Country-specific Study Project Vol. 5 (2015 )
Studies on Israel
Editor Dr. Mahendra Gaur
Director FPRC New Delhi
_____________________________________________
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH CENTRE NEW DELHI (INDIA) _____________________________________________
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PREFACE India is particularly sensitive about maintaining good relations with countries that hold an important position in world politics so as to concentrate on development. With this end in view,Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) has launched a country-specific studies project. Each study seeks to highlight India‘s relationship in bilateral and international perspectives. The initiative began in 2013 with Iran and has been followed by Studies on Pakistan, China and Japan. The Studies on Israel, the fifth in the series, is a timely initiative as the Indo-Israeli relationship is once again in focus following PM Benjamin Netanyahu's "sky is the limit" for bilateral ties comment after meeting Indian PM Narendra Modi in New York in September 2014. There is great momentum in cooperation. It is widely believed that Israel looks at India as a strategic partner in Asia, while China as merely a trading partner. In our venture, we have the support of national and international scholars who have agreed to come under the umbrella of FPRC to disseminate knowledge on Israel. We express our sincere gratitude to them for their cooperation in bringing this project to a successful culmination. They have always been a source of strength to us. Dr.Mahendra Gaur Director
Dr.Indira Gaur Mg. Director
Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi (www.fprc.in)
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Responses :
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Contributors
(1) Prof. Zaki Shalom Institute for National Security Studies and the Ben-Gurion Research Institute at Ben -Gurion University
(2) Dr. Denis M acEoin Distinguished Senior Fellow Gatestone Institute, New York, USA
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(3) Dr.Brandon Friedman The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies , Tel Aviv University,Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978 Israel
(4) Colonel ( Res) Dr. Shaul Shay Director of research, IPS and Senior Research Fellow, International Policy Institute for counter Interdisciplinary Center Herzeliya (IDC), Israel
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Terrorism
(ICT)
at
the
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(5) Rami Tal Senior fellow and Publications Editor at the Jewish People Policy Institute, Jerusalem
(6) Noam Sheizaf Israeli Journalist, Tel Aviv
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Articles : (1) Dr. Shaul Bartal Military analyst and a lecturer on Palestinian Affairs Middle Eastern Studies Department, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
(2) Dr. K.B. Usha Assistant Professor Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
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(3) Dr. R. Rousseau American University of Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates
(4) Dr.Rzayeva Nigar Researcher at Chair of International Policy and Foreign Policy, University of Cologne, Germany Deputy Head of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Department at the faculty of International Relations and Region Studies, Baku Slavic University, Azerbaijan
(5) Dr .Manas Chakrabarty Professor of Political Science University of North Bengal,DARJEELING. W.B.
&
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Miss Sumita Saha U.G.C. Project Fellow, Department of Political Science, University of North Bengal,Darjeeling. W.B. India
(6)Dr. AMIT MUKHERJEE PBC-Post Doctoral Research Fellowship 2015 National Security Studies Center,University of Haifa, ISRAEL
(7) Dr.Nadia Helmy Visiting senior researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University- Lund/ Sweden. Lecturer of Political Science, School of Economic Studies and Political Science, Beni Suef University, Egypt
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(8) Burzine K. WAGHMAR School of Oriental and African Studies University of London (Great Britain)
(9) Dr. Sanjay Kumar Associate Professor, Department of Defence Studies Meerut College, Meerut
& Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain Post Doctoral Fellow,Department of Defence Studies Meerut College, Meerut
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(10) Priya Singh Fellow Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata
(11) Balaji Chandramohan Visiting Fellow with Future Directions International, Perth
(12) Suhita Saha Maulana AbulKalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata
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Contents Responses : (pp. 12-48) (1) Prof. Zaki Shalom (2) Dr. Denis MacEoin (3) Dr.Brandon Friedman (4) Colonel ( Res) Dr. Shaul Shay (5) Rami Tal (6) Noam Sheizaf Articles : (1) Dr. Shaul Bartal Islamic Muslim Brotherhood scholars and “Arab Spring” in Palestine (pp.49-71) (2) Dr. K.B. Usha Holocaust Revisionism and Revival Of Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Baltic States (pp.72-98) (3) Dr. R. R ousseau The Israeli Defense Industry: Its Far-Reaching Threat and Impact (pp.99-110) (4) Dr.R zayeva Nigar The Bilateral Relations of ISRAEL AND RUSSIA in the conditions of modern geopolitical processes (pp.111-116) (5) Dr .Manas Chakrabarty & Miss Sumita Saha INDIA AND ISRAEL: A NEW S WING IN BILATERAL RELATIONS HIP (pp.117-136) (6)Dr. AMIT MUKHER JEE India-Israel-US Trilateral Cooperation Security Perspective: Challenges and Scope (pp.137-164) (7) Dr.Nadia Helmy The impact of Israeli activities in China on Arab national security (Analytical vision) (pp.165-212) (8) Burzine K. WAGHMAR Jinnah’s Jews: a Jeremiad (pp.213-235) (9) Dr. Sanjay Kumar & Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain Dynamics of political, economic and security partnership between India and Israel (pp.236-246) (10) Priya Singh Israel and the ‘New’ Middle East (pp. 247-260) (11) Balaji Chandramohan Indo-Israel strategic relations- Dawn of new hope (pp.261-268) (12) Suhita Saha Jewish Settlement and Arab Dilemma: The Root of Arab - Israeli Conflict (pp.269-274) (13) Dr.Nadia Helmy The relationship between Jewish minorities in China and Israel (pp.275-302)
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(1) Prof. Zaki Shalom Institute for National Security Studies and the Ben-Gurion Research Institute at Ben -Gurion University (Zaki Shalomis a member of the research staff at the Institute for N ational S ecurity Studies and the Ben-Gurion Research Institute at Ben-Gurion University. He has published extensively on various facets of Israel's defense policy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the role of the superpowers in the Middle East, and Israel's struggle ag ainst Islamic terror. His work has also focused on the study of Israel's nuclear option, both in historic al and contemporary perspectives. Professor Shalom holds a BA from the Hebrew University of Jerus alem and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomac y at Tufts University. He is the author of numerous articles and several books, including Israel's Nuclear Option: behind the Scenes Diplomacy between Dimona and Was hington (Sussex Ac ademic Press and J affee Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), andBen-Gurion's Politic al Struggles, 1963-1967: A Lion in Winter (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006). In 2007 he was aw arded the prime minister's prestigious David Ben-Gurion memorial prize for his book Fire in His Bones, which deals with Ben-Gurion's activities following his resignation as prime minister and until his death.) Researc h Israel: security policy Israel: civil-military relations Israel: National Security Council Israel: nuclear and arms control policy Israel: United States Israel: Europe and NATO
Publications INSS Insight The Iranian Nuclear Crisis and the U.S. Administration: The Dilemma of Sanctions in Light of the Effort to Promote an Agreement Will the United States Attempt to Renew the Political Process after the Israeli Elections? President Obama at the General Assembly: Sobriety, Continuity, and Renewal The US Administration on Israel‘s Military Activity in Operation P rotective Edge: Fluctuating Positions
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Ambassador Dermer and United States-Israel Relations US-Saudi Relations: On the Verge of a Crisis? Are the P5+1 Waging a Campaign against the Military Option? Contemplating a Substantive Change in the P alestinian Position on a P olitical Agreement: P ossible Israeli Responses The Debate on a Military Option against Iran Revisited: When and By Whom? The Obama Administration and the Civil War in Syria Israel and the United States in Disagreement over Iran Have the P alestinians Despaired of the Two-State Formula? Between the ―Zone of Immunity‖ and the ―Zone of Trust‖: US-Israel Relations in Light of Iran‘s Continuing Nuclearization The US on an Israeli Military Strike against Iran: A Change in P osition? Israeli-American Strategic Coordination regarding an Israeli Operation against Iran Are the United States and Iran on a Collision Course? The Palestinian Statehood Bid and US Aid to the P alestinian Authority The Peace P rocess: From Oslo P arameters to Unilateral Actions Prime Minister Netanyahu Goes to Washington: How to Rebuild Trust Israel and the US Administration: A Midterm Assessment The (Hillary) Clinton Outline: A Fundamental T urning Point? The Leaked American Documents: P ossible Ramifications for the Israeli P alestinian Peace Process The US Role in the Israeli-P alestinian P eace P rocess Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Netanyahu and Direct T alks with the P alestinians The Cloud's Silver Linings: The Flotilla to Gaza Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran The Israeli-P alestinian Peace Process: Where Is the Obama Administration Headed? Israel, the United States, and the Faltering P eace P rocess Oslo Revisited: Are the Fundamental Assumptions still Valid? The Obama Administration vs. Prime Minister Netanyahu: Confrontation in the Making? The IDF's New Response P olicy vis-à-vis Hizbollah: How Viable is It? Is a Military Attack on Iran Imminent? Hizbollah's Increased Strength: Risks and Opportunities for Israel
Strategic Assessment
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The ―Special Relationship‖ in the Test of Time: US P olicy during Operation Protective Edge The United States and the Israeli Settlements: Time for a Change The Disengagement Plan: Vision and Reality US-Israel Relations: Approaching a T urning P oint? Defining the Enemy in an Asymmetrical Confrontation: The Case of the Second Lebanon War Is Decision against a T errorist Organization P ossible? Operation Cast Lead: A Case Study Two States for Two Peoples: A Vision Rapidly Eroding Conceptual Flaws on the Road to the Second Lebanon War Dispelling Beliefs: The War in Lebanon as a Test Case Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks Military and Strategic Affairs The Unique Features of the Second Intifada Is the IDF Prepared to Face a Regular War against the Arab States?
