Dermaga Perkasapratama, PT Devina Raja Batubara, PT Dewata Bahtera Internasional, PT Dewi Putri Asean, CV Dharmalancar Sejahtera, PT Diamond Trading Company, CV Draya Resources, PT Dua Kota Laut, PT Dua Samudera Perkasa, PT Dumons Bara Multi, PT Dunia Sarana Sejahtera, PT Duta Batola, PT Dwijaya Prima Energy, CV Dwikarya Sukses, PT Eastern Mining Resources Indonesia, PT Eastern Mining Resources, PT Eka Bima Pamula Sakti, PT Ekapusaka Mahardhika, PT Emin Subenco, PT Eneralindo Energy, PT Energi Surya Persada, PT Energy Puri Tujuh, PT Energy Resources, PT Energy Tujuh Ribu, PT Enimex Power Energi, PT Equity Commodities, PT Eta Star Coal, PT Excel Regal Mineral Trading, PT Fajar Darwin, PT Febrian Putra Pratama, CV Fu Woo Mining Indonesia, PT Galatia Mas, PT Gardatama Mulia Kencana, PT Garuda Mineral Energy, PT Garuda Sapta Perkasa Coal, PT GCPR Hong Tai Resources, PT Gema Indonesia Baru, PT Gemilang Garden Flower, PT Ghina Hayati, PT GIG Choice Plus, PT Global Cahaya Energy, PT Global Indonesia Mandiri, PT Global Multi Coal, PT Global Trans Energy International, PT Glory Mitra Investex, PT Golden Arrow Energy, PT Grace Coal, PT Graha Sarana Gresik, PT GS Global Resources, PT Guna Sarana Mas, PT Gunung Lawoe Mercu Buana, PT Habco Primatama, PT Harapan Bahtera Internusa, PT Harapan Bara Energy, PT Harkat Utama Mulia Mandiri, PT Harma Nusa Mineral, PT Harta Bumi Resources, PT Hasil Alam Indonesia, CV Haskoning Indonesia, PT Hasta Selaras Sakti, PT Hatch, PT Henchi Arira Sata, PT Hijau Bumi Energi, PT Hikmah Albros, PT Himadri Energy, PT HMS Bergbau Indonesia, PT Hong Da Mining Indonesia, PT Hua Long International, PT Huashia Resources, PT Indah Bumi Nusantara, PT Indika Logistic & Support Services, PT Indo Jaya Anugrah, PT Indo Mitra, CV Indobeta, PT Indocom Trade, PT Indogati Resources, PT Indomineral Mega Perkasa, PT Indonesia Energi Prima, PT Indonesia Kangxin International Investment, PT Indonesia Pasti Jaya, PT Indoraya Megah Tehnik, PT Infinite Coal Resources, PT Inkatama Resources, PT Inkor Prima Coal, PT Inmas Energy, PT Instant Engineering Services Indonesia, PT Integrito Glonex Pratama, PT Interwell Indonesia, PT Inti Alam Murni, PT Inti Bara Mandiri, PT Inti Karya Cipta Nusantara, PT Intra Wahana Putra Nusantara, PT J Resources Nusantara, PT JA Nusantara, PT Jaya Coal Perkasa, PT Kalidanau Megah Abadi, CV Kalimantan Prima Persada, PT Kartika Jaya Baratama, PT Karunia Agung Infiniti, PT Karunia Mutiara Lestari, PT Karunia Persada Kalimantan, PT Karunia Prima Minerals, PT Karya Anugerah Tritunggal, CV Karya Bunga Pantai Ceria Group, PT Karya Indo Energi, PT Karya Lima Maritim, PT Karya Tangguh Perkasa, PT Kasih Anugerah Mulia, PT Kasih Industri Indonesia, PT KCC Mining Services Indonesia, PT KDM Argo Energy, PT Kenkim Energi, PT Kharisma Jaya Bersama, PT Kinarum Coal Indonesia, PT Kresna Inti Cipta, PT Kutai Enviro Energi, PT Lahat Centra Coalindo, PT Lambung Karang Sakti, PT Langkah Iman, PT Langkahiman, PT Leban Mutiara Hitam, PT Lestari Bara Abadi, PT Lingga Satria, CV Lintas Asia Resources, PT Luhur Indo Energy, CV Lumina Internastional, PT Mahakam Bara Lestari, PT Maju Bersama Sejahtera, PT Maju Lestarijaya Abadi, PT Makira Nature, PT Makmur Membara, PT Malinau Berkat Sejahtera, PT Mamb Energy, PT Maple Natural Resources, PT Mareta Persada, PT Maritim Barito Perkasa, PT Maritim Prima Mandiri, PT Masa Jaya Perkasa, PT Mega Coal Trading, PT Mega Karya Sakti, PT Menara Rukun International Trading, PT Mentari Bara Jaya, PT Meratus Advance Maritim, PT Mesra Prima Coal, PT Millenium Mining and Resources, PT Mirah Agung Raya, PT Mirza Utama International, PT Mitra Asia Coal, PT Mitra Bara Cindo, PT Mitra Bersama Prima, PT Mitra Jaya Bangun Sejati, PT Mitra Lingkungan Dutaconsult, PT Mitra Makmur Sejati, PT Mitra Nasional Pratama, PT Mitra Sinamar Perkasa, PT Mitrabahtera Segara Sejati, Tbk., PT Mitrada Sinergy, PT Muji Lines, PT Multi Energi Barutama, PT Multi Energy Sumber Artha, PT Multi Guna Maritim, PT Multi Indo Mineral, PT Multi Sinar Kencana, PT Multikarya Artha Megah, PT Mundra Coal, PT Mutadindo Taman Bumi, PT Mutiara Bumi Persada, PT Mutiara Timur Laut, PT Nanyang Dahua Mining Investment, PT Natarida Citra Energy, PT Natuna Energi Indonesia, PT Niaga Samudra, PT Novem Coal Mining, PT Nusantara Citra Lestari, CV Nusantara Trade Net, PT Orb Energy Indonesia, PT Orpheus Energy, PT Padang Alam Energi, PT Palaran Jasa Utama, PT Pan Indo Resources, PT Panca Bara Mandiri, PT Panca Putra Sejahtera, PT Pancar Caraka, PT Pancaran Samudera Transport, PT Paradise Indonesia Perkasa, PT Patria Maritime Lines, PT Peabody Coaltrade Indonesia, PT Pelabuhan Tiga Bersaudara, PT Pelayaran Bintang Laut Kalimantan, PT Pelayaran Borneo Karya Swadiri, PT Pelayaran Kartikasamudra Adijaya, PT Pelayaran Logistik Konversi Indonesia, PT Pelayaran Marindo Pacific, PT Pelayaran Mitra Delta Pratama, PT Pelayaran MitraBahari Sentosa, PT Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia (PELNI), PT Pelayaran Segara Niaga Utama, PT Pelayaran Trans Sarana Makmur, PT Pelita Berkah Makmur, PT Pelita Samudra Shipping, PT Pelnas Bahari Tembesi, PT Permata Alam Abadi, PT Permata Resources Borneo Makmur, PT Persada Sumber Mineral, PT Perusahaan Daerah Sarana Pembangunan Muara Enim, PT Perusahaan Pelayaran Rusianto Bersaudara, PT Philip Caesar Jaya, CV Pinta Karya Makmur, PT Planet Resources, PT Posco Resources Indonesia, PT PPR Indonesia, PT Prasto Energy, PT Prima Buana Alami, PT Prima Energytama, PT Prima Jaya Indah, PT Prima Multitrada, PT Prime Star Resources Indonesia, PT Provisit Asia Selaras, PT Puri Green Resources, PT Putera Bara Mitra, PT Putra Borneo Mandiri, PT Putra Tujuh Sebelas, PT Qilu Mining Group Indonesia, PT QR Tambang Makmur, PT Radiant Guna Persada, PT Rahmawati Suryamas, PT Rajawali Bara Makmur, PT Ramadha Kolaka Nickel, PT Resources Bumi Nusantara, PT Rich Coal Indonesia, PT Rig Tenders Indonesia, Tbk, PT Riski Pratama Putra, CV Rizki Anugrah Pratama, PT Rizkia Putri Membangun, CV Roundhill Capital Indonesia, PT Rudhra Global Energi, PT Samudra Pacific Marine, PT Sanmati Natural Resources, PT Sarana Cipta Intinusa, PT Satu Enam Sembilan, PT Saudagar Mutiara Hitam, PT Segara Gloria Anugrah Marine, PT Selamat Group Perkasa, PT Sembawang Indonesia, PT Sembilan Saudara, CV Semesta Andalan Energi, PT Sentosa Inti Prima Coal, PT Sentral Batubara Jawa, PT Servo Buana Resources, PT Setenco Investa Niaga, PT Setia Usaha Primaenergy, PT Setyawan Mahakarya Prima, PT SEW Trisula Batubara, PT Shasi Kirana International, PT Sinar Energi Alam, PT Sinar Krakatau Utama, PT Sinar Layan Mitra, PT Sinar Mawalinda Jaya, PT Sinar Prima Sejahtera, PT Sinergi Buana Perkasa, PT Sinergy Coal International, PT Sino Capatalindo, PT Sino Resources, PT Sion Anugrah Mandiri, CV Sipatuwo Energi, PT Sistima Solusindo, PT SK Networks Indonesia, PT SK Pelayaran Indonesia, PT SMS Minerals International, PT Solusi Coalindo, PT Soma Resources Indonesia, PT SPG Indonesia, PT Sriwijaya Bara Logistic, PT Sriwijaya Mandiri, CV Stenkole Nusantara, PT Subur Alam Rezeki, PT Sudan Prima Coal, PT Sumatera Bahtera Raya, PT Sumatera Bara Energi, PT Sumber Bara Jaya, PT Sumber Bara, PT Sumber Mitra Jaya, PT Sumber Surya Pratama, PT Sumber Suryadaya Prima, PT Sunhub Mining International, PT Sunway Indo Mining, PT Surya Inti Global, PT Surya Jaya Energy, PT Surya Mas Jaya Sakti, PT Surya Megah Abadi, CV Suryamas Makmur Pratama, PT SWI Energi Kalimantan, PT Synergi Mega Nusantara, PT Talang Segoro, PT Tara Energy Resources, PT Teknoplan Energi Nusantara, PT Telen Indoclay, PT Terra Resources, PT Tian Long International, PT Tiga Serangkai Mulia, CV Tiga Tiga Tujuh Bersaudara, PT Tiramana, PT Titan Daya Persada, PT Titan Wijaya, PT Tobajaya, PT Tobindo Anugrah Persada, PT Trans Power Marine, Tbk, PT Transco Prima Indonesia, PT Transcoal Pacific, PT Tri Noosa Jasada, PT Tri Prakarsa Buana, PT Triasmitra Multi Tambang, PT Trimaran Setia Utama, PT Trimukti Ajipratama, PT Trinity Mulia Energy, PT Trisakti Energy, PT Tunas Multi Anugrah, PT Turangga Energy Nuswantara, PT Tutui Batubara Utama, PT Ulet Bulu Mining, PT Uletbulu Mining, PT United Supplies Agency, PT Utama Wira Karya, PT Vastasia Devon Resources, PT Virgo Benua Jaya, PT Visage Energy & Coal, PT Wahana Energy Lestari, PT Warga Semen Gresik, Koperasi Wasita Energy, CV Wasita Energy, PT Windu Bentalanusa, PT Wira Multi Karya, PT Wirama Entiti Nusantara, PT Yasiga Sarana Utama, PT Yudirain Rizki Buana Saijaan, PT Zed Resources, PT Abdi Pertiwi Loka, PT Aceh Mineral Gemilang, PT Alief Multi Group, PT Aneka Krida Utama, PT Angso Duo Permai, PT Antik Unggul Mineral, PT Anugrah Cipta Permai, PT Arang Penawai Seahtera, PT Ariya Wisesa Fransnata, PT Astani Bangun Persada, PT Bakti Inti Guna, PT Bangun Wahana Lingkungan Lestari, PT Bara Energi Sempurna, PT Bara Pasifik International, PT Basindo Karya Utama, PT Basmal Utama Mandiri, Pd Basmal Utama Nusantara, PT Batang Semagi, PT Batubinumbun Maju Lestari, PT Bena Batu Binumbun Jaya, PT Benn Prima Coal, PT Bentang Terang Abadi, PT Beringin Coal Prakasa, PT Bersama Bara Nusantara, PT Beruang Putih, PT Bhakti Abadi Sriwijaya, PT Bhumi Perdasa, PT Bintuni Abisha Maden, PT Boas Mineral Bersinar, PT Buana Sekata Resources, PT Bukit Mallawa Sejahtera, PT Bukit Resources, PT Bumi Mineral Bersinar, PT Bumi Mineralindo Jaya, PT Bumiartha Mulia, PT Bungo Mitha Sejahtera, PT Cahaya Mulia Amraeni Catur Mitra Usaha Lestari, PT Cipta Anugrah Permai, PT Coal Petra Sejahtera, PT Conisma Energi, PT Danau Kencana Lestarindo, PT Dancomair Sakti, PT Dekalindo Sumber Makmur, PT Deltamas Persada, PT Dian Citra Mandiri, PT Dian Jaya, CV Diptaguna Mulyatama, PT Duaji Energi Alam, PT Eksa Nusa, PT Erwin Jaya Mandiri, PT Fajar Usaha Sejahtera, PT Gelora Muda Perkasa, PT Gemari Bumi Pusako, PT Gemilang Jambi Permai, PT Gemilang Sakti Mandiri, PT Global Sukses Makmur, PT Global Suria Nusantara, PT Globalindo Alam Lestari, PT Hamparan Sumber Energi, PT Hastabuana Mandiri, PT Indo Bara Patria, PT Inkalindo Manunggal, PT Inter Niaga Graha, PT Inti Bisnis Utama, PT Itikurih Hastari, PT Jalalindo Mulia, PT Jamalindo Indah, PT Jaya Manggala Sakti, PT Kalimantan Prima Coal, PT Kana Global Energi, PT Karsa Jaya Cemerlang, PT Karunia Bumi Sejahtera, PT Karya Bungo Pantai Ceria Group, PT Karyapertama Mudajaya, PT Kasih Energi Raya, PT Kasih Tata International, PT Kawasan Alam Surya Adilestari, PT Kemilau Samudera Berlian, PT Kemudi Kemuning, PT Ken Brother Muda Satya, PT Kirana Graha Buana, PT Lima Pelita Energi, PT Lion Multi Resources, PT Marga Bara Tambang, PT Marga Perkasa, PT MBH Mining Resources, PT Mega Fiume Internasional, PT Mega Nusa Kramindo, PT Merapi Energi Nusantara, PT Mitra Dipro Coal Indonesia, PT Mitra Maju Bangun Persada, PT Mitra Multi Komindo, PT Multi Tri Sempurna, PT Multiparta Kaltim Utama, PT Nusantara Alam Pasific, PT Pagun Taka, PT Paropo Sejahtera Abadi, PT Patria Drilling Company, PT Pelampung Jaya, PT Petrona Mining Contractor, PT Pipit Citra Perdana, PT Prima Didi Nusantara, PT Prima Dodo, PT Puro Nusa Dinamika, PT Putra Sungai Kapuas, PT Raja Girsang Energi, PT Rimbaka Mining Makmur, PT Sangkala Persada Sakti, PT Sarolangun Bara Coal, PT Satria Gilang Mandiri, PT Satria Tapak Nawala, PT Sekar Arum Setyo Abadi, PT Siarakka Udan Berkat, PT Siba-Safa Kayang Abadi, PT Sinar Bumi Baratama, PT Sinar Gunung Moile, PT Sinar Super Indah, PT Sugico Pendragon Energi, PT Sumara Nikarya, PT Sumber Alam Resources, PT Sumber Bumi Perkasa, PT Sumber Daya Persada, PT Sumber Mangaan Sakti, PT Sumber Prima Energi Buana, PT Sumber Wahyu Agung, PT Sumber Wahyu Mulyo, PT Surya Indo Global, PT Swadana Puranugraha, PT Taman Indah Makmur Sejahtera, PT Tambang Nusantara Perdana, PT Tambulun Panual Jaya, PT Teguh Agung Sejahtera, PT Tembesi Coalindo, PT Tiardo Jaya, PT Tiga Berlian Abadi, PT Titian Reski, PT Transindo Bara Cemerlang, PT Triadat Quantum, PT Trieka Bangun Persada, PT Trinamas Abadi, PT Trinusa Resources, PT Tunas Prima Coal, PT Utomo Kostrindo, PT Wana Adiprima Mandiri, PT Zafir Mitra Serasi, PT In 2015, Australia replaced Indonesia as the largest exporter of coal in the world. Previously, Indonesia had been supplying lower quality of coal with relatively cheapest price. The cost structure of Indonesian coal only comprises of extraction and transportation to the nearby seaports, ranging from $30 to $55 per ton. The ever cheapest price of Indonesian steaming coal in the world has been allowed by the government as the coal exported is not required to be upgraded in any quality terms, either as cleaner energy source or higher energy content. Coal that mined and exported has contributed as the major and highest source for state revenue, about 85% of mining revenue. That does not include revenues to local governments in terms of taxes and non-taxes. There has not been any report of any coal quality upgrades in Indonesia, particularly regarding the gasification process. Some coal liquefaction technologies have been implemented partially to produce SNG (synthetic natural gas), ethanol, DME (dimethyl ether), and methanol-olefins. However, direct application of coal in power generation (mine-mouth power plant) has been implemented only in Sumatera, known as IPP (Independent Power Producer) Coal. Coal liquefaction is the first step toward the implementation of coal gasification. Coal technology is discussed under the section of “Coal Gasification” along with the issues of CTL (coal-to-liquid), CTG (coal-to-gas), and CTC (coal-to-chemicals). Some coal deposits underground have been conceived by many to contain enormous amounts of reserves, either under the seabed of North Sea, NE England and the underground of Hat Creek, British Columbia, Canada. Nevertheless, some UCG (underground coal gasification) projects in the world have been cancelled due to failures to fulfill some clauses on guaranteeing environment protection whilst its technology implemented. No technology has ever been present at the moment to assure that the layers surrounding the coal seams underground won’t crack or collapse during coal gasification and let unidentified gas, liquids, fire, or mud to surface. Porong mud flows, Centralia underground coal fire, Derweze methane burning are some examples of man-made disasters on the mother nature. That hasn’t included the cancer plague suffered by the communities nearby Angren UCG in Uzbekistan operated by Linc Energy. Listed on the SGX-ST (SGX:BRE) and the OTCQX of USA (OTCQX: LNCGY), Linc Energy entered into Voluntary Administration on 30 March 2016 and got itself liquidated afterwards. Two Indonesian companies that have been known to make some deals with Linc Energy regarding the UCG technologies are PT Sugico Graha (Sugico) and PT Medco Energi Mining Internasional (MEMI), a subsidiary of PT Medco Energi Internasional Tbk. Coalbed methane (CBM) in Indonesia is another story to be told, discussed, and analysed in separate section in this book. This research report also contains coal statistics in Indonesia, from resources to reserves, production, export and import, domestic sales, coal terminals and coal seaports. And also a bunch of lists regarding coal regulations, coal agreements with the Indonesian government, issues on environmental and decentralisation, coal mining permits (from CCoW to IUP), the Clean and Clear (CNC) status, domestic market obligation (DMO) by coal companies, and the first coal companies performance. The above writing is a report sample of research and analysis on “Coal Business in Indonesia” To cite: Sando Sasako, Coal Business in Indonesia, Serabdi Sakti, Jakarta, March 2017. We are hiring. Kindly send your resume to serabdi.sakti @ gmail.com the1uploader 1:49 pm on 2016-07-19 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/coal-mining-business-in-indonesia/)
Tags: ccow ( 2 ), coal ( 2 ), coal-bed methane ( 3 ), energy ( 2 ), mining ( 2 ) Coal Mining Business in Indonesia Dear Client, Terlampir beberapa file terkait energi dan batubara: 1. Daftar isi terbaru dari buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017”. Last update: 7 Maret 2017. 2. Daftar harga buku-buku terkait energi dan batubara. 3. Daftar CNC ke-23 dan IUP yang dicabut. Bagian yang di-update/ditambahkan dari edisi sebelumnya terdapat pada bagian/bab Coal Transport. Beberapa sub-bab yang ditambahkan mencakup coal handling, coal shipping vessels and freight rates. Denah, bagan, grafis, dan tabel ditambahkan demi memberikan gambaran dan ilustrasi yang lebih riel dan detil. Saat ini, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017. Last update: 7 Maret 2017”, ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.000 (dua ribu dollar AS), khusus untuk e-book dengan format pdf, single license. E-book dengan format flash (file *.exe) disewakan dengan harga US$ 200 (dua ratus dollar AS) per hari. Dalam prakteknya, e-book flash bisa diakses dalam rentang waktu kurang dari 48 hari. Kelonggaran diberikan karena adanya tenggang waktu (time lapse) antara pembuatan, upload, dan download file e-book flash sampai ke layar monitor pembaca yang membeli. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke email pembaca yang membeli. Dua hal lainnya yang perlu di-update dalam buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, March 2017” adalah analisa tentang IUP dan daftar eksportir batubara. Daftar CNC yang dipublikasikan DMB banyak yang tidak konsisten. Pun analisa IUP yang disampaikan DMB. Akibatnya, verifikasi dan cross-check data dan informasi harus dilakukan demi keutuhan dan integritas analisa data dan informasi. Daftar eksportir batubara sudah tersedia, tetapi belum di-cross-check ulang dan cross-link dengan berbagai direktori yang ada, antara lain: 1. direktori usaha tambang dengan status CNC, 2. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara, 3. direktori perusahaan tambang batubara dengan status CNC, 4. direktori perusahaan eksportir batubara, 5. direktori perusahaan pengangkut batubara, 6. direktori usaha batubara, dan lainnya. Informasi yang sepotong-potong dari KESDM dan DMB membuat kompilasi dan analisa batubara menjadi lebih riweh dan ribet. Oleh karena itu, fokus kerja saya saat ini adalah meng-update analisa tentang IUP dan daftar eksportir batubara. Untuk itu, saya perlu waktu 2-3 hari. Setelah analisa dan peng-update-an terakhir ini selesai, buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” hanya akan ditawarkan dalam bentuk cetak dan sewa e-book flash. Tidak ada diskriminasi harga antara pembeli WNI atau WNA. Buku edisi cetak “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” ditawarkan dengan harga US$ 2.500 (dua ribu lima ratus dollar AS). File e-book flash berjudul “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” disewakan dengan harga US$ 250 per hari. Tidak ada batasan masa sewa e-book flash. Akan tetapi, e-book flash dibatasi menjadi kadaluwarsa setelah 5 hari. Di hari ke-5, file e-book flash dengan kadaluwarsa tambahan 5 hari berikutnya diharapkan sudah di-upload dengan link baru sudah terkirimkan ke e-mail pembaca yang membeli. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, saya menawarkan buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” dengan harga Rp 10 juta. Dengan lead time sekitar 3 minggu sebelum buku tersebut sampai ke tangan Bapak, bapak mendapat kompensasi dipinjamkannya e-book dalam format flash (file *.exe) berjudul “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017” selama 30 hari, yakni dalam 1+5 kali perpanjangan. Link dan password pasti berbeda di setiap perpanjangan. Khusus untuk e-book dalam format flash (file *.exe) berjudul “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017”, teks tidak bisa di-klip atau dicopy. Khusus untuk early bird buyers, bila bapak memerlukan tabel, denah, bagan, grafis, dan gambar dalam buku “Coal Business in Indonesia, April 2017”, saya bisa memberikannya secara gratis dengan beberapa batasan tertentu. Penawaran ini ditutup sampai 31 Maret 2017. Demikian update dan penawaran dari saya. Terima kasih atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya. Salam, Sando Jakarta, 8 Maret 2017 Coal Mining Business in Indonesia, August 2016 by Sando Sasako Jakarta, 20 July 2016 Last update: 6 December 2016 The updated version is available on this site: http://bit.ly/2gIZCWK
In 2015, Australia replaced Indonesia as the largest exporter of coal in the world. Previously, Indonesia had been supplying lower quality of coal with relatively cheapest price. The cost structure of Indonesian coal only comprises of extraction and transportation to the nearby seaports, ranging from $30 to $55 per ton. The ever cheapest price of Indonesian steaming coal in the world has been allowed by the government as the coal exported is not required to be upgraded in any quality terms, either as cleaner energy source or higher energy content. Coal that mined and exported has contributed as the major and highest source for state revenue, about 85% of mining revenue. That does not include revenues to local governments in terms of taxes and non-taxes. There has not been any report of any coal quality upgrades in Indonesia, particularly regarding the gasification process. Some coal liquefaction technologies have been implemented partially to produce SNG (synthetic natural gas), ethanol, DME (dimethyl ether), and methanol-olefins. However, direct application of coal in power generation (mine-mouth power plant) has been implemented only in Sumatera, known as IPP (Independent Power Producer) Coal. Coal liquefaction is the first step toward the implementation of coal gasification. Coal technology is discussed under the section of “Coal Gasification” along with the issues of CTL (coal-to-liquid), CTG (coal-to-gas), and CTC (coal-to-chemicals). Some coal deposits underground have been conceived by many to contain enormous amounts of reserves, either under the seabed of North Sea, NE England and the underground of Hat Creek, British Columbia, Canada. Nevertheless, some UCG (underground coal gasification) projects in the world have been cancelled due to failures to fulfill some clauses on guaranteeing environment protection whilst its technology implemented. No technology has ever been present at the moment to assure that the layers surrounding the coal seams underground won’t crack or collapse during coal gasification and let unidentified gas, liquids, fire, or mud to surface. Porong mud flows, Centralia underground coal fire, Derweze methane burning are some examples of man-made disasters on the mother nature. That hasn’t included the cancer plague suffered by the communities nearby Angren UCG in Uzbekistan operated by Linc Energy. Listed on the SGX-ST (SGX:BRE) and the OTCQX of USA (OTCQX: LNCGY), Linc Energy entered into Voluntary Administration on 30 March 2016 and got itself liquidated afterwards. Two Indonesian companies that have been known to make some deals with Linc Energy regarding the UCG technologies are PT Sugico Graha (Sugico) and PT Medco Energi Mining Internasional (MEMI), a subsidiary of PT Medco Energi Internasional Tbk. Coalbed methane (CBM) in Indonesia is another story to be told, discussed, and analysed in separate section in this book. This research report also contains coal statistics in Indonesia, from resources to reserves, production, export and import, domestic sales, coal terminals and coal seaports. And also a bunch of lists regarding coal regulations, coal agreements with the Indonesian government, issues on environmental and decentralisation, coal mining permits (from CCoW to IUP), the Clean and Clear (CNC) status, domestic market obligation (DMO) by coal companies, and the first coal companies performance. The above writing is a report sample of research and analysis on “Coal Mining Business in Indonesia” This book is a part of an on-going research on energy business in Indonesia, including a near exhaustive profile of renewable energy in the world and its increasing trends. This part will be updated in a timely manner. The e-book of “Coal Mining Business in Indonesia” is available for rent at US$ 150 per 24 hours. The price in USD is valid for nonIndonesian citizen. The price in IDR is valid for Indonesian citizen. The promotion period is limited. The rentable e-book is a flip-book, made of Adobe Flash, not PDF. Non-refundable. Ts&Cs apply. The singleuser license fee for PDF version is US$ 1,500. The price in USD is valid for non-Indonesian citizen. The price in IDR is valid for Indonesian citizen. The promotion period is limited. Non-refundable. Ts&Cs apply. How to order: 1. Kindly sent your purchase order by SMS/texting to +62 851 0518 7118 by mentioning your name, email, and mobile phone number. WhatsApp account is not available at the moment. 2. Upon receiving your order, we shall notify you our bank account number and the name of the account holder. 3. Please notify us regarding your successful payment to our mobile number above. WhatsApp account is not available at the moment. 4. Upon effectiveness of the fund received in our bank, we shall email the link to download the ebook you have ordered and paid. 5. The link to download shall expire in 24 hours. 6. Thank you. You may reach the publisher for demo request, inquiries, and purchase order from this number: +62 851 0518 7118 or +62 888 1617 440.
Contents Foreword iii Contents v List of Tables ix List of Figures x Global Trends in Energy Industry 1 The Saudi Factor 1 The Revolutionary US Shale 3 Primary Energy Consumption in the World 5 Global Coal Trends 8 Coal Price Dynamics in the World 9 Fracking Coalmines 11 Coal Gasification 12 Underground Coal Gasification 15 Kincardine UCG, Scotland, UK 16 Raven and Hat Creek Coalfield, BC, Canada 19 Global Warming or Global Heating 21 Greenhouse Gas 23 CO2 as One of GHGs 25 Oxygen Carriers 26 CO2 Recovery 28 Underwater Coalmines 29 Hashima Coal Mine, Japan 30 Okinoyama Coal Mine, Japan 31 Beizao Coal Mine, China 31 Bomlo Coal Mine, Norway 33 Cape Breton Coal Mines, Nova Scotia, Canada 35 Solway Coal Mines, Cumbria, UK 39 North Sea Coal Mines, NE England 40 Forth Coal Mines, Scotland, UK 41 The End of Deep Coal Mines in the UK 42 Energy Business in Indonesia in a brief 45 Coal-Bed Methane 47 The Milestone of CBM Commercialisation 49 CBM Asia @ Kutai West PSC 50 Dart Energy & IGas 52 Dart Energy & NuEnergy 53 Coal 61 History of Coal Business in Indonesia 66 Regulatory Frameworks 69 The Dutch Colonialism 69 The Mining Law of 1967 69 The Production Sharing Contract in Coal Mining of 1975 71 The Coal Contract of Work of 1981 71 Forced Localisation 72 Issues on Enviromental and Decentralisation 74 Ministerial Regulations (Permen ESDM) 75 Ministerial Decrees (Kepmen ESDM) 77 Clean and Clear: The Causes 80 The Non-CNC Status 82 Unclear DMO System 85 Forestry Land Use Permit 89 Korsup Minerba 90 CCoW Companies: The First Generations 93 BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia 98 BHP Businesses in Indonesia 100 Rio Tinto 100 Tata Power 101 Arutmin Indonesia 103 Kaltim Prima Coal 103 Bumi Resources 105 The IndoCoal Deals 105 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup 107 Allied Indo Coal 108 References 111 Directory of Coal Mining Companies in Indonesia 115 Abadi Batubara Cemerlang 115 Abadi Coal Cemerlang 115 Aceh Resources and Mineral 115 Aceh Resources and Mineral Core 115 Adaro Indonesia 115 Adimas Baturaja Cemerlang 115 Allied Indo Coal , PT 116 Andhika Mutiara Etam 116 Andhika Mutiara Lestari 116 Andhika Mutiara Sejahtera 116 Antang Gunung Meratus 116 Anugerah Jatimulia 117 Anugerah Jatimulya 117 Arutmin Indonesia 117 Asmin Bara Bronang 117 Asmin Bara Jaan 117 Asmin Koalindo Tuhup 117 Astaka Dodol 118 Bahari Cakrawala Sebuku 118 Bangun Banua Persada Kalimantan 118 Bara Mutiara Prima 118 Bara Pramulya Abadi 119 Bara Sentosa Lestari 119 Bara Utama Unggul 119 Baradinamika Mudasukses 119 Baramarta, PD 119 Baramarta 119 Baramulti Sukses Sarana 120 Baramulti Suksessartana 120 Baramutiara Prima 120 Barasentosa Lestari 120 Batu Alam Selaras 120 Batubara Duaribu Abadi, PT 120 Batubara Selaras Sapta, PT 120 Baturona Adimulya 121 Benakat Energi 121 Benakat Energy 121 Bentala Coal Mining 121 Berau Coal 121 Bharinto Ekatama 121 Bima Duta Batubara Sakti 122 Borneo Bhaktibara Utama 122 Borneo Indobara 122 Buana Bara Utama 122 Bukit Baiduri Enterprises 122 Bukit Sunur 123 Bumi Laksana Perkasa 123 Bumi Panen Sukses 123 Bumi Sukse Mandiri 123 Buntok Perdana Coal Mining 123 Calicari 123 Coal Duaribu Abadi 123 Coal Selaras Sapta 124 Danau Mas Hitam 124 Daya Lapan 124 Delma Mining Corporation 124 Dhamar Tejokencono 124 Dharma Puspita Mining 124 Dutaputra Tanaratama 125 Ekasatya Yanatama 125 Energi Batubara Sumatera 125 Energy Batubara Sumatra 125 Fajar Bumi Sakti 125 Firman Ketaun Perkasa 125 Galicari 125 General Sakti Kreasindo 126 Generalindo Prima Coal 126 Gunung Bayan Pratama 126 Gunung Bayan Pratama Coal 126 Hulubalang Inti Bumi 126 Indexim Coalindo 126 Indominco Mandiri 127 Insani Bara Perkasa 127 Interex Sacra Raya 127 Intitirta Prima Sakti 127 Intitirta Primasakti 128 Jorong Barutama Greston 128 Juloi Coal 128 Kadya Caraka Mulia 128 Kalimantan Energi Lestari 128 Kalteng Coal 129 Kaltim Prima Coal 129 Kartika Selabumi Mining 129 Karunia Poladaya Bumi 129 Karya Bumi Baratama 129 Kendilo Coal Indonesia 130 BHP Kendilo Coal Indonesia 130 Kideco Jaya Agung 130 Kitadin 130 Kodeco Horna Mandiri 130 Kurnia Sarana Lestari 130 Kutai Kertanegara Prima Coal 130 Lahai Coal 131 Lanna Harita Indonesia 131 Lianganggang Cemerlang 131 Mahakam Sumber Jaya 131 Mandiri Intiperkasa 131 Mantimin Coal Mining 132 Marunda Graha Mineral 132 Marunda Grahamineral 132 Maruwai Coal 132 Maruai Coal 132 Meulaboh Energitama 132 Meullaboho Energitama 133 Mitrajaya Timuragung 133 Multi Harapan Utama 133 Multi Tambangjaya Utama 133 Nusa Minera Utama 133 Nusantara Termal Coal (D/A Nusantara Thai Coal) 134 Nusantara Thai Coal 134 Pari Coal 134 Pendopo Energi Coal 134 Pendopo Energy Batubara 134 Perkasa Inakakerta 134 Persada Permata Mulya 135 Persada Permata Mulia 135 Pesona Khatulistiwa Nusantara 135 Pinang Jaya Sarana Bara 135 Pinangjaya Sarana Bara 135 Ramdany Coal Mining 135 Ratah Coal 135 Restubara Karya Pratama 136 Riau Bara Harum 136 Salamindo Coalindo 136 Salamindo Pahala 136 Santan Coal 136 Santan Batubara 136 Sarwa Sembada Karya Bumi 136 Selatan Selabara 137 Selo Argodedali 137 Selo Argokencono Sakti 137 Senamas Energindo Mulya 137 Senamas Energindo Mulia 137 Sinar Benua Prima 138 Sinarindo Barakarya 138 Singlurus Pratama 138 Solok Bara Adipratama 138 Sumber Barito Coal 138 Sumber Kurnia Buana 139 Suprabari Mapanindo Mineral 139 Tambang Damai 139 Tanito Harum 139 Tanjung Alam Jaya 140 Tanjung Alam Raya 140 Taraco Mining 140 Teguh Persada Coal 140 Teguh Reksa Daya 140 Teguh Sinar Abadi 140 Tempayang Cemerlang 141 Timah Batubara Utama 141 Torah Antareja Mining 141 Trimarta Coal Perkasa 141 Trimata Buana 141 Trimata Benua 141 Trimata Coal Perkasa 142 Trubaindo Coal Mining 142 Wadung Mas Tambang Mulia 142 Wadungmas Tambang Mulia 142 Wahana Baratama Mining 142 Whirakaneo Coalindo 142 Whiratama Bina Perkasa 142 Yamabhumi Palaka 143 List of Tables Table 1 – Primary Energy Consumption in the World by Countries, 2005-2015 (mtoe) 5 Table 2 – Primary Energy: Consumption in the World by Countries and by Fuel Type, 2014 (mtoe) 6 Table 3 – Primary Energy: Consumption in the World by Countries and by Fuel Type, 2015 (mtoe) 7 Table 4 – BP coal prices, 1987-2015 ($/tonne) 9 Table 5 – US coal export price, 2010q1-2016q1 ($/short tons) 9 Table 6 – Coal In-Place Resources for Upper Limestone Fm + Limestone Coal Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 17 Table 7 – Coal In-Place Resources for Upper Limestone Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 17 Table 8 – Coal In-Place Resources for Limestone Coal Fm, Kincardine, Nov.2014 17 Table 9 – Coal In-Place Resources, Kincardine, Nov.2014 18 Table 10 – Estimates of trace chemicals abundance in the global atmosphere, 1980. 25 Table 11 – Overview of existing chemical-looping combustors 28 Table 12 – Some undersea coalmines in Solway Firth, Cumbria, UK 39 Table 13 – CBM Resources in Indonesia 47 Table 14 – The 20 largest shareholders of Dart Energy Limited, 20100914 52 Table 15 – Some subsidiaries of IGas which were held through subsidiaries, 30 June 2015 53 Table 16 – Coal reserves in Indonesia, 2014 62 Table 17 – Coal supply in Indonesia, 2000-2014 63 Table 18 – Existing coal terminals in Indonesia 64 Table 19 – Coal mining companies in Indonesia by permits, March 2015 66 Table 20 – CNC status of IUP by announcements, 20110630-20160104 81 Table 21 – Problems of Non-CNC IUPs by category and regions, 20140203 82 Table 22 – Clean and Clear IUPs by province, 2014 – April 2016 84 Table 23 – Coal Domestic Market Obligations in Indonesia, 2010-2015 85 Table 24 – Coal Domestic Market Obligations in Indonesia, by CCoW and KP/IUP companies, 20100419-20150427 (mt) 87 Table 25 – Overlay of IUP, COW, and PKP2B with Forest Area Map and IPPKH 89 Table 26 – IUP within conservation forests in 12 provinces, 2014-2015 89 Table 27 – The First Generation CCoW Companies: The dates, area, and resources/reserves 93 Table 28 – The second generation of CCoW Companies: 17 of 19 93 Table 29 – Coal produced from Kalimantan, 1997-2000 (1000 ton) 94 Table 30 – The third generation of CCoW Companies: 106 of 114 95 Table 31 – Coal production from CCoW companies, 2005-2012 (1,000 ton) 97 Table 32 – Financial profile of 3 direct subsidiaries of Tata Power on coal business in Indonesia, 2015q1 ( crore) 101 Table 33 – Subsidiaries of Tata Power related with coal mining business in Indonesia, 2015q1 ( crore) 101 Table 34 – Tata Power companies in Indonesia, 2015 102 List of Figures Figure 1 – Potential future global oil projects by average breakeven prices 3 Figure 2 – Australian monthly thermal coal price, Jan. 1980 – July 2016 (US$/metric ton) 10 Figure 3 – Monthly coal prices from Australia, Colombia, South Africa, Jan. 1970 – July 2016 ($/mt) 10 Figure 4 – American weekly coal prices, 20080506-20160812 (US$) 11 Figure 5 – Various technologies implemented during power generation process 12 Figure 6 – Some chemical reactions in converting syngas 13 Figure 7 – Some routes of coal to chemicals from methane via syngas 13 Figure 8 – Coal cycle and its derived products schematics, from liquid (CTL), to gas (CTG), and chemicals (CTC) 14 Figure 9 – Potential UCG in the UK, 2004 15 Figure 10 – Kincardine UGC project area of interest, 20141105 17 Figure 11 – Kincardine UCG licenses in the Firth of Forth, 20150402. 18 Figure 12 – Kincardine area of interest in Midland Valley of Scotland, 20141105 19 Figure 13 – Coalmines in British Columbia, Canada 20 Figure 14 – Selected significant climate anomalies and events, July 2016 21 Figure 15 – Earth’s Annual Global Mean Energy Budget, July 1987 – Dec. 1988 22 Figure 16 – Earth’s Global Energy Budget, March 2000 – March 2004 22 Figure 17 – Monthly mean atmospheric carbon dioxide at Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii, March 1958 – July 2016 (ppm) 26 Figure 18 – Oxygen transport capability of different MeO/Me systems. 27 Figure 19 – The effective aquifuge in Beizao Coalmine 32 Figure 20 – TBU Underwater coal mining in The Baltic Union 33 Figure 21 – TBU Coal Island 34 Figure 22 – TBU Sandisle structure 34 Figure 23 – Coal mines in Nova Scotia, Canada 36 Figure 24 – Donkin coal resource block 36 Figure 25 – Solway Firth, Irish Sea, UK 39 Figure 26 – The map of Tynemouth-Boldon-Sunderland, NE England 41 Figure 27 – Deep coal mining closures in the UK, 2010-2015 43 Figure 28 – Deep coal mining closures in the UK, 1960-1969 43 Figure 29 – Onshore coal distribution in the UK by depth, 2014 44 Figure 30 – CBM Basins in Indonesia 47 Figure 31 – Coal bed methane (CBM) resources in Indonesia, 2010 48 Figure 32 – CBM PSC terms in Indonesia 48 Figure 33 – Some CBM PSCs in East Kalimantan 51 Figure 34 – CBM basin in South Sumatera, Nov. 2011 54 Figure 35 – Tanjung Enim CBM PSC 55 Figure 36 – Muralim CBM PSC 56 Figure 37 – Sangatta West CBM PSC 58 Figure 38 – The CBM PSCs of NuEnergy in Sumatera 59 Figure 39 – Gasification-based system concepts 61 Figure 40 – Gasification chemistry 61 Figure 41 – Coal distribution in Indonesia by calory class, 2014 62 Figure 42 – Supply and export of Indonesian coal, 1997-2014 63 Figure 43 – Export share over coal production in top producing countries 63 Figure 44 – Coal seaports in Indonesia, 2015 65 Figure 45 – UK banks involvement in Indonesian coal companies 66 Figure 46 – Mining permits in Indonesia, 20140203 67 Figure 47 – Mining problems in Indonesia, 20140203 80 Figure 48 – JORC’s general relationship between exploration results, mineral resources, and ore reserves 80 Figure 49 – Problems of Non-Clean & Clear Status of IUPs classified and mapped 83 Figure 50 – Adding value to the coal by implementing clean coal technology 85 Figure 51 – Coal DMO mechanism in Indonesia 86 Figure 52 – Monitoring and reporting system on the implementation of coal DMO mechanism in Indonesia 87 Figure 53 – Clean & Clear Status of IUPs, May 2011 – April 2016 90 Figure 54 – The mechanics of $600m structure finance (fixed rate note) of IndoCoal in 2005 106 Figure 55 – The mechanics of unrated $900m structured export notes (FRN) of IndoCoal in 2006 106 the1uploader 9:59 pm on 2016-07-14 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/07/15/anggota-mkdki-masa-bakti-tahun-2016-2021-yang-dilantik-per-15-juli-2016/)
Anggota MKDKI masa bakti tahun 2016 – 2021 yang dilantik per 15 Juli 2016 Anggota MKDKI masa bakti tahun 2016 – 2021 yang diangkat berdasarkan Keputusan Menteri Kesehatan RI Nomor HK.02.02/Menkes/350/2016 adalah: 1. dr. Dody Firmanda, Sp.A, MA (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia) 2. dr. Johan Akbari, Sp.S (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia) 3. dr. Nurdadi Saleh, Sp.OG (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia)
4. drg. Bulan Rachmadi, M.Kes (Persatuan Dokter Gigi Indonesia) 5. drg. Gregorius Maubili Fernandez, DDPH (Persatuan Dokter Gigi Indonesia) 6. Dr. drg. Harum Sasanti, Sp.PM (Persatuan Dokter Gigi Indonesia) 7. Prof. Dr. dr. Agus Purwadianto, Sp.F, SH, M.Si (Asosiasi Rumah Sakit) 8. drg. Bambang Kusnandir, Sp.Pros (Asosiasi Rumah Sakit) 9. H. Slamet Supriatna, SH, MH (Ahli Hukum) 10. Akhiar Salmi, SH, MH (Ahli Hukum) 11. Muhammad Lutfie Hakim, SH, MH (Ahli Hukum) SK Menkes tersebut dikukuhkan dalam SK Konsil Kedokteran Indonesia No.16/KKI/KEP/VII/2016 tentang Penetapan Anggota MKDKI dalam Jabatan Masa Bakti Tahun 2016-2021 http://www.kki.go.id/index.php/subMenu/informasi/berita/detailberita/81 Pengucapan Sumpah Anggota Majelis Kehormatan Disiplin Kedokteran Indonesia Periode 2016 – 2021 15 Juli 2016 17:40:20 http://www.kki.go.id/assets/images/berita/MKDKI.jpg Pengucapan Sumpah Anggota Majelis Kehormatan Disiplin Kedokteran Indonesia Periode 2016 – 2021 Anggota Majelis Kehormatan Disiplin Kedokteran Indonesia (MKDKI) masa bakti tahun 2016 – 2021 melakukan pengucapan sumpah dihadapan Ketua Konsil Kedokteran Indonesia Prof. Dr. dr. Bambang Supriyatno, Sp.A(K) dan disaksikan oleh Menteri Kesehatan RI Prof. Dr. dr. Nila Farid Moeloek, Sp.M(K). Acara berlangsung di ruang J. Leimena Kementerian Kesehatan. Anggota MKDKI masa bakti tahun 2016 – 2021 yang diangkat berdasarkan Keputusan Menteri Kesehatan RI Nomor HK.02.02/Menkes/350/2016 adalah: 1. dr. Dody Firmanda, Sp.A, MA (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia) 2. dr. Johan Akbari, Sp.S (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia) 3. dr. Nurdadi Saleh, Sp.OG (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia) 4. drg. Bulan Rachmadi, M.Kes (Persatuan Dokter Gigi Indonesia) 5. drg. Gregorius Maubili Fernandez, DDPH (Persatuan Dokter Gigi Indonesia) 6. Dr. drg. Harum Sasanti, Sp.PM (Persatuan Dokter Gigi Indonesia) 7. Prof. Dr. dr. Agus Purwadianto, Sp.F, SH, M.Si (Asosiasi Rumah Sakit) 8. drg. Bambang Kusnandir, Sp.Pros (Asosiasi Rumah Sakit) 9. H. Slamet Supriatna, SH, MH (Ahli Hukum) 10. Akhiar Salmi, SH, MH (Ahli Hukum) 11. Muhammad Lutfie Hakim, SH, MH (Ahli Hukum) Ketua KKI menyampaikan dalam sambutannya bahwa tujuan pembentukan MKDKI adalah untuk menegakkan disiplin dokter dan dokter gigi dalam penyelenggaraan praktik kedokteran dan tantangan penegakkan disiplin profesi kedokteran akan terasa lebih berat dan beragam di era globalisasi. Menteri Kesehatan berharap MKDKI sebagai pengemban amanah undang-undang dapat menjalankan tugas dengan sebaik-baiknya. Kasus-kasus pengaduan disiplin kiranya dapat segera diselesaikan sehingga masyarakat dapat terlayani dengan baik sebagai bentuk akuntabilitas kepada publik. the1uploader 12:40 pm on 2016-06-27 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/06/28/betting-against-the-market/)
How Soros was betting against the market and won, in the past Betting against the market by Sando Sasako Jakarta, 12 September 2017 In 1992, Soros won the bets against the sterling. It was one lucky move. How could he win remains a mystery for some. Many have tried to elaborate the tricks. Cornering the Bank of England was not that simple as many lay persons had mentioned it. Soros and friends did not do it by themselves. Some guerillas, secret talks, meetings, and deals remain unveiled. The answer and explanation is simple. It was when the central banks and the governments donot really own their financial markets and exploit their funny money in their virtual vaults. I am with the contrarians. Raise you hand with the middle finger stick out. Please check these links out …
issuu.com
wordpress.com
Asset Bubble, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, & Satellite Business in Indonesia
http://bit.ly/2wgeJMc
http://bit.ly/2ClIP3g
Asset Bubble: The Causalities and Its Limiter
http://bit.ly/2y1foou
http://bit.ly/2GgzbkJ
Inflation Management in Indonesia
http://bit.ly/2y0tlTo
http://bit.ly/2EJL6ug
Betting against the market or going along and take the long
http://bit.ly/2hOkE91
http://bit.ly/2F3y5Jx
How Soros broke the Bank of England
http://bit.ly/2xi1jno
http://bit.ly/2GfiiXA
The manipulative and collusive nature of LIBOR was intentional and by design
http://bit.ly/2wxOTDx
http://bit.ly/2EI5mfG
How to detect and spot asset bubble created by the central banks
http://bit.ly/2yIZU5u
http://bit.ly/2EtT5fC
Shrinking the asset bubble to avoid the inevitable burst
http://bit.ly/2wxLhl1
http://bit.ly/2EI5tb6
Asset bubble as the resultant of central bankers’ ability to make funny money
http://bit.ly/2C1ginZ
Space System/Loral, the BRISat builder swimming in a troubled water
http://bit.ly/2Cm7m8p
How LIBOR becomes a thing dismembered
http://bit.ly/2Etvtb0
every bubble needs its burst
http://bit.ly/2o2ow6n
How Soros was betting against the market and won, in the past
http://bit.ly/2BZIQOC
The followings are some clips regarding what happened in 1992 and the Brexit of 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/27/george-soros-i-did-not-bet-against-the-pound-before-brexit/ George Soros: I did not bet against the pound before Brexit Marion Dakers, Financial services editor 27 June 2016 • 3:18pm http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/business/2016/06/22/soros_trans_NvBQzQNjv4Bqk– b1aDvxTQVszVMARw2xOjyP505pzP1cv1plO-msXI.JPEG?imwidth=1240 George Soros warned against the dangers of Brexit Credit: Mike Segar/Reuters George Soros, the billionaire who bet against the pound on Black Wednesday in 1992, did not repeat the trick during the Brexit turmoil that has so far wiped 11pc off the value of sterling against the dollar. Mr Soros made a public warning about the risks of Britain leaving the EU in the days leading up to last Thursday’s referendum, predicting that the pound could fall below $1.15, but did not follow this up with a bet on the currency’s slump. Sterling has dropped from $1.48 since Thursday night to below $1.32, its lowest in 31 years, and remains volatile. “George Soros did not speculate against sterling while he was arguing for Britain to remain in the European Union,” a spokesman for Mr Soros said on Monday. “In fact, he was long the British Pound leading up to the vote.” “However, because of his generally bearish outlook on world markets, Mr Soros did profit from other investments,” the spokesman said. The pound is at its lowest against the dollar for more than 30 years https://s6.postimg.org/69eyeaqox/gbp1_chart.jpg https://s6.postimg.org/vxfneq6xt/gbp2.jpg https://s6.postimg.org/8khlw7qu9/gbp3.jpg https://s6.postimg.org/tinruaqox/gbp4.jpg Mr Soros gained notoriety by betting heavily against sterling during the exchange rate mechanism crisis in 1992, as John Major’s Government raced to shore up sterling against the German mark, leading to interest rates soaring to 15pc. His hedge fund’s position against sterling is said to have made him more than £1bn in profit on Black Wednesday, when the UK gave up on defending the currency to keep pace with the mark. The feat earned him the nickname “the man who broke the Bank of England”. “Britain eventually may or may not be relatively better off than other countries by leaving the EU, but its economy and people stand to suffer significantly in the short to medium term,” Mr Soros wrote over the weekend. Financial markets “are likely to remain in turmoil as the long, complicated process of political and economic divorce from the EU is negotiated,” he said. made a public warning https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/20/brexit-crash-pound-living-standards-george-soros and remains volatile. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/27/george-osborne-to-speak-in-attempt-to-calm-marketsfollowing-bre/ earned him the nickname http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2773265/Billionaire-who-broke-the-Bank-of-England.html over the weekend. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/brexit-eu-disintegration-inevitable-by-george-soros-2016-06 https://www.ft.com/content/c4f78d98-2a9d-32b7-9090-d95790bdec91 George Soros did not bet against the pound before Brexit by: Mehreen Khan, June 27, 2016 George Soros, the man who broke the pound on Black Wednesday in 1992, did not bet against sterling ahead of the UK’s vote on EU membership, a spokesman for the investor has said. Mr Soros had warned before the vote that a “Brexit” would cause the pound to fall to parity against the euro. Sterling suffered its worst ever one day fall of more than 10 per cent against the dollar following the vote on Friday and 5.6 per cent against the single currency. But despite not profiting from the move in sterling, Mr Soros did benefit from other market moves in the aftermath of the ‘Leave’ vote. A spokesman for Mr Soros said this morning: George Soros did not speculate against sterling while he was arguing for Britain to remain in the European Union. In fact, he was long the British pound leading up to the vote. However, because of his generally bearish outlook on world markets, Mr Soros did profit from other investments. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-soros/george-soros-did-not-bet-against-sterling-just-before-brexit-vote-spokesmanidUSKCN0ZD0IE George Soros did not bet against sterling just before Brexit vote: spokesman June 27, 2016 / 1:05 PM / a year ago Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge; editing by Kate Holton Reuters Staff http://s3.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20160627&t=2&i=1143008646&r=LYNXNPEC5Q096&w=200 http://s3.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20160627&t=2&i=1143008646&r=LYNXNPEC5Q096&w=1280 Business magnate George Soros arrives to speak at the Open Russia Club in London, Britain June 20, 2016. REUTERS/Luke MacGregor LONDON (Reuters) – George Soros, the billionaire who earned fame by betting against the pound in 1992, did not speculate against sterling just ahead of Britain’s vote to leave the European Union but he did profit from other bearish bets due to the Brexit result, a spokesman said. “George Soros did not speculate against sterling while he was arguing for Britain to remain in the European Union,” a spokesman for Soros said on Monday. “In fact, he was long the British Pound leading up to the vote.” “However, because of his generally bearish outlook on world markets, Mr. Soros did profit from other investments,” the spokesman said. Our Standards:The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. http://www.businessinsider.sg/r-george-soros-did-not-bet-against-sterling-just-before-brexit-vote-spokesman-2016-6/?r=US&IR=T George Soros didn’t bet against the pound this time Reuters, Ben Moshinsky, Business Insider US June 27, 2016 http://static.businessinsider.sg/sites/2/2017/06/562fbe189dd7cc15008c5271.jpg Georges Soros, the chairman of Soros Fund Management, at the annual conference of the Institute for New Economic Thinking at the OECD headquarters in Paris. Thomson Reuters George Soros, the billionaire who earned fame by betting against the pound in 1992, didn’t short sterling ahead of Britain’s vote to leave the European Union. “George Soros did not speculate against sterling while he was arguing for Britain to remain in the European Union,” a spokesman for Soros said on Monday. “In fact, he was long the British Pound leading up to the vote.” His spokesman said Soros did profit from other bearish bets because of the Brexit result. Soros, who made £1 billion betting against the pound on “Black Wednesday,” had said that after a British vote to exit the EU in a so-called Brexit, “the pound would fall by at least 15% and possibly more than 20%.” The pound, which at one point fell over 10% against the US dollar to about $1.33, a 31-year low, was one of the most immediate market casualties of the vote to leave the EU. It was worst single-day drop ever for the currency. On Black Wednesday – September 16, 1992 – the pound fell 4%. It had lost about 15% of its value by the end of the month. Soros warned that the EU risked being broken up and that the UK economy would suffer. “Britain eventually may or may not be relatively better off than other countries by leaving the EU, but its economy and people stand to suffer significantly in the short to medium term,” he wrote in a commentary on the website Project Syndicate. the pound would fall by at least 15% and possibly more than 20% http://uk.businessinsider.com/brexit-could-be-worse-than-blackwednesday-2016-6 he wrote in a commentary on the website Project Syndicate http://uk.businessinsider.com/soros-on-brexit-2016-6 http://fortune.com/2016/06/27/soros-pound-brexit/ Hedge Funds How George Soros Lost Money In a Bad Brexit Bet Stephen Gandel, Reuters, Jun 27, 2016 https://fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/151703280.jpg?w=720&quality=85 Billionaire investor George Soros speaks on “The Tragedy of the European Union” as a guest of The Institute for Media and Communications Policy on September 10, 2012 in Berlin, Germany. Photograph by Sean Gallup – Getty Images Perhaps George Soros should go back into retirement. It appears the 85-year-old lost money betting that the British pound would rise in the wake of the Brexit vote. A Soros spokesperson confirm to Bloomberg that the octogenarian’s fund was “long” the pound even after the vote. The fact that Soros lost money betting on the pound is surprising not only because he famously made a billion dollars “breaking the pound” back in 1992, but also because he predicting a drop in the sterling would happen. Last week, Soros made headlines by saying that the pound would plunge in value if the British citizens voted for a so-called Brexit, or leaving the European Union. They did. And the pound did plunge, as Soros predicted. But it appears the legendary hedge fund manager didn’t follow his own advice. Earlier this month, it was reported that Soros had recently come out of retirement because he saw a lot of money to be made betting against the global economy. Nonetheless, the pound is one bearish bet Soros appears not to have made. “George Soros did not speculate against sterling while he was arguing for Britain to remain in the European Union,” a spokesman for Soros said on Monday. “In fact, he was long the British pound leading up to the vote.” It’s unclear why Soros didn’t follow his own advice. It could be because, like most others, he didn’t think a Brexit was likely. Soros might not have wanted to seem like he was trying to profit from his dire warnings of what would happen if the Brexit vote prevailed, as it did. Still, the misstep isn’t likely to dent the billionaire banking account. It appears his other bearish bets against the economy made up for what Soros lost on the pound. “However, because of his generally bearish outlook on world markets, Mr. Soros did profit from other investments,” the spokesman said. Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/soros-was-long-the-pound-before-brexit-vote-says-spokesman Soros made headlines by saying that the pound would plunge in value http://fortune.com/2016/06/20/soros-brexit-pound/ Soros had recently come out of retirement http://fortune.com/2016/06/09/george-soros-is-betting-big-on-disaster/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2015/07/07/forbes-flashback-george-soros-british-pound-euro-ecb/#7360bf206131 How The Market Overwhelmed The Central Banks By Thomas Jaffe and Dyan Machan, November 9, 1992 https://specials-images.forbesimg.com/imageserve/468992164/640×0.jpg?fit=scale George Soros made the trade of a lifetime in 1992, clearing $1.5 billion on his bet against the Bank of England. (Eric Piermont/AFP/Getty Images) Here’s one for the “Guinness Book of World Records”: Though the world is chock-a-block with billionaires, George Soros may be the first person to make over $ 1 billion in the span of a single month. That’s right: one month. SEPTEMBER 1992 was a month international money managers won’t easily forget. Especially George Soros, the legendary chairman of the Quantum group of funds. Soros and clients of his four Netherlands Antilles-domiciled pools cleared a cool $ 1.5 billion in just one month as a result of the upheaval in Europe’s markets. Nor is that all the Soros crowd has made this year: Between the end of August and early October the new asset value of his flagship $ 3.3 billion (assets) Quantum Fund rose 31%, and it is up 51% year-todate. As of mid-October his assets under management had swelled to $ 7 billion. There were other big winners in the currency turmoil that toppled the pound sterling, the lira and other soft European currencies and humbled the central banks of Europe. The big winners include Bruce Kovner of Caxton Corp. and Paul Tudor Jones of Jones Investments. Kovner’s funds made an estimated $ 300 million, increasing assets to about $ 1.6 billion; Jones’ funds were up some $ 250 million, to $ 1.4 billion in assets. The month of wild trading and sheer excitement that wrecked the European Exchange Rate Mechanism were also good times for leading U.S. banks with big foreign exchange operations, especially Citicorp, J. P. Morgan, Chemical Banking, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, First Chicago and BankAmerica. Together, in the third quarter, they netted before taxes over $ 800 million more than what they normally earn in a quarter from trading currencies. What did these people do to make so much money? They bet on the inevitable. They bet that the pound and the other weaker European currencies were overpriced against the deutsche mark. They bet that the politicians and the central banks could not much longer maintain artificially high exchange rates in the interests of European unity. Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism was set up in 1979 by the then-members of the European Economic Community to keep the various European currencies relatively stable against one another. Relatively narrow fixed trading ranges were established within which the prices of 11 European currencies were supposed to fluctuate. But the system could work only if the various countries coordinated their economic policies. In one nation had, say, higher inflation than another, there would be great strain on the system. Differences in interest rates also would strain the system. When differences in interest rates and inflation rates among the 11 got out of line, the central banks had to intervene to buy and thus support the weakening currency against speculators and currency hedgers. Continue https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2015/07/07/forbes-flashback-george-soros-british-pound-euroecb/2/#3b49eac63ae8 In former times, powerful central banks could usually frustrate speculators. They did so by simply buying massive amounts of the weaker currency and flooding the market with the stronger currency. But times are changing. While the central banks can mobilize tens of billions of dollars, trading in foreign currency markets now runs to a trillion dollars a day. Andrew Weisman, director of currency fund management for French bank Credit du Nord, makes no apologies for the speculative operations mounted by his and other banks against the fixed rates. “The central banks brought September’s debacle upon themselves,” he asserts. Why does he say this? Because the exchange rates they were defending may have made political sense for the European leaders committed to the European Community but no longer made any economic sense. Soros and the others who won big when the market overwhelmed the banks were mostly involved in one variation or another on a basic technique: Go short the weakest currencies. Going short a currency can be done in a number of ways. The simplest is simply to borrow money, say, Italian lire, and convert the borrowed money into, say, deutsche marks at the fixed rates. Then you wait for the lira to drop sharply against the DM, buy in the now cheaper lira to repay your debt and pocket a lot of extra deutsche marks. In September the lira was trading at 765 lire to the mark. Four weeks later it took 980 lire to buy a single DM. A speculator who had performed this operation would have made a profit equal to 28% of the borrowed sum. But his profit would have been much more than 28%. Speculators with substantial credit lines like Soros can borrow on a margin of 5% and get 20-to-1 leverage. That means you can borrow $ 1 billion for speculation by putting up just $ 50 million in cash. The result: Instead of having made 28% on your lira bet, you would have made 560%, or $ 280 million. There are other ways, of course, to play the currency markets: through futures and options, for example. Soros actually evolved a complex play. George Soros generally avoids the press, and in this moment of great triumph, he is as elusive as ever. But it is clear that he had concluded the European central banks were holding lousy hands in their game against the speculators and hedgers. That’s why he was willing to bet the ranch. Though Soros would not talk with FORBES, his spokesman did. He told us Soros has expected financial turmoil in Europe ever since the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989, leading to the reunification of Germany. These events, thought Soros, would doom the Exchange Rate Mechanism. A Soros spokesman explains: “To have one [pan-European] currency and make it stick, you need one economy. But when one country was booming because it had essentially done a leveraged buyout of East Germany, while the others were in a recession, this made it inappropriate for the others to rely on Germany’s monetary policy in trying to maintain their own currencies.” After German reunification, in Soros’ view, it was only a matter of time before the European Exchange Rate Mechanism came unglued. By this year it was clear to just about everyone that some European currencies — the British pound and Italian lira, for example — were fundamentally overvalued in relation to stronger ones such as the deutsche mark and French franc. As Britain and Italy struggled to make their currencies attractive, they were forced to maintain high interest rates to attract foreign investment dollars. But this crimped their ability to stimulate their sagging economies. While the British and Italians tried to deal with weak economies, Germany embarked on a policy of trying to restrain its own economy, overstimulated by the spending on eastern Germany. There were plenty of players beside George Soros betting against the central banks and the ERM. Foreign exchange traders at money center banks and investment banks like Goldman, Sachs are constantly aware of what is happening in the international money markets. When large institutions, mutual funds and multinational corporations that do massive currency hedging to protect their profits started selling the weaker European currencies in September, the traders immediately picked up on the jump in volume they were handling for their customers. They could easily estimate just how great the selling pressure was and how much the central banks would have to spend to prop up those currencies. Then, the banks and investment houses got into the game for their own accounts. It was obvious, for instance, that the Bank of England wouldn’t be able to support the pound successfully, so the banks started to use their own capital to heavily sell the currency short. Some of the more aggressive, like Citicorp and Bankers Trust, made roughly an extra $200 million apiece pretax from the trading turmoil in September. And it may have been even more. But the magnitude of these gains won’t show up in the third quarter’s results. When trading profits are that large, the banks often roll them over into succeeding quarters to minimize their tax bill. We mentioned that Soros played a complex game. Here’s how it went. Soros expected the following: the breakdown of the ERM and a substantial realignment of European currencies; a dramatic drop in European interest rates; a decline for European stock markets. So, rather than simply shorting the weak currencies, he also placed simultaneous bets on interest rates and securities markets that would be affected by the currency realignments. In carrying out this operation, Soros and his aides sold short sterling to the tune of about $ 7 billion, bought the mark to the tune of $ 6 billion and, to a lesser extent, bought the French franc. As a parallel play they bought as much as $ 500 million worth of British stocks even while they were shorting sterling, figuring that equities often rise after a currency devalues. Soros also went long German and French bonds, while shorting those countries’ equities. Soros’ reasoning on the French and German markets was that upward valuation was bad for equities but was good for bonds because it would lead to lower interest rates. “When the Italians finally devalued the lira and the Germans lowered rates slightly,” says the Soros spokesman, “it was almost like we’d been preparing for an exam for six months and now were finally taking our test.” After the lira was battered, Soros read that Helmut Schlesinger, president of the Bundesbank, had openly stated that Germany’s central bank would not go to the wall for the pound. Soros has said that he saw this as a “clarion call for everyone to get out of sterling.” Because of his strong credit, Soros was able to maintain all these positions with just $ 1 billion in collateral. He was margined to the eyebrows, but he wasn’t really gambling. “The profits that people like Soros recently made seem astronomical,” says Gilbert de Botton, chief of London’s $ 5-billion-plus (assets) Global Asset Management. “But do not rap them on the knuckles on one of the few occasions where they actually could make money. Even the pros have lost their shirts from time to time because of the absolute power of the central banks.” Soros knew this, but all his experience, all his instincts told him that this time he was betting with odds overwhelmingly in his favor. Here’s how his leveraged positions worked out: The pound dropped 10%, the mark and franc both rose roughly 7%, the London stock market gained 7%, German and French bonds were up about 3% apiece, and the German and French stock markets briefly rallied, but basically remained flat. FORBES has learned that since early October Soros has substantially decreased the size of his hedge. He has bought pounds and sold marks to cover most of his short position in sterling. But Soros is still holding on to his British stocks, and continues to be bullish on European bonds. Soros sees interest rates dropping in Europe and thinks that the Continent is headed into a deep recession. He has taken no pride in being referred to as the man who beat the central banks. One money manager who knows Soros well says: “George actually wants to be perceived as helping central bankers.” Was betting against them being helpful? In the sense that he was essentially betting on the inevitable, maybe yes. The volatility in European currencies continues. Soros and other shrewd investor will no doubt continue trying to profit off the turbulence. But it will be a long time before a chance to make a killing like this year’s appears again. http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/08/greatest-currency-trades.asp The Greatest Currency Trades Ever Made By Andrew Beattie 2008-09-03T11:00:00-06:00 The foreign exchange (forex) market is the largest market in the world because currency is changing hands whenever goods and services are traded between nations. The sheer size of the transactions going on between nations provides arbitrage opportunities for speculators, because the currency values fluctuate by the minute. Usually these speculators make many trades for small profits, but sometimes a big position is taken up for a huge profit or, when things go wrong, a huge loss. In this article, we’ll look at the greatest currency trades ever made. How the Trades Are Made First, it is essential to understand how money is made in the forex market. Although some of the techniques are familiar to stock investors, currency trading is a realm of investing in and of itself. A currency trader can make one of four bets on the future value of a currency: Shorting a currency means that the trader believes that the currency will go down compared to another currency. Going long means that the trader thinks the currency will increase in value compared to another currency. The other two bets have to do with the amount of change in either direction – whether the trader thinks it will move a lot or not much at all – and are known by the provocative names of strangle and straddle. Once you’re decided on which bet you want to place, there are many ways to take up the position. For example, if you wanted to short the Canadian dollar (CAD), the simplest way would be to take out a loan in Canadian dollars that you will be able to pay back at a discount as the currency devalues (assuming you’re correct). This is much too small and slow for true forex traders, so they use puts, calls, other options and forwards to build up and leverage their positions. It’s the leveraging in particular that makes some trades worth millions, and even billions, of dollars. No. 3: Andy Krieger Vs. the Kiwi In 1987, Andy Krieger, a 32-year-old currency trader at Bankers Trust, was carefully watching the currencies that were rallying against the dollar following the Black Monday crash. As investors and companies rushed out of the American dollar and into other currencies that had suffered less damage in the market crash, there were bound to be some currencies that would become fundamentally overvalued, creating a good opportunity for arbitrage. The currency Krieger targeted was the New Zealand dollar, also known as the kiwi. Using the relatively new techniques afforded by options, Krieger took up a short position against the kiwi worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In fact, his sell orders were said to exceed the money supply of New Zealand. The selling pressure combined with the lack of currency in circulation caused the kiwi to drop sharply. It yo-yoed between a 3 and 5% loss while Krieger made millions for his employers. One part of the legend recounts a worried New Zealand government official calling up Krieger’s bosses and threatening Bankers Trust to try to get Krieger out of the kiwi. Krieger later left Bankers Trust to go work for George Soros. No. 2: Stanley Druckenmiller Bets on the Mark – Twice Stanley Druckenmiller made millions by making two long bets in the same currency while working as a trader for George Soros’ Quantum Fund. Druckenmiller’s first bet came when the Berlin Wall fell. The perceived difficulties of reunification between East and West Germany had depressed the German mark to a level that Druckenmiller thought extreme. He initially put a multimillion-dollar bet on a future rally until Soros told him to increase his purchase to 2 billion German marks. Things played out according to plan and the long position came to be worth millions of dollars, helping to push the returns of the Quantum Fund over 60%. Possibly due to the success of his first bet, Druckenmiller also made the German mark an integral part of the greatest currency trade in history. A few years later, while Soros was busy breaking the Bank of England, Druckenmiller was going long in the mark on the assumption that the fallout from his boss’ bet would drop the British pound against the mark. Druckenmiller was confident that he and Soros were right and showed this by buying British stocks. He believed that Britain would have to slash lending rates, thus stimulating business, and that the cheaper pound would actually mean more exports compared to European rivals. Following this same thinking, Druckenmiller bought German bonds on the expectation that investors would move to bonds as German stocks showed less growth than the British. It was a very complete trade that added considerably to the profits of Soros’ main bet against the pound. No. 1: George Soros Vs. the British Pound The British pound shadowed the German mark leading up to the 1990s even though the two countries were very different economically. Germany was the stronger country despite lingering difficulties from reunification, but Britain wanted to keep the value of the pound above 2.7 marks. Attempts to keep to this standard left Britain with high interest rates and equally high inflation, but it demanded a fixed rate of 2.7 marks to a pound as a condition of entering the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Many speculators, George Soros chief among them, wondered how long fixed exchange rates could fight market forces, and they began to take up short positions against the pound. Soros borrowed heavily to bet more on a drop in the pound. Britain raised its interest rates to double digits to try to attract investors. The government was hoping to alleviate the selling pressure by creating more buying pressure. Paying out interest costs money, however, and the British government realized that it would lose billions trying to artificially prop up the pound. It withdrew from the ERM and the value of the pound plummeted against the mark. Soros made at least $1 billion off this one trade. For the British government’s part, the devaluation of the pound actually helped, as it forced the excess interest and inflation out of the economy, making it an ideal environment for businesses. A Thankless Job Any discussion around the top currency trades always revolves around George Soros, because many of these traders have a connection to him and his Quantum Fund. After retiring from active management of his funds to focus on philanthropy, Soros made comments about currency trading that were seen as expressing regret that he made his fortune attacking currencies. It was an odd change for Soros who, like many traders, made money by removing pricing inefficiencies from the market. Britain did lose money because of Soros and he did force the country to swallow the bitter pill of withdrawing from the ERM, but many people also see these drawbacks to the trade as necessary steps that helped Britain emerge stronger. If there hadn’t been a drop in the pound, Britain’s economic problems may have dragged on as politicians kept trying to tweak the ERM. The Bottom Line A country can benefit from a weak currency as much as from a strong one. With a weak currency, the domestic products and assets become cheaper to international buyers and exports increase. In the same way, domestic sales increase as foreign products go up in price due to the higher cost of importing. There were very likely many people in Britain and New Zealand who were pleased when speculators brought down the overvalued currencies. Of course, there were also importers and others who were understandably upset. A currency speculator makes money by forcing a country to face realities it would rather not face. Although it’s a dirty job, someone has to do it. http://www.businessinsider.com/how-george-soros-shorted-the-pound-etching-his-name-into-financial-history-forever-2010-6/?IR=T The Real Story Of How George Soros Shorted The Pound, Etching His Name Into Financial History Forever Vince Veneziani Jun. 4, 2010, 2:03 PM 39,717 http://static3.businessinsider.com/image/4bbf29147f8b9a0018130100-345-259/george-soros.jpg George Soros George Soros is a man who needs no introduction. The famous investor has been through enough bull and bear markets to teach any young whippersnapper a thing or two about how to properly invest. But without a doubt, Soros’ most famous trade is his shorting of the British pound back in 1992. The upcoming book “More Money Than God,” written by Sebastian Mallaby, tells the tale of how Soros used his Quantum Fund to break the pound to pieces and pocket a billion dollars. The Atlantic has printed an excerpt from the novel, which has some interesting notes: The Bank of England’s plan was to aggressively buy the pound in hope that it would inspire confidence and stop speculators from destroying the currency. Germany’s central bank began to attack Britain, calling for a devaluation of the pound. Soros had AT LEAST $1.5 billion bet on the pound since August, 1992. The devaluation crisis occurred a month later in September. Instead of steadily building up a position in September of 1992, Soros told his lieutenants to “go for the jugular.” Investor Louis Moore Bacon worked with Soros to find ways to dump the pound. Britain had to raise interest rates to protect the pound, but Prime Minister John Major refused to authorize the hike. Ultimately, he capitulated. The killer moment? When Soros found out just how badly his short selling had affected the Bank of England: “I’ve learned we’ve just raised interest rates by two hundred basis points,” he said softly–a full two percentage points. Then he rose and shook Smick’s hand and left the room running.” The Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/2/ Read the full piece at The Atlantic -> http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/2/ https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/ ‘Go for the Jugular’ Sebastian Mallaby Jun 4, 2010 >The collapse of Greece’s economy, and its domino effect on Spain, Portugal, and other countries in the euro currency zone, is in many ways a replay of an earlier financial crisis–the break-up of the continent’s Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Then, as now, Europe’s policymakers showed little patience with–or understanding of–markets. Then, as now, Germany often seemed contemptuous of the less competitive economies on the periphery of Europe. The 1992 crisis came to a head on Friday September 9, when currency speculators forced the devaluation of the Italian lira. By the following Tuesday, Britain was facing the same fate. In this excerpt from More Money Than God, his new history of hedge funds, Sebastian Mallaby tells the story of the crisis from inside the cockpit of George Soros’s Quantum Fund. On Tuesday, September 15, the pound took another beating. Spain’s finance minister telephoned Norman Lamont, his British counterpart, to ask him how things were. “Awful,” Lamont answered. That evening Lamont convened a meeting with Robin LeighPemberton, the governor of the Bank of England. The two men agreed that the central bank should buy the pound aggressively the next morning. As the meeting wound down, Leigh-Pemberton read out a message from his press office. Helmut Schlesinger, the president of the German Bundesbank, had given an interview to the Wall Street Journal and a German financial newspaper, Handelsblatt. According to a news agency report on his remarks, Schlesinger believed there would have to be a broad realignment of Europe’s currencies. Lamont was stunned. Schlesinger’s remark was tantamount to calling for the pound to devalue. Already his public statements had triggered an assault on Italy’s lira. Now the German central banker was attacking Britain. Lamont asked Leigh-Pemberton to call Schlesinger immediately, overruling Leigh-Pemberton’s concern that the punctilious Bundesbanker did not like to have his dinner interrupted. After several conversations, Leigh-Pemberton reported that Schlesinger believed there was no cause for alarm. His comments were not “authorized,” and he would check the article and issue an appropriate statement when he reached his office in the morning. Lamont protested that this was a dangerously leisurely response. Schlesinger’s purported comments were already on news wires; traders in New York and Asia would react overnight; Schlesinger needed to issue a denial quickly. But Germany’s monetary master refused to be hurried. He was not going to adapt to a world of 24-hour trading. That night, Lamont went to bed knowing that the next day would be difficult. But he could not imagine how difficult. Stan Druckenmiller, the chief portfolio manager at George Soros’s Quantum Fund, read Schlesinger’s comments on Tuesday afternoon in New York. He didn’t care whether they were “authorized;” he reacted immediately. Schlesinger had made it obvious that the Bundesbank was not going to help the pound cling onto its position inside the exchange-rate mechanism by cutting German interest rates. The devaluation of sterling was now all but inevitable. Druckenmiller walked into Soros’s office and told him it was time to move. He had held a $1.5 billion bet against the pound since August, but now the endgame was coming and he would build on the position steadily. Soros listened and looked puzzled. “That doesn’t make sense,” he objected. “What do you mean?” Druckenmiller asked. Well, Soros responded, if the Schlesinger quotes were accurate, why just build steadily? “Go for the jugular,” Soros advised him. Druckenmiller could see that Soros was right: Indeed, this was the man’s genius. Druckenmiller had done the analysis, understood the politics, and seen the trigger for the trade; but Soros was the one who sensed that this was the moment to go nuclear. When you knew you were right, there was no such thing as betting too much. You piled on as hard as possible. For the rest of that Tuesday, Druckenmiller and Soros sold sterling to anyone prepared to buy from them. Normally they left it to their traders to execute orders, but this time they got on the phones themselves, searching for banks that would agree to take the other side of their orders. Under the rules of the exchange-rate mechanism, the Bank of England was obliged to accept offers to sell sterling, but this requirement only held during the trading day in London. With the Bank of England closed for business, it was a scramble to find buyers, particularly once word got around that Soros and Druckenmiller were selling crazily. Late that day, the hedge-fund trader Louis Bacon called Stan Druckenmiller. The two talked about how the drama might play out, and Bacon said he was still finding ways to dump sterling. “Really?” Druckenmiller blurted out. He told Bacon to wait, and a few seconds later Soros joined the call. “Where did you get the market?” Soros demanded furiously. Around 2 the next morning, Druckenmiller returned to the office. He wanted to be at his desk when London trading reopened and the Bank of England would be forced to resume purchases of sterling. Before he had even taken his coat off, Soros checked in by telephone. Druckenmiller hit the speaker button, and his boss’s disembodied East European accent filled the office, urging him to redouble sales of the British currency. When the markets opened in London, the Bank of England did its best to boost sterling, acting on the plan that Lamont had authorized the previous evening. It intervened twice before 8:30 AM, each time buying £300 million. But the buying had absolutely no effect. Druckenmiller was manning his cockpit on the other side of the Atlantic, clamoring to sell sterling by the billion. The Bank of England carried on intervening, not realizing how completely it was outgunned. By 8:40 AM it had purchased a total of £1 billion, but sterling still refused to budge. Ten minutes later, Lamont told Prime Minister John Major that intervention was failing. Britain would have to raise interest rates in order to protect sterling. To Lamont’s frustration, Major refused to authorize a rate hike. He had been responsible for taking Britain into the exchange-rate mechanism. He feared that his credibility would collapse if the policy was seen to be failing; he might face a leadership challenge from a member of his own cabinet. Major pleaded that new economic data would come out later that day. He told Lamont to hang tough in the hope that the markets would subside eventually. Every hour that went by, hedge funds and banks sold more sterling to the Bank of England, which was being forced to load up on a currency that seemed sure to be devalued. Britain was presiding over a vast financial transfer from its long-suffering taxpayers to a global army of traders. At 10:30 AM Lamont called John Major again to urge a rise in interest rates. While Lamont was calling the prime minister, British officials did their best to project confidence. Eddie George, the number two at the Bank of England, went ahead with a long scheduled meeting with David Smick, a financial consultant who fed political intelligence to Druckenmiller and Soros. Smick showed up at the Bank of England’s exquisite building on Threadneedle Street to find George in apparently fine form, decked out in a checkered shirt and striped tie in the manner of a London banker. “We have it all under control,” George said cheerily; in the extreme case, which was unlikely, to be sure, the Bank of England would raise interest rates by a full percentage point to see off the speculators. Smick wondered whether George understood the weight of the hedge-fund selling that was forcing down the value of the British currency. The avalanche had begun. It might be too late to stop it. Smick summoned up his nerve and asked George straight out: “Aren’t you worried that you may have slipped too far behind the curve on this thing?” George betrayed a look of mild annoyance. He was about to respond when the telephone rang. After a minute of intense conversation, he hung up. “I’ve learned we’ve just raised interest rates by two hundred basis points,” he said softly–a full two percentage points. Then he rose and shook Smick’s hand and left the room running. Lamont’s plea to the prime minister had succeeded this time, and the announcement of the dramatic rate hike had been set for 11 AM. A few minutes before the appointed hour, Lamont walked over to his outer office at the Treasury to watch the Reuters screen. But when the announcement came, the pound did not respond at all. The line on the screen remained totally flat. Lamont felt like a surgeon who looks at a heart monitor and realizes that his patient has expired. All that remained was to unplug the system. Lamont knew he had to take Britain out of the exchange-rate mechanism. But this would require the prime minister’s approval, and Major was not immediately available. Lamont had his staff call Major’s office repeatedly to stress the urgency of a meeting, but no audience was granted. Eventually Lamont led a team of advisers over to Admiralty House, the fine Georgian building that was serving temporarily as the prime ministerial residence; there they waited for at least another quarter of an hour before Major would see them. Lamont calculated that the nation was losing hundreds of millions of pounds every few minutes, but his boss looked annoyingly relaxed. He began the meeting by wondering aloud whether there was room for further financial diplomacy with Germany, then added that several other government ministers would shortly be joining the meeting. A meandering discussion ensued. Could Britain withdraw from the exchange-rate mechanism without offending its European partners? If it did withdraw, would there be calls for ministers’ resignations? It became clear that Major’s objective was to share responsibility for the crisis with the other people in the room–“we were there to put our hands in the blood,” one minister later commented. It was a shrewd maneuver, and from Major’s perspective, it served to neutralize potential rivals to his throne. Meanwhile, Druckenmiller and Soros were adding to their positions. The Admiralty House meeting broke up without the decision to quit the exchange-rate mechanism that Lamont had wanted. Instead, Major insisted on another interest rate hike–this time of three additional percentage points, effective the next day–as a last ditch effort to save sterling. Again, Lamont watched the news break on the Reuters screen. Again, there was no effect on sterling’s value. At their desks on the other side of the Atlantic, Druckenmiller and Soros saw the rate hikes as an act of desperation by a dying man. They were a signal that the end was nigh–and that it was time for one last push to sell the life out of the British currency. Lamont proceeded to warn his fellow finance ministers in Europe of sterling’s plight. His Italian counterpart, Piero Barucci, suggested that, rather than quitting the exchange-rate mechanism unilaterally, Lamont suspend markets to give himself time to negotiate a realignment with other European governments. Lamont had to point out that it is not in the power of a modern finance minister to suspend currency markets that trade continuously and globally. That evening, Lamont called a press conference in the Treasury’s central courtyard. At 7:30 p.m., facing a massive battery of TV cameras from all over the world, he announced Britain’s exit from the exchange-rate mechanism. The markets had won, and the government had at last recognized it. Adapted from More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite, to be published by the Penguin Press on June 14. More Money Than God http://www.amazon.com/More-Money-Than-God-Making/dp/1594202559/ref=sr_1_1? ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1275665470&sr=1-1 More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite http://www.amazon.com/More-Money-Than-GodMaking/dp/1594202559/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1275665470&sr=1-1 https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2015/07/07/forbes-flashback-george-soros-british-pound-euro-ecb/#7360bf206131 Forbes Flashback: How George Soros Broke The British Pound And Why Hedge Funds Probably Can’t Crack The Euro Steve Schaefer , Forbes Staff Jul 7, 2015 @ 11:40 AM 37,635 Greek citizens voted against further austerity measures demanded by the Troika financing their rescue package, casting even more doubt on the country’s future as a member of the eurozone and throwing bond and currency markets into an uproar. The euro has plunged from $1.20 to $1.09 this year (see chart). The feared unraveling of the currency – which, admittedly, would take a lot more than Greece’s departure – calls to mind another currency fiasco from the early 1990s, when George Soros and a group of other investors that included fellow hedge fund managers Paul Tudor Jones and Bruce Kovner, bet against a central bank’s ability to hold the line on its currency. https://media.ycharts.com/charts/ba79475d4b20f1b07d14418506ac4f49.png Euro to US Dollar Exchange Rate data by YCharts Forbes took a deep dive into that trade in the November 9, 1992 issue, illuminating how Soros made $1.5 billion in just a single month by betting the British pound and several other European currencies were priced too richly against the German deutsche mark. The entire group cashed in big-time. Jones’ funds made $250 million, while Kovner’s Caxton Corp. rang the register to the tune of $300 million, but no one made more than Soros, who cleared $1.5 billion in that fateful month of September. (The score made Soros’ legend and swelled his firm’s coffers; assets under management jumped to $7 billion, from $3.3 billion, by mid-October 1992, and to $11 billion by the end of 1993.) “They bet that the politicians and central banks could not much longer maintain artificially high exchange rates in the interests of European unity,” wrote authors Thomas Jaffe and Dyan Machan. The inverse is apt these days, with many traders questioning how European leaders can possibly maintain their tenuous grip on exchange rates and bond yields in the eurozone, where several nations boast 10-year bond yields well below those of the U.S., which at least controls its own currency. One thing that is clear is the stakes have only gone up since 1992. From Jaffe and Machan’s story (republished in full below): In former times, powerful central bankers could usually frustrate speculators. They did so by simply buying massive amounts of the weaker currency and flooding the market with the stronger currency. But times are changing. While the central banks can mobilize tens of billions of dollars, trading in foreign currency markets now runs to a trillion dollars a day. Foreign currency trading has only gotten more massive – pegged at over $5 trillion a day by the Bank for International Settlements – but so has the financial firepower of central banks. The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet stands at $4.5 trillion after years of quantitative easing, while the European Central Bank laid out a plan for 1.1 trillion euro of bond purchases through September 2016. That makes the sums Soros was betting against seem almost pedestrian by comparison. So could a repeat of the Soros score happen today? Traders can certainly position to profit if the euro currency unravels, but Soros’ bet benefited from the insular nature of the Bank of England in the early 1990s. “The world is a lot smaller than it was in 1992,” says Dean Popplewell, vice president of currency analysis at foreign exchange currency Oanda. “Central banks today work much more quickly and collectively than in years past, to avoid knock-on effects.” The last decade offered plenty of lessons in how rapidly a crisis can emerge, from the collapse of 2008 to the European sovereign debt mess that is still roiling financial markets. Central banks have moved to the forefront, far more transparently telegraphing their actions. While there can be isolated instances of breakdowns — the Swiss National Bank’s surprise withdrawal of its euro peg in January was far more reminiscent of 1992 than anything happening in the euro — trading has remained largely fluid and orderly, Popplewell says, pointing to the recent spike in German bund yields that was significant, but quickly absorbed by the market. Fed policy is also a crucial element in the euro story, since interest rate divergence is what helped make Soros’ trade a winner in 1992. Were it only considering U.S. conditions, the Fed would likely raise rates at least once and probably twice this year, Popplewell suggests, but it’s clear Janet Yellen and her central bank colleagues have a more global perspective that takes into account the stronger dollar, Europe’s struggles and the peril looming if the overheated Chinese stock market collapses. If those concerns keep a leash on Fed rate hikes, the bets on its policy diverging with that of the ECB will take longer to pay off. Will traders make money if the euro falls to parity with the dollar or below? Of course. A host of macro-focused hedge funds are said to have short euro positions. But are any loading up the truck like Soros did, with a variety of long and short positions designed to make billions on the currency’s collapse? The odds on that bet are probably a bit longer. Euro to US Dollar Exchange Rate http://ycharts.com/indicators/euro_to_us_dollar_exchange_rate by the Bank for International Settlements http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13fx.pdf surprise withdrawal of its euro peg in January http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2015/01/16/swiss-bank-stunner-claimsvictims-currency-broker-fxcm-bludgeoned/ Follow @SchaeferStreet https://twitter.com/SchaeferStreet https://priceonomics.com/the-trade-of-the-century-when-george-soros-broke/ The Trade of the Century: When George Soros Broke the British Pound By Rohin Dhar, Jun 17, 2016 · 157,677 views · 3,008 shares · 70 mentions Earlier version: May 15, 2014. https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/several-pound-bills-new-british-20-pounds-money%281%29.jpg “I’ve learned many things from [George Soros], but perhaps the most significant is that it’s not whether you’re right or wrong, but how much money you make when you’re right and how much you lose when you’re wrong.” Stanley Druckenmiller, 1994 * * In 1992, George Soros brought the Bank of England to its knees. In the process, he pocketed over a billion dollars. Making a billion dollars is by all accounts pretty cool. But demolishing the monetary system of Great Britain in a single day with an elegantly constructed bet against its currency? That’s the stuff of legends. Though it occurred just two decades ago, Soros made his nationshaking bet in a very different time. Back then, hedge funds hadn’t yet entered the public consciousness, restrictions on capital flowing from one country to another were just lifted, and the era of the 24-hour news cycle had just begun. To appreciate how Soros made a fortune betting against the British pound requires some knowledge of how exchange rates between countries work, the macroeconomic tools governments use to stimulate economies, and how hedge funds make money. Our readers are invited to correct us if we stumble in explaining any of these concepts. And so onwards with the story of how George Soros led a group of traders to break the entire foreign currency system of Great Britain-and profit handsomely at the expense of British taxpayers and others who were on the wrong side of the greatest financial bet of the 20th century. Picking Up the Pieces in Europe https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/EuropePostWWII.png Let’s start by laying out the historical backdrop for Soros’ gambit. After Word War II, European countries wanted to integrate their economies more tightly with each other. The hope was that tighter relations would prevent catastrophic wars from breaking out every few decades and create a Pan-European market that could compete with the United States. This culminated in the European Union (EU), which didn’t assume its current form with a single currency until 1999. A precursor to the EU was the European Exchange Rate mechanism (ERM), which was created in 1979. Countries weren’t ready to give up their national currencies, but they agreed to fix their exchange rates with each other instead of “floating” their currency and letting capital markets set the rates. Since Germany had the strongest economy in Europe, each country set their currency’s value in Deutschmarks. They agreed to maintain the exchange rate between their currency and the Deutschmark within an acceptable band of plus or minus 6% of the agreed upon rate. With fixed exchange rates, countries can’t just “set it and forget it.” People trade currency every day, exchanging their currency to buy imports or sell exports, and the market applies pressure based on what it thinks the actual rate should be based on supply and demand for a currency. To keep the exchange rate fixed, governments need to participate in the market and nudge it in the agreed upon direction. Governments can manage their currency in two main ways. First, they can take their reserves of foreign currency and buy up their own currency on the open market. That causes the currency to appreciate. Doing the opposite devalues the currency. Alternatively, governments can influence exchange rates by setting interest rates. Want your currency to appreciate? Raise rates to entice people to buy your currency and lend that money at higher interest rates. Want your currency to depreciate? Cut interest rates so capital needs to go elsewhere in search of juicy profits. Messing around with interest rates is a big deal, however, because interest rates affect the whole economy. Along with government spending, interest rates are the main lever governments can use to adjust the economy. If the country is experiencing a recession, the government might cut interest rates to spur investment and spending. If inflation is high, the government might raise rates to shrink the supply of money. So, all this is to say that there are consequences to maintaining a fixed exchange rate. It’s an external forcing function that ties governments’ hands on monetary policy, which may limit or even contradict what they need to do to keep the domestic economy healthy. Britain Enters the ERM https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/johnmajor.jpg John Major, leading proponent of ERM while serving under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Major was Prime Minister when the chickens came home to roost, so to speak. In 1990, Britain was a country that arguably could use an external forcing function to tie its hands on monetary policy. Inflation was high, productivity was low, exports were uncompetitive, and no one really believed the government was capable of fixing the issues. The Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, had long opposed entering the ERM, insisting that the price of the pound be set by the markets. By 1990, however, Thatcher lacked the political power to oppose other members of her Conservative party who wanted to fix their exchange rates with the rest of Europe. The decision to join the ERM was championed by John Major, who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Thatcher’s cabinet. In October 1990, Britain finally enter the ERM at an exchange rate of 2.95 Deutschmark (DM) for each British pound (GBP). The British government was obligated to keep the exchange rate within 2.78 DM to 3.13 DM. Shortly thereafter, Major replaced Thatcher as the Prime Minister. The fixed exchange rate system was to be the centerpiece of his economic plan. Major thought that the ERM would serve as a sort of “autopilot” that kept the British monetary policy on proper course. The government couldn’t play with the money supply willy-nilly because its hands were tied by the exchange rate agreement. And to a certain extent, the policy worked. Between 1990 and 1992, inflation decreased, interest rates eased, and unemployment was low by historical standards. In 1992, however, England felt the impact of a massive global recession, and unemployment spiked to 12.7% from just 7.7% two years prior. And so we come to 1992. Ordinarily, Britain could spur investment and spending by cutting interest rates during an employment crisis. But in this case, doing so would push the pound’s value below the agreed upon amount. So while the people of Great Britain dealt with a recession, the government’s hands were tied; they’d just have to ride it out. Meanwhile in New York City In 1992, George Soros was 62 years old and led the Quantum Fund, a hedge fund he founded in 1970 that bet on macroeconomic trends. Soros was already a very rich guy, but he wasn’t iconically rich, or the public figure he is today. If hedge funds have an air of mystery about them today, this was especially true in 1992-it wasn’t until then that the term even entered the popular vernacular. Mention of the words “Hedge Fund” by Year According to Google Books https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/Screenshot2014-05-1510.41.52.png https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph? content=hedge+fund&year_start=1950&year_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Chedge%20fund%3B%2Cc0 What is a hedge fund exactly? Well, the word “hedge” provides a clue to their original purpose: investing capital to make a specific bet that something will happen. Hedge funds also use financial instruments to “hedge” against other risks in order to more clearly isolate the bet that they want to make. Here’s an example. Say you’re a hedge fund that thinks AT&T’s cell phone network stinks and you want to bet against it. You could “short” the stock (make money when the stock goes down), but the whole cell phone market is going gangbusters, so AT&T might get new customers even though it stinks. If that happens, AT&T’s stock price could go up, and you’d lose a lot of money. To “hedge” against this risk, you buy some Verizon stock as well, because more precisely, you think that AT&T is crappy relative to Verizon. Now, if cell phone carrier stocks increase in value, you still make money in the event that Verizon goes up more than AT&T does. Conversely, if cell phone stocks go down, you still make money if AT&T’s stock goes down faster than Verizon’s does. By creating a position like this, you’ve “hedged” a lot of the more general market and industry risks away and made a very specific bet: that AT&T stinks compared to Verizon. Another thing hedge funds do (if they’re pretty sure about their wager) is borrow funds to put even more money behind the bet. On the AT&T-Verizon trade, they might make a little bit of money on each share. But if they use mostly borrowed money, they can buy a lot of shares without fronting much capital. So if you’re really sure a bet is right, you might borrow a lot of money to enhance your payday. A final thing to note about hedge funds is how their managers get paid. The managers are typically investing other people’s money (rich people, endowments, etc), and they receive management fees to cover the fund’s expenses; this includes a salary. The standard is about 2% of the funds under management. So if you manage a very large hedge fund in terms of the amount of money being invested, you can earn some decent income regardless of how the fund performs. But not enough to make you a billionaire. Hedge fund managers become billionaires by placing really successful bets. Managers earn around 20% of the returns that the fund creates (assuming the fund meets some minimum benchmark). So if your fund makes a bet that produces a billion dollar return, you and your partners make at least $200 million of that. Do that for a few years, especially if you place larger and larger bets, and voila! You’re a billionaire. So in short, hedge funds try to make isolated bets using financial instruments. They borrow money to make the potential rewards even sweeter, and hedge fund managers can make boatloads of money when they bet right. And that’s exactly what Soros and his partners were about to do. A Mis-priced Currency Means Big Opportunity https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/britishpound.jpg Photo by deg.io https://www.flickr.com/photos/deg_io/5731300467/ By the spring of 1992, just a year and a half after Britain joined the ERM, the fixed exchange rate posed a serious problem. While putting on a cheery public face, internally the Exchequer (England’s Treasury department) realized that the currency was mispriced relative to the Deutschemark. Jonathan Portes, an economist who was at the time a junior staff member there, wrote: “In May 1992, the immediate problem was obvious. From a domestic point of view, the appropriate level of interest rates, given weak demand, was much lower than that necessary to maintain [the] sterling’s position in the ERM. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear that sterling was overvalued; even in the depths of a recession, we still had a large current account deficit [the country was importing more than it exported]. We argued that the fundamental problem was that we’d joined the ERM at the wrong rate; sterling was overvalued, meaning that we were stuck with a structural current account deficit.” The sterling was priced too high. The British government knew it, and the market knew it too as the pound was trading at the lower end of the agreed upon band with the Deutschemark. What kept the pound from plummeting in value was the British government’s guarantee that it would keep the value propped up, and the market believed that it would. As long as everyone believed that England would stay indefinitely committed to buying pounds for around 2.95 Deutschemarks, the status quo was maintained. The Flashpoint “Markets can influence the events that they anticipate.” George Soros Throughout the summer of 1992, the British pound held its position. That is, until Germany threw Britain under the bus and all hell broke loose. For some time that year, German central bank officials made comments on and off the record that undermined the sterling’s strength. The British paper The Independent documents the slights: “On 25 August, for example, Reimut Jochimsen, a Bundesbank council member, issued a speech saying that there was potential for realignment within the ERM. Sterling weakened. On 10 September, an unnamed Bundesbank official was quoted as saying that a devaluation of sterling was inevitable. The pound fell.” The event that ultimately led to the undoing of the British pound’s fixed exchange rate was an interview with the President of the German Bundesbank, Helmut Schlesinger. Schlesinger gave the interview to the Wall Street Journal and a German newspaper. He had one condition: If they wanted to directly quote him, they had to let him review the quotes. If they only indirectly paraphrased him, no such permission was necessary. https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/HelmetSchlesingerBlackandWhitecopy.png President of the German Bundesbank, Helmut Schlesinger That night on September 16th, 1992, the following report paraphrasing Schlesinger’s words went out over the newswires: “The President of the Bundesbank, Professor Helmut Schlesinger, does not rule out the possibility that, even after the realignment and the cut in German interest rates, one or two currencies could come under pressure before the referendum in France. He conceded in an interview that the problems are of course not solved completely by the measures taken.” By the morning, the report landed on George Soros’ desk. Soros and the entire financial market took this to believe that the pound sterling was one of those currencies that could “come under pressure” and be devalued. In just one day, this seemingly innocuous, paraphrased quote would bring devastation to the Bank of England and net George Soros over a billion dollars in profit. The market ceased to believe that England would be able to maintain its current exchange rate-and that belief was all that was keeping the pound from falling. The Trade of the Century “There is no point in being confident and having a small position.” George Soros Since August, Soros and his Quantum Fund had been building a $1.5 billion position to bet that the price of Sterling would fall. Since the British government’s full faith and credit was stating that it would not fall, this wasn’t necessarily something that was going to happen. But Stanley Druckenmiller, a senior member of the fund, saw the report from Schlesinger and immediately realized its importance. Sebastian Mallaby’s book More Money Than God recounts the day’s events. According to Mallaby, Druckenmiller noted that their $1.5 billion bet against the pound was about to pay off and that they should consider adding to the position. Soros retorted with a different strategy: “Go for the jugular.” If Schlesinger’s quote could be used as the catalyst for the pound to devalue, why shouldn’t today be the day it happened? Instead of slowly building up a short position against the sterling, the Quantum Fund could short sell sterling on an unprecedented scale today. Doing so would not only help hasten the tumble of the sterling, but also increase the fund’s profit. It was this decision to “go for the jugular” that netted Soros’s firm over a billion dollars, toppled the Bank of England’s currency regime, and ultimately led to the disgrace of the Prime Minister. It also cost the British taxpayers billions. https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/ScreenShot2016-06-17at1.02.17PM.jpg The man himself, George Soros. Picture from “Charlie Rose”; modified by Priceonomics. Let’s walk through Soros’s trade to understand why it was so elegant. As we stated earlier, the trade was for the Quantum Fund to “short” the British pound, meaning they would make money if the currency’s value went down. Now, what exactly does it mean to “short” a currency, or anything for that matter? Let’s say it’s January 2009 and you think Apple’s iPhone is over the hill and that the company’s stock price (of $90) will decline. How do you benefit from this insight? Well, you or your broker can go to someone that owns some Apple stock and ask to borrow a single Apple stock from them. You’ll give them back the share later and of course pay them interest for the loan. But for now, you sell that stock for $90 in cash. Two days later, the stock price is $88, so you buy one share with your $90 in cash. That leaves you with $2 in profit! (Well almost two dollarsyou have to pay the person who loaned you the stock two days of interest.) But what if you didn’t sell your Apple stock when it hit $88 and instead decided to hold onto it until the stock plummeted further? Well, you’d be screwed because the stock went up from $90 to around $600; you would lose $510 on a the trade, plus interest! If you buy a stock, the worst you can do is lose all your money. If you short a stock, your downside is limitless because the stock can always keep going up. You can possibly lose more than all your money, and that’s a very bad thing. So if you take a short position, you want to make sure your downside risk is hedged. And what if you want to short a currency like the British pound? In this case, you’d go to a British person or company and ask to borrow money from them. They say, “Sure, here’s 100 British pounds. Just give me back the pounds in a few days with some interest, and we’ll have some tea and crumpets.” Now, you take those 100 British pounds, and you convert them into 295 Deutschemarks at the agreed upon exchange rate. At this point, you would really like the British pound to lose value relative to the Deutschmark. Why? Because if the British pound depreciates 10%, when you convert the 295 DM back to pounds to repay the loan, you’ll have 110 pounds. You can pay back the 100 pounds and a little bit of interest, and you’ll still clear about 10 pounds in profit. So you make money if the pound devalues. But what if the pound appreciates? You’ll lose your shirt. Therein lies the brilliance of Soros’s bet: if the pound tanked, they would make billions on their short. And if the pound increased in value? Well, that scenario was impossible because everyone knew the sterling was over priced. It already traded at the bottom of its trading band, and the only thing that kept it propped up was government intervention. There was no scenario in which the pound would appreciate. So, either the pound would stay about the same in value (in which case Soros’s fund wouldn’t make any money, but wouldn’t lose that much money), or the pound would be devalued and the firm would make an obscene amount of money. There was no massive downside-only a massive upside. As The Handbook of Hedge Funds puts it: “If speculators were to break the ERM, being short the pound could turn out to be a very profitable position. Even if the devaluation did not occur, the chances of seeing the pound strengthen were small — it was more likely to stay at the bottom of its fluctuation band. The only downside for speculators was transaction costs.” And so that morning, Soros and his fund increased their short position against the British pound from $1.5 to $10 billion. It was the perfect bet with a mitigated downside and a limitless upside. It was like betting on a coin flip, were if the coin lands on heads (the pound devalues), they make a lot of money. If the coin lands on tails (the exchange rates remained fixed), they only lose a small amount of money on loan interest. That’s the kind of bet Soros would pour money into all the day, even if he had to borrow billions. Fighting off the Speculators “Our total position by Black Wednesday had to be worth almost $10 billion. We planned to sell more than that. In fact, when Norman Lamont [the British finance minister] said just before the devaluation that he would borrow nearly $15 billion to defend sterling, we were amused because that was about how much we wanted to sell.” George Soros, 1992 As Europe slept, Soros borrowed and sold pounds from anyone that he could. The Quantum Fund’s position exceeded $10 billion shorting the pound. Other hedge funds got wind of the trade (and the report from the Bundesbank) and started following suit, also borrowing and selling pounds. By the time London markets opened for business and British treasury officials started their day, tens of billions of pounds had been sold. The pound was dangerously close to trading below the levels mandated by the ERM. The Bank of England was about to have a very shitty day. British officials first responded by buying one billion pounds at 8:40 AM. The purchase had no effect on the price of the pound. The whole world was selling, and the British government didn’t have the buying power to fight it all off. It’s estimated that the British government spent £27 billion of its reserves buying up pounds to no avail. By 9AM, finance minister Norman Lamont contacted Prime Minister John Major and told him they couldn’t possibly buy up enough pounds to keep the currency propped up. The only option left for the British government to keep their currency trading at the right level would be to increase interest rates dramatically and attract people to buy pounds. Major refused. Britain was in the midst of a recession, and increasing rates would further shrink the economy. It would be political suicide. Blood was in the water. Global capital continued to bet against the pound. An hour and a half later, Lamont called the Prime Minister to re-plead his case. The Prime Minister relented. At 11AM, the British government announced they would increase interest rates 200 basis points, from 10% to 12%. How did the value of the pound react to this enormous increase in interest rates? Nothing happened. The pound continued to plummet. Lamont headed to the Prime Minister’s residence to figure out how to salvage the situation, which led them to announce an interest rate increase of another 300 basis points, from 12% to 15%. What was the effect of this rate increase on the sterling? Again, nothing. As Mallaby later documents in his book, Soros and the gang of speculators knew victory was near: “At their desks on the other side of the Atlantic, Druckenmiller and Soros saw the rate hikes as an act of desperation by a dying man. They were a signal that the end was nigh–and that it was time for one last push to sell the life out of the British currency.” The market expected that Britain would have to devalue its currency and that no amount of interest rate hikes or currency purchasing would change that. At this point, the sentiment that Britain would exit the ERM and devalue its currency was a self-fulfilling prophecy; if the speculators believed it enough to put their money behind it, it would eventually come true. At 7:30 PM that night, Lamont held a news conference to announce that Britain would be exiting the ERM and floating its currency on the market. Soros and the speculators won. https://youtu.be/AHDsO7gvXHQ The Aftermath of Black Wednesday British financial history now refers to September 17, 1992, as “Black Wednesday;” George Soros, however, probably calls it something like “Awesome Wednesday.” Once Great Britain floated its currency, the pound fell 15% versus the Deutschmark and 25% versus the US Dollar. If you’ll remember, Soros’s Quantum Fund had approximately $15 billion betting that the pound would fall versus other currencies. https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/GBPVsDM.jpg They had borrowed billions to make this trade, and they were right. Here’s what happened to the value of their fund versus the price of the pound: https://pix-media.priceonomics-media.com/blog/718/QuantumFundReturnsVsGBP.png Source: The Handbook of Hedge Funds The value of the fund increased almost instantly from $15BN to $19BN when the pound floated; a few months later, the fund was worth almost $22 BN. Remember, this is a hedge fund, so Soros and his partners made at least 20% of that $7 billion upside, which is at least $1.4BN. And that, my friends, is how you become a billionaire. The nature of Wall Street trading is that if you win big, someone else must lose big. In this case, there was an enormous wealth transfer from the British taxpayers to Soros and other hedge fund managers. The Guardian recounts: “Jim Trott, former chief dealer for the Bank of England, described the day as “stunningly expensive”. He said that behind the scenes he bought more sterling in four hours that day than anybody had before or since. All of his purchases lost value during the day – and went down even more when the government pulled out.” In the run up to the devaluation, the British Treasury kept spending its foreign currency on British pounds that become much less valuable after the Treasury floated the exchange rate. To maintain the fiction that the pound was properly priced, it essentially paid a dollar for something everyone knew was going to be worth three quarters. The cost to British taxpayers was estimated at roughly £3.3 billion. Losing billions of dollars of taxpayer money is so routine for politicians that they may not lose any sleep over the matter. They do, however, care about the political implications of publicly looking like a bunch of incompetents. You can’t make multiple announcements in a single day that you’re massively hiking interest rates in the middle of a recession or completely changing how foreign currency works without giving everyone the impression that you have no idea what you’re doing. John Major had made entering the ERM the centerpiece of his monetary policy and his plan to bring austerity to England. The events destroyed his credibility. Voters booted Major and his party from power in the next election. As it turns out, Margaret Thatcher was right: the UK had no business trying to artificially prop up its currency in an era when a handful of hedge funds could assemble more capital in a few hours than the Bank of England had at its disposal. If you’re looking for a take away from this story, that’s one of them. The amount of money sloshing around global markets is so enormous that it can bring even the British government to its knees in one day. Another takeaway is that regulations like this can create unexpected loopholes, and someone more clever than the politicians will eventually spot it. But perhaps most importantly, this story shows the power of the one-sided bet. In 1992, the bet was a well-designed macroeconomic trade against fixed exchange rates, executed by George Soros and his team. If they were wrong, the downside was almost zero. But they were right, and the upside was unfathomably high. Bets like that almost never come along, but when they do, enormous transfers of wealth take place from the sheep to the wolves. Our next article examines the decision of the San Francisco School District to eliminate algebra from middle schools-and the freakout that followed. To get notified when we post it ? join our email list. Priceonomics published an earlier version of this article on May 15, 2014.
Major thought https://libcom.org/library/britain-european-exchange-rate-mechanism unemployment spiked http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2013/02/uk-unemployment-18701999.html wrote http://niesr.ac.uk/blog/sterling-my-part-its-downfall#.U2qzTOZdU1o George Soros http://25iq.com/2013/07/30/a-dozen-things-about-investing-ive-learned-from-george-soros/ slights http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/schlesinger-a-bankers-guilt-the-president-of-the-bundesbank-has-been-woefullyindiscreet-but-the-chancellor-too-is-a-diminished-figure-says-christopher-huhne-1554949.html led to the undoing http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true George Soros http://25iq.com/2013/07/30/a-dozen-things-about-investing-ive-learned-from-george-soros/ $1.5 billion http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true More Money Than God http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true “Charlie Rose” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgSDaTpHkAo puts it http://books.google.com/books? id=zVubHUSOxpoC&pg=PT410&lpg=PT410&dq=short+selling+soros+pound+downside+risk&source=bl&ots=qXf9JYHfJU&sig=HSCisRfM0p6PrAJckecC85WqiQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YbtrU_ObMdGBogTdioDwBg&ved=0CHwQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=short%20selling%20soros%20pound%20dow $1.5 to $10 billion http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true one billion pounds at 8:40 AM http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true 9AM http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true refused http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true continued to plummet http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true book http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/go-for-the-jugular/57696/?single_page=true pound fell http://olesiafx.com/Kathy-Lien-Day-Trading-The-Currency-Market/George-Soros-the-Man-Who-Broke-The-Bank-OfEngland.html The Handbook of Hedge Funds http://books.google.com/books? id=zVubHUSOxpoC&pg=PT410&lpg=PT410&dq=short+selling+soros+pound+downside+risk&source=bl&ots=qXf9JYHfJU&sig=HSCisRfM0p6PrAJckecC85WqiQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YbtrU_ObMdGBogTdioDwBg&ved=0CHwQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=short%20selling%20soros%20pound%20dow recounts http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/13/black-wednesday-20-years-pound-erm £3.3 billion http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Wednesday https://www.thebalance.com/black-wednesday-george-soros-bet-against-britain-1978944 International Investing Black Wednesday: George Soros’ Bet Against Britain How George Soros Broke the Bank of England By Justin Kuepper Updated August 28, 2017 https://fthmb.tqn.com/ZVj5x3LPPr-m_Cs8n5g6pNTuYMQ=/768×0/filters:no_upscale()/about/GettyImages-109625328575eb3885f9b58f22e8d2561.jpg Jemal Countess / Getty Images. “Markets are constantly in a state of uncertainty and flux and money is made by discounting the obvious and betting on the unexpected.” George Soros George Soros is perhaps the most famous currency trader in the world, thanks to his timely and brave bet against the Bank of England, on what became known as Black Wednesday. With costs of around £3.3 billion, Britain’s central bank was unable to defend itself from an attack in the currency markets, and Mr. Soros made an estimated $1 billion in profit as a result. In this article, we will look at what happened on Black Wednesday and some lessons from the crisis for central banks and governments in the future. Setting the Stage for Black Wednesday The European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was setup in March of 1979 in order to reduce exchange rate variability and stabilize monetary policy across Europe before introducing a common currency that would eventually be known as the euro. Simple put, the ERM set an upper and lower margin in which exchange rates could vary – known as a semi-peg. Britain initially declined to join the ERM when it originated, but later adopted a semi-official policy that shadowed the Deutsche Mark. In October of 1990, the country decided to join the ERM after a shake-up in leadership, preventing its currency from fluctuating more than 6% in either direction by intervening in the currency markets with countertrades. Black Wednesday’s Underlying Causes When Britain joined the ERM, the rate was set to 2.95 Deutsche Marks per Pound Sterling with a 6% permissible move in either direction. The problem was that the country’s inflation rate was three times that of Germany’s, interest rates were at 15%, and the country’s economic boom was far into a period of unsustainable growth – setting the stage for a bust period. Currency traders took note of these underlying problems and began short selling the Pound Sterling – that is, borrowing and immediately converting them into a foreign currency with the agreement to re-convert them in the future. George Soros was one of these bearish currency traders, amassing a short position of more than $10 billion worth of Pound Sterling. Black Wednesday & Its Aftermath The UK’s prime minister and cabinet members authorized spending billions of Pounds Sterling in an attempt to contain the short selling by speculators. Moreover, the British government announced that it would raise its interest rates from 10% to 15% to try and attract currency traders looking for greater yield on their currency holdings. Unfortunately, currency speculators didn’t believe the government would make good on these promises and continued shorting the Pound Sterling. After an emergency meeting among top officials, the country was ultimately forced to withdraw from the ERM and let the market revalue its currency to more appropriate (lower) levels. The country was arguably thrown into a recession afterwards, with many British citizens referring to the ERM as the “Eternal Recession Machine”. While the government lost a lot of money, some politicians are glad the ERM disaster occurred, since it paved the way for a more conservative government to enter the fold and revive the economy. Lessons from Black Wednesday Black Wednesday teaches a number of important lessons to both currency traders and governments, including some lessons that may surprise readers. For instance, statistical data suggests that the British economy was growing faster in the ERM than published figures suggest, and the resulting recession may have instead been due to the aftermath of the Lawson boom. Lessons for governments include: Don’t Dictate Interest Rates – The ERM interest rates were set for Germany for Germany when they should have been set by Europe for Europe. Pick Your Fights Against Speculators – Taking extreme measures to counteract decisive market action is often a futile (and expensive) endeavor. Lessons for currency traders include: Nothing’s Impossible – The departure of Britain from the ERM was unthinkable to many during the crisis, but even governments make big mistakes. Be Ready for Extreme Measures – Britain’s decision to raise interest rates some 2% to 5% in a single day demonstrates potential government resolve. Conclusions Black Wednesday is widely known as the day that billionaire currency trader George Soros broke the Bank of England and made over $1 billion. But, the real lessons are found by analyzing the underlying causes of the crisis and how they quickly led to problems. By understanding these issues, central banks can avoid future crises sparked by regulatory constraints. the1uploader 8:37 pm on 2016-05-21 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/05/22/how-to-monetise-the-digital-media-remains-a-mistery-or-a-misery/)
how to monetise the digital media remains a mistery or a misery? http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/interview-with-henry-blodget-editor-of-business-insider-a-1092698.html Interview with Henry Blodget Editor of Business Insider Business Insider CEO ‘There Are No Must-Read Publications Any More’ May 20, 2016 10:56 AM Interview Conducted by Isabell Hülsen http://cdn2.spiegel.de/images/image-994389-thumbbiga-zsli-994389.jpg Henry Blodget, editor-in-chief of Business Insider, talks to SPIEGEL about the future of digital media, the likelihood of another dotcom bubble and about his own checkered past on Wall Street. About Henry Blodget Henry Blodget, 50, is the co-founder of Business Insider, a business website launched in 2009. In the late 1990s, Blodget worked as a highly successful analyst on Wall Street. He was charged with civil securities fraud in 2003, after which he was barred from the securities industry and made to pay $4 million in fines. http://cdn1.spiegel.de/images/image-662910-breitwandaufmacher-zghp-662910.jpg Buzzfeed headquarters in New York. BuzzFeed has come a long way from cat lists. SPIEGEL: Mr. Blodget, let’s talk about watermelons. Blodget: Watermelons? Ok, nice. SPIEGEL: A few weeks ago, Buzzfeed published a video on Facebook Live showing two employees putting rubber bands around a melon for 45 minutes until it exploded. https://youtu.be/jYFc5CQAqdI (Please note: The above video is in super-slow motion. It may not look like it is playing even when it is.) Blodget: A brilliant idea. SPIEGEL: The video was a viral hit and was watched more than 10 million times in the days after it was put online. What does this tell us about success in digital publishing? Blodget: First of all: Digital is profoundly different than television, radio or print. Buzzfeed and other digital companies are capitalizing on that difference. You could not have a TV show where all you do is wrap rubber bands around a watermelon for 45 minutes. But for people who are bored at work or at school it was perfect drama, a digital media event. It won’t work again: The next exploding fruit or vegetable is not going to be that exciting. But the profound message was: Digital is just a different medium. SPIEGEL: The watermelon has kicked off a discussion in the US about the future of journalism on the web. Critics take the watermelon as a symbol for the obsession of digital media like Buzzfeed with clicks and reach. The question is: How can stories about tax reform, voting rights or other dry topics possibly compete against exploding watermelons on the web? Blodget: Wrapping rubber bands around a watermelon is not journalism. It is entertainment. But the key to success in media has always been a broad mix of serious reporting and entertainment. The New York Times does not make its money on reports about Iraq and Syria. It makes money on its gardening section, food and, yes, stories about cats. “The Today Show” is a very successful program because it is a mix of the celebrity chef and the crazy pet who does the rolls and serious news and interviews. SPIEGEL: The fact that serious news publications have to compete for eyeballs and advertising money with digital-only publications that focus more on reach than on journalism is nothing to worry about? Blodget: Again, successful publication is all about the mix. What Buzzfeed discovered was that people like cat pictures. We can pretend to be embarrassed about that as a species, but it is actually a truth. So Buzzfeed publishes a lot of cat pictures. But they use the money from cat pictures to build an exceptional newsroom that publishes stories that far fewer people want to read, but it is very important journalism. SPIEGEL: Only a few days after their watermelon success, it became public that Buzzfeed had missed its revenue forecasts. Vanity Fair was quick to write that we might be witnessing “the beginning of the end of the millennial media bubble.” Do you share that perception or is there a whiff of schadenfreude in the air? Blodget: It is important to note that Buzzfeed might have missed its targets, but it did grow something like 40 percent last year on a significant revenue base. Most media companies would kill for that. I would not call it a bubble by any means, rather a boom and bust cycle. I think our industry will go through a consolidation phase, as pretty much every industry does. The strong companies will come through that and will be in much better positions than a lot of the traditional media companies that still cling to the old business model they have. SPIEGEL: What makes you sure that you are not being overly optimistic? You became a star analyst on Wall Street during the dotcom era, but then the SEC banned you from Wall Street for life. Doesn’t that oblige you to be more skeptical today? Blodget: The dot-com experience was a searing lesson, without question. I saw that there was a big bubble building up and I warned many times to limit the risks. But I did not foresee how complete the devastation would be and how even great companies would be creamed and all the stocks would get crushed. But I think one has to be optimistic about the future to succeed in any entrepreneurial endeavor. In the early years of Business Insider, some of the investors would say: You are too cautious, you need to be more aggressive, you need to invest more money, you need to take more risk, this is a big opportunity, you are being too conservative. SPIEGEL: Not everybody is willing to forgive your mistakes. A former editor in chief of BusinessWeek wrote about you: “Blodget was dishonest and deeply cynical. Journalists should be the opposite. It hurts me to see him ply our trade.” The book author David Callahan described you as a great “hype master.” Blodget: What happened to me was a distressing, humiliating experience. I just felt terrible at the time. I felt I had let so many people down. But that motivated me to regain their trust. I would invite anybody who says things like that to simply judge my journalism and read what I have written. Most readers love it. SPIEGEL: You started your career as a freelance journalist, before moving to Wall Street at the age of 28. Were you succumbing to the temptations of money? Blodget: My father and grandfather were in the financial business. I did not really know what I wanted to do when I got out of college. I knew that I liked to write and tell stories. But actually when I worked at CNN Business News, I realized that the markets fascinated me much more and that I actually wanted to go work in the industry. SPIEGEL: Your great-grandfather lost his fortune in the stock market crash in 1929. That did not keep you away from Wall Street? Blodget: That was a legend in my family: My very successful great-grandfather, who had a big fortune and then he was on the TransSiberian Railway during the crash in 1929, and when he got off the train he was poor. I think the truth is not exactly like that, but that story was in my childhood. In the late 1990s, I would ask lots of people, who were older than me: Is it the 1920s again? Everybody said: No, no, we are much smarter now, we are so much more professional. It turned out it was exactly like that except worse. As with any bubble, everybody thinks that it is different this time. SPIEGEL: There has been a lot of bad news in the digital media industry over the last months: Viewer numbers for some sites have plateaued, lots of jobs have been slashed. The New York Times has diagnosed a “borderline panic” in online publishing. And even a Buzzfeed reporter used the term: “digital media bloodbath” So still, nothing to worry about? Blodget: I think it is helpful to take a long-term view. When CNN launched in the early 1980s, everybody said: A 24-hour news network won’t work. They launched, they did ok, CNN went almost bankrupt because of the risks they had taken, they got bailed out, and 25 years later CNN is CNN, this huge global brand. I think the same is going to happen in digital. If you look at the younger generation, there is a huge consumption of digital media and almost no consumption of print or traditional television. Eventually money will follow that. It is just a question of which companies win, how long it takes to get there and what kind of model you need to apply. But there is no question: The future is digital. SPIEGEL: Until now, many digital-only news sites have been traffic giants, but profits, if there have been any at all, have been meager. When will that change? Blodget: I think that our industry is similar to the newspaper industry in the first half of the 20th century. There would be five newspapers in each city and they would be competing extremely aggressively. It was very hard to survive as a business, but the papers that did became very profitable over time. I think it is simply a matter of time. SPIEGEL: But the investors who have poured a lot of money into these companies might get nervous. Blodget: Well, fortunately most investors in these companies are professional investors. They know that they can’t capitalize on the future without taking the risk. Fifteen years ago, nobody thought that content would ever work as a business. It was impossible to raise any money, initial investments were $10,000, seldom $100,000. It is only over the last two or three years that we have started to see very large amounts of capital coming into the industry, with Vice, and Buzzfeed or Quartz. That has created a lot more competition. SPIEGEL: So you do not get nervous calls from your new owner, Axel Springer in Berlin? The publisher has paid more than $340 million for a stake of 88 percent in Business Insider. Quite a courageous investment in a company that is not yet profitable. Blodget: No, Springer is a wonderful partner, far ahead of a lot of US media companies. They saw the changes very early. The DNA of Axel Springer is journalism, which is very unusual. A lot of media companies in the United States feel like they have to do journalism, but they do not want to. It is not a business they want to be in, it invites criticism, it is not as profitable as other things. Axel Springer firmly believes in what we do. SPIEGEL: The small tech blog you founded after your time on Wall Street has become a news site with 94 million unique visitors a month. What is your journalistic ambition? Blodget: Our mission is to figure out the journalistic model for the digital medium, finding out how we get the right stories readers want, at the right time and wherever they want to read them. SPIEGEL: Sounds good, but that is more a question of technology and distribution. What kind of journalism does Business Insider stand for? Blodget: One thing where we definitely want to differ from other business media is that we believe that, in the past 30 years in the United States, our economic system has been harmed by complete shareholder domination. An idea has been created that the only purpose of a company is to make money for shareholders. SPIEGEL: You mean papers like the Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal focus too much on shareholder value? That is an astonishing statement for somebody who has been part of the system. Blodget: The defining value for at least a couple of business publications is that profit is the only thing that matters in the end. That’s just not the best view for a healthy capitalistic system. At Business Insider we want to celebrate companies that not only create value for their shareholders, but for their clients, employees and for the world — companies like Google or Amazon. SPIEGEL: Is this how you want to push papers like the Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal from the throne of must-read publications? Blodget: In the new world of digital, there are no must-read publications any more. SPIEGEL: If you work in finance in London, you should read what the Financial Times writes. Blodget: But that will absolutely change, unless the Financial Times adapts over time. SPIEGEL: Hasn’t the Financial Times digitized itself more than most other papers? Blodget: The Financial Times is a wonderful publication, as is the Wall Street Journal and many others. But the new generation is consuming media fundamentally differently. At Business Insider, we have the chance to embrace that whole-heartedly. We do not have a print legacy, digital is not our second business behind a newspaper. It is our only one. SPIEGEL: The power of digital publishing lies in the ability to know what readers like, which stories they actually read and which ones they don’t — and to give them more of what they like. This creates the danger of a filter bubble. Blodget: What do you mean by filter bubble? SPIEGEL: Reading becomes a sort of self-optimization and self-reference, the only things that get through to me from the flood of information are those which I want to consume and which I like. My Facebook and Twitter feeds filter what fits into my conception of the world. Blodget: I don’t think that is actually what is happening. In fact, we have more information than ever before, and it is harder than ever to avoid actually seeing what the other side is saying. Yes, we focus on publications that we feel speak to us, but that is exactly the same way it was 20 or 100 years ago. In the US, two million people have subscribed to the New York Times and many more millions think the New York Times is a terrible, liberal paper they would never read. We can, of course, choose to put ourselves in a bubble of only people who agree with us, but in the digital world there are many more ways of saying “Hey, here is something you might want to consider.” SPIEGEL: How compatible is the idea of offering readers more and more of what they like with the role of journalists in a democratic society: to publish information that is relevant to our social coexistence but not necessarily read by millions of people; to investigate and uncover scandals and cases of wrongdoing? Blodget: Before the internet, big publications were like hydrants in the desert. There were relatively few of them, we needed each one of them tremendously and they had control over what was delivered. Now they are like little streams flowing into a massive ocean. An example: Before the internet, a journalist would write an article about a company that the company felt was unfair and missed a point. All they could do was write a letter to the editor and wait, and maybe a week later it would be printed, or not. Now, they can go to medium.com and immediately publish a long rebuttal, saying the journalist forgot this and did not consider that, the analyst is wrong here. Everybody pulls that immediately into the debate. So it is a much more democratic field for ideas. SPIEGEL: Your headlines are often bullish, vigorous and colloquial. What about the more quiet and reflective tones? Blodget: The reason is that in print, once readers have bought the paper, it actually doesn’t matter if they read the story. We have to draw readers into every single story. In the early years we did a lot of training around that. What happened typically was that somebody would spot a great story and say it to the newsroom. Everybody would say, oh, that’s great, write it. And the journalist would write it, with a formal newspaper headline that nobody would want to read. And we’d say: No. Go back to what you said. And by the way, that’s also the tweet. People love our conversational voice. SPIEGEL: In November, you launched Business Insider in Germany. Even a general interest publication like the Huffington Post is struggling in Germany. Business news is an even smaller niche. Why are you confident that Business Insider will succeed in Germany? Blodget: Our advantage is that we can see from New York where our readers are, we know where it makes sense to have a local edition. In Germany, we could see the readers reading in English. It is our first market with a different language, so it’s a big step for us. SPIEGEL: Do you still read a print-newspaper? Blodget: Rarely. It is a nostalgic experience for me. I read the print edition of the New Yorker. A couple of years ago, my kids were growing up and my wife and I suddenly realized to our horror: Oh my god, our children stare at their phones, they do not read. We have to get a newspaper! And so we ordered a local newspaper. It would be delivered every morning and it was my job to go and get it, but I would always forget. We would go out to school and come home and it would still be there. At the end of the week I would eventually take them to the recycling bin and out they would go, unread, in their tubes. So we realized pretty quickly: It’s too late, we are a digital household. Hopefully that’s ok. SPIEGEL: Mr. Blodget, we thank you for this interview. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/good-journalism-is-crucial-amid-all-the-lies-and-hysteria-a-1075302.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/most-germans-think-the-press-is-lying-to-them-about-refugees-a-1079049.html the1uploader 10:47 am on 2016-05-16 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/05/16/as-indonesian-king-of-debts-and-mines-has-lost-its-cash-cow-companies/)
As Indonesian King of debts and mines has lost its cash cow companies As Indonesian King of debts and mines has lost its cash cow companies 23 20110304 VALLAR PLC – Closing of Bumi Transaction 29 20130508 0601 Nat Rothschild Rues ‘Terrible Mistake’ in Deal Gone Sour 11 20140322 2128 Akhir Kisah Petualangan Grup Bakrie di London 01 20140922 1444 Gagal Bayar Utang Sudah Biasa di Eks ‘Bakrie Tujuh’ 02 20140616 0925 Tak Ada Lagi Nama Bakrie di Daftar Pemegang Saham ‘Bakrie Tujuh’ 10 20140506 2059 Batal “Private Placement”, BUMI “Rights Issue” Rp 6,5 Triliun 02 20140508 Bumi Resources Rights Issue & Castleford 24 20140611 Bumi Resources avoids default 25 20140611 1248 Bumi Resources Avoids Default After Paying Coupon on Notes 26 20140612 1019 Bumi Avoids Default After Paying Coupon On Bonds 07 20140703 Jadwal Rights Issue IV BUMI / Bumi Resources Tbk 2014 03 20140704 RIGHT ISSUE MADE BUMI SHAREHOLDERS MEETING RUN HARD 03 20140922 1043 Tak Bisa Bayar Bunga Utang Rp 1 Triliun, Bakrie Sumatera Minta Nego 03 20140922 1114 Tak Bisa Bayar Bunga Utang Rp 1 T, Saham Gocap Bakrie Plantation Dibekukan 02 20140922 1217 Bakrie Sumatera Tak Bisa Bayar Utang Rp 1 T, Apa Kata Grup Bakrie? 01 20140923 1052 Saham Bakrie Sumatera Kembali Diperdagangkan, Harga Tetap Gocap 05 20140925 1131 Belum Lapor Hasil Rights Issue, Saham Tambang Bakrie Kena Suspen 01 20140925 1340 Tak Bisa Bayar Utang Rp 4 Triliun, Bakrie Telecom Digugat Investor di AS 12 20141005 1915 Bumi Resources Ungkap Alasan Batalkan Rights Issue 06 20141006 1132 Sepi Peminat, Rights Issue Tambang Bakrie Turun Jadi Rp 3,6 Triliun 04 20141006 1242 Punya Utang Rp 44 Triliun, Bagaimana Tambang Bakrie Membayarnya? 14 20141006 2125 Bumi Trims Size of Rights Issue After Creditors Refuse to Be Paid With Shares i 17 20141007 Bumi Resources seeks to renegotiate with creditors as rights issue failed to reach target 08 20141010 RIGHTS ISSUE SEPI PEMINAT BUMI MEMBURU UTANG 28 20141111 1054 UPDATE 1-Bumi Resources shares plunge after S&P cuts debt rating 20 20141204 1050 Dicap ‘Gagal Bayar’, Tambang Bakrie Ingin Kurangi Utang Rp 24 Triliun 19 20141204 1134 (Sapa mo bantu?)Dicap ‘Gagal Bayar’, Tambang Bakrie Ingin Kurangi Utang Rp 24 Triliun 22 20150522 0814 Bumi Resources Gets Five-Month Extension of Debt Moratorium 27 20150929 1137 Bumi resources seeks debt relief as $4bn burden gets heavy 21 20151005 1845 Bumi Resources aims to restructure debts 01 20160414 1624 Soal utang, BUMI bersengketa lagi 15 20160426 0259 PT BUMI Resources Tbk. 16 20160426 0536 Indonesian court orders suspension of Bumi’s debt payment obligations 18 20160426 0806 Indonesian court orders suspension of Bumi’s debt payment obligations 13 20160524 0936 Jalan Panjang Restrukturisasi BUMI 09 20160516 2116 BUMI TERGUNCANG 23 20110304 VALLAR PLC – Closing of Bumi Transaction 2016-07-04 10:04 PM http://www.thefreelibrary.com/VALLAR+PLC+-+Closing+of+Bumi+Transaction.-a0250545252 VALLAR PLC – Closing of Bumi Transaction PR Newswire UK Disclose http://www.thefreelibrary.com/PR+Newswire+UK+Disclose/2011/March/4-p52003 20110304 Citations: * MLA style: “VALLAR PLC – Closing of Bumi Transaction..” The Free Library. 2011 PR Newswire Association LLC 04 Jul. 2016 http://www.thefreelibrary.com/VALLAR+PLC+-+Closing+of+Bumi+Transaction.-a0250545252 * Chicago style: The Free Library. S.v. VALLAR PLC – Closing of Bumi Transaction..” Retrieved Jul 04 2016 from http://www.thefreelibrary.com/VALLAR+PLC+-+Closing+of+Bumi+Transaction.-a0250545252 * APA style: VALLAR PLC – Closing of Bumi Transaction.. (n.d.) >The Free Library. (2014). Retrieved Jul 04 2016 from http://www.thefreelibrary.com/VALLAR+PLC+-+Closing+of+Bumi+Transaction.-a0250545252 Closing of Bumi Transaction Vallar PLC (“Vallar” or the “Company”), 4 March 2011 Vallar is pleased to announce the closing of the Bumi Transaction and the assumption of control of PT Berau Coal Energy Tbk (“Berau”) through the arrangements with PT Bukit Mutiara (“Mutiara”) described in the prospectus published by Vallar on 24 February 2011. Under the terms of the Bumi Transaction, Vallar (through its subsidiary, Vallar Investments UK Limited) has received a total of 5,193,350,000 shares in PT Bumi Resources Tbk (“Bumi”) from Bakrie & Brothers and Long Haul (together the “Bakrie Group”) and has issued 90,072,216 shares in Vallar to the Bakrie Group of which 28,861,172 are new Voting Ordinary Shares and 61,211,044 are new Suspended Voting Ordinary Shares. Applications have been made to the UK Listing Authority for 28,861,172 new Voting Ordinary Shares to be admitted to the standard listing segment of the Official List of the UK Listing Authority and to London Stock Exchange plc for 28,861,172 new Voting Ordinary Shares to be admitted to trading on the London Stock Exchange’s main market for listed securities (together, “Admission”). It is expected Admission will become effective, and that dealings will commence at 8.00 a.m. on Monday, 7 March 2011. After the expiry of the BCE Lock-up on or around 8 April 2011, Mutiara is expected to transfer title to, and registered ownership of, a total of 26,175,000,000 shares in Berau to the Vallar Group. At this time, Vallar will issue 52,297,680 New Vallar Ordinary Shares, of which 27,772,829 will be New Vallar Voting Ordinary Shares issued to Mutiara and 24,524,851 will be Suspended Voting Ordinary Shares issued directly to Long Haul pursuant to the Mutiara Share Transaction Arrangements. As part of the Berau Transaction Vallar also agreed to pay US$739 million in cash consideration for 35 per cent. of Berau. Of this amount, approximately US$639 million was paid to Mutiara on 18 November 2010 and, following the closing of the Bumi Resources Transaction, the balance will be released shortly to Bumi Resources from an escrow arrangement. On completion of the Acquisition on or around 8 April 2011, the Bakrie Group will own 40,763,812 Voting Ordinary Shares (representing 29.9 per cent. of Vallar’s voting share capital) and 73,833,255 Suspended Voting Ordinary Shares (representing, in aggregate, approximately 54.6 per cent. of Vallar’s issued share capital) and Mutiara will own 27,772,829 Voting Ordinary Shares (representing approximately 20.4 per cent. of Vallar’s voting share capital and approximately 13.2 per cent. of Vallar’s issued share capital). For the purposes of the Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules, following the closing of the Bumi Resources Transaction which occurred today, the total number of voting rights in the Company is 96,203,908. The total number of Ordinary Shares is 157,414,952 (of which 96,203,908 are Voting Ordinary Shares and 61,211,044 are Suspended Voting Ordinary Shares). The above total voting rights figure of 96,203,908 may be used by shareholders as the denominator for the calculations by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the voting rights of the Company, under the Disclosure and Transparency Rules. Capitalised terms not otherwise defined in this announcement have the meanings given to them in the Prospectus. For further information, please contact: Vallar: 01534 728 235 J.P. Morgan Cazenove: 020 7588 2828 Ian Hannam James Taylor Finsbury: 020 7251 3801 Ed Simpkins Clare Hunt This announcement has been issued by and is the sole responsibility of the Company. This announcement is an advertisement and not a prospectus and you should not subscribe for or purchase any shares referred to in this announcement except on the basis of information in the prospectus (the “Prospectus”) published by Vallar on 24 February 2011 in connection with the admission and proposed admission of certainofits ordinary shares to the standard listing segment of the Official List of the Financial Services Authority and to trading on London Stock Exchange plc’smain market as more particularly described in the Prospectus.Copies of the Prospectus areavailable for inspection at the Company’s registered officeat 12 Castle Street, St. Helier, Jersey JE2 3RT. J.P. Morgan plc (which conducts its UK investment banking activities as J.P. Morgan Cazenove) (“J.P. Morgan Cazenove”), which is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority, is acting for the Company in connection with the Acquisition and no one else and will not be responsible to anyone other than the Company for providing the protections afforded to clients of J.P. Morgan Cazenove. This announcement does not constitute or form part of any offer or invitation to purchase, otherwise acquire, issue, subscribe for, sell or otherwise dispose of any securities, nor any solicitation of any offer to purchase, otherwise acquire, issue, subscribe for, sell or otherwise dispose of, any securities. The securities of the Company referred to herein have not been and will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and may not be offered or sold in the United States unless they are registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act is available. The release, publication or distribution of this announcement in certain jurisdictions may be restricted by law and therefore persons in such jurisdictions into which this announcement is released, published or distributed should inform themselves about and observe such restrictions. This announcement does not constitute or form part of any offer or invitation to purchase, otherwise acquire, subscribe for, sell, otherwise dispose of or issue, or any solicitation of any offer to sell, otherwise dispose of, issue, purchase, otherwise acquire or subscribe for, any security, therefore this announcement does not constitute a public offering in Indonesia under Law Number 8 of 1995 regarding Capital Market. 29 20130508 0601 Nat Rothschild Rues ‘Terrible Mistake’ in Deal Gone Sour 2016-07-04 10:16 PM http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-07/nat-rothschild-rues-terrible-mistake-in-deal-gone-sour Nat Rothschild Rues ‘Terrible Mistake’ in Deal Gone Sour Jeremy Kahn and William Mellor Bloomberg Markets Magazine May 8, 2013 – 6:01 AM WIB After creating the coal-mining giant Bumi Plc with the Bakrie family of Indonesia, Rothschild fell out with his partners in an ugly boardroom brawl that left few reputations, including Rothschild’s, unscathed. Photographer: Jason Alden/Bloomberg Nat Rothschild, dressed in a hooded sweater, jeans and hiking boots, perches on a cowhide sofa in his relatively modest chalet-style apartment in the Swiss ski resort of Klosters. He recalls the fateful day in October 2010 when, as he scanned the globe for business opportunities, he first heard the word Bumi, Bloomberg Markets will report in its June issue. Ian Hannam, a well-known JPMorgan Chase & Co. investment banker, had e-mailed Rothschild suggesting he look at two coal companies, including PT Bumi Resources, linked to the Bakrie family, a powerful Indonesian business dynasty. “He said it was the best deal he had ever seen in his life,” Rothschild says. Hannam’s approach was the first step down a path that would lead to an ugly boardroom brawl pitting Rothschild against the Bakries. As it unfolded, the clash would see the two sides trading claims of e-mail hacking, bad faith and fraud. It would leave few reputations, including Rothschild’s, unscathed. “I am the first to admit we made a terrible mistake,” Rothschild, 41, says of his decision to partner with the Bakries. It’s early March as he speaks. Two weeks earlier, Rothschild had lost a critical shareholder vote he had hoped would put him back in control of the company he and the Bakries had created, Bumi Plc. Although defeated, he still holds 18 percent of Bumi’s shares and says he’s not giving up the fight. “The board needs to have their feet held to a fire,” he says. Stomach-Churning Twists The wild ride for investors — many hit by losses of 75 percent — may have yet more stomach-churning twists, with Bumi under the effective control of an Indonesian tycoon who rode to the Bakries’ rescue. Samin Tan, 49, is the polar opposite of the aristocratic Rothschild: a village boy-turned-billionaire who didn’t see a car until he was 15 and says self-deprecatingly that he neither fully understands U.K.-style corporate governance nor enjoys visiting London because each trip means enduring 13 hours inside a plane without a cigarette. Nathaniel Rothschild, scion of a family synonymous with financial success, is the youngest of four children of Jacob, the 4th Baron Rothschild, 77, who heads RIT Capital Partners Plc, which managed 2 billion pounds ($3.1 billion) as of March 31. ‘Boring Life’ At the University of Oxford, Nat acquired a party-boy image that would haunt him throughout his 20s. Rothschild, who’s dating a 22year-old model, Daisy Cummings, doesn’t drink or smoke these days and generally is in bed by 9:30 p.m. “I lead a very boring life,” he says. Rothschild’s professional life has been anything but boring. He joined Atticus Capital LLC, a New York-based hedge-fund firm, in 1996 as an equity partner and became co-chairman in 2005. At its 2007 peak, Atticus managed more than $20 billion. The firm disbanded in 2009 following the global financial crisis. From 2005 to 2011, Rothschild also served as chairman of Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska’s En+ Group, the holding company for the oligarch’s controlling stake in United Co. Rusal, the world’s biggest aluminum producer. His most daring financial play — the one that would come back to haunt him — came in July 2010, when he raised 707 million pounds on the London Stock Exchange for a company with no operating assets. Gulfstream G550 Vallar Plc was a blank-check company, so-called because that’s what investors give the founders: In Rothschild’s case, he merely promised to use the proceeds from Vallar’s initial public offering to buy mining assets within two years subject to the approval of the independent board of directors. Putting his reputation and 92 million pounds of his own money on the line, Rothschild jetted around the globe in his Gulfstream G550 soliciting investors for the IPO. Many big institutions signed on, including Abu Dhabi Investment Council and Schroders Plc. When Hannam, 57, drew his attention to the Bakries, Rothschild knew little about the family, whose wealth dates back to their days as traders starting in 1942, when Indonesia was a Dutch colony. Achmad Bakrie, who died in 1988, and later his eldest son, Aburizal, now 66, built a politically connected empire spanning steel, plantations, real estate and telecommunications. They were among the few ethnic Indonesian tycoons in a crony economy dominated by businessmen of Chinese descent. Opaque Transactions The 1997 Asian financial crisis rocked the Bakries. Laden with $1.3 billion in debt, Aburizal gave away 97.5 percent of his empire to creditors, his son, Anindya, 39, says. Then, as the Indonesian economy rebounded, so did the Bakrie companies. By June 12, 2008, they accounted for 15 percent of the market value of the Jakarta exchange, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Aburizal also solidified his political power, holding cabinet posts from 2004 to 2009. What hadn’t changed was the Bakries’ dependence on debt or their predilection for cross-holdings and other opaque transactions that turned off many foreign investors, says Mirza Baig, founder of Hyderabad, India-based Hikma Governance Consulting, which advises institutions on investments throughout Asia. Bakries’ Woes In October 2008, during the height of the global banking crisis, shares in PT Bumi Resources were suspended by the Jakarta stock exchange for a month after they plunged 32 percent in one day. Bumi Resources secured a $1.9 billion loan from China Investment Corp., the Chinese sovereign wealth fund, on which it paid annual interest of 19 percent in 2009. For the Bakries, what made the Rothschild deal so attractive was access to London’s established capital markets, says Bakrie Group spokesman Chris Fong. For Rothschild, the Bakries’ woes were part of the deal’s appeal. He could acquire stakes in Bumi Resources and a second Bakrie-linked company, PT Berau Coal Energy, through Vallar’s Londonlisted holding structure. Given the U.K.’s reputedly superior corporate governance rules, Rothschild says, he reckoned investors would be willing to pay higher multiples for the London-listed company than for the underlying Indonesian assets. Star Asset Rothschild says he was also convinced by Hannam that the Bakries wanted to improve their image ahead of the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, in which Aburizal is a candidate. Combining the Bumi Resources and Berau stakes under the Bumi Plc umbrella would create a mining giant just as China’s demand for coal-generated power seemed insatiable. The deal came together fast — perhaps too fast. Less than three weeks after Hannam’s e-mail, Rothschild met Nirwan Bakrie, one of Aburizal’s younger brothers, in Los Angeles and shook hands on the transaction. Three weeks later, he flew to Singapore to formalize the $3 billion deal. Only then did Rothschild personally visit the island of Borneo to inspect his new company’s star asset, Bumi Resources-owned PT Kaltim Prima Coal, one of the world’s largest sources of coal for power generation. The deal eventually gave Rothschild’s Vallar 29 percent of Bumi Resources and 85 percent of Berau. The Bakries got 55 percent of Vallar. Due Diligence An Indonesian with ties to the Bakries, Rosan Roeslani, who had been the majority shareholder in Berau, got 13 percent of Vallar. Rothschild was left holding 3.6 percent of Vallar, although he remained co-chairman alongside Indra Bakrie, another younger brother of Aburizal. Vallar was then renamed Bumi Plc. How much due diligence was done — and by whom — is the subject of heated debate. In a January statement, Bumi said Vallar Advisers LP, Rothschild’s management company, was responsible for vetting the two Indonesian companies. Rothschild says Vallar Advisers relied on 50 different experts and consultants who pored over thousands of documents, including prospectuses from Berau’s August 2010 Indonesian IPO and a September 2010 U.S. bond issue for Bumi Resources, both of which were marketed by Credit Suisse Group AG and JPMorgan. “The mistake we made was relying far too much on the supposed relationship that Hannam and JPMorgan had with the Bakries,” says Rothschild, who had boasted that Bumi investors would double their money. Successful Debut In response to e-mailed questions, a spokesman for Hannam, who no longer works at JPMorgan, says that by early 2011, Hannam was under investigation by the U.K. Financial Services Authority over an unrelated deal. Because of this, his work on the Vallar-Bumi merger was overseen by others. Hannam, who was fined by the FSA, has appealed the case. Credit Suisse and JPMorgan declined to comment. Investor Mark Mobius says Rothschild should have known better. “I was shocked that Rothschild would get into such a venture,” says Mobius, who oversees $50 billion at Templeton Emerging Markets Group. “I am not saying the Bakries have done anything wrong, but given their history of corporate governance, I was surprised.” At first, Bumi Plc seemed to be a success. Having debuted at 10 pounds the previous July, the shares hit 14 pounds in April 2011. That spring, the Bakries pledged their Bumi shares as collateral for a $1.35 billion loan from Credit Suisse and other lenders. Coal Price A coal company’s fate, however, is forever linked to the price of coal. After peaking at $138.50 a ton in January 2011, the price of thermal coal at Australia’s Newcastle port, a benchmark for Asia, slid to $122 by September that year as growth in China, the biggest consumer, slowed. Bumi’s shares, meanwhile, fell almost 30 percent from their April peak. When they crossed 8.50 pounds in early October 2011, the Bakries faced a margin call on the $1.35 billion loan, according to a Bumi statement. Bumi Resources also faced pressure to reduce interest payments on its $1.9 billion loan from CIC. As Bumi shareholder concern increased that the Bakries might sell their shares, Ari Hudaya, a Bakrie lieutenant who was Bumi’s CEO, stopped attending board meetings. “We were told he was too ill to travel,” says Julian Horn-Smith, Bumi’s senior independent director. Rothschild says he became convinced Hudaya was ducking the board. Bakrie spokesman Fong says Hudaya was indeed sick. In early April, Hudaya was outside Indonesia seeking medical treatment and unavailable to comment for this story, Fong says. Suspicious Transactions Rothschild says he became alarmed about $1 billion worth of suspicious transactions at Bumi Resources and Berau. These included spending on an iron ore mine in Mauritania and an oil field in Yemen, neither of which was producing. In December 2011, Bumi would write these assets off completely after auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP said it couldn’t confirm their valuation. Bumi Resources had also given Roeslani’s company, PT Recapital Advisors, $500 million in investments and loans, and then allowed Recapital to delay repayment, according to Bumi Resources financial filings in Indonesia. Rothschild says that when he brought his concerns to Bumi’s board, the independent directors — all of whom he had appointed — refused to act. “They were like deer in the headlights,” he says. Business Decision Horn-Smith, one of those appointees, says the board shared Rothschild’s concerns and immediately consulted lawyers and accountants. As of April 8, Roeslani’s companies hadn’t returned the money. After initially agreeing to be interviewed, Roeslani didn’t return follow-up calls. (Roeslani is an investor in PT Idea Karya Indonesia. PT Idea and Bloomberg LP are partners in Bloomberg Television’s Indonesian-language service.) Enter Tan, a former tax accountant who made a fortune when a coal mining company he controlled, PT Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal, went public in Jakarta in 2010. Tan says he has known the Bakries since his days as a tax consultant. In November 2011, when Credit Suisse called the Bakries’ loan, Tan borrowed $1 billion from Standard Chartered Plc and bought half of the family’s Bumi stake. Tan says it was a business decision, not a friendly helping hand. “We earn our own money; we make our own decisions,” he says over lunch in his headquarters overlooking Jakarta’s National Monument. ‘Relationship Breakdown’ In retrospect, Tan acknowledges two mistakes. “We did not expect the coal price would collapse,” he says. “Secondly, we have underestimated the level of the relationship breakdown between the Bakries and Nat.” On Nov. 8, 2011, the same day Bumi Resources announced that, thanks to Tan’s intervention, it had repaid $600 million of its CIC loan, Rothschild wrote to Bumi CEO Hudaya. The letter cited alleged accounting irregularities at Bumi Resources and Berau and called on Hudaya to clean up the balance sheets and corporate cultures at both companies. Then, Rothschild says, he leaked his own letter to the Financial Times. Fong says Rothschild was trying to drive down Bumi’s share price so he could buy the Bakries out. Rothschild denies this. Either way, the letter amounted to a declaration of war. Tan says he warned Rothschild about his confrontational approach. “I told him his style doesn’t work in Indonesia,” Tan says. ‘Asian Toughies’ Non-Indonesians agreed. “Nat is a very good friend of mine, but he does tend to go straight into the wall head down hoping the wall will break,” says Simon Murray, chairman of commodities giant Glencore International Plc and an old Asia hand. “You particularly don’t do what he did to a bunch of Asian toughies.” Meanwhile, the price of coal kept falling, dropping below $90 a ton in June 2012. By then, Bumi’s stock had slid 64 percent since the start of the year. In September, Rothschild presented the board with hundreds of documents alleging accounting irregularities at Bumi Resources, its PT Bumi Resources Minerals subsidiary and Berau. Rothschild says the documents also show Tan was aware of the irregularities and had sought a side deal with the Bakries to protect Borneo Lumbung. Tan says there was no such deal and denies hiding anything from the board. Whistle-Blower’s Identity Rothschild says the documents came unsolicited from a whistle-blower, whose identity he won’t reveal. The Bumi board handed them to regulators and police in London and Jakarta and appointed London law firm Macfarlanes LLP to investigate. The day the board announced those moves, Bumi’s stock fell 25 percent and Hudaya resigned. All the while, Rothschild was losing board support. During a fiery October board meeting at the Mandarin Oriental hotel in Singapore, the Bakries proposed buying back all of Bumi’s mining assets, according to four people who were there. Rothschild, surprised by the proposal, hurled invective at both Tan and Robin Renwick, head of Bumi’s audit committee. Afterward, Tan and Renwick wrote to Horn-Smith, threatening to resign unless Rothschild, who had already relinquished the cochairmanship, left the board entirely. On Oct. 15, Rothschild obliged. He then began assembling a 270 pounds million bid to regain control of Bumi and proposed that a slate of his own candidates, including himself, replace Tan, who had become Bumi’s chairman, and almost all of the directors. ‘Nothing Wrong’ The existing board had a different plan: to divorce Bumi Plc from the Bakries, who would pay $278 million in cash and surrender their Bumi shares to buy back Bumi Plc’s stake in Bumi Resources, leaving Bumi with the smaller Berau. Bumi Plc set a shareholder meeting for late February to vote on Rothschild’s proposal. The Bakries said that they would not agree to any separation if Rothschild won the vote. In January, Bumi announced that Macfarlanes found circumstantial evidence to support some of the claims in the alleged whistleblower documents. Bumi also said that technical analysis by an undisclosed firm determined that many documents had been obtained through e-mail hacking. (“I’ve done nothing wrong,” Rothschild says. Of the whistle-blower, he says, “The question of the provenance of the documents was for the whistle-blower, not for me.” He says he put Macfarlanes in touch with the whistle-blower’s lawyers.) The board declined to release the full report, saying Indonesian law forbids publication of information obtained by hacking. Rothschild says that the shareholders’ interest in the report’s contents should be paramount. Martial Atmosphere On Feb. 21, Bumi Plc shareholders gathered to vote on Rothschild’s package of proposals at the headquarters of the Honourable Artillery Company, a British army reserve regiment. The armor and muskets on the walls created an appropriately martial atmosphere. Rothschild strode briskly into the room accompanied by his mother, Serena Rothschild, also a shareholder. “She adores me, and she wanted to come,” Rothschild says. In the end, 19 of Rothschild’s 22 proposals were voted down. He did succeed in kicking off two Bakrie-affiliated directors and installing one from his slate. Bumi’s ultimate fate remains unclear. On April 12, Bumi announced that after investigating Berau’s financial statements, it found $94 million in questionable expenditures. A week later, trading in Bumi’s shares was suspended after the company said it could not meet an April 30 deadline for publishing 2012 annual results. Haunting Saga Rothschild claims the Bakries, who paid a $50 million deposit, don’t have the remaining $228 million to complete the separation deal. Anindya Bakrie says the family does have sufficient funds. Whatever the case, gone for now is the dream of Bumi becoming a global coal colossus. Meanwhile, the Bumi saga haunts the City of London at a time when companies from emerging markets are seeking respectable footholds. “Bumi shows that good governance is not about form; it is about culture,” says Hikma’s Baig. “Bumi Plc’s policies and controls were pasted on top, but they had no real impact — or even insight — into what was happening at the operational level.” After his defeat at the Honourable Artillery Company, Rothschild retreated to Klosters. With morning sunlight glinting off Alpine summits and streaming into his living room, he isn’t in a self-flagellating mood. “I’ve had a lot of luck in my life,” he says. “This time, I got unlucky.” While he disputes the notion that Bumi has ruined his ability to raise money in London, he says he’s not rushing into another deal. Pocketing his BlackBerry, he heads out to hit the ski slopes. 11 20140322 2128 Akhir Kisah Petualangan Grup Bakrie di London 2016-07-04 09:38 PM http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2014/03/22/2128052/Akhir.Kisah.Petualangan.Grup.Bakrie.di.London? utm_source=RD&utm_medium=box&utm_campaign=Kaitrd Akhir Kisah Petualangan Grup Bakrie di London Yuwono Triatmodjo, Barly Haliem, Veri Nurhansyah Tragistina KONTAN, Sabtu, 22 Maret 2014 | 21:28 WIB Editor : Erlangga Djumena JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com – Drama Bumi Plc yang kini bernama Asia Resources Minerals (ARM), memasuki babak akhir. Grup Bakrie, investor pendiri ARM, perlu setahun lebih untuk memisahkan diri dari perkongsiannya dengan taipan Inggris, Nathaniel Rothschild. Akankah kisah ini berakhir happy ending atau justru sebaliknya? Entahlah. Nirwan Dermawan Bakrie, petinggi Grup Bakrie, hanya menyatakan kelegaannya. “Alhamdulillah, transaksi sudah selesai,” ungkap Nirwan seperti dikutip KONTAN, Jumat (21/3/2014). Dia menyatakan, nyaris semua urusan sudah tuntas, termasuk pembayarannya. Kini, ia tinggal menyelesaikan beberapa dokumen transaksi pemisahan (separation transaction). “Mungkin malam ini (tadi malam), semua selesai,” tandas Nirwan. Nah, konsekuensi pemisahan ini, Grup Bakrie bisa memboyong lagi 29,2 persen saham PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) dari tangan ARM. Tapi, Grup Bakrie berkewajiban menyetor 501 juta dollar AS atau Rp 5,71 triliun (kurs 1dollar AS= Rp 11.500). Manajemen ARM menyatakan optimismenya bahwa transaksi pemisahan ini segera tuntas dalam sepekan ke depan. Berdasarkan pengumuman resmi ARM yang terbit Jumat malam (21/3/2014), manajemen ARM menyatakan, Grup Bakrie telah mentransfer seluruh dana transaksi ini. Seluruh dana tersebut sudah tertampung dalam rekening khusus (escrow account). Namun, lantaran terhalang libur akhir pekan, kemungkinan besar proses pencairannya akan berlangsung pada Senin (24/3/2014). “Oleh karena itu, ARM menyetujui perpanjangan perjanjian jual beli saham BUMI sampai Selasa, 24 Maret 2014, dan mudahmudahan semua tuntas pada Senin (24/3/2014) atau paling lambat Selasa (25/4/2014),” tulis manajamen ARM dalam rilis yang diterima KONTAN, Jumat (21/3/2014) tengah malam. Semula, kesanggupan Grup Bakrie mengakhiri transaksi ini memang sempat diragukan. Maklum, ia meminta penundaan penyelesaian transaksi sampai lima kali. Grup usaha ini menyatakan perlu waktu untuk menyediakan 501 juta dollar AS sebagai mahar atas 29,2 persen saham BUMI. Penundaan itu boleh dibilang pilihan yang paling rasional yang bisa dilakukan oleh Grup Bakrie. Sebab, valuasi harga saham BUMI yang harus dibayarkan Grup Bakrie jauh di atas nilai wajar sahamnya. Bayangkan, setahun terakhir, harga saham BUMI turun sekitar 61,5 persen. Pada 20 Maret 2013, harga BUMI berada di posisi Rp 780 per saham. Per 21 Maret 2014, harga saham perusahaan pertambangan batubara terbesar di Indonesia ini kurang dari setengahnya menjadi Rp 300 per saham. Menurut hitungan ARM, nilai buku 29,2 persen saham BUMI per 31 Desember 2013 hanya 372 juta dollar AS. Kini, valuasi 29,2 persen saham BUMI juga setara atau sekitar 372 juta dollar AS. Sementara Grup Bakrie harus menebusnya senilai 501 juta dollar AS. Di atas kertas, Grup Bakrie harus menombok sekitar 129 juta dollar AS atau sekitar Rp 1,5 triliun. Dari mana menutup kekurangan itu, sementara nyaris semua bisnis Grup Bakrie sedang muram. Boleh jadi, alasan itulah yang membuat Grup Bakrie yang dikomandoi Nirwan harus mengatur siasat dan mengeluarkan jurus manuver mencengangkan; menjual 23,8 persen saham ARM kepada Ravenwood Acquisition Company Limited (RACL) milik Samin Tan senilai 223 juta dollar AS. Setidaknya jurus sakti ini efektif menyiasati kekurangan pendanaan tersebut. Tentu saja, penyelesaian transaksi ini masih meninggalkan sejumlah jejak, yang bisa jadi akan menjadi kisah baru yang tak kalah seru. Termasuk, benarkah Grup Bakrie sudah mengubur dalam-dalam semua impiannya di bursa London dan mengikhlaskan ARM berada di bawah kendali Rothschild? Apakah semua urusan ARM memang sekarang murni dipanggul Samin Tan, salah satu kolega dekat Grup Bakrie? Sejauh ini, semuanya masih misterius. Satu hal lagi, taruh kata semua transaksi ini tuntas pekan ini dan Grup Bakrie kembali memboyong BUMI ke Tanah Air. Akankah akhir drama itu juga membawa ending membahagiakan bagi investor ritel BUMI di bursa saham Tanah Air? Sekali lagi, semuanya masih misterius. BUMI-AI-KPC 2016-07-04 12:08 AM indonesia_coal.pdf AI Arutmin was established in Indonesia on 31 October 1981 as a joint venture between Atlantic Richfield Company and Utah Exploration for the purpose of developing coal deposits in south-east Kalimantan. BHP Billiton (“BHP”) acquired a 100% stake in the company, 50% in 1983 and 50% in 1986. Arutmin’s concession extends to 2019 and covers a 70,153 hectare area. As of 31 March 2005, Arutmin had 391 employees, eight of whom are expatriates. Production commenced at Arutmin’s Senakin Mine in 1988 and at its Satui Mine in 1990. The two mines ramped up to commercial output levels following the completion of Arutmin’s two coal preparation plants in 1991 and 1992 and the completion of its main coal terminal (North Pulau Laut Coal Terminal) in 1994. PT Thiess Indonesia (“Thiess”, see Production Contractors) was contracted in 1986-1997 to construct key plant and infrastructure for Arutmin and to operate the company’s mines. The contract ended in February 1997, when the mines’ output ramped up to stable commercial levels. Under its CCOW, BHP was required to divest 51% of its interest in Arutmin to Indonesian parties within 10 years after the commencement of Arutmin’s operations. In 1989, BHP divested 20% of its interests to PT Bakrie & Brothers Tbk (“Bakrie”) and in 2001 it opted to divest the remaining 80%. BHP re-engaged Thiess to undertake Arutmin’s operations on 12 June 2000. On 23 October 2001, Bumi won the bid for Arutmin1. It financed the USD148m acquisition using loans from Bank Mandiri (USD103.9m) and PT Rifan Financindo Asset Management (USD45.2m), both of which were novated from Bumi to Arutmin following the acquisition. 1 Bumi completed the acquisition of 80% of Arutmin in November 2001 and it acquired the remaining 20% in August 2004 from a holding vehicle controlled by Bakrie’s creditors (the vehicle was set up as part of Bakrie’s debt restructuring). KPC KPC was established in April 1982 as a 50:50 joint venture between BP and Rio Tinto after the two were awarded a government concession to develop coal deposits along the coast of East Kalimantan. KPC’s concession extends to 2021 and covers a 90,960hectare area. As of 31 March 2005, KPC had 3,068 employees, 31 of whom are expatriates. KPC began constructing its main mine, the Sangatta mine in January 1989. This was followed by the completion of large-scale mine development projects in 1991 and the commencement of commercial production in 1992. As with Arutmin, BP and Rio Tinto were required by their CCOW to divest at least 51% of their collective interest in KPC to Indonesian parties between the fifth and the tenth years of KPC’s operation. Although BP and Rio Tinto offered KPC for sale every year between 1996 and 2002, no sale was concluded until July 2003, when the two agreed to sell 100% of KPC to Bumi for USD480m. BP and Rio Tinto did not retain minority interests in KPC as BP had exited the mining business, having divested all its mining assets except for KPC, while Rio Tinto (like BHP) prefers fully owned mines and generally avoids minority holdings. The sale was completed on 10 October 2003. Bumi financed the transaction by directing KPC to take on USD404m of debt, of which USD186m was used to repay KPC’s outstanding debt and USD218m was lent to Bumi for the acquisition. Bumi raised the remaining USD76m in the form of an inter-company loan from Arutmin, which raised debt in an equal amount. Following the acquisition (on 13 October 2005) Bumi entered a share sale and purchase agreement with the local government (the East Kutai Regency Government, “EKRG”) to sell 18.6% of KPC for USD104mn, with the rights to repurchase 10.6% back for the same price (the sale has yet to be executed). Later in March 2005, Bumi entered into an agreement to sell 32.4% of KPC to PT Sitrade Nusa Globus (“SNG”, representing a group of private Indonesian investors) 2 for USD400mn. Should these sales be executed, Bumi could maintain majority ownership in KPC by exercising its 10.6% repurchase rights3. 2 According to Bumi, these sales were motivated by the CCOW’s requirement to divest 51% of KPC to Indonesian parties (Bumi acquired KPC by acquiring BP’s and Rio Tinto’s offshore holding vehicles, which may not qualify as “Indonesian.”). 3 Bumi expects to lend EKRG the USD104mn, which would result in a cashless sale that provides Bumi the right to call 10.6% of KPC at any time (to be paid for by the cancellation of EKRG’s USD104mn debt to Bumi). BUMI Founded in 1973, Bumi was established as Bumi Modern Tbk., an Indonesian investment company engaged in hotel and tourism, whose operations included the Hyatt Regency Hotel, an apartment complex in Surabaya and Le Meridien Hotel Tashkent in Uzbekistan. Bumi had been listed on the Jakarta stock exchange since 30 July 1990 (Ticker: BUMI). In August 1997, PT Bakrie Capital acquired a 58.5% stake in Bumi, and in November, Bumi raised IDR108bn from a second offering. Bumi changed direction later that year by acquiring Gallo Oil (Jersey) Ltd. in December, while announcing plans to become a diversified natural resource company. Gallo owns two oil concessions in Yemen: 50% of Block R-2 at East Al Maber (2,856km2) and 100% of Block 13 at Al Armah (7,417km2). The fields are currently in the early stages of exploration. Following its name change in 2000, Bumi made the full transition to an energy company in 2001 by acquiring Arutmin in October and divesting its last hotel asset (Le Meridien, Tashkent) in November of the same year. Arutmin served as Bumi’s sole revenue-generating asset until Bumi acquired KPC in 2003. Later in the same year, Bumi established Enercorp Ltd. (a 60% subsidiary) to serve as Arutmin’s domestic sales agent. Bumi is 57.17% owned by public and institutional investors, while the remaining interest is owned by entities controlled by the Bakrie family4. 4 Long Haul Holdings (42.24%), Minarak Labuan Co. Ltd. (0.32%) and PT Bakrie Capital Indonesia (0.19%). Post-Acquisition Transition Although the sale of Arutmin and KPC to Bumi represented a change of ownership to a non-industry parent, Bumi was able to retain the companies’ existing management teams, which consist of senior personnel trained by BHP and Rio Tinto. Mid-level management members – who are mainly locally recruited and trained staff – have also remained in place, as have the internal systems, controls and practices of KPC and Arutmin (which are in line with international standards). In light of the factors above, the capacity of KPC and Arutmin to produce and sell coal, and to recruit and develop skilled managers have not been materially impaired by the change in ownership. Fitch expects the companies to maintain these capabilities for the life of the transaction. Reserves KPC and Arutmin have sufficient reserves to meet planned production over the life of the transaction (2005-2012). As of 31 March 2005, KPC had 601mt of proved and probable marketable reserves while Arutmin had 358mt of proved and probable marketable reserves 5. All reserve statements were prepared by reputable, competent third parties in accordance with the JORC Code. The reserves of KPC and Arutmin are supported by much larger resources, which, given ongoing exploration and drilling activities, should further contribute to the companies’ reserve base, extend the mines’ reserve lives and provide a substantial excess reserve buffer for the life of the transaction. 5 As of 31 March 2005, KPC had 616mt of proved and probable recoverable reserves while Arutmin had 375mt of proved and probable recoverable reserves. Production Together, KPC and Arutmin is the largest producer and exporter of coal in Indonesia, accounting for some 29% of the country’s production in 2004. From 36mt in 2004 (21.4mt KPC, 15mt Arutmin), KPCA plans to ramp up output to 50mt this year (32.2mt KPC, 18mt Arutmin) and to substantially higher levels in the next two to three years. When considering the feasibility of these planned volumes, Fitch drew comfort from the following factors: The technical feasibility of key expansion projects as well as the capacity of KPC and its contractors to plan, manage and execute existing and future projects are largely affirmed by the independent technical review (“ITR”, see Independent Technical Review). The existing production capacity (which will produce a large share of planned volumes) is supported by management and production infrastructure that are in line with global standards and industry best practices, and have been in place and operating for over a decade. The expansion of existing mines accounts for a significant share of the planned expansion. These projects benefit from current infrastructure (pits, roads, coal chains, ports etc.), which substantially limit execution risks. Development of the greenfield Bengalon Mine is well under way. Since May 2005, Bengalon had been conveying coal from its mining pit to its barge loading facility. While delays caused by events relating to the contractor had reduced 2005’s target volumes to 3.1mt from 6mt, such issues have been resolved recently (see below) and are unlikely to recur. Further expansion of Bengalon during 2006 and 2007 is achievable, in Minarco’s view, and, given foreseeable execution risks, appears credible in Fitch’s opinion. Presently, plant and infrastructure (coal haul road, crushing plant and barge loading facilities) with 6mtpa-10mtpa of capacity is on schedule for completion in 3Q05, which should allow Bengalon to ramp up output largely as planned.