Book Between Dimona and Washington: The Struggle over the Development of Israel's Nuclear Option 1960-1968 (Hebrew ) Diplomacy in the Shadow of War: Myth and Reality in Advance of the Six Day War (Hebrew ) Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy betw een Dimona and Washington
Journal Article (external) Where is the Obama Government Heading vis-à-vis Iran? T o Attack or not to Attack Israel Confronts a Dramatic Decision Obama's Speech at AIPAC
Chapter Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran
Media Israelis Split on Netanyahu Tactics Still United on Iran Threat Bloomberg Business, March 02, 2015 -Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom ‗US-Israel divide: Unlike Israel, Washington feels no threat f rom Iran‘ RT, February 25, 2015 -Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom Should Israel Embrace Anew the Doctrine of Preventive War? Israel Defense, July 27, 2014 The Peace Process: Winds of Change? Israel Defense, May 10, 2014
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If Middle East Peace Isn‘t Possible, Acceptance Might Be The Next Best Thing KGOU, April 18, 2014 -Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom The Ukraine Crisis - Possible Implications for Israel Israel Defense, April 09, 2014 Iranian Weapons Ship Seizure - The American Perspective Israel Defense, March 11, 2014 Israel-US Dispute Regarding Iran is still highly Significant Israel Defense, December 11, 2013 -A commentary by Professor Zaki Shalom Where is the Obama Government heading vis -à-vis Iran? Israel Defense, November 26, 2013 Does Israel Have Veto Power Over An Agreement With Iran? Israel's homeland security home site, November 12, 2013 Professor: U.S. must remain vigilant on Iran Stillwater News Press, October 16, 2013 -Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom Operation Pillar of Defense - Gains & Losses Israel Defense, February 01, 2013 Has Operation Pillar of Defense Enhanced Israel‘s Deterrence e-International Relations, January 06, 2013 Obama's second term: ideology or pragmatism? Mishpacha, November 14, 2012 -Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom Is Israel‘s Deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah Diminishing? e-International Relations, October 29, 2012 Syrian Turmoil Convenient for the U.S., Says Expert Arutz Sheva, September 11, 2012 -Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom To attack or not to attack Israel confronts a dramatic decision Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, September 03, 2012 Obama's Speech at AIPAC Middle East Institute New Delhi, April 11, 2012 President Obama's State of the Union Address, January 24, 2012: Between Realities and Aspirations CEMMIS, March 12, 2012 Netanyahu's visit to the United States and the Future of the Israeli Palestinian Peace Process Center for Mediterranean, Middle East and Islamic Studies, June 21, 2011 Zaki Shalom Strategic Studies Center Report: Netanyahu Doing Well with Obama Arutz Sheva, January 03, 2011- Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom Peace of the cowards Ynet, July 20, 2010 -Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom
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Captured in Our Hearts Omedia, May 15, 2007 Zaki Shalom Too Friendly The Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2006-Quoted/interviewed: Zaki Shalom By Yaakov Katz, The Jerusalem
Response to Questionnaire 1.President Obama says the U.S .'s friendshi p with Israel is undying, but he also says : The U.S., though willing to defend an isolated Israel at the United Nations and in other international bodies, might soon be unable to do so effectively. Do you think the U.S . no longer considers Israel a strategic ally in the Middle East forcing Israel to rethink its histori c alliances? The United States still considers Israel as an ally. Israel is the only stable, reliable and powerful democracy in the Middle East, an d the United States is well aware of this. There are disagreements between the two parties with regard to Iran and the peace process but the strategic military cooperation between Israel and the United States is stronger than ever before. There were indeed threats that the United States will find it hard to support Israel in the United Nations in the future. I do not think that the United States will support a resolution that imposes on Israel a settlement which is not acceptable by Israel. Since the SixDay War the United States supporte d resolution 242 an d the Oslo agreements and there were statements by the United States presidents that any Arab-Israeli settlement will have to ensure Israel secure and recognized boun daries, and thatIsrael's security position is not jeopardized. President Obama has made it clear that there has to be a recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and that a withdrawal by Israel to the 1967 lines will have to include swaps. That means that Israel will be able to keep under its control territories in the West Bank, which are populated by Jewish communities. I do n ot believe the United states will give hand to a dramatic change in this regard. One has to take into consideration the fact that the United States power and influence has bee n weaken in recent years, mainly in the Middle East, an d that the leverage options the United States has on Israelare limited, mainly because Israel enjoys great support in the Congress and the general public. In addition the power of the Arab world has be en dramatically decreased in recent years due the Arab spring, the internal wars, regime instability and the decline in the importance of oil, which for years has been the main asset of the Arab world. 2. W hat are the challenges to Israel‘s national security? How does Israel‘s National Security Doctrine takes care of these challenges?
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There are two strategic threats on Israel: Iran and terror organizations – Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran poses a grave threat to Israel's survival because it intends to have control over nuclear weapons. As you know Israel is a very small state and a nuclear strike on Israel could mean the end of the Jewish state. Iran leaders say publicly that their intention is to annihilate the Jewish state. So its clear we think that a nuc lear device in the hands of Iran is a great menace to Israel. We try to cope against this threat in political means. We are trying the convince the United States to take the lead in a struggle against Iran's nuclear project. We have great support in the Congress in our position. Yet the White House disagree with us, and as you know we are now in the center of a confrontation between the Congress and the White House on this topic. I estimate that the White House will not conclude an agreement with Iran whic h will be oppose d by the majority of the Congress members. I assume that Israel and the United States are carrying out, together and separately, various kinds of covert operations intended to obstruct the Iranian nuclear project. Obviously not much is known about these operations. 3.President Obama affirms that a peace deal with the Palestinians is the right thing to do for Israel and it was necessary to stress the need for a two-state solution. W hy is President Obama still fixated on the Two-State Solution? Is the two-state solution possible? Is it even feasible, given the turmoil in the region? W ill it bring peace? Israel and the United States officially support the idea of two states solution to the Israeli -Palestinian conflict. However it is clear now that neither Israel nor the Palestinians are ready to pa y the necessary price in order to fulfill this goal. Esta blishment of a Palestinian state can be done right now only in the West Bank. Gaza is controlled by the Hamas which opposes any settlement with Israel. Therefore, what Israel is asked to agree to today is to the establishment of two Palestinian states one in Gaza one in the West Bank. No Israeli government can accept such a situation. In addition the establishment of a Palestinian state will necessarily bring about an removal of at least 100000 Jewish settlers from the West Bank. I don‘t think there is a feasible option for any Israeli government to undertake such a process. It simply cannot be done in the Israeli political system as it is now composed. Furthermore, Israel demands that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized an d that Israel will control its airports and seaports to prevent the smuggling of weapons and terrorists into the Palestinian state. The Palestinian authority totally opposes this demand since it puts her in an inferior position with regard to Israel and actually frustrate her abilities to perform as an independent sovereign state. There are also huge gap between the parties with regard to the future of Jerusalem and the refugees problem. So I really do not think the option of a Palestinian state is realistic in the near future. Until now president Obama opposed any alternative to the two states idea. However, in recent interviews he stated clearly that option of a
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comprehe nsive settlement does not seem to be realistic in the near future. Therefore, in his view the most realistic option is limited measures that would enhance the trust between the parties. Will this lead to a dramatic change in United States position with regard to the two states solution – I do not think so. Certainly not during Obama's presidency. 4.W hy is there such a divide between the United States‘ and Israel‘s positions on Iran‘s nu clear programme and can they be bridge d? Do you agree with the view that like Israel, U.S. Arab allies -such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—are just as distraught and also fear Obama‘s Iran Nuclear Deal ? The controversy between Israel and the United States with regard to Iran derives in the first place from the different perception of the threat. Israel feels its very survival is threatened by the Iran's nuclear project. The United States does face real threat to its homeland from Iran's nuclear project. Iran does not threaten the United States homeland.It only threatens her allies in the region. So there is a huge gap in the perception of the threat between Israel and the United States. Also, the time framework is very different. Israel feels that as time goes by her ability to destroy the nuclear proje ct in Iran by a military operation becomes increasingly more limited. The United States has huge military abilities and can postpone the strike against Iran for years. This will not have a meaningful effect on her military options against Iran. The bottom line is this: Eventually a nuclear Iran does not really pose a major threat, imminent and concrete to the American homeland. Furthermore, it seems that president Obama looks now on Iran more as a partner rather than an enemy. He believes Iran has a stable regime and powerful army. Her leaders reflect pragmatic policy. He seems to believe that Iran wants only to be recognized as a potential nuclear state. Once she is given this status, the Iranian leadership will become much more pragmatic and moderate and will restraint their support of terror organizations and activities intended to de stabilize regimes in the Arab world. So in the future the United States and Iran can join hands an d cooperate against extremist powers in the Middle East like ISIS. Finally, the United States under president Obama is simply oppose d to the use of military power away from home. President Obama made it clear that following the devastating American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States will use its military only whe n there is a concrete and imminent threat to vital interests of the United States. This is not the case right now with regard to Iran. Israel and many Arab states in the region do not accept such an assessment. They believe that a recognition of Iran as a potential nuclear state will only enhance her subversive activities in the region.Indeed many Arab states allies of the United States are deeply disappointed by this American policy. That is why they tend to enhance their relations with Israel at this peri od of time.
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5.Is the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship likely to be fundamentally different now that M odi is in power? The Indian – Israeli strategic cooperation stems mainly from the fact that both states believe this serve their best interests. Israe l and India face very similar threats, Israel has become a leading power in its military, technology and science and so is India. The change that has occurred since Modi came to power is that India does not feel it necessary anymore to hide her strategic cooperation with Israel as it used to do in the past. This derives in the first place from Modi's unique personality and his long standing political and ideological convictions. To the best of my knowledge he supported strong an d open relations with Israel long before he came to power in India. We have always told In dian officials that good relations with Israel does not necessarily harm relations with the Arab world. The improving strategic cooperation between our states certainly reflect the decreasing power of the Arab world in world affairs. I estimate that this cooperationwill improve in coming years as the threats India faces, in particular from Pakistanand terror organizations are not going to disappear, on the contrary. It should be emphasized though thatthis strategic cooperation between India and Israel does not necessarily mean an agreement on all the subjects. Israel is well aware that India holds different views with regard to the peace process and the settlements in the West Bank. And this leads her often to vote against Israel in the United Nations and other international organizations. We believe we can enhance our relations notwithstanding those different views. 6.After W orld W ar II, anti-Semitism seemed to disappear in Europe. It is back, to a very disquieting degree.Although it is not exactly the same
anti-Semitism
that
in
the
1930's,
it
is
not
fully
different.Hatred towards Israel is now the most wi dely shared sentiment among Europeans, whatever their place on the political spectrum. An increasing number of Europeans seem quite ready for another Holocaust.How do you look at this development? Anti Semitism in Europe is indeed a disturbing phenomenon not only for Israel but also for all th ose who believe in freedom, democracy and li beral ideas all over the world. The difference between our days and the 1930's is that today unlike beforepersecute d Jews can take a flight and within few hours can be citizens of Israel. The Jews in Europe during the holocaust di d not have such an option unfortunately. That is why the Nazis could kill six million Jews in Europe. We believe that some of the criticism against Israel in Europe derives also from anti -Semitic sentiments and not only from disagreement to its policy. We call all the Jewsin europe to come and live in Israel. Many come many others –
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don‘t. we have sharp disagreements with many European countrie s over many issues, but basically Europe today knows its limitation of power much more than before. It is aware of the fact that it simply cannot force Israel to undertake decisions which are not serving Israel's best interests. Our relations with europe are now based on the principle that we simply agree to disagree.We have very good economic and scientific relations with many European states. We are struggling against initiatives to boycott Israeli goods in Europe. Until now those initatives did not cause Israel major economic damages. 7. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democra cy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring.Do you agree with this statement? Israel is not against the Arab spring. We believe that democracy in the Arab world will eventually bring about peace with Israel. However, unfortunately the Arab spring which began as a sort of democratic movement has dramatically changed its face and has become violent ans radical. We are fearful that the internal violence in the Arab states will lead to an anarchy in the Arab world. Already as you know many Arab states like Syria Iraq Lybia Yemen are already torn a part without a central authoritative regi me. This poses grave dangers not only to Israel but also to the whole world. The Arab spring in principle has begun as a very positive process. Young people in the Arab world called their leaders to devote their energies to economic and social purposes ra ther than to unnecessary warfare. However, as time passed by this movement in certain countries has taken a different look than its original. 8. Is Israeli-Arab conflict
an "intra ctable conflict ?" W hy peace-
making efforts don't make headway ? The Arab-Israeli conflict is an outcome of the fact that the Arab world has been opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Even now the Palestinians refuse to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. For many Israelis this reflects the fact that they have not yet really recognized Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish state. There are also huge gaps between Israel and the Palestinians concerning territorial issues religious subjects the refugee problem and many others. I do not belie ve this conflict can be solved in the forthcoming future. It is extremely complicated and involves sentiments, beliefs and so on. As you know well from your experience the Arab -Israeli conflict is not the only conflict that cannot be solved. The best thin g we can do -un der the present circumtances, is to live with disagreements and try to get the best out of it. 9. Do you believe NATO-Israel relations are arriving at strategic crossroa ds, which could serve to take this relationship to new levels, particularly following the introdu ction of N ATO's new partnership policy?
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There will be no dramatic change in the relations between Israel and NATO as long as there is no solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. And this conflict unfortunately is not going to be solved in the near future. There were suggestions that Israel will become part of NATO. I do not think that the majority of NATO members wish to have Israel as a formal member of NATO. As you know certainty the alliance calls each state to support another me mber of the alliance that has been attacked by another power. So if Arab states would decide to attack Israel states like France and Germany might find themselves engaged in a war which they do not want to be involved in. In my view Israel also does not wa nt to become a formal member of NATO because it believes this will limit her freedom of action .
(2) Dr. Denis M acEoin Distinguished Senior Fellow Gatestone Institute, New York, USA (Denis MacEoin is a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Gatestone Institute, New York. He first graduated with a B.A. an d an M.A. in En glish Language and Literature from Trinity College, Dublin, followed by a second 4-year M.A. in Persian, Arabic, and Islamic Studies from Edin burgh and a PhD in Persian/Islamic Studies from Cambridge (King's College). He has lectured in Arabic and Islamic Studies at Newcastle University, and written several academic books and numerous journal articles and encyclopedia entries for the Encyclopedia of Islam, the Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam in the Modern World, the Encyclolpedia Iranica, and others. Recently, he has written reports for UK think tank s on hate literature, Shari‗a Law, and Islamic schools. He has worked as the Royal Literary Fund Fellow at Newcastle University, where he has also taught a short course in creative writing ('Writing in Genre'). He served as the editor of a US-based journal, The Middle East Quarterl y. In 1992, HarperCollins published a volume of his journalism under the title New Jerusalems: Islam, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Rushdie Affair. He is also the author of 26 novels under two pen-names.) Response to Questionnaire on Israel 1.President Obama says the U .S.‘s friendshi p with Israel is undying, but he also says : The U.S., though willing to defend an isolated Israel at the United Nations and in other international bodies, might soon be unable to do so effe ctively. Do you think the U.S . no longer considers Israel a strategic ally in the M iddle East forcing Israel to rethink its histori c alliances?
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Reply Under the Obama administration, Israel does indeed face a level of isolation unprecedented in its history. For years, the US has been Israel‘s most important ally, backing it in the UN and in other forums, paying it large sums of money, selling advanced arms, and providing a space within which Israeli diplomats and speakers can present their views openly. The American public, many think tanks, and much of the media have traditionally been supportive of Israel and the Jewish people. But Obama has been openly rude to Israel‘s Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and has expressed support for the Palestinian cause . John Kerry, assigned to further the peace process, has significantly failed because he has put more pressure on Israel to capitulate to Palestinian demands and has not addressed the fundamental question of Palestinian irredentism and intransigence. Obama‘s desperation to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, Israel‘s biggest enemy (and the enemy of many other countries in the Middle East) has expose d the Jewish state to an enormous threat by relaxing oversight of Iranian progress to the building of nuclear weapons. This seems to be part of Obama‘s broa d policy of withdrawing the United States from full involvement in the outside world, notably the Middle East and the Islamic world. It is a policy born of US catastrophe in its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it has allowed Muslim extremists across the world to gain an upper hand in many places, while many of the Arab states collapse into total disarray, civil war, and takeover by groups like ISIS (Da‘ish). Where is Israel to find new allies? With a largely hostile US administration and a pro-Palestinian trend across Europe, only two major Western states are willing to stand up for Israel in the public arena: Canada and Australia. But the Obama a dministration may well be replaced in a short time by one more sensitive to Israel‘s need to survive among neighbours who daily threaten to destroy it or ‗wi pe it from the map‘. The US Congress is overwhelmingly supportive of Israel, and this is boun d to influence the long-term policy on the Middle East. If that happens, the US will rejoin the ranks of Israel‘s staunch allies. 2. W hat are the challenges to Israel‘s national security? How does Israel‘s National Security Doctrine takes care of these challenges? Reply The challenges are immense. Over the years, some have declined in seriousness. Having made peace treaties with Egypt (1979) an d Jordan (1994), the threat of war on four or five fronts as before (1948, 1967, 1973) has receded. That is not to say that the populations of any of Israel‘s neighbours have become friendly to Israel, but both Egypt and Jordan understand that they cannot defeat Israel in battle, while both
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countries have greater internal and external enemies to face. The threat of a major international war has also declined because neither Syria nor Lebanon is in a fit state to contemplate an engagement. However, Israel does face external non-national foes in the form of Hamas (since 2006), Hizbullah (Hezbollah) (1980s on), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (since 1981), and the Islamic State of Iraq an d Syria (ISIS, Da‘ish, since 2014). Hizbullah in particular, which is financed, armed and trained by Iran, has a vast arsenal of advanced weaponry, including over 80,000 short, medium, and long-range missiles, and it currently controls most of Lebanon. The chief distractions from Israel for these groups are the civil wars in Syria and Iraq and the clashes between Sunni groups like Hamas and the Shi‗i Hizbullah, the competing interests of Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Distractions notwithstanding, Israel has now been forced to fight wars with Hamas. Although Israel has won each war, it has not been able to complete the job by destroying the terrorist entity, and its actions, though entirely within the rules of international law, have brought deep opprobrium on the country. On the military front, Israel‘s National Security Doctrine – most fully studied by David Rodman – remains intact, but has undergone several changes over the years. Israel‘s biggest problem has always been geography, given its tiny dimensions and its being surrounded on three sides by enemy states. Originally, this meant Egypt when it occupied Gaza and Jordan when it occupied the West Bank. Taking the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights in 1967 allowed Israel buffer zones. However, following the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, Israel felt confident to return the Sinai, and later, in 2005, it ended its occupation of Gaza. The need for extensive territory was replaced by reliance on superior weaponry, a dvanced technical skills, high levels of intelligence gathering, a navy equipped with four nuclear -capable submarines and, more recently, the deployment of high quality anti missile defences such as Iron Dome and David‘s Sling. Behind this has always been the more or less open secret of Israel‘s nuclear armoury, held as a last reserve. Since 1979, there has been a growing threat from Iran. The Islamic regime there is deeply involved in terrorism and guerilla warfare across the Middle East, in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. In July 2015, the United States and its allies have reached a nuclear deal with Iran that will allow it to develop weapons without full IAEA inspection or sanctions. Given that the regime has repeatedly threatened to ‗wipe Israel from the pages of time‘, a nuclear-armed Iran will pose a major existential danger to Israel. A conventional war is out of the question without US an d European support, which is not currently forthcoming. A full-out war would entail fighting on several fronts if Hizbullah, Hamas, and perhaps others joined in the fighting.
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A response to the Iranian threat must rest on the non -military aspects of Israel‘s National Security Doctrine, largely through diplomacy. Some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have started to see Iran as a real threat to their own survival and are warming to improved relations with Israel. In the context of Western antagonism, Israel is building relations with other countries of influence, notably India and China, with whom trade relations are rapidly rising. Such countries, lacking the anti Semitic bias that still underlines European attitudes to Israel and plays a part in US views under the present administration, do not hold the same grievances against the Jewish state that have corrupte d the Muslim countries and Europe for so long. Despite the antagonism of the White House, there remains a very high level of support for Israel in Congress. In May 2015, in a period of tension between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, Congress approved a large arms deal worth $1.9 billion to supply large quantities of missiles and penetration bom bs, which will beef up Israel‘s arsenal considerably. Here, diplomatic and military security work hand in hand. Another security threat to Israel exists on what has come to be called ‗lawfare‘, which embraces international pressure on the country by making accusations of war crimes, apartheid, colonialism, oppression, torture and anything else that may be thought a pplicable in forums like the International Criminal Court. This is exacerbated by the unending focus in the UN and its Human Rights Council on Israel to the exclusion of genuinely rights-denying and criminal regimes like Iran, Syria, Sudan, Kazakhstan, China and many more. When combined wi th a massive anti-Israel movement across Europe an d the United States, Israel has to fight hard to present in the political, legal, and media forums its case, its achievements, and its positive development of human rights in an international arena. The international Boycott, Divestments, and Sanctions campaign, though relatively unsuccessful, is very noisy and attracts much attention from both the media and politicians. Co-existent with these lawfare campaigns and widespread protests, many countries (notably in Europe) are calling for the unilateral creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Ga za. This has to be battled out in the UN, at the EU, an d in the media. Academic dissociation from Israel now includes attempts to argue the illegitimacy of I srael as a state and calls for its dismantlement and replacement with a unitary Palestinian state. To resist this vast anti -Israel campaign, pro-Israel groups in the public arena and on campuses across Europe and the US provi de a voluntary form of engageme nt that is backed by Israeli embassies in the countries involved. The Palestinian cause has become the cause par excellence of the international left, particularly the far left, which is now tightly allied to the Muslim far right. Pro-Palestinian activists in the United States have
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played an important role in the protests and rioting in US cities like Ferguson and Baltimore in 2014 an d 2015, allying themselves with black resistance movements. And this narrowly focused campaign draws increasing support from the growing level of anti -Semitism that is now endemic across Europe and in parts of the US, Canada, and Australia. It is not surprising, then, to find that the Jewish communities in Israel and worldwi de are again faced with the oldest hatred. The good news is that the fight against anti -Semitism is one where Jews will find genuine support from Western governments. As it becomes increasingly clear that anti-Israelism is just another form of anti -Semitism, public, academic and political attitudes to Israel m ay start to change for the better. 3.President Obama affirms that a peace deal with the Palestinians is the right thing to do for Israel and it was necessary to stress the need for a two-state solution. W hy is President Obama still fixated on the Two-State Solution? Is the two-state solution possible? Is it even feasible, given the turmoil in the region? W ill it bring peace? Reply The two-state solution has had its day. The Palestinians have been offered very generous terms on which to build a state alongside Israel on about a dozen occasions. It is well known that, since 1947, the Palestinian Arabs have rejected a state next to Israel, demanding at every turn a single Palestinian state without Israel or, as Mahmoud Abbas made clear about a year ago, without a single Jew. All Palestinian documents, media articles, mosque sermons, political speeches, school textbooks, and even maps proclaim a unified Palestinian state ‗from the river to the sea‘ (i.e. from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean). It could not be clearer. The Hamas Charter and Hizbullah‘s Risala Maftuha (Open Letter) set out an uncompromising denial of Israel‘s right to exist. A two-state solution cannot work so long as ra dical Islamist theories dominate Palestinian thought. Let me explain. International law, which fully recognizes Israel as a sovereign state, permits Israel to remain in the West Bank until it is given secure borders and security, and allows Jewish settlement across the area of the original Palestine Mandate territory (except for what is now Jordan), is the basis for all negotiations. But Western, democratic international law norms are not recognized in Islamic shari‗a law. According to Dutch scholar Rudolph Peters, a recognized expert on jihad, the Islamic form of internation al law is the law of jihad, as foun d in the writings of centuries of Muslim jurisprudents (fuqaha‟). Un der jihad law, any territory that has once been ruled by a Muslim authority, within an empire or separately, must remain in Muslim hands for all eternity. This disparity between Western standards of international law and its Islamic equivalent is at the root of the 68-year armed struggle by the