Production Contractors Roughly three-quarters of KPCA’s output will be produced by contractors while one-quarter will be produced by KPC itself. In Fitch’s view, KPC is competent and experienced in operating its own sites and is capable of producing its share of planned output. The reliability of the remaining volumes is dependent on the operating strength of the contractors and their commitment to executing on their contracts in a timely and satisfactory fashion. Analysis of the relevant plans and credentials supports Fitch’s view that the contractors are largely competent and capable of meeting the obligations of their production contracts, although more (but acceptable) risks are associated with HWEI owing to recent events (see below). In general, the contractors are experienced in Indonesia and are familiar with local geology and terrain. KPC and Arutmin management have a long history of working with contractors and are skilled in managing and supervising their work. These strengths are supplemented by wellestablished internal systems and controls, many of which are codified in the contractors’ operating agreements. The contracts are robust documents that specify the responsibilities and liabilities of the parties and provide for the timely replacement of contractors should any fail to perform. Consultation, planning and progress evaluation are conducted with the contractors on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual basis. The contractors’ interests are long term in nature and are largely aligned with those of KPC and Arutmin, which are among their largest clients in the country. The contracts require a total of some USD450m in capital investments by the contractors, which further links their interests to the success of their respective projects. The stability of the Bengalon contractor, HWEI, came into question at end-2004 when Henry Walker Eltin (“HWE”), HWEI’s parent, filed for voluntary administration in Australia as a result of severe contract losses in that market. To secure the stability of the contract and the delivery of associated equipment, Bumi organized the purchase of HWE’s interests in HWEI by a consortium of private investors (in May 2005). HWEI’s set-up is similar to those of BHP and BP/Rio Tinto prior to the sales of KPC and Arutmin. Its senior management was trained by HWE, and it is supported by an established local management structure whose members were recruited and developed locally. As the management structure of HWEI is expected to remain largely intact, its ability to execute on the existing contract should not be materially impaired. While above events delayed Bengalon’s initial ramp up, the delay was one-time in nature and has not significantly impacted the progress of the mine’s development (see Production). Equipment required to meet Bengalon’s 2005 targets is either on site or en route, and should allow for the achievement of the revised planned volumes (3.1mt) this year. As for further capex needs over the duration of the contract, financing has been arranged with the help of Bumi. PT Thiess Indonesia: Thiess is a subsidiary of Thiess Pty Ltd, one of Australia’s largest construction and engineering firms. Thiess is one of the largest mining contractors in Indonesia, with a long history of operating the mines of KPC and Artumin. Thiess has a 12-year contract with KPC and a life-of-mine contract with Arutmin to produce over 40% of KPCA’s planned output to 2012. PT Pamapersada Nusantara (“Pama”): Pama is a subsidiary of United Tractors and it is the largest Indonesian mining contractor. Pama has a 10-year contract with KPC to produce roughly 10% of KPCA’s planned output to 2012. PT Cipta Kridatama (“CK”): CK is a subsidiary of Trakindo Utama, a major Indonesian supplier of heavy equipment. CK is currently negotiating a new five-year contract with Arumin with the aim of producing some 3% of KPCA’s output to 2012. PT Henry Walker Eltin Indonesia: Formerly Darma Henwa Indonesia, HWEI was a subsidiary of Henry Walker Eltin prior to HWE’s voluntary administration at the end of 2004, which resulted in the sale of HWEI to a group of private investors coordinated by Bumi. HWEI has a 10-year contract with KPC to develop the Bengalon mine and to produce roughly one- fifth of KPCA’s planned output to 2012.
Redirection would therefore not necessarily yield any significant increase in cash flows – an extra approximately USD[146]m per year (i.e. the largest debt service amount per annum for the term of the transaction assuming a coupon rate of 7%). http://globaldocuments.morningstar.com/documentlibrary/document/1b32ef5992c771a9.msdoc/original TCW Galileo Funds, Inc International Funds TCW Galileo Emerging Markets Income Fund indonesia 9.3%, $6,406,704 principal amount 1,680,483 value 1,663,678 indocoal exports cayman ltd (144A), 7.134%, due 07/06/2012 http://www.globalcapital.com/article/k5c40tqlh87d/securitisation-flowers-in-variety-of-asian-habitats Securitisation flowers in variety of Asian habitats 20 Jan 2006 Indonesia back after eight years Even the smaller and less mature markets produced a variety of transactions. Perhaps most significantly, Merrill Lynch arranged Indocoal Exports (Cayman), a $600m securitisation of export receivables for Indonesia’s Bumi Resources – the first securitisation to emerge from the country since the financial crisis of 1997. The success of the transaction, which attracted a $900m order book, may rekindle interest in mooted securitisations for Bank Internasional Indonesia and oil refiner Pertamina, among others. http://www.iflr.com/Article/3026175/Indonesian-securitisation-set-to-make-a-comeback.html Indonesian securitisation set to make a comeback 10 May 2012 Lawyers in Jakarta expect Indonesia’s securitisation market to relaunch this year, with the country’s first major cross-border securitisation in two decades. After several cross-border motor-cycle and auto securitisations in the 1990s, Indonesia’s securitisation market has suffered years of unfulfilled promise. The last such transaction in the country – IndoCoal Exports’ 2006 issuance of an $800 million 7% structured notemade headlines as the region’s largest-ever securitisation. But there have been no similar deals since. In June 2010, IndoCoal Resources (Cayman) Ltd (ICRL), a jointly controlled entity, and Candice Investments Pte Ltd, an associate company of 30% owner of KPC and Arutmin, entered into an Equity Partner Loan Agreement, wherein ICRL grants to Candice an unsecured, convertible term loan facility in the http://jp.whitecase.com/files/Publication/da0b10bb-7d5d-4118-8215-00a5d120036f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/19ead43d583a-4fab-967f-02b5f8631114/IFLR1000_2007_Rankings_Summary.pdf Bertie Mehigan leads White & Case’s banking and finance practice in Singapore, where he is accompanied by eight associates. Mehigan has raised his profile in the banking sector in Singapore and across the Asia-Pacific region over the past 12 months by taking the lead on several important financings, including the $291 million financing for the acquisition of the United Broadcasting Corporation and banking transactions for PT Bank Danamon Indonesia and the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. The type of the work the group has advised on also demonstrates the cross-border nature of the practice. The firm’s Singapore team has advised on matters in Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Taiwan, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The firm’s client list includes Calyon, the China Development Bank, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Mizuho Corporate Bank, PT Bank Danamon Indonesia, PT Bumi Resources, The Royal Bank of Scotland, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and UOB. For example, White & Case represented PT Bumi Resources and Indocoal Exports in connection with the issuance of $800 million structured export notes in a private placement to Credit Suisse. White & Case is known by peers in the market to be “very good on emerging markets,” and occupies a leading position CDO work, in which it boasts “a really impressive practice”. The firm has increased its team this year, and now has for partners focusing on pure structured financing matters. An especially noteworthy transaction for the firm was its role advising WestLB as global coordinator on Turkey’s largest-ever securitization and the largest-ever wrapped bond by a Turkish borrower, a $1.433 billion offering of guaranteed floating-rate notes issued by Akbank via Arts, a Jersey special purpose vehicle (SPV). The note offering was issued in 11 separate tranches under Arts’ future-flow securitization programme. In another landmark deal, the firm represented PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC) and PT Arutmin Indonesia, coal mining subsidiaries of Bumi Resources, in connection with a $600 million note offering by IndoCoal Exports (Cayman), a Cayman Islands SPV formed to purchase existing and future receivables and related assets generated from sales of coal by KPC and Arutmin. This was the first investment-grade offering and the first securitization out of Indonesia since the Asian financial crisis, and was widely heralded as reopening the market for securitizations by Indonesian companies. The firm also acted for WestLB and JP Morgan in the first ever public future-flow securitization of diversified payment rights (DPRs) in Kazakhstan, in a $300 million floating-rate note issue for Kazkommertsbank. The transaction was a truesale securitization of the issuer’s dollar-denominated present and future DPRs; with a securitization law expected to be passed in Kazakhstan in the near future the Kazakh securitization market is predicted to grow rapidly, and White & Case is well-placed to take advantage of this growth. Among the year’s other highlights, White & Case advised high-profile client Kensington Mortgages on its 20th and 21st issues in Kensington Mortgage’s RMBS programme, David Barwise led a team that acted for Deutsche Bank as arranger of a €400 million bond issue by Eurocredit Opportunities I, which was the first-ever European market value CDO, and a 10-strong team of lawyers spanning London and New York advised Citigroup on its first-ever unit trust to use structured finance techniques. http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Indonesia%20Energy%20and%20Natural%20Resource%20credentials.PDF IndoCoal Exports (Cayman) Ltd. We advised on the USD900m Floating Rate Notes due 2011 and 2012 issued by IndoCoal Exports (Cayman) Ltd. as part of a securitisation programme for Bumi Resources’ principal operating subsidiaries, PT Kaltim Prima Coal and PT Arutmin Indonesia. This was the largest bond sale by an Indonesian corporate, the largest FRN private placement out of Indonesia and one of the largest securitisations ever from Asia. IndoCoal Exports Advised Credit Suisse as placement agent and the note purchasers in relation to the issue of Floating Rate Notes due 2011 and 2012 by IndoCoal Exports (Cayman) Limited, used to refinance existing notes. This was the largest bond sale by an Indonesian corporate and the largest FRN private placement out of Indonesia. PT Bumi Resources Tbk Advised Deutsche Bank as arranger of a structured finance transaction for PT Bumi Resources Tbk with an issuance of USD60m floating rate notes by Jimba Finance Limited. Representing a coal mining publicly listed company In its proposed issuance of U.S. Dollar bonds in reliance of Rule-144A and Regulation S of the U.S. Securities Act. arutmin 2016-07-02 04:21 PM ArCo & Utah International Arutmin Indonesia, a joint venture of Utah Exploration Inc.and Atlantic Richfield Co. of the United States, 2. PT ARUTMIN INDONESIA Sejak awal kelompok Bakrie terlibat di Arutmin. Perusahaan ini tadinya merupakan hasil; kongsi antara Bakrie (20%) dengan BHP Minerals Australia (80%). Arutmin mengoperasikan dua tambang terbuka di Kalimantan Selantan. Arutmin bias memproduksi 19 juta metric ton batu bara setiap tahun. Kini, Arutmin juga sepenuhnya berada di bawah naungan PT Bumi resource. PT Arutmin operates two open-cut energy coal mines, Senakin and Satui, in south Kalimantan. The mines produce approximately 11 million tonnes per annum of thermal coal, which is predominantly exported to Asian markets. PT Arutmin Indonesia PT Arutmin Indonesia, a joint venture between BHP Minerals of Australia (80%) and Bakrie Brothers (20%), operates two open-cut coal mines and a coal loading facility located in South Kalimantan. The two mines are Senakin mine with a capacity of four million MT/year and Sentui mine with a capacity of two million MT/year. Commencing trial production in 1988, Arutmin increased production to 6.3 million MT in 1998 and 8.7 million MT in 1999 and targeted production of 12 million MT/year of bituminous coal in the near future from its seven separate projects. Arutmin exported 7.1 million MT in 1999 through its deep-water coal transshipment point at North Pulau Laut. The port is designed to accommodate Panamax size vessels with a stockyard capacity of 500,000 MT. Japanese buyers postponed transactions to purchase 700,000 MT of coal from Arutmin due to fears of supply interruptions following deteriorating ties between Australia and Indonesia. Officials said the postponement would not only affect PT Arutmin, but also coulld diminish Indonesia’s foreign exchange earnings, as the Japanese buyers may switch to coal contracts with other countries. For the subsequent phase of PT Arutmin Indonesia’s divestment, which will involve the acquisitionn of 17% of the company’s stock, the Department of Mines and Energy has appointed PT Tambang Timah to act as the coordinator. Currently, PT Arutmin Indonesia is jointly owned by Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) Co. Ltd. of Australia (80%) and PT Bakrie Brothers (20%). PT Arutmin; A Utah International Project (United States) a fully owned subsidiary of BHP (Australia). The project is about 15 kilometers from barge loading facilities that can directly serve markets or can transfer coal to ships for regional markets. This project has a stripping ratio of about 6:1 and staged development is planned from the present production of about 1 million tonnes to 5.5 million tonnes in 1993. Substantial production will probably go to Indonesian power plants. kpc 2016-07-02 04:21 PM RTZ/BP 1. PT KALTIM PRIMA COAL (KPC) Awalnya, KPC merupakan perusahaan patungan milik Rio Tinto Australia (50%) dan British Petroleum (50%) dari Inggris. KPC adalah operator batu bara terbesar di Indonesia. Kegiatan produksi secara komersial di KPC dimulai pada tahun 1991. setelah itu KPC sanggup memproduksi batu bara secara stabil di level stabil 15 juta metric ton per tahun. Kini, KPC berada di bawah kepemilikan PT Bumi Resources, unit usaha kelompok Bakrie. Pada tahun 2007 silam produksi KPC mencapai 50 juta metric ton. PT Kaltim Prima Coal – The largest coal producer PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC), jointly owned by the Rio Tinto group of Australia (50%) and British Petroleum of UK (50%), is the largest coal operator in Indonesia. Commencing commercial production in 1991, KPC steadily increased coal production to nearly 15 million MT in 1999 afer investing about one billion US dollars. At the current production rate, the company’s marketable coal reserves of 650 million MT can sustain mining for more than 20 years. Its high quality coal, extensive exploration, and heavy investment in infrastructure were the key factors in its success. Production is currently exported through the Tanjung Bara Coal Terminal (TBCT), a deep-water load-out facility which is capable of handling cape-size vessels of 200,000 dead weight ton (DWT) capacity. In 1999, KPC exported 13.9 million MT of coal to destinations in Europe, the U.S., Japan and other Asian countries. KPC produces two brands of coal – “Prima Coal” and “Pinang Coal.” Prima Coal is a high quality, internationally traded coal, predominantly sold on the basis of long- term contracts. While targeted to reach a production level of 15 million MT in 2000, KPC operations and production were affected for the first time in its history by labor actions. The company was shut down intermittently in the third quarter of the year, losing some 1.8 million MT of production, and had to declare force majeure to all its customers before starting back up on August 18. PT Kaltim Prima Coal was jointly owned by Rio Tinto and BP Amoco is located in northeast Kalimantan. In July 2003 100% of the KPC shares (owned by BP and Rio Tinto), were sold to PT Bumi Resources Tbk. Bumi is a local company owned by Long Haul Holdings Ltd (73.01%), Minarak Labuan Ltd (21.99%), PT Bakri Capital Indonesia (2.17%) and the public (2.88%). In 2003, KPC’s coal output declined by 8.4% to 16.2 Mt (17.57 Mt) owing to a three-week strike by the workforce in September. The cause of the strike was the workers’ demand for a bonus of 15% from the proceeds of the sale of KPC shares to PT Bumi Resources. Australian copper producer Straits Resources Ltd has a 80% operating interest in the Sebuku opencast coal mine located on Sebuku Island, South Kalimantan. Sebuku produces approximately 1.5 Mt of high volatile bituminous coal each year. Rio Tinto Plc Rio Tinto once owned 50% (the remainder with BP Coal) of Kaltim Prima in Indonesia, a major coal producer with operations in East Kalimantan. PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC), which is 50% owned by Rio Tinto of Australia and 50% by British Petroleum of England, is also conducting divestment. In this regard, the Directorate General of General Mines has designated PT TBBA and three private national companies to take over as much as 23% of the company’s stock. KPC, whose area of operations is located in the East Kalimantan kecamatan of Sangatta, has been operating in Indonesia since 1989 on the basis of a coal-mining agreement which it signed with PT TBBA in 1982. Given that the process of KPC’s divestment commenced in 1998, the transfer of 51% of the company’s stock to the local partners can be expected to be completed in 2003. PT Kaltim Prima: This is the premium coal project in both quality and probably competitive position in Indonesia. A joint venture between CRA (Australia) and BP (Britain). The project has a planned capacity of 7.0 million tonnes per year, an average stripping ratio of 6/1. Coal will be transported 13 km by conveyor belt to ships up to 180,000 DWT. Capital investment is estimated at about US$500 million (US$71-79/annual tonne capacity), and direct operating costs will probably fall in the US$12-15 per torme range. This project can supply steaming coal to Asia at very competitive prices, and is likely to be competitive in the European market, and perhaps in the coastal areas of eastern United States. The project is expected to produce about 800 thousand tonnes in 1990 with transport to the port by truck. Commercial production using the preparation plant and conveyor system is expected in late-1991 with a gradual build up to 7.0 million tonnes in 1996 with about 6 million tonnes going to the export market. The build up to 7 million tormes could occur well before 1996. The capacity constraint of 7 million tormes is primarily due to the capacity of the conveyor belt system. berau 2016-07-02 04:21 PM Asia Resource Minerals (Vallar Investments UK Ltd, 84.74%) Vallar owns 75% Berau Coal Vallar -> PT Berau Coal Energy Tbk (owned by Recapital Advisors) Recapital Advisors -> Risco (owned by Boy Thohir (15%), Rizal Risjad (65%), and Handy Purnomo Soetedjo (20%). 4. PT BERAU COAL PT Berau Coal saat ini berada di tangan kendali PT Armadaian Tritunggal (51%)- milik Rizal Risjad (anak Ibrahim Risjad). Selain itu, ada juga Rognar holding BV Belanda (39%), dan Sojitc Corp dari Jepang. Tadinya, Berau dimiliki oleh United Tractors (60%), PT Pandua Dian Pertiwi (20%), dan Nissho Iwai (20%). Berau memiliki tiga lokasi tambang di kabupaten Berau, Kalimantan Timur, yaitu Lati, Binungan, dan Sambrata. Berau memegang Perjanjian Karya Pengusahaan Pertambangan Batubara (PKP2B) dengan pemerintah Indonesia atas konsesi sekitar 118 ribu hectare (ha) dengan lahan produksi 40 ribu ha. Tahun ini perusahaan menargetkan produksi 15 juta metric ton batu bara setelah tahun lalu mebukukan 12,5 juta ton. PT Berau Coal PT Berau Coal, a joint venture between United Tractors (60%), PT Pandua Dian Pertiwi (20%) and Nissho Iwai (20%), operates coal mines located around Latek River (about 600 km north of Samarinda), East Kalimantan. Berau Coal reported measured reserves of 745 million MT from its five potential fields. Production rose sharply from 300,000 MT in 1994 to 2.3 million MT in 1998 and 3.3 million MT in 1999. Berau Coal plans to expand its mining capacity to 8.0 million MT/year in 2000. The company has been contracted to supply 4.5 million MT/year of coal by power companies. The contracts include a 30-year deal with Daya Listrik Pratama valued at US $1 billion for 1.1 million MT/year; a deal with the developer of a rescheduled 400 MW coal power plant project at Cilegon; a 30-year deal with Paiton II worth US $1.5 billion to supply two million MT/year; and a 5-year deal with Paiton I valued at US $300 million. PT Berau has begun production from a new colliery located near Sambarata in East Kalimantan. PT Berau has measured reserves totaling over 550 Mt from its deposits (of which Sambarata is one) located in the northern part of Eastern Kalimantan. PT Berau operates several collieries in Indonesia, primarily in East Kalimantan. In 1997, PT Berau Coal (BC)–a subsidiary of United Tractors–won a US$ 1 billion contract on the procurement of coal for PT Dayalistrik Pratama, a private power-supply company, whose coal-fired power plant is located in Cilegon, West Java. Under the contract agreement, PT BC is required to supply the coal-fired power plant, which has a 400-MW capacity, with 1.1 million tons of coal annually for 30 years. However, according to Presidential Decree No. 39 of 1997, PT Dayalistrik Pratama’s power plant project is one of the 13 private power projects which have to be suspended. PT Berau Coal: This project on Kalimantan is located 10 kilometers from the Berau River, where small 3500 DWT barges will carry the coal to a transshipment point. Production starting at 0.5 million tonnes in 1994 jumping to 2 million tonnes in 1995 have been suggested. Due to coal quality considerations and transportation constraints, the rate of development of this project could be slower than indicated. 01 20140922 1444 Gagal Bayar Utang Sudah Biasa di Eks ‘Bakrie Tujuh’ 2016-07-04 09:18 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/09/22/144441/2697315/6/gagal-bayar-utang-sudah-biasa-di-eks-bakrie-tujuh Gagal Bayar Utang Sudah Biasa di Eks ‘Bakrie Tujuh’ Angga Aliya – detikfinance Senin, 22/09/2014 14:44 WIB Jakarta -PT Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk (UNSP) menyatakan belum bisa bayar bunga atas utang US$ 100 juta (Rp 1,1 triliun). Gagal bayar utang ini sudah biasa terjadi di perusahaan-perusahaan yang dulu masuk dalam ‘Bakrie Tujuh’. Gagal bayar utang sepertinya sudah menjadi hal yang biasa bagi kelompok usaha ini. Berikut ini beberapa aksi gagal bayar yang pernah terjadi di eks ‘Bakrie Tujuh’, seperti dirangkum detikFinance, Senin (22/9/2014). PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk (BTEL) Perusahaan telekomunikasi ini gagal bayar kupon obligasi (bunga surat utang) senilai Rp 218 miliar. Kupon tersebut merupakan bagian dari obligasi perseroan senilai Rp 3,8 triliun yang jatuh tempo Mei 2015. Seharusnya operator Esia itu membayar kewajibannya pada 7 November 2013. Akibatnya, peringkat obligasi perseroan pun turun. Lembaga pemeringkat internasional Fitch Ratings menurunkan peringkat obligasi anak usaha Grup Bakrie itu dari C menjadi CC. Turunnya peringkat ini juga terjadi pada peringkat utang Bakrie Telecom untuk jangka panjang dalam bentuk rupiah dan dolar. Meski demikian, Fitch percaya Bakrie Telecom akan mampu melakukan restrukturisasi utangnya dengan mencari sumber pendanaan yang likuid pada masa tenggat setelah jatuh tempo (grace period). PT Bakrieland Development Tbk (ELTY) Perusahaan properti ini pernah gagal bayar bunga dan pokok utang tahun lalu. Pembayaran pelunasan pokok dan bunga ke-20 Obligasi I Bakrieland Development Tahun 2208 Seri B seharusnya dilaksanakan pada 11 Maret 2013 namun sampai hari yang ditentukan belum juga terlaksana. Bakrieland sendiri punya utang jatuh tempo sebanyak Rp 280 miliar, yang merupakan utang Obligasi I Bakrieland Development tahun 2008. Obligasi seri B itu bertenor lima tahun ini akan jatuh tempo pada 11 Maret 2013 dan memiliki tingkat bunga tetap sebesar 12,85%. PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) Perusahaan tambang ini sudah meminta keringanan syarat dan ketentuan Obligasi Konversi Bergaransi senilai US$ 375 juta kepada pemegang saham. Jatuh tempo obligasi yang sempat tidak dibayar ini mundur ke April 2008. Rapat pemegang obligasi sudah digelar di Singapura Jumat 22 Agustus 2014. Atas mundurnya tanggal jatuh tempo ini manajemen BUMI mengklaim semua kemungkinan gagal bayar (event of default) telah dihilangkan sebagai bagian dari perjanjian tersebut. Obligasi yang jatuh tempo Agustus 2014 ini selanjutnya akan digantikan dengan Obligasi Konversi dan ditempatkan sederajat (pari passu) dengan utang antar kreditor lainnya. Persyaratan utama dari Obligasi Konversi yang diperpanjang hingga April 2018 adalah, Jumlah Pokok Utang: US$ 374,9 juta, tanggal jatuh tempo pindah ke 7 April 2018, dan ketentuan pembayaran bunga menjadi 6% per tahun terhitung mulai tanggal 25 Agustus 2014. PT Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk PT Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk (UNSP) terancam gagal bayar bunga obligasi senilai US$ 100 juta (Rp 1,1 triliun). Anak usaha Grup Bakrie itu akan bernegosiasi dengan para trustee alias pemegang obligasi. Perusahaan sawit itu sudah menjelaskan kepada Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) bahwa jika bunga tersebut tidak dibayar maka bisa menimbulkan event of default atas Secured Equity-linked Redeembale Notes senilai US$ 100 juta tersebut. “Namun perusahaan sampai saat ini belum menerima notice event of default dari trustee yang ditujukan kepada perseroan,” kata Direktur Bakrie Sumatera Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran dalam keterangan tertulisnya. Ia mengatakan, perseroan sudah berbicara dengan para pemegang obligasi ini dan akan kembali melakukan negosiasi pada triwulan IV tahun ini. (ang/dnl) 02 20140616 0925 Tak Ada Lagi Nama Bakrie di Daftar Pemegang Saham ‘Bakrie Tujuh’ 2016-07-04 09:20 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/06/16/091734/2608906/6/tak-ada-lagi-nama-bakrie-di-daftar-pemegang-saham-bakrie-tujuh Tak Ada Lagi Nama Bakrie di Daftar Pemegang Saham ‘Bakrie Tujuh’ Angga Aliya – detikfinance Senin, 16/06/2014 09:25 WIB Jakarta -Masih ingat dengan istilah Bakrie Tujuh yang pernah populer di kalangan pelaku pasar modal beberapa tahun yang lalu? Sekarang mungkin lebih tepatnya hanya Tujuh saja karena sudah tidak ada Bakrie di sana. Nama Bakrie sudah tidak ada lagi di daftar nama pemegang saham di sebagian besar emitennya tersebut. Kalaupun ada, kepemilikan sahamnya sudah kecil sekali. Menurut salah satu eksekutif di Grup Bakrie, kepemilikan BNBR di emiten-emitennya itu sudah kecil sekali, bahkan ada beberapa perusahaan yang kinerja keuangannya sudah tidak konsolidasi lagi dengan Bakrie and Brothers. Sahamnya mulai menyusut pasca krisis ekonomi global 2008 lalu. Waktu itu Grup Bakrie mencoba membayar utang-utangnya dengan cara gadai saham ke pihak lain. Nah sampai sekarang saham-sahamnya itu belum kembali. “Jadi sebenarnya mereka sudah tidak bisa lagi disebut milik Bakrie, karena sahamnya (Bakrie) sudah sedikit sekali. Mereka itu ya perusahaan publik,” katanya. Tapi nama Bakrie tidak hilang seluruhnya di daftar pemegang saham. Namanya masih muncul di BTEL dan UNSP. Berikut ini daftar pemegang saham di eks Bakrie Tujuh berdasarkan data Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI), Bakrie and Brothers (BNBR) * Credit Suisse AG Singapore Branch S/A Bright Ventures Pte Ltd 21,81% * Mellon Bank NA S/A For Mackenzie Cundill Recovery Fund 9.34% * Armansyah Yamin 0,01% * Nugroho I Purbowinoto 0,01% * Publik 69,06% PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) * Credit Suisse AG Singapore Branch 23,09% * Raiffeisen Bank International AG Singapore Branch/Long Haul Holding Ltd 6,09% * Publik 70,82% PT Bakrieland Development Tbk (ELTY) * CGMI Client Safekeeping Account 10,41% * PT Asuransi Jiwa Sinarmas 6,32% * Publik 83,28% PT Bakrie Sumatra Plantation Tbk (UNSP) * Credit Suisse AG Singapore Branch/Long Haul Holding Ltd 3,13% * PT Asuransi Jiwa Sinarmas MSIG 3,06% * Meivel Holdings Corporation 2,34% * JP Morgan Bank Luxembourg SA1,76% * PT Danatama Makmur 1,75% * Nomura PB Nominees Ltd 1,69% * Reksa Dana Penyertaan Terbatas Syailendra Multi Strategy Fund II 1,42% * Citibank New York S/A Dimensional Emerging Markets Value Fund 1,33% * The Wenas Panwell 1,05% * Bakrie and Brothers 0,02% * Publik 82,45% PT Energi Mega Persada Tbk (ENRG) * Mellon Bank NA S/A for Mackenzie Cundill Recovery 7,76% * UBS AG Singapore Non-Treaty Omnibus Account 20,09% * Didit Hidayat Agripinanto 0,01% * Publik 72,16% PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk (BTEL) 16,35% * Bakrie and Brothers 16,35% * Bakrie Global Ventura 6,87% * Raiffeisen Bank International AG Singapore Branch 7,24% * Publik 69,54% PT Darma Henwa (DEWA) * Zurich Asset International Ltd 21,61% * Goldwave Capital Limited 17,68% * Publik 60,71% (ang/ang) 10 20140506 2059 Batal “Private Placement”, BUMI “Rights Issue” Rp 6,5 Triliun 2016-07-04 09:35 PM http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2014/05/06/2059556/Batal.Private.Placement.BUMI.Rights.Issue.Rp.6.5.Triliun Batal “Private Placement”, BUMI “Rights Issue” Rp 6,5 Triliun Editor : Erlangga Djumena Sumber : KONTAN, Selasa, 6 Mei 2014 | 20:59 WIB JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com – PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) melakukan aksi korporasi yang mengejutkan. Emiten batu bara keluarga Bakrie ini tiba-tiba mengumumkan rencana untuk menerbitkan 26,17 miliar saham biasa seri B dalam rangka penerbitan Hak Memesan Efek Terlebih Dahulu (HMETD). Hal itu terungkap dalam prospektus rights issue yang dirilis BUMI pada Selasa (6/5/2014). Merujuk pada prospektus itu, harga pelaksanaan aksi korporasi yang biasa disebut rights issue itu senilai Rp 250 per saham. Alhasil, jika rights issue terserap maksimal, maka BUMI bakal meraup dana segar senilai Rp 6,54 triliun. Rencana ini tentu mengejutkan lantaran pada Desember tahun lalu, BUMI sejatinya sudah mengumumkan rencana untuk menerbitkan 13,67 miliar saham baru, tetapi dengan skema Penerbitan Tanpa Hak Memesan Efek Terlebih Dahulu (Non-HMETD) alias private placement. Harga pelaksanaan private placement, kala itu, direncanakan senilai Rp 425 per saham. Imbasnya, nilai total private placement BUMI waktu itu senilai Rp 5,8 triliun. Sayangnya, manajemen BUMI masih bungkam terkait perubahan aksi pencarian dana ini. Dileep Srivastava, Direktur dan Sekretaris Perusahaan BUMI, tidak merespons pertanyaan yang dilayangkan Kontan. Satu hal yang pasti, rencana rights issue itu akan menghasilkan pengurangan yang terbilang besar, yakni 55,75 persen. BUMI menjelaskan, dana hasil rights issue akan digunakan untuk empat kebutuhan. Pertama, sekitar Rp 1,73 triliun atau 150 juta dollar AS akan digunakan untuk melunasi pinjaman dari China Investment Corporation (CIC). Fasilitas itu sejatinya diperoleh dari anak CIC, yaitu Country Forest Limited (CFL), pada 18 September 2009. Total pinjaman BUMI ke CFL tercatat 1,3 miliar dollar AS. Senilai 600 juta dollar AS dari fasilitas itu akan jatuh tempo pada 18 September 2014, sementara 700 juta dollar AS baru jatuh tempo pada 18 September 2015. Kedua, sekitar Rp 1,73 triliun atau setara 150 juta dollar AS akan digunakan BUMI untuk melunasi fasilitas utang dari Castleford Investment Holdings, Ltd. Fasilitas itu diperoleh pada 14 November 2013, yang digunakan untuk ekspansi anak usaha BUMI. Ketiga, BUMI akan menggunakan Rp 2,59 triliun atau setara 225 juta dollar AS untuk melunasi obligasi (guaranteed convertible bonds) yang diterbitkan 5 Agustus 2009. Sisa dana hasil rights issue lainnya akan digunakan untuk modal kerja. Rencana rights issue ini akan dimintakan persetujuan dalam rapat umum pemegang saham luar biasa (RUPSLB) pada 5 Juni 2014. (Veri Nurhansyah Tragistina) 02 20140508 Bumi Resources Rights Issue & Castleford 2016-07-04 09:08 PM https://analysis.yosefardi.biz/2014/05/08/bumi-resources-rights-issue-castleford/ Bumi Resources Rights Issue & Castleford by yosefardi.com, May 8, 2014 Bumi Resources (BUMI), controlled by Bakrie Group, has kicked off the issuance of 26.17 billion new shares at Rp250 per share to raise Rp6.54 trillion. About US$150 million of proceeds will be used to repay China Investment Corporation’s facility, while the balance will go to Castleford (US$150 million), holders of Guaranteed Convertible Bonds Due 2014 (US$225 million), and working capital. Total shares after the rights issue will be 46.95 billion. If the current price of Rp196 stays after the rights issue, BUMI will have market capitalization of Rp9.2 trillion or about US$800 million. While the rights issue price reflects a premium of 27%, BUMI ended flat Wednesday (May 7th). The rights issue size is significantly bigger than initial plan of 13.665 billion new shares without preemptive rights at Rp425 per share. Why? It is because BUMI want to ‘repay’ loans from Castleford Investment Holdings. On November14, 2013, PT Bumi Resources Investment (BRI), a non-restricted subsidiary of BUMI, and Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd entered into a facility agreement, wherein Castleford agreed to provide financial support amounting to US$110 million in order to develop certain projects of BRI. The loan bears an interest rate of 5% per annum and payable within 12 months. BUMI owns 99% shares in BRI, which had total assets of US$616.43 million as at December 31, 2013, compared to US$556.9 million in December 2012. BRI, meanwhile, controls the following companies: 1/ PT Green Resources 2/ Pendopo Coal Ltd, and accordingly PT Pendopo Energi Batubara; 3/ Leap Forward Resources Ltd, and accordingly PT Fajar Bumi Sakti; Bear in mind that BRI had on August 29, 2012 signed CSPA to sell 50% shares in Leap-Forward to PT Alam Cipta Manunggal (ACM) for US$140 million, which can be adjusted down by US$60 million. If BRI indeed invested US$150 million of funds from Castleford, why its assets grew only by US$59 million last year? What kind of investment had actually been committed by BRI since November 2013? What is Castleford? Who owns the company? Is it another scheme to squeeze public investors? “It is more like BUMI’s skyrocketing receivables from PT Jhonlin Group last year. You know the answer,” one retail investor commented. FYI, BUMI booked US$171.3 million of receivables from PT Jhonlin Group as at December 31, 2013, against US$5.9 million in 2012. That was the single largest receivable in the period. Regarding the Guaranteed Convertible Bond, BUMI issued US$375 million GCB in August 2009 with Credit Suisse as the sole placement agent. The GCB matures on August 5th, 2014 with initial conversion price of Rp3367 per share. Outstanding principal of the GCB as at December 31, 2013 was US$375 million. Interesting that the rights issue will only repay US$225 million of the GCB. How about the balance of US$150 million, which is exactly the same amount BUMI will pay to Castleford? Frankly, it’s hard to follow BUMI and other Bakrie-related stocks. They launched way too many complex actions. 24 20140611 Bumi Resources avoids default 2016-07-04 10:07 PM http://www.worldcoal.com/coal/11062014/Bumi_Resources_avoids_default_963/ Bumi Resources avoids default Sam Dodson, 11/06/2014 According to a filing to the Indonesian stock exchange, Bumi Resources avoided a default by paying an overdue coupon on its US$ 300 million November 2016 bonds. “The outstanding coupon has been paid today within the cure period,” director Dileep Srivastava said in the statement, which came after the exchange halted trade in Bumi’s stock and sought information on the payment’s status. Jakarta-based Bumi had until 11 June to make the twice-a-year coupon payment after delaying by a month while it negotiated with creditors and lenders to ease its cash strain. The company, which had US$ 4.72 billion of short-term liabilities at the end of 2013, on 6 June asked bondholders for permission to extend the maturity on US$ 375 million of convertible notes that are coming due in August. Bumi’s refinancing plan is being watched carefully by investors. Concern remains deep-set that non-payments among Asia’s riskiest borrowers will rise, as a slowdown hits some regional miners and property developers. Moody’s Investors Service expects speculative-grade defaults in the region outside Japan will climb almost 3% in 2014, according to a recent report. Xavier Jean, a credit analyst at Standard & Poor’s in Singapore, said Bumi still has “pretty sizeable maturities beyond the convertible bonds, so refinancing risk will remain high. It seems pretty challenging unless they execute their planned large equity raising, or sell assets.” The controversial Bakrie family own Bumi Resources. Aga Bakrie, one of the firm’s co-founders, recently entered into {a virulent row on social media} with financier Nat Rothschild. The Indonesian company posted losses in the past two years, amid a slump in coal prices. Benchmark prices in the Southeast Asian nation have dropped 8.4% since 31 December, extending a two-year slide to the lowest level since 2009. “The main underlying issue is the low coal prices,” Amit Jain, a credit analyst in Bangalore at SJS Markets Ltd., said in an e-mail. The company cannot sustain the current debt load. Coal producers are just looking to survive and wait for prices to improve.” Bumi has called a meeting on 20 June in Singapore to seek consent from its convertible note bondholders to extend the maturity of the 9.25% debt to 2021, consent solicitation agent Deutsche Bank AG said earlier this week. Other terms haven’t been publicly disclosed. Any investments based on hope Analysts have grown increasingly wary over investing in Bumi. Rohit Gadkar, and emerging markets money manager at Trea Capital Partners SV in Barcelona, sold his holding in Bumi’s convertible bonds earlier this year because information on the company’s situation was hard to come by. “I felt you’re taking a complete punt based on hope, and that type of trade doesn’t fit into my strategy,” Gadkar said in an e-mail interview. “There’s not enough transparency. I may revisit this once there is more clarity.” 25 20140611 1248 Bumi Resources Avoids Default After Paying Coupon on Notes 2016-07-04 10:10 PM http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-11/bumi-resources-avoids-default-with-coupon-payment-on-2016-notes Bumi Resources Avoids Default After Paying Coupon on Notes David Yong, June 11, 2014 – 12:48 PM WIB PT Bumi Resources avoided a default by paying an overdue coupon on its $300 million November 2016 bonds, according to a filing to the Indonesian stock exchange. “The outstanding coupon has been paid today within the cure period,” director Dileep Srivastava said in the statement, which came after the exchange halted trade in Bumi’s stock and sought information on the payment’s status. The 12 percent notes jumped 2.6 cents to 47.29 cents on the dollar as of 1:05 p.m. in Hong Kong, Bloomberg-compiled prices show, set for the biggest one-day gain since May 16 and the highest level since May 2. They’ve returned 20 percent since the coal producer sought a 30-day grace period to make the interest payment. Jakarta-based Bumi had until today to make the twice-a-year coupon payment after delaying by a month while it negotiated with creditors and lenders to ease its cash strain. The company, which had $4.72 billion of short-term liabilities at the end of 2013, on June 6 asked bondholders for permission to extend the maturity on $375 million of convertible notes that are coming due in August. Investors are watching Bumi’s refinancing plan amid concern non-payments among Asia’s riskiest borrowers will rise as a slowdown hits some regional miners and property developers. Moody’s Investors Service expects speculative-grade defaults in the region outside Japan will climb to 2.9 percent in 2014 from 2.1 percent in 2013, according to a June 6 report. Coal Prices Bumi still has “pretty sizeable maturities beyond the convertible bonds, so refinancing risk will remain high,” said Xavier Jean, a credit analyst at Standard & Poor’s in Singapore. “It seems pretty challenging unless they execute their planned large equity raising, or sell assets.” Bumi, controlled by Indonesia’s Bakrie family, posted losses in the past two years amid a slump in coal prices. Benchmark prices in the Southeast Asian nation have dropped 8.4 percent since Dec. 31, extending a two-year slide to the lowest level since 2009. “The main underlying issue is the low coal prices,” Amit Jain, a credit analyst in Bangalore at SJS Markets Ltd., said in an e-mail today. “The company cannot sustain the current debt load. Coal producers are just looking to survive and wait for prices to improve.” ‘Complete Punt’ Bumi has called a meeting on June 20 in Singapore to seek consent from its convertible note bondholders to extend the maturity of the 9.25 percent debt to 2021, consent solicitation agent Deutsche Bank AG said earlier this week. Other terms haven’t been publicly disclosed. Rohit Gadkar, an emerging markets money manager at Trea Capital Partners SV in Barcelona, sold his holding in Bumi’s convertible bonds earlier this year because information on the company’s situation was hard to come by. “I felt you’re taking a complete punt based on hope, and that type of trade doesn’t fit into my strategy,” Gadkar said in an e-mail interview June 6. “There’s not enough transparency. I may revisit this once there is more clarity.” Bumi’s refinancing plans also entail selling as many as 26.17 billion of new shares to repay $1.3 billion to China Investment Corp., according to a May statement. That comes after the completion of a $501 million breakup in March from a venture with U.K. financier Nathaniel Rothschild. Srivastava, in today’s exchange filing, said Bumi has won consent from lenders for the China Investment Corp. deal. Shares in Bumi closed yesterday at 194 rupiah ($0.02), up 2.65 percent. The stock has fallen 35 percent this year. 26 20140612 1019 Bumi Avoids Default After Paying Coupon On Bonds 2016-07-04 10:12 PM http://malaysiandigest.com/business/504607-bumi-avoids-default-after-paying-coupon-on-bonds.html Bumi Avoids Default After Paying Coupon On Bonds Thursday, 12 June 2014 10:19 JAKARTA: PT Bumi Resources has avoided a default by paying an overdue coupon on its US$300 million (RM960 million) November 2016 bonds, according to a filing to the Indonesian stock exchange. “The outstanding coupon has been paid within the cure period,” said its director Dileep Srivastava in the statement, which came after the exchange halted trade in Bumi’s stock and sought information on the payment’s status. It had until yesterday to make the twice-a-year coupon payment after delaying by a month while it negotiated with creditors and lenders to ease its cash strain. Bumi, which had US$4.72 billion of short-term liabilities at the end of last year, had asked bondholders for permission to extend the maturity on US$375 million of convertible notes due in August. –Bloomberg 07 20140703 Jadwal Rights Issue IV BUMI / Bumi Resources Tbk 2014 2016-07-04 09:23 PM http://www.britama.com/index.php/2014/07/jadwal-rights-issue-iv-bumi-bumi-resources-tbk-2014/ Jadwal Rights Issue IV BUMI / Bumi Resources Tbk 2014 3 Juli 2014 by britama.com britama.com, Rights Issue IV (Penawaran Umum Terbatas / PUT IV) dalam rangka penerbitan Hak Memesan Efek Terlebih Dahulu (HMETD) BUMI / Bumi Resources Tbk dan “PT Danatama Makmur, Long Haul Holdings Limited dan Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd sebagai pembeli siaga”. Rasio pembagian HMETD BUMI adalah setiap 20 saham lama BUMI yang dimiliki akan mendapatkan 31 HMETD, dimana setiap pemegang 1 HMETD berhak untuk membeli 1 saham baru BUMI dengan nilai nominal Rp100,- setiap saham, dengan harga pelaksanaan Rp250,- per saham. Apabila terdapat sisa saham, maka (A) sebanyak 13.800.000.000 Saham Baru akan diambil bagian dengan alokasi sebagai berikut: (i) Long Haul Holdings Limited akan mengambil bagian sebanyak 6.900.000.000 Saham Baru (atau setara dengan AS$150.000.000), (ii) sejumlah 6.900.000.000 Saham Baru akan dialokasi kepada Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd (“Castleford”) sebagai konversi utang BUMI menjadi saham, dan apabila masih ada sisa saham yang belum diambil, (B) sebanyak-banyaknya 2.042.090.000 saham dari sisa saham akan diambil bagian oleh PT Danatama Makmur sebagai pembeli siaga atas komitment penuh (full commitment). Rencana Penggunaan Dana yang di peroleh dari hasil PUT IV setelah di kurangi biaya-biaya emisi seluruhnya akan di pergunakan, antara lain: 1. Sebesar AS$14 juta setara dengan Rp 161 miliar (dengan menggunakan kurs Rp11.500), untuk modal kerja meliputi biaya operasional dan pembayaran bunga, 2. Sebanyak-banyaknya sebesar AS$ 275 juta setara dengan Rp 3.162 miliar akan digunakan untuk melakukan pelunasan pinjaman secara proporsional, 3. Sebesar AS$ 48 juta atau sebesar Rp 552 miliar, untuk merealisasikan anggaran program untuk Blok 13 dan Blok R2 dari konsesi hidrokarbon yang dimiliki Gallo Oil (Jersey) Ltd (“Gallo”), 4. Sebesar AS$ 32,58 juta atau sebesar Rp 374,67 miliar, untuk melaksanakan feasibility study konsesi tembaga dan emas yang dimiliki oleh PT Gorontalo Minerals (“GM”) yang merupakan anak perusahaan dengan kepemilikan tidak langsung sebesar 69,67% melalui PT Bumi Resource Mineral Tbk (BRMS), 5. Sebesar AS$150 juta setara dengan Rp 1.725 miliar, untuk melakukan pelunasan sebagian fasilitas pinjaman dari China Investment Corporation (“CIC”) melalui Country Forest Limited (“CFL”), (prioritas). 6. Sebesar AS$150 juta atau setara dengan Rp1.725 miliar, untuk melakukan pelunasan seluruh utang Perseroan kepada Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd (“Castleford”). Dana hasil PUT IV yang diperoleh dari Pembeli Siaga setelah dikurangi biaya emisi akan dipergunakan dengan prioritas pada poin 1, 5 dan 6 dari rencana penggunaan dana di atas. Adapun jadwal kegiatan Right Issue IV tersebut sebagai berikut: 07 Jul 2014 Tanggal perdagangan bursa yang memuat HMETD (Cum HMETD) di Pasar Reguler dan Nego 08 Jul 2014 Tanggal perdagangan bursa tidak memuat HMETD (Ex HMETD) di Pasar Reguler dan Nego 11 Jul 2014 Tanggal perdagangan bursa yang memuat HMETD (Cum HMETD) di Pasar Tunai 14 Jul 2014 Tanggal perdagangan bursa tidak memuat HMETD (Ex HMETD) di Pasar Tunai 11 Jul 2014 Tanggal daftar pemegang saham yang berhak menerima HMETD (Recording Date) 14 Jul 2014 Tanggal distribusi HMETD 15 Jul 2014 Tanggal Pencatatan HMETD di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) 15 Jul – 01 Sep 2014 Periode Perdagangan HMETD 15 Jul – 01 Sep 2014 Periode Pelaksanaan HMETD 17 Jul – 03 Sep 2014 Periode Penyerahan Saham Hasil Pelaksanaan HMETD 03 Sep 2014 Tanggal Terakhir Pembayaran Pemesanan Saham Tambahan 04 Sep 2014 Tanggal Penjatahan Efek Tambahan 05 Sep 2014 Tanggal pengembalian uang yang tidak memperoleh penjatahan 03 20140704 RIGHT ISSUE MADE BUMI SHAREHOLDERS MEETING RUN HARD 2016-07-04 09:09 PM http://kusnandarlaw.blogspot.co.id/2014/08/right-issue-made-bumi-shareholders.html RIGHT ISSUE MADE BUMI SHAREHOLDERS MEETING RUN HARD Business New – July 4, 2014 Kusnandar & Co., Sunday, 10 August 2014 18:39 PT Bumi Resources Tbk [BUMI] always attracted investors’ attention and the mass media; understandable because the Extraordinary Meeting of Shareholders was delayed, since it failed to meet quorum. As planned the RUPLB meeting was scheduled for 15.00 PM and ended on 21.00 WIB on Monday [30/6]. One of the strenuous was BUM’s plan to release right issue, which the shareholders finally agreed to release right issue. As agreed, every shareholder holding 20 shares had the right over 31 HMETD shares. The fund obtained from this limited offering would be used firstly, as company’s working capital amounting to around USD 15.8 Million base on Rp 11.500 exchange rate. Secondly the company would use around USD 48 million or equal to Rp 552 billion to realized USD 48 million or equal to Rp 552 billion to realize Block 13 and Block R2 program of Gallo oil which was a subsidiary company. Thirdly around USD 150 million or equal to Rp 1.72 trillion for debt payment to CBD, Asia Bank, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank. Fourthly around USD 32.58 million or around Rp 374.67 billion for executing feasibility for concession of copper and gold by PT Gorontalo Minerals. Fifthly around USD 150 million or Rp 1.72 trillion for payment of loan from China Investment Corporation [CIC] through Country Forest Limited on September 18, 2009. Sixthly, the fund would also be spent on payment of all company’s debt to Castleford Investment Holdings. Of the total fund obtained, USD 600 million had been allocated for paying debt especially to China Investment Corporation [CIC] to the amount of USD 150 million followed by payment to Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. It was known that the standard minimum attendance of shareholders at the Extraordinary Meeting of Shareholders [RUPSLB] was 50% plus 1 provided there was no change in company’s rules. “It was agreed that for rights issue attendance is 99%” Commissioner of BUMI Anton Setianto Soedarsono was quoted as saying. It was said that right issue was the right was to support company’s performance. He was even optimistic that this Corporate act could jack up performance of the coal mine. “Price trend of commodities is also good” he further said. Meanwhile one of the shareholders named M Saladdin disclosed that the atmosphere at RUPSLB meeting was strenuous. Some shareholders even questioned the reason for BUMI to issue new B series just to pay debt; but as one of the shareholders he stated that he agreed to the rights issue plan proposed by the company. “It’s for paying debt, whet is there to say or do?” he said. The Director and Company’s secretary of Bumi Resources Dileep disclosed that the shares to be distributed to shareholders in issuing rights issue was 26.174 shares lots at the most was 26.174 billion shares at the most. He disclosed that the company would use the fund fro corporate act amounting to Rp 1,725 trillion for paying debt to China Investment Corporation [CIC] through Country Forest Limited. Besides, the company would also use fund of Rp 1.725 trillion for paying debt to Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd, furthermore Rp 2.587 trillion would be used for settlement if “guaranteed Government bond due” 2014 issued by the company on August 5, 2009, and certain amount of debt to creditors the rest would be used as working capital. The fund obtained from rights issue amounting to USD 15.8 million or Rp 182 billion would be used for company’s working and operational cost while USD 150,000,000 or Rp 1.725 trillion would be used for paying CDB, Axis Bank L 2011 UBS AG 2011-2012. USD 48 million or Rp 552 billion for realization of program Block 13 and Block R2 of Gailo Oil Jersey, a subsidiary company. USD 32.58 million or Rp 374.67 billion for feasinility study by Gorontalo Mineral, a subsidiary company and USD 150,000,000 Rp 1.725 trillion for paying company’s debt to Bank BRI. Rights issue of BUMI aimed at fund amounting to Rp 8.05 trillion through right issue to be launched in the next 2 months to reduce company’s debt. Director of BUMI Dileep Shrivastava as quoted by Bloombreg, disclosed that shareholders of BUMI Resources had given company’s approval to issue 32.3 billion new lots of serie B at Rp 250 per lot. As planned the company would accomplish fund collecting on September 1, 2014 next, assuming that all shareholders had taken their shares. Bumi Resources needed a sun of money to pay their short term debt worth USD 4.7 billion after showing descend of performance due to falling coal price which brought the company closer to default. This company of Bakrie Group hads suspended payment of interest of bond in USD which they issued and planned to sell asset for paying some debt to some creditors including China Investment Corp. USD 150 million of this amount obtained through rights issue would be used for reducing debt to China Investment Corp amounting to USD 1.3 billion based on investors presentation on June 26 last. Another USD 150 million would be used for paying debt to China Development Bank Corp, Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank, UBS and Axia Bank Ltd and another USD 150 million would be used for paying debt to Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. (SS) 03 20140922 1043 Tak Bisa Bayar Bunga Utang Rp 1 Triliun, Bakrie Sumatera Minta Nego 2016-07-04 09:17 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/09/22/104339/2696918/6/tak-bisa-bayar-bunga-utang-rp-1-triliun-bakrie-sumatera-minta-nego Tak Bisa Bayar Bunga Utang Rp 1 Triliun, Bakrie Sumatera Minta Nego Angga Aliya – detikfinance Senin, 22/09/2014 10:43 WIB Jakarta -PT Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk (UNSP) terancam gagal bayar bunga obligasi senilai US$ 100 juta (Rp 1,1 triliun). Anak usaha Grup Bakrie itu akan bernegosiasi dengan para trustee alias pemegang obligasi. Perusahaan sawit itu sudah menjelaskan kepada Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) bahwa jika bunga tersebut tidak dibayar, maka bisa menimbulkan event of default atas Secured Equity-linked Redeembale Notes senilai US$ 100 juta tersebut. “Namun perusahaan sampai saat ini belum menerima notice event of default dari trustee yang ditujukan kepada perseroan,” kata Direktur Bakrie Sumatera Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran dalam keterangan tertulisnya, Senin (22/9/2014). Ia mengatakan, perseroan sudah berbicara dengan para pemegang obligasi ini dan akan kembali melakukan negosiasi pada triwulan IV tahun ini. “Saat ini terlalu dini untuk menyampaikan hal-hal yang dapat membatalkan negosasi yang dilakukan, karena sebagian besar lenders telah menyatakan komitmennya untuk mendukung proposal yang akan dilakukan perseroan,” ujarnya. Saat ini saham UNSP masih dihentikan sementara alias suspensi oleh BEI. Otoritas Bursa menanti penjelasan dari UNSP terkait ancama gagal bayar tersebut. (ang/dnl) 03 20140922 1114 Tak Bisa Bayar Bunga Utang Rp 1 T, Saham Gocap Bakrie Plantation Dibekukan 2016-07-04 09:18 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/09/22/111434/2696963/6/tak-bisa-bayar-bunga-utang-rp-1-t-saham-gocap-bakrie-plantationdibekukan Tak Bisa Bayar Bunga Utang Rp 1 T, Saham Gocap Bakrie Plantation Dibekukan Angga Aliya – detikfinance Senin, 22/09/2014 11:14 WIB Jakarta -PT Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk (UNSP) tak bisa bayar bunga obligasi senilai US$ 100 juta (Rp 1,1 triliun). Perdagangan saham UNSP masih dihentikan (suspen) dari akhir pekan lalu. Pekan lalu sahamnya dihentikan oleh PT Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) di harga Rp 50 per lembar. Sahamnya memang sudah berhenti bergerak dalam beberapa bulan terakhir. Juni lalu sempat naik ke Rp 51 per lembar tapi setelah itu turun lagi. Kinerja perusahaan yang terhambat harga loyonya harga sawit jadi penyebabnya. Namun hingga triwulan pertama tahun ini, kinerja Bakrie Sumatera sudah mulai membaik. Seperti dikutip dari situs BEI, Senin (22/9/2014), perusahaan mencatat omzet Rp 659 miliar dibandingkan posisi yang sama tahun sebelumnya hanya Rp 481 miliar. Perusahaan juga mencetak laba Rp 296 miliar dari sebelumnya rugi Rp 62 miliar. Namun kinerjanya ini tidak berbanding lurus dengan sahamnya yang masih gocap. Padahal lima tahun lalu sahamnya empat berada di titik tertinggi sebesar Rp 1.010 per lembar. Anak usaha Grup Bakrie itu mengaku akan bernegosiasi dengan para trustee alias pemegang obligasi atas event gagal bayar ini. “Saat ini terlalu dini untuk menyampaikan hal-hal yang dapat membatalkan negosiasi yang dilakukan, karena sebagian besar lenders telah menyatakan komitmennya untuk mendukung proposal yang akan dilakukan perseroan,” ujar Direktur Bakrie Sumatera Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran. (ang/dnl) 02 20140922 1217 Bakrie Sumatera Tak Bisa Bayar Utang Rp 1 T, Apa Kata Grup Bakrie? 2016-07-04 09:15 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/09/22/115546/2697044/6/bakrie-sumatera-tak-bisa-bayar-utang-rp-1-t-apa-kata-grup-bakrie Bakrie Sumatera Tak Bisa Bayar Utang Rp 1 T, Apa Kata Grup Bakrie? Angga Aliya – detikfinance Senin, 22/09/2014 12:17 WIB Jakarta -PT Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk (UNSP) tak bisa bayar bunga utang US$ 100 juta (Rp 1,1 triliun). Grup Bakrie ternyata tidak ambil pusing atas aksi gagal bayar ini. Pasalnya, menurut salah satu sumber di Grup Bakrie, Bakrie Sumatera saat ini sudah tidak terafiliasi dengan PT Bakrie and Brothers Tbk (BNBR), induk usaha di banyak perusahaan Bakrie. Pasalnya, berdasarkan data perdagangan Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI), BNBR hanya punya 2.463.471 lembar saham saja di UNSP atau setara 0,02%. “Kepemilikan masih ada, BNBR tetap masih pegang saham UNSP, tapi sudah tidak dicatat di lapkeu (laporan keuangan),” ujarnya kepada detikFinance, Senin (22/9/2014). “Tidak konsolidasi lagi, UNSP bukan lagu unit usaha atau anak usaha BNBR,” tambahnya. Berikut daftar pemegang saham Bakrie Sumatera: * Credit Suisse AG Singapore Branch/Long Haul Holding Ltd 3,13% * PT Asuransi Jiwa Sinarmas MSIG 3,06% * Meivel Holdings Corporation 2,34% * JP Morgan Bank Luxembourg SA1,76% * PT Danatama Capital Management 2,04% * Reksa Dana Penyertaan Terbatas Syailendra Multi Strategy Fund II 1,42% * Citibank New York S/A Dimensional Emerging Markets Value Fund 1,33% * PT Bakrie Kimia Investama 1,24% * DBS Bank Ltd SG-PB Clients 1,16% * Bakrie and Brothers 0,02% * Publik 82,45% Lantas mengapa UNSP masih pakai nama Bakrie? Apakah Grup Bakrie tidak keberatan dengan hal ini? “Ganti nama itu tergantung pemegang saham. Bakrieland, Bakrie Telecom, Bumi Resources, dan lain-lain, juga sudah tidak konsolidasi lagi ke BNBR,” jelasnya. Daftar perusahaan mantan ‘Bakrie Tujuh’, klik di sini. (ang/dnl) 01 20140923 1052 Saham Bakrie Sumatera Kembali Diperdagangkan, Harga Tetap Gocap 2016-07-04 09:14 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/09/23/105229/2698225/6/saham-bakrie-sumatera-kembali-diperdagangkan-harga-tetap-gocap Saham Bakrie Sumatera Kembali Diperdagangkan, Harga Tetap Gocap Angga Aliya – detikfinance Selasa, 23/09/2014 10:52 WIB Jakarta -PT Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) mencabut penghentian sementara (suspensi) saham PT Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk (UNSP). Setelah dibuka, sahamnya bergeming. “Bursa memutuskan untuk mencabut penghentian sementara perdagangan efek perseroan di seluruh di seluruh pasar sejak sesi I perdagangan hari ini,” kata Kepala Divisi Operasional Perdagangan Eko Siswanto dalam keterangan tertulis, Selasa (23/9/2014). Sejak perdagangan dibuka sampai siang ini harga saham UNSP tetap berada di level Rp 50 alias gocap per lembar. Sahamnya sempat ditransaksikan lima kali sebanyak 1.782 lot senilai Rp 5,4 juta. “Bursa mengimbau agar para pemangku kepentingan selalu memperhatikan keterbukaan informasi yang disampaikan perseroan,” ujarnya. BEI menghentikan perdagangan saham UNSP sejak pekan lalu gara-gara perusahaan sawit tersebut tak bisa bayar bunga obligasi senilai US$ 100 juta (Rp 1,1 triliun). Anak usaha Grup Bakrie itu akan bernegosiasi dengan para trustee alias pemegang obligasi. Perusahaan sawit itu sudah menjelaskan kepada Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI), bahwa jika bunga tersebut tidak dibayar maka bisa menimbulkan event of default atas Secured Equity-linked Redeembale Notes senilai US$ 100 juta tersebut. Namun sampai saat ini belum ada kejelasan apakah Bakrie Plantation bisa membayar bunga utang tersebut. (ang/dnl) 05 20140925 1131 Belum Lapor Hasil Rights Issue, Saham Tambang Bakrie Kena Suspen 2016-07-04 09:21 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/09/25/113156/2700776/6/belum-lapor-hasil-rights-issue-saham-tambang-bakrie-kena-suspen Belum Lapor Hasil Rights Issue, Saham Tambang Bakrie Kena Suspen Angga Aliya – detikfinance Kamis, 25/09/2014 11:31 WIB Jakarta -Saham PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) dihentikan sementara (suspen) hari ini. Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) masih meminta penjelasan soal laporan penjatahan dalam penerbitan hak memesan efek terlebih dahulu (HMETD) alias rights issue BUMI. Kepala Divisi Operasional Perdagangan BEI Eko Siswanto, mengatakan anak usaha Grup Bakrie itu sudah mendapat persetujuan dari pemegang saham lewat RUPSLB yang digelar 30 Juni lalu, namun hasilnya belum dilaporkan. Selain itu, emiten berkode BUMI itu juga dianggap belum memberi penjelasan melalui keterbukaan infromasi kepada publik. “Dalam rangka menjaga pasar yang teratur, wajar, dan efisien, Bursa memutuskan untuk melakukan penghentian sementara perdagangan efek BUMI di seluruh pasar sejak sesi I perdagangan Kamis 25 September 2014,” katanya di situs resmi BEI, Kamis (25/9/2014). Suspensi ini akan dilakukan sampai dengan ada keputusan lebih lanjut dari BEI. Otoritas bursa meminta para pemangku kepentingan untuk memperhatikan setiap keterbukaan informasi yang disampaikan perseroan. Seperti diketahui, BUMI menerbitkan saham baru dengan target dana Rp 8,05 triliun. Saham yang akan diterbitkan sebanyak 32,2 miliar lembar di harga Rp 250 per saham. (ang/dnl) 01 20140925 1340 Tak Bisa Bayar Utang Rp 4 Triliun, Bakrie Telecom Digugat Investor di AS 2016-07-04 09:13 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/09/25/134048/2701025/6/tak-bisa-bayar-utang-rp-4-triliun-bakrie-telecom-digugat-investor-di-as Tak Bisa Bayar Utang Rp 4 Triliun, Bakrie Telecom Digugat Investor di AS Angga Aliya – detikfinance Kamis, 25/09/2014 13:40 WIB New York -PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk (BTEL) dituntut investor di Amerika Serikat (AS) gara-gara dianggap gagal bayar obligasi senilai US$ 380 juta (Rp 4,1 triliun). Sudah dua kali operator Esia itu lalai bayar bunga utang. Akibatnya, anak usaha Grup Bakrie itu terancam gagal bayar jika kembali lalai. Universal Investment Advisory SA, Vaquero Master EM Credit Fund Ltd, dan Trucharm Ltd merupakan tiga penggugat dalam kasus ini. Sementara yang digugat adalah Bakrie Telecom Pte Ltd, BTEL, PT Bakrie Network, dan PT Bakrie Connectivity di Pengadilan New York. Emiten berkode BTEl itu adalah induk usaha Bakrie Telecom Pte Ltd, perusahaan Singapura yang menerbitkan obligasi tersebut. Semetara Bakrie Network dan Bakrie Connectivity adalah perusahaan afiliasi BTEL. Pihak penggugat, yang punya lebih dari 25% kepemilikan obligasi itu menyatakan surat utang tersebut akan jatuh tempo Mei 2015. Grup Bakrie dianggap dua kali gagal bayar bunga pada November 2013 dan Mei 2014. “Tergugat telah mengakui bahwa ancaman gagal bayar ini akan terus berjalan tapi tidak ada pembayaran bunga yang dilakukan,” kata pihak penggugat dalam dokumen yang diterima Reuters, Kamis (25/9/2014). “Dengan demikian besar kemungkinan tergugat akan mengalami gagal bayar untuk pembayaran November 2014,” tambahnya. (ang/dnl) 12 20141005 1915 Bumi Resources Ungkap Alasan Batalkan Rights Issue 2016-07-04 09:40 PM http://bisnis.liputan6.com/read/2114617/bumi-resources-ungkap-alasan-batalkan-rights-issue Bumi Resources Ungkap Alasan Batalkan Rights Issue Agustina Melani, 05 Okt 2014, 19:15 WIB Liputan6.com, Jakarta – PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) menyatakan pembatalan penerbitan saham baru senilai US$ 275 juta atau sekitar Rp 3,1 triliun karena mengalami kekurangan permintaan. Hal itu disampaikan dalam materi publik perseroan yang disampaikan dalam keterbukaan informasi ke Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI), yang ditulis Minggu (5/10/2014). Dalam penjelasan kepada otoritas bursa, perseroan mengalami kekurangan permintaan dalam rangka penawaran saham terbatas atau rights issue senilai US$ 275 juta. Selain itu, para kreditor tidak bersedia menerima pembayaran pinjaman dalam bentuk saham. Perseroan melihat peluang positif untuk melakukan pembicaraan lebih lanjut dengan para kreditur guna menentukan langkah selanjutnya. Alhasil perseroan tidak dapat memperoleh dana tunai US$ 275 juta atau sekitar Rp 3,16 triliun dari hasil penerbitan saham baru sekitar 12,65 miliar lewat rights issue. Perseroan memasukkan kembali 12,65 miliar saham ke dalam portepel. Dana hasil rights issue antara lain digunakan untuk melunasi pinjaman antara lain kepada Axis Bank Limited 2011, Credit Suisse 2010-2012, Deutsche Bank 2011, UBS AG 2012, dan CBS 2011. Perseroan juga membatalkan rights issue untuk merealisasikan anggaran proyek Gallo dan Gorontalo Minerals. Masing-masing perolehan dana rights issue itu US$ 48 juta untuk proyek Gallo Oil dan US$ 32,58 juta untuk proyek PT Gorontalo Minerals. Berdasarkan prospektus yang diterbitkan 30 Juni 2014, perseroan akan melakukan rights issue dengan melepas 32,19 miliar saham. Total dana yang diincar sekitar Rp 7,7 triliun. Dengan pembatalan rights issue senilai US$ 275 juta, pereroan hanya melepas 15,85 miliar saham dengan dana yang diraup mencapai Rp 3,61 triliun. Dana hasil rights issue antara lain digunakan untuk modal kerja perseroan mencapai US$ 14 juta. Lalu perseroan melunasi sebagian fasilitas pinjaman dari China Investment Corporation melalui Country Forest Limited sebesar US$ 150 juta. Selain itu, perseroan juga melunasi seluruh utang perseroan kepada Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd sebesar US$ 150 juta. Sejumlah pihak yang mengambil bagian dalam rights issue PT Bumi Resources Tbk antara lain publik sejumlah 11,53 juta saham. Lalu perusahaan milik grup Bakrie, Long Haul Holding Ltd melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham. Castleford Holding Ltd melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham dengan PT Damar Reka Energi sebagai agen fasilitas castleford. Selain itu, PT Danatama Makmur sebagai pembeli siaga menyerap sekitar 2,04 miliar saham. (Ahm/) 06 20141006 1132 Sepi Peminat, Rights Issue Tambang Bakrie Turun Jadi Rp 3,6 Triliun 2016-07-04 09:22 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/10/06/113214/2710566/6/sepi-peminat-rights-issue-tambang-bakrie-turun-jadi-rp-36-triliun Sepi Peminat, Rights Issue Tambang Bakrie Turun Jadi Rp 3,6 Triliun Dewi Rachmat Kusuma – detikfinance Senin, 06/10/2014 11:32 WIB Jakarta -PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) memberi penjelasan kepada pemegang saham atas rencana penerbitan saham baru dengan hak memesan efek terlebih dahulu (HMETD) alias rights issue yang sepi peminat. Dari target raupan dana Rp 8 triliun, BUMI hanya akan mengantongi dana sekitar Rp 3,6 triliun. Public Expose insidentil digelar BUMI di ruang Avara 123 Avara Lounge & Function Hall Epiwalk, Jakarta, Senin (6/10/2014). Perusahaan tambang Grup Bakrie itu menjelaskan pembatalan penerbitan sebagian saham dalam rights issue tersebut di hadapan seratusan pemegang saham yang sudah diundang untuk hadir. “Saya mohon pengertiannya kepada pemegang saham,” kata Presiden Direktur BUMI Ari Saptari Hudaya di acara tersebut. Awalnya, perseroan berniat melakukan rights issue dengan melepas 32,19 miliar saham seri biasa atas nama Seri B dengan nilai nominal Rp 250 per saham sehingga seluruhnya bernilai sebanyak-banyaknya Rp 8 triliun. Dengan pembatalan rights issue senilai US$ 275 juta, perseroan hanya melepas 15,85 miliar saham dengan dana yang diraup mencapai Rp 3,61 triliun. Perseroan mengalami kekurangan permintaan (undersubscription) dan para kreditor tidak bersedia menerima pembayaran pinjaman dalam bentuk saham. Alhasil perseroan gagal dapat dana segar US$ 275 juta dari hasil penerbitan saham baru sekitar 12,65 miliar lembar. Perseroan memasukkan kembali 12,65 miliar saham ke dalam portepel. Anggaran untuk proyek Gallo dan Gorontalo Minerals juga dibatalkan. Tadinya ada dana dari rights issue US$ 48 juta untuk proyek Gallo Oil dan US$ 32,58 juta untuk proyek PT Gorontalo Minerals. Dana hasil rights issue antara lain digunakan untuk melunasi pinjaman antara lain kepada Axis Bank Limited 2011, Credit Suisse 2010-2012, Deutsche Bank 2011, UBS AG 2012, dan CBS 2011. Dana hasil rights issue antara lain digunakan untuk modal kerja perseroan mencapai US$ 14 juta. Lalu perseroan melunasi sebagian fasilitas pinjaman dari China Investment Corporation melalui Country Forest Limited sebesar US$ 150 juta. Selain itu, perseroan juga melunasi seluruh utang perseroan kepada Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd sebesar US$ 150 juta. Sejumlah pihak yang mengambil bagian dalam rights issue PT Bumi Resources Tbk antara lain publik sejumlah 11,53 juta saham. Lalu perusahaan milik grup Bakrie, Long Haul Holding Ltd melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham. Castleford Holding Ltd melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham dengan PT Damar Reka Energi sebagai agen fasilitas castleford. Selain itu, PT Danatama Makmur sebagai pembeli siaga menyerap sekitar 2,04 miliar saham. (drk/ang) 04 20141006 1242 Punya Utang Rp 44 Triliun, Bagaimana Tambang Bakrie Membayarnya? 2016-07-04 09:11 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/10/06/124235/2710625/6/punya-utang-rp-44-triliun-bagaimana-tambang-bakrie-membayarnya Punya Utang Rp 44 Triliun, Bagaimana Tambang Bakrie Membayarnya? Dewi Rachmat Kusuma – detikfinance Senin, 06/10/2014 12:42 WIB Jakarta -PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) saat ini punya total utang US$ 4 miliar atau sekitar Rp 44 triliun. Utang ini berasal dari berbagai institusi. Direktur sekaligus Sekretaris Perusahaan BUMI Dileep Srivastava mengatakan, utang tersebut akan dikurangi hingga menjadi US$ 2,2 miliar atau sekitar Rp 24 triliun tahun depan. “Saat ini total utang BUMI US$ 4 miliar, tahun depan akan diturunkan jadi US$ 2,2 miliar,” kata Dileep di acara Public Expose Insidentil BUMI di ruang Avara 123 Avara Lounge & Function Hall Epiwalk, Jakarta, Senin (6/10/2014). Tambang Grup Bakrie itu baru saja mengumumkan penerbitan saham baru dengan hak memesan efek terlebih dahulu (HMETD) alias rights issue yang sepi peminat. Dari target raupan dana Rp 8 triliun, BUMI hanya akan mengantongi dana sekitar Rp 3,6 triliun. Perseroan mengalami kekurangan permintaan (undersubscription) ditambah para kreditor yang tidak bersedia menerima pembayaran pinjaman dalam bentuk saham. Dana hasil rights issue antara lain digunakan untuk melunasi pinjaman antara lain kepada Axis Bank Limited pada tahun 2011, Credit Suisse 2010-2012, Deutsche Bank 2011, UBS AG 2012, dan CBS 2011. Perseroan juga akan melunasi sebagian fasilitas pinjaman dari China Investment Corporation (CIC) melalui Country Forest Limited sebesar US$ 150 juta dan seluruh utangnya kepada Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd sebesar US$ 150 juta. Sejumlah pihak yang mengambil bagian dalam rights issue PT Bumi Resources Tbk antara lain publik sejumlah 11,53 juta saham. Lalu perusahaan milik grup Bakrie, Long Haul Holding Ltd melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham. Selain itu Castleford Holding Ltd melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham dengan PT Damar Reka Energi sebagai agen fasilitas Castleford. Danatama Makmur sebagai pembeli siaga menyerap sekitar 2,04 miliar saham. (ang/dnl) 14 20141006 2125 Bumi Trims Size of Rights Issue After Creditors Refuse to Be Paid With Shares i 2016-07-04 09:43 PM http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/business/bumi-trims-size-of-rights-issue-after-creditors-refuse-to-be-paid-with-shares/ Bumi Trims Size of Rights Issue After Creditors Refuse to Be Paid With Shares i By : Muhamad Al Azhari | on 10:12 PM October 06, 2014 [This story was first published at 21:25 p.m. on Monday, Oct. 6, 2014] http://img.beritasatu.com/cache/jakartaglobe/909×605-2/2014/07/lowres-36-OLC-1024×611.jpg Bumi Resources’ jetty in Kalimantan. The coal miner is the largest operating in Indonesia. (Photo Courtesy of Bumi Resources) http://img.thejakartaglobe.com/2014/10/Screen-shot-2014-10-06-at-10.48.03-PM.png?_ga=1.185403561.1462910031.1467626143 http://img.thejakartaglobe.com/2014/10/Screen-shot-2014-10-06-at-10.48.03-PM.png Jakarta. Bumi Resources, the country’s biggest coal miner by production volume, has trimmed the size of rights issue proceeds by more than half, after creditors refused the company’s offer to be paid with shares, the company said in a statement on Monday. Bumi raised Rp 3.96 trillion ($324.5 million), pricing its new shares at Rp 250 each after it cut the total number of new shares issued in their rights issue to 15.85 billion from 32.2 billion. That is below their Rp 8.05 trillion target, according to the company’s prospectus published on June 30, 2014. Bumi initially offered its shares via a rights issue scheme to Axis Bank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, UBS and China Development Bank to repay a total of $275 million in debt. “Those creditors were not willing to be paid with shares,” the company said in a presentation on Monday. The parties who have subscribed to Bumi’s rights issue are Bakrie-affiliated vehicle companies Long Haul and Castleford and investment bank Danatama Makmur as a standby buyer under a standby purchase agreement of June 19. Bumi also said on Monday it dropped its plan to sell new shares worth about $81 million for drilling and exploration of the company’s energy and metal assets. Bumi previously said it had planned to spend $48 million to help fund exploration of commercial hydrocarbon in the concession area owned by Gallo Oil in Yemen. The proceeds from the impending lower-than-targeted rights issue will help Bumi to fund its working capital, including operating costs and considerable interest payment (Rp 161 billion). Bumi will also be able to service its loan via part-payments to China’s sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation ($150 million) and make a full repayment of its loan to Castleford Investment Holdings ($150 million). “Bumi is engaged in individual dialogues with the concerned lenders on managing the debt, in addition to the contractors for developing our potentially high value energy and metal assets to achieve alternate win-win solutions,” Dileep Srivastava, a director and corporate secretary at Bumi said in an e-mail to the Jakarta Globe on Monday. He added the company is now focused on reducing debt by $2 billion and bringing interest costs down by more than 50 percent by the end of 2015. Dileep also said Bumi is expecting a gradual increase in coal production over the coming years. “Our operations are very strong on volumes. Costs have been significantly lowered, infrastructure enhanced and upgraded to ensure coal mine capability reaches 100 million tons in 2015, compared with 90 million tons [estimated] in 2014,” he said. 17 20141007 Bumi Resources seeks to renegotiate with creditors as rights issue failed to reach target 2016-07-04 09:54 PM http://www.rambuenergy.com/2014/10/bumi-resources-seeks-to-negotiate-with-creditors-as-rights-issue-failed-to-reach-target/ Bumi Resources seeks to renegotiate with creditors as rights issue failed to reach target October 7, 2014 JAKARTA (Rambu Energy) – PT Bumi Resources Tbk, the country’s largest coal producer, said it will renegotiate with its creditors after its move to launch rights issue to raise funds of Rp8.05 trillion was far below target (under-subscribed). Initially, the company decided to issue new shares of 32.198 billion units, at a price of Rp250 per share. The rights issue plan (PUT IV) has been approved by the company’s shareholders at the company’s extraordinary shareholders on June 30. The company was supposed to raise net proceeds of Rp7.7 trillion from the original rights issue plan. Of this, the company planned to pay debts to its creditors amounting to US$275 million or Rp3.16 trillion. The creditors are (1) Axis Bank Ltd, (2) Credit Suisse, (3) Deutsche Bank, (4) UBS AG, and (5) CDB. It said US$48 million of the rights issue proceed was supposed to fund the development of Block 13 and Block R2, owned by the company’s subsidiary Gallo Oil (Jersey) Ltd. As much as US$32.58 million was supposed to fund feasibility study of its gold and copper project, which is being developed by its unit PT Gorontalo Minerals. In addition, US$150 million planned proceeds was supposed to pay debts to China Investment Corporation (CIC) through Country Forest Ltd. And the remaining US$150 million was supposed to pay out debts to Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. It said US$14 million was for strengthen its working capital. It turned out that the rights issue plan was under-subscribed. Bumi only managed to raise Rp3.96 trillion and net proceeds of Rp3.61 (US$344 million) from the rights issue. Therefore, it decided to cancel portion of the rights issue as some investors declined to exercise their rights. Of this rights issue proceeds, US$14 million is allocated for working capital, US$150 million is allocated to pay loan facility to CIC and US$150 million is to repay its whole debts to Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. “The rights issue was under-subscribed and creditors declined its debts to be repaid with shares (equity),” the company said in a statement to the Indonesian Stock Exchange. “The company now sees opportunity to hold further talks with creditors on what steps to be taken,” it said. The below-target rights issue has prompted the Indonesian Stock Exchange to suspend the company’s shares trading. Bumi’s President Director Ari S. Hudaya expressed its disappointment over the move by its individual investors not to exercise their rights. In addition, he also regretted that the company’s creditors rejected their debts to be settled with equity. The decision by investors not to exercise their rights indicates that the investors have little trust to the Management’s plan. Some analysts say the results of the rights issue is a “no confidence vote” to the management. Bumi’s Director and Corporate Secretary Dileep Srivastava said Monday that Bumi Resources will now turn its focus to hold one-onone renegotiation with its key creditors as well as with contractors so that they will carry on the existing projects. Currently, Bumi has total debts of US$4.4 billion or equal to Rp44 trillion. Bumi aims to cut the debts by half and reduce the interest rates by 50 percent through renegotiation. Bumi Resources capital structure after the rights issue is as follows: Before rights issue: Credit Suisse AG SG Branch S/A – LHHL: 23.09 percent Raiffeisen Bank International AG, Singapore Branch S/A Long Haul Holdings Ltd: 6.09 percent Public (below 5 percent ownership): 70.82 percent After rights issue: Credit Suisse AG SG Branch S/A – LHHL: 13.09 percent Raiffeisen Bank International AG, Singapore Branch S/A Long Haul Holdings Ltd: 3.45 percent Public: 40.17 percent B-series shares: Long Haul through PT Karsa Daya Rekatama: 18.84 percent Castleford through PT Damar Reka Energi: 18.84 percent Standby buyer: 5.58 percent Public: 0.03 percent (