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Arab world an d Iran to remove Israel entirely and replace it with a unitary Palestine state encompassing Gaza, the West Bank, the former Israel, and possibly Jordan. Ra dical Muslims (and many less radical) still harbour hopes of bringing Spain, Portugal, Sicily, southern France and Italy, Northern India, and the former Ottoman provinces in Europe back within the fold of Islam. ISIS, as we know, plans to establish a new caliphal empire to match the Umayyad or Abbasi d or Ottoman empires of the past. From this perspective, the thought that Jews – long considered in the Qur‘an and Sunna to be the most despised of all cre atures – are now ruling a territory that was the very first of the Arab Muslim conquests of the seventh century (from 634) is intolerable in the extreme. It is a sin against God, an insult to Islam, and a provocation that can only be met by jihad. As its says in the Hamas Charter, article 13, ‗la hall li‟l-qadiyya al-filastini yya illa bi‟l-jihad‘ – there is no solution to the Palestine question except by jihad. Just last year, BDS co-foun der Omar Barghouti proudly declared: ―Definitely, most definitely we oppose a Jewish state in any part of Palestine. No Palestinian, rational Palestinian, not a sellout Palestinian, will ever accept a Jewish state in Palestine.‖ That Israel is a democracy – and a vibrant, li beral one at that – only serves to make things worse in the eyes of anti -democratic radicals. In fundamentalist Islam, whether in the Salafi, Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabi or similar versions, only God can make laws and the only laws that merit obedience are those contained in the corpus of the shari„a. To destroy a democracy that rules where God‘s laws should a pply can only be an act of religious righteousness. Israel accepted a two-state solution in 1947, when the UN voted for partition of the time -limited British Mandate of Palestine. Israeli governments have never ceased to favour co-existence and a negotiated settlement that will give justice to both sides. But after a multitude of aggressive wars and an endless barrage of terrorist attacks, suicide bom bings, shootings and sta bbings, the Palestinians seem to have nothing to offer the peace process but renewed violence. They have turned down flat every peace offer ever made to them. Israelis cannot reasonably contemplate the creation of one or two unredeemed Palestinian states on its borders, states now free to import a dvanced weaponry, bigger and better rockets, volunteers from abroad ready an d willing to take part in a final onslaught, to legitimize its terrorist gangs as the armed forces of a sovereign nation, and to receive increasing amounts of international aid that will be spent on building its military strength. For hatred and war are all they seem to care for. It is widely thought that a Palestinian state on the West Bank would quickly be overrun by Hamas, and there are real fears that a
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Hamas state, mired in the same chaos that currently afflicts Gaza, might well fall to an ISIS invasion. The entire Middle East is in a constant state of flux. Governments will continue to fall, dictators will arise, be overthrown, and rise again, wars will spread, lives will be lost, anarchy will rule in many places – and this is something that is likely to continue for many generations. Since Israel is the only stable country in the region (Jordan is fairly well stabilized under a popular monarchy, but the large proportion of Palestinians living there and the general unrest in Iraq and Syria are immediate threats to its survival), it makes absolute sense to strengthen Israel and hope that, as things change and weariness sets in, the Jewish state can serve as a model for its neighbours. Weaken or destroy Israel and the Middle East may never recover from its current drive to selfdestruction. 4.W hy is there such a divide between the United States‘ and Israel‘s positions on Iran‘s nuclear programme and can they be bridged? Do you agree with the view that like Israel, U.S. Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—are just as distraught and also fear Obama‘s Iran Nuclear Deal ? Reply Pundits have been trying to unravel this complex issue for months and will do so far more now a deal is ready to sign. It is not so much a divide between the United States and Israel as a breach between President Obama and his administration on the one hand and on the other Israel, most of the US Congress, many Arab states, other countries round the world, and many political and military advisors who counsel against the nuclear deal as it stands. Obama and his supporters seem to be naïve in opening a clear path for the world‘s leading terrorist-supporting state to acquire and possibly use nuclear weapons, while lifting sanctions, giving the Iranian regime a huge multi -billion-dollar bonus, freedom from unannounced IAEA inspections, and a breakout time that could be only months. Israel has the greatest reason to fear a nuclearized Iran, given years on end of Iranian threats to wipe Israel out entirely; but countries like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states now have reason to fear Iranian intrusion backed by the threat of nuclear attack. This has already started a Middle East arms race by Saudi Ara bia, Qatar, the UAE an d possibly other states who possess the financial clout either to build or buy nuclear arms of their own an d to enter into a post-Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. In March this year, I published an article (http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5359/iran-nuclear-theology) in which I draw attention to the non-rational and even superstitious forces in Iran at many levels, including the Revolutionary Guard Corps which has ultimate control of the country‘s nuclear weapons project. The policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) worked during the Cold
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War (just a bout!) mainly because the Western nuclear powers and Russia acted in a reasonably rational manner and foresaw real damage to the world (an d even the end of humanity) as a price too high for whatever advantage a nuclear attack might bestow for h ours or minutes. The Iranian regime and much of the Iranian public harbour a pocalyptic aspirations based on Ithna‘ ‗Ashari Shi‗i prophecies. President Ahmadinezhad and his core allies held (and hold) such dangerous beliefs. When apocalypticism is combined with a love of martyrdom (as exemplified in the Iran-Iraq war), it is almost certain to create an atmosphere in which risks may be taken. Some Iranian clerics have stated that even if half the Iranian population were to die in a n uclear conflict it would still spell a victory for the country and for God. This leaves us with a situation in which a supposedly rational government like that of the United States has capitulated on almost every demand ma de by the Iranian leadership in an almost insane drive to provi de nuclear arms to one of the world‘s least stable and aggressive countries. Will Israel attack Iran in order to destroy some or all of its nuclear installations? If neighbouring states like Saudi Arabia were to turn a blind eye to such an attack or even facilitate it, it might well work. But the result of such an attack would almost certainly be a conventional war between Israel and Iran. Even Israel‘s new allies would fall back from that, knowing they would lose popular support if they were seen to be giving military aid to the Arab world‘s greatest enemy. If the current US policy of staying out of Middle East conflicts still held, then it would not help Israel and would certainly con demn it, even if its attack was done in orde r to make the world and the Middle East safer places. 5. Is the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship fundamentally different now that M odi is in power?
likely
to
be
I confess that my knowledge of Indian politics is very limited, so I can‘t answer this as fully as I might wish. But there can be no doubt that Narendra Modi is seen as a strong friend of the Jewish state. A year ago, in the Tel Aviv Institute for National Security Studies, he was praised with powerful encomia such as ‗extremely, extremely cleve r‘ and ‗very tachles, very direct, very Israeli‘. (Tachles/Tachlis, ‗the most essential word in Hebrew‘, depicts an attitude of getting down to business, taking matters seriously, dating a girl when you have every intention of marrying her.) When Benjamin Netanyahu telephoned Modi to congratulate him on his election as prime minister, Modi told him he hoped to ‗deepen and develop economic ties with the state of Israel‘. This represents a major shift in direction. Although India has recognized Israel since 1950, it has been reticent about creating public ties with the Jewish state, in part to
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appease the large Muslim population an d to avoid alienating its Arab allies. In fact, despite that early recognition, India was the last country in the non-Arab and non-Muslim world to establish official ties with Israel in 1992. These attitudes did n ot augur well for good relations between the one tiny state and the other enormous one. Yet, in spite of public avoidance of ties, relations between Israel‘s MOSSAD and India ‘s Research and Analysis Wing worked together for many years in intelligence cooperation and presumably still do so. The Mumbai train bom bing of 2006, carried out by the Lashkar-e Qahhar terrorist unit, the four-day 2008 atrocities by the Lashkar-e Ta‘iba group, the 2011 Mumbai bom bings by a group of Indian Mujahideen, not to mention long struggles with Islamist organizations over Kashmir, with fighters coming mainly from Pakistan, all gave India many opportunities to become sensitive to the dangers Israel faces from similar opponents and terrorist organizations. But that early coyness has grown to a sort of love over the past two decades. Trade with India brings in many billions of dollars a year, and ties in technology, space exploration and military collaboration grow stronger all the time. Israeli agriculture, pharmaceutical, alternative energy, and information technology com panies have flourished a bove all in Gujarat, where Modi served as chief minister for many years. Based on that success, he now wants to extend the benefits of Israeli cooperation to India as a whole. As one Indian investor put it recently, ‗If only a fraction of what ha ppened in Gujarat will happen in India as a whole, the state of Israel will be one of the biggest beneficiaries.‘ Thi s bodes well for the future. Much of this developing relationship has been detailed by PR Kumaraswamy in India‟s Israel Policy. Let us not forget that Israel is now the largest arms supplier to India – and this at a time when India has become the world‘s biggest arms importer. Both countries see themselves as beleaguered democracies facing similar threats from genocidal forces. Nor should it be forgotten that Indians were impressed by Israel‘s superlative response to the Nepal earthquake crisis of 2015, with an Israeli team far beyond all other countries except India itself (in numbers). Finally, there is another interesting link between Israel and India. Israel is home (in Haifa and at a location outside Acco) to the two major shrines and international centre of the Baha‘i religion, these constituting a UN ESCO World Heritage Site. New Delhi is the home of the Baha‘i Mother Temple of India, a lotus-sha ped structure that draws hun dreds of thousands of visitors every year and has become a major tourist attraction on the sub-continent. (Its architect, Fariborz Sahba, was a friend of mine in Iran many years ago.) The fact that both India and Iran are welcoming to the Baha‘i religion while surrounded by Muslim countries where the Baha‘is are persecuted or banned, is a significant token of their joint devotion to democracy and human rights.
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6. After W orld W ar II, anti -Semitism seemed to disappear in Europe. It is ba ck, to a very disquieting degree. Although it is not exactly the same anti-Semitism as that in the 1930s, it is not fully different. Hatre d towards Israel is now the most widely shared sentiment among Europeans, whatever their place on the political spectrum. An increasing number of Europeans seem quite ready for another Holocaust. How do you look at this development? Reply I do not doubt that another Holocaust could occur, most obviously should the Arab an d Iranian threats to commit genocide in Israel come to fruition. This is a significant matter. Thinking over the past two thousand years, it is well known that the Jews have been the most persecuted race and religion in Europe and the Islamic world. Pogroms, inquisitions, and genocides have marked Jewish history in a way that is not true of any other minority. It is surely no coincidence that today, regardless of fading memories of the Nazi Holocaust, Israel, the one Jewish state, is the focus of abiding hatred all roun d the world. No other country is singled out at the United Nations in the way Israel is, no other country suffers the same barrage of attacks, falsehoods, outright lies and hate speech as Israel. No other country has been forced to fight so many wars, defend itself against so many terrorist attacks. No other country is boycotte d, divested from and sanctioned in the way Israel has been. Thi s is despite the fact that Israel is a law-abiding, human rights observing, and vibrantly democratic state that has done more for the world in medicine, technology, science, and advanced thinking than most other nations. Israelis and Jews in general win Nobel prizes by the hundred, whereas the vast Islamic world of over 1.5 billion has won about 8 in all. Yet the Islamic world con demns Israel and seeks to destroy it while Muslim countries are still made up of monarchies, dictatorships, and tyrannical regime s that commit atrocities year on year and are seldom if ever condemned by governments, the UN, or publics anywhere. You are right to say that modern anti -Semitism, a subject well covered by numerous academics, notably the late Robert Wistrich, who died thi s May, is ‗not fully different‘ form more traditional forms, including its Nazi variant. In much of the media, particularly in the Arab world an d Iran, we see cartoons and other depictions of Jews that are uncannily like or even identical to images produce d during the Fourth Reich. To this has been added a body of anti -Semitism derived from Islamic scripture and law, bringing scurrilous hatred of Jews back to the streets of European cities under the guise of anti -Israel protest. 7. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democra cy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring. Do you agree with this statement?
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Reply Israel has never been against the emergence of democracy in the Arab world. In fact, stable democratic states as neighbours could well benefit Israel much more than having dictatorships or terrorist entities on its borders and nearby. The Arab Spring started as an attempt to overthrow dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen, and had something in common with the 2008 pro-democracy protests in Iran, which were so cruelly suppressed. The Arab Spring did result in the overthrow of rulers across the countries where it took place, but it also let loose growing instability, massive violence, and, in some places, civil war (Syria, Iraq, Yemen). Civil uprisings erupted in Bahrain; major protests started in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, an d S udan, and minor protests trouble d Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, the Western Sahara, and the Palestinian territories. Today, the Arab world is a seething mess of jihadist violence, greater autocracy (as in Egypt), refugee flight, assassinations , more security barriers (as between Saudi Arabia and Yemen), and Western refusal to be drawn back into a war or a series of wars in Arab countries. Tribalism and clan solidarity, often kept in check by governments, have come to play a major role in confli ct. Many now speak of the spurious Spring as the Arab Winter. Democracy, so long deferred, is now further away than ever. Lebanon, once the only viable democracy in the Arab world, is now effectively controlled by an Iranian -backed jihadist movement, Hizbullah. Countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco which are ruled by kings, princes, or strong men are now on the alert against potential threats from their own citizens, and this is likely to reinforce autocratic rule across the region. The threat posed by ISIS and the influx of over 25,000 foreign Muslims to fight with them, has meant the loss of territory, the slaughter of local populations, and the destruction of a great part of the regional heritage, leaving country after country more impoverished, less populous, and less rooted in its own past. It is argua ble that, by the time the upheavals have run their course (something that could take generations), many states will no longer be viable. And countries like Iraq, Syria and Yemen may be forced to split into smaller states as borders are redrawn. In addition, the awakening of intense sectarian conflict, much of which is funded and promulgated by the Islamic Republic of Iran, has proved divisive in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Beyond the Arab world, there remain many tensions in the non-Arab Muslim world, nota bly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Eritrea, and the Xinjiang province of north-west China. It is only natural that Israel, which has been a genuine democracy from its inception, should be appalled by this shift in checks and balances through the region, for both humanitarian reasons (note its reception and treatment of Syrians in its hospitals) and for reasons of self-defence. No country can welcome the breakdown of neighbouring states, even if they have been traditional enemies, especially when passive enmity turns to active threats of violence and actual displays of barbarism.
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The United Nations, still dominated by Third World an d developing states, including the 56 members who belong to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation representing a population of over 1.5 billion, has been extremely weak in its response to this international breakdown and has never seriously fostered democracy or human ri ghts in any of the places now embroiled in catastrophes largely of their own making. Like the Western powers, the UN holds back from military intervention or places peace -keeping forces without teeth in dangerous places: the UN Force in Lebanon, though ordered to prevent arms supplies to Hizbullah, has for years stood aside while the group has built one of the biggest arsenals of missiles and other weaponry in the region, an arsenal much greater than those of most countries. Apart from its resistance to Ham as and its response to occasional incursions into the Golan Heights by Syrian rebel fighters, Israel has stood aside from the conflicts around it. The building of its long security barriers indicate that exclusion works better than direct engagement, even if direct engagement is sometimes necessary when the country is attacked. But even here, there are signs of change as some of the more stable Arab states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States find themselves taking part in actions against Shi‗a movements and enclaves in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, or countering the rapid spread of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. This is bringing about something of a cooling of attitudes towards Israel, which is known not to be a threat. Tenuous cooperation in intelligence, counter-terrorism tactics and military knowhow have already started to emerge, and if things do not deteriorate too much, may form a basis for increased relationships an d perhaps treaties. That will, of course, take time. The Islamic world is notori ously averse to democracy, all the more so since the emergence of Salafi Islamism, which acknowledges only God‘s right to legislate, denying human beings any role in passing or implementing laws. Hopes for a genuine Arab Spring must be deferred to the distant future. In the meantime Israel has created a model for citizenship, innovation, human rights, and economic development that are surely the envy of the younger generation of Arabs. Young Muslims who stand aloof from Salafist and Jihadist interpretations of Islam and are able to contrast Palestinian intransigence coupled with endless misery and Jewish forward thinking linked to affluence, international status, and happiness may start to think, first of the consequences of the Arab Spring, then of the bene fits that may accrue from contact with the only successful state in the Middle East. Israelis were recently shown to be, after the citizens of ten affluent European states, the happiest people in the world. An other survey has placed them at number five. More than any of its other achievements, the happiness level of a people who have emerged from a Holocaust, known war upon war, experienced terrorism, been dragged through the mud of public opinion, been isolated from much of the world, an d more stands in marked contrast to the misery of all its enemies, who come very low in the happiness stakes shown in the same surveys. Israel exports many of the modern world‘s greatest achievements, and is renowned for its expertise in many fields. But if the
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world was willing to engage with Israel and recognize its virtues, perhaps happiness in adversity could be its greatest export of all.
(3) Dr.Brandon Friedman The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies , Tel Aviv University,Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978 Israel Email:
[email protected] Research: Arab-Iranian relations, Contemporary political history of the Arabian/Persian Gulf, Political biography Brandon delivered a public lecture entitled "Muscle Flexing, Quiet Diplomacy, and Iran's Nuclear Program," at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on 27 February 2012. http://www.fpri.org/events/2012/20120227.lecture.friedman.html Brandon was also a participant and discussant in the 2012 Herzliya Conference, Round Table Session: "Strategy and Deterrence in the Arab and Muslim World," at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya on 1 February 2012. Recent Publications "Battle for Bahrain: What One Uprising Meant for the Gulf States and Iran," World Affairs, March/April 2012. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/battle-bahrain-what-one-uprisingmeant-gulf-states-and-iran "Iran in Israel's Strategic Calculus," Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) e note, April 2012. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.friedman.iran-israel-calculus.html "Qatar: Security Amid Instability," inFocus Quarterly, Volume V, Number 4, Winter 2011. http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2821/qatar-security-instability "The Geopolitical Dimension of Sunni-Shi‘i Sectarianism in the Middle East," coauthored with Dr. Uzi Rabi, International Intervention in Loc al Conflicts: Crisis Manag ement and Conflict Resolution Since the Cold War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), Uzi Rabi (Ed.). "Engagement, Diplomacy, and Iran's Nuclear Program," AJS Perspectives (The Magazine of the Association for Jewish Studies), Fall 2010. "The Principles and Practice of Iran's Post-Revolutionary Foreign Policy," Yale Interdisciplinary Institute for the Study of Antisemitism (YIISA). Online ISSN: 1940-6118 ISBN: 978-0-9827894-3-8 http://www.yale.edu/yiisa/brandonfriedmanworkingpaper71310.pdf
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Response to QUESTIONNAIRE 1.President Obama says the U.S.'s friendship with Israel is undying, but he also says : The U.S., though willing to defend an isolated Israel at the United Nations and in other international bodies, might soon be unable to do so effectively. Do you think the U.S. no longer considers Israel a strategic ally in the Middle East forcing Israel to rethink its historic alliances? No, I believe this U.S. a dministration thinks it is doing what is best for Israel by pressuring it to make un-reciprocated concessions to the Palestinians. I believe the U.S. has not given enough thought to what kind of Palestinian leadership is necessary to create the change it would like to see. I believe the US recognizes the value of Israel as a strategic ally and this is unlikely to change in the near or medium term. This is evidence d by the the extraordinary military aid Israel receives. 2.What are the challenges to Israel‘s national security? How does Israel‘s National Security Doctrine takes care of these challenges? First, a nuclear Iran threatens to create a chain of nuclear proliferation in the ME. This could change the regional balance of power in the medium term. Second, an international legal and publicity campaigns to delegitimize and isolate Israel is a huge challenge. M omentum appears to be building for a South Africa style campaign against Israel and this could have a increasing impact on Israel's economy. Third, revolutionary groups (both Shi'i and Sunni, including Iran) on Israel's northern borders is an immediate threat. Fourth, the ongoing wars in Iraq and Syria may threaten stability in Jordan, whi ch is a key strategic ally for Israel. 3.President Obama affirms that a peace deal with the Palestinians is the right thing to do for Israel and it was necessary to stress the need for a two-state solution. Why is President Obama still fixated on the Two-State Solution?
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He thinks it is in both the U .S.'s and Israel's best interest. Is the two-state solution possi ble? Is it even feasible, given the turmoil in the region? Will it bring peace? It is possible, but unlikely. Coordinated disengagement, where Israel defines and se cures its borders seems more realistic. 4.Why is there such a divide between the United States‘ and Israel‘s positions on Iran‘s nuclear programme and can they be bridge d? Israel lives in Iran's neighborhood (and currently shares a border with it) and the U.S . does not. That explains the divide and the difference in threat perception. They can not be bridged with this US administration. Do you agree with the view that like Israel, U.S. Arab allies -such as Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and the
United Arab Emirates—are
just as
distraught and also fear Obama‘s Iran Nuclear Deal ? Yes. 5.Is the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship likely to be fundamentally different now that Modi is in power? I do not possess the knowledge to answer that question. 6.After World War II, anti -Semitism seemed to disappear in Europe. It is back, to a very disquieting degree.Although it is not exactly the same anti-Semitism that in the 1930's, it is not fully different.Hatred towards Israel is now the most widely shared sentiment among Europeans, whatever their place on the political spectrum. An increasing number of Europeans seem quite ready for another Holocaust.How do you look at this development? It is troubling and deserves close and continued attention. 7. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democracy, but in reality it is against the Arab S pring.Do you agree with this statement? No, I don't agree. It is in Israel's interest to have stable, liberal democratic regimes on its borders. Israel was not against the Arab Spring, it simply anticipated that the product of the 2010 -2011
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uprisings was unlikely to be an immediate transformation to liberal democracy and therefore rejected the characteri zation by analysts, scholars, and pundits who interpreted it as such. The developments in Tunisia offer great hope, but I would argue that the Islamists in Tunisia only compromised be cause they saw the failure of the Islamists in Egypt.
(4) Colonel ( Res) Dr. Shaul Shay Director of research, IPS and Senior Research Fellow, International Policy Institute for counter Terrorism (IC T) at the Interdisci plinary Center Herzeliya (IDC), Israel Colonel (Res) Dr.Shaul Shay served 27 years in the IDF as a paratrooper officer and in the Military Intelligence. In the years 2007-2009 he w as the deputy head of the N ational Sec urity Council (NSC) of Israel. Shaul Shay is the director of research of the IPS and a senior researc h fellow of the International Policy Institute for counter Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzeliya (IDC), Israel. Dr Shay is the author and the editor of 18 books, 10 of them were published in the USA and U.K. His last book is :Somalia in transition, Trans action Publishers, New Brunswick,2014.