[email protected]) 08 20141010 RIGHTS ISSUE SEPI PEMINAT BUMI MEMBURU UTANG 2016-07-04 09:26 PM http://www.businessnews.co.id/ekonomi-bisnis/rights-issue-sepi-peminat-bumi-memburu-utang.php RIGHTS ISSUE SEPI PEMINAT BUMI MEMBURU UTANG Jakarta, 7 Oktober 2014 (Business News) 10 October 2014 PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) berencana mencari pinjaman perbankan untuk melunasi utang-utangnya yang mencapai USD4 miliar (Rp44 triliun). Pencarian pinjaman ini dilakukan setelah penerbitan saham baru dalam dengan hak memesan efek terlebih dahulu (HMETD) atau rights issue perseroan sepi peminat. Pihak pemberi utang juga menolak dibayar dengan saham tapi ingin uang tunai. Oleh karena itu perusahaan akan mencoba melakukan refinancing. Dalam Public Expose Insidentil BUMI di ruang Avara 123 Avara Lounge & Function Hall Epiwalk, Jakarta, Senin (6/10), terungkap BUMI gagal meraup dana rights issue seperti yang ditargetkan. Mayoritas pemegang saham BUMI tidak mengeksekusi haknya pada pelaksanaan rights issue yang digelar beberapa waktu lalu. Manajemen BUMI menjelaskan dari total 32,19 miliar saham yang ditawarkan, yang terserap hanya 15,85 miliar. Dengan harga pelaksanaan Rp250 per saham, maka total nilai rights issue hanya Rp3,61 triliun. Padahal, manajemen berharap, dana yang terkumpul bisa mencapai Rp8,04 triliun. Oleh karena itu, BUMI pun batal menerbitkan sekitar 16,34 miliar sisa saham dan memasukkannya kembali ke dalam portepel perusahaan. Pembatalan ini terjadi lantaran perseroan mengalami kekurangan permintaan dan ditambah pula keengganan kreditor menerima pembayaran pinjaman dalam bentuk saham. Dengan kata lain, sejauh ini perseroan tidak dapat memperoleh dana tunai dari hasil right issue. Padahal, dana hasil rights issue antara lain akan digunakan untuk melunasi pinjaman kepada Axis Bank Limited 2011, Credit Suisse 2010-2012, Deutsche Bank 2011, UBS AG 2012, dan CBS 2011. Dengan pembatalan rights issue tersebut, perseroan hanya melepas 15,85 miliar saham dengan dana yang diraup mencapai Rp3,61 triliun. Dana hasil rights issue digunakan untuk modal kerja perseroan mencapai 14 juta dollar AS. Perseroan berniat melunasi sebagian fasilitas pinjaman dari China Investment Corporation melalui Country Forest Limited sebesar 150 juta dollar AS. Selain itu, BUMI juga melunasi seluruh utang perseroan kepada Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd sebesar 150 juta dollar AS. Beberapa pihak yang mengambil bagian dalam rights issue PT Bumi Resources Tbk. antara lain publik sejumlah 11.530.427 saham. Ada pula perusahaan milik grup Bakrie, Long Haul Holding Ltd. melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham. Castleford Holding Ltd. melalui mekanisme debt to equity conversion sejumlah 6,9 miliar saham dengan PT Damar Reka Energi sebagai agen fasilitas castleford. Selain itu, PT Danatama Makmur sebagai pembeli siaga menyerap sekitar 2.042.090.000 saham. Alhasil, BUMI tidak bisa membayar tanggungan utang kepada sejumlah kreditur dengan total nilai Rp3,16 triliun atau sekitar USD275 juta. Kreditur-kreditur yang dimaksud adalah Axis Bank LImited, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, UBS AG, dan China Development Bank (CDB). BUMI sedang melakukan negosiasi terkait. Tidak hanya itu, BUMI juga tidak ada alokasi dana untuk membiayai proyekproyeknya, terutama proyek yang dimiliki Gallo Oil (Jersey) Ltd dan PT Gorontalo Minerals. Namun, pihaknya mendapatkan project financing dan para kontraktor bersedia dibayar dengan saham. Dengan demikian, dana hasil rights issue hanya bisa digunakan untuk modal kerja yang meliputi biaya operasional dan pembayaran bunga. Nilainya sebesar Rp161 miliar atau sekitar USD14 juta. Kemudian, pelunasan sebagian fasilitas pinjaman milik China Investment Corporation (CIC) melalui Country Forest Limited (CFL). Nilai pinjaman setara dengan USD150 juta atau Rp1,72 triliun. Ini merupakan bagian dari tukar utang dengan saham (debt to equity swap) antaran BUMI dan CIC. Jadi, bukan dana tunai yang dibuhkan, melainkan saham. Selanjutnya, untuk pelunasan seluruh utang BUMI kepada Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd dengan nilai dan mekanisme yang sama dengan CIC. Utang pokok Bumi ke CIC saat ini tercatat sebesar USD1,3 miliar atau sekitar Rp15,6 triliun dengan tingkat bunga 12 persen per tahun. Dari jumlah tersebut, sebanyak USD600 juta akan jatuh tempo pada Oktober 2014 dan sebesar USD700 juta pada Oktober 2015 Untuk itulah salah satu solusi terbaik yang dilakukan BUMI mencari pinjaman yang bunganya lebih murah dari utang saat ini. Utang perseroan akan dikurangi hingga menjadi USD2,2 miliar atau sekitar Rp24 triliun tahun 2015. Lembaga-lembaga yang akan menerima pembayaran tahun 2014 antara lain Axis Bank Limited, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank 2011, UBS AG, dan CBS, China Investment Corporation (CIC) melalui Country Forest Limited dan Castleford Investment Holdings. Presiden Direktur PT Bumi Resources Tbk. (BUMI) Ari S. Hudaya, mengungkapkan, kreditor perusahaan salah satu milik Grup Bakrie itu, tidak bersedia menerima pembayaran pinjaman dalam bentuk saham. “Ya mereka kan bukan investor, mereka bank. Mereka maunya uang,” ujar Ari, seraya menambahkan keengganan kreditor tersebut membuatnya harus mencari jalan mencari uang. Menurut dia, kemungkinan besar jalan yang akan ditempuh adalah refinancing. Utang Bumi yang jatuh tempo 1. 2012 mencapai USD638 juta (Rp6,38 triliun). 2. 2013 mencapai USD1,1 miliar 3. 2014 mencapai USD635 juta 4. 2015 sebesar USD313 juta 5. 2016 sebesar USD450 juta 6. 2017 sebesar USD700 juta. (Sg) 28 20141111 1054 UPDATE 1-Bumi Resources shares plunge after S&P cuts debt rating 2016-07-04 10:14 PM http://www.reuters.com/article/bumi-resources-bonds-idUSL3N0T15SM20141111 UPDATE 1-Bumi Resources shares plunge after S&P cuts debt rating Tue Nov 11, 2014 10:54am EST By Eveline Danubrata Editing by David Holmes JAKARTA Nov 11 PT Bumi Resources Tbk shares plunged more than 10 pct on Tuesday after a leading credit agency downgraded a rating on debt issued by Indonesia’s biggest coal miner to “default” status in response to a missed interest payment. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) cut its rating on Bumi’s $700 million bond due 2017 to “D” after the company missed an interest payment. The coupon had been due on Oct. 6 and Bumi said it would make the payment at the end of November, after a 30-day grace period expired. “We lowered the issue rating on the $700 million notes because Bumi Resources, the guarantor, has failed to make the interest payment within the 30-day grace period allowed under the bond indenture,” said S&P credit analyst Vishal Kulkarni. However, Bumi Resources Director Dileep Srivastava questioned the rationale behind the move. Srivastava said in an e-mail that the S&P report was “devoid of ground reality, employing an outdated model ignoring the mitigating factors and steps the company has taken to counter the weak sector sentiment and sharply falling prices.” The company has been trying to improve sales and reduce costs, Srivastava said, adding it was committed to settling its obligations in “as timely a manner as possible bearing today’s environment in mind”. Bumi, which last year agreed a $1.36 billion debt-for-equity swap with Chinese sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corp , has been struggling to service its debt amid depressed coal prices. The company had planned to sell new shares to its creditors last month, but was forced to slash the size of the rights issue by about half due to tepid demand. Bumi’s shares have fallen more than 60 percent so far this year. In August, Bumi narrowly avoided default on its $375 million convertible bonds after bondholders approved a proposed restructuring of the debt. Bumi’s latest failure to pay interest on the $700 million bond “highlights Bumi’s financial stress and the complexity of its ongoing balance sheet restructuring,” Brian Grieser, senior analyst at Moody’s Investors Service, said last week. “We expect Bumi’s efforts to restructure its debts, ease liquidity pressures and improve leverage to extend into 2015 and potentially 2016.” Bumi Resources shares fell 10.6 percent to their lowest since Oct. 16, far underperforming the broader Jakarta stock exchange, which rose 1.4 percent. 20 20141204 1050 Dicap ‘Gagal Bayar’, Tambang Bakrie Ingin Kurangi Utang Rp 24 Triliun 2016-07-04 09:59 PM http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/12/04/105017/2767504/6/dicap-gagal-bayar-tambang-bakrie-ingin-kurangi-utang-rp-24-triliun? f9911023 Dicap ‘Gagal Bayar’, Tambang Bakrie Ingin Kurangi Utang Rp 24 Triliun Dewi Rachmat Kusuma – detikfinance Kamis, 04/12/2014 10:50 WIB Jakarta -Manajemen PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) mengaku kecewa atas diturunkannya peringkat utang Perseroan menjadi default (D) dari sebelumnya selective default (SD). Perusahaan tambang Grup Bakrie itu sudah berniat mengurangi utangnya yang sekarang mencapai Rp 44 triliun. Menurut Direktur sekaligus Sekretaris Perusahaan BUMI Dileep Srivastava, posisi utang tersebut adalah per akhir Juni 2014. Perseroan akan menurunkan tingkat utangnya menjadi tinggal Rp 24 triliun di akhir 2015. “Tujuan kami adalah mengurangi utang yang posisi Juni 2014 sebesar US$ 3,7 miliar menjadi di bawah US$ 2 miliar pada akhir 2015,” ujarnya kepada detikFinance, Kamis (4/12/2014). Dalam bahan paparan publiknya, perusahaan tambang Grup Bakrie itu masih punya 12 utang berbagai jenis ke beberapa pihak per September 2014. Berikut rinciannya: * Guaranteed Convertible Bond I sebesar US$ 375 juta * Country Forest Limited Facility 2009 sebesar US$ 1,037 miliar * Guaranteed Senior Secured Notes sebesar US$ 300 juta * Credit Suisse 2010 Facility – 2 (Amended & Restated) sebesar US$ 117,5 juta * Guaranteed Senior Secured Notes II sebesar US$ 700 juta * UBS AG Facility sebesar US$ 62,5 juta * Axis Bank Limited Facility 2011 sebesar US$ 140 juta * Deutsche Bank 2011 Facility sebesar US$ 54 juta * China Development Bank Facility sebesar US$ 600 juta * RBI Loan Facility sebesar US$ 80,69 juta * Credit Suisse Facility -2014 sebesar US$ 114,31 juta * Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd Facility 2013 sebesar US$ 150 juta Dengan demikian total utangnya mencapai US$ 3,731 miliar atau sekitar Rp 44,77 triliun. Salah satu cara yang ditempuh BUMI untuk membayar utang adalah melalui penerbitan saham baru dengan mekanisme hak memesan efek terlebih dahulu (HMETD) alias rights issue. (ang/dnl) 19 20141204 1134 (Sapa mo bantu?)Dicap ‘Gagal Bayar’, Tambang Bakrie Ingin Kurangi Utang Rp 24 Triliun 2016-07-04 09:57 PM http://www.kaskus.co.id/thread/547fe4515074109d5a8b458a/sapa-mo-bantudicap-gagal-bayar-tambang-bakrie-ingin-kurangi-utangrp-24-triliun/ (Sapa mo bantu?)Dicap ‘Gagal Bayar’, Tambang Bakrie Ingin Kurangi Utang Rp 24 Triliun Jakarta -Manajemen PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) mengaku kecewa atas diturunkannya peringkat utang Perseroan menjadi default (D) dari sebelumnya selective default (SD). Perusahaan tambang Grup Bakrie itu sudah berniat mengurangi utangnya yang sekarang mencapai Rp 44 triliun. Menurut Direktur sekaligus Sekretaris Perusahaan BUMI Dileep Srivastava, posisi utang tersebut adalah per akhir Juni 2014. Perseroan akan menurunkan tingkat utangnya menjadi tinggal Rp 24 triliun di akhir 2015. “Tujuan kami adalah mengurangi utang yang posisi Juni 2014 sebesar US$ 3,7 miliar menjadi di bawah US$ 2 miliar pada akhir 2015,” ujarnya kepada detikFinance, Kamis (4/12/2014). Dalam bahan paparan publiknya, perusahaan tambang Grup Bakrie itu masih punya 12 utang berbagai jenis ke beberapa pihak per September 2014. Berikut rinciannya: Guaranteed Convertible Bond I sebesar US$ 375 juta Country Forest Limited Facility 2009 sebesar US$ 1,037 miliar Guaranteed Senior Secured Notes sebesar US$ 300 juta Credit Suisse 2010 Facility – 2 (Amended & Restated) sebesar US$ 117,5 juta Guaranteed Senior Secured Notes II sebesar US$ 700 juta UBS AG Facility sebesar US$ 62,5 juta Axis Bank Limited Facility 2011 sebesar US$ 140 juta Deutsche Bank 2011 Facility sebesar US$ 54 juta China Development Bank Facility sebesar US$ 600 juta RBI Loan Facility sebesar US$ 80,69 juta Credit Suisse Facility -2014 sebesar US$ 114,31 juta Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd Facility 2013 sebesar US$ 150 juta Dengan demikian total utangnya mencapai US$ 3,731 miliar atau sekitar Rp 44,77 triliun. Salah satu cara yang ditempuh BUMI untuk membayar utang adalah melalui penerbitan saham baru dengan mekanisme hak memesan efek terlebih dahulu (HMETD) alias rights issue. 22 20150522 0814 Bumi Resources Gets Five-Month Extension of Debt Moratorium 2016-07-04 10:01 PM http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-22/bumi-resources-gets-five-month-extension-of-debt-moratorium Bumi Resources Gets Five-Month Extension of Debt Moratorium David Yong, May 22, 2015 – 8:14 AM WIB Updated on May 22, 2015 – 2:46 PM WIB PT Bumi Resources, Asia’s most-indebted coal miner, obtained a five-month extension of a debt moratorium, allowing it to fend off creditors after it defaulted on two of its dollar bonds last year. The extra time granted by a Singapore court on Thursday will end on Oct. 24, Chris Fong, a Jakarta-based spokesman for the group, said in a phone interview. He declined to disclose details of the debt workout, saying more time is needed to complete the process. The extension came before an initial six-month freeze on creditor actions expires Sunday. Three Bumi units in Singapore, which have $1.375 billion of dollar-denominated debt outstanding, in December filed for Chapter 15 court protection in the U.S., each listing assets and debt of as much as $1 billion. A slump in the coal market has depressed producers from Indonesia to China and the U.S., contributing to some of the 58 defaults in 2014, according to Standard & Poor’s. Earlier this month, Chinese coking-coal importer Winsway Enterprises Holdings Ltd. defaulted on $309 million of bonds while PT Berau Coal Energy is seeking to extend the maturity on $950 million of debentures. “The coal industry is still going through a consolidation and shutdown phase, so coal assets will not get a good price with thin merger and acquisition flow,” Helen Lau, a mining analyst in Hong Kong at Argonaut Securities (Asia) Ltd., said. “Any recovery in demand this year is going to be weak and highly leveraged companies will still struggle to revive earnings.” ‘Sustainable Levels’ Coal prices tumbled 54 percent to $62.30 per metric ton in the four years through 2014, and have fallen further to $55.80 as of May 21, according to futures contracts for the commodity at Newcastle port in Australia. Bumi shares rose as much 9.1 percent in intraday trade to 96 rupiah in Jakarta on Friday. The objective is “to bring down debt to sustainable levels as early as possible,” Bumi said in a stock exchange filing on Jan. 21. The company is ready for the next upturn in the coal market, whenever this takes place, it said. Its capital reorganization may include asset sales to repay creditors, a separate filing shows. Bumi skipped a semi-annual coupon payment on its $700 million of 10.75 percent 2017 notes in November following a 30-day grace period, prompting S&P and Moody’s Investors Service to declare a default. It also missed an interest payment on $300 million of 12 percent 2016 notes in December. Convertible Bonds The 2016 debentures rose from a three-month low, adding 0.8 cents to 28.34 cents on the dollar as of 3:44 p.m. in Hong Kong on Friday, according to prices compiled by Bloomberg. The 2017 notes fell 0.7 cents to a three-month low of 28.34 cents. Both securities fell to record lows of less than 20 cents in January. They were sold at par, or 100 cents on the dollar. Bumi Resources restructured $375 million of convertible bonds in August by extending their maturity, after selling stakes in some coal-producing units to China Investment Corp. to pare debt. The Bakrie group, which controls Bumi, also defaulted on notes issued by PT Bakrieland and PT Bakrie Telecom, according to Bloomberg data. At Bumi Resources, current liabilities exceeded assets by $4.63 billion as at the end of September, it said in an interim report in January. It’s also defaulted on some loan agreements as a result of non-payment to bondholders. Bondholders formed an ad-hoc group on Dec. 3 to discuss a “comprehensive capital structure solution” with the company, the group’s financial adviser Houlihan Lokey Inc. said. It also named Kirkland & Ellis LLP as a legal adviser. Bakries Say ‘No Easy Fixes’ to Bumi Default Until Coal Rebounds http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-12/bakries-say-no-easy-fixes-to-bumi-default-until-coal-rebounds 27 20150929 1137 Bumi resources seeks debt relief as $4bn burden gets heavy 2016-07-04 10:13 PM http://www.mineweb.com/news-fast-news/bumi-resources-seeks-debt-relief-as-4bn-burden-gets-heavy/ Bumi resources seeks debt relief as $4bn burden gets heavy David Yong (Bloomberg) | 29 September 2015 11:37 Indonesian miner can only sustain less than half of its debt load. A new restructuring plan from PT Bumi Resources failed to stop Asia’s most-indebted coal miner’s bonds sinking to a record low Tuesday. The proposal seeks to convert $1.5 billion of loans and bonds into a 32.5 percent equity stake in the Jakarta-based company, according to a stock exchange filing late Monday. It will also require sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corp. and China Development Bank to swap $780 million of debt with shares in Bumi and unlisted units. Some $410 million of convertible notes will turn into stock after five years, under the plan. Bumi chose a torrid time to seek a reprieve from lenders as markets punish firms from Glencore Plc to Noble Group Ltd. amid a global commodities rout. The Indonesian miner said it can only sustain less than half of its $4 billion debt load as coal prices, which tumbled 54 percent in the four years through 2014, sank further to $55.45 on Monday. “Coal demand could slow further as coal consumption is being replaced by more clean energy,” said Helen Lau, a mining analyst in Hong Kong at Argonaut Securities (Asia) Ltd. “We expect coal supply to shrink further as more companies cut production or shut mines. For creditors, some deep haircuts cannot be avoided.” Bumi’s 2016 dollar notes earlier traded down 0.5 cents at a record-low 18.525 cents on the dollar in Hong Kong, according to prices compiled by Bloomberg, and were little changed at 19.017 cents as of 4:20 p.m. Its 2017 notes fell to the same price, also an all-time low. They were both sold to investors at par, or 100 cents on the dollar. October Deadline Bumi aims to garner feedback and consent from creditors by Oct. 22, and wants to implement the plan under Indonesian restructuring law. The revised debt terms came before a moratorium from a Singapore court expires on Oct. 24. Last December, three Bumi units in Singapore, which have $1.375 billion of dollar-denominated debt outstanding, filed for Chapter 15 court protection in the U.S. to fend off creditors. Bumi plans to hold bondholder meetings next week in London and the following week in Asia with parties including Chinese creditors, a person familiar with the matter said today, asking not to be identified because the details are private. The Bakrie group, which controls Bumi Resources, also defaulted on notes issued by PT Bakrieland and PT Bakrie Telecom in 2013, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. This year, Chinese coking-coal importer Winsway Enterprises Holdings Ltd. defaulted on $309 million of bonds, and Jakarta-based PT Berau Coal Energy is embroiled in a $950 million debt restructure with bondholders. Bumi units skipped a semi-annual coupon payment on $700 million of 10.75 percent 2017 notes in November following a 30- day grace period, prompting Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service to declare a default. It also missed an interest payment on $300 million of 12 percent 2016 securities in December. ©2015 Bloomberg News 21 20151005 1845 Bumi Resources aims to restructure debts 2016-07-04 10:00 PM http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/05/bumi-resources-aims-restructure-debts.html Bumi Resources aims to restructure debts Anggi M. Lubis, The Jakarta Post Jakarta | Mon, October 5 2015 | 06:45 pm Bumi Resources, the country’??s largest coal mining company, is proposing another debt-restructuring scheme to its lenders, involving converting a portion of its US$3.9 billion debts into 32 percent ownership of the company. Bumi finance director Andrew Christopher Beckham said the company hoped to sign an in-principal agreement for the proposal by the fourth week of October, when a legal action moratorium granted by a Singaporean court expires. The restructuring aims to lower the company’??s debt to $1.2 billion by January at the soonest, as the firm expects to take three to four months to persuade lenders and to hold a general shareholders meeting in December, according to Beckham. The proposal, he said, included converting $1.9 billion of debt into a 32 percent stake in the company through a non-preemptive rights issue at a price more than 20 times higher than Bumi’??s current mooted share price of Rp 50 apiece. The conversion would result in the dilution by around 32 percent of each current stake. Currently, the public holds a 70.57 percent stake. ‘??If it’??s done according to this proposal, share pieces will be Rp 1,100. That’??s why there might be more discussion [on this issue],’? Beckham told reporters after a public expose held over the weekend. He added that the plan would be good for everyone and would reflect the value of the company, which is $4.6 billion. ‘??It depends on the equity valuation […] and the debts will be converted at that value. [The debts] will be converted into shares and rupiah. They get 32 percent of the company with this value.’? Bumi’??s outstanding debts as of August stood at $3.98 billion, including $1.19 billion owed to the China Investment Corporation (CIC). Bumi, which is affiliated with politician and tycoon Aburizal Bakrie, has been struggling to service its debt amid depressed coal prices. Beckham said the company also hoped to pool around $100 million from selling a part of its asset Fajar Bumi Sakti and would also propose to exchange a total $630 million of loans from CIC and the China Development Bank (CDB) into stakes in the company’??s unlisted subsidiaries. Bumi’??s average selling price, excluding its Ecocoal output, lost nearly half of its value from $99.8 a ton in 2011 to $55 a ton by the first half of this year. The scheme would, according to Beckham, leave Bumi with five-year debts of $1.2 billion, which will be split equally into Trance A and Trance B loans bearing a 6 percent annual interest to be paid each quarter and a 9 percent interest paid when the debt is due. The company can pay the debts ahead of time if it can secure excess cash, which was possible if coal prices climbed above $60 to $70 per ton, Beckham said. Bumi’??s recorded net losses attributable to owner stood at $555.74 million in the first half, a stark contrast with its net profit of $149.4 million in the corresponding period last year. The firm’??s revenues were down by around 41 percent year-on-year to $21.5 million in the first six months of this year. Bumi units skipped a semi-annual coupon payment on $700 million of 10.75 percent 2017 notes in November following a 30-day grace period, prompting Standard & Poor’??s and Moody’??s Investors Service to declare a default, according to a Bloomberg report. The miner also missed an interest payment on $300 million of 12 percent 2016 securities in December. 01 20160414 1624 Soal utang, BUMI bersengketa lagi 2016-07-04 09:06 PM http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/soal-utang-bumi-bersengketa-lagi Soal utang, BUMI bersengketa lagi Kamis, 14 April 2016 / 16:24 WIB Reporter Sinar Putri S.Utami Editor Adi Wikanto Jakarta. Sudah lama tak terdengar kabarnya, PT Bumi Resources Tbk ternyata tengah menghadapi permohonan restrukturisasi utang lewat permohonann penundaan kewajiban utang (PKPU) di Pengadilan Niaga Jakarta Pusat. Pemohon adalah salah satu krediturnya, Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. Dalam berkas permohonan dalam hal ini Castleford diwakili pengacara Junuardo S. P. Sihombing. Ia menjelaskan, permohonan ini ia layangkan lantaran perusahaan yang memiliki kode saham BUMI di Bursa Efek Indonesia ini memiliki utang yang jatuh tempo dan dapat ditagih. “Klien kami memiliki hubungan hukum yang sah yang timbul berdasarkan Agreement of Acknowledge of Indebtedness pada 30 Desember 2014,” jelas Junuardo dalam berkas yang diterima KONTAN, Kamis (14/4). Lebih lanjut ia juga menjelaskan, sebagaimana telah di amandemen berdasarkan Amendement Agreement relating to the Agreement of Acknowledge of Indebtedness pada 1 September 2015. “Perjanjian tersebut merupakan perjanjian utang,” tambah dia. Dimana berdasarkan perjanjian utang tersebut, Junuardo mengklaim BUMI memiliki utang kepada Castleford sebesar US$ 50 juta. Berdasarkan jumlah utang tersebut BUMI berkewajiban untuk membayar pada saat jatuh tempo berikut bunganya. Adapun pembayaran seharusnya sudah dilakukan BUMI paling lambat satu tahun setelah tanggal berlaku pengalihan pada 30 Desember 2015. Tak hanya itu dalam Pasal 2.2 dalam perjanjian utang juga disebutkan, kewajiban BUMI terhadap pembayaran bunga atas utang yang harus dibayar kembali secara kwartal sejak berlakunya perjanjian utang. Adapun besar bunga tersebut sebesar 6,7% per tahun. Namun pada perjalanannya, BUMI tidak melaksanakan balik pembayaran baik utang pokok dan bunga. Terkait hal itu Castleford pun telah melayangkan surat peringatan alias somasi kepada BUMI sebanyak tiga kali. Namun BUMI tetap tak melakukan pembayaran. Dengan demikian, terhitung per 31 Maret 2016 jumlah kewajiban BUMI kepada Castleford sebesar US$ 54,38 juta. Utang tersebut terdiri dari utang pokok dan utang bunga hingga periode Maret 2016. “Telah jelas dan terang bahwa BUMI memiliki utang yang telah jatuh tempo dan dapat ditagih,” lanjut Junuardo. Sehingga menurut dia sudah sepatutnya permohonan PKPU tersebut diterima olrh majelis hakim. Apalagi selain kepada dirinya, BUMI juga terbukti memiliki utang kepada kreditut lain diantaranya Hartman International Pte Ltd sebesar US$ 104,08 juta, Axis Bank Limited US$ 135 juta, dan kepada Credit Suisse dengan total utang US$ 637,38 juta yanh terdiri dari tiga fasilitas kredit pada 2010. Kemudian kepada China Development Bank sebesar US$ 550,15 juta, Raiffeissen Bank International US$ 80,68 juta, UBS AG US$ 62,50 juta dan Deutsche Bank US$ 54 juta. Junuardo menyampaikan, data kreditur lain itu didapat berdasarkan laporan keuangan BUMI 31 Desember 2013 dan 2014. Mengingat BUMI merupakan perusahaan publik yang memiliki kewajiban untuk melaporkan hasil kinerja keuangannya kepada otoritas bursa untuk diketahui publik. Hal tersebut juga ia meyakini permonohan PKPU ini sudah sesuai dengan ketentuan Undang-Undang No 37 Tahun 2004 tentang Kepailitan dan PKPU. Maka dari itu ia meminta kepada majelis hakim untuk mengangkat William E. Daniel, Imran Nating, Akhmad Henry Setyawan, Tri Hartono dan Arif Nugroho sebagai tin penguus PKPU. Sekadar informasi saja perkara PKPU dengan No. 36/Pdt.Sud.PKPU/2016/Pn.Jkt.Pst ini didaftarkan pada 6 April 2016. Sidang perdana pun baru dilaksanakan Kamis, (14/4) dan akan dilanjutkan Senin pekan depan (18/4) dengan agenda bukti. Adapun majelis hakim memiliki waktu paling tidak 45 hari sejak didaftarkan untuk memutus perkara ini. Adapun diketahui Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. merupakan perusahaan yang berkedudukan Victoria, Mahe, Seychelles. Dimana menurut anggaran dasar perusahaan direkturnya bernama Dian Febrian. 15 20160426 0259 PT BUMI Resources Tbk. 2016-07-04 09:47 PM http://www.publicnow.com/view/3B1A607195238FE36A0C4066F65B1187993FFCF0?2016-04-29-04:30:41+01:00-xxx527 PT BUMI Resources Tbk. 26/04/2016 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 29/04/2016 02:59 PT Bumi Resources Tbk Information Disclosure of the Company regarding the Report of Court Proceedings in respect of PKPU_dated 26 April 2016 (Bilingual) fabf7acb-8988-436f-bf75-9f97a43f0b86.pdf No.: 091/ BR-BOD/ IV/16 Jakarta, 26 April 2016 Kepada Yth. OTORITAS JASA KEUANGAN Gedung Soemitro Djojohadikusumo Jl. Lapangan Banteng Timur No.2-4 Jakarta 10710 Up. : Ibu Nurhaida Kepala Eksekutif Pengawas Pasar M odal Dengan hormat, Perihal: Keterbukaan Informasi PT Bumi Resources Tbk. (“Perseroan”) Merujuk kepada surat keterbukaan informasi Perseroan No.: 078/ BR-BOD/ IV/16 tanggal 14 April 2016, bersama ini kami sampaikan informasi mengenai laporan proses persidangan atas permohonan PKPU oleh salah satu kreditor Peseroan, yaitu Castleford Investment Holdings, Ltd. Sebagai informasi, pada tanggal 25 April 2016, Majelis Hakim mengeluarkan putusan yang menyatakan BUMI dalam PKPU Sementara, amar putusan lengkapnya berbunyi sebagai berikut: 1. Mengabulkan PKPU Sementara kepada BUMI untuk jangka waktu 45 hari sejak tanggal putusan dibacakan; 2. Mengangkat Bapak Kisworo sebagai Hakim Pengawas dalam proses PKPU; 3. Mengangkat Bapak William Daniel, Bapak Imran Nating, dan Bapak Akhmad Henry Setiawan sebagai Tim pengurus dalam proses PKPU; 4. Menetapkan hari sidang Rapat Permusyawaratan Majelis pada hari Kamis tanggal 9 Juni 2016; 5. Memerintahkan Pengurus untuk memanggil para kreditor BUMI yang dikenal untuk hadir pada rapat-rapat kreditor di Pengadilan Niaga. Untuk lebih jelasnya, kami melampirkan Surat Laporan Penanganan Perkara yang dibuat oleh Aji Wijaya & Co. selaku Kuasa Hukum Perseroan. Bakrie Tower 121 Floor Komplek Rasuna Epicentrum Jin. H. R Rasuna Said Jakarta 12940 Indonesia Tel (62-21) 5794 2080 Fax (62-21) 5794 2070 http://www.bumiresources.com PT BUM I ResourceS Tbk. Demikian kami sampaikan untuk dapat diterima dengan baik. Atas perhatian dan kerja sama yang diberikan kami ucapkan terima kasih. Hormat kami, PT Bumi Resourc Tbk. ox 0·11eep sn·vastava Direktur & Corporate Secretary English Translation No.: 091/BR-BOD/IV/16 Jakarta, 26 April 2016 Kepada Yth. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY Gedung Soemitro Djojohadikusumo Jl. Lapangan Banteng Timur No.2-4 Jakarta 10710 Up. : Ibu Nurhaida Chief Executive for Capital Market Supervision Dear Madam, Regarding: Information Disclosure of PT Bumi Resources Tbk. (“Perseroan”) With reference to information disclosure letter of the Company No.: 078/BR-BOD/IV/16 dated 14 April 2016, we hereby provide you with the report of court proceedings in respect of PKPU Petition lodged by one of our creditors, Castleford Investment Holdings, Ltd. As you may be informed, on 25 April 2016, the panel of judges have rendered a court ruling placing BUMI under status of temporary PKPU. The court held as follows: 1. To grant a temporary PKPU to BUMI, for a period of 45 days from the date in which the Decision was read; 2. To appoint Mr. Kisworo as the Supervisory Judge for the PKPU process; 3. To appoint Mr. William Daniel, Mr. Imran Nating and Mr. Akhmad Henry Setiawan as the Administrators for the PKPU process; 4. To declare the hearing of deliberation of the Panel of Judges on 9 June 2016; 5. To order the Administrators to summons the creditor, known by BUMI, to attend the creditor’s meetings in the Commercial Court. For more information, we hereby attach the Legal Proceeding Report prepared by Aji Wijaya & Co. as Company’s Legal Counsel. We highly appreciate your kind attention. An WIJAYA & Co. ATIORNEYS Be COUNSELLORS AT LAW CYBER 2 TOWER, FLOOR 31, UNIT A, JL. H.R. RASUNA SAID BLOK X-5 NO. 13, JAKARTA SEL.ATAN 12950, lNDONESIA TELEPHONE : (62-21) 2902-1577 ; FACSIMILE : (62-21) 2902-1566 WEBSITE : http://www.awijaya.co.id No. 038/AWIJAYA-AW/0416 To: PT. Bumi Resources Tbk., Bakrie Tower, 12th Floor, Rasuna Epicentrum Complex, Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said, Jakarta 12940 Attn. Direksi/ Directors Jakarta, 25 April 2016 Subject: Legal Proceeding Report Perihal: Laporan Proses Persidangan Dear Sirs Dengan hormat, We, AJI WIJAYA & Co, have acted as Indonesian legal counsels for and behalf PT. Bumi Resources, Tbk. (the “Company or BUMI”) in connection with the Petition for Suspension of Debt Payment Obligation (PKPU) filed by Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd., againts tl1e Company (“PKPU Petition”). We hereby would like to submit a Report of Legal Proceeding regarding the PKPU Petition, as follows: Kami, AJI WIJAYA & CO, bertindak selaku penasehat hukum Indonesia untuk clan atas nama PT. Bumi Resources, Tbk. (“Perseroan atau BUMI”), sehubungan dengan Permohonan Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang (PKPU) yang diajukan oleh Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd., terhadap . Perseroan (“Permohonan PKPU”) Kami hendak menyampaikan Laporan atas Proses Persidangan berkenaan dengan Permohonan PKPU tersebut, yaitu sebagai berikut: 1. On 6 April 2016, the PKPU Petition 1. was lodged with the Commercial Court in District Court of Central Jakarta (“Commercial Court”), by Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd., witl1 case number No. 36/Pdt.Sus PKPU/2014/PN .Niaga. Jkt.Pst. 2. Castleford Investment Holdings 2. Ltd.as BUMI creditor filed oetition Bahwa pada tanggal 6 April 2016, Permohonan PKPU telah diajukan ke Pengadilan Niaga pada Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat Jakarta (“Pengadilan Niaga”), oleh Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd., dengan nomor register perkara No. 36/Pdt.Sus-PKPU /2014/PN.Niaga. Jkt.Pst. Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd., vane: adalah kreditor BUMI 16 20160426 0536 Indonesian court orders suspension of Bumi’s debt payment obligations 2016-07-04 09:52 PM http://www.ooyuz.com/geturl?aid=11377556 Indonesian court orders suspension of Bumi’s debt payment obligations Reuters, Tue Apr 26 05:36:12 EDT 2016 JAKARTA, April 26 Indonesian coal miner PT Bumi Resources Tbk said on Tuesday a Jakarta court has suspended its debt payment obligations at the request of one of its creditors, Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. Castleford, which claimed it was owed $54.4 million by Bumi, filed a request for the suspension at a Jakarta commercial court. On Monday, the judges granted the suspension, which will last for 45 days. Under what is known locally as the PKPU process, companies typically make a debt rest.. http://www.reuters.com/article/bumi-resources-court-idUSJ9N16500K?feedType=RSS&feedName=cyclicalConsumerGoodsSector 18 20160426 0806 Indonesian court orders suspension of Bumi’s debt payment obligations 2016-07-04 09:56 PM http://www.reuters.com/article/bumi-resources-court-idUSJ9N16500K?feedType=RSS&feedName=cyclicalConsumerGoodsSector Indonesian court orders suspension of Bumi’s debt payment obligations Tue Apr 26, 2016 8:06am EDT Indonesian coal miner PT Bumi Resources Tbk said on Tuesday a Jakarta court has suspended its debt payment obligations at the request of one of its creditors, Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. Castleford, which claimed it was owed $54.4 million by Bumi, filed a request for the suspension at a Jakarta commercial court. On Monday, the judges granted the suspension, which will last for 45 days. Under what is known locally as the PKPU process, companies typically make a debt restructuring proposal to its creditors. Heavily indebted Bumi is part of Indonesian conglomerate Bakrie Group. (Reporting by Eveline Danubrata; editing by David Clarke) 13 20160524 0936 Jalan Panjang Restrukturisasi BUMI 2016-07-04 09:41 PM http://koran.bisnis.com/read/20160524/442/550682/jalan-panjang-restrukturisasi-bumi Jalan Panjang Restrukturisasi BUMI Sukirno Selasa, 24/05/2016 09:36 WIB Editor : Bunga Citra Arum Nursyifani Kisah perusahaan tambang batu bara PT Bumi Resources Tbk., walaupun terlalu panjang dan rumit, masih layak untuk diikuti. Kini, emiten dengan kode saham BUMI ini tengah bergelut dengan restrukturisasi utang. Bagaimana kabar terakhirnya? Tahun ini, BUMI harus melunasi utang sebesar US$4,22 miliar, setara dengan Rp55,69 triliun (kurs Rp13.173 per dolar AS). Utang itu tercatat dalam laporan keuangan perseroan yang terakhir kali dirilis per 30 November 2015. Pinjaman jangka pendek mencapai US$220,78 juta, pinjaman jangka panjang yang jatuh tempo dalam waktu setahun mencapai US$3,63 miliar, dan obligasi konversi sebesar US$375 juta. Utang jangka pendek dari Credit Suisse 2012 mencapai US$143,89 juta dan dari Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. pada 2014 mencapai US$50 juta. Adapun, tiga utang terbesar yang bakal jatuh tempo tahun ini a.l. dari Country Forest Limited 2009 senilai US$1,06 miliar, obligasi senior II senilai US$700 juta, dan pinjaman China Development Bank senilai US$500 juta. Kini, manajemen BUMI menghadapi proses persidangan dalam permohonan penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang (PKPU). Proses PKPU sementara oleh Pengadilan Niaga Jakarta Pusat tersebut dimohonkan oleh Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd sebagai pemilik piutang US$50 juta. Meski tengah bersengketa, pihak Bumi Resources optimistis mampu mencapai perdamaian dengan para kreditur selama proses penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang sementara selama 45 hari. “Sampai dengan saat ini, belum diketahui ada atau tidaknya kreditur yang menolak atau menyetujui rencana perdamaian, oleh karena sesuai dengan jadwal yang ditetapkan oleh tim pengurus, pembahasan voting atas rencana perdamaian baru akan dilakukan pada 6 Juni 2016,” papar Dileep Srivastava, Direktur & Corporate Secretary Bumi Resources, dalam laporan tertulis kepada PT Bursa Efek Indonesia pekan lalu. Emiten komoditas batu bara itu berharap restrukturisasi utang yang kini tengah berlangsung itu mampu mengembalikan struktur permodalan menjadi positif akibat turunnya beban utang. Memang, per 30 September 2015, perseroan masih membukukan rugi bersih US$640,86 juta dengan defisiensi modal US$1,38 miliar. Kuasa hukum Bumi Resources Aji Wijaya menjelaskan sebelum permohonan restrukturisasi diajukan oleh pemohon, manajemen BUMI telah melakukan negosiasi secara dua belah pihak dengan sejumlah kreditur. Bank dan pemegang surat berharga, menjadi prioritas dalam negosiasi. Proses restrukturisasi utang di pengadilan akan melibatkan kreditur lain yang belum sempat membicarakan negosiasi penyelesaian kewajiban secara bilateral. Kreditur tersebut yang menentukan singkat tidaknya proses PKPU. Proposal perdamaian juga telah disiapkan oleh pihak BUMI, bahkan saat persidangan memasuki tahap jawaban. Kendati masih berkonsep awal, proposal tersebut merupakan hasil diskusi bersama dengan kreditur besar. Aji menjelaskan proposal awal yang dilampirkan beserta berkas jawaban memang belum memasukkan tenor waktu maupun nominal pembayaran. Isi akan dilengkapi saat debitur sudah mengetahui seluruh tagihan tetap kreditur. Saptari Hoedaja, Presiden Direktur Bumi Resources, dalam sebuah dokumen menjelaskan perjanjian tersebut akan dijadikan sebagai dasar penyusunan dalam proses restrukturisasi utang. Materi dalam perjanjian tersebut masih dapat berubah dengan memperhatikan hasil kajian dokumen dan perusahaan lebih lanjut. Dalam rencana perdamaian tersebut, utang kepada kreditur separatis dan konkuren akan diselesaikan melalui konversi ke ekuitas perseroan, konversi ke ekuitas anak-anak usaha perseroan di dalam grup, serta konversi ke mandatory convertible bond (MCB) dalam waktu 5 tahun. Utang perusahaan kepada kreditur konkuren lain akan diselesaikan melalui konversi ke saham perusahaan secara langsung dan skema pembayaran dengan baloon payment. Kelebihan kas yang tersedia akan dialokasikan menurut aturan prioritas atau prinsip cash waterfall. Januardo Sihombing, kuasa hukum Castleford, menanggapi pernyataan tersebut dan berharap debitur dapat memberikan tawaran proposal perdamaian yang menarik bagi kreditur. “Pada intinya kami minta kejelasan dan penyelesaian kewajiban melalui proposal perdamaian yang realistis serta mampu dilaksanakan debitur,” tuturnya. Manajemen BUMI pun harus memutar otak untuk melunasi utang-utangnya. Tetapi, tekanan harga komoditas membuat perseroan mengerem laju ekspansi tahun ini. BELANJA MODAL Manajemen BUMI memangkas belanja modal hingga 50% menjadi US$50 juta pada tahun ini dari US$100 juta tahun lalu. Produksi batu bara perseroan juga diperkirakan flat sekitar 80 juta ton. Dileep mengatakan perseroan belum mengumumkan target produksi batu bara pada tahun ini. “Belanja modal kami untuk perawatan sekitar US$50 juta,” katanya kepada Bisnis. Menurutnya, selama lebih dari setahun, BUMI telah melakukan dialog intensif dengan para pemegang obligasi. Manajemen BUMI berharap menemukan solusi terbaik bagi perjanjian restrukturisasi utang perseroan. Hingga 30 November 2015, pemegang saham BUMI terdiri dari Credit Suisse AG SG qq Longhaul Holdings Ltd sebesar 23,15%, PT Damar Reka Energi 6,28%, dan publik 70,57%. Harga saham BUMI tersungkur 99,3% dari level tertinggi Rp8.200 pada 30 Juni 2008 hingga tiarap di level Rp50 per saham. Akankah kisah BUMI ini berakhir manis? 09 20160516 2116 BUMI TERGUNCANG 2016-07-04 09:28 PM http://www.majalahreviewweekly.com/read/994/bumi-terguncang BUMI TERGUNCANG Oleh: Setyo Adi Nugroho, Dita Pertiwi, Lucky Benyamin Senin 16 Mei 2016 | 21:16 WIB Bagaimana nasib PT Bumi Resources Tbk setelah berstatus PKPU? Sementara prospek harga batu bara mengkhawatirkan. Rapat itu berlangsung akrab. Boleh dibilang, seperti pertemuan keluarga atau teman. Tak ada ngotot-ngototan antara si pemberi utang dan penerima utang. Kedua pihak masing-masing saling memahami. Hari itu, Senin (9/5) pekan lalu, berlangung rapat antara manajemen PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI) dengan para krediturnya. Inilah rapat pertama yang berlangsung di salah satu ruang di Pengadilan Niaga Jakarta Pusat. Dalam rapat tersebut, BUMI diwakili Direktur Keuangannya Andrew Cristoper Beckham dan tim kuasa hukum. Selain beragendakan pengenalan dengan para krediturnya, BUMI juga menyampaikan ringkasan proposal perdamaian. Asal tahu saja, sejak tanggal 25 April 2016, BUMI yang, dimiliki Grup Bakrie berstatus Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang (PKPU), setelah majelis hakim Pengadilan Niaga Jakarta Pusat menerima permohonan PKPU yang diajukan Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd. Dalam sidang putusan yang dipimpin ketua majelis hakim Suko Triyono disebutkan, permohonan PKPU yang diajukan Castleford Investment Holdings Ltd dikabulkan lantaran sudah memenuhi syarat formil dan materil sesuai dengan Undang-Undang No. 37 Tahun 2004 tentang Kepailitan dan PKPU. Artinya, BUMI terbukti punya utang yang telah jatuh tempo dan dapat ditagih kepada Castleford. Selain itu, BUMI juga terbukti memiliki lebih dari satu kreditur. “Permohonan sudah memenuhi Pasal 222 UU Kepailitan dan PKPU, sehingga majelis memiliki alasan hukum untuk mengabulkan PKPU sementara selama 45 hari bagi BUMI,” ujar Suko dalam putusannya. Permohonan ini diajukan Castleford lantaran BUMI memiliki utang yang telah jatuh tempo dan dapat ditagih sebesar US$ 54,38 juta sesuai dengan Agreement of Acknowledge of Indebtedness pada 30 Desember 2014. Dengan begitu, BUMI berkewajiban membayar utang pada saat jatuh tempo berikut bunganya kepada Castleford. Seharusnya pembayaran dilakukan BUMI paling lambat satu tahun setelah tanggal berlaku pengalihan pada 30 Desember 2015. Selain itu, BUMI juga berkewajiban membayar bunga sebesar 6,7% per tahun. Namun dalam perjalanannya, BUMI tidak melaksanakan pembayaran, baik utang pokok maupun bunganya. Castleford pun melayangkan surat peringatan alias somasi kepada BUMI sebanyak tiga kali. Namun BUMI tetap tak melakukan pembayaran. Jengkel atas sikap BUMI, Castleford kemudian mengajukan PKPU ke Pengadilan Niaga Jakarta Pusat. Seperti sudah dijelaskan tadi, majelis hakim mengabulkan permohonan PKPU yang diajukan Castleford terhadap BUMI. Nah, untuk mencari jalan keluar penyelesaian utang yang menjerat BUMI, diadakanlah rapat pada Senin pekan lalu. Dalam rapat tersebut, BUMI mengajukan proposal perdamaian kepada para krediturnya. Opsi yang ditawarkan adalah BUMI bersedia membayar utang dengan saham. Misalnya, utang kepada Castleford akan dikonversikan 100% menjadi saham BUMI. Selain dengan Castleford, BUMI juga tersangkut utang dengan beberapa kreditur lain, antara lain China Investmen Corporation (CIC) dan China Development Bank (CDB). Kepada CIC, BUMI menawarkan utang dikonversi menjadi 5,2 miliar saham di BUMI atau 9,63% dari total ekuitas perusahaan dari penawaran umum terbatas 2014. Tak hanya itu, BUMI juga menawarkan utang CIC akan dikonversi menjadi saham aset BUMI, yakni 45% di PT Pendopo Energi Barubara, 40% PT Dairi Prima Minerals, dan sisanya dikonversi menjadi saham BUMI. Untuk utang kepada CDB, BUMI menyampaikan akan menyelesaikan bunga utang dalam new senior secured facility trance A dan trance B dengan masing-masing penyelesaiannya 50%. Kemudian opsi penyelesaian utang pokok akan dikonversi ke Pendopo Equity dan Contingent Value Rights (CVR). Lalu untuk kreditur konkuren dengan tagihan Rp 1 – Rp 2,6 miliar akan diselesaikan selama 4 tahun. Tagihan dengan Rp 2,6 – Rp 6,6 miliar dibayarkan dengan waktu 6 tahun. Lalu untuk tagihan Rp 6,6 – Rp 13 miliar diselesaikan 8 tahun dan tagihan Rp 13 – Rp 67,5 miliar akan diselesaikan selama 10 tahun. “Masing-masing kreditur yang nantinya akan memiliki saham BUMI mempunyai hak untuk mencalonkan satu direksi dan satu dewan komisaris perusahaan,” ujar Andrew Cristoper Beckham, Direktur Keuangan BUMI, seperti dikutip dari Kontan. Meski begitu, Andrew mengatakan, proposal tersebut masih dapat berubah-ubah sejalan dengan negosiasi yang dilakukan BUMI dengan para krediturnya. “Untuk draft finalnya kami akan berikan pada 6 Juni nanti,” katanya. Dalam kesempatan itu, Andrew menyampaikan keadaan perusahaan memang tak memungkinkan untuk membayar semua utang kepada kreditur. “PKPU ini menunjukan iktikad baik kami ingin melakukan penyelesaian terbaik melalui rencana perdamaian yang kami tawarkan kepada kreditur,” ujar Andrew. Kuasa hukum salah satu kreditur sekaligus pemohon PKPU Castelford Januardo S. P. Sihombing mengatakan, pihaknya memahami kondisi komoditas saat ini tengah lesu. Namun pihaknya menempuh jalur PKPU lantaran ingin memiliki kepastian akan penyelesaian utang terhadap BUMI. “Kami menyakini debitur masih punya iktikad baik. Kami berharap debitur dapat memberikan hal yang terbaik,” katanya. Berdasarkan catatan BUMI, saat ini utangnya kepada seluruh kreditur mencapai US$ 7,29 miliar atau mencapai Rp 97,09 triliun. Rinciannya, utang kepada kreditur separatis sebesar US$ 3,98 miliar dan kreditur konkuren US$ 3,30 miliar. Hanya saja, salah satu tim pengurus BUMI, William E. Daniel mengatakan jumlah tersebut masih perlu diverifikasi kembali saat verifikasi tagihan pada 30 Mei 2016. William juga mengimbau kepada para kreditur untuk dapat mendaftarkan tagihan paling lambat 23 Mei 2016. PROSPEK BATU BARA BUMI yang dikuasai Keluarga Bakrie memang telah mengundang keprihatinan para investor dan para pemegang sahamnya setelah harga batu bara, yang menjadi core business mereka, anjlok sejak tahun 2012. Batu bara yang semula menjadi primadona sempat menyentuh harga hingga US$ 130 per ton di tahun 2011, tapi perlahan-lahan turun dan kini hanya US$ 47 per ton. Sejak saat itu hingga saat ini BUMI terus terguncang. Sayangnya, belum diperoleh laporan keuangan terbaru perusahaan ini. Hanya saja, kinerja keuangan BUMI pada kuartal III-2015 bisa dijadikan catatan. Saat itu, perseroan mengalami kerugian sebesar US$ 630,27 juta dibandingkan pada periode yang sama tahun 2014, yang masih mencetak laba bersih US$ 12,52 juta. Selain itu, pendapatan BUMI juga menyusut dari US$ 49,4 juta pada kuartal III-2014 menjadi US$ 33,49 juta di kuartal III-2015. Beban bunga dan keuangan BUMI mencapai US$ 405,4 juta. BUMI juga masih menanggung ekuitas negatif alias defisiensi modal sebesar US$ 1,3 miliar. Beban ini jauh lebih berat daripada total defisiensi modal BUMI per akhir tahun 2014 sebesar US$ 733 juta. Meskipun begitu, seperti dikatakan Andrew, manajemen BUMI terus berupaya memperbaiki keadaan perusahaan dengan menekan beban dan meningkatkan volume produksi. “Kami berharap harga komoditas (batu bara) dapat membaik,” katanya. Apakah harga batu bara akan membaik? Mudah-mudahan saja. Hanya saja, melihat kekhawatiran akan polusi dan persaingan dengan bahan bakar yang lebih bersih, banyak negara di dunia perlahan-lahan mulai menyingkirkan batu bara, yang dulu sukses menggerakkan revolusi industri. Lihat saja Amerika Serikat (AS). Negara ini mulai mengurangi konsumsi batu bara. Saat ini, AS sudah siap-siap mengadopsi aturan polusi yang akan melarang pembangunan pembangkit listrik berbahan batu bara. Dan China, yang mengonsumsi 4 miliar ton batu bara per tahun tengah mengambil langkah-langkah serupa. Bahkan, Pemerintah China mengumumkan bahwa mereka akan melarang pembangkit listrik baru berbahan bakar batu bara di tiga daerah industri penting, yaitu Beijing, Shanghai, dan Guangzhou. Michael Parker, analis komoditas di Bernstein Research, menyebut pergeseran di China itu sebagai ‘awal dari akhir keemasan batu bara’. Apalagi, semua ini dibarengi dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi China yang melambat sehingga konsumsi batu bara hanya sedikit. “Semua masyarakat industri akhirnya memutuskan, meski batu bara murah, namun kerusakan lingkungan yang disebabkan oleh kegiatan industri yang tidak terkendali tak lagi bisa ditoleransi,” kata para analis Bernstein. Jika prediksi ini terjadi, itu akan memberatkan negara-negara pengekspor batu bara besar, seperti Indonesia. Dan, bagaimana dengan nasib BUMI, sebagai produsen batu bara terbesar di Indonesia? Entahlah. Mudah-mudahan saja harga batu bara ke depan membaik. BERNYAWA SEMBILAN Dulu, ketika harga komoditas meroket, Aburizal Bakrie sebagai orang yang sangat dihormati di Grup Bakrie, dipilih majalah Forbes menjadi orang terkaya di Indonesia di tahun 2007. Saat itu, pria yang akrab disapa Ical itu masih berusia 60 tahun dengan total kekayaan ditaksir mencapai US$ 5,4 miliar. Ical menduduki posisi puncak mengalahkan Sukanto Tanoto (US$ 4,7 miliar), R. Budi Hartono (US$ 3,14 miliar), Michael Hartono (US$ 3,08 miliar), dan Eka Tjipta Widjaja (US$ 2,8 miliar). Dia menjalankan perusahaan Grup Bakrie yang diwarisi dari ayahnya, Ahmad Bakrie. Tetapi posisi Ical terus melorot sebagai orang terkaya di Tanah Air. Pada 2009 bertengger di urutan 4, pada 2010 urutan 10, pada 2011 urutan 30, kemudian terpental dari daftar 40 orang terkaya Indonesia sejak 2012. Bisa jadi, terpentalnya nama Ical dalam daftar orang terkaya di Indonesia terpengaruh anjloknya harga komoditas. Maklum saja, mayoritas perusahaan milik Keluarga Bakrie itu memang bergerak di sektor komoditas batu bara, minyak dan gas, serta perkebunan kelapa sawit. Dulu, siapa tak kenal dengan PT Bumi Resources Tbk. Saat masa jayanya, emiten berkode saham BUMI itu sahamnya bahkan meroket ke langit dari Rp 50 per lembar menjadi Rp 8.750 per lembar. Kini, saham BUMI pun ‘membumi’. Saham BUMI bersama dengan beberapa emiten yang terafiliasi dengan Grup Bakrie lainnya harus tiarap di level terendah, Rp 50 per lembar. Tapi, ini hebatnya BUMI. Meskipun sedang menghadapi kesulitan, perusahaan itu tidak terdengar melakukan PHK terhadap karyawannya. “Sampai saat ini, kita masih berkomitmen untuk tidak akan merumahkan dan tidak mem-PHK karyawan. Kita juga enggak memotong gaji karyawan,” ujar Sri Dharmayanti, Direktur Legal BUMI saat Public Expose di Jakarta, 2 Oktober 2015. Grup Bakrie sudah banyak pengalaman menghadapi masalah di perusahaannya dan selalu lolos dari ‘maut’. Bakrie pernah bermasalah dengan Bank Nusa Nasional miliknya pada 1999, lalu luapan lumpur Lapindo pada 2006. Kemudian terjadi persoalan suspensi perdagangan saham BUMI yang menyeret Menteri Keuangan waktu itu, Sri Mulyani Indrawati. “Ibaratnya, kucing bernyawa sembilan, baru mati lima,” ujar Lin Che Wei dari PT Independent Research & Advisory Indonesia seperti dikutip dari majalah Tempo edisi 10 September 2012 dalam laporan berjudul Tsunami Utang Bakrie. Tapi bagaimana setelah Ical tak lagi menjabat Ketua Umum Partai Golkar? Boleh jadi dia bakal berkonsentrasi penuh membimbing dua puteranya, Anindya Bakrie dan Ardie Bakrie untuk kembali mengangkat pamor Grup Bakrie.rw the1uploader 6:35 am on 2016-04-13 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/04/13/krisis-finansil-cina/)
Krisis Finansil Cina: Perspektif Kebijakan Moneter, Corporate Finance (Analisa Laporan Keuangan), dan Investment Banking (Valuasi Nilai) Krisis Finansil Cina: Perspektif Kebijakan Moneter, Corporate Finance (Analisa Laporan Keuangan), dan Investment Banking (Valuasi Nilai) oleh : Sando Sasako https://issuu.com/the1uploader/docs/isbn_978-602-73508-5-4_4ren
Please check these links out …
issuu.com
wordpress.com
Asset Bubble, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, & Satellite Business in Indonesia
http://bit.ly/2wgeJMc
http://bit.ly/2ClIP3g
Asset Bubble: The Causalities and Its Limiter
http://bit.ly/2y1foou
http://bit.ly/2GgzbkJ
Inflation Management in Indonesia
http://bit.ly/2y0tlTo
http://bit.ly/2EJL6ug
Betting against the market or going along and take the long
http://bit.ly/2hOkE91
http://bit.ly/2F3y5Jx
How Soros broke the Bank of England
http://bit.ly/2xi1jno
http://bit.ly/2GfiiXA
The manipulative and collusive nature of LIBOR was intentional and by design
http://bit.ly/2wxOTDx
http://bit.ly/2EI5mfG
How to detect and spot asset bubble created by the central banks
http://bit.ly/2yIZU5u
http://bit.ly/2EtT5fC
Shrinking the asset bubble to avoid the inevitable burst
http://bit.ly/2wxLhl1
http://bit.ly/2EI5tb6
Asset bubble as the resultant of central bankers’ ability to make funny money
http://bit.ly/2C1ginZ
Space System/Loral, the BRISat builder swimming in a troubled water
http://bit.ly/2Cm7m8p
How LIBOR becomes a thing dismembered
http://bit.ly/2Etvtb0
every bubble needs its burst
http://bit.ly/2o2ow6n
How Soros was betting against the market and won, in the past
http://bit.ly/2BZIQOC
Perpustakaan Nasional RI: Data Katalog dalam Terbitan (KDT) Sando Sasako. Krisis finansil Cina: perspektif kebijakan moneter, corporate finance (analisa laporan keuangan), dan investment banking (valuasi nilai) / Sando Sasako. — Jakarta : CV Serabdi Sakti, 2016. xii, 202 hlm, 21 cm Bibliografi : hlm. 173 ISBN 978-602-73508-5-4 1. Cina — Keadaan ekonomi. I. Judul. 330.951 Keywords: data management, financial economics, financial crises, financial management, financing policy, central banking, monetary operations, early warning systems JEL Classification Codes: C80, E53, E58, F31, G01, G15, G18, G24, G32, G34 Untuk mendapatkan buku ini, silahkan hubungi +62 851 0518 7118 Kata Pengantar Sangat sedikit tulisan yang easy reading, sederhana, singkat, terpadu tentang ekonomi finansil dunia dalam perspektif kebijakan moneter, corporate finance, dan investment banking. Kebanyakan tulisan yang ada lebih bersifat teknis dan ‘asyik sendiri’. Belum ada refleksi keseharian yang membumi dan bisa langsung dimengerti. Tulisan ini diharap bisa menghantarkan sidang pembaca, di setiap akhir bagian yang selesai dibaca, pada gumaman, ‘oh, begitu toh’. Di tingkatan yang lebih lanjut, buku ini bermaksud membedah kebijakan dan langkah-langkah strategis pemerintah dan otoritas moneter di tingkat nasional, regional, dan dunia, yang sudah dan akan dilaksanakan di saat krisis finansil. Kebijakan preventif dilakukan dengan pemasangan berbagai rambu dan indikator EWS (early warning system). Semantic neural network analysis sudah mulai diterapkan atas dasar diseminasi press release, RSS feed, SDI (selective dissemination of information), atau lainnya. Error, noise, dan redudancy dalam data sebenarnya bisa direduksi ke tingkat paling minimum dengan memasukkan algoritme yang di-generate dari program intelijensi buatan. Di sisi lain, media sering menyesatkan dalam hal propaganda isu-isu usang atas informasi yang kelihatannya penting, tetapi sebenarnya jauh dari relevan dengan ‘realita’ kehidupan. Pesan yang disampaikan media massa sering merupakan bentuk politisasi tanpa arah dan membabi-buta, kecuali sensasi murahan. Technical analysis sering dan sengaja tidak membeberkan semua kartu di atas meja. Banyak kartu sengaja ditutup dan tidak terbuka. Hal yang terburuk adalah mereka menyimpan kartu truf untuk agenda dan kepentingannya yang terselubung. Mereka sering menyembunyikan data laporan keuangan yang sebenarnya sangat fundamental. Laporan keuangan merupakan jendela untuk menguak isi perut dan jeroan suatu perusahaan. Laporan keuangan yang baik biasanya terbuka dalam segala hal. Terutama dalam hal penyajian atau expose kronologi riwayat utang dan kebijakan capex (capital expenditure). Berbagai rasio keuangan ditampilkan, mulai dari rasio finansil yang sifatnya standar, sampai pada penerapannya di tingkat Bank Indonesia, IMF, dan bank sentral AS. Tulisan ini sebenarnya dibuat sebagai buku pegangan untuk para pihak yang berminat dengan kebijakan moneter dan aktivitas pasar finansil. Buku ini merupakan kompilasi dari beberapa buku dan tulisan yang sudah pernah penulis publikasikan, terutama sebagai pengembangan buku yang berjudul ‘Corporate Financing: Early Warning System melalui pengukuran indikator kesulitan finansil’. Nilai tambah buku ini terletak pada lessons learnt dan kenyataan yang terjadi di dunia finansil. Beberapa mata kuliah terkait buku ini mencakup akuntansi keuangan (financial accounting), akuntansi manajemen (managerial accounting), manajemen finansil (financial management), manajemen keuangan (managerial finance), ilmu ekonomi keuangan (financial economics), ilmu ekonomi manajerial (managerial economics), investment banking, corporate finance, dan corporate analysis. Jakarta, 28 Maret 2016 Sando Sasako sandosako @ yahoo.com Mobile: +62 812 8056 516 Kata Pengantar dalam buku ‘Corporate Financing’ Tulisan ini disusun dalam kerangka berpikir pengadaan aset melalui serangkaian aktivitas manajemen yang tercatat dalam neraca, yakni investasi (asset investment), pembiayaan (asset financing), dan pendanaan (asset funding). Asset funding di sini didefinisikan sebagai pengadaan aset yang dananya diakui sebagai biaya, atau lebih dikenal dengan istilah biaya modal (capex). Serangkaian aktivitas pengadaan aset yang tidak dicatat dalam neraca dikenal dengan sebutan off-balance sheet financing. Serangkaian aktivitas pengadaan aset berdampak pada nilai nominal setiap komponen pada bagian kanan neraca (komponen modal). Komposisi komponen modal yang dinyatakan secara nominal disebut struktur modal, dan bila disampaikan dalam bentuk fraksi aset (funded debts) disebut struktur finansil. Komposisi dari setiap komponen modal dari struktur modal sangat mempengaruhi tingkat risiko dan keuntungan (risk and return). Struktur modal yang optimal ditandai dengan nilai perusahaan yang maksimal, yakni rasio utang yang rendah, WACC berada pada tingkat minimum, PER yang rendah, dan ekspektasi EPS yang maksimal. Biaya modal menjadi penting karena proses penganggaran dan realisasinya bersifat jangka panjang, dan tidak bisa dilakukan dalam waktu kurang dari 1 tahun. Sifatnya sebagai utang membuat risiko finansil dinilai cenderung relatif lebih berisiko dibanding risiko bisnis yang biasa dihadapi dari hari-ke-hari. Peran penting lainnya dari biaya modal adalah serangkaian aktivitas setiap komponen modal bisa dihitung sebagai biaya (activitybased costing). Sementara peran penting struktur modal adalah untuk melihat signifikansi perbedaan antara beban operasional dan beban finansil. Dua hal ini merupakan dua dari tiga fokus utama pembahasan dalam tulisan ini. Fokus ketiga dalam tulisan ini adalah peran penting manajemen dalam aktivitas pengadaan aset. Hal ini membuat penempatan posisi manajemen dalam tulisan seharusnya dan kebanyakan ditempatkan di bagian awal tulisan. Tetapi, berdasarkan tingkat urgency-nya yang tinggi, penulis merasa pembahasan bagian manajemen harus ditempatkan di bagian akhir dari tulisan, yakni sebagai penutup dan reminder. Menurut Stiglitz, Corporate Finance merupakan satu dari tiga pilar bagi the modern theory of the firm. Perubahan paradigma ini dibangun atas dasar perkembangan informasi yang semakin sangat tidak simetris dan menyebar secara ekstensif and intensif. Termasuk didalamnya semakin maraknya dinamika sharecropping and the General Theory of Incentives sebagai new frontiers dalam ilmu ekonomi. Jakarta, 24 Juni 2015 Sando Sasako sandosako @ yahoo.com Mobile: +62 812 8056 516 Daftar Isi Kata Pengantar iii Kata Pengantar dalam buku ‘Corporate Financing’ v Daftar Isi vii Daftar Tabel x Daftar Bagan xi Pendahuluan 1 Masalah Pengukuran 1 Data, Informasi, Fakta 2 Data Mining 4 Pemilahan Data 5 Business Intelligence 7 Analisa Kuantitatif 8 Analisa Data 8 Self-Organising Map 9 Hambatan bagi Efektivitas Analisa Data 11 Confirmatory Data Analysis 11 Analisa Finansil 11 Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK, GAAP, IFRS) 12 Peran Perusahaan Audit dalam PSAK 12 Analisa Finansil sebagai Alat Ukur Kinerja Keuangan 12 Analisa Fundamental 13 Rasio-rasio Finansil 14 Pertumbuhan 14 Produktivitas 14 Kontribusi terhadap Stakeholder 14 Dividend Policy Ratios 14 Rasio-rasio Aktivitas Usaha 15 Perputaran aset (asset turnover) 15 Perputaran aset rata-rata (asset turnover) 15 Rasio perputaran aset tetap (fixed assets turnover) 15 Perputaran piutang (receivables turnover) 16 Rata-rata periode penagihan (average collection period) 16 Perputaran inventaris (inventory turnover) 16 Periode inventaris (inventory period) 16 Rasio-rasio Likuiditas 17 Rasio lancar (current ratio, CR) 17 Rasio modal kerja (working capital ratio) 18 Rasio cepat (quick ratio, QR) 18 Rasio kas (cash ratio) 18 Pendapatan lancar (current income) 19 Rasio pendapatan bunga (Time Interest Earned, Interest Coverage) 19 Rasio investasi terhadap kebijakan (investment to policy ratio) 19 Rasio utang lancar terhadap inventaris (current debts to inventory ratio) 19 Rasio-rasio Profitabilitas 19 Marjin laba kotor (gross profit margin) 20 Marjin laba bersih (net profit margin) 20 Return on Equity (ROE) 20 Return on Asset (ROA) dan Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 20 Return on Capital (ROC) dan Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 21 Return on Investment (ROI) 21 Beban bunga (Interest Coverage, Times Interest Earned) 22 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 22 Efisiensi beban finansil (efficiency of financial leverage) 22 Rasio-rasio Struktur Modal 23 Rasio utang terhadap modal (debt to equity ratio) 23 Rasio kapitalisasi (capitalisation ratio) 24 Tingkat pertumbuhan ekuitas (equity growth rate) 24 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 24 Rasio utang (debt ratio) 24 Rasio modal saham terhadap aset tetap bersih 24 Rasio utang lancar terhadap modal saham (Current Debts to Net Worth Ratio) 24 Rasio kewajiban total terhadap modal saham (Total Liabilities to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio aset tetap terhadap modal saham (Fixed Assets to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio-rasio Kecukupan Modal 25 Solvabilitas 25 Solvency ratio (SR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap aset (Debt to Asset Ratio, DAR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap modal (Debt to Equity Ratio, DER) 26 Kemampuan laba menutup biaya tetap (Fixed Charge Coverage). 26 Rasio pinjaman terhadap aset (Loan to Asset Ratio, LAR) 27 Rasio pinjaman terhadap simpanan (Loan to Deposit Ratio, LDR) 27 Risks vs Rewards 27 Risiko Mencari Keuntungan 28 Efek Domino Risiko 29 Rent-Seeking Behaviours 30 When the Deal Slips Away 32 Indikator Kesulitan Finansil 34 Indeks Kerentanan 36 Stress Test 38 Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan 40 Financial Stability Index 43 Indeks Kesehatan Finansil ala IMF 44 Laporan Stabilitas Finansil Global ala IMF 48 Operasi Moneter 48 Inflasi Terencana sebagai Prasyarat Kestabilan Finansil 50 Dinamika Pasar Finansil 52 Dinamika Aset Finansil 53 Kerapuhan Sistem Finansil 54 Krisis Finansil 55 Menelikung Krisis Finansil 56 Kasus LTCM 57 Krisis Subprime Mortgage 60 Kasus Lehman Brothers 63 Krisis Eurozone 64 Spiral Kekacauan Krisis Eurozone 65 Debt Exposures of PIGS 66 AS 68 Inggris 69 Jerman 69 Perancis 70 Jepang 71 Yunani 72 Irlandia 73 Italia 74 Portugis 74 Spanyol 75 Some PIGS are More PIGS 76 Krisis Finansil Cina 77 Kenapa Cina menjadi begitu penting? 78 Bermain dengan nilai tukar 81 Pasar CNH 82 Dominansi nilai tukar CNH terhadap CNY 87 Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 91 Qualified Domestic Individual Investor 91 Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect 91 Pilot Free Trade Zones 91 Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds 92 Kenapa pasar finansil Cina bisa crash? 92 Ketika gelembung finansil Cina mulai pecah 93 Pelonggaran likuiditas sebagai solusi ancaman resesi 94 Aksi pemadam kebakaran ala pemerintah Cina 96 Permasalahan fundamental ekonomi Cina 99 Beban utang Cina 101 Kebijakan dan otoritas moneter Cina 102 Pasar obligasi Cina 103 Obligasi Panda 105 Obligasi dim sum 106 Daftar emisi obligasi dim sum 108 Aksi pemerintah Cina terhadap masalah tunggakan utang 110 Policy and Politicisation 113 Primary Dealer 113 Solusi Teoritis, Bisa dan Benarkah? 116 Kebijakan Too Big To Fail 117 Cashless Solution 118 Minyak sebagai Mata Uang dan Sumber Kemakmuran 120 Negative Interest Rates Policy 125 Kas 129 Pengadaan Aset 130 Asset Investment 130 Asset Financing 131 Capital Expenditures 132 Menghitung Biaya Modal 134 Biaya utang 134 Biaya saham preferensi 134 Biaya laba ditahan 134 Biaya ekuitas eksternal 135 WACC 135 Biaya modal marjinal 136 Break point 136 Off-Balance Sheet Financing 136 Perubahan Portofolio The Fed 136 OBS sebagai Produk Inovasi Menyembunyikan Risiko Finansil 137 MBS sebagai Produk Rekayasa Finansil Penyebab Krisis 2008 139 Bencana Prilaku Berisiko Berlebihan 141 Bertaruh pada Aset Fiktif 142 Akuntansi OBS 144 Fleksibilitas Pasal Karet 145 Penyesuaian Pasal Karet 146 Memanfaatkan Celah Hukum 147 Equity Financing 148 Debt Financing 149 Struktur Modal 152 Teori Struktur Modal 153 Teori Pensinyalan 154 Struktur Modal dalam Praktek dan Realitas 155 Menghitung Tingkat Optimal Struktur Modal 155 Besar Beban Operasi 156 Analisis EBIT/EPS terhadap Efek Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Total 158 Efek Struktur Modal terhadap Harga Saham dan Biaya Modal 159 Likuiditas dan Arus Kas 159 Struktur Finansil 160 Ukuran Optimal Beban/Struktur Finansil 161 Valuasi Nilai 162 Corporate Financing vs Investment Banking 163 Pentingnya Valuasi Nilai 164 Valuasi Usaha 164 Komponen Pendapatan 166 Komponen Neraca 167 Komponen Arus Kas 167 Time Value of Money 168 Future Value 169 Future Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Present Value 169 Present Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Future Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 169 Future Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Future Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Perpetuities 171 Present Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Periode Semesteran atau lainnya 171 Amortisasi Pinjaman 172 Referensi 173 Web 173 e-book 177 Buku 180 Daftar Lampiran Lampiran – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 183 Lampiran – Ukuran dan skenario dalam laporan stabilitas finansil global, Okt. 2015 185 Ukuran likuiditas 185 Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 187 Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Lampiran – Ukuran Kerentanan Finansil 193 Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Lampiran – Daftar Indikator dalam ISSK Bank Indonesia 197 Lampiran – Profil Cina 199 Lampiran – Jumlah (instrumen) utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 201 Daftar Tabel Table 1 – Aktivitas M&A di business intelligence dengan nilai >$100 juta, 2009-2014q1 7 Table 2 – Beberapa indikator kebijakan macroprudential 36 Table 3 – Indikator pengukuran stabilitas sistem keuangan 42 Table 4 – Indikator utama kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 5 – Indikator tambahan (encouraged) bagi kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 6 – Indikator parsial dan bobot dalam indeks stabilitas perbankan Republik Ceko 47 Table 7 – Indikator kesehatan finansil ala ECS (Macro-Prudential Indicators) 47 Table 8 – Tiga skenario stabilitas finansil 48 Table 9 – Operasi moneter menurut standing facility 49 Table 10 – Pentingnya likuiditas yang lentur (resilient) 50 Table 11 – Penambahan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 12 – Penyerapan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 13 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk 5 produk utama, 2014-2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 14 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk produk teknologi tinggi, 2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 15 – PDB Cina, 2010-2014 dalam milyaran dan US$ 101 Table 16 – Nilai obligasi pemerintah dan korporasi di Cina, 2002-2015 (US$ milyar) 101 Table 17 – Buletin harga obligasi di pasar uang Hong Kong, 11 Maret 2016 107 Table 18 – Daftar 22 primary dealer di Amerika Serikat, 2014 114 Table 19 – Beberapa veteran primary dealer pilihan Bank Sentral Amerika 114 Table 20 – Daftar 19 primary dealer di Indonesia, 2014-2015 115 Table 21 – Nilai derivatif 25 bank terbesar di AS, Nov. 2015 (US$ milyar) 119 Table 22 – Ringkasan Perlakuan Transaksi Sekuritisasi menurut UK GAAP 145 Table 23 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Table 24 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Table 25 – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 184 Table 26 – Ukuran likuiditas 186 Table 27 – Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 188 Table 28 – Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Table 29 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Table 30 – Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Table 31 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Table 32 – Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Table 33 – Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Table 34 – Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Table 35 – Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Table 36 – Daftar indikator pembentuk ISSK 197 Table 37 – Profil Singkat Cina 199 Table 38 – Indikator Ekonomi Cina, 2011-2017 200 Table 39 – Utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 202 Daftar Bagan Figure 1 – Diagram alur hierarki DIKW (Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom) 3 Figure 2 – Kontinuum pemahaman dalam konteks DIKW 3 Figure 3 – Proses data mining 4 Figure 4 – Hubungan antara Data, Informasi, dan Intelijen 6 Figure 5 – Analisa eksplorasi data 9 Figure 6 – Taksonomi ketidakpastian 27 Figure 7 – Igloo ketidakpastian 28 Figure 8 – PV perusahaan berutang 32 Figure 9 – Skema indeks kerentanan dan komponennya 37 Figure 10 – Siklus pengawasan macroprudential 38 Figure 11 – Prasyarat bagi antisipasi dan pencegahan ketidakstabilan sistem finansil 39 Figure 12 – Hubungan antara stabilitas sistem finansil dan stabilitas moneter 39 Figure 13 – Keterkaitan antar-variabel dalam BAMBI (Banking Model of Bank Indonesia) 41 Figure 14 – Beberapa indikator pembentuk Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (ISSK) 42 Figure 15 – Peran Bank Indonesia dalam menciptakan stabilitas moneter 49 Figure 16 – Bentuk interaksi antara BI, pempus, dan pemda dalam mengendalikan inflasi 51 Figure 17 – Perkembangan aktivitas perbankan internasional 52 Figure 18 – Aset Riel dan Aset Fiktif Bank-bank di AS, 1995–2000 58 Figure 19 – Nilai Derivatif dan Modal 25 Bank AS Ternama (US$ milyar) 59 Figure 20 – CDOs direpresentasikan dalam bentuk building blocks, The Big Short, 2015 60 Figure 21 – Pasar rumah di AS, 1989-2006 61 Figure 22 – Pemetaan proses penularan krisis finansil 2008 62 Figure 23 – Pinjaman sektoral dari Bank of England, 1997-2012 63 Figure 24 – Utang-piutang PIGS 67 Figure 25 – Utang AS ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 68 Figure 26 – Utang Inggris ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 69 Figure 27 – Utang Jerman ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 70 Figure 28 – Utang Perancis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 29 – Utang Jepang ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 30 – Utang Yunani ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 72 Figure 31 – Utang Irlandia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 73 Figure 32 – Utang Italia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 74 Figure 33 – Utang Portugis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 75 Figure 34 – Utang Spanyol ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 76 Figure 35 – Cadangan Devisa Cina, Des. 1999 – Jan. 2016 78 Figure 36 – Tiga Kekuatan Ekonomi Dunia 79 Figure 37 – Nilai perdagangan Cina dengan negara lain (impor + ekspor) 80 Figure 38 – Nilai tukar bilateral yuan terhadap 3 mata uang dunia, USD, ¥, dan €. 81 Figure 39 – Cadangan devisa Cina dan nilai tukar CNY dan CNH 83 Figure 40 – Selisih CNY dengan CNH, Agustus 2010-Januari 2016 83 Figure 41 – Selisih tajam antara CNY dan CNH berdampak pada lonjakan bunga antar-bank di bulan Januari 2016 84 Figure 42 – Intervensi pasar CNH bisa menyesuaikan bunga CNH dengan CNY, 20151110-20160126 85 Figure 43 – Pasar deposit CNH, Maret 2009 – Des. 2015 86 Figure 44 – Distribusi CNH menurut bank sentral (offshore yuan’s swap line), Nov. 2015 88 Figure 45 – Penyelesaian perdagangan dalam CNH, 2009Q3-2015Q4 89 Figure 46 – Pasar deposit CNH menurut negara, 2014 89 Figure 47 – Beberapa alternatif indikator pertumbuhan ekonomi Cina mengacu pada penurunan yang lebih besar (greater slowdown), 2010–2015 95 Figure 48 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai (SCI), Mei 2015 sampai 5 Februari 2016 97 Figure 49 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai, 1 Januari 2015 – 8 Maret 2016 98 Figure 50 – Triple policy trilemma 99 Figure 51 – Pasar obligasi Cina, 2003-2014 104 Figure 52 – Aktivitas perdagangan pasar sekunder obligasi Cina, 2000-2014 104 Figure 53 – Pangsa pasar obligasi Cina menurut jenis obligasi, Des. 2014 104 Figure 54 – Daftar emisi obligasi Panda, 20151010-20160121 106 Figure 55 – Emisi obligasi CNY, 2008-2015 111 Figure 56 – Emisi obligasi CNH, 2008-2015 111 Figure 57 – Asset backed securities di Cina, 2005-2014 112 Figure 58 – Peristiwa bersejarah dan harga minyak mentah, 1861-2014 (US$/b) 121 Figure 59 – Harga minyak mentah Brent (US$), 20040102-20160106 123 Figure 60 – Kelebihan pasokan minyak mentah dunia, 2012q3-2015q3 123 Figure 61 – Distribusi ladang produksi minyak shale AS, April 2015 124 Figure 62 – Suku bunga deposito dan pembiayaan ulang ECB, 2008-Maret 2016 127 Figure 63 – Prediksi nilai tengah suku bunga Federal Funds, Des. 2015-2019 127 Figure 64 – Federal funds target rata (%), 1983-2015 128 Figure 65 – Federal funds rate, 1 Juli 1954-18 Feb. 2016 128 Figure 66 – Skema sumber pendanaan perusahaan 130 Figure 67 – Factors adding to reserves and off balance sheet securities lending program 137 Figure 68 – Multiplikasi Penciptaan Aset Fiktif 143 Figure 69 – Klasifikasi struktur aset, struktur finansil, dan struktur kapital 161 Untuk mendapatkan buku ini, silahkan hubungi +62 851 0518 7118 Referensi Web Alessandra Migliaccio and Sonia Sirletti, Italy to Kick Cash Habit as Monti Cracks Down on Tax Evaders, businessweek.com, 20111223, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-27/italy-to-kick-cash-habit-as-monti-cracks-down-on-tax-evaders.html Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Oil market spiral threatens to prick global debt bubble, warns BIS, 20160205, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/12143304/Oil-market-spiral-threatens-to-prick-global-debt-bubble-warns-BIS.html Bank Indonesia, Definisi Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan, http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/ikhtisar/definisi/Contents/Default.aspx Bank Indonesia, Kerangka Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan, http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/peran-bi/kerangka/Contents/Default.aspx Bank Indonesia, Koordinasi Pengendalian Inflasi, http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/koordinasi-pengendalianinflasi/Contents/Default.aspx Bank Indonesia, Penjelasan Operasi Bank Monter, http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/operasi/penjelasan/Contents/Default.aspx Bank Indonesia, Penjelasan Operasi Moneter, http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/operasi/penjelasan/Contents/Proses_om.aspx Bank Indonesia, Proses Operasi Moneter, http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/operasi/penjelasan/Contents/Proses_om.aspx Bank Indonesia, Uji Daya Tahan Sistem Keuangan Indonesia, BI Lakukan Stress Test Secara Reguler, 20150109, http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/serbaserbi/Pages/BI-Lakukan-Stress-Test-Secara-Reguler.aspx BBC, Europe’s PIGS: Country by country, 20100211, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8510603.stm BBC, Eurozone debt web: Who owes what to whom?, 20111118, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-15748696 Bill Palace, Data Mining, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA, June 1996, http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/jason.frand/teacher/technologies/palace/index.htm Bill Palace, Data Mining: What is Data Mining?, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA, June 1996, http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/jason.frand/teacher/technologies/palace/datamining.htm Bloomberg, China’s Finance Ministry Plan Yuan Bond Sales in London, 20151014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1014/china-s-finance-ministry-said-to-plan-yuan-bond-sales-in-london British Petroleum, Oil prices, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2015, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energyeconomics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/oil-review-by-energy-type/oil-prices.html Chris Buckley, China Weighs Letting Banks Sell Bad Debt to Investors, 20160312, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/business/international/china-weighs-letting-banks-sell-bad-debt-to-investors.html?_r=0 cmab.gov.hk, CS and Mayor of Shenzhen co-chair Hong Kong/Shenzhen Co-operation Meeting, 20160229, http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/press/press_3735.htm cnbc.com, China’s IFRS rule leaves little incentive for US banks to get into Panda bonds, 20160301, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/01/chinas-ifrs-rule-leaves-little-incentive-for-us-banks-to-get-into-panda-bonds.html Collen Kriel, IBM acquires technology from curated search engine Blekko to bolster Watson, 20150330, http://siliconangle.com/blog/2015/03/30/ibm-acquires-technology-from-curated-search-engine-blekko-to-bolster-watson/ Dan Taylor, A Visual Guide to the Financial Crisis, https://www.mindmeister.com/58511581/a-visual-guide-to-the-financial-crisis Daniel Ren, Default looms for 300m yuan bond issued by Sichuan Shengda Group, 20151204, http://www.scmp.com/business/globaleconomy/article/1886760/default-looms-300m-yuan-bond-issued-sichuan-shengda-group David Weinberger, The Problem with the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy, 20100202, https://hbr.org/2010/02/data-isto-info-as-info-is-not Donald Clark, Understanding and Performance, 20040309, http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/performance/understanding.html economist.com, Red ink rising, 20160305, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21693963-china-cannot-escapeeconomic-reckoning-debt-binge-brings-red-ink-rising Ed Crooks, Oil: US shale’s big squeeze, 20160122, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2db96dae-c0eb-11e5-9fdb-87b8d15baec2.html Ed Crooks, The US shale revolution, 20150424, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de.html#slide0 Elliot Bentley, Pat Minczeski, Jovi Juan, Which Oil Producers Are Breaking Even?, first published on 20141127; last update on 20160118, http://graphics.wsj.com/oil-producers-break-even-prices/ Enoch Yiu, Dim Sum bonds brace for impact as Beijing opens onshore bond market to global investors, 20160302, http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1919663/dim-sum-bonds-brace-impact-beijing-opens-onshore-bond-market European Central Bank, Financial Structure, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/eaec/shared/ img/chart_2_5nw.jpg Financial Times, When interest rates rise, http://ig.ft.com/sites/when-rates-rise/#what-is-happening Fiona Law, Beijing Widens Opening of ‘Panda-Bond’ Market, 201502923, http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-widens-opening-ofpanda-bond-market-1442990496 Gary Ng, Debt Market Industry in Hong Kong, 20160115, http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/HongKong-Industry-Profiles/Debt-Market-Industry-in-Hong-Kong/hkip/en/1/1X000000/1X003UPT.htm Gene Bellinger, Durval Castro, Anthony Mills, Data, Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom, 2004, http://www.systemsthinking.org/dikw/dikw.htm Gregor Stuart Hunter, South Korea to Offer ‘Panda Bonds’ in China Onshore Markets, 20151211, http://www.wsj.com/articles/southkorea-to-offer-panda-bonds-in-china-onshore-markets-1449832233 Herwin Loman, China: turbulence on financial markets accompanied by fall of FX reserves, Country Report, 20160203, https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2016/february/china-turbulence-on-financial-markets-accompanied-by-fall-of-fxreserves/ hkma.gov.hk, Renminbi Business in Hong Kong, 20160212, http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financialcentre/renminbi-business-hong-kong.shtml Hudson Lockett, Chinese asset-backed securities rise from the ashes, 20151123, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/chineseasset-backed-securities-rise-ashes Ibnu Purna, Hamidi, Prima, Stabilitas Sektor Keuangan Indonesia, 20090821, http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=3888, http://bit.ly/1UIPZoT Iman Gunadi, Aditya Anta Taruna, Cicilia Anggadewi Harun, “Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (ISSK) Pelaksanaan Surveilans Makroprudensial” Working Paper, Bank Indonesia, 2013. Iman Gunadi, Aditya Anta Taruna, Cicilia Anggadewi Harun, “Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (ISSK) Pelaksanaan Surveilans Makroprudensial”, Kajian Stabilitas Keuangan, 22, Bank Indonesia, Maret 2014, hal.123-133. IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, Oct. 2015: Vulnerabilities, Legacies, and Policy Challenges. Risks Rotating to Emerging Markets, Washington DC, Oct. 2015. indiatimes.com, China 2-year finance ministry bond yield at 2.6457%, 20150914, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201509-14/news/66532421_1_yield-26-billion-yuan-interbank-market Jana Randow and Simon Kennedy, Negative Interest Rates, First published 20131205, Last update 20160318, http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/negative-interest-rates Jeanny Yu, China MOF dim sum bond sale sees hot demand, 20150520, http://www.scmp.com/business/money/marketsinvesting/article/1804689/china-mof-dim-sum-bond-sale-sees-hot-demand Jennifer Hughes, South Korea ‘panda’ bond five times subscribed, 20151215, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d97a2a6-a31a-11e5-bc707ff6d4fd203a.html#axzz42Okmtqvk Jin Yang, Tough times for China’s dim sum bonds, 20160101, http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1896849/toughtimes-chinas-dim-sum-bonds Jing Yang, Panda bonds alluring in China’s booming bond market, 20151223, http://www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/1894090/panda-bonds-alluring-chinas-booming-bond-market Joel Dahlberg and Carolina Neurath, Kontanter fasas ut hos bankerna (Cash phased out by the banks), SvD Näringsliv, 20121224, http://www.svd.se/kontanter-fasas-ut-hos-bankerna_7775408, http://www.svd.se/naringsliv/branscher/bank-och-fastighet/kontanterfasas-ut-hos-bankerna_7775408.svd Joseph T. Salerno, Chase Joins the War on Cash, Mises Institute, Alabama, 20150420, https://mises.org/blog/chase-joins-war-cash Joseph T. Salerno, How the IRS Violates Legal Tender Laws, Mises Institute, Alabama, 20130311, https://mises.org/blog/how-irsviolates-legal-tender-laws Joseph T. Salerno, Laundered Money, Mises Institute, Alabama, 20120320, https://mises.org/library/laundered-money. Joseph T. Salerno, Man Has Home Ransacked by Police for Paying Cash, Mises Institute, Alabama, 20130711, https://mises.org/blog/man-has-home-ransacked-police-paying-cash Joseph T. Salerno, The International War on Cash, Mises Institute, Alabama, 20130308, https://mises.org/library/international-warcash Karl Russell and K.K. Rebecca Lai, Why China Is Rattling the World, NYT, 20160205, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/08/26/business/-why-china-is-rattling-the-world-maps-charts.html Keith Bradsher, For China Banks, Swapping Stock for Debt Is a Stopgap With Pitfalls, 20160310, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/business/dealbook/for-china-banks-swapping-stock-for-debt-is-a-stopgap-with-pitfalls.html Kurt Thearling, An Introduction to Data Mining, 20080717, http://www.thearling.com/text/dmwhite/dmwhite.htm Lorraine Cushnie, The lowdown: Panda bonds, 20160127, http://www.globalcapital.com/article/w7lmrj29cmkx/the-lowdown-pandabonds Malin Rising, In Sweden, cash is king no more, Associated Press, 20120317, http://news.yahoo.com/sweden-cash-king-no-more082544562.html Marty Schmidt, Financial Strucutre, Capital Structure (Capitalization), and Leverage Explained, Business Encyclopedia, https://www.business-case-analysis.com/capital-and-financial-structure.html. Matt McGee, Goodbye Blekko: Search Engine Joins IBM’s Watson Team, 20150327, http://searchengineland.com/goodbye-blekkosearch-engine-joins-ibms-watson-team-217633 Mehreen Khan, Back to the 1970s: four charts that showing where the oil market is heading, 20151110, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/11985594/Back-to-the-1970s-four-charts-that-showing-where-theoil-market-is-heading.html Mehreen Khan, Debt, defaults, and devaluations why this market crash is like nothing we’ve seen before – Telegraph, (Why this market crash is like nothing we’ve seen before), 20160206, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12138466/when-is-thenext-financial-crash-coming-oil-prices-markets-recession.html Mehreen Khan, Mapped: How the world became awash with oil, 20151209, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/11998370/Mapped-How-the-world-became-awash-with-oil.html Michelle Chen and Hongmei Zhao, Update 1-China completes sale of 14 bln yuan bonds in Hong Kong, 20150520, http://www.reuters.com/article/china-bonds-dimsum-idUSL3N0Y91PC20150520 Michelle Chen, Update 1-Jumbo China bond sale in Hong Kong meets strong demand, 20140521, http://www.reuters.com/article/china-bondholders-dimsum-idUSL3N0O71SZ20140521 mindmeister.com, Pasar rumah di AS, 1989-2006, https://www.mindmeister.com/images/download/1343026 Neil Gough, China Moves to Bolster Lending by Easing Banks’ Reserve Ratio, 20160229, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/business/international/china-cut-banks-reserve-ratio.html?_r=0 Neil Hume, Anjli Raval and David Sheppard in London, Brent crude oil slides below $35 for first time since 2004, 20160106, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/06f747ac-b45e-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51.html#axzz43VgbMYun, https://twitter.com/ft/status/684797857682092033 Nelson D. Schwartz, In and Out of Each Other’s European Wallets, New York Times, 20100501, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/weekinreview/02schwartz.html Neraca, Transparansi Stress Test, 20150402, http://www.neraca.co.id/article/52257/transparansi-stress-test New York Times, Europe’s Web of Debt, 20100501, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/02/weekinreview/02marsh.html?_r=0 Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, Can Europe Be Saved?, slate.com, 20110516, http://www.slate.com/articles/business/project_syndicate/2011/05/can_europe_be_saved.single.html Oracle.com, What is data mining?, created: 20080701, mod: 20150710, https://docs.oracle.com/cd/B28359_01/datamine.111/b28129/process.htm Panagiotis Roilos, Economic Crisis, the “PIGS” and the European “Animal Farm”, 20120512, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/panagiotis-roilos/european-animal-farm_b_1511619.html Patrick McGee, Panda bonds triumph over dim sum debt after turmoil, 20151130, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/511cb962-7f15-11e598fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#slide0 Pete Sweeney, Shu Zhang, and Ryan Woo, Exclusive: China to ease commercial banks’ bad debt burden via equity swaps – sources, 20160311, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-banks-npls-exclusive-idUSKCN0WC0MD positivemoney.org, Financial Crisis & Recessions, 201304, http://positivemoney.org/issues/recessions-crisis/ Pro Publica, Bailout Recipients, 20160314, https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list reuters.com, Chinese property developers rush to print private Panda bonds, 20160110, http://www.reuters.com/article/china-debtbonds-idUSL3N14V1GR20160111 reuters.com, CNH Tracker-Dim sum bond market seen to get a boost from stable FX, 20150917, http://www.reuters.com/article/china-yuan-offshore-idUSL4N11M2OU20150917 Rune Thomas and Kristian Helgesen, Jarl (59) betalte kontant – endte med politirazzia, (Earl (59) paid cash – ended with police swoop), 20130710, http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utrolige-historier/artikkel.php?artid=10118319 Shoaib-ur-Rehman Siddiqui, China finance ministry to auction 30bn yuan 5-year bonds, 20150826, http://www.brecorder.com/markets/fixed-income/asia/252464-china-finance-ministry-to-auction-30bn-yuan-5-year-bonds.html sifma.org, Asia Credit Report, Fourth Quarter 2015, 20160209, http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589958731 Spiegel, The Specter of Protectionism: World Faces New Wave of Currency Wars, 20101005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-specter-of-protectionism-world-faces-new-wave-of-currency-wars-a-721044.html Statistics Solutions. Confirmatory Factor Analysis. 2013. http://www.statisticssolutions.com/confirmatory-factor-analysis/ Stefan Wagstyl, Banks ask for crisis funds for eastern Europe, Vienna, 20090122, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9830fa0c-e809-11ddb2a5-0000779fd2ac.html Summer Zhen, Dim Sum bonds losing shine as China’s onshore yuan bond market reopens, 20160224, http://www.scmp.com/business/money/investment-products/article/1916146/dim-sum-bonds-losing-shine-chinas-onshore-yuan Telegraph Staff, Oil falls below $40 a barrel for first time since February 2009, 20151208, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/12039499/Oil-falls-below-40-a-barrel-for-first-time-since-February-2009.html The Economist, R.A., Gradual failure: The questionable logic behind the Fed’s premature rate rise, The Economist, 20160108, http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2016/01/gradual-failure The Economist, The Federal Reserve has at last raised interest rates, 20151216, http://www.economist.com/news/21684225economys-reaction-feds-rate-rise-hard-predict-federal thestar.com.my, China’s finance ministry to issue 14b yuan bond in Hong Kong, 20151116, http://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2015/11/16/chinas-finance-ministry-to-issue-14-bln-yuan-bond-in-hong-kong/ Wolf Richter, Draconian Cash Controls Are Coming To France, businessinsider.com, 20130213, http://www.businessinsider.com/draconian-cash-controls-are-coming-to-france-2013-2?IR=T&r=US&IR=T Xu Leiying, China’s Panda Bonds Expected to Boom, 20160125, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/01/25/1821s914546.htm e-book Adam Geršl and Jaroslav Heřmánek, Financial Stability Indicators: Advantages and Disadvantages of Their Use in the Assessment of Financial System Stability, June 2007. Adam Geršl and Jaroslav Heřmánek, Indicators of Financial System Stability: Towards an Aggregate Financial Stability Indicator?, Prague Economic Papers, 3, 2008. Andrew Gutmann, How to Be an Investment Banker: Recruiting, Interviewing, and Landing the Job, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013. Andrew Labelle, China’s economy is entering a slower, riskier phase (and policy options are running thin), Special Report, TD Economics, 20150723. Atlantic Council, Mapping the Economic and Financial Future, Washington DC, June 2011. Bank for International Settlements, International banking and financial market developments, BIS Quarterly Review, December 2015. Bank Indonesia, Laporan Pelaksanaan Tugas dan Wewenang, Triwulan IV-2015 dan Tahun 2015, Maret 2016. Bank of China, Development of the Offshore RMB Market, 20150829. Blaise Gadanecz and Kaushik Jayaram, Measures of financial stability – a review, Bulletin, 31, IFC, July 2009. ‘Capital expenditure’, A Dictionary of Accounting, 2/e, Oxford University Press, 2003. ‘Capital expenditure’, A Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 2/e, Oxford University Press, 2003. Cathérine Koch, Foreign bank lending to China, BIS Quarterly Review, December 2015. Cathy O’Neil and Rachel Schutt, Doing Data Science, O’Reilly, 2014, ISBN: 978-1-449-35865-5. Chaim Zins, Conceptual Approaches for Defining Data, Information, and Knowledge, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 58(4):479–493, 2007. Charles Roxburgh, et al, Debt and deleveraging: The global credit bubble and its economic consequences, McKinsey Global Institute, Jan. 2010. Charles Roxburgh, et al, Debt and deleveraging: Uneven progress on the path to growth, Updated Research, McKinsey Global Institute, Jan. 2012. Christof Tannert, Horst-Dietrich Elvers, and Burkhard Jandrig, The ethics of uncertainty. In the light of possible dangers, research becomes a moral duty, The European Molecular Biology Organization, Reports, Vol.8 No.10, pp.892–896, Oct. 2007. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2002561/ Chuck Hagel and Frederick Kempe, Mapping the Economic and Financial Future, Atlantic Council, Washington DC, June 2011. David Aikman, Michael T. Kiley, Seung Jung Lee, Michael G. Palumbo, and Missaka N. Warusawitharana. “Mapping Heat in the U.S. Financial System,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-059. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20150625, http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.059. Eswar S. Prasad, China’s Efforts to Expand the International Use of the Renminbi, Report to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Brookings Institution, 20160204. Franklin Allen and Elena Carletti, “Financial system:shock absorber or amplifier?,” Paper, Sixth BIS Annual Conference 2007, “Financial system and macroeconomic resilience”, 18–19 June 2007, Brunnen, Switzerland; BIS Working Papers, 257, July 2008. FTSE Russell, FTSE BOCHK Offshore RMB Bond Quarterly Research Report, An Examination of the Offshore RMB Bond Market, Jan. 2016. Graham Summers, Stock Market Crash Survival Guide, Phoenix Capital Research, Alexandria, VA, 20151117. Graham Summers, Survive the Fed’s War on Cash, Phoenix Capital Research, Alexandria, VA, 20151117. Gregor Irwin, The ‘Chinese Put’, Global Counsel, London, 20150721. Hervé Ferhani and Cheng Hoon Lim, Indonesia: Financial System Stability Assessment, Monetary and Capital Markets and Asia and Pacific Departments, IMF Country Report No.10/288, Sept. 2010. Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong: The Global Offshore Renminbi Business Hub, Jan.2016. IMF Staff and the FSB Secretariat, The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps, Action Plans and Timetables, Progress Report, May 2010. IMF, Understanding Financial Interconnectedness, Prepared by the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, in collaboration with the Statistics Department, 20101004. James Marple, Maria Solovieva, and Admir Kolaj, China’s Renminbi will not threaten the dollar’s reserve currency status, Special Report, TD Economics, 20150811. Jay H. Bernstein, The Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy and its Antithesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Aug. 2014. Jeroen de Mast and Albert Trip. “Exploratory Data Analysis in Quality-Improvement Projects”, Journal of Quality Technology, 39(4): 301-311. 2007. Jinyue Dong and Le Xia, A tale of two markets for the redback, Economic Analysis, China Economic Watch, BBVA Research, 20160125. John A. Bullinaria, Self Organizing Maps: Fundamentals, Introduction to Neural Networks : Lecture 16, 2004. John Edmunds and Roberto Bonifaz, firm financial structure, dalam Robert E. McAuliffe (ed), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management Managerial Economics. John W. Tukey. Exploratory Data Analysis, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 1977. Jonathan Hey, The Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom Chain: The Metaphorical link, 200412. Jörg Krämer, Peter Dixon, Ulrich Leuchtmann, et al, Is China running out of reserves?, Week in Focus, Economic Research, Commerzbank AG, Frankfurt/Main, 20160219. Joshua Rosenbaum and Joshua Pearl. Investment Banking: Valuation, Leveraged Buyouts, and Mergers & Acquisitions. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009. Mahamoud Islam and Ludovic Subran, China: Great Wall, Great Mall, Great Fall? Not really…, Euler Hermes, 20150909. Mali Chivakul and W. Raphael Lam, Assessing China’s Corporate Sector Vulnerabilities, Working Paper, WP/15/72, IMF, March 2015. Mark Adelson, “Off-Balance Sheet Update,” Nomura Fixed Income Research, Nomura Securities International, 24 Nov. 2003. Matthew Wood, Shifting Paradigms?: Mapping Policy Change in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Paper, ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, 24-28 August 2011. Michael McLeay, Amar Radia, and Ryland Thomas, Money creation in the modern economy, Bank’s Monetary Analysis Directorate, Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1. Nargiza Salidjanova, Lauren Gloudeman, Katherine Koleski, Matthew Snyder, Sean O’Connor, Economics and Trade Bulletin, The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 20160205. Ndari Surjaningsih dan Tevy Chawwa, Model Proyeksi Perbankan Triwulanan Bank Indonesia (Banking Model of Bank IndonesiaBAMBI), Kajian Stabilitas Keuangan, 23, Sept. 2014, hal.139-147. Oscar Claveria, Enric Monte, and Salvador Torra, Self-Organizing Map Analysis of Agents’ Expectations. Different Patterns of Anticipation of the 2008 Financial Crisis, Working Paper, 2015/11, Research Institute of Applied Economics (IREA), Barcelona, 2015. Patrick Fearon, What is Investment Banking?, Grenoble, Ecole de Management, Graduate School of Business, Grenoble, RhôneAlpes, France, Autumn 2012. Patrick McGuire and Karsten von Kleist, “Cyclical growth in the interbank market,” dalam Patrick McGuire, et al, “Highlights of international banking and financial market activity”. Patrick McGuire, et al, “Highlights of international banking and financial market activity,” BIS Quarterly Review: International banking and financial market developments, March 2008. Peter Breuer, Measuring Off-Balance-Sheet Leverage, Working Paper, WP/00/202, IMF, 20001201. Peter Jeffrey, “International Harmonization of Accounting Standards, and The Question of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment,” Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol.12:341, Duke, 2002. Peter Sarlin and Tuomas A. Peltonen, Mapping the State of Financial Stability, Discussion Papers, 18/2011, Bank of Finland, BOFIT, Helsinki, 20110727. Peter Sarlin and Tuomas A. Peltonen, Mapping the State of Financial Stability, Working Paper, 1382/Sept. 2011, European Central Bank, Sept. 2011. Peter Sarlin, Mapping Financial Stability, TUCS Dissertations, 159, Turku Centre for Computer Science, Turku, Finland, June 2013. R. L. Ackoff, “From Data to Wisdom”, Journal of Applies Systems Analysis, Volume 16, 1989 p 3-9. Redwood Capital, Business Intelligence, NY, April 2014. Richard Dobbs, Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel, Mina Mutafchieva, Debt and (not much) deleveraging, McKinsey Global Institute, Feb. 2015. Robert E. McAuliffe (ed), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management Managerial Economics, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK, 2005. Robert F. Austin, Geospatial Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy, Solstice, Vol. XXVI, No.2, 2015. Robert Huebscher, The Danger in Emerging Market Debt, Advisor Perspectives, Inc., 20160201. Robert N. McCauley and Chang Shu, Dollars and renminbi flowed out of China, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2016. Robert N. McCauley, Capital flowed out of China through BIS reporting banks in Q1 2015, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2015. Stanley Fischer, “Concluding panel comments,” Sixth BIS Annual Conference on “Financial System and Macroeconomic Resilience”, Brunnen, Switzerland, 18–19 June 2007; dalam Financial system and macroeconomic resilience, Papers No.41, BIS, July 2008. Stanley Fischer, “Keynote Address,” Fifth BIS Annual Research Conference tentang Financial Globalisation, 19-20 June 2006; dalam “Financial Market Liberalisation,” Papers, No.32, December 2006. Makalah awal pernah disampaikan dalam Konferensi OECD tentang Balancing Globalisation yang diadakan bulan Mei 2006. Subash Pillai, Lily Li, and Harry Huang, FAQ: China’s Bond Market, First Half 2015, Goldman Sachs Global Liquidity Management, Goldman Sachs Asset Management Australia Pty Ltd, 20150310. Teuvo Kohonen, “Self-Organized Formation of Topologically Correct Feature Maps”. Biological Cybernetics 43 (1): 59–69. 1982. The Conference Board, Business Cycle Indicators, February 2006. The Fed, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, 15-16 December 2015, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20151216.pdf Tyler Durden, Mapping The Crisis Contagion Process: The Flowchart, zerohedge.com, 20150903. Untoro, Priyo R. Widodo, Wahyu Yuwana, Kajian Penggunaan Instrumen Sistem Pembayaran sebagai Leading Indicator Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan, Working Paper, WP/5/2014, Des. 2014. Vijay Chander, Kyle Brandon, Sharon Sung, Sheeba Ogirala, Asia Credit Report, Fourth Quarter 2015, ASIFMA (Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association), Hong Kong, 20160204. Wayne M. Morrison and Gabriel M. Nelson, China’s Recent Stock Market Volatility: What Are the Implications?, CRS Insight, IN10325, 20160211. Buku Agnes Sawir, Kebijakan Pendanaan dan Restrukturisasi Perusahaan, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 2004. Arthur J. Keown, et al, Basic Financial Management, Prentice-Hall, NJ, 1996. C. Kindleberger, Manias, panics, and crashes: a history of financial crises, Basic Books, 1978. Charles P. Jones, Investments: Analysis and Management, 9/e, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, 2004. Frank K. Reilly dan Keith C. Brown, Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management, 5/e, Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, TX, 1997. Frederic S. Mishkin and Stanley G. Eakins, Financial Markets and Institutions, 4/e, Addison-Wesley, Boston, 2003. J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Essentials of Managerial Finance, 10/e, Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace, Orlando, Fl., 1993. Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 4/e, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1991. Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking in Theory and Practice, cet.6, Wiley, Chichester, UK, March 2003. Zvi Bodie, et al, Investments, 7/e, McGraw-Hill, Singapore, 2008. the1uploader 3:24 am on 2016-03-23 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/03/23/stress-test-ekonomi-perbankan-di-indonesia/)