Response to QUESTIONN AIRE 1.President Oba ma says the U.S.'s friendship with Israel is undying, but he also says : The U.S., though willing to defend an isolated Israel at the United Nations and in other international bodies, might soon be unable to do so effectively. Do you think the U.S . no longer considers Israel a strategic ally in the Middle East forcing Israel to rethink its histori c alliances? In spite of several disputed subjects such as the nuclear deal with Iran and the peace process with the Palestinians the United States and Israel are still the closest friends and allies with ―special relationship‖ rooted in the shared values of the two nations. During more than six decades of state -building, Israelis have looked to the United States for political inspiration, financial and military assistance and diplomatic support. Americans, in turn, have viewed Israel with a special appreciation for its successful effort to follow the Western democratic tradition, its remarkable economic development, and its determined struggle against its uncompromising enemies. If one were forced to reduce the explanation for the unique relationship between the United States and Israel to one sentence, it was proba bly best expressed by President Lyndon Johnson who, when asked by Soviet
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Premier Aleksei Kosygin why the U.S. supported Israel when there are 80 million Arabs and only three million Israelis, the President replied simply: "Because it is right." The relationship consists of a metaphorical triangle linking American Jewry with the governments of Israel and the United States. In the natural course of political events, all three actors intermediate between the other two, for good and i ll. 2.W hat are the challenges to Israel‘s national security? There are 5 main challenges to Israel‘s national security: The Iranian nuclear threat if Iran will be able to develop nuclear weapon. Iran has constantly called for Israel's destruction, most recently by the head of the Revolutionary Guard. Hezbollah,thearmed Iranian proxy with a dvanced military capa bilities including 100,000 missiles and rockets. Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations in Gaza strip and terror networks in Judea and Samaria. The Salafi – Jihadi groups: ISIS in Syria and Sinai, Al Qaeda branch in Syria ( Jabhat al Nusra). The delegitimization of Israel and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions M ovement (BDS M ovement). How does Israel‘s National Security Doctrine takes care of these challenges? Israel has no written, agreed upon securitydoctrine. Israel's security doctrine was shaped in the early 50s by the Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion. His perception was based on the assumption that there is a fundamental asymmetry between Israel and the Arab countries around it. Consequently, Israel will never be able to overcome the Arab and Muslim world due to its geographic and demographic inferiority as well as to economic resource disparities. That doctrine still serves as an important intellectual basis to those who deal with this issue, even though this doctrine lacks formal validity. The traditional security doctrine of Israel consists of three main components: deterrence, early warning and de cision. A fourth com ponent, defense, was proposed by the former minister Dan Meridor Committee in 2006.Afew years ago, Meridor unsuccessfully attempted to achieve a consensus statement of principles and policy. But this document was never seriously discussed in any governmental forum, and it was certainly never adopte d as obligatory. In 2013 I formed together with Prof Alex Mintz,andthe HerzliyaForum for updating the national security doctrine. Its goal is to obtain information from experienced decision-makers, high ranking military leaders and academics, and discuss it, so that the various perceptions of Israel's
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national security may be bridged. This interdisciplinary approach enables forging of new components and updates, to supplement the traditional elements of the security concept. The current study suggests four a dditional elements:the "special relations with the U.S .prevention and thwarting/pre -emption, regional alliances, and adaptation.The Forum recommended that these key elements of the security doctrine should be a dded to the previous ones when considering the security needs of Israel. 3.President Obama affirms that a peace deal with the Palestinians is the right thing to do for Israel and it was necessary to stress the need for a two-state solution. W hy is President Obama still fixated on the Two-State Solution? Is the two-state solution possible? Is it even feasible, given the turmoil in the region? W ill it bring peace? President Obama wants to revive talks toward a two-state solution. Support for a two-state solution is not dead in either country, but Americans and Israelis do not look at this question with the same eyes. After elections in Israel, P.M Netanyahu clarified that“I haven‟t changed my policy. What has changed is the reality. I don‟ t want a one-state solution; I want a sustainable, peaceful two-state solution, but for that, circumstances have to change. I was talking about what is achievable and what is not achievable. To make it achievable, then you have to have real negotiations with people who are committed to peace.” Israelis,eventhose who support a two-state solution in principle, are aware of the challenges in creating a viable country that connects Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas did anticipate reducing Israel to rubble last summer, and only the extraordinary performance of the IDF forces and the" Iron Dome" prevented this. Hamas would try to take over the West Bank if Israel pulle d out — an d then to tunnel under and fire rockets over Israel borders. Hamas in the West Bank would entirely paralyze Israel. A single Hamas rocket that landed a mile from the airport last summer prompted two-thirds of foreign airlines to stop flying to Israel for a day and a half — including all the major US airlines. 4.W hy is there such a divide between the United States‘ and Israel‘s positions on Iran‘s nu clear programme and can they be bridge d? President Obama and P.M. Netanyahu hold opposing views on how best to ensure that Iran doesn‘t develop nuclear weapons, but that difference reflects divergent ideas within their governments on the role Iran might play in the future. The Obama administration believes that the deal they are currently negotiating with Iran blocks Iran‘s path to the bom b and that Iran might one day become an agent of change in the Middle East.
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Ron Dermer, Israel‘s ambassador to the United States, said that Israel believes that this deal paves Iran‘s path to the bom ban d P.MNetanyahu said that the nuclear agreement will leave Israel‘s most strident enemy on the threshold of a nuclear weapon. Israel believes Iran must remain isolated until its leaders recognize Israel‘s right to exist. The Nuclear negotiations have widened this gap. Do you agree with the view that like Israel, U.S. Arab allies -such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—are just as distraught and also fear Obama‘s Iran Nuclear Deal ? At the very moment that a nuclear deal with Iran is looking closer to reality, Iran is expan ding its influence throughout the Middle East. Both the Israelis and the Saudis fear that lifting the deepest sanctions against Iran through the nuclear deal will further embolden Iranian expansionism. To the Saudis, the Emirates and Israel , all of whom see Iran as the greatest threat in the region this is a disturbing phenomenon. Israel has reacted by calling on the United States to link the nuclear negotiations to Iran's broa der behavior in the region. In his address before a joint session of Congress, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the U.S. should not sign a deal until Iran halts its terrorist activity and ceases its support of extremist groups. More recently, the prime minister has called for no agreement until Iran accepts Israel's legitimacy. Not surprisingly, the U.S. rejected those proposals as unachievable and saw them as an effort to block any nuclear deal. At this moment when the U.S. is providing essential support for the Saudi-led military coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, they are not looking for a full-blown con frontation with their main ally and supporter, the United States.On the other hand, the Saudis continue to express in many ways their frustration with what they perceive to be weak American leadership in the region. While not willing to link their critique to the nuclear issue, they have found other ways to get their point across. Another negative outcome can a nuclear race in the Middle East ,as former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton noted in The New York Times, that ―neighboring countries are moving forward, driven by fears that Mr. Obama‘s diplomacy is fostering a nuclear Iran. Extensive progress in uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing reveal its ambitions. Saudi, Egyptian and Turkish interests are complex and conflicting, but faced with Iran‘s threat, all have concluded that nuclear weapons are essential.‖
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5.Is the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship likely to be fundamentally different now that M odi is in power? Cooperation between the two nations was ramped up over a decade ago, but the Indian government preferred to keep a low profile, until now.Since his BJP party came in first in April‘s general election, Modi has been a very public supporter of Israel. In September, during the UN General Assembly session in New York, Modi met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Although the two nations ramped up security cooperation around a decade ago, India has become the largest customer of Israeli defense exports ove r the past two years. The annual value of arms deals between the two countries has toppe d $1 billion and makes up nearly 15 percent of all Israeli defense exports. Under Modi, Israel and India have pushed ahead with the joint development of an aerial defe nse system, which passed its first trial simulating combat con ditions in November. In October, India opted to buy Rafael‘s Spike anti -tank guided missile in a deal worth $525 million, choosing the Israeli product over a U.S. offer of its Javelin missiles. 6.After W orld W ar II, anti-Semitism seemed to disappear in Europe. It is back, to a very disquieting degree.Although it is not exactly the same anti-Semitism that in the 1930's, it is not fully different.Hatred towards Israel is now the most wi dely share d sentiment among Europeans, whatever their place on the political spectrum. An increasing number of Europeans seem quite ready for another Holocaust.How do you look at this development? Irwin Cotler, a former professor of law at McGill University and le ading scholar of human rights, proposed the concept of "new anti-Semitism" which entails the delegitimization, demonization and setting of double standards, not only against the Jewish state(Israel), but against the Jewish people. Some of what we are seeing in Europe is the old anti -Semitism of the far right and the radical left, which never went away and merely lay dormant during the years when attacks on Jews were considered unacceptable in polite society. That taboo is now well and truly broken. Today‘s anti-Semitism differs from the old in three ways. First,itspretext. In the Middle Ages, Jews were hated for their religion. In the 19th and 20th centuries, they were hated for their race. Today, they are hated for their nation state. This isn‘t to say that all criticism of Israel is anti -Semitism. Manifestly it is not. Israel itself is one of the most self-critical nations in the world, and criticism of its policies is a legitimate part of democratic debate.
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But Iran and the supporters of Hamasand Hezbollaharen‘t interested in this policy. They are committed as a matter of principle, stated in their charter, to the complete destruction and elimination of the Jewish state. Israel, now 67 years old, still finds itself the only country in the United Nations who's right to exist is routinely challenged and in many quarters denied. 7. Israel advocates and supports the princi ple of democra cy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring.Do you agree with this statement? Israel is the only real democracy in the Middle East and the first to encourage implementation of democracy and democratic values in the region and beyon d. The term ―Arab S pring‖ was popularized by the Western media in early 2011, when the successful uprising in Tunisia against former leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali emboldened similar anti -government protests in most Arab countries. The "Arab Spring" was a series of anti -government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across the Middle East since 2011. The ―Arab S pring‖, against the optimistic expectations in West, didn't lead to democracy but to the rise of radical Islamic groups and the foundation of the new Caliphate – the Islamic State. Israel is not involve d in the inter Islamic turmoil of the Arab countries and the conflict between Shia and Sunna in the Muslim world. 8. How far it is correct to say that as the M iddle East collapses all around Israel, as jihadi fa ctions grow bolder and as Iran spreads its reach into Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, Israel has be come the canary in the W est's coal mine? Since 2011 the Middle East is in a violent period of transition with the collapse of many of the Arab nation states ,civil and sectarian wars and the rise of violent Islamic non state actors.The conflict is mainly an inter Islamic conflict among four com peting groups: • The Shia alliance (Iran, Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah, Houties in Yemen, Iraqi militias). • The moderate Sunni states (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and Morocco). • The Muslim Brotherhood an d Hamas supported by Turkey and Qatar. • The Salafi - Jihadi groups ( Islamic State, Al Qaeda \ AQAP, Ja bhat al Nusra). The policy of Israel is to avoid any involvement in the inter Islamic conflicts,tomaintain the peace agreements with Jordan an d Egypt, to protect its interests and to respon d to any attack against Israel . The best way to describe the situation of Israel is,"avilla in the jungle," as former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak said.