stress test ekonomi & perbankan di Indonesia Krisis Finansil Cina: Perspektif Kebijakan Moneter, Corporate Finance (Analisa Laporan Keuangan), dan Investment Banking (Valuasi Nilai) oleh : Sando Sasako Jakarta, 28 Maret 2016 ISBN 978-602-73508-5-4 Untuk mendapatkan buku ini, silahkan hubungi kami di +62 851 0518 7118
Daftar Isi Kata Pengantar iii Kata Pengantar dalam buku ‘Corporate Financing’ v Daftar Isi vii Daftar Tabel x Daftar Bagan xi Pendahuluan 1 Masalah Pengukuran 1 Data, Informasi, Fakta 2 Data Mining 4 Pemilahan Data 5 Business Intelligence 7 Analisa Kuantitatif 8 Analisa Data 8 Self-Organising Map 9 Hambatan bagi Efektivitas Analisa Data 11 Confirmatory Data Analysis 11 Analisa Finansil 11 Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK, GAAP, IFRS) 12 Peran Perusahaan Audit dalam PSAK 12 Analisa Finansil sebagai Alat Ukur Kinerja Keuangan 12 Analisa Fundamental 13 Rasio-rasio Finansil 14 Pertumbuhan 14 Produktivitas 14 Kontribusi terhadap Stakeholder 14 Dividend Policy Ratios 14 Rasio-rasio Aktivitas Usaha 15 Perputaran aset (asset turnover) 15 Perputaran aset rata-rata (asset turnover) 15 Rasio perputaran aset tetap (fixed assets turnover) 15 Perputaran piutang (receivables turnover) 16 Rata-rata periode penagihan (average collection period) 16 Perputaran inventaris (inventory turnover) 16 Periode inventaris (inventory period) 16 Rasio-rasio Likuiditas 17 Rasio lancar (current ratio, CR) 17 Rasio modal kerja (working capital ratio) 18 Rasio cepat (quick ratio, QR) 18 Rasio kas (cash ratio) 18 Pendapatan lancar (current income) 19 Rasio pendapatan bunga (Time Interest Earned, Interest Coverage) 19 Rasio investasi terhadap kebijakan (investment to policy ratio) 19 Rasio utang lancar terhadap inventaris (current debts to inventory ratio) 19 Rasio-rasio Profitabilitas 19 Marjin laba kotor (gross profit margin) 20 Marjin laba bersih (net profit margin) 20 Return on Equity (ROE) 20 Return on Asset (ROA) dan Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 20 Return on Capital (ROC) dan Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 21 Return on Investment (ROI) 21 Beban bunga (Interest Coverage, Times Interest Earned) 22 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 22 Efisiensi beban finansil (efficiency of financial leverage) 22 Rasio-rasio Struktur Modal 23 Rasio utang terhadap modal (debt to equity ratio) 23 Rasio kapitalisasi (capitalisation ratio) 24 Tingkat pertumbuhan ekuitas (equity growth rate) 24 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 24 Rasio utang (debt ratio) 24 Rasio modal saham terhadap aset tetap bersih 24 Rasio utang lancar terhadap modal saham (Current Debts to Net Worth Ratio) 24 Rasio kewajiban total terhadap modal saham (Total Liabilities to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio aset tetap terhadap modal saham (Fixed Assets to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio-rasio Kecukupan Modal 25 Solvabilitas 25 Solvency ratio (SR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap aset (Debt to Asset Ratio, DAR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap modal (Debt to Equity Ratio, DER) 26 Kemampuan laba menutup biaya tetap (Fixed Charge Coverage). 26 Rasio pinjaman terhadap aset (Loan to Asset Ratio, LAR) 27 Rasio pinjaman terhadap simpanan (Loan to Deposit Ratio, LDR) 27 Risks vs Rewards 27 Risiko Mencari Keuntungan 28 Efek Domino Risiko 29 Rent-Seeking Behaviours 30 When the Deal Slips Away 32 Indikator Kesulitan Finansil 34 Indeks Kerentanan 36 Stress Test 38 Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan 40 Financial Stability Index 43 Indeks Kesehatan Finansil ala IMF 44 Laporan Stabilitas Finansil Global ala IMF 48 Operasi Moneter 48 Inflasi Terencana sebagai Prasyarat Kestabilan Finansil 50 Dinamika Pasar Finansil 52 Dinamika Aset Finansil 53 Kerapuhan Sistem Finansil 54 Krisis Finansil 55 Menelikung Krisis Finansil 56 Kasus LTCM 57 Krisis Subprime Mortgage 60 Kasus Lehman Brothers 63 Krisis Eurozone 64 Spiral Kekacauan Krisis Eurozone 65 Debt Exposures of PIGS 66 AS 68 Inggris 69 Jerman 69 Perancis 70 Jepang 71 Yunani 72 Irlandia 73 Italia 74 Portugis 74 Spanyol 75 Some PIGS are More PIGS 76 Krisis Finansil Cina 77 Kenapa Cina menjadi begitu penting? 78 Bermain dengan nilai tukar 81 Pasar CNH 82 Dominansi nilai tukar CNH terhadap CNY 87 Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 91 Qualified Domestic Individual Investor 91 Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect 91 Pilot Free Trade Zones 91 Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds 92 Kenapa pasar finansil Cina bisa crash? 92 Ketika gelembung finansil Cina mulai pecah 93 Pelonggaran likuiditas sebagai solusi ancaman resesi 94 Aksi pemadam kebakaran ala pemerintah Cina 96 Permasalahan fundamental ekonomi Cina 99 Beban utang Cina 101 Kebijakan dan otoritas moneter Cina 102 Pasar obligasi Cina 103 Obligasi Panda 105 Obligasi dim sum 106 Daftar emisi obligasi dim sum 108 Aksi pemerintah Cina terhadap masalah tunggakan utang 110 Policy and Politicisation 113 Primary Dealer 113 Solusi Teoritis, Bisa dan Benarkah? 116 Kebijakan Too Big To Fail 117 Cashless Solution 118 Minyak sebagai Mata Uang dan Sumber Kemakmuran 120 Negative Interest Rates Policy 125 Kas 129 Pengadaan Aset 130 Asset Investment 130 Asset Financing 131 Capital Expenditures 132 Menghitung Biaya Modal 134 Biaya utang 134 Biaya saham preferensi 134 Biaya laba ditahan 134 Biaya ekuitas eksternal 135 WACC 135 Biaya modal marjinal 136 Break point 136 Off-Balance Sheet Financing 136 Perubahan Portofolio The Fed 136 OBS sebagai Produk Inovasi Menyembunyikan Risiko Finansil 137 MBS sebagai Produk Rekayasa Finansil Penyebab Krisis 2008 139 Bencana Prilaku Berisiko Berlebihan 141 Bertaruh pada Aset Fiktif 142 Akuntansi OBS 144 Fleksibilitas Pasal Karet 145 Penyesuaian Pasal Karet 146 Memanfaatkan Celah Hukum 147 Equity Financing 148 Debt Financing 149 Struktur Modal 152 Teori Struktur Modal 153 Teori Pensinyalan 154 Struktur Modal dalam Praktek dan Realitas 155 Menghitung Tingkat Optimal Struktur Modal 155 Besar Beban Operasi 156 Analisis EBIT/EPS terhadap Efek Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Total 158 Efek Struktur Modal terhadap Harga Saham dan Biaya Modal 159 Likuiditas dan Arus Kas 159 Struktur Finansil 160 Ukuran Optimal Beban/Struktur Finansil 161 Valuasi Nilai 162 Corporate Financing vs Investment Banking 163 Pentingnya Valuasi Nilai 164 Valuasi Usaha 164 Komponen Pendapatan 166 Komponen Neraca 167 Komponen Arus Kas 167 Time Value of Money 168 Future Value 169 Future Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Present Value 169 Present Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Future Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 169 Future Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Future Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Perpetuities 171 Present Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Periode Semesteran atau lainnya 171 Amortisasi Pinjaman 172 Referensi 173 Web 173 e-book 177 Buku 180 Daftar Lampiran Lampiran – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 183 Lampiran – Ukuran dan skenario dalam laporan stabilitas finansil global, Okt. 2015 185 Ukuran likuiditas 185 Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 187 Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Lampiran – Ukuran Kerentanan Finansil 193 Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Lampiran – Daftar Indikator dalam ISSK Bank Indonesia 197 Lampiran – Profil Cina 199 Lampiran – Jumlah (instrumen) utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 201 Daftar Tabel Table 1 – Aktivitas M&A di business intelligence dengan nilai >$100 juta, 2009-2014q1 7 Table 2 – Beberapa indikator kebijakan macroprudential 36 Table 3 – Indikator pengukuran stabilitas sistem keuangan 42 Table 4 – Indikator utama kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 5 – Indikator tambahan (encouraged) bagi kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 6 – Indikator parsial dan bobot dalam indeks stabilitas perbankan Republik Ceko 47 Table 7 – Indikator kesehatan finansil ala ECS (Macro-Prudential Indicators) 47 Table 8 – Tiga skenario stabilitas finansil 48 Table 9 – Operasi moneter menurut standing facility 49 Table 10 – Pentingnya likuiditas yang lentur (resilient) 50 Table 11 – Penambahan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 12 – Penyerapan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 13 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk 5 produk utama, 2014-2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 14 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk produk teknologi tinggi, 2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 15 – PDB Cina, 2010-2014 dalam milyaran dan US$ 101 Table 16 – Nilai obligasi pemerintah dan korporasi di Cina, 2002-2015 (US$ milyar) 101 Table 17 – Buletin harga obligasi di pasar uang Hong Kong, 11 Maret 2016 107 Table 18 – Daftar 22 primary dealer di Amerika Serikat, 2014 114 Table 19 – Beberapa veteran primary dealer pilihan Bank Sentral Amerika 114 Table 20 – Daftar 19 primary dealer di Indonesia, 2014-2015 115 Table 21 – Nilai derivatif 25 bank terbesar di AS, Nov. 2015 (US$ milyar) 119 Table 22 – Ringkasan Perlakuan Transaksi Sekuritisasi menurut UK GAAP 145 Table 23 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Table 24 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Table 25 – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 184 Table 26 – Ukuran likuiditas 186 Table 27 – Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 188 Table 28 – Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Table 29 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Table 30 – Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Table 31 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Table 32 – Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Table 33 – Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Table 34 – Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Table 35 – Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Table 36 – Daftar indikator pembentuk ISSK 197 Table 37 – Profil Singkat Cina 199 Table 38 – Indikator Ekonomi Cina, 2011-2017 200 Table 39 – Utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 202 Daftar Bagan Figure 1 – Diagram alur hierarki DIKW (Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom) 3 Figure 2 – Kontinuum pemahaman dalam konteks DIKW 3 Figure 3 – Proses data mining 4 Figure 4 – Hubungan antara Data, Informasi, dan Intelijen 6 Figure 5 – Analisa eksplorasi data 9 Figure 6 – Taksonomi ketidakpastian 27 Figure 7 – Igloo ketidakpastian 28 Figure 8 – PV perusahaan berutang 32 Figure 9 – Skema indeks kerentanan dan komponennya 37 Figure 10 – Siklus pengawasan macroprudential 38 Figure 11 – Prasyarat bagi antisipasi dan pencegahan ketidakstabilan sistem finansil 39 Figure 12 – Hubungan antara stabilitas sistem finansil dan stabilitas moneter 39 Figure 13 – Keterkaitan antar-variabel dalam BAMBI (Banking Model of Bank Indonesia) 41 Figure 14 – Beberapa indikator pembentuk Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (ISSK) 42 Figure 15 – Peran Bank Indonesia dalam menciptakan stabilitas moneter 49 Figure 16 – Bentuk interaksi antara BI, pempus, dan pemda dalam mengendalikan inflasi 51 Figure 17 – Perkembangan aktivitas perbankan internasional 52 Figure 18 – Aset Riel dan Aset Fiktif Bank-bank di AS, 1995–2000 58 Figure 19 – Nilai Derivatif dan Modal 25 Bank AS Ternama (US$ milyar) 59 Figure 20 – CDOs direpresentasikan dalam bentuk building blocks, The Big Short, 2015 60 Figure 21 – Pasar rumah di AS, 1989-2006 61 Figure 22 – Pemetaan proses penularan krisis finansil 2008 62 Figure 23 – Pinjaman sektoral dari Bank of England, 1997-2012 63 Figure 24 – Utang-piutang PIGS 67 Figure 25 – Utang AS ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 68 Figure 26 – Utang Inggris ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 69 Figure 27 – Utang Jerman ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 70 Figure 28 – Utang Perancis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 29 – Utang Jepang ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 30 – Utang Yunani ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 72 Figure 31 – Utang Irlandia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 73 Figure 32 – Utang Italia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 74 Figure 33 – Utang Portugis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 75 Figure 34 – Utang Spanyol ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 76 Figure 35 – Cadangan Devisa Cina, Des. 1999 – Jan. 2016 78 Figure 36 – Tiga Kekuatan Ekonomi Dunia 79 Figure 37 – Nilai perdagangan Cina dengan negara lain (impor + ekspor) 80 Figure 38 – Nilai tukar bilateral yuan terhadap 3 mata uang dunia, USD, ¥, dan €. 81 Figure 39 – Cadangan devisa Cina dan nilai tukar CNY dan CNH 83 Figure 40 – Selisih CNY dengan CNH, Agustus 2010-Januari 2016 83 Figure 41 – Selisih tajam antara CNY dan CNH berdampak pada lonjakan bunga antar-bank di bulan Januari 2016 84 Figure 42 – Intervensi pasar CNH bisa menyesuaikan bunga CNH dengan CNY, 20151110-20160126 85 Figure 43 – Pasar deposit CNH, Maret 2009 – Des. 2015 86 Figure 44 – Distribusi CNH menurut bank sentral (offshore yuan’s swap line), Nov. 2015 88 Figure 45 – Penyelesaian perdagangan dalam CNH, 2009Q3-2015Q4 89 Figure 46 – Pasar deposit CNH menurut negara, 2014 89 Figure 47 – Beberapa alternatif indikator pertumbuhan ekonomi Cina mengacu pada penurunan yang lebih besar (greater slowdown), 2010–2015 95 Figure 48 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai (SCI), Mei 2015 sampai 5 Februari 2016 97 Figure 49 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai, 1 Januari 2015 – 8 Maret 2016 98 Figure 50 – Triple policy trilemma 99 Figure 51 – Pasar obligasi Cina, 2003-2014 104 Figure 52 – Aktivitas perdagangan pasar sekunder obligasi Cina, 2000-2014 104 Figure 53 – Pangsa pasar obligasi Cina menurut jenis obligasi, Des. 2014 104 Figure 54 – Daftar emisi obligasi Panda, 20151010-20160121 106 Figure 55 – Emisi obligasi CNY, 2008-2015 111 Figure 56 – Emisi obligasi CNH, 2008-2015 111 Figure 57 – Asset backed securities di Cina, 2005-2014 112 Figure 58 – Peristiwa bersejarah dan harga minyak mentah, 1861-2014 (US$/b) 121 Figure 59 – Harga minyak mentah Brent (US$), 20040102-20160106 123 Figure 60 – Kelebihan pasokan minyak mentah dunia, 2012q3-2015q3 123 Figure 61 – Distribusi ladang produksi minyak shale AS, April 2015 124 Figure 62 – Suku bunga deposito dan pembiayaan ulang ECB, 2008-Maret 2016 127 Figure 63 – Prediksi nilai tengah suku bunga Federal Funds, Des. 2015-2019 127 Figure 64 – Federal funds target rata (%), 1983-2015 128 Figure 65 – Federal funds rate, 1 Juli 1954-18 Feb. 2016 128 Figure 66 – Skema sumber pendanaan perusahaan 130 Figure 67 – Factors adding to reserves and off balance sheet securities lending program 137 Figure 68 – Multiplikasi Penciptaan Aset Fiktif 143 Figure 69 – Klasifikasi struktur aset, struktur finansil, dan struktur kapital 161 Contents 01 20150109 Uji Daya Tahan Sistem Keuangan Indonesia, BI Lakukan Stress Test Secara Reguler 04 20150112 Hasil Stress Test BI, Perbankan RI Masih Kuat 03 20150325 STRESS TEST PERBANKAN: Lonceng Otoritas Membuat Deposan Terperangah 05 20150402 Transparansi Stress Test 02 20150815 BCA, Permata conduct stress tests as rupiah falls 07 DEFINISI STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 08 PENTINGNYA STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 06 KERANGKA STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 09 PERAN BANK INDONESIA DALAM STABILITAS KEUANGAN 10 FORUM STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 11 SERBA-SERBI STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 01 20150109 Uji Daya Tahan Sistem Keuangan Indonesia, BI Lakukan Stress Test Secara Reguler 2016-03-23 03:24 PM http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/serbaserbi/Pages/BI-Lakukan-Stress-Test-Secara-Reguler.aspx Uji Daya Tahan Sistem Keuangan Indonesia, BI Lakukan Stress Test Secara Reguler Departemen Komunikasi, 09-01-2015 Tel (021) 500 131 Fax.: (021) 386-4884, E-mail :
[email protected] Bank Indonesia melakukan stress test secara reguler untuk mengetahui daya tahan sistem keuangan Indonesia dalam menghadapi berbagai risiko yang mengancam dari waktu ke waktu. Hasil stress test tersebut juga diumumkan secara terbuka sebagai bentuk himbauan agar pihak-pihak terkait dapat memitigasi risiko dan mengambil langkah-langkah yang diperlukan apabila keadaa memburuk. Hasil stress test Bank Indonesia (BI) terkini menunjukkan sistem keuangan Indonesia memiliki daya tahan yang kuat dalam menghadapi risiko kredit dan risiko pasar (suku bunga, nilai tukar dan harga SBN). “Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan Indonesia tetap terjaga, baik dari dilihat dari sisi perbankan, korporasi maupun rumah tangga”, jelas Deputi Gubernur Bank Indonesia, Halim Alamsyah pada 9 Januari 2015 di Kantor Pusat Bank Indonesia, Jakarta. Dari sisi perbankan, hasil stress test dengan menggunakan data neraca dan kinerja bank posisi Oktober 2014, menunjukkan bahwa dari sisi permodalan, perbankan Indonesia masih cukup kuat meskipun terjadi penguatan dolar Amerika Serikat (AS). Sementara itu, koreksi harga Surat Berharga Negara (SBN) dengan skenario terburuk, yaitu penurunan harga SBN sebesar 20% menunjukkan penurunan Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) hanya sebesar 142 bps sehingga permodalan masih cukup memadai untuk mengantisipasi risiko kerugian terkait penurunan harga SBN. Stress test secara terintegrasi dengan kombinasi risiko pasar dan risiko kredit, juga menunjukkan CAR industri perbankan maupun per kelompok BUKU masih cukup kuat diatas 8%. Dari sisi korporasi, penguatan dolar AS akan berdampak pada peningkatan kewajiban valas korporasi terutama bagi korporasi yang memiliki Utang Luar Negeri (ULN) relatif tinggi. Peningkatan kewajiban valas korporasi yang tidak diikuti dengan peningkatan aset valas berpotensi menggerus permodalan korporasi. Terkait dengan hal tersebut, berdasarkan hasil stress test ketahanan korporasi swasta non bank yang memiliki ULN menunjukkan bahwa dari 91 korporasi yang memiliki ULN dan posisi Net Foreign Liabilities (NFL) dengan data per triwulan II 2014 diperkirakan terdapat 7 korporasi atau 8,77% dari total korporasi yang di-observasi berpotensi insolvent (equity negatif) apabila nilai tukar Rupiah melemah sampai dengan kurs Rp15.500/USD. “Pengujian dengan skenario Rp15.500/USD tolong jangan diartikan bahwa angka tersebut adalah level tolerasi BI. Kami juga menguji dengan berbagai variasi angka. Intinya, kami tidak menetapkan level tertentu dalam stabilitasi nilai tukar rupiah”, jelas Halim Alamsyah Selain sisi perbankan dan korporasi yang menunjukkan hasil yang positif, dari sisi Rumah Tangga (RT) juga menunjukkan tingkat leverage RT masih berada pada level yang aman. Dalam hal ini, utang RT masih dapat ditutup oleh pendapatan dan asetnya. Hal ini ditunjukkan dengan porsi pengeluaran untuk cicilan pinjaman (Debt Service Ratio/DSR) masih lebih rendah dibandingkan dengan persyaratan yang ditetapkan bank bagi calon debitur yang umumnya ditetapkan sekitar 30% dari penghasilan. Meskipun tingkat DSR RT relatif rendah, namun terdapat potensi risiko yang patut diwaspadai terutama pada kelompok RT berpenghasilan rendah. Stress test ini menggunakan hasil Survei Konsumen Bank Indonesia pada posisi Juni 2014. “Meskipun hasil stress test menunjukkan hasil yang positif, BI senantiasa akan menjaga ketersediaan likuiditas di pasar keuangan dan mengedepankan stabilitas nilai tukar untuk mengeliminir dampak rambatannya terhadap SSK. BI juga akan terus berkoordinasi dengan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) untuk melakukan supervisory action dan mempercepat pendalaman pasar keuangan, termasuk penyempurnaan pasar repo untuk menjaga ketersediaan likuiditas melalui pasar uang yang lebih efisien.”, pungkas Halim. Sekilas Metodologi Stress Test Sama seperti Bank sentral di banyak negara, Bank Indonesia juga melakukan general check-up dan stress test secara reguler untuk mengetahui daya tahan sistem keuangan dalam menghadapi krisis. Penilaian risiko yang dilakukan antara lain berupa asesmen dampak risiko baik yang berasal dari dalam maupun di luar sistem keuangan terhadap elemen lain di sistem keuangan. Penilaian risiko lebih lanjut juga dilakukan atas rambatannya terhadap dan sektor riil atau yang lebih dikenal dengan feedback loop. Untuk saat ini, penilaian risiko tersebut dilakukan dengan fokus utama pada sektor perbankan serta pada sektor korporasi yang memiliki interkoneksi tinggi dengan sektor perbankan. Dalam penilaian risiko, dilakukan melalui penentuan stress scenario untuk melihat reaksi dari sektor perbankan, korporasi dan interaksi antar keduanya. Halim Alamsyah, juga menjelaskan bahwa kedepan perekonomian dan sistem keuangan Indonesia akan dihadapkan oleh empat risiko utama. “Pertama, normalisasi kebijakan moneter AS. Kedua, potensi risiko likuiditas yang masih tinggi. Ketiga, berlanjutnya penurunan harga-harga komoditas. Dan terakhir adalah meningkatnya kerawanan eksternal akibat kembali naiknya rasio utang luar negeri”, jelasnya. Melihat tantangan tersebut, Bank Indonesia menyusun stress scenario secara komprehensif baik dari sisi suku bunga, nilai tukar dan variabel makro lainnya. Secara lebih lanjut, Bank Indonesia juga melakukan pengukuran stress scenario likuiditas dan interbank secara seksama. Exchange rate stress-test ditujukan untuk memperkirakan dampak perubahan nilai tukar terhadap modal bank dan kinerja korporasi. Interest rate stress-test mengestimasi dampak perubahan suku bunga terhadap perbankan, khususnya saat Fed melakukan normalisasi kebijakannya. Perhitungan macro stress-test lainnya dimaksudkan menganalisa dampak dari guncangan variabel makroekonomi terhadap kinerja sektor perbankan secara lebih utuh. Bank Indonesia juga makin memperkuat credit risk stress test dengan mempertimbangkan pemburukan kinerja korporasi berbasis komoditas menyusul tren perlambatan harga komoditas global. Sementara itu, liquidity stress-test digunakan untuk menghitung kemampuan alat likuid bank atau korporasi dalam memenuhi kewajiban jangka pendeknya terutama jika ada kebutuhan likuiditas dalam jumlah besar dari korporasi yang memiliki eksposur komoditas yang besar. Hal tersebut juga dilengkapi dengan interbank stress-test untuk mengetahui potensi kegagalan bank dalam memenuhi kewajiban antar bank. Secara umum, perhitungan stress test menggunakan dua pendekatan yaitu bottom-up dan top-down. Bottom-up stress-test bertujuan untuk menilai ketahanan industri perbankan atau korporasi yang didapatkan dengan menggabungkan ketahanan individu institusi keuangan atau korporasi dalam merespon guncangan yang terjadi sehingga diperoleh dampak secara agregat. Mayoritas perhitungan stress-test menggunakan metode bottom-up dilakukan secara parsial, dan terintegrasi. Selai itu, pada metode ini juga menggunakan model yang berbeda untuk setiap individual mengingat bank atau korporasi mengadopsi business model yang berbeda-beda misalnya korporasi dengan net kewajiban valas akan mengalami kerugian pada saat terjadi depresiasi nilai tukar, dan sebaliknya korporasi yang memiliki net aset valas akan mengalami keuntungan. Di sisi lain, top-down stress-test dilakukan untuk melihat kerentanan industri perbankan atau korporasi secara agregat yang dapat mengganggu stabilitas sistem keuangan. Berbeda dengan bottom-up stress-test yang menggunakan data dan model internal, topdown stress-test dilakukan oleh otoritas dan dihitung dengan menggunakan asumsi, model, dan perlakuan yang sama untuk semua bank atau korporasi. Saat ini, Bank Indonesia telah secara rutin melakukan top-down stress-test bagi keseluruhan bank umum dengan menggunakan balance sheet approach terhadap tiga risiko utama bank, baik secara parsial maupun terintegrasi. Selain itu, metode top-down juga digunakan dalam perhitungan macro stress-test. 04 20150112 Hasil Stress Test BI, Perbankan RI Masih Kuat 2016-03-23 03:27 PM http://economy.okezone.com/read/2015/01/12/457/1090923/hasil-stress-test-bi-perbankan-ri-masih-kuat Hasil Stress Test BI, Perbankan RI Masih Kuat Meutia Febrina Anugrah, Senin, 12 Januari 2015 – 11:14 wib JAKARTA – Hasil stress test Bank Indonesia (BI) pada Juni 2014 menunjukkan sistem keuangan Indonesia memiliki daya tahan yang kuat dalam menghadapi risiko kredit dan risiko pasar (suku bunga, nilai tukar dan harga SBN). Stress test ini menggunakan hasil Survei Konsumen Bank Indonesia pada posisi Juni 2014. “Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan Indonesia tetap terjaga, baik dari dilihat dari sisi perbankan, korporasi maupun rumah tangga,” kata Deputi Gubernur Bank Indonesia, Halim Alamsyah yang dikutip dari laman resmi BI, Senin (12/1/2015). Dari sisi perbankan, hasil stress test dengan menggunakan data neraca dan kinerja bank posisi Oktober 2014, menunjukkan bahwa dari sisi permodalan, perbankan Indonesia masih cukup kuat meskipun terjadi penguatan dolar Amerika Serikat (AS). Sementara itu, koreksi harga Surat Berharga Negara (SBN) dengan skenario terburuk, yaitu penurunan harga SBN sebesar 20 persen menunjukkan penurunan Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) hanya sebesar 142 bps sehingga permodalan masih cukup memadai untuk mengantisipasi risiko kerugian terkait penurunan harga SBN. Stress test secara terintegrasi dengan kombinasi risiko pasar dan risiko kredit, juga menunjukkan CAR industri perbankan maupun per kelompok BUKU masih cukup kuat di atas 8 persen. Dari sisi korporasi, penguatan dolar AS akan berdampak pada peningkatan kewajiban valas korporasi terutama bagi korporasi yang memiliki Utang Luar Negeri (ULN) relatif tinggi. Peningkatan kewajiban valas korporasi yang tidak diikuti dengan peningkatan aset valas berpotensi menggerus permodalan korporasi. Terkait dengan hal tersebut, berdasarkan hasil stress test ketahanan korporasi swasta nonbank yang memiliki ULN menunjukkan bahwa dari 91 korporasi yang memiliki ULN dan posisi Net Foreign Liabilities (NFL) dengan data per triwulan II 2014 diperkirakan terdapat 7 korporasi atau 8,77 persen dari total korporasi yang di-observasi berpotensi insolvent (equity negatif) apabila nilai tukar Rupiah melemah sampai dengan kurs Rp15.500 per USD. “Pengujian dengan skenario Rp15.500 per USD tolong jangan diartikan bahwa angka tersebut adalah level tolerasi BI. Kami juga menguji dengan berbagai variasi angka. Intinya, kami tidak menetapkan level tertentu dalam stabilitasi nilai tukar rupiah”, jelas Halim Alamsyah Tak hanya itu, sisi Rumah Tangga (RT) juga menunjukkan tingkat leverage RT masih berada pada level yang aman. Dalam hal ini, utang RT masih dapat ditutup oleh pendapatan dan asetnya. Hal ini ditunjukkan dengan porsi pengeluaran untuk cicilan pinjaman (Debt Service Ratio/DSR) masih lebih rendah dibandingkan dengan persyaratan yang ditetapkan bank bagi calon debitur yang umumnya ditetapkan sekitar 30 persen dari penghasilan. Meskipun tingkat DSR RT relatif rendah, namun terdapat potensi risiko yang patut diwaspadai terutama pada kelompok RT berpenghasilan rendah. “Meskipun hasil stress test menunjukkan hasil yang positif, BI senantiasa akan menjaga ketersediaan likuiditas di pasar keuangan dan mengedepankan stabilitas nilai tukar untuk mengeliminir dampak rambatannya terhadap SSK. BI juga akan terus berkoordinasi dengan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) untuk melakukan supervisory action dan mempercepat pendalaman pasar keuangan, termasuk penyempurnaan pasar repo untuk menjaga ketersediaan likuiditas melalui pasar uang yang lebih efisien.”, pungkas Halim. 03 20150325 STRESS TEST PERBANKAN: Lonceng Otoritas Membuat Deposan Terperangah 2016-03-23 03:27 PM http://finansial.bisnis.com/read/20150325/90/415371/stress-test-perbankan-lonceng-otoritas-membuat-deposan-terperangah STRESS TEST PERBANKAN: Lonceng Otoritas Membuat Deposan Terperangah Novita Sari Simamora Rabu, 25/03/2015 00:41 WIB Bisnis.com, JAKARTA–Dua pengawas perbankan, yakni Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) dan Bank Indonesia (BI) pada bulan ini baru saja memaparkan hasil stress test untuk mengetahui daya tahan industri perbankan menghadapi krisis. Pengawas mikroprudensial dan makroprudensial merilis tema yang sama, yakni stress test, tetapimemiliki hasil berbeda. Saat kebijakan moneter ketat, telah berimbas memperlambat bisnis bank, ditambah sentimen ekonomi global. Dalam stress test yang diadakan BI secara regular, hasil menyatakan bahwa bank-bank di Tanah Air mampu untuk memitigasi risiko. Baik risiko kredit, suku bunga, nilai tukar dan harga surat berharga negara (SBN). Pengujian stress test itu berskenario Rp15.500 per dolar, dipadu dengan penurunan SBN hingga 20% bakal menurunkan rasio kecukupan modal (capital adequacy ratio/CAR) hingga 142 basis poin. Di sisi lain, paparan stress test, BI mengklaim bahwa modal bank masih cukup kuat. Sedangkan pengawas mikroprudensial perbankan, memaparkan dengan skenario Rp15.000 per dolar, akan ada paling banyak 5 bank kecil yang mencatatkan modal yang terpukul. Sontak, deposan kakap yang meletakkan dana di bank-bank kecil bertanya-tanya, “Bank apa yang mau koleps? Aduh, gimana uang kami di bank-bank itu?” Kutipan di atas adalah curahan hati bankir kelas menengah. Dia adalah bankir yang bertugas di bank umum kegiatan usaha (BUKU) 2 dengan modal Rp1 triliun–Rp5 triliun. Bankir itu mempertanyakan kembali hasil stress test yang dirilis OJK. “Deposan kami, banyak yang bertanya-tanya kondisi keamanan bank. Syukurnya, deposan kakap itu bertanya pada manajemen, sehingga kami menenangkan kepanikannya. Kalau deposan-deposan itu enggak konfirmasi ulang ke kami dan langsung menarik dana, maka kondisi akan sulit,” ucap bankir swasta. Bankir itu mempertanyakan dasar otoritas yang memprediksikan akan ada sekitar 5 bank yang terpukul, apalagi mengingat fluktuatif nilai tukar rupiah terhadap dolar. Sebab, dalam stress test BI, dengan skenario yang lebih tinggi Rp500 per dolar dari OJK, pun diklaim aman. Merespons itu, Anggota Dewan Komisioner merangkap Kepala Eksekutif Pengawas Perbankan OJK Nelson Tampubolon mengatakan skenario dan variabel yang digunakan otoritas di Lapangan Banteng dan Thamrin juga berbeda. “OJK melalukan stress test untuk industri secara keseluruhan dan individual bank. Jadi kami lebih lengkap,” ucapnya, Kamis (19/3/2015). Nelson menggungkapkan variable yang digunakan OJK antara lain kurs, pertumbuhan ekonomi dan inflasi. Stress test yang dilakukan OJK juga mempertimbangkan profil risiko yang ada di pasar dan kondisi makro ekonomi dari hari ke hari. Meski otoritas di Jalan Thamrin memberikan sinyal ketat sejak pertengan 2013, bank-bank kelas menengah dan kecil itu tetap optimis untuk tumbuh. Tertekan. Pasti iya. Namun optimisme tetap muncul dari bankir yang berpotensi terpukul. Direktur Eksekutif Departemen Komunikasi BI Tirta Segara mengungkapkan bank sentral tetap melakukan stress test yang rutin, akan tetapi hasil tersebut tidak akan dipublikasikan secara rutin. “Kami lakukan stress test untuk bank sistemik juga,” tuturnya. Pada kesempatan terpisah, Deputi Komisioner OJK Irwan Lubis menilai terpukulnya bank-bank kecil didongkrak oleh pemburukan kualitas aset. Apalagi mengingat tren capital adequacy ratio perbankan yang diprediksi bakal menembus 3%. Hasil stress test, secara tersirat untuk mengingatkan bank-bank terutama bank kelas menengah dan kecil untuk kian berhati-hati mengelola kualitas aset. Bila sinyal tersebut tak direspon dengan pembenahan dan menerapkan prinsip kehati-hatian, besar kemungkinan akan ada bank yang terpukul. 05 20150402 Transparansi Stress Test 2016-03-23 03:28 PM http://www.neraca.co.id/article/52257/transparansi-stress-test Transparansi Stress Test Kamis, 02/04/2015 Untuk pertama kalinya sejak 2009, Bank Sentral Amerika Serikat (The Fed) sudah merilis terbuka hasil stress test perbankan ke publik. Meski diantara bank-bank yang tidak lolos tes terdapat Citigroup, bank ternama di AS, kebijakan The Fed itu patut kita acungi jempol dan patut ditiru oleh Bank Indonesia (BI) maupun Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK). BI dan OJK sebenarnya sudah sejak lama melakukan tes serupa untuk perbankan yang beroperasi di Indonesia, namun hasilnya tetap tidak terbuka alias tertutup mengumumkan nama bank yang gagal tes tersebut. Padahal stress test tidak termasuk dalam kategori rahasia bank yang diatur UU Bank Indonesia. Stress test memang dapat menggambarkan kemampuan bank untuk memenuhi kebutuhan likuiditas dalam kondisi krisis, yang didasarkan pada berbagai skenario. Penetapan cakupan dan frekuensi stress test harus sesuai dengan skala dan kompleksitas usaha, serta eksposur risiko likuiditas bank. Tidak hanya The Fed. Bank Sentral Spanyol, Bank of Spain, juga sudah memutuskan akan mempublikasikan hasil stress test perbankan negara itu pada tahun lalu. Langkah Spanyol ini akan menambah tekanan pada negara Eropa lainnya untuk mengambil langkah serupa. Dengan menggunakan skenario stress secara spesifik pada bank maupun stress pada pasar yang sudah mempertimbangkan berbagai faktor, maka pihak bank sentral dapat mengetahui potensi penyebab kondisi krisis likuiditas, durasi peristiwa dan kedalaman (severity) permasalahan yang ditimbulkan oleh bank yang bersangkutan. Dalam menetapkan skenario untuk stress test, bank menggunakan skenario yang bersifat historis dan/atau hipotesis dengan mempertimbangkan aktivitas bisnis dan kerentanan bank. Karena krisis yang terjadi atas suatu instrumen keuangan, atau produk tertentu yang dapat berdampak pada bank yang memiliki eksposur pada suatu instrumen keuangan atau produk tertentu, misalnya produk terstruktur (structured product). Pengalaman The Fed mengumumkan hasil uji stress perbankan telah menghasilkan efek positif pada perekonomian. Pertama, sentimen investor membaik, karena kehadiraninformasi tersebut memungkinkan mereka untuk lebih mampu menilai risiko untuk pengambilan keputusan investasi. Ini berarti bahwa aliran modal swasta di sektor keuangan akan meningkat, dan bunga obligasi bank dan utang lainnya akan menurun. Kedua, sangat perlu untuk lulus uji yang sama perbankan sudah harus meningkatkan modalnya. Bank Indonesia sebagai lembaga pengawas makroprudensial di negeri ini, tentu sangat berkepentingan dengan program stress test untuk menentukan skenario yang dapat mengancam kelangsungan hidup bank (reverse stress test), sehingga kemudian terungkap risiko-risiko dan interaksi antar risiko yang sebelumnya terselubung dan tidak diketahui oleh masyarakat luas. Apalagi dengan adanya UU No. 14/2008 tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik (KIP), BI sebagai lembaga publik sejatinya harus mematuhi ketentuan hukum tersebut. Artinya, hasil stress test perbankan wajib diumumkan ke publik sesuai UU tersebut. Karena pada hakikatnya setiap orang berhak melihat dan mengetahui informasi publik, dan menyebarluaskan informasi hasil stress test perbankan. Hanya masalahnya pada pasal 17 huruf e (6) UU tersebut disebutkan, proses dan hasil pengawasan perbankan masuk kategori informasi yang dikecualikan, sehingga masyarakat tidak dapat mengakses informasi seperti hasil stress test perbankan. Nah, DPR seharusnya cepat tanggap mengajukan usulan perubahan pasal tersebut, mengingat dinamika perubahan sangat cepat sekali. Kebijakan The Fed yang mengumumkan secara terbuka sejatinya menjadi dasar untuk mengubah pasal tersebut. 02 20150815 BCA, Permata conduct stress tests as rupiah falls 2016-03-23 03:26 PM http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/15/bca-permata-conduct-stress-tests-rupiah-falls.html BCA, Permata conduct stress tests as rupiah falls The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Business | Sat, August 15 2015, 4:10 PM Bank Central Asia (BCA), the country’s third largest bank, said its financial performance would be resilient enough to cope with the impact of the sharp depreciation of the rupiah against the US dollar even if the rupiah continued falling. BCA president director Jahja Setiaatmadja said its stress test showed that the bank would be resilient enough to face rupiah depreciation as it had minimal exposure to dollar-denominated loans. “We learned a lot from our experience in 1998,” Jahja said on Friday as quoted by Kontan newspaper in reference to the time when Indonesian currency fell to as low as Rp 15,000 per US dollar, a situation which led to Indonesia’s worst ever financial crisis. Jahja said that during the 1998 financial crisis, the share of dollar-denominated loans in the total portfolio touched 35 percent, which significantly affected the bank’s financial performance. The bank then reduced the quantity of dollar loans to reduce the risk of a second crisis. BCA recently joined a stress test carried out by the Financial Services Authority (OJK) to gauge the impact of the depreciation of the rupiah on its financial performance. The test was based on a simulation of what would happen if the rupiah fell to Rp 14,000 per dollar. The rupiah fell 0.14 percent to close at Rp 13,787 per dollar on Thursday, based on data compiled by Bloomberg. Meanwhile, Indonesian currency reached 13,381 in the Wednesday afternoon trading session, the weakest level in 17 years since the 1998 Asian financial crisis. Dollar loans stood at US$1.5 billion, 5.7 percent of BCA’s total outstanding loans, which was Rp 347 trillion in the first half of the year, up 7.9 percent from the previous year Meanwhile, Sinarmas Sekuritas analyst Evan Lie Hadiwidjaja said that BCA had been conservative about its loan expansion, highlighting quality over loan portfolio growth to avoid non-performing loans (NPL). The bank’s NPL for the first half of the year stood at 0.7 percent, still under the average for the country’s banking sector, 2.5 percent. Meanwhile, publicly listed PermataBank also conducted a routine stress test to measure the bank’s capital resilience against the worsening economy. Among the factors tested were the performance of borrowers, loan-loss provision, NPLs, risk-weighted assets (RWA) and capital adequacy ratio (CAR). PermataBank’s president director Roy Arman Arfandy said the bank used different scenarios of rupiah value in the stress test. “The impact of the rupiah fluctuation on the bank’s NOP [net open position] is not significant to the bank’s performance, as the bank’s openness to foreign exchange is relatively small,” said Roy. He added that in the scenario where the rupiah stood at Rp 14,000 per dollar, the bank would not suffer significantly in its NPR, CAR and loan to deposit ratio (LDR). However, the rupiah depreciation would affect corporate borrowers, which are engaged in import activities, he said. The bank has taken measures to keep its financial performance intact, including a more careful approach to channel loans in the commodities and automotive sector to keep the NPL level down, as well as focus on the earnings from fee-based income. Its fee-based income increased by 34.9 percent to Rp 1.1 trillion in the first half of the year from Rp 815 billion in the same period last year. The increase was driven by bancassurance, trade finance, as well as its equity participation in PT Astra Sedaya Finance. Meanwhile, its net profit was up 5 percent to Rp 837 billion in the first half of the year, compared to Rp 801 billion last year. (fsu) 07 DEFINISI STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 2016-03-24 06:37 AM http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/ikhtisar/definisi/Contents/Default.aspx DEFINISI STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (SSK) sebenarnya belum memiliki definisi baku yang telah diterima secara internasional. Oleh karena itu, muncul beberapa definisi mengenai SSK yang pada intinya mengatakan bahwa suatu sistem keuangan memasuki tahap tidak stabil pada saat sistem tersebut telah membahayakan dan menghambat kegiatan ekonomi. Di bawah ini dikutip beberapa definisi SSK yang diambil dari berbagai sumber: ” Sistem keuangan yang stabil mampu mengalokasikan sumber dana dan menyerap kejutan (shock) yang terjadi sehingga dapat mencegah gangguan terhadap kegiatan sektor riil dan sistem keuangan.” ” Sistem keuangan yang stabil adalah sistem keuangan yang kuat dan tahan terhadap berbagai gangguan ekonomi sehingga tetap mampu melakukan fungsi intermediasi, melaksanakan pembayaran dan menyebar risiko secara baik.” ” Stabilitas sistem keuangan adalah suatu kondisi dimana mekanisme ekonomi dalam penetapan harga, alokasi dana dan pengelolaan risiko berfungsi secara baik dan mendukung pertumbuhan ekonomi.” Arti stabilitas sistem keuangan dapat dipahami dengan melakukan penelitian terhadap faktor-faktor yang dapat menyebabkan instabilitas di sektor keuangan. Ketidakstabilan sistem keuangan dapat dipicu oleh berbagai macam penyebab dan gejolak. Hal ini umumnya merupakan kombinasi antara kegagalan pasar, baik karena faktor struktural maupun perilaku. Kegagalan pasar itu sendiri dapat bersumber dari eksternal (internasional) dan internal (domestik). Risiko yang sering menyertai kegiatan dalam sistem keuangan antara lain risiko kredit, risiko likuiditas, risiko pasar dan risiko operasional. Meningkatnya kecenderungan globalisasi sektor finansial yang didukung oleh perkembangan teknologi menyebabkan sistem keuangan menjadi semakin terintegrasi tanpa jeda waktu dan batas wilayah. Selain itu, inovasi produk keuangan semakin dinamis dan beragam dengan kompleksitas yang semakin tinggi. Berbagai perkembangan tersebut selain dapat mengakibatkan sumbersumber pemicu ketidakstabilan sistem keuangan meningkat dan semakin beragam, juga dapat mengakibatkan semakin sulitnya mengatasi ketidakstabilan tersebut. Identifikasi terhadap sumber ketidakstabilan sistem keuangan umumnya lebih bersifat forward looking (melihat kedepan). Hal ini dimaksudkan untuk mengetahui potensi risiko yang akan timbul serta akan mempengaruhi kondisi sistem keuangan mendatang. Atas dasar hasil identifikasi tersebut selanjutnya dilakukan analisis sampai seberapa jauh risiko berpotensi menjadi semakin membahayakan, meluas dan bersifat sistemik sehingga mampu melumpuhkan perekonomian. DefinisiSSK.jpg Bagan – Hubungan antara stabilitas sistem keuangan dengan stabilitas moneter http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/ikhtisar/definisi/PublishingImages/DefinisiSSK.jpg 08 PENTINGNYA STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 2016-03-24 06:44 AM http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/ikhtisar/pentingnya/Contents/Default.aspx PENTINGNYA STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN Sistem keuangan memegang peranan yang sangat penting dalam perekonomian. Sebagai bagian dari sistem perekonomian, sistem keuangan berfungsi mengalokasikan dana dari pihak yang mengalami surplus kepada yang mengalami defisit. Apabila sistem keuangan tidak stabil dan tidak berfungsi secara efisien, pengalokasian dana tidak akan berjalan dengan baik sehingga dapat menghambat pertumbuhan ekonomi. Pengalaman menunjukkan, sistem keuangan yang tidak stabil, terlebih lagi jika mengakibatkan terjadinya krisis, memerlukan biaya yang sangat tinggi untuk upaya penyelamatannya. Pelajaran berharga pernah dialami Indonesia ketika terjadi krisis keuangan tahun 1998, dimana pada waktu itu biaya krisis sangat signifikan. Selain itu, diperlukan waktu yang lama untuk membangkitkan kembali kepercayaan publik terhadap sistem keuangan. Krisis tahun 1998 ini membuktikan bahwa stabilitas sistem keuangan merupakan aspek yang sangat penting dalam membentuk dan menjaga perekonomian yang berkelanjutan. Sistem keuangan yang tidak stabil cenderung rentan terhadap berbagai gejolak sehingga mengganggu perputaran roda perekonomian. Secara umum dapat dikatakan bahwa ketidakstabilan sistem keuangan dapat mengakibatkan timbulnya beberapa kondisi yang tidak menguntungkan seperti: Transmisi kebijakan moneter tidak berfungsi secara normal sehingga kebijakan moneter menjadi tidak efektif. Fungsi intermediasi tidak dapat berjalan sebagaimana mestinya akibat alokasi dana yang tidak tepat sehingga menghambat pertumbuhan ekonomi. Ketidakpercayaan publik terhadap sistem keuangan yang umumnya akan diikuti dengan perilaku panik para investor untuk menarik dananya sehingga mendorong terjadinya kesulitan likuiditas. Sangat tingginya biaya penyelamatan terhadap sistem keuangan apabila terjadi krisis yang bersifat sistemik. Atas dasar kondisi di atas, upaya untuk menghindari atau mengurangi risiko kemungkinan terjadinya ketidakstabilan sistem keuangan sangatlah diperlukan, terutama untuk menghindari kerugian yang begitu besar lagi. 06 KERANGKA STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 2016-03-23 03:29 PM http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/peran-bi/kerangka/Contents/Default.aspx KERANGKA STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN Dalam kapasitasnya menjaga stabilitas sistem keuangan, tidak seluruh cakupan dalam sistem keuangan berada dalam wewenang Bank Indonesia. Di sisi lain, sebagai sebuah sistem, stabilitas keuangan harus dilakukan secara utuh. Oleh karena itu, dalam menjaga stabilitas sistem keuangan secara menyeluruh diperlukan kerangka kerjasama dengan lembaga terkait yaitu pemerintah dan otoritas jasa keuangan. Hal ini dimaksudkan untuk menghindari duplikasi dan gesekan kepentingan dari masing-masing lembaga terkait. Gambaran umum kerangka stabilitas sistem keuangan ini dapat dijelaskan sebagai berikut: Misi dan Tujuan Penetapan misi dan tujuan dimaksudkan untuk memberikan landasan yang jelas bagi lembaga yang memonitor stabilitas sistem keuangan. Di banyak negara, misi untuk menjaga stabilitas keuangan dilakukan oleh bank sentral (misal: Inggris, Australia, Korea dan Malaysia). Di Indonesia sendiri, tugas ini sudah termasuk dalam tugas pokok Bank Indonesia, yaitu mencapai dan memelihara stabilitas Rupiah melalui stabilitas moneter dan didukung oleh stabilitas keuangan. Jadi dalam prakteknya, fungsi untuk menjaga stabilitas moneter tidak dapat terlepas dari fungsi menjaga stabilitas sistem keuangan. Strategi Dalam menjaga stabilitas sistem keuangan diperlukan strategi monitoring stabilitas sistem keuangan dan solusi bila terjadi krisis. Strategi tersebut mencakup koordinasi dan kerjasama, pemantauan, pencegahan krisis dan manajemen krisis. 1. Koordinasi dan kerjasama Upaya untuk menjaga stabilitas sistem keuangan, selain dilakukan oleh Bank Indonesia juga oleh instansi terkait lainnya. Jadi berbagai instrumen dalam stabilitas sistem keuangan, tidak hanya ditentukan oleh bank sentral, tetapi juga oleh otoritas lainnya. Untuk pengelolaan informasi dan efektivitas kebijakan dalam stabilisasi sistem keuangan, maka perlu adanya koordinasi antara lembaga tersebut. Hal ini dimaksudkan agar setiap kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh otoritas yang terlibat dalam stabilitas sistem keuangan, dapat terhindar dari pertentangan dan dampak negatif. Pengalaman di negara lain menunjukkan bahwa koordinasi sulit terjadi apabila fungsi pengawasan & pengaturan perbankan dipisahkan dari bank sentral. Namun jika pemisahan terpaksa harus dilakukan, maka koordinasi dapat dilakukan melalui pembentukan Forum Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan yang beranggotakan bank sentral (Bank Indonesia), otoritas pengawas sistem keuangan, dan pemerintah yang didukung oleh kekuatan hukum. 2. Pemantauan Pemantauan terhadap stabilitas keuangan penting dilakukan untuk mampu mengukur tekanan risiko yang akan timbul, khususnya gangguan yang bersifat sistemik atau dapat menciptakan krisis. Melalui deteksi dini ini, pencegahan terjadinya instabilitas keuangan yang mematikan perekonomian dapat dilakukan melalui kebijakan bank sentral maupun pemerintah. Pemantauan stabilitas keuangan merupakan tugas bank sentral yang merupakan satu kesatuan dalam menjaga stabilitas keuangan. Ada dua indikator utama yang menjadi target pemantauan, yakni indikator microprudential dan indikator makroekonomi. Kedua indikator tersebut saling melengkapi sebagai aksi dan reaksi dalam sistem keuangan dan ekonomi. Pemantauan indikator microprudential dilakukan terhadap kondisi mikro institusi keuangan dalam sistem keuangan. Melalui pemantauan ini dapat diketahui potensi risiko likuiditas, risiko pasar, risiko kredit dan rentabilitas institusi keuangan, yang dimaksudkan untuk mengukur ketahanan sistem keuangan. Pemantauan indikator makroekonomi juga perlu dilakukan terhadap kondisi makroekonomi domestik maupun internasional yang berdampak signifikan terhadap stabilitas keuangan. Berdasarkan hasil pemantauan tersebut, selanjutnya dilakukan analisis guna memprediksi kondisi stabilitas sistem keuangan. Indikator Pengukuran Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan Indikator microprudential (Agregat) Kecukupan modal § Rasio modal agregat Kualitas Aset Bagi Kreditur § Konsentrasi kredit secara sektoral § Pinjaman dalam mata uang asing § Pinjaman terhadap pihak terkait, kredit macet (NPL) dan pencadangannya Bagi Debitur § DER (rasio hutang thd modal), laba perusahaan Manajemen Sistem Keuangan yang Sehat § Pertumbuhan jumlah lembaga keuangan, dan lain-lain Pendapatan dan Keuntungan § ROA, ROE, dan rasio beban terhadap pendapatan Likuiditas § Kredit bank sentral kpd Lemb.Keu, LDR, struktur jangka waktu aset dan kewajiban Sensitivitas terhadap risiko pasar § Risiko nilai tukar, suku bunga dan harga saham Indikator berbasis pasar § Harga pasar instrumen keuangan, peringkat kredit, sovereign yield spread, dll. Indikator makroekonomi Pertumbuhan ekonomi § Tingkat pertumbuhan agregat § Sektor ekonomi yang jatuh BOP § Defisit neraca berjalan § Kecukupan cadangan devisa § Pinjaman luar negeri (termasuk struktur jangka waktu) § Term of trade § Komposisi dan jangka waktu aliran modal Inflasi § Volatilitas inflasi Suku Bunga dan Nilai Tukar § Volatilitas suku bunga dan nilai tukar § Tingkat suku bunga domestik § Stabilitas nilai tukar yang berkelanjutan § Jaminan nilai tukar Efek menular § Trade spillover § Korelasi pasar keuangan Faktor-faktor lain § Investasi dan pemberian pinjaman yang terarah § Dana pemerintah pada sistem perbankan § Hutang jatuh tempo 3. Pencegahan Krisis Pencegahan krisis dilakukan dengan cara mencegah ketidakstabilan dalam sistem keuangan. Terdapat berbagai langkah kebijakan untuk mengatasi ketidakstabilan dalam sistem keuangan. Langkah-langkah tersebut diadopsi dari standar/regulasi yang dikeluarkan oleh lembaga-lembaga internasional, seperti International Monetary fund (IMF), Bank for International Settlement (BIS), maupun asosiasi profesional lainnya. http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/peran-bi/kerangka/PublishingImages/gbr2.jpg 4. Manajemen krisis Meskipun pendekatan untuk mencegah timbulnya krisis cukup banyak, namun tidak ada jaminan bahwa krisis tidak akan terjadi lagi. Karena potensi terjadinya krisis selalu ada, maka perlu adanya pengelolaan krisis. Manajemen krisis ini berisi prosedur penyelesaian krisis dan kejelasan peran serta tanggung jawab dari masing-masing institusi yang terlibat didalamnya. Apabila suatu bank dinyatakan dalam kesulitan misalnya, maka diperlukan langkah-langkah di bawah ini: Institusi yang berwenang harus menetapkan apakah bank yang dinyatakan dalam kesulitan itu tergolong sistemik atau tidak. Proses penyelamatan harus ditetapkan secara hukum mengingat adanya penggunaan dana publik dalam proses penyelamatan tersebut. Peran Bank Indonesia, otoritas pengawasan, dan pemerintah harus ditetapkan secara jelas. 09 PERAN BANK INDONESIA DALAM STABILITAS KEUANGAN 2016-03-24 06:45 AM http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/peran-bi/peran/Contents/Default.aspx PERAN BANK INDONESIA DALAM STABILITAS KEUANGAN Sebagai otoritas moneter, perbankan dan sistem pembayaran, tugas utama Bank Indonesia tidak saja menjaga stabilitas moneter, namun juga stabilitas sistem keuangan (perbankan dan sistem pembayaran). Keberhasilan Bank Indonesia dalam menjaga stabilitas moneter tanpa diikuti oleh stabilitas sistem keuangan, tidak akan banyak artinya dalam mendukung pertumbuhan ekonomi yang berkelanjutan. Stabilitas moneter dan stabilitas keuangan ibarat dua sisi mata uang yang tidak dapat dipisahkan. Kebijakan moneter memiliki dampak yang signifikan terhadap stabilitas keuangan begitu pula sebaliknya, stabilitas keuangan merupakan pilar yang mendasari efektivitas kebijakan moneter. Sistem keuangan merupakan salah satu alur transmisi kebijakan moneter, sehingga bila terjadi ketidakstabilan sistem keuangan maka transmisi kebijakan moneter tidak dapat berjalan secara normal. Sebaliknya, ketidakstabilan moneter secara fundamental akan mempengaruhi stabilitas sistem keuangan akibat tidak efektifnya fungsi sistem keuangan. Inilah yang menjadi latar belakang mengapa stabilitas sistem keuangan juga masih merupakan tugas dan tanggung jawab Bank Indonesia. Pertanyaannya, bagaimana peranan Bank Indonesia dalam memelihara stabilitas sistem keuangan? Sebagai bank sentral, Bank Indonesia memiliki lima peran utama dalam menjaga stabilitas sistem keuangan. Kelima peran utama yang mencakup kebijakan dan instrumen dalam menjaga stabilitas sistem keuangan itu adalah: Pertama, Bank Indonesia memiliki tugas untuk menjaga stabilitas moneter antara lain melalui instrumen suku bunga dalam operasi pasar terbuka. Bank Indonesia dituntut untuk mampu menetapkan kebijakan moneter secara tepat dan berimbang. Hal ini mengingat gangguan stabilitas moneter memiliki dampak langsung terhadap berbagai aspek ekonomi. Kebijakan moneter melalui penerapan suku bunga yang terlalu ketat, akan cenderung bersifat mematikan kegiatan ekonomi. Begitu pula sebaliknya. Oleh karena itu, untuk menciptakan stabilitas moneter, Bank Indonesia telah menerapkan suatu kebijakan yang disebut inflation targeting framework. Kedua, Bank Indonesia memiliki peran vital dalam menciptakan kinerja lembaga keuangan yang sehat, khususnya perbankan. Penciptaan kinerja lembaga perbankan seperti itu dilakukan melalui mekanisme pengawasan dan regulasi. Seperti halnya di negaranegara lain, sektor perbankan memiliki pangsa yang dominan dalam sistem keuangan. Oleh sebab itu, kegagalan di sektor ini dapat menimbulkan ketidakstabilan keuangan dan mengganggu perekonomian. Untuk mencegah terjadinya kegagalan tersebut, sistem pengawasan dan kebijakan perbankan yang efektif haruslah ditegakkan. Selain itu, disiplin pasar melalui kewenangan dalam pengawasan dan pembuat kebijakan serta penegakan hukum (law enforcement) harus dijalankan. Bukti yang ada menunjukkan bahwa negara-negara yang menerapkan disiplin pasar, memiliki stabilitas sistem keuangan yang kokoh. Sementara itu, upaya penegakan hukum (law enforcement) dimaksudkan untuk melindungi perbankan dan stakeholder serta sekaligus mendorong kepercayaan terhadap sistem keuangan. Untuk menciptakan stabilitas di sektor perbankan secara berkelanjutan, Bank Indonesia telah menyusun Arsitektur Perbankan Indonesia dan rencana implementasi Basel II. Ketiga, Bank Indonesia memiliki kewenangan untuk mengatur dan menjaga kelancaran sistem pembayaran. Bila terjadi gagal bayar (failure to settle) pada salah satu peserta dalam sistem sistem pembayaran, maka akan timbul risiko potensial yang cukup serius dan mengganggu kelancaran sistem pembayaran. Kegagalan tersebut dapat menimbulkan risiko yang bersifat menular (contagion risk) sehingga menimbulkan gangguan yang bersifat sistemik. Bank Indonesia mengembangkan mekanisme dan pengaturan untuk mengurangi risiko dalam sistem pembayaran yang cenderung semakin meningkat. Antara lain dengan menerapkan sistem pembayaran yang bersifat real time atau dikenal dengan nama sistem RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement) yang dapat lebih meningkatkan keamanan dan kecepatan sistem pembayaran. Sebagai otoritas dalam sistem pembayaran, Bank Indonesia memiliki informasi dan keahlian untuk mengidentifikasi risiko potensial dalam sistem pembayaran. Keempat, melalui fungsinya dalam riset dan pemantauan, Bank Indonesia dapat mengakses informasi-informasi yang dinilai mengancam stabilitas keuangan. Melalui pemantauan secara macroprudential, Bank Indonesia dapat memonitor kerentanan sektor keuangan dan mendeteksi potensi kejutan (potential shock) yang berdampak pada stabilitas sistem keuangan. Melalui riset, Bank Indonesia dapat mengembangkan instrumen dan indikator macroprudential untuk mendeteksi kerentanan sektor keuangan. Hasil riset dan pemantauan tersebut, selanjutnya akan menjadi rekomendasi bagi otoritas terkait dalam mengambil langkah-langkah yang tepat untuk meredam gangguan dalam sektor keuangan. Kelima, Bank Indonesia memiliki fungsi sebagai jaring pengaman sistim keuangan melalui fungsi bank sentral sebagai lender of the last resort (LoLR). Fungsi LoLR merupakan peran tradisional Bank Indonesia sebagai bank sentral dalam mengelola krisis guna menghindari terjadinya ketidakstabilan sistem keuangan. Fungsi sebagai LoLR mencakup penyediaan likuiditas pada kondisi normal maupun krisis. Fungsi ini hanya diberikan kepada bank yang menghadapi masalah likuiditas dan berpotensi memicu terjadinya krisis yang bersifat sistemik. Pada kondisi normal, fungsi LoLR dapat diterapkan pada bank yang mengalami kesulitan likuiditas temporer namun masih memiliki kemampuan untuk membayar kembali. Dalam menjalankan fungsinya sebagai LoLR, Bank Indonesia harus menghindari terjadinya moral hazard. Oleh karena itu, pertimbangan risiko sistemik dan persyaratan yang ketat harus diterapkan dalam penyediaan likuiditas tersebut. inflation targeting framework http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/kerangka-kebijakan mekanisme pengawasan dan regulasi http://www.bi.go.id/id/peraturan/perbankan Arsitektur Perbankan Indonesia http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/arsitektur/struktur implementasi Basel II http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/implementasi-basel sistem pembayaran http://www.bi.go.id/id/sistem-pembayaran jaring pengaman sistim keuangan http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/manajemen-krisis/jaring-pengaman 10 FORUM STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 2016-03-24 06:50 AM http://www.bi.go.id/id/perbankan/ssk/forum/Contents/Default.aspx FORUM STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN Forum Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (FSSK) adalah forumkoordinasi, kerja sama dan pertukaran informasi antara otoritas yang berkepentingan dalam pemeliharaan stabilitas sistem keuangan Indonesia. Forum ini sangat diperlukan terutama dalam menghadapi risiko atau dampak sistemik, yang penyelesaiannya menuntut kebijakan dan pengambilan keputusan bersama secara efektif dan responsif. FSSK dibentuk pada tanggal 30 Desember 2005, berdasarkan Keputusan Bersama Menteri Keuangan, Gubernur Bank Indonesia, dan Ketua Dewan Komisioner Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan. Empat fungsi pokok FSSK, yakni : 1. Menunjang pelaksanaan tugas Komite Koordinasi dalam proses pengambilan keputusan terhadap Bank Bermasalah yang ditengarai sistemik; 2. Melakukan koordinasi dan tukar menukar informasi untuk sinkronisasi peraturan perundang-undangan dan ketentuan di bidang perbankan, lembaga keuangan non bank, dan pasar modal; 3. Membahas berbagai permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh lembaga-lembaga yang berkecimpung dalam sistem keuangan yang berpotensi sistemik berdasarkan informasi dari otoritas pengawas lembaga keuangan; 4. Mengkoordinasikan pelaksanaan atau persiapan inisiatif tertentu di sektor keuangan. Untuk memudahkan pelaksanaan keempat fungsi di atas, FSSK dikelompokkan dalam tiga jenjang, yakni: 1. Forum Pengarah, bertugas memberikan arahan kepada Forum Pelaksana mengenai fungsi pokok FSSK. Forum Pengarah terdiri dari 7 orang anggota, yakni 3 orang setingkat Direktur Jenderal (Dirjen) Departemen Keuangan, 3 orang anggota Dewan Gubernur Bank Indonesia dan 1 orang Kepala Eksekutif LPS. 2. Forum Pelaksana, bertugas melaksanakan fungsi pokok FSSK sesuai arahan dari Forum Pengarah terdiri dari 14 orang anggota, yakni 6 orang Direktur di Departemen Keuangan, 6 orang Direktur Bank Indonesia, dan 2 orang Direktur LPS. 3. Tim Kerja, berfungsi menunjang kelancaran tugas Forum Pengarah dan Forum Pelaksana, beranggotakan pejabat-pejabat dari Departemen Keuangan, BI dan LPS yang dibentuk berdasarkan usulan dari masing-masing lembaga dan keputusan Forum Pengarah. 11 SERBA-SERBI STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN 2016-03-24 06:50 AM SERBA-SERBI STABILITAS SISTEM KEUANGAN Tanggal Judul Hits 09-01-2015 Uji Daya Tahan Sistem Keuangan Indonesia, BI Lakukan Stress Test Secara Reguler 3910 28-10-2014 Siklus Keuangan Indonesia Mengindikasikan Perlambatan 3293 21-10-2014 Stress Test BI Menunjukkan Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan Indonesia Tetap Terjaga Menghadapi Risiko Capital Outflow 3022 12-09-2014 Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan : Likuiditas dan Risiko Kredit Perbankan Indonesia Masih Terkendali 3467 the1uploader 10:06 am on 2016-03-20 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/03/20/negative-interest-rate-policy-as-they-say/)
Negative interest rate policy, as they say Krisis Finansil Cina: Perspektif Kebijakan Moneter, Corporate Finance (Analisa Laporan Keuangan), dan Investment Banking (Valuasi Nilai) oleh : Sando Sasako Jakarta, 28 Maret 2016 ISBN 978-602-73508-5-4 Untuk mendapatkan buku ini, silahkan hubungi kami di +62 851 0518 7118