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(5)Rami Tal Senior fellow and publications editor at theJewish People Policy Institute, Jerusalem Military Service 1966-1969 , Signal Corps, Southern Command. Rank when discharged – lieutenant. Education 1966, 1969-1972, University of Tel Aviv Law School, L.L.B. 1972-1975, Bar-Ilan University, departments of history and political science, B.A. W ork 1976-78 teaching assistant, Bar-Ilan University, de partment of political science. 1977-1994: member of the editorial staff of "Yedioth Ahronot", the newspaper with the largest circulation in Israel; among my roles there: foreign news editor, front page editor (1982-89), Washington correspon dent (1989-93), political commentator. 1994-2004: "Yedioth Books" publishing house, editor in charge of books in the fields of politics and defense A partial list of books edited: The Yom Kippur War: Myth vis-a-vis Reality, by General (res.) Eli Ze'ira A place among the Nations, by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu Lights through the Fog, by General (res.) Uri Sagui The General Security Service between the Schisms, by former head of the GSS Carmi Gilon A front without a Rearguard, by former foreign minister Shlomo Ben -Ami The Long Short Roa d, by former chief of staff Moshe ("Bogey") Ya'alon War Story, Love Story, by General (res.) Gal Hirsch Flags over the Ghetto, by former foreign and defense minister Moshe Arens The Confidant, by General (res.) and former head of Mossad Danny Yatom Straightforward, by former IDF chief of staff Danny Haloutz Since 2004: Senior fellow and publications editor at the Jewish People Policy Institute, Jerusalem. Response to QUESTIONN AIRE 1.President Obama says the U.S.'s friendship with Israel is undying, but he also says : The U.S., though willing to defend an isolated Israel at the United Nations and in other international bodies, might soon be unable
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to do so effectively. Do you think the U.S. no longer considers Israel a strategic ally in the Middle East forcing Israel to rethink its historic alliances? No. Admittedly, there has been recently some tension in the U.S.Israeli relationship, but the alliance is still extremely strong. Additionally, Israel does not have too much choice in the matter. 2.What are the challenges to Israel‘s national security? How does Israel‘s National Security Doctrine takes care of these challenges? The answer to this question could easily fill a heavy book. Very basically, the main challenge is Israel's existence as a Jewish state in an Arab, almost completely M oslem, region, whose inhabitants identify Israel with the hated W estern Colonialism and accuse it with expelling the Palestinians from their homeland in 1948 and oppressing them since 1967 in Gaza and the West Bank. I am not sure if there's any formal national security doctrine, but generally, Israel relies on its military advantage, its technological edge, and the immense support from the U.S. 3.President Obama affirms that a peace deal with the Palestinians is the right thing to do for Israel and it was necessary to stress the need for a two-state solution. Why is President Obama still fixated on the Two-State Solution? Is the two-state solution possible? Is it even feasible, given the turmoil in the region? Will it bring peace? For years, the 2 state frame has seemed as the only both fair and feasible solution. So it's not a surprise that Obama continues to stick to it. Is it possible? Probably yes, although the difficulties to implement are growing, both be cause of the turmoil in the region, particularly caused by radical Islamic groups, and by the growing number of Israeli settlers on land which should have been assigned for the Palestinian state. 4.Why is there such a divide between the United States‘ and Israel‘s positions on Iran‘s nuclear programme and can they be bridge d? Do you agree with the view that like Israel, U.S. Ara b allies -such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—are just as distraught and also fear Obama‘s Iran Nuclear Deal ? I Think that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are much more distraught than Israel, because: A. They are much closer to Iran than Israel is. B. Israel is militarily much stronger than Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and for that matter – than Iran too. C. Israel is supposed to have a considerable military nuclear power. Israel has never declared it, but
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that does not matter. Iran (and practically all the rest of the world) assume that Israel is a nuclear power, and that's what matters, because it practically insures Israel against a nuclear strike from Iran, if and when Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems for them. The differences between the US and Israel concerning the Iran Nuclear Deal are bridgeable and I have no doubt that indeed they will be bridged. The president needs the confirmation of the Congress, so eventually a formula will be found that more or less satisfies Israel. Of course, Israel will not get all what it desires, but who does? 5.Is the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship likely to be fundamentally different now that Modi is in power? M ost Israelis believe so. I don't know enough about India and P.M . M odi, but my feeling is that it depends whether he feels he is absolutely free to condu ct a foreign policy according to his priorities, or has to take account of pressure groups and various interests, such as Indian M oslems, the Congress Party etc. 6.After World War II, anti -Semitism seemed to disappear in Euro pe. It is back, to a very disquieting degree. Although it is not exactly the same anti-Semitism that in the 1930's, it is not fully different. Hatred towards Israel is now the most widely shared sentiment among Europeans, whatever their place on the politi cal spectrum. An increasing number of Europeans seem quite ready for another Holocaust. How do you look at this development? First of all, I strongly disagree with the assumption that "An increasing number of Europeans seem quite ready for another Holocaust." This is extremely exaggerated. There is a huge distance between increasing anti-Semitism and a ne w Holocaust. Second, I believe that this new anti-Semitism is mainly nourished by the view that Israel is maintain an Apartheid regime against the Palestinians, and if that is so, then a major part of the problem is soluble by achieving peaceful co -existence between Israel and the Palestinians, whi ch I think is feasible. 7. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democracy, but in reality it is against the Arab S pring. Do you agree with this statement? Partially. Israel has been used to the old Arab regimes – M ubarak in Egypt, King Hussein in Jordan, the Saudi Dynasty, even Assad in Syria, whi ch were/are autocratic but preserve either peace or at least non-belligerence with Israel. The Arab Spring, at least until now.strengthened the radical Islamist elements in the Arab world, something whi ch naturally scares Israel.
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(6) Noam Sheizaf Israeli Journalist, Tel Aviv Noam Sheizaf is an Israeli Journalist, based in Tel Aviv. Noam writes mostly a bout Israeli politics, the diplomatic process and the occupation. His work has been published at Haaretz, Maariv, The Daily Beast, The Nation, Foreign Affairs and other publications. Noam is a co-foun der and the first editor-in-chief of +972 Magazine. Before working in journalism, Noam served four an d a half years in the IDF as an infantry officer. Response to QUESTIONN AIRE 1.President Oba ma says the U.S.'s friendship with Israel is undying, but he also says : The U.S., though willing to defend an isolated Israel at the United Nations and in other international bodies, might soon be unable to do so effectively. Do you think the U.S . no longer considers Israel a strategic ally in the Middle East forcing Israel to rethink its histori c alliances? There is no evidence to the claim that the U.S. stoppe d seeing Israel as its central strategic ally in the Middle East. Quite the opposite: The military aid to Israel increased in recent years. It now includes aid in research and development of missiles intercepting systems, and the financing of most of these systems‘ costs, once development is completed (as was with the Iron Dome); emergency supply of ammunition during times of need – as the US authorized in the 2014 Gaza war; an d various systems which weren‘t approved for export in the past, such as the bunker-busting guided bom bs. An d that‘s only what was made public. Furthermore, the willingness of American administrations to defend Israel in international forums hasn‘t diminished – be that certain UN agencies or the Security Council, where the US is repeatedly using its veto power (or the threat to use it) in order to block resolution which criticize Israeli policies and the Occupied Territories. The problem is not with the US, but with Israeli hardline policies and the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, which are rejected by most of the international community. Israel is increasingly isolated, an d so are the few governments that still support it – hence the American pressure on the Israeli government to show a more forthcoming and pragmatic approach. As the president indicated, the U.S. might have difficulties to defend certain Israeli policies in the future, but we are not there yet. 2.W hat are the challenges to Israel‘s national security? How does Israel‘s National Security Doctrine takes care of these challenges?
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Historically, the main threat that Israel was facing was a conventional military challenge from one of its neighboring countries. This probl em was significantly diminished in the last decades of the previous century due to the peace agreements with Egypt an d Jordan, an d the widening technological gap between the IDF an d other regional armies. Things saw an even more dramatic change, due to the second Iraq war and the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The Iranian and Syrian threats no longer exist, and the Egyptian army will be occupied internally for the foreseeable future. There is no functioning military force which poses an existential threat on Israel in the region. Today, Israeli governments recognize a twofold challenge: from non governmental military actors, such as Hezbollah, and from the Iranian regime. Yet the real long term threat to Israel is in its inability to solve the Palestinian i ssue, which results in an ongoing effort to maintain the status quo – consisting of control over millions of civilians with no rights – by force alone. Israeli governments have no strategy for solving this problem – in fact, they fail to recognize or addre ss it at all. 3.President Obama affirms that a peace deal with the Palestinians is the right thing to do for Israel and it was necessary to stress the need for a two-state solution. W hy is President Obama still fixated on the Two-State Solution? Is the two-state solution possible? Is it even feasible, given the turmoil in the region? W ill it bring peace? The two state solution is one of several ways that were offered to resolve the so called ―temporary‖ Israeli occupation, to which I referred to in my previous answer. This solution is certainly the most beneficial to Israel, since it would allow it to keep 78 percent of historic Palestinian and avoid the return of Palestinian refugees who were displaced in 1948. This is the reason the American administration and the more pragmatic forces in Israel adopted it, and not, for example, a solution which is based on ―one man, one vote‖ formula (also known as the one state solution). However, Israelis currently reject any form of solution, and would like to maintain the military occupation of the West Bank and the siege on the Gaza Strip. The talks of peace in that context are irrelevant. The true problem is not a ―state of war‖ between Israelis and Palestinians, but rather the absence of rights to the Palestini an civilian population. 4.W hy is there such a divide between the United States‘ and Israel‘s positions onIran‘s nuclear programme and can they be bridged? Do you agree with the view that like Israel, U.S. Arab allies -such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—are just as distraught and also fear Obama‘s Iran Nuclear Deal ?
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Israel, exactly like Saudi Arabia, views Iran as its main regional adversary. Both countries not only fear that a nuclear Iran would become a stronger regional power, but also that an agreement would open an era of detente between Washington and Tehran, he nce their willingness to openly – and quite bluntly – challenge the administration policies in its negotiations with the Iranian regime. There is certainly a temporary merger of interest between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE on this issue, but it cannot be translated into open cooperation due to Israel‘s policies on the Palestinian issue, and especially toward Abbas an d the PA. 5.Is the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship likely to be fundamentally different now that M odi is in power? As Israel is getting more and more isolated internationally, it will seek for political support wherever it may find it. If the Indian government will be ready to support Jerusalem‘s policies on the Palestinian issue, the two will become way closer (as was the case with the relations between Israel and the conservative governments of Canada and Australia). If not, relations can improve only on other fields, such as military or economic cooperation, but less so on the diplomatic level. 6. After W orld W ar II, anti-Semitism seemed to disappear in Europe. It is back, to a very disquieting degree.Although it is not exactly the same anti-Semitism that in the 1930's, it is not fully different.Hatred towards Israel is now the most wi dely shared sentiment among Europeans, whatever their place on the political spectrum. An increasing number of Europeans seem quite ready for another Holocaust.How do you look at this development? Statement such as that ―Europeans are ready for another Holocaust‖ or that most Europeans are anti -Israeli are complete nonsense. Not only that the memory of the Holocaust is stronger than ever in Western Europe, Israeli representatives – from politicians to artist to sports team – are still welcomed in most European forums. Europe is Israel‘s largest trade partner; and European investment in R&D in Israel is at an all-time high. Furthermore, European governments are among the major suppliers of arms to Israel (after the U.S). Most of the Israeli navy‘s latest acquisitions are from Germany, at considerable subsidies. That includes several nuclear submarines, reported to have second-strike capabilities. While there is a certain rise in Anti -semitic incidents in Europe, it is nowhere near the proportion of the first half of the twenty century, and unlike in the past, all European governments oppose these acts (though one could argue that they could do more in order to counter them). The fact that there is a growing unease in Europe from Israeli policies toward the Palestinian isn‘t anti -Semitism, but legitimate political and moral
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concern over an ongoing, systematic violation of human rights done by Israel. 7. Israel advocates and supports the princi ple of democra cy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring.Do you agree with this statement? As far as I can tell, Israel doesn‘t view the Arab Spring through the perspective of democracy, but rather through its effect on its policies and national interest. There isn‘t a unified Israel sentiment towards the Arab Spring as a whole, but rather a set of reaction and observation, examines the changing balance of power and the challenges or opportunities it poses to Israel. A development can have a ―positive‖ net – such as the collapse of Syria and the threat on Hezbollah due to its involvement in the civil war; they could have a net negative – like the rising influence of Iran – and they could have mixed results, such as the rise of ISIS, which poses a threat but also took some of the diplomatic pressure of Israel. 8.