Daftar Isi Kata Pengantar iii Kata Pengantar dalam buku ‘Corporate Financing’ v Daftar Isi vii Daftar Tabel x Daftar Bagan xi Pendahuluan 1 Masalah Pengukuran 1 Data, Informasi, Fakta 2 Data Mining 4 Pemilahan Data 5 Business Intelligence 7 Analisa Kuantitatif 8 Analisa Data 8 Self-Organising Map 9 Hambatan bagi Efektivitas Analisa Data 11 Confirmatory Data Analysis 11 Analisa Finansil 11 Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK, GAAP, IFRS) 12 Peran Perusahaan Audit dalam PSAK 12 Analisa Finansil sebagai Alat Ukur Kinerja Keuangan 12 Analisa Fundamental 13 Rasio-rasio Finansil 14 Pertumbuhan 14 Produktivitas 14 Kontribusi terhadap Stakeholder 14 Dividend Policy Ratios 14 Rasio-rasio Aktivitas Usaha 15 Perputaran aset (asset turnover) 15 Perputaran aset rata-rata (asset turnover) 15 Rasio perputaran aset tetap (fixed assets turnover) 15 Perputaran piutang (receivables turnover) 16 Rata-rata periode penagihan (average collection period) 16 Perputaran inventaris (inventory turnover) 16 Periode inventaris (inventory period) 16 Rasio-rasio Likuiditas 17 Rasio lancar (current ratio, CR) 17 Rasio modal kerja (working capital ratio) 18 Rasio cepat (quick ratio, QR) 18 Rasio kas (cash ratio) 18 Pendapatan lancar (current income) 19 Rasio pendapatan bunga (Time Interest Earned, Interest Coverage) 19 Rasio investasi terhadap kebijakan (investment to policy ratio) 19 Rasio utang lancar terhadap inventaris (current debts to inventory ratio) 19 Rasio-rasio Profitabilitas 19 Marjin laba kotor (gross profit margin) 20 Marjin laba bersih (net profit margin) 20 Return on Equity (ROE) 20 Return on Asset (ROA) dan Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 20 Return on Capital (ROC) dan Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 21 Return on Investment (ROI) 21 Beban bunga (Interest Coverage, Times Interest Earned) 22 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 22 Efisiensi beban finansil (efficiency of financial leverage) 22 Rasio-rasio Struktur Modal 23 Rasio utang terhadap modal (debt to equity ratio) 23 Rasio kapitalisasi (capitalisation ratio) 24 Tingkat pertumbuhan ekuitas (equity growth rate) 24 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 24 Rasio utang (debt ratio) 24 Rasio modal saham terhadap aset tetap bersih 24 Rasio utang lancar terhadap modal saham (Current Debts to Net Worth Ratio) 24 Rasio kewajiban total terhadap modal saham (Total Liabilities to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio aset tetap terhadap modal saham (Fixed Assets to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio-rasio Kecukupan Modal 25 Solvabilitas 25 Solvency ratio (SR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap aset (Debt to Asset Ratio, DAR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap modal (Debt to Equity Ratio, DER) 26 Kemampuan laba menutup biaya tetap (Fixed Charge Coverage). 26 Rasio pinjaman terhadap aset (Loan to Asset Ratio, LAR) 27 Rasio pinjaman terhadap simpanan (Loan to Deposit Ratio, LDR) 27 Risks vs Rewards 27 Risiko Mencari Keuntungan 28 Efek Domino Risiko 29 Rent-Seeking Behaviours 30 When the Deal Slips Away 32 Indikator Kesulitan Finansil 34 Indeks Kerentanan 36 Stress Test 38 Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan 40 Financial Stability Index 43 Indeks Kesehatan Finansil ala IMF 44 Laporan Stabilitas Finansil Global ala IMF 48 Operasi Moneter 48 Inflasi Terencana sebagai Prasyarat Kestabilan Finansil 50 Dinamika Pasar Finansil 52 Dinamika Aset Finansil 53 Kerapuhan Sistem Finansil 54 Krisis Finansil 55 Menelikung Krisis Finansil 56 Kasus LTCM 57 Krisis Subprime Mortgage 60 Kasus Lehman Brothers 63 Krisis Eurozone 64 Spiral Kekacauan Krisis Eurozone 65 Debt Exposures of PIGS 66 AS 68 Inggris 69 Jerman 69 Perancis 70 Jepang 71 Yunani 72 Irlandia 73 Italia 74 Portugis 74 Spanyol 75 Some PIGS are More PIGS 76 Krisis Finansil Cina 77 Kenapa Cina menjadi begitu penting? 78 Bermain dengan nilai tukar 81 Pasar CNH 82 Dominansi nilai tukar CNH terhadap CNY 87 Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 91 Qualified Domestic Individual Investor 91 Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect 91 Pilot Free Trade Zones 91 Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds 92 Kenapa pasar finansil Cina bisa crash? 92 Ketika gelembung finansil Cina mulai pecah 93 Pelonggaran likuiditas sebagai solusi ancaman resesi 94 Aksi pemadam kebakaran ala pemerintah Cina 96 Permasalahan fundamental ekonomi Cina 99 Beban utang Cina 101 Kebijakan dan otoritas moneter Cina 102 Pasar obligasi Cina 103 Obligasi Panda 105 Obligasi dim sum 106 Daftar emisi obligasi dim sum 108 Aksi pemerintah Cina terhadap masalah tunggakan utang 110 Policy and Politicisation 113 Primary Dealer 113 Solusi Teoritis, Bisa dan Benarkah? 116 Kebijakan Too Big To Fail 117 Cashless Solution 118 Minyak sebagai Mata Uang dan Sumber Kemakmuran 120 Negative Interest Rates Policy 125 Kas 129 Pengadaan Aset 130 Asset Investment 130 Asset Financing 131 Capital Expenditures 132 Menghitung Biaya Modal 134 Biaya utang 134 Biaya saham preferensi 134 Biaya laba ditahan 134 Biaya ekuitas eksternal 135 WACC 135 Biaya modal marjinal 136 Break point 136 Off-Balance Sheet Financing 136 Perubahan Portofolio The Fed 136 OBS sebagai Produk Inovasi Menyembunyikan Risiko Finansil 137 MBS sebagai Produk Rekayasa Finansil Penyebab Krisis 2008 139 Bencana Prilaku Berisiko Berlebihan 141 Bertaruh pada Aset Fiktif 142 Akuntansi OBS 144 Fleksibilitas Pasal Karet 145 Penyesuaian Pasal Karet 146 Memanfaatkan Celah Hukum 147 Equity Financing 148 Debt Financing 149 Struktur Modal 152 Teori Struktur Modal 153 Teori Pensinyalan 154 Struktur Modal dalam Praktek dan Realitas 155 Menghitung Tingkat Optimal Struktur Modal 155 Besar Beban Operasi 156 Analisis EBIT/EPS terhadap Efek Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Total 158 Efek Struktur Modal terhadap Harga Saham dan Biaya Modal 159 Likuiditas dan Arus Kas 159 Struktur Finansil 160 Ukuran Optimal Beban/Struktur Finansil 161 Valuasi Nilai 162 Corporate Financing vs Investment Banking 163 Pentingnya Valuasi Nilai 164 Valuasi Usaha 164 Komponen Pendapatan 166 Komponen Neraca 167 Komponen Arus Kas 167 Time Value of Money 168 Future Value 169 Future Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Present Value 169 Present Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Future Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 169 Future Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Future Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Perpetuities 171 Present Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Periode Semesteran atau lainnya 171 Amortisasi Pinjaman 172 Referensi 173 Web 173 e-book 177 Buku 180 Daftar Lampiran Lampiran – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 183 Lampiran – Ukuran dan skenario dalam laporan stabilitas finansil global, Okt. 2015 185 Ukuran likuiditas 185 Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 187 Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Lampiran – Ukuran Kerentanan Finansil 193 Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Lampiran – Daftar Indikator dalam ISSK Bank Indonesia 197 Lampiran – Profil Cina 199 Lampiran – Jumlah (instrumen) utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 201 Daftar Tabel Table 1 – Aktivitas M&A di business intelligence dengan nilai >$100 juta, 2009-2014q1 7 Table 2 – Beberapa indikator kebijakan macroprudential 36 Table 3 – Indikator pengukuran stabilitas sistem keuangan 42 Table 4 – Indikator utama kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 5 – Indikator tambahan (encouraged) bagi kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 6 – Indikator parsial dan bobot dalam indeks stabilitas perbankan Republik Ceko 47 Table 7 – Indikator kesehatan finansil ala ECS (Macro-Prudential Indicators) 47 Table 8 – Tiga skenario stabilitas finansil 48 Table 9 – Operasi moneter menurut standing facility 49 Table 10 – Pentingnya likuiditas yang lentur (resilient) 50 Table 11 – Penambahan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 12 – Penyerapan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 13 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk 5 produk utama, 2014-2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 14 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk produk teknologi tinggi, 2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 15 – PDB Cina, 2010-2014 dalam milyaran dan US$ 101 Table 16 – Nilai obligasi pemerintah dan korporasi di Cina, 2002-2015 (US$ milyar) 101 Table 17 – Buletin harga obligasi di pasar uang Hong Kong, 11 Maret 2016 107 Table 18 – Daftar 22 primary dealer di Amerika Serikat, 2014 114 Table 19 – Beberapa veteran primary dealer pilihan Bank Sentral Amerika 114 Table 20 – Daftar 19 primary dealer di Indonesia, 2014-2015 115 Table 21 – Nilai derivatif 25 bank terbesar di AS, Nov. 2015 (US$ milyar) 119 Table 22 – Ringkasan Perlakuan Transaksi Sekuritisasi menurut UK GAAP 145 Table 23 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Table 24 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Table 25 – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 184 Table 26 – Ukuran likuiditas 186 Table 27 – Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 188 Table 28 – Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Table 29 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Table 30 – Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Table 31 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Table 32 – Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Table 33 – Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Table 34 – Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Table 35 – Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Table 36 – Daftar indikator pembentuk ISSK 197 Table 37 – Profil Singkat Cina 199 Table 38 – Indikator Ekonomi Cina, 2011-2017 200 Table 39 – Utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 202 Daftar Bagan Figure 1 – Diagram alur hierarki DIKW (Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom) 3 Figure 2 – Kontinuum pemahaman dalam konteks DIKW 3 Figure 3 – Proses data mining 4 Figure 4 – Hubungan antara Data, Informasi, dan Intelijen 6 Figure 5 – Analisa eksplorasi data 9 Figure 6 – Taksonomi ketidakpastian 27 Figure 7 – Igloo ketidakpastian 28 Figure 8 – PV perusahaan berutang 32 Figure 9 – Skema indeks kerentanan dan komponennya 37 Figure 10 – Siklus pengawasan macroprudential 38 Figure 11 – Prasyarat bagi antisipasi dan pencegahan ketidakstabilan sistem finansil 39 Figure 12 – Hubungan antara stabilitas sistem finansil dan stabilitas moneter 39 Figure 13 – Keterkaitan antar-variabel dalam BAMBI (Banking Model of Bank Indonesia) 41 Figure 14 – Beberapa indikator pembentuk Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (ISSK) 42 Figure 15 – Peran Bank Indonesia dalam menciptakan stabilitas moneter 49 Figure 16 – Bentuk interaksi antara BI, pempus, dan pemda dalam mengendalikan inflasi 51 Figure 17 – Perkembangan aktivitas perbankan internasional 52 Figure 18 – Aset Riel dan Aset Fiktif Bank-bank di AS, 1995–2000 58 Figure 19 – Nilai Derivatif dan Modal 25 Bank AS Ternama (US$ milyar) 59 Figure 20 – CDOs direpresentasikan dalam bentuk building blocks, The Big Short, 2015 60 Figure 21 – Pasar rumah di AS, 1989-2006 61 Figure 22 – Pemetaan proses penularan krisis finansil 2008 62 Figure 23 – Pinjaman sektoral dari Bank of England, 1997-2012 63 Figure 24 – Utang-piutang PIGS 67 Figure 25 – Utang AS ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 68 Figure 26 – Utang Inggris ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 69 Figure 27 – Utang Jerman ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 70 Figure 28 – Utang Perancis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 29 – Utang Jepang ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 30 – Utang Yunani ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 72 Figure 31 – Utang Irlandia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 73 Figure 32 – Utang Italia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 74 Figure 33 – Utang Portugis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 75 Figure 34 – Utang Spanyol ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 76 Figure 35 – Cadangan Devisa Cina, Des. 1999 – Jan. 2016 78 Figure 36 – Tiga Kekuatan Ekonomi Dunia 79 Figure 37 – Nilai perdagangan Cina dengan negara lain (impor + ekspor) 80 Figure 38 – Nilai tukar bilateral yuan terhadap 3 mata uang dunia, USD, ¥, dan €. 81 Figure 39 – Cadangan devisa Cina dan nilai tukar CNY dan CNH 83 Figure 40 – Selisih CNY dengan CNH, Agustus 2010-Januari 2016 83 Figure 41 – Selisih tajam antara CNY dan CNH berdampak pada lonjakan bunga antar-bank di bulan Januari 2016 84 Figure 42 – Intervensi pasar CNH bisa menyesuaikan bunga CNH dengan CNY, 20151110-20160126 85 Figure 43 – Pasar deposit CNH, Maret 2009 – Des. 2015 86 Figure 44 – Distribusi CNH menurut bank sentral (offshore yuan’s swap line), Nov. 2015 88 Figure 45 – Penyelesaian perdagangan dalam CNH, 2009Q3-2015Q4 89 Figure 46 – Pasar deposit CNH menurut negara, 2014 89 Figure 47 – Beberapa alternatif indikator pertumbuhan ekonomi Cina mengacu pada penurunan yang lebih besar (greater slowdown), 2010–2015 95 Figure 48 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai (SCI), Mei 2015 sampai 5 Februari 2016 97 Figure 49 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai, 1 Januari 2015 – 8 Maret 2016 98 Figure 50 – Triple policy trilemma 99 Figure 51 – Pasar obligasi Cina, 2003-2014 104 Figure 52 – Aktivitas perdagangan pasar sekunder obligasi Cina, 2000-2014 104 Figure 53 – Pangsa pasar obligasi Cina menurut jenis obligasi, Des. 2014 104 Figure 54 – Daftar emisi obligasi Panda, 20151010-20160121 106 Figure 55 – Emisi obligasi CNY, 2008-2015 111 Figure 56 – Emisi obligasi CNH, 2008-2015 111 Figure 57 – Asset backed securities di Cina, 2005-2014 112 Figure 58 – Peristiwa bersejarah dan harga minyak mentah, 1861-2014 (US$/b) 121 Figure 59 – Harga minyak mentah Brent (US$), 20040102-20160106 123 Figure 60 – Kelebihan pasokan minyak mentah dunia, 2012q3-2015q3 123 Figure 61 – Distribusi ladang produksi minyak shale AS, April 2015 124 Figure 62 – Suku bunga deposito dan pembiayaan ulang ECB, 2008-Maret 2016 127 Figure 63 – Prediksi nilai tengah suku bunga Federal Funds, Des. 2015-2019 127 Figure 64 – Federal funds target rata (%), 1983-2015 128 Figure 65 – Federal funds rate, 1 Juli 1954-18 Feb. 2016 128 Figure 66 – Skema sumber pendanaan perusahaan 130 Figure 67 – Factors adding to reserves and off balance sheet securities lending program 137 Figure 68 – Multiplikasi Penciptaan Aset Fiktif 143 Figure 69 – Klasifikasi struktur aset, struktur finansil, dan struktur kapital 161 20160320 Sunday, 20 March 2016 10 20160314 Here’s Why Negative Interest Rates Are More Dangerous Than You Think 2016-03-20 10:06 PM http://fortune.com/2016/03/20/foxconn-lowering-offer-for-japans-sharp/ Here’s Why Negative Interest Rates Are More Dangerous Than You Think Charles Kane, March 14, 2016, 1:00 AM EDT Europe and other parts of the world are in for big risks. Desperate times call for desperate and somewhat speculative measures. The European Central Bank (ECB) cut its deposit rate last Thursday, pushing it deeper into negative territory. The move is not unprecedented. In 2009, Sweden’s Riksbank was the first central bank to utilize negative interest rates to bolster its economy, with the ECB, Danish National Bank, Swiss National Bank and, this past January, the Bank of Japan, all following suit. The ECB’s latest move, however, was coupled with the announcement that it would also ramp its Quantitative Easing measures by increasing its monthly bond purchases to 80 billion Euros from 60 billion Euros – a highly aggressive policy shift. The fact that the ECB has adopted this approach raises two key questions: What are the risks? And, if the policy fails, what other options are left? Negative rates are an attempt by the ECB to prod commercial banks to lend more money to businesses and consumers rather than maintain large balances with the Central Bank. In essence, it is forcing the banks to leverage its balance sheet to a higher level or the ECB will penalize the banks by charging interest on their deposits. Historically, such a practice would be highly inflationary, however, with oil prices falling to record lows combined with a slowdown in global growth, inflation is not feared. In fact, inflation is desired at a manageable level, as this would promote near-term growth in the economic markets. Read more: Mario Draghi Is Losing His Magic http://fortune.com/2016/03/10/draghi-ecb-euro-qe-rates/ This does not mean, however, that the ECB’s policy does not present risks. First, if the commercial banks decide to pass on the cost of the negative rates to their customers – in other words, they charge customers for keeping their savings in the bank in the same way central banks are now charging the commercial banks for keeping their money – the customers might simply withdraw their savings. In a worst-case scenario, this could create a run on the banks in Europe with customers hoarding their money rather than paying interest on deposits. This would inhibit the free flow of funds through the financial system – ironically, the very reason that negative interest rates were implemented in the first place. Conversely, if the banks continue to absorb the costs, it could cut deeply into their profits. Even a tenth of a percent on billions of dollars adds up and can mean the difference in profit or loss in a major commercial bank. To date, the effect negative interest rates have had on bank profits have put downward pressure on the majority of bank stocks, which in turn, has depressed the European and global equity markets. Negative interest rates also have a profound impact on the foreign exchange markets. Interest rate differentials from one currency to another drive the future value of currencies and as the ECB lowers rates into more negative levels, this puts downward pressure on the European Currency Unit (ECU). This may improve near-term EC trade exports from the region. However, capital flight from the lower interest rate ECU markets to more favorable returns in positive interest rate currencies is inevitable over time. Additionally, the U.S. Fed has clearly stated its intent to raise rates over the next year to eighteen months, thereby making the interest differential gap even greater and thus downward pressure on the ECU even more pronounced. Read more: Japan’s Negative Interest Rates Are Driving Up Sales of Safes http://fortune.com/2016/03/10/draghi-ecb-euro-qe-rates/ Something has to give and the ECB is painting itself into a corner with very few options left. The European banks (most vocally, the German banks) are already objecting to current negative interest rate levels; the Euro continues to be negatively pressured by lower rates relative to other currencies due to interest rate differentials; and Quantitive Easing measures, a practice that was shunned by the ECB when the U.S. did its first round of Quantitative Easing in the 2007-2008 timeframe, has been ramped up by the ECB with no apparent material impact on economic growth. All in all, negative interest rates are not spurring economic growth and are likely to damage the banking sector in Europe if deployed for an extended period. Market stability, tantamount to improving long-term growth prospects, cannot be achieved by testing aggressive and relatively unknown monetary practices such as negative interest rates. Rather, further interest rate adjustments downward by the ECB will seriously hurt the European banking industry – in turn, increasing instability in the European markets. In short, pursuing a negative interest rate policy will most likely hurt economic growth in Europe, not help it. In the face of continually lowering growth estimates, persistently high unemployment, and a possible Brexit, this is the last thing Europe needs. Charles Kane is a senior lecturer in international finance and entrepreneurial studies at the MIT Sloan School of Management. Sunday, 20 March 2016 01 Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP) 2016-03-20 09:28 PM http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/negative-interest-rate-policy-nirp.asp Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP) What is a ‘Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP)’ A negative interest rate policy (NIRP) is an unconventional monetary policy tool whereby nominal target interest rates are set with a negative value, below the theoretical lower bound of zero percent. BREAKING DOWN ‘Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP)’ During deflationary periods, people and businesses hoard money instead of spending and investing. The result is a collapse in aggregate demand which leads to prices falling even farther, a slowdown or halt in real production and output, and an increase in unemployment. A loose or expansionary monetary policy is usually employed to deal with such economic stagnation. However, if deflationary forces are strong enough, simply cutting the central bank’s interest rate to zero may not be sufficient to stimulate borrowing and lending. (See also: How Interest Rates Can Go Negative.) A negative interest rate means the central bank and perhaps private banks will charge negative interest: instead of receiving money on deposits, depositors must pay regularly to keep their money with the bank. This is intended to incentivize banks to lend money more freely and businesses and individuals to invest, lend, and spend money rather than pay a fee to keep it safe. Examples An example of a negative interest rate policy would be to set the key rate at – 0.2%, such that bank depositors would have to pay twotenths of a percent on their deposits instead of receiving any sort of positive interest. The Swiss government ran a de facto negative interest rate regime in the early 1970s to counter its currency appreciation due to investors fleeing inflation in other parts of the world. In 2009 and 2010 Sweden and in 2012 Denmark used negative interest rates to stem hot money flows into their economies. In 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) instituted a negative interest rate that only applied to bank deposits intended to prevent the Eurozone from falling into a deflationary spiral. Theoretically, targeting interest rates below zero will reduce the costs to borrow for companies and households, driving demand for loans and incentivizing investment and consumer spending. Retail banks may choose to internalize the costs associated with negative interest rates by paying them, which will negatively impact profits, rather than passing the costs to small depositors for fear that otherwise they will move their deposits into cash. (For more, see: Negative Interest Rates and QE: 3 Economic Risks.) Though fears that bank customers and banks would move all their money holdings into cash (or M1) did not materialize, there is some evidence to suggest that negative interest rates in Europe cut down interbank loans. To stay on top of the latest finance and investing lingo, subscribe to our Term of the Day newsletter. Sunday, 20 March 2016 02 20131205 Negative Interest Rates 2016-03-20 09:29 PM http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/negative-interest-rates Negative Interest Rates Less Than Zero By Jana Randow and Simon Kennedy First Published Dec. 5, 2013 Updated Mar 18, 2016 2:56 AM EDT Imagine a bank that pays negative interest. Depositors are actually charged to keep their money in an account. Crazy as it sounds, several of Europe’s central banks have cut key interest rates below zero and kept them there for more than a year. Now Japan is trying it, too. For some, it’s a bid to reinvigorate an economy with other options exhausted. Others want to push foreigners to move their money somewhere else. Either way, it’s an unorthodox choice that has distorted financial markets and triggered warnings that the strategy could backfire. If negative interest rates work, however, they may mark the start of a new era for the world’s central banks. The Situation The Bank of Japan surprised markets by adopting negative interest rates in January, more than a year and a half after the European Central Bank became the first major institution of its kind to venture below zero. With other options to stimulate the economy limited, more policy makers are willing to test the technique. They acknowledge that sub-zero rates can crimp the ability of banks to make money or lead them to take additional risks in search of profit. The ECB cut rates again March 10, charging banks 0.4 percent to hold their cash overnight. At the same time, it offered a premium to banks that borrow in order to extend more loans. Sweden also has negative rates, Denmark is using them to protect its currency’s peg to the euro and last year Switzerland moved its deposit rate below zero for the first time since the 1970s. Janet Yellen, the U.S. Federal Reserve chair, said in November that a change in economic circumstances could put negative rates “on the table” in the U.S. Since central banks provide a benchmark for all borrowing costs, negative rates spread to a range of fixed-income securities. By February, more than $7 trillion of government bonds worldwide offered yields below zero. That means investors buying bonds and holding to maturity won’t get all their money back. While most banks have been reluctant to pass on negative rates for fear of losing customers, a few began to charge large depositors. http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/content/uploads/sites/2/2013/12/189736-20160318064942000000000.png Source: Bloomberg The Background Negative interest rates are an act of desperation, a signal that traditional policy options have proved ineffective and new limits need to be explored. They punish banks that hoard cash instead of extending loans to businesses or to weaker lenders. Rates below zero have never been used before in an economy as large as the euro area. While it’s still too early to tell if they will work, ECB President Mario Draghi said in January 2016 that there are “no limits” on what he will do to meet his mandate. Europe’s central bank chose to experiment with negative rates before turning to a bond-buying program like those used in the U.S. and Japan. Policy makers in both Europe and Japan are trying to prevent a slide back into deflation, or a spiral of falling prices that could derail the economic recovery. The euro zone is also grappling with a shortage of credit and unemployment is only slowly receding from its highest level since the currency bloc was formed in 1999. http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/content/uploads/sites/2/2016/03/ecb_rates_cs_031016_preupdate_cs6.png Source: European Central Bank The Argument In theory, interest rates below zero should reduce borrowing costs for companies and households, driving demand for loans. In practice, there’s a risk that the policy might do more harm than good. If banks make more customers pay to hold their money, cash may go under the mattress instead, robbing lenders of a crucial source of funding. But there’s mounting concern that when banks absorb the cost of negative rates themselves, that squeezes the profit margin between their lending and deposit rates, and might make them even less willing to lend. The Bank for International Settlements warned in a March 2016 report of “great uncertainty” if rates stay negative for a prolonged period. And if more and more central banks use negative rates as a stimulus tool, there’s concern the policy might ultimately lead to a currency war of competitive devaluations. The Reference Shelf A Bloomberg comic explains how negative interest rates aim to put money to work. The Bank for International Settlements published a March 2016 report on negative rates. An analysis of the impact of negative rates in 2015 from Sweden’s central bank. Blog posts from Francesco Papadia, a former director general for market operations at the ECB, on whether the central bank should have negative rates, and a discussion about where rates could go. A speech by Benoit Coeure, a member of the ECB Executive Board, on monetary policy and the challenges of the zero lower bound. A Bloomberg News article outlining the pros and cons of a deposit rate of zero or below and a QuickTake on the ECB’s debate over quantitative easing. An ECB research paper on non-standard monetary policy and a Bank of England study of negative rates. To receive a free monthly QuickTake newsletter, sign up at http://www.bloombergbriefs.com/quicktake To contact the writers of this QuickTake: Jana Randow in Washington at
[email protected] Simon Kennedy in London at
[email protected] To contact the editor responsible for this QuickTake: Leah Harrison Singer at
[email protected] unorthodox http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-18/larry-summers-has-a-wintry-outlook-on-the-economy distorted https://medium.com/bull-market/apple-just-proved-that-the-zero-lower-bound-still-exists-4f5402b97e43 new era http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-11/negative-interest-rates-the-new-normal-next-time-economies-slump surprised http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-29/yen-tumbles-more-than-2-as-boj-adopts-negative-interest-rates adopting http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-29/bank-of-japan-adopts-negative-interest-rates-by-vote-of-5-4 crimp http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-09/draghi-has-banking-chiefs-bemoaning-ecb-s-negative-rate-push additional risks http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-02/ubs-s-ermotti-says-negative-rates-may-encourage-risky-lending charging banks http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/draghi-sees-ecb-done-for-now-on-rates-with-kitchen-sinkstimulus Denmark http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/fx-speculators-seen-driving-denmark-to-test-world-s-lowest-rate Switzerland http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-18/snb-starts-negative-interest-rate-of-0-25-to-stave-off-inflows on the table http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-04/yellen-signals-solid-economy-would-lead-to-december-rate-hike benchmark http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-24/metal-manipulation-and-negative-rates range of fixed-income securities http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-13/money-for-nothing-and-company-cash-for-free more than $7 trillion http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-09/world-s-negative-yielding-bond-pile-tops-7-trillion-chart reluctant http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-28/nordea-bank-may-charge-clients-for-deposits-amid-negative-rates a few http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/julius-baer-charges-institutional-clients-for-snb-negative-rate desperation http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-22/the-great-negative-rates-experiment proved ineffective http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-18/larry-summers-has-a-wintry-outlook-on-the-economy extending http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-07/the-european-bank-s-underwhelming-surprise.html will http://research.nordeamarkets.com/en/2013/12/04/euro-area-viewpoint-qa-on-negative-ecb-deposit-rate/ no limits http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-21/draghi-says-ecb-may-ramp-up-stimulus-in-march-on-global-risks unemployment http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-29/euro-area-unemployment-unexpectedly-drops-amid-recovery.html theory http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/02/economist-explains-15 risk http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/yellen-sees-chance-fed-could-cut-rate-it-pays-banks-on-reserves.html cash http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/treasurycommittee/ir/tsc160513.pdf profit margin http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-10/ubs-doubles-dividend-as-fourth-quarter-profit-beats-estimates report https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603e.htm concern http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-26/carney-warns-g-20-against-zero-sum-game-of-negative-rates currency war http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/currency-wars explains http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-central-banks/#1 report https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603e.htm https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603e.pdf analysis http://www.riksbank.se/Documents/Rapporter/Ekonomiska_kommentarer/2015/rap_ek_kom_nr11_150929_eng.pdf should have negative rates http://moneymatters-monetarypolicy.blogspot.de/2013/11/should-ecb-go-negative.html where rates could go http://moneymatters-monetarypolicy.blogspot.de/2014/05/where-could-ecb-interest-rates-go.html#more speech http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120219.en.html pros and cons http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-26/draghi-may-enter-twilight-zone-where-bernanke-fears-to-tread.html QuickTake http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/europes-qe-quandry/ non-standard http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1528.pdf study http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/treasurycommittee/ir/tsc160513.pdf Japan 10-Year Yield Drops to Record, Below Negative Deposit Rate http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-18/japan-10year-yield-drops-to-record-below-negative-deposit-rate Draghi Sees ECB Done for Now on Rates With Kitchen-Sink Stimulus http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/draghisees-ecb-done-for-now-on-rates-with-kitchen-sink-stimulus Draghi Has Banking Chiefs Bemoaning ECB’s Negative-Rate Push http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-09/draghi-hasbanking-chiefs-bemoaning-ecb-s-negative-rate-push The $5 Trillion Quandary as Negative-Yielding Japan Debt Doubles http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-07/the-5trillion-quandary-as-negative-yielding-japan-debt-doubles Negative Interest Rates Are Working Just Fine So Far, BIS Shows http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-06/negativeinterest-rates-are-working-just-fine-so-far-bis-shows Sunday, 20 March 2016 02a 20160306 Negative Interest Rates Are Working Just Fine So Far: BIS 2016-03-20 09:42 PM http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-06/negative-interest-rates-are-working-just-fine-so-far-bis-shows Negative Interest Rates Are Working Just Fine So Far: BIS Jeff Black Jeffrey_Black March 6, 2016 – 6:00 AM EST * Study finds few negative effects on money markets or cash use * Pass-through of mildly negative rates similar to normal rates Negative interest-rate policies currently in use by central banks around the world have worked through their respective systems in much the same way as positive rates, though it’s not known how far below zero that would continue to be the case, the Bank for International Settlements said. In its quarterly report published Sunday, the Basel-based “central bank for central banks” said that “so far, zero has not proved to be a technically binding lower limit for central bank policy rates.” “Nonetheless, there is great uncertainty about the behavior of individuals and institutions if rates were to decline further into negative territory or remain negative for a prolonged period,” it said. “It is unknown whether the transmission mechanisms will continue to operate as in the past and not be subject to ‘tipping points.”‘ QuickTake Negative Interest Rates The BIS’s verdict on negative rates gives backing to the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and others at a time when such unconventional methods are facing increasing criticism for their potential impact on the financial industry and currency markets. A sell-off in European bank stocks this year was partly driven by fears that further rate cuts by the ECB would damage profitability in a sector still recovering from the debt crisis. Policy Transmission “The experience so far suggests that modestly negative policy rates are transmitted to money-market rates in very much the same way as positive rates are,” report authors Morten Bech and Aytek Malkhozov said. “Anecdotal evidence suggests banks seek to avoid negative rates by either extending maturities or lending to riskier counterparties.” The report also presented calculations of the average effective rate that banks pay on cash above the minimum requirements or exemptions at the ECB, the Swiss National Bank, the Riksbank and the Danish central bank, showing that a lower negative policy rate doesn’t necessarily translate into a more expensive proposition for lenders. For example, while Switzerland’s central bank has the lowest policy rate at minus 75 basis points, the exemption of some deposits means that the average rate is only minus 27 basis points. http://assets.bwbx.io/images/ia3XzDSc7e4c/v2/488x-1.png Fears that interest rates below zero would prompt banks or the public to withdraw and hoard cash rather than pay penalties so far haven’t materialized in any jurisdiction, according to the report. This is partly due to banks’ “reluctance to pass negative rates through to retail depositors,” with the exception of Switzerland, where some lenders actually increased mortgage rates to mitigate some of the costs incurred at the central bank. “The Swiss experience points to a fundamental policy tension if the intention of negative policy rates is to transmit negative interest rates to the wider economy,” the BIS said. “If negative policy rates do not feed into lending rates for households and firms, they largely lose their rationale. On the other hand, if negative policy rates are transmitted to lending rates for firms and households, then there will be knock-on effects on bank profitability.” Sunday, 20 March 2016 02b 20160306 How have central banks implemented negative policy rates? 2016-03-20 09:43 PM https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603e.htm How have central banks implemented negative policy rates? by Morten Linnemann Bech and Aytek Malkhozov 6 March 2016 Since mid-2014, four central banks in Europe have moved their policy rates into negative territory. These unconventional moves were by and large implemented within existing operational frameworks. Yet the modalities of implementation have important implications for the costs of holding central bank reserves. The experience so far suggests that modestly negative policy rates transmit through to money markets and other interest rates for the most part in the same way that positive rates do. A key exception is retail deposit rates, which have remained insulated so far, and some mortgage rates, which have perversely increased. Looking ahead, there is great uncertainty about the behaviour of individuals and institutions if rates were to decline further into negative territory or remain negative for a prolonged period.1 JEL classification: E42, E58, G21, G23. With policy rates close to zero in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, several central banks around the world have introduced unconventional policies to provide additional monetary stimulus. One example is the decision by five central banks – Danmarks Nationalbank (DN), the European Central Bank (ECB), Sveriges Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and most recently the Bank of Japan (BoJ) – to move their policy rates below zero, traditionally seen as the lower bound for nominal interest rates. The motivations behind the decisions differed somewhat across jurisdictions, leading to differences in policy implementation. This feature reviews the experience of the four central banks in Europe that have kept their policy rates below zero for more than one year, focusing exclusively on the technical aspects of the implementation of negative policy rates, their impact on the money market and their transmission to other interest rates. The feature does not address the broader question of whether negative rates are desirable as a policy strategy, as this would call for a broader analysis of their impact on the financial system and the macroeconomy. For instance, more recently their debilitating impact on banks’ resilience through undermined profitability, coming on the heels of persistently ultra-low interest rates, has emerged as an important constraining factor. The remainder of the feature is organised as follows. The first section describes the economic context for the introduction of negative policy rates, while the second looks at their technical implementation. The third section assesses the transmission of negative policy rates to money markets and other interest rates. The penultimate section takes stock of the factors that determine the lower bound for nominal interest rates. In concluding, the feature highlights a number of potential risks associated with using negative policy rates going forward. Context for negative policy rates While the ECB, SNB, DN and Riksbank all introduced negative interest rates in mid-2014 and early 2015 (Box 1), and all faced a challenging macroeconomic environment, their respective motivations differed somewhat. In some cases the central banks’ declared objective was to counter a subdued inflation outlook, while in others they focused on currency appreciation pressures in the context of bilateral pegs or floors on their exchange rates. The ECB moved its deposit rate into negative territory in mid-2014 to “underpin the firm anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations” (Draghi (2014)). Similar concerns led the Riksbank to implement negative interest rates starting in the first quarter of 2015 (Graph 1, left-hand panel). The aim was “safeguarding the role of the inflation target as a nominal anchor for price setting and wage formation” (Sveriges Riksbank (2015)). Negative interest rates in both cases complemented other unconventional measures. The ECB resumed its purchases of covered bonds and expanded its asset purchase programme to include government bonds and asset-backed securities. It also provided additional term funding to banks through targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs). The Riksbank began bond purchases that by mid-2016 are set to cover just over 30% of outstanding nominal government bonds, a proportion somewhat larger than the ECB’s programme.2 The euro area’s new wave of monetary easing added to the appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc, which in 2011 had led the SNB to impose a floor vis-à-vis the euro. To stem the inflow of funds (Graph 1, right-hand panel) and maintain the floor, the SNB announced the introduction of negative interest rates (-0.25%) on sight deposit account balances in December 2014 (effective 22 January 2015). In mid-January, with pressure on the franc unabated, the SNB discontinued the minimum exchange rate and lowered the interest rate on sight deposit accounts further to -0.75%. The goal was to discourage capital inflows and thereby counter the monetary tightening due to the Swiss franc’s appreciation. Still, pressure on the currency persisted and the SNB continued to accumulate foreign exchange reserves into the second half of 2015. Following the SNB decision, DN, which maintains a nearly fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro, saw a surge in demand for Danish kroner and intervened heavily in the FX market (Graph 1, right-hand panel). Moreover, the central bank cut the key monetary policy interest rate from just below zero to -0.75% in early 2015.3 These measures stabilised the krone, and, towards the end of February 2015, the inflow of funds ceased. Over the course of 2015, the situation gradually normalised, and DN sold part of the foreign exchange it had acquired back into the market. In January 2016, DN raised the key policy rate to -0.65%, thus narrowing the policy rate spread vis-à-vis the euro area. Context for negative interest rates Technical implementation of negative policy rates The implementation of negative policy rates took place by and large within existing operational frameworks. The SNB had to change its terms of business to implement negative policy rates. Prior to December 2014, remuneration of reserves (positive or negative) was not part of the contractual framework for sight deposit accounts. Moreover, the SNB put in place individual exemption thresholds for sight deposit accounts so that only reserve holdings above the threshold earn negative interest (Box 2). Even though wholesale changes were not needed at the other central banks, substantial “behind-the-scenes” work took place in every jurisdiction. Each central bank conducted an in-depth review of its IT systems as well as of its documentation and account rules. And several minor adjustments were made. Moreover, the central banks carefully signalled the possibility of negative interest ahead of time in order to prepare both financial institutions and the public at large. Implementation modalities beyond the negative policy rates themselves have important implications for the costs to banks of holding central bank liabilities. In each case, the marginal remuneration of an additional unit of reserves differs from the average remuneration rate. Box 1 Moving into negative territory Danmarks Nationalbank (DN), the European Central Bank (ECB), Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) all cut their key policy rates to below zero over the period from mid-2014 to early 2015 (Graph A, left-hand panel). The ECB moved first, on 11 June 2014, when it cut the deposit rate to -10 basis points after having signalled the possibility for at least a year. DN followed on 5 September 2014, when the rate on certificates of deposit was cut from +5 to -5 bp following a further rate cut by the ECB. The SNB went negative on 18 December 2014 when it announced that sight deposits exceeding a certain threshold would earn -25 bp effective 22 January 2015. The Riksbank cut its repo rate to -10 bp on 18 February 2015, whereas the Bank of Japan announced on 29 January 2016 that it would apply a rate of -10 bp to part of the balances in current accounts. In Europe, central banks took more than one step into negative territory. The ECB lowered its deposit rate to -20 bp in September 2014 and further to -30 bp in December 2015, while the SNB announced a further 50 bp cut on 15 January 2015 in connection with the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro. Appreciation pressure on the Danish krone led to four successive rate cuts over a period of two and half weeks that took DN to -75 bp in early February 2015. A reversal of the pressure on the krone led to an increase to -65 bp in early 2016. For its part, the Riksbank cut to -25 bp in March 2015, and further to -35 bp in July and -50 bp in February 2016. However, negative policy rates were not entirely new. The Riksbank had flirted with negative policy rates in 2009-10 (Graph A, righthand panel). The repo rate was cut to 25 bp on 8 July 2009 and the overnight deposit rate was lowered to -25 bp in order to keep the interest rate corridor symmetrical at +/-50 bp. Still, the amount of funds on deposit overnight was minuscule, as the Riksbank typically uses daily fine-tuning operations (at 10 bp below the repo rate) to drain most excess liquidity prior to the close of business. DN had maintained negative certificate of deposit rates from mid-2012 to April 2014. Central bank policy rates Box 2 Design of remuneration schedules In general, the four central banks are applying negative rates to the majority of accounts on their books with a view to limiting the potential for arbitrage between accounts.icon The ECB, DN and SNB use some combination of exemption thresholds in computing the negative remuneration. The design and calibration of the remuneration schedules reflect a combination of the policy goals and the existing implementation frameworks. The SNB’s exemption thresholds are determined in one of two ways. The first approach applies to all banks that have to fulfil minimum reserve requirements. This exemption threshold currently corresponds to 20 times the minimum reserve requirement prior to implementation (a static component) minus/plus any increase/decrease in the amount of cash held (a dynamic component). The dynamic component aims to prevent account holders from substituting cash for sight deposits. The second approach defines a fixed exemption threshold for all account holders not subject to the minimum reserve requirement. The minimum fixed threshold is CHF 10 million, a level chosen so as not to inhibit an institution’s ability to settle Swiss franc payments. While new for the SNB, tiered remuneration was already part of the operational framework at the other three central banks. In the Eurosystem, required reserves earn the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO) rate – currently at 5 basis points – whereas excess reserves currently “earn” -30 bp. In Denmark, the central bank offers one-week certificates of deposit funds with a yield currently at -65 bp. In contrast, overnight demand deposits in the current account earn zero. Both an aggregate limit and individual limits have been set on the amount of funds that can be held in the current accounts. If the aggregate limit is exceeded at the end of the day, then deposits exceeding the individual limits are converted into certificates of deposit. In addition to interest rates, DN has actively varied the current account limits – most recently increasing them in March 2015, and then lowering them in August 2015 and January 2016. In Sweden, the Riksbank currently issues one-week debt certificates. Moreover, daily fine-tuning operations aim to drain any remaining reserves prior to the close of business, and hence banks hold only small amounts as overnight deposits with the central bank. At the moment, one-week debt certificates “yield” -50 bp and fine-tuning operations earn -60 bp, while any residual amounts left in the current account face a negative “remuneration” of -125 bp. With the move below zero, the Bank of Japan adopted a remuneration schedule that will divide balances in the current accounts of financial institutions into three tiers. The three tiers are remunerated at +10 bp, 0 bp and -10 bp, respectively. icon For government deposits, the treatment varies. In Switzerland, the sight deposits of the Federal Administration are exempt but balances are being monitored. In Denmark, government deposits earn negative interest only above a certain threshold; whereas in the euro area, government accounts are de facto subject to negative rates due to de minimis exemptions. In Sweden, the Riksbank has not been the government’s bank since 1994. The structure of liabilities and of their remuneration differs across central banks. In each jurisdiction, the banking system currently holds reserves and other central bank liabilities above required amounts (“liquidity surplus”). In the euro area and Switzerland the liquidity surplus is held as overnight deposits (reserves), whereas in Denmark and Sweden the central banks use a combination of overnight and one-week liabilities. In addition, the ECB, DN and SNB all exempt at least part of the reserve holdings from negative interest rates (Box 2). As illustrated in Table 1 and Graph 2 (left-hand panel), the average remuneration rate on central banks’ liabilities depends not only on the different policy rates, but also on the exemption thresholds. In mid-February 2016, the average rates were lowest at the Danish and Swedish central banks at just above – 50 basis points. In comparison, the average rates at the SNB and ECB were around – 25 basis points. Thus, the average remuneration was not necessarily the lowest in the jurisdictions with the most negative policy rates. Central bank remuneration schedules (mid-February 2016) Remuneration of central bank liabilities Since going negative, the spread between marginal and average costs ranged from -11 to -47 basis points in Denmark, as the central bank actively adjusted its policy stance by varying the exemption thresholds. In contrast, the spread was mostly constant for the other three central banks (Graph 2, right-hand panel). For Switzerland, the spread has been around -50 basis points, whereas it was approximately -5 and -8 basis points for the ECB and the Riksbank, respectively. Market functioning The experience so far suggests that modestly negative policy rates are transmitted to money market rates in very much the same way as positive rates are. However, questions remain as to whether negative policy rates are transmitted to the wider economy through lower lending rates for firms and households, especially in rates associated with bank intermediation. Institutional and contractual constraints may create a discontinuity at the zero rate and impede the pass-through beyond money markets. Before addressing these broader issues of efficacy, we first examine the transmission of negative policy rates to the money markets. Money markets Overall, so far the introduction of modestly negative policy rates does not appear to have affected the functioning of money markets much. The pass-through to short-term money market rates has persisted, and the impact on trading volumes, which are already very low because of the abundant and cheap supply of reserves by central banks, appears in general to have been small. In all four jurisdictions, the overnight rate has followed the policy rate below zero. Moreover, the negative policy rates have passed through to other money market rates (Graph 3). In the euro area and Switzerland, money market rates track the central bank deposit rate. In Sweden, money market rates closely follow the repo rate. In Denmark, the relationship has been somewhat less tight. On some days the tomorrow-next rate is close to the current account rate of zero, whereas on other days it is closer to (or even below) the certificate of deposit rate. This volatility results from a thin market, where on some days pricing can be driven by banks whose reserve holdings do not exceed their limit and earn a higher current account rate (Andersen et al (2015)). In terms of money market volumes, experiences vary. In the euro area, money market volumes were stable after the ECB’s deposit rate went negative in mid-2014. However, volumes have dropped across all maturities as excess liquidity in the banking system has increased. Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks seek to avoid negative rates by either extending maturities or lending to riskier counterparties. While negative rates may have improved market access for banks in the periphery countries of the euro area, other explanations for increased access are also possible – not least the introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, its efforts to improve the health of balance sheets, and stronger economic and financial conditions. In Denmark, the turnover in the (unsecured) money market has declined since the introduction of negative interest rates. This decrease reflects, in part, the higher amounts that banks were allowed to deposit “on demand” in their current accounts. Key policy and money market rates In contrast, trading in the Swiss (secured) money market has increased moderately. This increase in activity is a mechanical effect of the new individual exemption thresholds, as banks reshuffle reserves among themselves. Banks that hold levels of reserves below their exemption threshold are willing to borrow reserves up to that threshold, whereas those that hold levels of reserves above theirs are keen to lend. At the outset the exemption thresholds were not fully exploited, but over time a redistribution of reserves has taken place and this has led to a decrease in the non-exploited exemption thresholds. Most of this “reshuffling” is overnight. Problems with money market instruments designed with only positive interest rates in mind have so far not materialised. For example, there is no evidence that repo market counterparties have strategically failed to deliver collateral to delay receiving cash.4 And constant net asset value (NAV) money market funds in the euro area designed contractual provisions that work around NAV falling below 1 because of the simple pass-through of negative money market rates.5 The returns on these funds remained positive throughout the first half of 2015 as they lengthened the maturity in search of higher yields, but became systematically negative by the end of the year. A further shift from constant to variable NAV may be possible. Transmission beyond money markets The initial introduction of negative policy rates coincided with a decrease in longer-maturity and higher-risk yields, although simultaneous central bank asset purchase programmes and other factors behind the fluctuations in the risk premium make it difficult to isolate the effect of negative policy rates alone (Graph 4). In terms of operational matters, market participants initially faced some uncertainty related to how negative rates would be treated in connection with outstanding securities or existing contract types. A particular concern was the treatment of negative coupons in floating rate instruments and the ability for market infrastructures to accommodate negative interest rates. In Switzerland, banks and other financial institutions, in general, adjusted their terms of business or financial contracts prior to the implementation of negative policy rates by, for example, introducing a zero lower bound on Libor-based mortgages. In Denmark, government-led working groups had to clarify both the tax treatment and the mechanics of dealing with negative mortgage bond coupons.6 In Sweden, elements of the clearing and settlement system were not designed to deal with negative coupon payments and had to be modified. These technical issues have for the most part been resolved, and instances of market operational issues have been limited. In part, this is because, once spreads over the contractual reference rates are added, the resulting interest rates are less likely to be negative at current modestly negative policy rates. Nonetheless, new market practices can vary across individual banks and legal jurisdictions, including within the euro area, creating a risk of market segmentation. Initially, there was some uncertainty as to how banks would treat their “wholesale” depositors, but they are now passing on the costs in the form of negative wholesale deposit rates. In some cases, banks have used exemption thresholds akin to those that central banks have applied to their reserves. The key exception in terms of transmission has been banks’ reluctance to pass negative rates through to retail depositors. This reaction was motivated by the concern, shared by some central banks, that negative deposit rates would lead to substantial deposit withdrawals. In Switzerland, banks have responded to lower lending margins in some business lines by adjusting other selected lending rates upwards. In particular, Swiss banks have raised the lending rate on mortgages, even as government and corporate bond yields fell in line with the money market rates (Graph 4, bottom left-hand panel).7 Pass-through beyond money markets The Swiss experience points to a fundamental policy tension if the intention of negative policy rates is to transmit negative interest rates to the wider economy. If negative policy rates do not feed into lending rates for households and firms, they largely lose their rationale. On the other hand, if negative policy rates are transmitted to lending rates for firms and households, then there will be knock-on effects on bank profitability unless negative rates are also imposed on deposits, raising questions as to the stability of the retail deposit base. In either case, the viability of banks’ business model as financial intermediaries may be brought into question. The dilemma is less acute if the objective is to influence the exchange rate. In this case, however, other thorny issues arise, not least that of cross-border spillovers. Institutional constraints may also create a demand for instruments with interest payments floored at zero. Investors, notably insurers, may be unwilling or unable to buy negative cash flow securities, and banks issuing covered bonds have often included an interest floor at zero in the documentation or assumed one implicitly. Such floors can weaken the link between the cash flows of floating rate loans, bonds issued by banks to finance them, and the interest rate swaps that are used to hedge the associated exposures and pass through negative interest payments. The resulting hedging difficulties have led to an increase in the demand for new instruments – for example, Euribor options with 0% strikes that cover the residual risk arising from the floor. Technically, where is the effective lower bound? Some other central banks close to the zero bound have adopted or have been considering negative policy rates. At the end of January 2016, the Bank of Japan announced that, “in order to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (Bank of Japan (2016)), remuneration of -0.10% would apply to any future increases in reserves.8 In December 2015, the Bank of Canada made an explicit reference to this possibility and changed its estimate of the lower bound for its policy rate from 0.25% to -0.50% (Bank of Canada (2015)). Still, questions regarding the specific implementation and the technically effective lower bound remain open. The possibility of earning zero nominal interest by storing value in physical currency is the primary motivation for the concept of the zero lower bound in the academic literature.9 So far, negative policy rates have not led to an abnormal jump in the demand for cash across the four European jurisdictions under review (Graph 5), although this may be due to that fact that retail depositors have been shielded from negative rates so far. In the case of Denmark, the euro area and Switzerland, cash demand had already been on an increasing trend, in part because rates were already very low. Given transport, storage, insurance and other costs associated with holding cash in size, the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates is somewhere below zero. The effective lower bound is, however, likely to move up if interest rates remain, or are expected to remain, negative for a long time. Agents may start adapting to the new environment and begin to innovate with a view to reducing the costs associated with physical currency use (eg McAndrews (2015)). Moreover, some of the costs of increasing cash usage are fixed, and incurring those may become profitable if interest rates are expected to remain negative for long. As alluded to above, the fact that retail bank customers have so far been shielded from negative rates has probably played a key role in keeping the demand for cash stable. The ability of the banking sector to limit the pass-through of negative rates is thus an important factor determining the effective lower bound (Alsterlind et al (2015)). Central banks’ efforts to limit the cost of negative remuneration on the banking system were in some cases aimed at maintaining this ability. Other institutional factors, such the prevalence of adjustable rate mortgages and more generally floating rate debt, can broaden agents’ exposure to negative rates and affect the technical room central banks have to move interest rates into negative territory. Banknotes and coins in circulation Conclusions The introduction of moderately negative policy rates by the four central banks under review was by and large achieved within their existing operational frameworks. The experience so far suggests that modestly negative policy rates are transmitted through to money market rates in much the same way as positive rates are. It also appears that they are transmitted to longer-maturity and higher-risk rates, although this assessment is clouded by the impact of complementary monetary policy measures. By contrast, so far retail deposit rates have remained insulated, partly by design. And, at least in Switzerland, negative rates have actually raised, rather than lowered, mortgage rates. So far, zero has not proved to be a technically binding lower limit for central bank policy rates. Nonetheless, there is great uncertainty about the behaviour of individuals and institutions if rates were to decline further into negative territory or remain negative for a prolonged period. It is unknown whether the transmission mechanisms will continue to operate as in the past and not be subject to “tipping points”. Furthermore, an extended period of negative interest rates has so far been limited to the euro area and neighbouring economies. It is not clear how negative policy rates would play out in other institutional settings. This special feature has examined exclusively the technical aspects of the implementation of negative policy rates. It has not addressed the question of the impact of negative policy rates on the financial system as a whole. Many questions remain. For instance, more recently, the debilitating impact of persistently negative interest rates on the profitability of the banking sector has emerged as an important consideration (BIS (2016)). Even more directly, such rates can weaken the profitability and/or soundness of institutions with long-duration liabilities, such as insurance companies and pension funds, seriously challenging their business models.10 And an assessment of their desirability would necessarily require an evaluation of their effectiveness in achieving the central bank objectives as well as their more general impact on financial and macroeconomic stability.11 This, however, is beyond the scope of this special feature.12 References Alsterlind, J, H Armelius, D Forsman, B Jönsson and A-L Wretman (2015): “How far can the repo rate be cut?”, Sveriges Riksbank, Economic Commentaries, no 11. Andersen, M, M Kristoffersen and L Risbjerg (2015): “The money market at pressure on the Danish krone and negative interest rates”, Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, 4th Quarter. Bank of Canada (2015): “Bank of Canada updates framework for unconventional monetary policy measures”, press release, 8 December. Bank for International Settlements (2015): 85th Annual Report, June. — (2016): “Uneasy calm gives way to turbulence”, BIS Quarterly Review, March, pp 1-14. Bank of Japan (2016): “Introduction of ‘quantitative and qualitative monetary easing with a negative interest rate'”, press release, 29 January. Borio, C (2015): “Revisiting three intellectual pillars of monetary policy received wisdom”, speech at the Cato Institute, 12 November, forthcoming in the Cato Journal. Borio, C, L Gambacorta and B Hofmann (2015): “The influence of monetary policy on bank profitability”, BIS Working Papers, no 514, October. Caruana, J (2016): “Persistent ultra-low interest rates: the challenges ahead”, speech at the Bank of France-BIS Farewell Symposium for Christian Noyer, Paris, 12 January. Committee on the Global Financial System (2011): “Fixed income strategies of insurance companies and pension funds”, CGFS Papers, no 44, July. Domanski, D, H S Shin and V Sushko (2015): “The hunt for duration: not waving but drowning?”, BIS Working Papers, no 519, October. Draghi, M (2014): “Introductory statement to the press conference”, 4 December. Fleming, M and K Garbade (2004): “Repurchase agreements with negative interest rates”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol 10, no 5, April. Friedman, M (1969): The optimum quantity of money, Macmillan. Hicks, J (1937): “Mr Keynes and the ‘Classics’; a suggested interpretation”, Econometrica, vol 5, no 2, April. McAndrews, J (2015): “Negative nominal central bank policy rates – where is the lower bound?”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, speech at the University of Wisconsin, 8 May. Rognlie, M (2015): “What lower bound? Monetary policy with negative interest rates”, working paper, 23 November. Sveriges Riksbank (2015): “Riksbank cuts repo rate to -0.25 per cent and buys government bonds for SEK 30 billion”, press release, 18 March. Working Group on Negative Mortgage Rates (2015): “Negative mortgage rates”, Danish Ministry of Business and Growth report. 1 The authors would like to thank Meredith Beechey Österholm, Matthias Jüttner, Benjamin Müller, Holger Neuhaus, Frank Nielsen and Marcel Zimmermann for valuable discussions, and Claudio Borio, Ben Cohen (the editor) and Dietrich Domanski for comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or the Markets Committee. 2 While the Riksbank has no exchange rate operational target, it has stated that it is prepared to intervene on the foreign exchange market if the krona’s appreciation threatens price stability. On 4 January 2016, its executive board took a delegation decision enabling immediate intervention on the foreign exchange market as a complementary monetary policy measure. 3 On the recommendation of Danmarks Nationalbank, the Ministry of Finance also temporarily suspended issuance of Danish government bonds. 4 Fleming and Garbade (2004) discuss the strategic fails in the context of negative special repo rates. 5 For example, under the Reverse Distribution Mechanism, investors’ shares are cancelled in proportion to the reduction in value due to negative interest rates, allowing the NAV to remain constant. 6 The Danish Ministry of Business and Growth has chaired a working group with the participation of the Danish financial sector to analyse the different aspects related to negative mortgage rates. Its findings were published in Working Group on Negative Mortgage Rates (2015). 7 In Denmark, where mortgage loans are primarily financed with pass-through bonds rather than deposits, mortgage rates fell together with money market rates and government bond yields. However, bank lending rates for new loans to non-financial corporations edged up in 2015. 8 Under its Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing programme, the Bank of Japan is buying assets to increase the monetary base by about ¥80 trillion annually. 9 See eg Hicks (1937): “If the cost of holding money can be neglected, it will always be profitable to hold money rather than lend it out, if the rate of interest is not greater than zero. Consequently the rate of interest must always be positive.” 10 For a more detailed analysis, see Borio et al (2015), CGFS (2011) and Domanski et al (2015). 11 In addition, Friedman (1969) argues that non-zero nominal interest rates lead to a suboptimal quantity of money. In the case of negative nominal interest rates, the holders of physical currency, who receive a nominal return of zero, benefit from an implicit subsidy. See also Rognlie (2015). 12 For a sceptical view concerning their desirability, see BIS (2015), Borio (2015) and Caruana (2016). Full text https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603e.pdf * 14 pages, 230 kb https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/grap3-1.jpg https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/grap3-A.jpg https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/table3-1.jpg https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/grap3-2.jpg https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/grap3-3.jpg https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/grap3-4.jpg https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/grap3-4.jpg https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603/images/grap3-5.jpg Sunday, 20 March 2016 03 20160317 BOJ minutes reveal negative interest rate policy decision 2016-03-20 09:46 PM http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/17/boj-minutes-reveal-negative-interest-rate-policy-decision.html BOJ minutes reveal negative interest rate policy decision Thursday, 17 Mar 2016 | 8:39 PM ET The Bank of Japan’s staff made two proposals; one to expand the bank’s massive asset-buying program and another to add negative interest rates to asset purchases, at the January rate review, minutes of the meeting showed on Friday. The BOJ eventually decided to adopt the negative interest rate policy after several members argued the move would help forestall the risk of external factors delaying the eradication of Japan’s “deflationary mindset,” the minutes showed. The BOJ unexpectedly deployed the negative interest rate policy in January to stimulate the economy, although four of the nine board members dissented the decision, which drew criticism from lawmakers for failing to boost stock prices or arrest an unwelcome rise in the yen. The central bank kept policy settings unchanged at a subsequent meeting in March but offered a bleaker view on the economy, signalling its readiness to roll out further stimulus if needed to hit its ambitious 2 percent inflation target. http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/28/bank-of-japan-adopts-negative-interest-rate-policy-reuters.html Negative rates mean Sweden risks bubble: Moody’s Sunday, 20 March 2016 04 20160319 BOJ chief says spillover effect of negative interest rate policy expected to take time 2016-03-20 09:50 PM http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160319/p2a/00m/0na/001000c BOJ chief says spillover effect of negative interest rate policy expected to take time March 19, 2016 (Mainichi Japan) Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda (Mainichi) March 16 marked one month since the Bank of Japan (BOJ) introduced a negative interest rate policy. In its monetary policy meeting on March 15, the central bank decided to maintain its current policy of monetary easing, reasoning that there was a need to chart the benefits and side-effects of the policy. While low home mortgage rates make it easier to borrow money, difficulties in managing funds have resulted in fewer investment choices, and it appears that it will take some time for the policy to bolster the Japanese economy as the central bank hopes. In a news conference on March 15, BOJ Gov. Haruhiko Kuroda stated, “Interest on money lent to businesses and on home loans has clearly decreased, and we are seeing effects of the policy in terms of interest.” Regarding the actual economy, however, he added, “From here on, it will take some time.” The aim of the BOJ’s policy is to lower market interest rates and encourage a shift in company and household funds from savings to investment. Market interest rates have declined as the central bank hoped, and interest on newly issued 10-year government bonds, a benchmark for long-term interest rates, has fallen below zero for the first time. The long-term prime rate, which forms a standard for interest on lending to companies, has dropped to between 0.95 and 1 percent per annum, the lowest on record. Banks have also been cutting interest rates for home loans, with the lowest preferential interest rates for 10-year fixed-rate loans at major banks ranging between 0.5 and 0.8 percent per annum — also a record low. As a result, banks have been flooded with inquiries about refinancing. The negative interest rate policy, however, has failed to produce much of a spillover effect in the actual economy. While refinancing of housing loans frees up funds, the impact on the economy is negligible if people do not use that money to buy things or borrow cash to purchase new homes and the like. Interest is already low, and the negative interest rate policy has not produced enough steam to stimulate investment by companies and households. The economies of emerging nations have also been slowing, and on March 15, the BOJ revised its economic assessment downward for the first time in 23 months. The negative interest rate policy has also produced some negative effects for households, such as narrowing options on where to put their money. Banks have reduced interest payments on deposits to recover profits they have lost from lowering interest rates on the money they lend. The annual interest rate for regular deposits at major banks has declined to 0.001 percent — yet another record low. This means that 10 million yen deposited for a year will yield just 100 yen in interest — less than the fee for using an automatic teller machine outside regular banking hours. It has also become difficult to secure stable returns from holding government bonds, and life insurance companies are moving to raise premiums for savings-based products such as single premium whole life insurance or to stop selling them altogether. At its monetary policy meeting on March 15, the BOJ decided to exclude money reserve funds (MRFs), from the negative rate. Since money in MRFs, which serve as settlement accounts for stock investment, are invested mainly in short-term government bonds, introduction of a negative interest rate could heighten the risk of loss of principal, and there were fears of a negative impact on stock investments. BOJ statistics show that cash circulation in February (the average monthly balance) was 6.7 percent higher than the same month the previous year and the highest year-on-year increase in about 13 years. It is thought that people are holding cash at home. “With the effects of the negative interest rate, households are losing places to store their money,” Japan’s Weekly Economist magazine surmised. Sunday, 20 March 2016 05 20160317 Negative interest rates threaten Europe’s financial stability 2016-03-20 09:51 PM http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/03/negative-interest-rates-threaten-europes-financial-stability/ Negative interest rates threaten Europe’s financial stability by Etienne Desjardins, March 17, 2016 Negative interest rates erode the profitability of the banking sector and pose a threat to financial stability. In exchange, they offer an economic stimulus that is mild at best and that has actually been seen to backfire in some regions. The world economy is once again navigating in uncharted waters. Watch out for the reefs. Central bankers are at it again. After having taken policy rates precipitously to zero following the global financial crisis of 2008 and experimented with the new instruments of quantitative easing and forward guidance, they are back in the lab. The new gadget is called negative interest rate policy, and it is emitting a distressing tick. The first major central bank to take rates negative was the ECB. It lowered its deposit rate to -0.10% in June 2014, before doubling down – quite literally – the following September. Then came the Danmarks Nationalbank and the Swiss National Bank, followed by the Swedish Riksbank in February 2015. The last entry into the club was by the Bank of Japan in January 2016. The latest of these moves, on March 10th, saw the ECB cut its deposit rate by 10 basis points, bringing it to a historical low of -0.4%. http://i0.wp.com/globalriskinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/rates-chart-1.png?resize=791%2C340 http://i0.wp.com/globalriskinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/rates-chart-1.png Source: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2016 Why it took so long to implement negative interest rates Raising or lowering the policy rate is just about the plainest item on a central bank’s menu. In normal times, it is the bread and butter of monetary policy. Why, then, are negative rates being considered by some as the most dangerous experiment in monetary policy to be undertaken in decades? For a long time economists believed that nominal interest rates could never go below zero, or at the very least should not, given the inherent uncertainty of venturing into such strange and unfamiliar territory. There are very good reasons to think that. A negative nominal rate on a loan means the lender is effectively paying the borrower. Such a situation has long been the case in real terms. With nominal rates near zero, any positive rate of inflation means that the real return on a loan is negative. However, inflation is hard to evade. Negative nominal rates, however, are much easier to avoid. Simply holding cash offers a nominal return of 0%. Therefore, it was thought market rates would not go below zero, and hence a negative policy rate would not provide further monetary stimulus. How have negative rates been implemented? In practice, negative policy rates mean that banks pay to keep their reserves at the central bank overnight, or equivalently lend them to other banks at a loss. This fee is usually levied only on reserves above a certain amount – sometimes called excess reserves – to avoid penalizing banks for holding a reasonable amount of reserves. Imposing a negative rate on excess reserves is feasible because to avoid paying the penalty, banks would need to withdraw these excess reserves from the central bank in the form of cash. As long as rates remain only moderately negative, the storage, security, insurance, and inconvenience costs involved outweigh the benefits, and a stampede for physical currency remains unlikely. Business as usual: Why they are the same as regular rates The BIS reports that some money market rates have gone negative as a result of the negative policy rates. Commercial banks have thus began lending at a negative nominal yield to short-term corporate borrowers. It would seem that negative policy rates are having the intended effect. Some sovereign bonds are also trading at negative yields. This, at first glance, is puzzling. The investors buying these bonds are not subject to negative central bank deposit rates, and so should shy away from such assets. Some investment funds, however, are institutionally required to hold sovereign debt, therefore setting a floor on the demand for sovereign bonds irrespective of their yield. Others may still consider a negative-yield asset profitable if interest rates or the exchange rate are expected to move favorably. http://i2.wp.com/globalriskinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Untitled-18.png?resize=709%2C319 http://i2.wp.com/globalriskinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Untitled-18.png Source: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2016 Additionally, when it comes to currency depreciation, negative yields work no differently than their positive counterparts. A fall in interest rates weakens a currency because investors in search of specific returns are forced to park their capital elsewhere. This is just as true when rates go negative. That is why Switzerland, a common destination for capital fleeing Eurozone volatility, and Denmark, whose currency is pegged to the Euro, have chosen to follow the ECB into negative territory. Why they are different from regular rates Negative rates, however, differ in at least one important dimension from positive rates. It is difficult – perhaps impossible – for banks to pass them on to retail depositors. A good measure of bank profitability is the net interest margin (NIM) – the difference between the average yield banks receive on their assets and the average rate they pay on liabilities. An important component of the latter is the interest rate paid on retail deposits. When rates turn negative, NIMs get squeezed because asset yields fall but the rate on deposit liabilities cannot be made to follow. With roughly 50% of Eurozone banking profits coming from net interest income, this is a significant side-effect. Partly as a result of this fall in profitability, bank stocks have been consistently underperforming their domestic markets since the introduction of negative rates. http://i2.wp.com/globalriskinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Untitled-19.png?resize=728%2C437 http://i2.wp.com/globalriskinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Untitled-19.png Banks are unwilling to impose negative rates on depositors because they fear doing so would trigger a run on their deposits. In general, the elasticity of deposits to the rate they are paid is relatively low; few retail depositors switch banks in their deposit rate is cut. Many fear, however, that this elasticity would jump if deposits were brought below zero. Negative rates have a psychological bite that positive rates do not. The situation is further complicated by the fact that its strategic structure can be conceived as a sort of prisoner’s dilemma. If no banks paid negative interest rates to depositors, it would be in no individual bank’s interest to be the first to do so. If, instead, every bank was paying negative rates to depositors, it would be in every bank’s advantage to be the first to stop doing so. Some experiments are underway that should help clarify whether there is cause for these concerns. A small Swiss bank, Alternative Bank Schweiz (ABS), started imposing negative rates on individual depositors in January 2016. Some large banks, including Credit Suisse and UBS, have begun doing the same for larger institutional clients. If banks remain unable to pass on the operational costs entailed by negative rates, this loss in profitability is likely to have perverse side effects. Some banks in Switzerland have responded to negative rates by increasing interest rates on mortgages. To similar effect, eroded profitability increases the cost of equity for banks. Meanwhile, institutional requirements force banks to hold capital for every new asset they load onto their balance sheet. While the cost of debt should follow the policy rate, negative rates could end up raising the average cost of issuing a new loan if the cost of equity increases sufficiently. This would, perversely, make banks less willing to extend additional loans. Banks may also take undue risk in search of the higher yields they now need to stay profitable. Banks are being bled slowly by negative rates. This could push some to act in desperation. Letting this go on for too long would be inviting a repeat of 2008. The new lower bound As long as cash exists as an alternative to deposits, there will be a lower bound on nominal interest rates. Therefore, to get rid of the lower bound, some have suggested getting rid of cash completely. Wherever it lies, the true lower bound is likely to be flexible. Important fixed costs must be paid before a bank can withdraw large amounts of reserves. Banks first have to acquire and adapt large facilities in which to store the physical currency. As long as rates are expected to turn positive quickly enough, they may shy from these investments. Once the fixed costs are spent, however, banks are likely to tolerate much less negativity in interest rates. Thus, pushing rates too low for too long could make the lower bound move up. Looking forward Negative rates have crossed the Sea of Japan but they are not about to cross the Atlantic. The likely trajectory for the Fed Funds rate points up, not down, although adverse developments in China or Europe could belie that. Still, the Fed has demonstrated openness to the idea. Its 2016 stress tests for banks will include scenarios where short-term treasury yields turn negative. It is unlikely that calls to get rid of cash or tax it heavily will be heeded in the near future. The uncertain benefits of such a move would be too difficult to convey to a recalcitrant public. If that is the case, however, central bankers will need to start bringing rates back in the black soon. Banks can only be bled so much before they start jerking on the operating table. In an already fraught global financial system, that would be to the detriment of all. ECB cut its deposit rate https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310.en.html BIS reports https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603.pdf 50% of Eurozone banking profits https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/bankingstructuresreport201410.en.pdf started imposing negative rates http://news.yahoo.com/swiss-alternative-bank-breaks-negative-rates-taboo-055303880.html increasing interest rates on mortgages http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/03/07/2155458/the-swiss-banking-response-to-nirp-increaseinterest-rates/ getting rid of cash http://willembuiter.com/ELB.pdf short-term treasury yields turn negative http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/rates-less-than-zero-is-bank-stress-fedwants-to-test-in-2016 Sunday, 20 March 2016 06 201602 Negative Interest Rate Policies May Be Part of the Problem 2016-03-20 09:55 PM https://www.pimco.com/insights/viewpoints/viewpoints/negative-interest-rate-policies-may-be-part-of-the-problem Negative Interest Rate Policies May Be Part of the Problem By Scott A Mather February, 2016 Investors may see these experimental policy moves as damaging to financial and economic stability. Central banks around the world are developing a newfound fondness for experimenting with negative interest rate policy (NIRP) despite unknown consequences and what appears to be a chilling effect on financial markets. After initially rejecting the idea given the uncertainties and potential for collateral damage, the European Central Bank in 2014 and the Bank of Japan last month joined the central banks of Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland in negative territory. Now it seems the Fed may be warming to the idea, having gone beyond supportive innuendo to subtle preparation for potentially engaging in NIRP. (One example: The Fed’s 2016 scenarios for bank stress tests, released in late January, included as part of the “severely adverse scenario” the potential for short-term Treasury rates to fall to negative 50 basis points.) While there is no longer any doubt about the ability or willingness of many central banks to manufacture negative interest rates, their efficacy on growth or inflation is far from certain. In fact, policymakers may have significantly underestimated the economic risks. The new abnormal Central bank advocates of NIRP increasingly seem to portray it as nothing more than a natural extension of conventional monetary policy. In a “normal” interest rate cycle, central banks cut interest rates to reduce nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates; the goal is to ease the burden on debtors and lower hurdle rates for investment. The belief is that lower rates (even negative ones) are always stimulative, while higher rates are always restrictive. However, risks may increase exponentially the lower rates go and the longer they stay there. Although it is difficult to know the counterfactual because this is such an unprecedented situation, it appears that NIRP has not been especially impactful in lifting growth or inflation, or in lifting expectations about future growth or inflation. Instead, it seems that financial markets increasingly view these experimental moves as desperate and consequently damaging to financial and economic stability. What are the potential negative externalities that could be upsetting financial markets? Markets At a minimum, NIRP is a contributing factor to the financial market volatility of the past few months. And contrary to current central bank dogma, NIRP is possibly one of the major catalysts behind the tightening in global financial conditions. While NIRP undoubtedly helps lower government bond yields, which in isolation represents a loosening of financial conditions, it may be causing the opposite effect on overall financial conditions: widening of credit and equity risk premiums, increased volatility and reduced credit availability from a more stressed bank system. Moreover, NIRP may act to reduce inflation expectations embedded in financial assets rather than encourage anticipation of a return to targeted inflation. Nominal government bond yields can be decomposed into two yield components: a component that represents the expected “real” inflation-adjusted return, and a component that compensates for expected inflation. The exact decomposition is not scientifically determined; individual investors will make their own decisions. But policymakers hope that all of the downward adjustment in yield reflects a lowering of the real yield component and not the nominal yield piece that reflects inflation expectations. This seems unrealistic. When interest rates are negative, some of the resulting lower nominal yield will tend to spill over from the real yield component into the inflation expectations component. Central banks cannot control this; the process is imprecise by nature. The result, however, is that NIRP and the lowering of nominal yields can suppress medium- and long-term inflation expectations. This is directly at odds with the central bank policy objective of returning inflation and inflation expectations to target. In addition, negative interest rates may act to increase risk aversion and uncertainties across the financial system through portfolio decisions. As rates fall into zero or negative territory, the “safest” financial assets – government and other high quality bonds – actually become riskier! As yields are pushed into negative territory, holding these bonds represents a guaranteed loss of purchasing power if held to maturity. In essence, perceived risk-free and other high quality assets are being removed from the financial system and replaced with riskier, negative-expected-return assets. While that may encourage some investors to take more risk to compensate for loss of income, others will certainly be forced to reduce risk in response. Macro effects Negative interest rates represent another escalation of the so-called currency wars – these policies seem to have outsized influence on currency levels and volatilities. A beggar-thy-neighbor currency policy designed to suppress a currency’s value for competitive gain can hasten a return to protectionism and nationalistic polices, which are negatives for global growth. Also, negative rates affect the financial system in other adverse ways. Bank interest margins are reduced and their cost of capital is increased as spreads on debt and equity expand to compensate for reduced profitability. Banks attempt to pass on these costs to consumers and businesses; they also constrain credit and raise lending rates, weighing on growth. Insurance companies and pension funds may also come under stress as potentially reduced future portfolio returns make it harder to deliver on their commitments to policyholders and pensioners. Finally, negative interest rates also act as a tax on savers and investors who must plan on lower rates of return into the future. This, in turn, may cause an increase in savings rates, further hampering near-term growth. NIRP alternatives In summary, negative interest rates may be a central bank tool that is increasingly ineffective at boosting growth and inflation, and may pose more risk to the financial system than commonly understood. It could very well be that a return to more normal monetary policy rates would beget a return to more normal economies with normal inflation expectations. Even if that were not to be the case, monetary policies more focused on easing financial conditions by lowering credit and equity risk premiums directly (for example, asset purchase policies directed at credit and equity, or raising the inflation target) may prove far more effective than negative interest rate policies that have many unknown costs and risks and, to date, have done more harm than good. Sunday, 20 March 2016 07 20160129 Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy 2016-03-20 09:57 PM http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/28/bank-of-japan-adopts-negative-interest-rate-policy-reuters.html Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy Nyshka Chandran | @nyshkac Friday, 29 Jan 2016 | 12:17 AM ET The Bank of Japan blindsided global financial markets Friday by adopting negative interest rates for the first time ever, buckling under pressure to revive growth in the world’s third-largest economy. In a move that was signaled by the Nikkei business daily minutes ahead of the decision, the BOJ said it will apply a rate of negative 0.1 percent to excess reserves that financial institutional place at the bank, effective February 16. Charging banks for the privilege of parking some of their excess funds was an unexpected move, although not without precedent. Central banks in Europe, notably the European Central Bank, have slashed interest rates below zero before to push down borrowing costs and prod banks to lend more. The BOJ left its program to buy government bonds and exchange traded funds (ETFs) unchanged. The central bank noted that the Japanese economy has recovered modestly with underlying inflation picking up, along with spending by companies and households. “Recently, however, global financial markets have been volatile against the backdrop of the further decline in crude oil prices and uncertainty such as over future developments in emerging and commodity-exporting economies, particularly the Chinese economy,” the BOJ said in a statement accompanying the decision. “For these reasons, there is an increasing risk that an improvement in the business confidence of Japanese firms and conversion of the deflationary mindset might be delayed and that the underlying trend in inflation might be negatively affected.” Spending, factory output slumps pile pressure on BOJ The new system announced on Friday will divide the outstanding balance of each account at the BOJ into three tiers and a positive, zero or negative interest rate will be applied to each one. The bank also clearly communicated a dovish bias, with officials saying they would undertake additional easing if necessary using quantitative and qualitative tools, as well as interest rates. In addition, the BOJ did not set a lower limit on the yields of Japanese government bonds it purchases, meaning that longer-maturity Japanese interest rates may follow short rates into negative territory, explained Bill Adams, senior international economist at PNC Financial Services Group. The news sent financial markets into a frenzy, with the benchmark Nikkei shooting up as much as 3 percent and the yen sliding 2 percent against the greenback. U.S. stock futures meanwhile rallied 1 percent. Richard Harris, CEO of Port Shelter Investment Management, supported Friday’s decision. “They have a problem with buying more government bonds since it just monetizes government debt. Negative rates are the way ahead to go, it’s good for Japan.” Hitting 2% inflation Negative rates are aimed at achieving the government’s 2 percent inflation target “at the earliest possible time,” said the BOJ’s statement. The BOJ now forecasts core inflation to average 0.2 to 1.2 percent between April 2016 and March 2017. Governor Kuroda had previously said he hoped to hit 2 percent inflation by late 2016 but markets are widely skeptical of that. Collapsing inflation expectations were a key reason underpinning high expectations for fresh stimulus. Ahead of Friday’s decision, leading banks, including Societe Generale and BNP Paribas, estimated the probability of further easing at 40-50 percent. Consumer prices have remained stubbornly low, seen by December’s core consumer prices released earlier on Friday. The index, which includes oil but not fresh food, ticked up just 0.1 percent on year, unchanged from the previous month. Friday’s shock move is a direct reaction to the downgraded inflation outlook as a result of January’s oil price crash, which has a bigger impact on global central banks excluding the U.S. Federal Reserve, Adams said. “The Bank of Japan’s more aggressive easing is a signal that major foreign central banks are not ready to follow the Fed in withdrawing monetary stimulus. More monetary easing announcements outside of the United States are likely in 2016….Foreign economies’ domestic vulnerabilities make their central banks more sensitive to the influence of lower oil prices on inflation than the Federal Reserve.” Offsetting volatility The surprise decision was also taken to preempt any dents to business confidence arising from recent market volatility, the BOJ said. It was a close call, with 5 members voting for negative interest rates and 4 against. Year-to-date, the Nikkei has tanked more than 10 percent,while the haven yen is 1.2 percent higher against the greenback, pushing Japanese front-end interest rates to a premium versus Europe’s negative levels.That’s dealt a blow to corporate sentiment, particularly as a rising currency weighs on domestic exporters, whose overseas earnings have been boosted by a weaker yen since Abenomics began three years ago. An appreciating yen also threatens to deter wage growth,which is becoming an increasingly significant focus for the central bank. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has pushed companies to raise employee salaries and bonuses as he seeks to boost personal consumption levels, a key element of Abenomics, his ambitious plan to reinvigorate the Japanese economy through a combination of fiscal spending, monetary stimulus and structural reforms. Friday’s outcome also comes a day after the surprise resignation of Economy Minister Akira Amari, which was the latest blow to frazzled markets. Prime Minister Abe quickly appointed Nobuteru Ishihara, a former executive of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as Amari’s successor but little immediate impact is expected on the government’s fiscal stimulus program. Still, Amari’s resignation could signify a lack of progress in Abenomics, Tim Quinlan, vice president and economist at Wells Fargo, told CNBC. “It’s been three years now and Abenomic’s track record is spotty at best. Amari’s stepping down is somebody taking ownership and responsibility for the fact that Abenomics is not living up to the hype.” Spending, factory output slumps pile pressure on BOJ http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/28/japan-household-spending-slumps-factoryoutput-slides-adds-to-pressure-on-boj.html financial markets into a frenzy http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/28/asia-stocks-look-higher-after-three-day-win-streak-for-oil-on-russiasaudi-arabia-talks.html surprise resignation of Economy Minister Akira Amari http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/28/japans-economy-minister-amari-announcesresignation.html Sunday, 20 March 2016 08 20160220 3 Dangers of a Negative Interest Rate Policy 2016-03-20 09:59 PM http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/02/20/3-dangers-of-a-negative-interest-rate-policy.aspx 3 Dangers of a Negative Interest Rate Policy Sean Williams Setting benchmark interest rates to a negative number is a central bank tactic designed to spur lending and prevent deflation, but it also carries some economic risks. Take everything you think you knew about the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy and throw it out the window, because earlier this month Fed Chair Janet Yellen announced plans to run a stress test on the United States’ financial institutions to see how they would cope with a negative interest rate environment. Why banks are considering negative interest rates Think a negative interest rate policy, or NIRP, could never come to the United States? Don’t rule it out, as Yellen has hinted that the financial governing body would consider all options to stimulate U.S. economic growth and provide a semblance of stability. Although, to be crystal clear, the Fed has also implied that it’s still quite a ways away from even considering a move to negative interest rates. That, however, hasn’t stopped the third-largest economy in the world, Japan, from shocking the world with a NIRP. At the end of January, the Bank of Japan announced it was moving its benchmark lending rate to minus 0.1% in an effort to stimulate its stagnant economy. The BOJ also left in place its current stimulus measures, which include ETF and government bond purchases. The idea of a negative rate is that it charges banks interest for parking their money in a central bank, which encourages those banks to lend to more of it out to consumers and businesses, which in turn can boost consumption, business expansion, and job creation. As long as benchmark rates remain low, or negative, businesses should, in theory, have more incentive to borrow at a low cost and put their capital to work. In Japan’s case, its economy has also dealt with several long periods of deflation, or falling prices. And while decreases in prices could be construed as positive for the consumer, deflation is bad news for businesses and economies broadly. It’s a signal that businesses have lost pricing power, and that demand is likely falling. Another value of negative interest rates is that they also help spur inflation. And a healthy inflation rate — say, in the 2%-to-3% range — is suggestive of a strong and steady economy. And, in case you were wondering, Japan isn’t alone. Switzerland and Sweden have also imposed negative interest rates. https://g.foolcdn.com/editorial/images/195481/16165619661_26f0a28bd3_z_large.jpg Fed Chair Janet Yellen. Image source: Flickr user Day Donaldson. Three dangers of a negative interest rate policy While encouraging lending and a potential rise in inflation are the upsides of a negative interest rate policy, there are also three big dangers of a NIRP. First, negative interest rates discourage saving and interest-based investments. It’s highly likely that banks would further reduce interest paid to account-holders on checking and savings accounts, and it’s quite possible that CD yields would drop further. Even with inflation tame for the time being, low CD yields would almost ensure that ultra-conservative investors would be losing real purchasing power from the money placed in those assets. In another context, negative interest rates penalize those among our nation’s seniors and baby boomers who felt victimized by the 2007-2009 stock market crash, and who still don’t have the stomach to invest in the volatile stock market again. Often loaded with interest-dependent investment options like CDs and savings accounts, these individuals could find it very difficult to grow their wealth, and some may not hit their retirement goals. Secondly, financial institutions being penalized by central banks are likely to pass the costs on to their customers by imposing higher fees. If banks are going to be charged by a central bank for hanging onto cash, but they remain leery about lending, they may instead boost high-margin fees to raise additional cash. Monthly charges for maintaining a checking account, higher fees for wire transfers and overdrafts, fees for out-of-network ATM usage, and even fees to see a teller as opposed to using an ATM, could come into play and rise. In fact, many of these fees have been rising, on average, over the past couple of years, whether you realize it or not. As icing on the cake, U.S. News & World Report noted last March that some banking customers in European markets where lending rates are negative are actually paying interest to their banks! Accountant Pixabay Image source: Pixabay. The final danger of a NIRP is that it may encourage more speculative investing, which in turn could increase market volatility. If investors can’t generate any return on investment by parking their money in CDs or savings accounts, they may grow more desperate for sources of income appreciation. Although investing in the stock market has been shown to be a good source of income generation over the long term, not all investors have that long-term mindset. What might happen is a considerable rise in risk-taking among investors, which could correlate to an increase in volatility in equity prices. One smart way to counter negative rates If these dangers demonstrate anything, it’s that a NIRP may not be a cure-all for the U.S. economy. Nonetheless, in the somewhat unlikely event that the Fed does choose to adopt negative interest rates, there’s a pretty simple solution that should allow investors to generate real wealth and sleep well at night. This solution? Buy high-quality dividend stocks. As long as you can add brand-name businesses with superior yields to your portfolio, you should be able to generate income above and beyond the rate of inflation. On the flip side, the strength of a business’ brands, and a recurring dividend, afford you the patience to wait for an eventual economic turnaround. High-yielding names like AT&T, Philip Morris International, and Johnson & Johnson aren’t going anywhere just because lending rates may one day move into negative territory, and the dividend income they provide can potentially fuel inflation-topping wealth generation. The $15,978 Social Security bonus most retirees completely overlook If you’re like most Americans, you’re a few years (or more) behind on your retirement savings. But a handful of little-known “Social Security secrets” could help ensure a boost in your retirement income. In fact, one MarketWatch reporter argues that if more Americans knew about this, the government would have to shell out an extra $10 billion annually. For example: one easy, 17-minute trick could pay you as much as $15,978 more… each year! Once you learn how to take advantage of all these loopholes, we think you could retire confidently with the peace of mind we’re all after. Simply click here to discover how you can take advantage of these strategies. Sunday, 20 March 2016 09 20160301 The Investing Implications of Negative Interest Rates 2016-03-20 10:02 PM http://www.nasdaq.com/article/the-investing-implications-of-negative-interest-rates-cm586639 The Investing Implications of Negative Interest Rates By Russ Koesterich, BlackRock March 01, 2016, 09:35:05 AM EDT It’s hard to miss all the media mentions lately surrounding negative interest rate policy ( NIRP ). A handful of developed countries across the globe-including Japan- have implemented negative interest rates lately , as the chart below shows, and the Federal Reserve (Fed) is analyzing the implications of moving the U.S. Federal Funds rate into negative territory too . It’s no wonder, then, that many investors are asking how negative rates could impact portfolios. The technical details of negative interest rates Simply put, when rates are negative, a depositor (think a retail bank) has to pay a central bank for the benefit of parking cash at the nation’s central bank coffers. Or put another way, negative rates mean lenders pay borrowers for the privilege of lending (think of a bank paying you to take out a mortgage). The theoretical aim of such policies is that since banks would have to pay to store their cash, they would be motivated to lend any extra cash to businesses and consumers, propelling the economy. How negative interest rates affect equities, bonds and currencies While it still remains to be seen whether negative rates will have this intended economic effect, from a portfolio standpoint, negative interest rates are likely to continue impacting various asset classes. Equities From a sector standpoint, the banking sector is most vulnerable to negative rates, not only because retail banks have to pay central banks to park their reserves. The sector’s business model is built around borrowing at the short end of the yield curve (think deposits) to lend at the long end (think loans). Since the long end of the curve tends to be anchored from years of quantitative easing purchases, NIRP tends to hurt banks’ profit margins on the short end, especially since many banks are reluctant to charge depositors. As such, the financial sector has struggled in countries with negative rates and could struggle further. This is one of the reasons why we recently downgraded our view of the global financial sector to neutral . According to Bloomberg data for Stoxx Europe 600 indices, since the June 2014 introduction of below-zero rates in the eurozone, the region’s retail and housing-related sectors are down in absolute terms -3 percent and 0 percent respectively. But they’re outperforming the European banking sector and the broader European market, which are down -39 percent and -7 percent respectively over the same time period. (As of 2/26/2016) Meanwhile, from an overall market perspective, negative interest rates should, in theory, function the same way as the lowering of rates to zero percent has since the crisis, benefitting stocks overall. But in practice, this unique round of stimulus may not be as rewarding. For one, valuations still remain elevated, even amidst this year’s selloff. For instance, via Bloomberg, while the price-to-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 has fallen 5 percent in 2016, it still remains 25 percent higher than it was at the start of 2012. Second, negative interest rates could be seen as an attempt to drag down long-term rates further, but the efficacy of this unconventional policy has had only limited success in encouraging businesses and households to borrow and spend. Lastly, there’s some evidence that global markets will perform not on the depth of negative rates, but rather on how well communicated the policy is to the public and if it appears to have truly lasting effects for the real global economy. This helps to explain why markets reacted unfavorably to the news out of negative interest rates out of Japan. The negative reaction may also have been because the negative rate only applies to a small percentage of Bank of Japan (BOJ) reserves. Bonds Negative rates are a sign of central bankers’ concerns about slowing economic growth and deflation. In such an economic environment, government debt prices are likely to rise, while government debt yields fall (bond prices and yields work inversely). In fact, according to Bloomberg data, as major central banks promised or delivered more stimulus support and interest rate cuts, yields of long-dated government bonds have fallen across the world. Meanwhile, fixed income credit sectors, such as U.S. high yield and emerging debt, are suffering from idiosyncratic factors such as lower oil prices and slower economic growth, and thus may be more challenged in a period of high market uncertainty. For this reason, we recently suggested investors consider adding back some interest rate exposure into portfolios, as a hedge against equity risk. Currencies After rallying close to 11 percent in 2015, the U.S. Dollar (USD) has become a very crowded trade and has suffered amid this year’s economic growth concerns, with the Bloomberg Dollar Index Spot (DXY) down close to 1 percent year to date. Looking forward, the further the Fed is from achieving its economic goals, the more likely the USD is to suffer. Still, it’s unlikely that the Fed will move to negative interest rates, as this would represent a sharp and abrupt reversal of the central bank’s December hike, and we haven’t seen economic data negative enough to warrant such an action. On the other hand, with the recent commitment from the Bank of Japan (BOJ) of more stimulus, and expectations that the European Central Bank (ECB) is on the verge of another deposit rate cut, the euro and yen may weaken versus the dollar. As such, to the extent that the Fed’s policies continue to diverge from that of other major central banks, it’s still worth considering hedged currency positions for certain international equity exposures. Of course, there’s much to be determined with respect to the impacts of NIRP, and just how widespread the policy will become globally is still uncertain. But what’s certain is that economic textbooks are being rewritten, and this will inevitably impact various asset classes. Russ Koesterich , CFA, is the Chief Investment Strategist for BlackRock. He is a regular contributor to The Blog . Terry Simpson, CFA, contributed to this post. He is a Global Investment Strategist for BlackRock. all the media mentions http://www.marketwatch.com/story/negative-interest-rates-more-bad-news-for-savers-2016-02-25 have implemented negative interest rates lately https://www.blackrockblog.com/2016/02/22/problems-negative-interest-rates/ into negative territory too http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/11/fed-chair-yellen-theres-always-some-chance-of-recession.html our view of the global financial sector to neutral https://www.blackrock.com/investing/literature/market-commentary/investmentdirections-en-us.pdf?cid=blog:negative:blackrockblog:russ U.S. high yield and emerging debt, are suffering from idiosyncratic factors https://www.blackrock.com/investing/insights/investmentdirections?cid=blog:negative:blackrockblog:russ suggested https://www.blackrockblog.com/2016/02/09/ballast-portfolio-bonds/ the1uploader 8:55 am on 2016-03-20 Permalink (https://the1uploader.wordpress.com/2016/03/20/negative-interest-rate-policy/)
Negative Interest Rate Policy Krisis Finansil Cina: Perspektif Kebijakan Moneter, Corporate Finance (Analisa Laporan Keuangan), dan Investment Banking (Valuasi Nilai) oleh : Sando Sasako Jakarta, 28 Maret 2016 ISBN 978-602-73508-5-4 Untuk mendapatkan buku ini, silahkan hubungi kami di +62 851 0518 7118
Daftar Isi Kata Pengantar iii Kata Pengantar dalam buku ‘Corporate Financing’ v Daftar Isi vii Daftar Tabel x Daftar Bagan xi Pendahuluan 1 Masalah Pengukuran 1 Data, Informasi, Fakta 2 Data Mining 4 Pemilahan Data 5 Business Intelligence 7 Analisa Kuantitatif 8 Analisa Data 8 Self-Organising Map 9 Hambatan bagi Efektivitas Analisa Data 11 Confirmatory Data Analysis 11 Analisa Finansil 11 Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK, GAAP, IFRS) 12 Peran Perusahaan Audit dalam PSAK 12 Analisa Finansil sebagai Alat Ukur Kinerja Keuangan 12 Analisa Fundamental 13 Rasio-rasio Finansil 14 Pertumbuhan 14 Produktivitas 14 Kontribusi terhadap Stakeholder 14 Dividend Policy Ratios 14 Rasio-rasio Aktivitas Usaha 15 Perputaran aset (asset turnover) 15 Perputaran aset rata-rata (asset turnover) 15 Rasio perputaran aset tetap (fixed assets turnover) 15 Perputaran piutang (receivables turnover) 16 Rata-rata periode penagihan (average collection period) 16 Perputaran inventaris (inventory turnover) 16 Periode inventaris (inventory period) 16 Rasio-rasio Likuiditas 17 Rasio lancar (current ratio, CR) 17 Rasio modal kerja (working capital ratio) 18 Rasio cepat (quick ratio, QR) 18 Rasio kas (cash ratio) 18 Pendapatan lancar (current income) 19 Rasio pendapatan bunga (Time Interest Earned, Interest Coverage) 19 Rasio investasi terhadap kebijakan (investment to policy ratio) 19 Rasio utang lancar terhadap inventaris (current debts to inventory ratio) 19 Rasio-rasio Profitabilitas 19 Marjin laba kotor (gross profit margin) 20 Marjin laba bersih (net profit margin) 20 Return on Equity (ROE) 20 Return on Asset (ROA) dan Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 20 Return on Capital (ROC) dan Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 21 Return on Investment (ROI) 21 Beban bunga (Interest Coverage, Times Interest Earned) 22 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 22 Efisiensi beban finansil (efficiency of financial leverage) 22 Rasio-rasio Struktur Modal 23 Rasio utang terhadap modal (debt to equity ratio) 23 Rasio kapitalisasi (capitalisation ratio) 24 Tingkat pertumbuhan ekuitas (equity growth rate) 24 Beban finansil (financial leverage) 24 Rasio utang (debt ratio) 24 Rasio modal saham terhadap aset tetap bersih 24 Rasio utang lancar terhadap modal saham (Current Debts to Net Worth Ratio) 24 Rasio kewajiban total terhadap modal saham (Total Liabilities to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio aset tetap terhadap modal saham (Fixed Assets to Net Worth Ratio) 25 Rasio-rasio Kecukupan Modal 25 Solvabilitas 25 Solvency ratio (SR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap aset (Debt to Asset Ratio, DAR) 26 Rasio utang terhadap modal (Debt to Equity Ratio, DER) 26 Kemampuan laba menutup biaya tetap (Fixed Charge Coverage). 26 Rasio pinjaman terhadap aset (Loan to Asset Ratio, LAR) 27 Rasio pinjaman terhadap simpanan (Loan to Deposit Ratio, LDR) 27 Risks vs Rewards 27 Risiko Mencari Keuntungan 28 Efek Domino Risiko 29 Rent-Seeking Behaviours 30 When the Deal Slips Away 32 Indikator Kesulitan Finansil 34 Indeks Kerentanan 36 Stress Test 38 Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan 40 Financial Stability Index 43 Indeks Kesehatan Finansil ala IMF 44 Laporan Stabilitas Finansil Global ala IMF 48 Operasi Moneter 48 Inflasi Terencana sebagai Prasyarat Kestabilan Finansil 50 Dinamika Pasar Finansil 52 Dinamika Aset Finansil 53 Kerapuhan Sistem Finansil 54 Krisis Finansil 55 Menelikung Krisis Finansil 56 Kasus LTCM 57 Krisis Subprime Mortgage 60 Kasus Lehman Brothers 63 Krisis Eurozone 64 Spiral Kekacauan Krisis Eurozone 65 Debt Exposures of PIGS 66 AS 68 Inggris 69 Jerman 69 Perancis 70 Jepang 71 Yunani 72 Irlandia 73 Italia 74 Portugis 74 Spanyol 75 Some PIGS are More PIGS 76 Krisis Finansil Cina 77 Kenapa Cina menjadi begitu penting? 78 Bermain dengan nilai tukar 81 Pasar CNH 82 Dominansi nilai tukar CNH terhadap CNY 87 Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 90 Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 91 Qualified Domestic Individual Investor 91 Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect 91 Pilot Free Trade Zones 91 Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds 92 Kenapa pasar finansil Cina bisa crash? 92 Ketika gelembung finansil Cina mulai pecah 93 Pelonggaran likuiditas sebagai solusi ancaman resesi 94 Aksi pemadam kebakaran ala pemerintah Cina 96 Permasalahan fundamental ekonomi Cina 99 Beban utang Cina 101 Kebijakan dan otoritas moneter Cina 102 Pasar obligasi Cina 103 Obligasi Panda 105 Obligasi dim sum 106 Daftar emisi obligasi dim sum 108 Aksi pemerintah Cina terhadap masalah tunggakan utang 110 Policy and Politicisation 113 Primary Dealer 113 Solusi Teoritis, Bisa dan Benarkah? 116 Kebijakan Too Big To Fail 117 Cashless Solution 118 Minyak sebagai Mata Uang dan Sumber Kemakmuran 120 Negative Interest Rates Policy 125 Kas 129 Pengadaan Aset 130 Asset Investment 130 Asset Financing 131 Capital Expenditures 132 Menghitung Biaya Modal 134 Biaya utang 134 Biaya saham preferensi 134 Biaya laba ditahan 134 Biaya ekuitas eksternal 135 WACC 135 Biaya modal marjinal 136 Break point 136 Off-Balance Sheet Financing 136 Perubahan Portofolio The Fed 136 OBS sebagai Produk Inovasi Menyembunyikan Risiko Finansil 137 MBS sebagai Produk Rekayasa Finansil Penyebab Krisis 2008 139 Bencana Prilaku Berisiko Berlebihan 141 Bertaruh pada Aset Fiktif 142 Akuntansi OBS 144 Fleksibilitas Pasal Karet 145 Penyesuaian Pasal Karet 146 Memanfaatkan Celah Hukum 147 Equity Financing 148 Debt Financing 149 Struktur Modal 152 Teori Struktur Modal 153 Teori Pensinyalan 154 Struktur Modal dalam Praktek dan Realitas 155 Menghitung Tingkat Optimal Struktur Modal 155 Besar Beban Operasi 156 Analisis EBIT/EPS terhadap Efek Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Finansil 157 Besar Beban Total 158 Efek Struktur Modal terhadap Harga Saham dan Biaya Modal 159 Likuiditas dan Arus Kas 159 Struktur Finansil 160 Ukuran Optimal Beban/Struktur Finansil 161 Valuasi Nilai 162 Corporate Financing vs Investment Banking 163 Pentingnya Valuasi Nilai 164 Valuasi Usaha 164 Komponen Pendapatan 166 Komponen Neraca 167 Komponen Arus Kas 167 Time Value of Money 168 Future Value 169 Future Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Present Value 169 Present Value Interest Factor for i & n 169 Future Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 169 Future Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Future Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value Interest Factor untuk Anuitas Biasa 170 Present Value untuk Anuitas Awal 170 Present Value untuk Perpetuities 171 Present Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Aliran Arus Kas Variabel 171 Future Value untuk Periode Semesteran atau lainnya 171 Amortisasi Pinjaman 172 Referensi 173 Web 173 e-book 177 Buku 180 Daftar Lampiran Lampiran – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 183 Lampiran – Ukuran dan skenario dalam laporan stabilitas finansil global, Okt. 2015 185 Ukuran likuiditas 185 Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 187 Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Lampiran – Ukuran Kerentanan Finansil 193 Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Lampiran – Daftar Indikator dalam ISSK Bank Indonesia 197 Lampiran – Profil Cina 199 Lampiran – Jumlah (instrumen) utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 201 Daftar Tabel Table 1 – Aktivitas M&A di business intelligence dengan nilai >$100 juta, 2009-2014q1 7 Table 2 – Beberapa indikator kebijakan macroprudential 36 Table 3 – Indikator pengukuran stabilitas sistem keuangan 42 Table 4 – Indikator utama kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 5 – Indikator tambahan (encouraged) bagi kesehatan finansil ala IMF 45 Table 6 – Indikator parsial dan bobot dalam indeks stabilitas perbankan Republik Ceko 47 Table 7 – Indikator kesehatan finansil ala ECS (Macro-Prudential Indicators) 47 Table 8 – Tiga skenario stabilitas finansil 48 Table 9 – Operasi moneter menurut standing facility 49 Table 10 – Pentingnya likuiditas yang lentur (resilient) 50 Table 11 – Penambahan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 12 – Penyerapan likuiditas menurut jenis instrumen OPT 50 Table 13 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk 5 produk utama, 2014-2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 14 – Nilai ekspor dan impor AS-Cina untuk produk teknologi tinggi, 2015 (US$ juta) 100 Table 15 – PDB Cina, 2010-2014 dalam milyaran dan US$ 101 Table 16 – Nilai obligasi pemerintah dan korporasi di Cina, 2002-2015 (US$ milyar) 101 Table 17 – Buletin harga obligasi di pasar uang Hong Kong, 11 Maret 2016 107 Table 18 – Daftar 22 primary dealer di Amerika Serikat, 2014 114 Table 19 – Beberapa veteran primary dealer pilihan Bank Sentral Amerika 114 Table 20 – Daftar 19 primary dealer di Indonesia, 2014-2015 115 Table 21 – Nilai derivatif 25 bank terbesar di AS, Nov. 2015 (US$ milyar) 119 Table 22 – Ringkasan Perlakuan Transaksi Sekuritisasi menurut UK GAAP 145 Table 23 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (AT-ES) 181 Table 24 – Jenis data yang digunakan dalam laporan stabilitas finansil beberapa bank sentral (GB-TR, ECB, IMF) 182 Table 25 – Variabel yang umum dipakai sebagai ukuran stabilitas finansil 184 Table 26 – Ukuran likuiditas 186 Table 27 – Ukuran utang korporasi di pasar emerging 188 Table 28 – Asumsi dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 189 Table 29 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario gangguan pada pasar aset global 190 Table 30 – Asumsi dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 191 Table 31 – Mekanisme transmisi kejutan dalam skenario normalisasi yang berhasil 192 Table 32 – Indikator valuasi risk appetite / aset 193 Table 33 – Indikator ketidakseimbangan non-finansil 194 Table 34 – Indikator kerentanan finansil 195 Table 35 – Indikator Kebijakan Macroprudential 196 Table 36 – Daftar indikator pembentuk ISSK 197 Table 37 – Profil Singkat Cina 199 Table 38 – Indikator Ekonomi Cina, 2011-2017 200 Table 39 – Utang Cina menurut emiten, domestik, nasional, internasional, 2015Q2-2015Q4 202 Daftar Bagan Figure 1 – Diagram alur hierarki DIKW (Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom) 3 Figure 2 – Kontinuum pemahaman dalam konteks DIKW 3 Figure 3 – Proses data mining 4 Figure 4 – Hubungan antara Data, Informasi, dan Intelijen 6 Figure 5 – Analisa eksplorasi data 9 Figure 6 – Taksonomi ketidakpastian 27 Figure 7 – Igloo ketidakpastian 28 Figure 8 – PV perusahaan berutang 32 Figure 9 – Skema indeks kerentanan dan komponennya 37 Figure 10 – Siklus pengawasan macroprudential 38 Figure 11 – Prasyarat bagi antisipasi dan pencegahan ketidakstabilan sistem finansil 39 Figure 12 – Hubungan antara stabilitas sistem finansil dan stabilitas moneter 39 Figure 13 – Keterkaitan antar-variabel dalam BAMBI (Banking Model of Bank Indonesia) 41 Figure 14 – Beberapa indikator pembentuk Indeks Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan (ISSK) 42 Figure 15 – Peran Bank Indonesia dalam menciptakan stabilitas moneter 49 Figure 16 – Bentuk interaksi antara BI, pempus, dan pemda dalam mengendalikan inflasi 51 Figure 17 – Perkembangan aktivitas perbankan internasional 52 Figure 18 – Aset Riel dan Aset Fiktif Bank-bank di AS, 1995–2000 58 Figure 19 – Nilai Derivatif dan Modal 25 Bank AS Ternama (US$ milyar) 59 Figure 20 – CDOs direpresentasikan dalam bentuk building blocks, The Big Short, 2015 60 Figure 21 – Pasar rumah di AS, 1989-2006 61 Figure 22 – Pemetaan proses penularan krisis finansil 2008 62 Figure 23 – Pinjaman sektoral dari Bank of England, 1997-2012 63 Figure 24 – Utang-piutang PIGS 67 Figure 25 – Utang AS ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 68 Figure 26 – Utang Inggris ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 69 Figure 27 – Utang Jerman ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 70 Figure 28 – Utang Perancis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 29 – Utang Jepang ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 71 Figure 30 – Utang Yunani ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 72 Figure 31 – Utang Irlandia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 73 Figure 32 – Utang Italia ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 74 Figure 33 – Utang Portugis ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 75 Figure 34 – Utang Spanyol ke 4 negara adidaya dan PIGS 76 Figure 35 – Cadangan Devisa Cina, Des. 1999 – Jan. 2016 78 Figure 36 – Tiga Kekuatan Ekonomi Dunia 79 Figure 37 – Nilai perdagangan Cina dengan negara lain (impor + ekspor) 80 Figure 38 – Nilai tukar bilateral yuan terhadap 3 mata uang dunia, USD, ¥, dan €. 81 Figure 39 – Cadangan devisa Cina dan nilai tukar CNY dan CNH 83 Figure 40 – Selisih CNY dengan CNH, Agustus 2010-Januari 2016 83 Figure 41 – Selisih tajam antara CNY dan CNH berdampak pada lonjakan bunga antar-bank di bulan Januari 2016 84 Figure 42 – Intervensi pasar CNH bisa menyesuaikan bunga CNH dengan CNY, 20151110-20160126 85 Figure 43 – Pasar deposit CNH, Maret 2009 – Des. 2015 86 Figure 44 – Distribusi CNH menurut bank sentral (offshore yuan’s swap line), Nov. 2015 88 Figure 45 – Penyelesaian perdagangan dalam CNH, 2009Q3-2015Q4 89 Figure 46 – Pasar deposit CNH menurut negara, 2014 89 Figure 47 – Beberapa alternatif indikator pertumbuhan ekonomi Cina mengacu pada penurunan yang lebih besar (greater slowdown), 2010–2015 95 Figure 48 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai (SCI), Mei 2015 sampai 5 Februari 2016 97 Figure 49 – Indeks Saham Gabungan Shanghai, 1 Januari 2015 – 8 Maret 2016 98 Figure 50 – Triple policy trilemma 99 Figure 51 – Pasar obligasi Cina, 2003-2014 104 Figure 52 – Aktivitas perdagangan pasar sekunder obligasi Cina, 2000-2014 104 Figure 53 – Pangsa pasar obligasi Cina menurut jenis obligasi, Des. 2014 104 Figure 54 – Daftar emisi obligasi Panda, 20151010-20160121 106 Figure 55 – Emisi obligasi CNY, 2008-2015 111 Figure 56 – Emisi obligasi CNH, 2008-2015 111 Figure 57 – Asset backed securities di Cina, 2005-2014 112 Figure 58 – Peristiwa bersejarah dan harga minyak mentah, 1861-2014 (US$/b) 121 Figure 59 – Harga minyak mentah Brent (US$), 20040102-20160106 123 Figure 60 – Kelebihan pasokan minyak mentah dunia, 2012q3-2015q3 123 Figure 61 – Distribusi ladang produksi minyak shale AS, April 2015 124 Figure 62 – Suku bunga deposito dan pembiayaan ulang ECB, 2008-Maret 2016 127 Figure 63 – Prediksi nilai tengah suku bunga Federal Funds, Des. 2015-2019 127 Figure 64 – Federal funds target rata (%), 1983-2015 128 Figure 65 – Federal funds rate, 1 Juli 1954-18 Feb. 2016 128 Figure 66 – Skema sumber pendanaan perusahaan 130 Figure 67 – Factors adding to reserves and off balance sheet securities lending program 137 Figure 68 – Multiplikasi Penciptaan Aset Fiktif 143 Figure 69 – Klasifikasi struktur aset, struktur finansil, dan struktur kapital 161 Contents 10 Monetary Policy – Effects of Interest Rate Changes 09 Effect of raising interest rates 11 When interest rates rise 12 20160129 Federal Reserve: Credibility on the line 13 20160131 Economists see 20% chance of US recession 14 201602 Guess who’s spending again? 04 20160206 Debt, defaults, and devaluations: why this market crash is like nothing we’ve seen before 06 20160201 NK-The Potential Power of Negative Nominal Interest Rates 05 20160209 NK-Negative Rates: A Gigantic Fiscal Policy Failure 02 20160210 BlackRock: Negative rates ‘new toy’ around world 03 20160215 Mapped: Negative central bank interest rates now herald new danger for the world 07 20160215 NK-Staying Positive About Going Negative 01 20160216 The consequences of negative interest rates 08 20160216 NK-Monetary Policy and Ending Too-Big-To-Fail 15 20160317 The appearance of disappearance: the CIA’s secret black sites 10 Monetary Policy – Effects of Interest Rate Changes 2016-03-20 08:00 PM http://www.tutor2u.net/economics/reference/monetary-policy-effects-of-interest-rate-changes Monetary Policy – Effects of Interest Rate Changes Geoff Riley How do changes in policy interest rates affect the macroeconomy? cpi_inflation_base_rates.jpg The Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism It is worth remembering that when the Bank of England is making an interest rate decision, there will be lots of other events and policy decisions being made elsewhere in the economy, for example changes in fiscal policy by the government, or perhaps a change in world oil prices or the exchange rate. In macroeconomics the ceteris paribus assumption (all other factors held equal) rarely applies! * There are several ways in which changes in interest rates influence aggregate demand, output and prices. These are collectively known as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy * One of the channels that the Monetary Policy Committee in the UK can use to influence aggregate demand, and inflation, is via the lending and borrowing rates charged in the financial markets. * When the Bank’s own base interest rate goes up, then commercial banks and building societies will typically increase how much they charge on loans and the interest that they offer on savings. * This tends to discourage businesses from taking out loans to finance investment and encourages the consumer to save rather than spend – and so depresses aggregate demand * Conversely, when the base rate falls, banks cut the market rates offered on loans and savings and the effect ought to be a stimulus to demand and output. A key influence played by interest rate changes is the effect on confidence – in particular household’s confidence about their own personal financial circumstances. mon_policy_transmission.png Transmission mechanism of monetary policy Monetary Policy in Action Australia Cuts Interest Rates to Boost Growth Australia’s central bank has cut its main policy interest rate to a new record low, in an attempt to spur a fresh wave of economic growth. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) cut its key rate to 2.5% from 2.75%. The decision to make monetary policy more expansionary came a short while after the Australian government cut its GDP growth forecasts and warned that unemployment in the country could rise amid a slowdown in output and business investment. Source: Adapted from news reports Monetary Policy Asymmetry * Fluctuations in interest rates do not have a uniform impact on the economy. Some industries are more affected by interest rate changes than others, for example exporters and industries connected to the housing market. And, some regions are also more sensitive to a change in the direction of interest rates. * The markets and businesses most affected by changes in interest rates are those where demand is interest elastic in other words, demand responds elastically to a change in interest rates or indirectly through changes in the exchange rate * Good examples of interest-sensitive industries include those directly linked to the housing market¸ exporters of manufactured goods, the construction industry and leisure services * In contrast, the demand for basic foods and utilities is less affected by short-term fluctuations in interest rates and is affected more by changes in commodity prices such as oil and gas. mon_policy_evaluation_effects.png Evaluating the effects of interest rate changes Ultra low interest rates in the UK from 2009-2014 * The Bank of England started cutting monetary policy interest rates in the autumn of 2008 as the credit crunch was starting to bite and business and consumer confidence was taking a huge hit. By the start of 2009 rates were down to 3% and they carried on falling * By the summer of 2009 the policy interest rate in the UK was 0.5% and the Bank of England had reached the point of no return when it comes to cutting interest rates * The decision to reduce official base rates to their minimum was in response to evidence of a deepening recession and fears of price deflation * Ultra-low interest rates are an example of an expansionary monetary policy i.e. a policy designed to deliberately boost aggregate demand and output. In theory cutting interest rates close to zero provides a big monetary stimulus – this means that: * Mortgage payers have less interest to pay – increasing their effective disposable income * Cheaper loans should provide a possible floor for house prices in the property market * Businesses will be under less pressure to meet interest payments on their loans * The cost of consumer credit should fall encouraging the purchase of big-ticket items such as a new car or kitchen * Lower interest rates might cause a depreciation of sterling thereby boosting the competitiveness of the export sector * Lower rates are designed to boost consumer and business confidence But some analysts argue that in current circumstances, a period of low interest rates has little impact on demand. Several reasons have been put forward for this: * The unwillingness of banks to lend – most banks have become risk-averse and they have cut the size of their loan books and making credit harder to obtain * Low consumer confidence – people are not prepared to commit to major purchases because the recession has made people risk averse. Weak expectations lower the effect of rate changes on consumer demand – i.e. there is a low interest elasticity of demand. * Huge levels of debt still need to be paid off including over £200bn on credit cards * Falling or slowing rise asset prices makes it unlikely that cheap mortgages will provide an immediate boost to the housing market. * Although official monetary policy interest rates are now close to zero, the rate of interest charged on loans and overdrafts has actually increased – the cost of borrowing using credit cards and bank loans is a high multiple of the policy rate. Little wonder that many smaller businesses have complained that the Bank of England’s policy of ‘cheap money’ has done little to improve their situation during the recession and in the early stages of the recovery. mon_policy_boe_challenges.png Some of the challenges facing the Bank of England when operating monetary policy Negative Interest Rates (Explained in 60 Seconds) 09 Effect of raising interest rates 2016-03-20 07:31 PM http://www.economicshelp.org/macroeconomics/monetary-policy/effect-raising-interest-rates/ Effect of raising interest rates Tejvan The main interest rate is set by the Bank of England. This is known as the base rate. If the Bank of England is worried that inflation is likely to increase, then they may decide to increase interest rates to reduce demand and reduce the rate of economic growth. Usually, if the Bank of England increase base rates it will lead to higher commercial rates too. Higher interest rates have various economic effects: 1. Increases the cost of borrowing. Interest payments on credit cards and loans are more expensive. Therefore this discourages people from borrowing and saving. People who already have loans will have less disposable income because they spend more on interest payments. Therefore other areas of consumption will fall. 2. Increase in mortgage interest payments. Related to the first point is the fact that interest payments on variable mortgages will increase. This will have a big impact on consumer spending. This is because a 0. 5% increase in interest rates can increase the cost of a £100,000 mortgage by £60 per month. This is a significant impact on personal discretionary income. 3. Increased incentive to save rather than spend. Higher interest rates make it more attractive to save in a deposit account because of the interest gained. 4. Higher interest rates increase the value of pound (due to hot money flows. Investors are more likely to save in British banks if UK rates are higher than other countries) A stronger Pound makes UK exports less competitive – reducing exports and increasing imports. This has the effect of reducing Aggregate demand in the economy. 5. Rising interest rates affect both consumers and firms. Therefore the economy is likely to experience falls in consumption and investment. 6. Government debt interest payments increase. The UK currently pays over £23bn a year on its own national debt. Higher interest rates increase the cost of government interest payments. This could lead to higher taxes in the future. 7. Reduced confidence. Interest rates have an effect on consumer and business confidence. A rise in interest rates discourages investment; it makes firms and consumers less willing to take out risky investments and purchases. Therefore, higher interest rates will tend to reduce consumer spending and investment. This will lead to a fall in Aggregate Demand (AD). If we get lower AD, then it will tend to cause * Lower economic growth (even negative growth – recession) * Higher unemployment. If output falls, firms will produce less goods and therefore will demand less workers. * Improvement in the current account. Higher rates will reduce spending on imports and the lower inflation will help improve the competitiveness of exports. AD/AS diagram showing impact of Interest rates on AD Effect of higher interest rates fall-AD3.jpg Evaluation of higher interest rates * Higher interest rates affect people in different ways. The effect of higher interest rates does not affect each consumer equally. Those consumers with large mortgages (often first time buyers in the 20s and 30s) will be disproportionately affected by rising interest rates. For example, reducing inflation may require interest rates to rise to a level that cause real hardship to those with large mortgages. However, those with savings may actually be better off. This makes monetary policy less effective as a macro economic tool. * Time lags. The effect of rising interest rates can often take up to 18 months to have an effect. For example, if you have an investment project 50% completed, you are likely to finish it off. However, the higher interest rates may discourage starting a new project in the next year. * It depends upon other variables in the economy. At times, a rise in interest rates may have less impact on reducing the growth of consumer spending. For example, if house prices continue to rise very quickly, people may feel that there is a real incentive to keep spending despite the rise in interest rates. * Real interest rate. It is worth bearing in mind that what is important is the real interest rate. The real interest rate is nominal interest rates minus inflation. Thus if interest rates rose from 5% to 6% but inflation rose from 2% to 5.5 %. This actually represents a cut in real interest rates from 3% (5-2) to 0.5% (6-5.5) Thus in this circumstance the rise in nominal interest rates actually represents expansionary monetary policy. * It depends whether increases in the interest rate are passed onto consumers. Banks may decide to reduce their profit margins and keep commercial rates unchanged. 11 When interest rates rise 2016-03-20 08:06 PM http://ig.ft.com/sites/when-rates-rise/#what-is-happening When interest rates rise Financial Times What’s happening? Federal Reserve keeps close eye on market moves The US central bank met on January 27 – its first policy meeting since it raised interest rates for the first time in nearly a decade at the end of last year. The Fed said it was keeping a close eye on the volatility in financial markets since its historic rate decision, but signalled that it would not rush to judgement over its plans for adjusting the interest rate. But there is already growing criticism about its decision to raise rates at all. How fast will rates rise? There are different ways to guess. One of these is by looking at the Fed Fund futures markets, where investors essentially bet on what level the interest rate will be in upcoming months What does the market “think”? Probability of a range of interest rate outcomes based on Fed Fund future contract prices Federal funds effective interest rate 96%4%92%8%88%11%86%13%1%81%17%1%76%21%2%62%32%6%1%Mar 16 2016Apr 27 2016Jun 15 2016Jul 27 2016Sep 21 2016Nov 01 2016Dec 14 2016 Source: CME Group Updated hourly What does the Fed say? Interest rate predictions from December 2015 meeting; median values highlighted Interest rate predictions: median values 012342015201620172018Longer Run0.375%1.375%2.375%3.25%3.5% Source: Federal Reserve What do economists think? Economists have downgraded their expectations of the US central bank’s ability to tighten policy this year, with their median forecast coming in halfway between two and three 25 basis point rate rises in 2016. Half of those surveyed by the Financial Times in January said the Fed would lift two or fewer times. How will this affect me? and other frequently asked questions US economy What is at stake if the Fed raises rates? Why is the Fed considering raising interest rates now? Why have rates in the US been held so low for so long? Is the US economy ready to cope with interest rate rises? How fast are rates likely to rise? Will they return to pre-crisis levels? How does a rise in central bank interest rates get transmitted to the wider economy? US business Are businesses ready for an increase in borrowing costs? What are zombie companies and why are we concerned about them? US consumers What will a rate rise mean for my personal finances? Are US consumers in general prepared for rates to rise? Financial Markets How will investors react to higher US interest rates? How are currency traders positioning themselves in the anticipation of rate rises? What investments are most sensitive to interest rate rises? What about the UK? Will the UK automatically follow the US in raising rates? What are we expecting from UK interest rate rises? The rest of the world Are all major central banks around the world thinking of raising interest rates? Why would a rate rise in the US impact the emerging market countries? Jargon buster What is tightening and loosening? What is monetary policy? Who makes the rate decisions within the Federal Reserve? What is at stake when the Fed raises rates? A lot. The effects of a Fed rate rise is transmitted not just through to banks and businesses in the US, but also has an impacct on the global economy. video Why is the Fed raising interest rates now? America has seen its longest private sector hiring spurt on record, and unemployment has halved since its peak. The Fed thinks the hot jobs market could spur a pickup in inflation and wages. Given it is tasked with keeping inflation low, it is considering raising the cost of borrowing to keep the economy on an even keel. Unemployment has halved since its peak in 2009 %20000204060810121416180246810 Source: Bloomberg Why have rates in the US been held so low for so long? The US was hit by the crash in its housing market and banking sector between 2007-09. The Fed felt it needed to pull out all of the stops to prevent the economy from collapsing into a new Great Depression. One way of keeping things afloat was by cutting the cost of borrowing to rock-bottom levels. Federal funds effective interest rate %1950607080902000102005101520 Source: Bloomberg Is the US economy ready to cope with interest rate rises? That is the trillion dollar question – and opinions vary widely. To optimists, the Fed has managed to engineer a respectable recovery that is outshining many other economies. They say a quarter-point increase, as the Fed has announced, would have a negligible impact but is a sensible first step to ensure the Fed stays ahead of inflation. Sceptics warn that inflation remains on the floor and the Fed risks roiling world markets and pushing up the dollar if it acts too soon. How fast are rates likely to rise? Not fast at all – if the Fed is to be believed. One of the mantras adopted by Chair Janet Yellen this year has been that rate rises will be gradual. The pace of increases is expected to be less than half the tempo of the Fed’s last round of rate rises, which started in 2004. And the ultimate rate they stop at is likely to be very low too, at less than 4 per cent. Will they return to pre-crisis levels? Not for the foreseeable future, according to Fed policymakers’ own projections. The Fed believes the rate compatible with stable growth and prices has sunk sharply because of the lingering effects of the crisis and will increase only gradually. In this subdued postcrisis world, the central bank will need to keep its foot on the accelerator for some time to come. How does a rise in central bank interest rates get transmitted to the wider economy? Adjusting the federal funds rate – the rate banks charge each other for short-term loans – affects other short term rates paid by firms and households. These movements also have knock-on effects on long-term rates, including mortgages and corporate bonds. Changes in long-term rates will have an influence on asset prices, including the equity market. During the crisis the Fed also purchased longer-term mortgage backed securities and Treasury bonds to lower the level of long-term rates. These purchases could now make the mechanics of raising rates more complicated for the Federal Reserve. Read more about why this is the case. US business Are businesses ready for an increase in borrowing costs? Many corporations have taken advantage of the low rate environment to borrow money via the bond markets. Most companies say they are relaxed about the impact of a small rate hike, believing the market has already priced their bonds or such an event. However, some economists say the interest payments for companies who have issued low-grade debt could rise more quickly. What are zombie companies and why are we concerned about them? Zombie companies are enterprises that have been able to stay in business primarily because of the persistence of ultra-low interest rates, and which would be unable to survive a rate hike. Many of these companies will go under when their borrowing costs rise, but some, such as “bond king” Bill Gross, think this could be a good thing. They argue that when weak companies file for bankruptcy, their owners and employees often go on to work for more successful ventures, which is ultimately a good thing for the economy. US consumers What will a rate rise mean for my personal finances? An upward move in short-term interest rates will be positive for savers who have been missing out on interest on their deposits. But the change could also be transmitted to a range of other interest rates, including car loans, credit cards and mortgages, which would make them more costly. Are US consumers in general prepared for rates to rise? The burden of household debt has fallen since the crisis, reaching 114 per cent of net disposable income last year, according to OECD statistics, suggesting consumers are better prepared for higher borrowing costs. In addition, a quarter-point hike would still leave rates at historically low levels. Financial Markets How are investors reacting to higher US interest rates? Investors’ immediate reaction to the first rate rise in nearly a decade was generally one of relief that it is finally happening. The end of the Fed’s “zero interest rate policy” has been anxiously anticipated by investors for more than a year, but policymakers have worked hard to stress that the coming monetary tightening cycle will be exceptionally gentle, to avoid a repeat of the market “taper tantrum” that erupted when they announced the end of quantitative easing. From the intial market movements after the rate rise decision was announced, it seems they have succeeded. How are currency traders positioning themselves? Currency markets are fickle, but differences in interest rates tend to drive movements in the longer-run. For example, if a European investor can borrow cheaply in Berlin and buy a higher-yielding US bond, then all else being equal the dollar will rise versus the euro. As a result, the dollar started the year in rip-roaring fashion, with an index measuring the US currency against a basket of its peers rocketing to a 12-year high, as investors bet on the Fed tightening monetary policy and bond yield differences widened. Since then it has continued to beat up emerging market currencies but the broad rally has fizzled out as the euro and the Japanese yen have regained their footing. However, many analysts and fund managers expect the greenback to continue to climb higher in the coming years, as the Fed raises interest rates further. What investments are most sensitive to interest rate rises? Almost every asset class on the planet exhibits some evidence of frothiness these days, but some seem more vulnerable to higher interest rates. Normally, higher interest rates indicates that economic growth is firm, and that is good for listed companies. Gold typically loses its shine when interest rates climb, as the metal doesn’t pay any interest like a bank account will, but has already been beaten up heavily recently. The bond market looks more exposed. Highly rated debt is trading with very low yields, which means they are vulnerable to even a modest rise in Fed interest rates, while bonds issued by companies rated “junk” could suffer if more expensive borrowing tips some weaker groups into bankruptcy. What about the UK? Will the UK automatically follow the US in raising rates? There is no automatic or formal link between US and UK interest rates but the widespread expectation is that the Bank of England will be the next central bank after the US to raise rates. The UK’s economic recovery is well on track, with solid growth and a strong labour market. The Bank of England typically follows the Federal Reserve’s lead %Fed target rateBoE base rate1910203040506070809020001020051015 Source: Bloomberg Historically, US and UK market interest rates, as measured by government bond yields, have also moved in tandem. These are the rates, set by the financial markets that feed down into the real costs of borrowing for households and companies. Bond yields move in tandem %10yr US bond yield10yr UK bond yield196070809020001020051015 Source: Bloomberg What are we expecting from UK interest rate rises? Bank of England governor Mark Carney has stressed that while the next move in rates is likely to be upwards, the path of increases will be “limited and gradual”. While refusing to be drawn on precise timing, Mr Carney said the decision of whether to start lifting rates was likely to come into “sharper relief” around the turn of the year. Analysts are not predicting the first rise until February at the earliest, with many pushing the timing back into the late spring. The rest of the world Are all major central banks around the world thinking of raising interest rates? No. The Bank of England is widely expected to follow the Fed and raise rates, most likely some time in the new year. But as the prolonged weakness in oil prices continues to keep inflation low, many central banks in the rich world are expected to loosen monetary policy further, for example expanding their programmes of quantitative easing. Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, paved the way for an extension of QE and the Bank of Japan cut its rates to negative territory in January. In China, the central bank may also cut rates further to stimulate growth. The outlook for emerging markets is harder to gauge: were a Fed hike to trigger turmoil across Africa, Asia and Latin America, countries there may choose to cut rates to help the economy, or increase them in order to dissuade investors from taking their money abroad. Why would a rate rise in the US impact the emerging market countries? We have already seen one of the main impacts: a stronger US dollar, backed by higher US interest rates, tends to depress the values of emerging market currencies at a time when many EM economies are already weakening and their currencies have already slumped against the greenback. The Fed’s rate rise could exacerbate the EM currency turmoil, and even help precipitate a full-blown crisis. video Jargon buster What is tightening and loosening? When a central bank “loosens” or “eases” policy it essentially increases the supply of money in the economy and pushes down the cost of borrowing. This could be by lowering interest rates, or buying more assets with the aim of putting more money into circulation and encouraging greater economic activity. “Tightening” is the opposite. If policymakers worry that an economy is begin to overheat, potentially generating too much inflation, they can tighten policy – such as raising the interest rate they charge banks to borrow from them, to make the cost of credit more expensive. Changes to interest rates can take-up to 18 months to feed through into the real economy. What is monetary policy? Central bankers control more than just interest rates. “Monetary policy” is a broad brush term for a whole range of actions, including things like selling or buying assets such as government bonds, raising or reducing the amount of capital banks need to hold against liabilities, and raising or lowering interest rates. All of these actions impact the cost and supply of money in an economy which are the main levers central banks use to try and keep inflation at its target level and the economy growing at a sustainable speed. Changes in monetary policy can take-up to 18 months to feed through into the real economy. Who makes the rate decisions within the Federal Reserve? The Federal Open Market Committee, sometimes called the FOMC. This group of people are responsible for determining monetary policy, which means they decide whether rates will go up or down. The FOMC has 12 members: The seven people on the Fed’s board of governors, plus five of the 12 Reserve Bank presidents. The FOMC changed its look following the regular rotation of members at the beginning of 2016. Who are these members? Come meet the FOMC. In-depth analysis Credibility on the line Criticism grows over rate rise decision (Recently added) Instead of soothing the markets, US policymakers are accused of fraying nerves and exacerbating outflows from emerging markets by purportedly clinging to a strategy that envisages further increases this year. Initial reaction Global markets show relief at smooth Fed lift-off Investors did not recoil at the prospect of higher interest rates. Instead they appear to welcome the clarity brought by the Fed’s decision to raise rates. Video Is the US economy on the road to recovery? EMs spooked Emerging markets set to feel the wrath Analysts warn the impact on already fragile emerging economies threatens to spill back into the US. Following the rate hike: Accelerated capital outflows from China will threaten the country’s economic stability Chinese holdings of US Treasury debt might fall This would create potential funding shortfalls for the US government video Hot and cold Why the Fed faced such a difficult decision In the months leading up to its December decision to raise rates for the first time, the US central bank faced a fiendishly complex picture with economic hotspots emerging across the economy despite sluggish wage growth. car sales are rising at the quickest pace in a decade commercial real estate prices are going through the roof unemployment is low again but wage growth remains sluggish Deepening conundrum Low rates era challenges growth models Inflation figures have stayed low even as the economy hits what the Fed believes is full employment. After years of low rates and QE policy makers lament a disappointing recovery While unemployment is declining, inflation is lower than the Fed target Fears that asset price bubbles are appearing after years of easy money United they stand Will the UK follow if US raises interest rates? After a sharp drop in the unemployment rate, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England are looking at the first increase in interest rates for nearly a decade. With the Fed leading the way, policy makers and businessmen in the UK are wondering what a rate rise means for them. A stronger USD likely to make British exports to the US cheaper But Mark Carney, BoE governor, has dismissed the widely held conviction that the BoE will mechanically follow the Fed Corporate hangover Turning point looms for US debt binge With a $4tn mountain of debt maturing over the next five years, corporate America’s reliance on cheap cash is about to get tested. US corporate treasurers have rushed to refinance more than $1tn each year since 2012 to lock in cheap borrowing costs in advance of the expected rate rise Energy sector most vulnerable to rate rises given lower oil prices Corporate defaults are likely to increase in the coming years Just do it Some emerging markets called on Fed to raise rates Indonesia, Peru, Mexico and India central bank officials called on the Fed to make a move The uncertainty is worse than a US rate rise Contrasts with IMF and World Bank warnings Expert view Gillian Tett (Recently added) Janet Yellen will need skill and luck While the initial market reaction to the Fed’s rate rise has been calm, the real test for the wider financial system has barely begun, writes the FT’s US managing editor. Three areas investors need to watch: Ultra-loose policy has created credit bubbles that could now deflate The now longer “duration” of investors’ bond portfolios Stealthy shifts in the opaque world of money markets John Authers (Recently added) Janet Yellen has passed her first big parenting test The challenge of raising rates without triggering a market spasm that would endanger financial stability and the economy could be likened to removing an iPad from a child’s grip without a meltdown. Janet Yellen has achieved it, writes the FT’s Senior Investment Commentator. Lloyd Blankfein The Fed should delay raising rates The chief executive of Goldman Sachs warned the Fed that the decision based on “soft” factors rather than hard data evaluation might be dangerous for the economy. “The consequences of going too soon and hurting the recovery are vastly disproportionate to the consequences of taking a little bit more incremental inflation risk” Currency Strategist, Citi Fed up with waiting Steven Englander of Citigroup tells Roger Blitz why central banks around the world are all waiting on the US to act first Listen to the Podcast (Hard Currency) World Bank Rate rise risks triggering “panic and turmoil” in emerging markets World Bank chief economist highlights the mounting concern outside the US over the Fed’s potential “lift-off” Warns that a rate rise could yield a “shock” and a new crisis in emerging markets The World Bank’s June forecast of 2.8 per cent growth for the global economy was now under threat from the slowdown in emerging economies such as China and Brazil Richard Fisher Monetary policy timing means Fed must act The former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas argued in September that the Fed should not wait any longer to raise rates. Headline and core inflations are flawed at showing medium-term inflation trends A third measure, ‘Trimmed mean inflation’, has been running at 1.6 per cent This is much closer to the Fed’s stated 2 per cent inflation target Since monetary policy operates with a time lag, the Fed should act now Comment John Authers (Recently added) US rate rise harder to justify nine years on The last time the Federal Reserve raised its target interest rate was in 2006. Nine years on, the economic conditions in the US are very different video FT View US Fed should keep rates on hold “…after so long with no serious signs of inflation, there is no compulsion to move now Martin Wolf Keep US interest rates low: the world is still abnormal “…central banks should continue to focus on stabilising the real economy, though more needs to be done to curb financial excesses The Big Read Higher interest rates are supposed to boost lenders, but do they? Rising rates might prove to be a mixed bag for banks, as not all of them were created equal. Impacts to consider: banks with deposits will benefit more than those with loans bank borrowers might struggle with the rise that will lead to bad debt banks’ book values could be affected Global impact Mexico … while Mexican companies’ mounting pile of dollar debt is concerning, and rising peso costs threaten to increase consumer prices and inflation, Mexico is also positioned to weather wider emerging market storms Brazil Brazilian companies that issued billions of dollars of US debt are no less gloomy about the prospect of the dollar rising further due to higher US rates – especially as China’s slowing economy has already pushed down commodity prices Indonesia Compared with the so-called “taper tantrum” two years ago, when the decisions of the US Federal Reserve last sent shock waves through emerging markets, the Indonesian economy is said to be better prepared for a rise in US rates China Overall, most economists believe the direct impact on China will be minor Japan Inflation in Japan is still running close to zero, and in January its central back made a surprise decision to cut interest rates to negative territory. South Africa For more than two years, South Africa’s central bank has been flagging the complex policy dilemma it is challenged with when considering whether to raise interest rates. And the recent spate of global market turbulence looks to have made it all the more complicated Turkey With a Fed interest rate hike looming on the horizon, more bad news may be in store for the lira – and for Turkish companies facing a growing pile of foreign debt Gulf With Gulf currencies pegged to the dollar, central banks generally track Fed interest rate rises Russia For Russia’s central bank, a stronger dollar, almost inevitably the result of a rate hike in the US, would make it even more difficult to rebuild its international reserves Hungary … overall, analysts appear sanguine about Hungary’s direct exposure to the Fed decision Eurozone …higher interest rates in the US could damage Europe’s economy if a Fed rate rise sows the seeds for more market turbulence Switzerland If the US Federal Reserve raises interest rates, perhaps even later this month, the world might quake. In Switzerland, there will be sighs of relief volatility in financial markets http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/51ca24e6-bf5a-11e5-9fdb-87b8d15baec2.html#axzz3xhw17Wuv not rush to judgement http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c0b03570-c091-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf.html growing criticism http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3c9e2bd6-c639-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e.html downgraded their expectations http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/da2ed38a-c6bd-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.html Read more http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/30f6a3ba-9d14-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861.html?segid=0100320# meet the FOMC https://ig.ft.com/sites/profiles/fomc/ Credibility on the line Criticism grows over rate rise decision http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3c9e2bd6-c639-11e5-808f8231cd71622e.html Global markets show relief at smooth Fed lift-off http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9561727e-a4e1-11e5-a91e162b86790c58.html#axzz3uVzrvO9U Emerging markets set to feel the wrath http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7edb6a0a-524d-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html Why the Fed faced such a difficult decision http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7893c6c8-5262-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html Low rates era challenges growth models http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8a20f7d8-5624-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html Will the UK follow if US raises interest rates? http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e0a1ede4-554b-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html Turning point looms for US debt binge http://www.ft.com/cms/s/25f138ce-5636-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html Some emerging markets called on Fed to raise rates http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e88abe7a-56e3-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html Janet Yellen will need skill and luck http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b12df170-a429-11e5-873f-68411a84f346.html#axzz3uVzrvO9U Janet Yellen has passed her first big parenting test http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a7b30b8-a42b-11e5-873f-68411a84f346.html The Fed should delay raising rates http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e5c4b132-5c97-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#axzz3lommqBWv Fed up with waiting http://podcast.ft.com/index.php?sid=57&pid=2956 urn:not-loaded:http://podcast.ft.com/download2/57/2956/hard_currency_20150910.mp3 Rate rise risks triggering “panic and turmoil” in emerging markets http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e5142190-5630-11e5-a28b50226830d644.html Monetary policy timing means Fed must act http://www.ft.com/cms/s/39c233fc-5556-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html US rate rise harder to justify nine years on http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ede88ebe-5c89-11e5-9846de406ccb37f2.html#axzz3lommqBWv US Fed should keep rates on hold http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2cb34a90-5874-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html Keep US interest rates low: the world is still abnormal http://www.ft.com/cms/s/b1ebac86-556b-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html Higher interest rates are supposed to boost lenders, but do they? http://www.ft.com/cms/s/49f8b480-525e-11e5-b029b9d50a74fd14.html Mexico http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2b5c96f0-4a42-11e5-b558-8a9722977189.html Brazil http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a8022274-4a42-11e5-b558-8a9722977189.html Indonesia http://www.ft.com/cms/s/811fc292-4a42-11e5-b558-8a9722977189.html China http://www.ft.com/cms/s/5ec4422c-4a42-11e5-b558-8a9722977189.html Japan http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/23ff8798-c63c-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.html#axzz3ypQS9PS2 South Africa http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0f8185a4-4c08-11e5-9b5d-89a026fda5c9.html Turkey http://www.ft.com/cms/s/50646038-4d9c-11e5-b558-8a9722977189.html Gulf http://www.ft.com/cms/s/b8ae64fc-5154-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html Russia http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d1e7e306-5156-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html Hungary http://www.ft.com/cms/s/003ae31c-518d-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html Eurozone http://www.ft.com/cms/s/fc2f2a42-5481-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.html Switzerland http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a7d9c936-56e6-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html 12 20160129 Federal Reserve: Credibility on the line 2016-03-20 08:38 PM http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/3c9e2bd6-c639-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e.html Federal Reserve: Credibility on the line Sam Fleming in Washington January 29, 2016 7:03 pm Last month’s rate rise is drawing criticism. Some say it should abandon plans to increase again soon As Janet Yellen, chair of the Federal Reserve, was preparing last month for the first increase in US interest rates for a decade, protesters in New York’s financial district were holding a candlelight vigil bemoaning the end of near-zero monetary policy. In the crowd bearing illuminated signs saying “what recovery?” and “wage growth is good” was Mauricio Jimenez, a 44-year-old construction worker from Queens, who warned against the move as he stood outside the New York Fed. “It was a mistake,” he said this week, arguing the central bank should have paid more attention to working families and minorities who had seen paltry wage growth, and that the Fed should reverse course. “We are the people most affected.” Complaints about the prospect of higher rates had long been levelled by left-of-centre groups such as Fed Up, which arranged the protest, as well as Democratic politicians including Bernie Sanders, the presidential challenger, as a way to highlight the stagnating fortunes of millions of Americans. This month, however, fears of a global slowdown and the crash in commodity prices have prompted a flurry of criticisms from a different constituency. Stung by brutal declines in the S&P 500 index, some Wall Street investors are accusing the Fed of failing to appreciate the dangers brewing overseas. Instead of soothing the markets, US policymakers are accused of fraying nerves and exacerbating outflows from emerging markets by purportedly clinging to a strategy that envisages further increases this year. “The market views tightening as a mistake now,” says Jordi Visser, chief investment officer at Weiss Multi-Strategy Advisers. “I don’t think 25 basis points matters much but the market clearly does. We’re now closer to a recession than we all realise.” Having its policy decisions second-guessed is an occupational hazard for the Fed, and a failure to lift rates in December would have triggered no less irate criticisms from America’s political right, not to mention poorly positioned hedge fund managers. The torrid opening to 2016, however, has thrown Ms Yellen and colleagues on to the defensive, coming so soon after they gambled on the rate increase. In its policy meeting on Wednesday, Fed officials said they were closely watching the gyrations in global markets. A host of central banks, including the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the Swedish Riksbank, have tightened policy only to reverse the decision. The BoJ on Friday adopted negative interest rates. It would be a painful blow to the Fed’s credibility if it turned out that it lifted rates on the cusp of a slowdown and was forced to backtrack. Ms Yellen was initially praised for her handling of the rate rise, which came without a single voice of dissent in her policy committee. Yet the move was controversial even within the central bank. Lael Brainard, a Fed governor, argued before the decision that the risks of tightening may be higher than sticking with near-zero rates because there would be little scope to stimulate the economy with further monetary easing if policymakers had to reverse course. The question is whether these doubts will be confirmed by events. Perhaps sensing blood, senior investors, including bond manager Jeff Gundlach of DoubleLine Capital and Ray Dalio, the head of the world’s biggest hedge fund, Bridgewater Associates, have renewed criticism of the Fed, urging it to abandon the notion of raising rates any time soon. Market expectations that rates could rise again as early as March have sunk, with September now seen as the earliest date. Adam Posen, the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, says raising rates has been a mistake and that none of the developments in juddering global markets or China had changed the picture. Looking ahead, he says his gut instinct is that “they hold, they postpone, but they don’t reverse”. Several factors have stoked worries about the merits of tighter policy, many driven by deteriorating global conditions at a time when other central banks continue to ease. The fall in demand for commodities that drove oil below $30 a barrel in mid-January is seen by some as an indicator of a worsening global downturn led by China, rather than simply a reflection of buoyant supply. The US has turned out to be vulnerable to the fall in crude prices. The boost from cheap energy to consumer spending has not met expectations while the associated drop in investment in the sector hurts growth. Jim O’Sullivan of High Frequency Economics describes the oil price decline as “a wash” for the US economy instead of the lift that many had hoped to see. Confirming concerns about the impact of the high dollar and oil price plunge on US industry, the first reading for fourth-quarter US gross domestic product yesterday showed a slowdown in growth to an annualised pace of 0.7 per cent, compared with an expansion of 2 per cent in the previous three months. As growth in the US economy slows, inflation has stuck below the Fed target of 2 per cent. Narayana Kocherlakota, who was president of the Minneapolis Fed until December, is calling for a “hard U-turn” in monetary policy. He thinks the central bank is underestimating the risks of sinking inflation expectations and says the credibility of its target is under threat. The dovish former policymaker says the world faces a “global demand shortfall” and tighter US monetary policy could exacerbate uncertainties outside the country. “It is hard to know how much feedback from international weakness there will be to the US economy; as the Fed tightens, that tightens economic conditions throughout the world,” Mr Kocherlakota says. That steep drop in inflation expectations is being watched by Fed policymakers, as is the effect of market volatility on corporate borrowing costs. Inflation has been lower than the Fed target for more than three years, and the pressures on the oil price and surge in the dollar could force the bank to again push back its forecasts for when price growth returns to its target. Despite such challenges, some economists argue that those complaining about the Fed’s quarter-point increase have lost perspective, not least given how supportive policy remains after that increase. Charles Plosser, who was president of the Philadelphia Fed until last year, dismisses arguments that the central bank has been partly responsible for the volatility in global markets, adding that it is much too soon to judge whether the December increase was merited. The Fed needed to “disabuse” the markets of the notion that it would rush to investors’ aid whenever prices slid, he argues. As for the US economy, Mr Plosser says: “The data has come in mixed. There has been some volatility but if you look beyond the energy sector and beyond the financial markets, the economy is not doing too badly”. The main reason for optimism is the labour market. In the face of chatter among analysts about the risk of a US recession, job growth has exceeded expectations, with payrolls growing by nearly 300,000 in December. Ms Yellen placed the employment trend – which has seen 13.2m jobs added over 67 straight months – at the heart of her case for raising rates, arguing that it would be unwise to wait too long before responding to the erosion of spare capacity. The central bank is not rushing to judgment about global developments. The Fed on Wednesday noted the jitters surrounding China, as well as the low rate of inflation and slower US growth in the fourth quarter. Its message was that even if there are risks ahead, it was too soon to decide the implications for future rate decisions. To many analysts, that circumspect approach is sensible. An overly downbeat statement this week would have triggered a greater panic in markets. If investors calm down, the damage to the US economy could turn out to be minimal, as it was after the last China-induced bout of turbulence in August. Tim Duy, a professor at the University of Oregon and close Fed watcher, says that December’s rise was not of the magnitude to “make or break the economy” and that talk in markets of a policy mistake was unhelpful. He says the important aim now was for the Fed to avoid sending signals that it was hell-bent on tightening policy further. That meant downplaying last month’s forecasts from policymakers suggesting that there will be four rate increases in 2016, a bullish outlook that traders now see as divorced from reality. The Fed has insisted it will be guided by the data and has made no commitment to tighten. Ms Yellen will give further clues in February when she addresses Congress in testimony on Capitol Hill. A few weeks after the Fed lifted rates in a flurry of optimism, the ground has shifted beneath the feet of Ms Yellen and her policy committee. Whether or not their gamble on higher rates ends up being vindicated will depend heavily on global developments, many of them well beyond America’s control. With reporting by Robin Wigglesworth Extent of Fed’s dovishness roils markets http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28d5c5d6-ec0f-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html US banking industry calls for rate rises http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/88898858-eac7-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html Economists expect Fed to remain on hold http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6eca5554-e703-11e5-bc31-138df2ae9ee6.html Fed governor cautions on rate rise pace http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/44295d22-dccc-11e5-8541-00fb33bdf038.html China Inc – The quest for cash flow http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/020b064c-ecfe-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html EM debt – A trawl for yield http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/61215bb0-ea9a-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4.html How Italy fell out of love with the EU http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d11a974-eab2-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html Japan Inc – Heavy meddling http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0118e3a6-ea99-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html Talk of Fed ‘policy error’ grows http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcb4202a-c04d-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf.html#axzz3ybOOvFTL Federal Reserve stands back amid market gyrations http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9eae35f4-c527-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.htm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e008078c-a592-11e5-a91e-162b86790c58.html Pay attention to long-term debt cycle http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b41813dc-c028-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf.html Slowing China needs to support its economy http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb22c454-be9f-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf.html buoyant supply (Oil: US shale’s big squeeze) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2db96dae-c0eb-11e5-9fdb-87b8d15baec2.html Fed meeting: What to watch out for http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/652a0bb2-c4ed-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e.html 13 20160131 Economists see 20% chance of US recession 2016-03-20 08:48 PM http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/da2ed38a-c6bd-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.html Economists see 20% chance of US recession Eric Platt in New York January 31, 2016 1:48 pm Leading global economists now see a 20 per cent chance of the US falling into recession this year, and a diminishing likelihood of the Federal Reserve raising rates as previously thought. A Financial Times survey of 51 economists, conducted in the days after the Fed’s January meeting, underscores the impact of the past month’s severe market turbulence and a string of lacklustre economic reports out of the US and China. The fear that the world’s largest economy – considered the lone engine of global growth – is on the verge of recession has intensified. In the FT’s December survey economists had put the odds of a US recession at 15 per cent during the next two years. Now, they see a one-in-five chance of recession in the next 12 months. The concern about a possible global slowdown – which prompted the Bank of Japan to cut interest rates to negative territory on Friday – is likely to keep the Fed from fulfilling its forecast of lifting benchmark interest rates by 100 basis points this year, leading economists say. The economists downgraded their expectations of the US central bank’s ability to tighten policy this year, with their median forecast coming in halfway between two and three 25 basis point rate rises in 2016. Half of those surveyed said the Fed would lift two or fewer times. In December, the group of economists had expected 75 basis points of tightening. Nearly three-quarters then projected three or more rises. “There’s no question that the risks have risen given the hit that financial conditions have taken, given the softness in various indicators,” said Peter Hooper, chief economist of Deutsche Bank. Until recently, few economists entertained the notion that the US could tip into recession. The robust labour market, alongside a briskly expanding service sector was thought likely to offset declines in the country’s manufacturing sector, which has struggled with the strengthening dollar. A slowdown in China has renewed fears that the US economy is vulnerable, with investors pointing to dislocations in credit markets and a spate of expected defaults in the energy sector. Lists compiled by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s of companies most in danger of default have swelled. Global stock markets have slid 6 per cent this year, including a 5 per cent drop in the US, while worldwide high-yield credit has declined almost 2 per cent. Strategists with Citigroup note that a “stunning” 31 per cent of S&P 500 companies have fallen more than 30 per cent from their 52-week highs. Investors have pointed to sputtering capital markets as a sign that the credit cycle has turned. Large investment-grade groups have had to pay up to issue debt, while the door has been completely shut to low-rated energy companies. “Investors are unsure if there is a systematic or spillover event coming out of the energy sector,” said Michael Gapen, US economist with Barclays. Economists surveyed by the FT emphasised that while the odds of a recession had climbed, a large majority still expected the US to escape one. Several who have fielded increased investor calls on the subject said that the conversation had been skewed because of the near obsession with the price of oil – a point that they argued had more to do with supply than global demand. Mr Gapen, who put the odds of a recession between 10 and 15 per cent, said that he still thought strong consumption trends would keep the US economy from contraction. “If you look at corporate profits, look at the data on high yield spreads, those are being driven by the weakness abroad,” he said. “You have to make a judgment if those are the signals you should be relying on or if you should be relying on the labour market.” Japan to cut interest rates to negative territory http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/23ff8798-c63c-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.html 14 201602 Guess who’s spending again? 2016-03-20 08:53 PM http://www.fidelity.com.au/insights-centre/investment-articles/guess-whos-spending-again/ Guess who’s spending again? Michael Collins, February 2016 Nine years after the last increase, seven years after zero was reached and two years since quantitative easing was abandoned, recent history’s most awaited rate rise occurred. The Federal Reserve raised the US cash rate to all of 0.25% in December, and such is the importance of this central bank that the anticipated consequences of this decision were noticeable long beforehand. A looming Fed rate increase sucked in capital from the rest of the world, (thereby boosting the US dollar, the world’s reserve currency) and boosted shorter-dated US bond yields, which are the benchmark for global credit markets. It was even behind the “taper tantrum” of 2013. So why does the Fed (and the US dollar) loom over the world to such a great extent? Part of the answer is that the US is the world’s biggest economy. The US’ output of US$17.4 trillion (A$24 trillion) in 2014 was about four times the size of Japan’s by way of comparison. But add the 28 EU members together and the EU economy is larger, at US$18.5 trillion in 2014. Yet the European Central Bank, which covers the 19 euro-using countries plus other EU members indirectly as they have currencies tied to the euro, is well behind the Fed on influence.[1] China’s economy is bigger than the US’ in purchasing-powerparity terms, which is the fairest way to compare countries. It’s US$18.01 trillion for China versus US$17.4 trillion for the US in 2014, yet there are far fewer People’s Bank of China watchers.[2] The complete answer to the question of why the Fed dominates over other central banks (and the US dollar over other currencies) is that the US citizen is the world’s “consumer of last resort”. This term, which sounds silly taken literally, acknowledges the importance of the US consumer to the global economy ever since the US became the world’s largest economy in 1916.[3] US GDP is about 68% consumption, which is a bigger number than for other large economies. Chinese consumers, for instance, only power 37% of China’s economy, EU consumers only drive 57% of EU output while the ratio is 60% for Japan.[4] Given the size of the US economy to the world economy, the US consumer is responsible for about one-fifth of global output. Thus, US consumer spending is a key determinant of global growth. The promising news for investors is that US consumers are spending for various reasons. That should encourage optimism that the world economy will expand for a while yet. Relying on the US consumer to drive the global economy is not without drawbacks, however. And it can’t go on forever. To be sure, the US consumers are not as crucial to the world as they were. The US economy comprises a smaller part of the world economy these days – US economic output as a percentage of the world’s total slipped from 25.6% in 1980 to 22.5% by 2014.[5] Rising inequality (or stagnant median income growth to put in another way) has robbed the middle and lower classes of spending power. The rampant-consuming baby-boomer generation is moving onto a stage in life where it spends less. The other 32% of the US economy, especially business investment, is misfiring to the extent that some analysts warn of a US recession.[6] Not every survey of US consumers is upbeat and any global ructions could upset US consumer spending. But at a time when the eurozone, Chinese, Japanese and many emerging economies are struggling, investors can be thankful that the US consumer is poised to drive the world economy in coming years. Can and able The influence of the US consumer was evident once again in the most recent report on US GDP, which showed consumer spending expanded at 10-year high of 3.1% in 2015 (even if it did flatten out towards the end of the year). This outlay helped the US economy grow 2.4% over the year, its equal-fastest expansion in five years.[7] Household purchases of goods and services are expected to keep up this healthy pace of growth for the foreseeable future because US consumers have more money to spend and more capacity to spend. US households have more ability to spend because the US is one of the few countries in the world where people reduced their debts after the global financial crisis intensified in 2008. Rather than taking on bigger mortgages and other debts Australian-style, US households cut their debt-to-GDP ratio by 18 percentage points from 2007 to 2014, the most among 47 major economies surveyed by McKinsey Global Institute.[8] (Over the same time, Australian households boosted their debt by 10 percentage points as a proportion of GDP.) While consumer debt in the US still amounts to 77% of GDP, that ratio compares with a worrying 113% for Australia. If nothing else were to change, this debt reduction alone has placed US consumers in a position whereby they can increase spending; they are making fewer repayments and even have scope to borrow to buy items. These less-indebted US consumers don’t necessarily need to borrow more because they have more money to spend anyway. The most important source of extra money in the wallets of the US consumers is that the US economy has added more than 12 million jobs since 2009, helping the jobless rate to halve from a peak of 10% in October 2009 to an eight-year low of 4.9% in January.[9] While hidden unemployment is hovering at 9.9%, by the government’s reckoning, that is down from the post-crisis peak of 17.1% that was set across 2009 and 2010.[10] More people in work boosts aggregate consumer firepower. Personal income in the US rose 4.5% in 2015, after jumping 4.4% in 2014, according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.[11] The other thing more people in work does is place upward pressure on wages. While wages have stagnated in recent years because of high unemployment, the shift of jobs to China, technology displacing people, the decline in union power and capital’s increased political influence, the improved jobs market is boosting US salaries above the 1%-to-2% snail’s pace of the past five years. Now that there are only 1.5 unemployed job seekers for every opening compared with 6.8 in 2009, average hourly earnings are rising at a 2.5% to 2.8% speed, well above the inflation rate of 0.5%. Consumer surveys show that more people expect pay increases than decreases.[12] Many analysts expect wages increases to top 3% in the coming year. Another fillip for household budgets is that oil prices have plunged. Quirky as it might be, petrol prices are among the prices most monitored by consumers. (It’s why Australia’s retail giants bought petrol stations.) US consumers are reminded every time they fill up their cars that they have more money to spend on other items. The point is that the plunge in oil prices from US$115 a barrel in 2014 to under US$30 now not only gives motorists more money to spend on other items, they are constantly reminded that they have more money to spend. While US consumers appear to have saved much of the gains so far from lower oil prices, their spending power has risen nonetheless. Greater spending power wouldn’t mean much if consumers were gloomy. Investors can be confident US consumers will spend because the opposite is true. Consumer confidence, as measured by the University of Michigan, averaged 92.9 in 2015, the highest since 2004, due largely to improvements in how people evaluated current conditions.[13] Several forces are prompting US consumers to feel confident enough to release their pent-up demand, the force that drives economic recoveries. The first is that housing, after triggering the US sub-prime crisis, has recuperated. Fed data shows that, due to rising home prices and thrift, the equity of US homeowners reached 57% of home values in September last year, the highest level since 2006. This result compares with just 37% in 2009 when one in four households owed more on their homes than they could sell them for.[14] Another buzz for consumers is that the US dollar’s 22% climb on the Fed’s trade-weighted index in the two years to January has reduced import prices.[15] Bargains are everywhere! On top of this, low inflation means that consumers are not being put off shopping by jumps in prices, which promotes the opposite of the bargain effect. It denotes too that the Fed is not expected to raise the US cash rate too much too quickly, which will keep down the bond yields that determine mortgage rates. The absence of self-inflicted distress helps too. For the first time in five years, Congress in December passed a budget without too much fuss. The budget is projected to be in a deficit worth just over 2% of GDP, which supports economic activity, and contained sweeteners for consumption. One, for example, was that Congress made permanent enhancements to working-class family tax credits, which are a subsidy for adults with children. Some estimate that these moves will lift 16 million people above or closer to the poverty line in 2018 and beyond.[16] Help needed Even if oil prices stay low, wages increase and political and economic conditions stay favourable for a while yet, US consumers can’t drive the world forever. The cyclical nature of economics means that beneficial forces create imbalances that eventually check them. The first curb on ever-rising US consumption would be measures to counteract the inflation it would produce. If consumer spending drives economic growth enough and fans big enough wage increases, inflation could head beyond the Fed’s 2% limit. The Fed is well aware that wages unexpectedly surged when the US economy hit full employment in the late 1990s. Any annual increases beyond 3% would raise concerns about inflation. Another impediment is that US consumption will enlarge the deficit on the current account that the US has run since every year since 1991. In theory, a widening of the current-account deficit from the 2.2% of GDP it set in 2014 should undermine the US dollar, make imports more expensive and thereby curb consumption. If the US current-account deficit heads towards its pre-2008 level above 5% of GDP that lasted from 2004 to 2007, such a shortfall paired with current-account surpluses elsewhere would reinstate the global imbalances that at played such a significant role in triggering the global financial crisis.[17] As it is, the IMF expects the US currentaccount deficit to head beyond 3% of output from 2017.[18] The view that the world has entered a period of “secular stagnation” is partly based on a view that current-account surpluses will persist in countries such as China, Germany and Japan, which automatically means deficits elsewhere. Large countries running hefty current-account surpluses can destabilise the world because they must export capital to deficit countries. These capital flows sap growth in these countries by diverting consumer spending abroad and suppressing domestic investment opportunities. Germany’s current-account surplus was 7.4% of GDP in 2014 and is headed for a fresh record of 8.5% in 2015, which is expected to push the eurozone’s surplus to reach 3% of output. Japan is expected to post a surplus of 3% for 2015 and beyond. Thankfully, China’s current-account surplus is a more manageable 2% to 3% of GDP these days, well down from a peak of 10% in 2007. But it’s still a surplus.[19] Investors should enjoy the US consumers’ coming contribution to global growth. They could have far more faith in the medium-term outlook for the world economy, however, if Chinese, German and Japanese consumers were to make such a bigger contribution to global demand that they too earned the title of “consumer of last resort”. Financial information comes from Bloomberg unless stated otherwise. [1] IMF. World Economic Outlook database. GDP at current prices in US dollars. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx [2] CIA. The Word Factbook. Economy section for the economies of China and the US. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/index.html. [3] Adam Tooze. “The deluge. The Great War and the remaking of global order 1916-1931” Pengiun, 2014. Page 13. The US economy overtook the economy of the British empire in this year. [4] CIA. Op cit. [5] IMF. Op cit. GDP in current prices in US dollars. [6] Financial Times. “Economists see 20% chance of US recession.” 31 January 2016. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/da2ed38a-c6bd11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.html#axzz3yrs342E2 [7] US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Fourth quarter and annual 2015 (advance estimate) data. 29 January 2016. http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp [8] McKinsey Global Institute. Debt and (not much) deleveraging.” February 2015. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/debt_and_not_much_deleveraging [9] The US workforce has jumped from a post-crisis low of 138.0 million in December 2009 to 149.9 million in December 2015. United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost [10] The US government’s measure of hidden unemployment is the U-6 measure produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The measure tracks the unemployed plus people marginally attached to the labor force, plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t15.htm [11] US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Pesonal income and outlays, December 2015. 1 February 2016. http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm [12] The Conference board. “The Conference Board consumer confidence index improves in December.” 29 December 2015. In the coming months, the proportion of consumers expecting their incomes to increase declined from 17.3% to 16.3%. However, the proportion expecting a reduction in income decreased from 11.8% to 9.7%. https://www.conferenceboard.org/data/consumerconfidence.cfm [13] Survey of consumers. University of Michigan. “Final results for December 2015.” http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/ [14] Bloomberg News. “The end of the housing hangover.” 14 December 2015. http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-1214/the-end-of-the-housing-hangover [15] Federal Reserve. Foreign exchange rates – H.10. Nominal index. Broad. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/summary/ [16] Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a left-leaning US think tank. “Tax deal makes permanent key improvements in workingfamily tax credits.” 16 December 2016. http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/tax-deal-makes-permanent-key-improvements-toworking-family-tax-credits [17] The US current-account deficit was 5.2% in 2004, 5.7% in 2005, 5.8% in 2006 and 5.0% in 2007. IMF. World Economic Outlook Database. October 2015. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx [18] IMF. Op cit. [19] IMF. Op cit. 04 20160206 Debt, defaults, and devaluations: why this market crash is like nothing we’ve seen before 2016-03-20 06:57 PM http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12138466/when-is-the-next-financial-crash-coming-oil-prices-markets-recession.html Debt, defaults, and devaluations: why this market crash is like nothing we’ve seen before Mehreen Khan, 10:00AM GMT 06 Feb 2016 A pernicious cycle of collapsing commodities, corporate defaults, and currency wars loom over the global economy. Can anything stop it from unravelling? A global recession is on the way. This truism of economics holds at any point in which the world is not in the grips of a contraction. The real question is always when and how deep the upcoming downturn will be. “The crash will come, but it would be nice if it came two years from now”, Thomas Thygesen, head of economics at SEB told over 200 commodity investors and analysts in London last month. His audience was rapt with unusual attention. They could be forgiven for thinking the slump had not already arrived. Commodity prices have crashed by two thirds since their peaks in 2014. Oil has borne the brunt of the sell-off, suffering the worst price collapse in modern history. Brent crude has fallen from $115 a barrel in the summer of 2014, to just $27.70 in mid-January. Thomas Thygesen: We are in a very unusual situation where market sentiment is of a different nature to anything we’ve seen before Plenty of investors sitting in the blue-lit, cavernous surrounds of Bloomberg’s London HQ would have had their fingers burnt by the price capitulation. • Mapped: How the world became awash with oil Global oil production (October 2015) 1-1.png “They tell you should start your presentations with a joke, but making jokes at a commodities seminar is hardly appropriate these days,” Thygesen told his nervous audience. Major oil price falls have a number of historical precedents. Today’s glutted oil market is often compared to the crash of 1986, the last major episode over global over-supply. Back in the late 90s, a barrel of Brent crude fell to as low as $10 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Oil last fell close to $10 in 1998 A perfect storm But is the current oil price collapse really like anything the world economy has ever experienced? For many market watchers, a confluence of factors – led by oil, but encompassing China, the emerging world, and financial markets – are all brewing to create a perfect storm in a global economy that has barely come to terms with the Great Recession. “We are in a very unusual situation where market sentiment is of a different nature to anything we’ve seen before,” says Thygesen. Unlike previous pre-recessionary eras, the current sell-off has seen commodity prices, equities and credit conditions all move in dangerous lockstep. The S&P 500 trading pit at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Although a 75pc oil price collapse should represent an unmitigated positive for the world’s fuel thirsty consumers, the sheer scale of the price rout is already imperiling the finances of producer nations from Nigeria to Azerbaijan, and is now threatening to unleash a wave of bankruptcies across corporate America. It is the prospect of this vicious feedback loop – where low oil prices create financial tail risks that spill over into the real economy – which could now propel the world into a “full blown crisis” adds Thygesen. So will it materialise? The world economy is throwing up reasons to worry, as the globe’s largest emerging markets have shown signs of deterioration over the last six months, says Olivier Blanchard, the former long-serving chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. Olivier Blanchard: My biggest fear is precisely that the dramatic shift in mood becomes self-fulfilling “China’s growth is probably less than officially reported. Russia and Brazil are doing very badly. South Africa is flirting with recession. Even India may not be doing as well as was forecast,” says Blanchard, who left the Fund after seven years late last year. As it stands however, he says market ructions still represent a classic case of “herd” behaviour. “Investors worry that other investors know something bad, and so just sell, although they themselves have no new information.” Blanchard spent seven years firefighting the worst financial crisis in history at the IMF But a tipping point may well be approaching. According to Blanchard’s calculations, a 20pc decline in stock markets that persists for more than six months, will translate into a decline in consumption of between 0.5pc to 1.0pc. “This would be a serious shock. My biggest fear is precisely that the dramatic shift in mood becomes self-fulfilling”. The first domino to fall For now, oil-induced financial stress is concentrated in the energy sector. With Brent set to languish around $30-35 barrel for the rest of the year, prices will persist below the $40-60 barrel break-even point that renders the bulk of US oil and gas companies profitable. Spreads on high yield US energy corporates have soared to unprecedented highs. “They make Lehman look like a walk in the park” says Thygesen. More than a third of the entire US high yield bond index is now vulnerable to crude prices remaining low or falling even further, according to calculations from Oxford Economics. Probability of company defaults in the US 2917-1454689948130653059.svg As a result, 2016 is set to see the first wave of corporate bankruptcies in the oil and gas sector. Highly leveraged US shale companies will be the first be picked off. Should escalating defaults have a further depressant effect on oil prices, it could unleash a tidal wave of corporate bankruptcies in the world’s largest economy. Oxford Economics: Conditions that usually pave the way for mounting defaults are currently met in the US Indebtedness is not just the scourge of the US. Globally, the oil and gas industry has issued $1.4 trillion of bonds and taken out a further $1.6 trillion in syndicated loans, driving the sector’s combined debt to $3 trillion, according to the Bank of International Settlements. They warn of an “illusion of sustainability” that could quickly turn toxic as the credit cycle unravels. The question exercising the minds of economists and investors is the extent to which this contagion could metastasize beyond the energy sector, as banks cut off credit access, loans turn bad, and financial conditions enter a critical tightening phase. “Conditions that usually pave the way for mounting defaults – such as growing bad debt, tightening monetary conditions, tightening of corporate credit standards and volatility spikes – are currently met in the US”, says Bronka Rzepkowski at Oxford Economics. Such levels of financial distress, more often than not, portend a global recession. In every instance of the US high yield spread rising above its long-term average, a recession or financial crisis has been nigh, says Rzepkowski, who cites 2011 as the only time the markets sent out a false signal, lulled by the Federal Reserve’s mega quantitative easing programme. US shale break-even prices remain closer to $60 a barrel We are not there yet, but worryingly for market watchers, a series of other indicators are also flashing red. Global equity markets have endured their worst start to a year since the dotcom crash. To paraphrase Nobel prize-winning US economist Paul Samuelson, Wall Street has predicted nine out of the last five recessions, but the current turbulence has an ominous precedent. Over the last 45 years, the S&P500 has suffered a loss of more than 12.5pc on 13 occasions. Six of these have given way to a recession in the US, providing a near 50pc probability that a global downturn is just around the corner. In Europe, stocks have now fallen by 10pc in the last six months. “Of the 14 previous occasions equities have had a similar decline, seven have been associated with recession, with lacklustre returns thereafter,” says Dennis Jose at Barclays. He notes investors have begun to pile into “defensive” stocks, such as healthcare and consumer industries. “The weighting in defensives has increased to the highest levels seen since 1980 suggesting that investors may have already embraced the risk of a recession.” Dollar danger Macroeconomic indicators from the world’s largest economy are also beginning to turn sour. The US has already fallen prey to a manufacturing collapse. Service sector data for December showed the slowdown is spreading to the dominant driver of economic growth. “The shine has come off the US”, says David Folkerts-Landau, chief economist at Deutsche Bank. He notes the economy is “firing on one cylinder” with consumers the sole bright spot in an environment of still weak capital investment, and a crippling exchange rate that is hurting exporters and squeezing corporate profits. “It is not a very healthy situation,” says Folkerts-Landau, who forecasts US growth will fall below 2pc this year. “That is a precarious number.” A crucial part of the story has been the relentless appreciation of the US dollar. The greenback has risen by more than 22pc on a trade weighted basis since mid-2014. The soaring US dollar The effects have been felt far beyond the US. The soaring dollar has put record pressure on China’s exchange rate peg, forcing Beijing to burn through its reserves with interventions amounting to $140bn-a-month in December to protect the renminbi. Meanwhile, China’s capital outflows have accelerated to $676bn, according to the Institute of International Finance. This policy bind – known as the “Impossible Trinity” of managing a fixed exchange rate, maintaining independent monetary policy, and a open capital account – means a devaluation of some magnitude is all but inevitable. • Has China lost control of its currency? “It will definitely be in the double digits”, says Folkerts-Landau. “We will be lucky if the depreciation will be in the lower double-digits by the end of the year.” “Once you anticipate that, and you are sitting in Indonesia or Latin America, it has an immediate impact on how you think about the world”. 2918-1454690051159766678.svg A weaker renminbi would unleash a new wave of deflation in an already fragile global environment, and hasten the pressure on emerging market exchange rates as the world’s currency wars would renew apace. Federal reverse? What, if anything, could halt this pernicious cycle of events from unfolding? In the short-term, analysts are unanimous: all eyes are on the US Federal Reserve. The central bank’s first rate hike in seven years last December has come to look frighteningly premature in the space of just eight weeks. Olivier Blanchard: I have no doubt that the Fed would expand QE Events have forced the Fed’s policymakers to take to the airwaves and soothe fears that another four rate hikes are on the way this year. It is a welcome sign for jittery markets, but may not be enough to convince them that the Fed will be nimble enough to reverse course and begin easing should financial conditions worsen. Others, like Blanchard, are more sanguine about the ability of central banks to ride to the rescue again. “I have no doubt that, if there was such a decrease in consumption, or if the strong dollar proved to affect net exports more than is forecast, or any other adverse event for that matter, the Fed would wait to do further increases” he says. “And if things got really bad, I have no doubt that the Fed would expand QE.” Oil prices meanwhile are widely expected to rebound from their depths by the second half of the year, as dwindling investment and the buckling of the vulnerable shale players begins to bite on production levels. This in itself presents its own set of challenges. The lower oil prices fall, the faster buyers are expected to flood back in, with violent upward movements already in evidence over the last ten days. In the longer term, even the postponement of the next global recession will do little to assuage fears that world could find itself defenceless against another round of mania, panics or crashes. Two of the world’s three major central banks have slashed interest rates in to negative territory. Monetary tools will need to be deployed more creatively, perhaps going as far as injecting stimulus directly into the veins of the economy. Should the world manage to ride out the perfect storm of 2016, next time round, answers will be difficult to find. • Mapped: How the world became awash with oil http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/11998370/Mapped-How-the-worldbecame-awash-with-oil.html fell to as low as $10 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/12094394/Oil-price-could-fall-to-10-a-barrel-warn-investment-bankbears.html imperiling the finances of producer nations from Nigeria to Azerbaijan, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12130181/Oilprice-crash-Saudis-told-to-embrace-austerity-as-debt-defaults-loom.html Olivier Blanchard http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11919355/fiscal-union-eurozone-emu-olivier-blanchard-imf.html who left the Fund after seven years late last year. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11919355/fiscal-union-eurozoneemu-olivier-blanchard-imf.html Bank of International Settlements http://preview.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/12143304/Oil-market-spiral-threatens-to-prickglobal-debt-bubble-warns-BIS.html chief economist at Deutsche Bank http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12122506/Devastating-Brexit-will-consign-Europeto-a-second-rate-world-power-warns-Deutsche-Bank.html “Impossible Trinity” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12086754/Has-China-lost-control-of-its-currency.html • Has China lost control of its currency? http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12086754/Has-China-lost-control-of-itscurrency.html first rate hike in seven years http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12054011/Federal-Reserve-rate-rise-takes-US-economyinto-new-era.html WEF Davos 2016: Optimism in Indonesia Inside RGE http://www.inside-rge.com/WEF-Davos-Indonesia-Lunch-Dialogue? utm_source=OB&utm_medium=OB&utm_campaign=OB201602LD 06 20160201 NK-The Potential Power of Negative Nominal Interest Rates 2016-03-20 07:25 PM https://sites.google.com/site/kocherlakota009/home/policy/thoughts-on-policy/2-1-16 The Potential Power of Negative Nominal Interest Rates N. Kocherlakota Rochester, NY, February 1, 2016 (Very Long – But You Can Skip the Postscript if You Want) Last week, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) lowered its marginal bank deposit rate below zero. Its action followed similar moves by many European central banks. In this post, I’ll discuss how negative nominal interest rates can be a useful tool of monetary policy. I’ll argue that central banks can only achieve the full power of this new tool if they treat it as completely standard, as opposed to a temporary emergency measure. Why might negative nominal interest rates be desirable to a central bank? The general thinking in economics is that the incentives to spend, rather than save, are shaped by the real (that is, net of inflation) interest rate. Negative nominal interest rates allow a central bank to achieve lower real interest rates, without raising inflation expectations. For example, suppose a central bank is unwilling or unable to raise medium-term inflation expectations much above 2%. Suppose too that it faces a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. Then, the central bank cannot lower the real interest rate much below -2%. In contrast, if the central bank can lower the nominal interest rate to -1%, it can lower the real interest rate to -3%. In this sense, a negative nominal interest rate gives more policy space to the central bank. It has much the same benefits as raising the inflation target, without the costs associated with higher inflation. There have to be limits on how negative nominal interest rates can go. Households and businesses always have the option to switch to cash, which has an apparent nominal yield of zero. But cash is relatively bulky and is not always easy to store or transport safely. These costs mean that the true nominal yield to cash is less than zero. The experience in Europe has suggested that cash’s costs allow central banks to lower nominal interest rates much further below zero than might have been thought. So, negative nominal interest rates give a central bank more policy space. My second – and main point – is that this space will be of little use unless negative nominal interest rates are deployed in conjunction with the right central bank communication. Here’s the wrong way to communicate: keep saying that negative is a purely emergency setting that will be abandoned shortly. The impact of policy depends on the expected path of interest rates over the medium and longer term. The central bank’s communication means that its expanded policy space will have little influence on those medium and longer term expectations. Note that even if the central bank actually keeps rates negative for many years, this ongoing communication will systematically rob the policy of its effectiveness (as well as hurting central bank credibility). Here’s the right way to communicate: keep saying that all available tools, including negative interest rates, will be used as is needed to return employment and inflation to desirable levels as rapidly as possible. This communication means that the public and markets know that the new policy space can be used to buffer the economy against any adverse shock. To sum up: I see negative nominal interest rates as a potentially powerful tool for central banks. But negative rates will only be an effective form of stimulus if they are treated as being fully conventional, as opposed to an unconventional emergency measure. Postcript Here are responses to some questions that I’ve been asked about negative nominal interest rates. * Can the Fed achieve a negative target for the fed funds rate, given its existing statutory authorities? I’m not a lawyer. But see ViceChair Fischer’s comments about negative nominal interest rates in his January 3, 2016 speech. He does not mention any concerns on this dimension. * What are the financial stability costs of negative nominal interest rates? It has been argued that low nominal and real interest rates may be a source of financial instability (like bubbles and undue risk-taking). I’ve discussed this issue here. But I don’t see anything special in this regard about slightly negative nominal interest rates (like -0.5% or -1%), as opposed to zero nominal interest rates. (There may be other resource distortions related to negative nominal interest rates – see Rognlie (2015).) * You predicted that the FOMC would use negative interest rates in 2016. How do you feel about that prediction now? Actually, I’ve never made such a prediction. I did say in October 2015 that it would be appropriate monetary policy to lower the fed funds rate target range below zero, in order to facilitate a more rapid return of inflation and employment to desirable levels. (I still feel that the current macroeconomic situation requires a U-turn in monetary policy.) I didn’t anticipate that the FOMC would actually take such a policy step. My overarching concern is that the FOMC will only use negative nominal interest rates in what it would characterize as an emergency situation. As discussed above, this kind of approach would mean that negative nominal interest rates would not be of much use in the US. Please address media enquiries and non-academic speaking requests to Monique Patenaude (
[email protected] and 585-276-3693). January 3, 2016 speech http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20160103a.htm here https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/low-real-interest-rates-20140605 Rognlie (2015) http://economics.mit.edu/files/11174 October 2015 https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/still-room-for-improvement U-turn https://sites.google.com/site/kocherlakota009/home/policy/thoughts-on-policy/1-21-16 05 20160209 NK-Negative Rates: A Gigantic Fiscal Policy Failure 2016-03-20 07:23 PM https://sites.google.com/site/kocherlakota009/home/policy/thoughts-on-policy/2-9-16 Negative Rates: A Gigantic Fiscal Policy Failure N. Kocherlakota Rochester, NY, February 9, 2016 Since October 2015, I’ve argued that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should reduce the target range for the fed funds rate below zero. Such a move would be appropriate for three reasons: 1. It would facilitate a more rapid return of inflation to target. 2. It would help reduce labor market slack more rapidly. 3. It would slow and hopefully reverse the ongoing and dangerous slide in inflation expectations. So, going negative is daring but appropriate monetary policy. But it is a sign of a terrible policy failure by fiscal policymakers. The reason that the FOMC has to go negative is because the natural real rate of interest r* (defined to be the real interest rate consistent with the FOMC’s mandated inflation and employment goals) is so low. The low natural real interest rate is a signal that households and businesses around the world desperately want to buy and hold debt issued by the US government. (Yes, there is already a lot of that debt out there – but its high price is a clear signal that still more should be issued.) The US government should be issuing that debt that the public wants so desperately and using the proceeds to undertake investments of social value. But maybe there are no such investments? That’s a tough argument to sustain quantitatively. The current market real interest rate – which I would argue is actually above the natural real rate r* – is about 1% out to thirty years. This low natural real rate represents an incredible opportunity for the US. We can afford to do more to ensure that all of our cities have safe water for our children to drink. We can afford to do more to ensure that our nuclear power plants won’t spring leaks. We can afford to do more to ensure that our bridges won’t collapse under commuters. These opportunities barely scratch the surface. With a 30-year r* below 1%, our government can afford to make progress on a myriad of social problems. It is choosing not to. If the government issued more debt and undertook these opportunities, it would push up r*. That would make life easier for monetary policymakers, because they could achieve their mandated objectives with higher nominal interest rates. But, more importantly, the change in fiscal policy would make life a lot better for all of us. I don’t think that Chair Yellen will say the above in her Humphrey-Hawkins testimony tomorrow – but I also think that it would be great if she did. Please address media enquiries and non-academic speaking requests to Monique Patenaude (
[email protected] and 585-276-3693). October 2015 https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/still-room-for-improvement We can afford to do more to ensure that all of our cities have safe water for our children to drink. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/us/regulatory-gaps-leave-unsafe-lead-levels-in-water-nationwide.html We can afford to do more to ensure that our nuclear power plants won’t spring leaks. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/08/nyregion/federal-specialist-to-inspect-elevated-radiationat-indian-point.html We can afford to do more to ensure that our bridges won’t collapse under commuters. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/us/02bridge.html 02 20160210 BlackRock: Negative rates ‘new toy’ around world 2016-03-20 06:06 PM http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/10/blackrock-negative-rates-new-toy-around-world.html BlackRock: Negative rates ‘new toy’ around world Matthew J. Belvedere | @Matt_Belvedere Wednesday, 10 Feb 2016 | 8:47 AM ET BlackRock’s Rick Rieder said Wednesday he does not believe the Federal Reserve is contemplating negative interest rates, which have become all the rage in the euro zone and Japan. “The new toy in the world of monetary policy is we’re going to negative rates,” Rieder told CNBC’s “Squawk Box” ahead of day one of Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s semiannual congressional testimony on the economy. “I don’t think the Federal Reserve is in a thought process of negative rates today.” The Fed may not be thinking about negative rates for the U.S., but wants to be prepared just in case. The central bank’s annual stress test is asking banks to examine the possibility of negatively yielding Treasury rates. The yield on the 10-year Treasury was about 1.765 percent in early Wednesday trading. Read More From ZIRP to NIRP: What’s the Fed’s next move? Yellen is expected to try to balance the Fed’s stated goal of raising interest rates against the risks of a weaker global economy. She appears before the House Financial Services Committee at 10 a.m. ET, and before the Senate Banking Committee on Thursday morning. In written remarks, released ahead of the hearing, Yellen said the future for rates depends on the economic data, and that a lower rate path would be appropriate if the economy falters. Conditions were likely to warrant gradual rate hikes, she said, acknowledging the risk of China’s slowdown could pose for the U.S. economy. When the Fed increased rates from near zero percent for the first time in December in more than nine years, policymakers projected four more hikes in 2016. But the dismal start of 2016 on Wall Street, plunging oil prices and concerns about China’s economy have tempered market expectations for such an aggressive path higher. “The U.S. economy is slowing,” said Rieder, BlackRock’s global fixed income CIO. “Clearly the global economy is slowing. I think it’s going to be hard for the Fed to go many times this year, if at all.” “I think we’ve seen the best of U.S. growth,” he continued. “[But] I think people understated how the U.S. economy did for the last three or four years. It created 8 million jobs in three years [and] 18 million car [sales]. The homes sales were pretty solid.” The Fed should have started raising rates two years ago, he argued. Looking forward, Rieder handicapped whether June might be on the table for a rate hike. “If you think about the next press conference is June, there are four pieces of employment data to come out. There are four pieces of CPI. There are four pieces of core PCE,” he continued. “There’s an awful lot of data.” From ZIRP to NIRP: What’s the Fed’s next move? http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/09/from-zirp-to-nirp-whats-the-feds-next-move.html 03 20160215 Mapped: Negative central bank interest rates now herald new danger for the world 2016-03-20 06:16 PM http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12149894/Mapped-Why-negative-interest-rates-herald-new-danger-for-the-world.html Mapped: Negative central bank interest rates now herald new danger for the world Mehreen Khan, 1:30PM GMT 15 Feb 2016 Sub-zero rates are becoming the “new abnormal” in a shaky world economy. With fresh panic hitting markets, are we finally hitting the limits of what monetary policy can achieve? Click on the countries to find out The world’s tentative experiment with negative interest rates got off to an unremarkable start. Sweden’s Riksbank – the world’s oldest central bank – became the first major monetary authority to cross the rubicon and take its main policy rate into the red exactly a year ago to the month (see map above). The Riksbank’s move followed the likes of Switzerland and Denmark, who had turned negative in a bid to stimulate flagging inflation and halt the punishing appreciation of their currencies. How Sweden went sub-zeroSource: Riksbank But the introduction of sub-zero rates caused no immediate panic that central bankers were “losing control”. Neither did they seem to produce deleterious economic effects in their host countries, as savers continued to keep their money deposited in banks rather than fleeing for the safety of cash. Commercial lenders, meanwhile, adjusted their business models to help maintain profitability. • How Sweden’s negative rates turned economics on its head In September, Andy Haldane, chief economist at the Bank of England, joined a chorus of influential thinkers in positing that negative rates could be necessary to protect the UK and the other advanced economies from the next global recession. The “new abnormal” But recessionary fears have crept up on the world much faster than the likes of Mr Haldane may have anticipated. • Why this market crash is like nothing we’ve seen before Global markets have crashed into bear market territory. A cocktail of fears, including the collapsing price of oil, the creaking health of the world’s biggest banks and China’s competence in managing its economic slowdown, have ignited fears that investor panic may lead the world into a new downturn. Bank shares have been in the eye of the selling storm, concentrating minds on just what negative interest rates mean for the financial system. Jitters were set off by the Bank of Japan’s shock decision to join the negative rate club at the end of January. One year into the negative rates experiment, it seemed monetary authorities were getting desperate in their attempts to stimulate growth and inflation with their limited policy tools (see map above). Like its counterparts in northern Europe, Japan’s sub-zero rates were intended to drive down the value of its currency, the yen. It didn’t work. The yen has now risen by 10pc against the US dollar since the Bank of Japan’s negative interest rate decision on January 30. Negative rates have not had the desired effect on the yen • AEP: Bank of Japan loses control as QE hits the limits Sweden soon followed suit in the competitive devaluation cycle, slashing its already negative repo rate to -0.5pc to generate inflation by weakening the value of the krona. With the ECB expected to head further into negative territory next month, the world has entered a “new abnormal” of negative rates, says Scott Mather at Pimco, the world’s biggest bond fund. Taxing the banking system One of the unintended consequences of global central banks’ race to the bottom (which seemingly has no bottom) is that negative interest rates act as a tax on the banking system. JP Morgan: Banks seem unable or unwilling to pass negative deposit rates to their retail customers By penalising commercial lenders for parking their reserves at the central bank, it erodes the profit margin they make on charging already low interest rates while raising the cost of capital. So far, “banks seem unable or unwilling to pass negative deposit rates to their retail customers, leaving them with few options to offset costs”, note analysts at JP Morgan. They also highlight that, should banks start imposing higher lending costs on their customers, this would have the reverse effect of easy monetary policy, crimping credit creation and tightening financial conditions. Time for fiscal dominance All of this begs the question of whether the world has hit the limits of what monetary policy can achieve, as the distortions produced by sub-zero rates overwhelm its stimulatory benefits. Mario Draghi: Monetary policy has been the only truly stimulative policy in the last four years The current global recovery has been one of the most deflationary in modern times. Over the last six-and-a-half years, the nominal GDP of the advanced world – or the total cash value of their economies – has grown by just 11pc, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Meanwhile, more than $8 trillon of high grade sovereign debt is trading at a negative yield. Distortions such as this have led prominent monetary policymakers to dub the move into negative interest rates a “gigantic fiscal policy failure”. Eight years on the from the financial crisis, central banks have done all the heavy lifting to get the world out of its low growth morass. Monetary policymakers have cut interest rates 637 times and purchased $12.3?trillion (£8.5? trillion) of assets since March 2008. Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, bemoans that his institution has provided the sole source of stimulus to the eurozone over the last six years. He renewed his calls for governments to finance mass public investment schemes and cut tax burdens to reflate their economies this week. So although negative interest rates may herald new danger for financial markets, they could well be the catalyst jolting politicians and governments into finally making use of powerful fiscal policy tools to rescue the world from the grips of another slump. first major monetary authority http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11408950/Sweden-cuts-rates-below-zero-as-globalcurrency-wars-spread.html central bankers were “losing control”. http://preview.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11378193/How-central-banks-have-lostcontrol-of-the-world.html deleterious economic effects http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11895084/How-Swedens-negative-interest-ratesexperiment-has-turned-economics-on-its-head.html adjusted their business models http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d2c32a4-ca66-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44.html#axzz40EYNOrq4 • How Sweden’s negative rates turned economics on its head http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11895084/HowSwedens-negative-interest-rates-experiment-has-turned-economics-on-its-head.html negative rates could be necessary to protect the UK http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/bank-of-england/11874061/Negative-interestrates-could-be-necessary-to-protect-UK-economy-says-Bank-of-England-chief-economist.html • Why this market crash is like nothing we’ve seen before http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12138466/when-is-the-nextfinancial-crash-coming-oil-prices-markets-recession.html crashed into bear market territory. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12138466/when-is-the-next-financial-crash-comingoil-prices-markets-recession.html shock decision to join the negative rate club http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12128832/Bank-of-Japan-slashesinterests-rates-into-negative-territory.html • AEP: Bank of Japan loses control as QE hits the limits http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12153032/Bank-of-Japanloses-control-as-QE-hits-the-limits.html “new abnormal” https://www.pimco.com/insights/viewpoints/viewpoints/negative-interest-rate-policies-may-be-part-of-the-problem “gigantic fiscal policy failure”. https://sites.google.com/site/kocherlakota009/home/policy/thoughts-on-policy/2-9-16 07 20160215 NK-Staying Positive About Going Negative 2016-03-20 07:27 PM https://sites.google.com/site/kocherlakota009/home/policy/thoughts-on-policy/2-15-16 Staying Positive About Going Negative N. Kocherlakota Rochester, NY, February 15, 2016 Just over two weeks ago, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) cut the (marginal) deposit rate that it pays to banks from zero to negative onetenth of one percent. Following the BOJ’s change in policy, Japanese equity indices fell and the yen appreciated against a number of other currencies. In this post, I suggest that these effects are, at least in part, due to the BOJ’s prior negative communications about negative rates. I argue that, in light of the BOJ’s experience, the Federal Reserve should immediately begin to communicate more positively about negative rates. In a press conference in early December 2015, Governor Kuroda said that the BOJ was not intending to use negative rates, even though many observers were concerned about the low Japanese inflation outlook. On January 21, 2016, Governor Kuroda told the Japanese parliament that the BOJ was not planning to go negative, pointing to unstated “cons” of such a move. Eight days later, the BOJ did in fact go (slightly) negative. The BOJ’s monetary policy statement communicated that it had made this move in order to forestall general risks from abroad, and from the Chinese economy in particular. I see the combination of these negative messages as at least partly responsible for the outsized and adverse changes in Japanese financial conditions over the past two weeks. Even as late as January 21, the BOJ’s words and actions communicated a clear distaste for negative rates. Given that apparent distaste, the Bank’s highlighting of international risks in its monetary policy statement suggested that those risks were, in fact, quite dire. The decision to go negative also seemed to carry a latent message that the BOJ had lost at least some confidence in the efficacy of expanding its quantitative easing program. To be clear: my intention is not to engage in (pointless) second-guessing of the BOJ’s communication strategy. (Indeed, I would argue that a number of Policy Board members are among the best communicators in global central banking.) My goal is to suggest that the BOJ’s experience has some key lessons for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) here in the US. The FOMC is currently targeting a range of a quarter to a half percent for the fed funds rate. In response to a sufficiently adverse shock, it can cut this range by twenty-five basis points To provide further accommodation beyond this twenty-five basis point cut, the Committee has to turn to other tools. There have to be plausible scenarios in which the FOMC would, in fact, very much want to turn to negative interest rates. But its prior communication has to set up that decision. The Committee can’t convey that it sees big costs or concerns with negative rates. These kinds of communications create the risk that any decision to go negative would carry the signals I’ve discussed above (that is, the macroeconomic situation is more dire than previously communicated and the Committee lacks confidence in its other methods of providing stimulus). How then should the FOMC communicate about negative rates? The messaging from Committee leaders should be relentlessly positive. It is reasonable to highlight that Federal Reserve staff are studying whether negative rates would in fact stimulate aggregate demand in the US, given the ability of banks and others to substitute into cash. (After all, most of us thought until about two years ago that going negative would have essentially no effect on aggregate demand given those substitution possibilities.) But FOMC leaders should be clear that, as long as negative rates do have a stimulative effect, the Federal Reserve is more than willing to use them as a monetary policy tool. There is room for considerable improvement on this dimension in the current FOMC communications about negative interest rates. For example, Vice-Chair Dudley said on Friday that it was “extraordinarily premature” to discuss negative interest rates as a tool. The Vice-Chair largely accomplished his primary short-run goal of signaling confidence in the strength of the US economy. But the subtext of his remarks – which was probably text to many – is that negative rates are not a desirable tool. If not corrected soon, that message could well come back to haunt the Committee. P. S. My conclusion from this WSJ article was that the Fed does have the ability, under existing statute, to implement a negative target range for the fed funds rate. I agree with the author of the article that such a move would not be without controversy. Of course, that is not new ground for the Fed – for example, the Volcker fight to contain inflation was met with a great deal of criticism. Please address media enquiries and non-academic speaking requests to Monique Patenaude (
[email protected] and 585-276-3693). early December 2015 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-economy-kuroda-idUSKBN0TQ0E720151207 January 21, 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-economy-boj-idUSKCN0UZ0AN extraordinarily premature http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2016/02/12/feds-dudley-talk-negative-rates-extraordinarilypremature.html WSJ article http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/02/10/four-legal-questions-the-fed-would-face-if-it-decided-to-go-negative/ 01 20160216 The consequences of negative interest rates 2016-03-20 06:02 PM http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/16/the-consequences-of-negative-interest-rates-commentary.html The consequences of negative interest rates Christopher Swann, 20160216 How low can central banks go? Until recently, it was assumed that policy makers had to stop once they had cut nominal interest rates to zero. But negative interest rates – charging commercial banks for the privilege of holding reserves with the central bank – are being more widely deployed. Countries accounting for almost a quarter of global GDP now have sub-zero interest rates – including the euro zone, Switzerland, and most recently Japan. Janet Yellen, Chairwoman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Samuel Corum | Andolu Agency | Getty Images Even in the U.S., where 100 basis points (one percentage point) of rate hikes were priced in at the end of 2015, markets now attach a 10-percent chance (four times higher than the start of this year) that the Federal Reserve will impose negative rates over the next 12 months, in response to softer current economic activity indicators. Those central banks that have gone negative believe it could boost growth and markets in several ways. Janet Yellen How negative rates can crush average investors First, the policy should encourage commercial banks to make loans to avoid charges on cash in excess of mandatory reserves. Second, sub-zero rates also have the potential to weaken a nation’s currency, making exports more competitive and boosting inflation as imports become more expensive. Third, by lowering short-dated government bond yields, negative rates should increase the relative appeal of equities, helping that market. Fourth, negative rates may complement other easing measures (like quantitative easing), and signal central bank resolve to tackle persistently below-target inflation. Janet Yellen, chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve, speaks during a Senate Banking Committee hearing in Washington, Feb. 11, 2016. A Fed negative-rate move would hurt Wall St banks That is the theory. But the brief history of negative rates shows things haven’t always gone according to plan. So what are the limits of the policy and its possible unintended consequences? Credit conditions might actually tighten. For negative rates to boost bank lending, commercial banks must become willing to lend more, and/or at lower costs. A sticking point is that negative rates tend to squeeze bank profits – trimming the gap between the rates at which they borrow and offer loans. If profits suffer too much, banks may even scale back lending. Difficulties in imposing negative rates on depositors may mean debt costs rise for other consumers; Swiss and Danish banks have hiked borrowing costs for homeowners since negative rates were introduced. Equities don’t always respond. Negative rates can promote a shift from bonds to stocks. But this effect has not been clear recently. Since banks form a large proportion of equity market capitalization, as in the U.S. and Japan, shrinking bank profitability may drag on stock indices. Foreign-exchange rates aren’t playing ball. Negative rates should lead to currency depreciation. This link, too, appears to have broken recently. The yen has appreciated 5.4 percent against the U.S. dollar since Japan’s policy move, with rising risk aversion overriding interest rate differentials. Central banks may go too far. European Central Bank President Mario Draghi has said there are no limits to the ECB’s potential easing. But there is a limit to how negative rates can go. At a certain point, commercial banks could be forced to charge clients to hold deposits, which could lead many to convert savings into physical cash. Bank of Canada Next country with negative rates could be… Canada? Central banks are determined to do what it takes to boost growth and inflation. With interest rates already at zero, more central banks have been resorting to negative interest rates to fulfill their objective. But as policy becomes more unorthodox, investors will need to monitor potential unintended consequences more closely. Commentary by Christopher Swann, a strategistin the Chief Investment Office at UBS Wealth Management, which oversees the investment strategy for $2 trillion in assets. Follow UBS on Twitter @UBS. How negative rates can crush average investors http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/12/what-negative-interest-rates-can-do-to-us-stockmarket.html A Fed negative-rate move would hurt Wall St banks http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/12/a-yellen-rate-reversal-would-hurt-wall-streetbanks.html Next country with negative rates could be… Canada? http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/12/next-country-with-negative-rates-could-becanada.html Why negative Fed rates have everyone worried http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/10/why-talk-of-negative-fed-rates-has-everyoneworried.html BlackRock: Negative interest rates ‘new toy’ around world http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/10/blackrock-negative-rates-new-toy-aroundworld.html 08 20160216 NK-Monetary Policy and Ending Too-Big-To-Fail 2016-03-20 07:29 PM https://sites.google.com/site/kocherlakota009/home/policy/thoughts-on-policy/2-16-16 Monetary Policy and Ending Too-Big-To-Fail N. Kocherlakota (very snowy) Rochester, NY, February 16, 2016 My successor as Minneapolis Fed President, Neel Kashkari, gave his first speech in his new role today. I congratulate him on a wellworded and stimulating set of remarks. He argued passionately in favor of imposing much tighter restrictions on the nation’s largest financial institutions, including possibly requiring them to hold a lot more capital or breaking them up. In this post, I’ll comment on two monetary policy aspects of his proposals. The first is how they would interact with the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates. The second is that monetary policymakers need to get even better at “cleaning up” after crises, given how hard crises are to prevent. My first comment is that adopting President Kashkari’s proposals when interest rates remain near their lower bound would have adverse macroeconomic consequences. Almost by design, higher capital standards mean that banks face higher financing costs (in part because debt is subsidized by the tax code). At least some of those higher financing costs would be passed along in the form of lower rates of return to savers and higher interest rates to borrowers. To compensate for these effects, the Fed would have to target a lower range for the fed funds rate. That would not be a problem if the fed funds rate were well into positive territory. But it could create distinct macroeconomic challenges when the Fed is constrained in terms of the stimulus that it can provide. (Admittedly, judicious fiscal policy could be used instead of monetary policy to offset the macroeconomic effects that I’ve described.) I’ve focused on the idea of higher capital standards. But, to the extent that we believe that there are returns to scale in the US, breaking up the banks would also generate higher intermediation costs. The consequences for monetary policy would be the same. My second comment has to do with “cleaning up” after crises using monetary policy. I completely agree with President Kashkari that policymakers should work to reduce the probability of financial crises. But I’m skeptical of their ability to eliminate such crises entirely (not that President Kashkari suggested that they had such an ability). I am sure that, at some point in the future, the public, lenders, and governments will again become convinced that “This Time Is Different,” in Reinhart and Rogoff’s evocative phrase. And that “different” time will be followed by a financial crisis. In contrast, I do think that policymakers have become considerably better at responding to financial crises. Thus, the Federal Reserve’s response to the 2007-09 crisis was, in my estimation, a big improvement on its response to the events of 1929-33.. (It is worrisome, though, that Congress has taken away so many of the Fed’s crisis response tools since 2009. Puzzlingly, both sides of the aisle seem to feel that it would have been better for the world to have suffered through a much deeper financial crisis.) But there is certainly room for further improvement in the policy response to crises. The financial crisis of 2007-09 began over eight years ago. Yet, monetary policymakers are still struggling to deal with its aftermath. The fraction of Americans aged 25 to 54 with a job remains well below its level in 2007. Perhaps even more tellingly, Inflation remains unduly low relative to the Federal Open Market Committee’s 2% target (and seems likely to stay low for several more years). In my view, and with the benefit of hindsight, I think that the FOMC’s monetary policy response was constrained by its strong desire to normalize the level and form of accommodation as rapidly as possible. Going forward, the Committee needs to develop a monetary framework that automatically leads to a more appropriate degree of patience in the removal of accommodation. President Kashkari was right to emphasize financial regulation in his first speech – it does matter a lot for all of us. I see my point as complementary to his: the ultimate impact of financial regulation on the macro-economy is shaped in important ways by the constraints on monetary policy – both actual and self-imposed – faced by central banks. Please address media enquiries and non-academic speaking requests to Monique Patenaude (
[email protected] and 585-276-3693). speech https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/lessons-from-the-crisis-ending-too-big-to-fail I think https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/monetary-policy-renormalization 15 20160317 The appearance of disappearance: the CIA’s secret black sites 2016-03-20 08:55 PM http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/90796270-ebc3-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4.html The appearance of disappearance: the CIA’s secret black sites Edmund Clark and Crofton Black March 17, 2016 1:44 pm Photographer Edmund Clark and journalist Crofton Black on the CIA’s covert detention facilities http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/68a497ac-ebdb-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img The windowless warehouse built by the CIA in Antaviliai, a quiet hamlet surrounded by lakes and woods, 20km from the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius; photographed in 2011. Work began on the prison facility in 2004. By the time of its closure, in March 2006, the existence of the CIA’s secret detention programme had been widely publicised, although not yet officially acknowledged. Twelve years ago, in a village on the edge of a pine forest not far from Lithuania’s elegant capital Vilnius, workmen constructed an unusual warehouse. It was the size of an Olympic swimming pool with no windows, many air vents and no stated purpose. The site had formerly been a riding stables and a paddock. It had also served as a local watering hole – a welcome one since the village lacked a bar or restaurant. The new building was shiny and modern, incongruous amid the tumbledown farm buildings and Soviet-era housing blocks. The convivial atmosphere of the riding club was replaced, in the words of one local inhabitant, by “this certain emptiness”. Naturally, the neighbours were curious. They speculated about the new building’s function. Was it a military listening post? A drug factory? A clandestine organ transplant lab? None of them guessed that it might be a key facility in the US Central Intelligence Agency’s Rendition, Detention and Interrogation programme, one of a secret network of “black sites”, set up in half a dozen countries to house undisclosed prisoners out of reach of lawyers, the Red Cross or other branches of the US government. Why should they? Lithuania was a long way from the front lines of the war on terror, and the village of Antaviliai, although only 20 minutes by car from the capital, was known for summer lake swims rather than for covert operations. http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/ce8b6472-ebe2-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img Lithuania. Satellite view of a former riding stables in the village of Antaviliai, annotated by a local resident to show building works, 2004 The secret detention programme, as it was gradually uncovered, stretched across the globe. The network of sites we have documented encompasses Antaviliai and Kabul, North Carolina and Skopje, Columbia County, Milan, Tripoli and Bucharest. In our journeys through this material, we have sought to portray the appearance of disappearance. Sceptics like to invoke the power of photography, its ability to show what is real. Three years ago, at a hearing for a European Parliament civil liberties committee inquiry into complicity in illegal detentions, one MEP asked if he could see a photograph of a prisoner on a plane. Failing that, he would remain convinced of the fictional world in which it didn’t happen. In the same way, Valdas Adamkus, a former president of Lithuania, when asked during a visit to London in 2011 about CIA prisoners being held in his country, stated firmly that: “Nobody proved it, nobody showed it.” In unveiling the form and structure of the network, journalists and investigators pieced together elements in many countries. Police identified names of rendition crews from phone and hotel records. We compiled dossiers with material accumulated from plane movements, government archives, NGO and media investigations, contractual paperwork and invoices. A summary of a 6,000-page report by the US Senate Intelligence Committee, partially and belatedly released in 2014, confirmed much that had by then already become public, but held a fig leaf over the names of participating countries. Last year, US government lawyers, long loath to admit to the programme’s existence, admitted to the existence of 14,000 photographs of prisoners being transported on planes and held in secret locations. Nonetheless, across Europe, officials still deny that there is any evidence of their countries’ involvement with the secret detention network. http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/d629e51e-ebe2-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img Macedonia. The room in the Skopski Merak hotel where Khaled el-Masri was held by Macedonian officials in January 2004; May 2015. Khaled el-Masri was detained by Macedonian police, who confused his name with that of an al-Qaeda suspect and handed him over to the CIA. He was held in a secret prison in Afghanistan for four months before the CIA acknowledged its mistake. He later sued CIA director George Tenet for imprisonment and torture but the US dismissed the case under state secrets privilege. He later won a case for compensation in the European Court So far, the Obama administration has refused to disclose its 14,000 photographs, and as a result we cannot show them. We can show, however, a swimming pool in a hotel in Mallorca where a flight crew relaxed for a couple of days between dropping off one piece of human cargo and picking up another. We can show a bed in a hotel room in Macedonia, where a man was tied up for 23 days before being flown to a facility in Afghanistan because he had the same name as someone else. We can show the bland fronts of offices, large and small, where the transport was organised. We can show paperwork linking a multinational service provider – a blue-chip company with thousands of employees that was formerly a contractor for Transport for London – to an aviation brokerage, a mom-and-pop affair in upstate New York. And we can show documents from the court case that ensued when two logistics firms fell out over how many hours had been flown and how much money had been earned – documents that, on close inspection, laid out the history and blueprint of the US’s most secret post-9/11 government programme. http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/d27c7e2c-ebe2-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img A page from the CIA’s Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003), dated May 7 2004. In 2004, after complaints by government officials, the CIA’s inspector-general conducted a review of the first two years of the agency’s detention and interrogation activities. It examined the range of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, including ways in which interrogators had exceeded authorised methods. Much of the report was redacted on its eventual declassification and publication in 2009 http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/ca72cdf8-ebe2-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img El-Masri’s sketch of the layout of the hotel room during his detention. (El-Masri vs Tenet, Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit, Exhibit F) . . . Looking for meaning in unexpected areas began with the weak points of business accountability: the traceable bureaucracy of invoices, documents of incorporation and billing reconciliations from companies using the familiar paths and carriages of executive travel and global exchange. These pieces of paper bear the traces of small- and medium-enterprise America seeking profit from the outsourcing of prisoner transportation. The documents and the locations to which they refer are the everyday façades behind which global, public-private partnership operated. The photographs show only banal surfaces, unremarkable streets, furnishings, ornaments and detritus. Look at them and they reveal nothing. Look into them and they are charged with significance. They are veneers of the everyday under which the purveyors of detention and interrogation operated in plain sight. The process of investigating these events proceeds in a puzzling order: revelations are veiled, significance emerges in retrospect, the central shifts to the peripheral, paradoxes and contradictions solidify and dissolve. It is an experience that, by turn, sheds light and acknowledges impenetrability. The act of photographing becomes not one of witnessing but an act of testimony, recreating parts of this network. http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/c692f582-ebe2-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img Mallorca. Swimming pool in the Hotel Gran Meliá Victoria, Palma de Mallorca; September 2014. The rendition team and crew from N313P relaxed in the hotel in January 2004 after the transfers of Binyam Mohamed from Morocco to Afghanistan and of Khaled elMasri from Macedonia to Afghanistan. Binyam Mohamed was held in Guantánamo Bay between 2004 and 2009, when he was released without charge In piecing together evidence of rendition, our account includes locations where nothing happened and people who never existed. A flight crew, enjoying a rest and recuperation stop in Palma de Mallorca, travelled under false names with no addresses other than anonymous PO boxes. A plane filed a flight plan for Helsinki but never arrived there, going instead to Lithuania, then recorded its onward destination as Portugal while travelling to Cairo. A company registered in Panama and Washington DC gave power of attorney to a man whose address turned out to be a student dormitory where no one of that name was known. A series of letters, purportedly from the US State Department, accrediting air crew to give “global support to US Embassies worldwide”, were all signed by Terry A Hogan – one name with many differing signatures. http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/80565e3e-ebf5-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img Billing reconciliation document, N308AB, Prime Jet and BaseOps, August 2004. (Document on file with Reprieve) In 2003, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), an IT support company, acquired DynCorp Systems and Solutions, a private military company, and with it a government aviation contract to organise flights at short notice for US government personnel. CSC made use of trip-planning companies to take care of arrangements such as overflight permissions, landing and handling fees. Here, trip planner BaseOps invoices operating company Prime Jet for services rendered to its aircraft N308AB between August 23 and August 25 2004. This plane carried black site prisoner Laid Saidi from Afghanistan, where he had been imprisoned by the CIA for 15 months, to Algeria, where he was released without charge These are all masks, obscuring by design and revealing by accident. The most common form in which the appearance of disappearance is found, however, is the simple black line: the redaction or strikeout. Sometimes this can be applied to entire paragraphs, pages. From these black lines many things can be perceived. Every black line has to hide something. . . . While contemplating these abstractions, we should remember that principally what disappeared here is people. They remained disappeared for between half a dozen and 1,600 days, as far as records – eventually released in 2014 by the Senate Intelligence Committee, in a form that was almost entirely redacted but still susceptible to interpretation – can determine. What also disappeared is the law. In the US, Europe, in almost all the world, the law is very clear: no secret detention, no torture. But sometimes the law is a mirage. The law can determine – has determined, indeed – which firm owes how much money to which other firm for performing prisoner transport flights. But who set up and ran the secret prisons, where, how? Who was responsible? Even as the answers become increasingly well attested, these questions remain beyond the law’s vanishing point. The documents and photographs that we have excavated are physical artefacts of extraordinary rendition. At a time when one US president has failed to close the Guantánamo Bay detention camps after two terms, and one of his prospective successors wants to “bring back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding”, the negative publicity evoked by these images is an indication of how the law vanished. http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/7cb2182c-ebf5-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img New York. Richmor Aviation’s office at Columbia County Airport, New York; February 2013. In early 2005, Richmor Aviation’s Gulfstream jet N85VM was publicly implicated in the CIA’s 2003 abduction of the Egyptian cleric Abu Omar from Milan, Italy. A year and a half after the jet’s role was publicised, Richmor’s president Mahlon Richards wrote to aircraft brokerage firm Sportsflight. Despite the re-registration of the plane, it would, he said, ‘always be linked to renditions’. Shortly afterwards he took Sportsflight to court for money owed. In this section of the court transcript, Richards describes how N85VM flew to Italy, Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, ‘to every place’. The purpose was to pick up ‘a bad guy’. The court clerk has corrected the misheard ‘theorists’ to ‘terrorists’. The judge agreed with Richmor’s assessment that the context of renditions was ‘irrelevant and immaterial’ to the case. Sportsflight was ordered to compensate Richmor for its lost earnings http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/78e1bb4e-ebf5-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img Transcript of the cross-examination of Mahlon Richards, Richmor Aviation Inc vs Sportsflight Air Inc, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Columbia, Index No 07-2171, July 2 2009 http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/75142c04-ebf5-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img Afghanistan. Site in north-east Kabul, now obscured by new factories and compounds, believed to have been the location of the Salt Pit; October 2013. The Salt Pit is the name commonly given to the CIA’s first prison in Afghanistan, which began operating in September 2002. Dozens of prisoners were held there over the next 18 months. Gul Rahman, a young Afghan detainee, died of hypothermia there in November 2002. He was buried in an unmarked grave. The US Senate’s report on the CIA programme described how detainees ‘were kept in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste’. Members of a visiting delegation from the Federal Bureau of Prisons commented that they had ‘never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived’. The site was closed in 2004 and replaced by a purpose-built facility http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/71b4181c-ebf5-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.img Sketches by Mohammed Shoroeiya, a Libyan opposed to the Gaddafi regime, of two of the torture devices used on him in a CIA prison in Afghanistan, where he was kept for a year in 2003-04. They show a small wooden box in which he was locked, and a waterboard to which he was strapped. Other drawings showed a narrow windowless box in which he was held naked for one and a half days. According to the US Senate report, Shoroeiya was ‘walked for 15 minutes every half hour through the night and into the morning’ to prevent him from sleeping. He said: ‘They wouldn’t stop until they got some kind of answer from me.’ In August 2004 he was flown by a CIA-contracted jet to Libya, where he was imprisoned. He was finally released in February 2011. (©Mohammed Shoroeiya from Human Rights Watch report, Delivered Into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya, 2012) ‘Negative Publicity: Artefacts of Extraordinary Rendition’, by Edmund Clark and Crofton Black, is published by Aperture/the Magnum Foundation, £50; aperture.org/flowers gallery.com. The authors will be in conversation with Julian Stallabrass at the Courtauld Institute on Wednesday March 23, admission free; courtauld.ac.uk. Images from ‘Negative Publicity’ will be included in an exhibition of Edmund Clark’s work at the Imperial War Museum, London, from July 28 2016 to August 28 2017 Photographs: Edmund Clark, Courtesy of Flowers Gallery London and New York
Blog at WordPress.com.