W hat led you to believe that Netanyahu's fourth government
will not change course on the Palestinian issue? Netanyahu‘s forth government is even less likely to try an d implement a two-state solution for several reasons. First, Netanyahu and most of his ministers went on record in their opposition to full Palestinian Statehood, so it‘s difficult to see them changing course. Second, this is a very narrow government which depends on the support of every Knesset Member and every Knesset Party. A serious move towards a two state solution is boun d to bring the departure of at least one party from the coalition, thus forcing the Prime Minister to form a different coalition or to call elections. Third, the maximum that Netanyahu was willing to offer in previous rounds of talks – when he actually revealed his positions – was far from the minimum any credible Palestinian leadership can sign to – and both parties are aware of that. *****
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(1) Islamic Muslim Brotherhood scholars and “Arab Spring” in Palestine Dr. Shaul Bartal Middle Eastern Studies Department, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail:
[email protected]
[email protected]
(Doctor (major in the Israel Defense Forces reserves) Shaul Bartal served extensively in various security capacities in the West Bank. He earned a BA in Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University (1995). He earned a second BA in Social Studies and Education from the Open University (1998). He successfully completed the direct track PhD in Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University (2006). Today he is a military analyst and a lecturer on Palestinian Affairs at BarIlan University. Dr. Bartal is the author of The fedayeen emerge, the PalestineIsrael conflict, 1949-1956 (Bloomington: 2011); The jihad way in Palestine (Jerusalem, 2013) and he has written many articles about the Palestinian problem.)
Abstract: This article shows the connections between three subjects -- the ―Arab Spring,‖ Yusuf al-Qardawi and Hamas and its war against Israel. The recent upheavals in the Arab world commonly referred to as the ―Arab Spring‖ have elicited reactions on the part of various Islamic figures. The most important of the se is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the leading Islamic scholar and the spiritual leader of Hamas. Al-Qaradawi supports the revolutions and regime changes by the Muslim Brotherhood. He bases his views upon the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, the paradigm of takfir. According to Sayyid Qutb, societies that don‘t behave according to Islam are infidel societies. This includes secular rulers like Husni Mubarak and Muammar al-Gaddafi. Therefore, they must be replaced by a truly Islamic society. According to al-Qaradawi, the Arab Spring period is for that type of replacement. Hamas, as presented by Khaled Abu Arfa and others, is the organization that should benefit from the Arab Spring revolutions. The Islamic revolutions and the new Islamic regimes in Tunis, Egypt and othe rs can help Hamas in the way of jihad against Israel. The Pan Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood could also be the harbinger of the State of Israel.
Key Words: Al-Qara dawi, Hamas, ―Ara b S pring,‖ ―Muslim Brotherhood,‖ Sayyi d Qutb, Khaled Abu Arfa, Islam, revolution, jihad
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Islamic law and se cular rulers Islamic scholars struggle to understand modern-day Muslim rulers who do not con duct themselves according to sharī ʿa principles and Muslim rulers who adopt foreign and secular norms of governance such as western democracy, eastern European socialism and communism. The views of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qarada wi, head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), a popular preacher on al-Jazeera and a member of many Muslim organizations, do not differ from other Muslim Brotherhood figures such as Hassan al-Hadi bi, Sayyid Qutb, Abu Ala al-Maududi and others who have written extensively on this topic. Sayyid Qutb‘s works serve as Qara dawi‘s major source of inspiration, particularly for his treatment of the problem of takfīr -- the Islamic attitude toward a Muslim society that is, for all practical purposes, secular.1 Takfīr is described in detail in Sayyid Qutb‘s well-known book Maʿālim fil-Ṭ arīq (Milestones or Signposts on the road). This book presents a sober analysis of the idea of a new jāhiliyya (the pre -Islamic period of paganism and ignorance) where only the rule of Allah, al-ḥ ākimiyya, is the true government according to shari‟a. Qutb clearly defines what constitutes a jāhiliyya society: ―The Jāhili [sic] society is any society other than Muslim society. And if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society which does not dedicate itself, in its beliefs, to submission to Allah alone, is a Jāhili [sic] society. According to this
definition, all of today‘s
societies worldwide are Jāhili.‖2 Qutb further states that Muslim societies, such as Egypt un der Nasser and his successors, are jāhiliyya societies: ―We classify them among Jāhili [sic] societies not because they believe in other deities besides Allah or because they worship anyone other than Allah… Although they may believe in taw ḥ īd (monotheism), still they have relegated
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the legislative attribute of Allah almighty to others and submit to their authority and from this authority they derive their systems, their traditions and customs, their laws, their values and standards an d almost every practice of life .‖3 Qutb‘s idea of the new jāhiliyya implies that secular societies in Arab countries exist in a state of ignorance similar to what prevailed prior to the revelation of Islam and Muslims are obligated to re -establish Islamic society. Qutb‘s message of hate toward secular rulers and the right to rebel against them in order to establish a just and true Islamic regime was presented in his book, Our war with the Jew, originally published in 1954. Qutb expressed his hatred toward the government of the Free Officers and referred to them as ―Black Englishmen.‖ They look like Arab Muslims but con duct themselves like English colonialists. Qutb promises the people that: ―Your day will come and your opportunity will arrive. [It will
be]
the
day when
you
will throw the
White
En glishmen beyond the borders an d you will establish popular courts for the Black Englishmen. And we will put those on trial who have ‗honored‘ you with fear, hunger and loss of property, valuables and crops. Thus, it will be proclaimed to those who are patient ( ṣ ābirīn): ‗Those who have been afflicted by a catastrophe and said to God: ―We are yours and we are returning to you.‘‘‘ I shall dedicate my prayers to them before their Master and [there will be mercy] from Him. They are
those
who have
been
instructed in the right path.‖4 Many years later, Sheikh Qara dawi similarly called the army officers led by General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, ―army dogs.‖5 Like Qutb before him, Qara dawi adopted the idea of the ḥ ākimiyya, the sovereignty of God as a key concept.6 Qara dawi‘s statements include a fatwa to kill Muammar Ga ddafi 7 and a fatwa to stone Mahmoud Abbas for his cooperation with Israel during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza (27/12/2008 -17/1/2009).8
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This type of fatwa constitutes a direct continuation of Qutb‘s idea of takfīr which maintains that secular rulers of Muslim societies should be viewed as infidels deserving of the death penalty. 9 This attitude was not typical to Qardawi in the past because of his firm condemnations of the attacks of radical Islamists against secular governments.10 The
justification
of
Ga dda fi‘s
death
under
his
fatwa
was
the
indiscriminate slaughter of his own people and his un precedented crimes beyon d th ose of any secular ruler. In contrast, Qaradawi has not issued a fatwa permitting the killing of either Bashar al-Assad or Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, despite his disapproval of their regimes and his desire to see them fall.11 Qara dawi distinguishes between a backsliding Muslim ruler whose regime must be oppose d and the Muslim public. He maintains that those who consider Muslims that act differently than themselves as infidels are mistaken and simply do not un derstand the works of Sayyid Qutb. According to Qarada wi‘s interpretation of Sayyid Qutb, the term ―the new jāhiliyya,‖ invented by Qutb, refers specifically to the regime and the ruler and not to members of the Muslim community. Qara dawi also contends that it is possible to understand the origins of the broader interpretation of Qutb‘s idea of takfīr on the part of Muslim Brotherhood activists. Qara dawi supports the overthrow of governments and voices criticism against the secular rulers by openly opposing their regimes. Any public deviation from Islamic norms on the part of the rulers, such as adopting a Western life style of laws, is considered heresy whose punishment is death. Heresy on the part of a Muslim ruler, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi or Mahmoud Abbas means their ―joining the enemies of God in order to act against the friends of God.‖12 (Gudrun Kramer, 2006). Sayyid Qutb's legacy of political Islam successfully enables Hamas to portray all Palestinian secular opposition as part of the modern Jaliiyya and as such obstacles to the acquisition of a free Palestinian state.13
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According to Hamas activist Khaled Abu Arfa, the sin of Gaddafi ―was that through his deeds he joined the enemies of the Ummah an d recruited regiments of mercenaries in order to injure civilians.‖14Thus, Qara dawi is justified for issuing a fatwa to kill Ga ddafi. Muslim public opinion (the
Muslim conscience , led by scholars,
preachers and thinkers) demands opposition to backsliding Muslim rulers. The arguments by Qara dawi and Qutb15 before him, may be understood as supporting armed struggle against such rulers, led by independent thinkers, if necessary. 16 This is the
background for
understanding Qaradawi‘s position in regard to the events that are referred to as the Arab S pring. Qaradawi‘s attitude toward the ―Arab Spring‖ Muhammad Bouazizi, a 28-year old from Sidi Bouzid, Tunesia, set himself on fire on 17/12/2010. His subsequent death led to a wave of protests against rulers in many Arab countries. On 14/1/2011, the president of Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was forced out. The AlNahda (Renaissance) Party received 41% of the vote in the national elections that were held later that year and became the ruling party. Its leader, Rashid al-Ghannushi, represented the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Revolutions
in
other
Arab countries
followed.
The
outstanding examples were Libya and Egypt. In Libya, the regime of Muammar Gaddafi fell. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak left office in disgrace after ruling for thirty years. The revolution of 15/1/2011 brought a bout the end of Mubarak‘s rule and the accession of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2013, there were further changes in the Arab world. The most important was the counter-revolution led by General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood an d their elected president Muhammad Morsi. In addition, the Shiite-Sunni split grew as a result of the public entry of Hezbollah into the Syrian conflict on the side of Bashar al Assad.17
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Over the past three years, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qara dawi, from his home in Qatar, has encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood all over the Ar ab world to play an active role in ousting ―infidel‖ rulers and taking power. According to Qara dawi, after the abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of the Colonial rulers, the Islamic
ummah suffered an
additional blow from the subjugation by rulers who were nominally Muslims but di d not live according to Islamic law. These rulers were exposed as unbelievers and as greater offenders than the Colonialists. 18 Al-Qara dawi, in his program on al-Jazeera, ―Al-sharī ʿa wal- Ḥayāt,‖ emphasized the
legitimacy of the
representatives
of the
Muslim
Brotherhood parties -- al-Nahda in Tunisia and al-Huriya wal-ʿAdel (Freedom
and
Justice)
party
in
Egypt
--
which
were
elected
democratically. In addition, he did not hesitate to pron ounce dea th sentences against Muammar Gaddafi or call for jihad against the Syrian regime that slaughtered its Muslims aided by Iran and Russia. 19 In order to ensure the success of the Arab revolutions, Qara dawi exerted his great religious and political influence. Qara dawi believed that these upheavals would lead to the revival of the Islamic ummah as ―one people, one religion, and one language .‖20 Delegations from Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Libya, Syria and Palestine made pilgrimages to Qara dawi and received his blessing and financial support. As head of IUMS, Qara dawi functions as the most influential spiritual leader of the Sunni ―Islamic ummah.‖ In a sermon delivered on 10/5/2013 at the Great Omari Mosque in Gaza, Qara dawi explained that all of the Arab peoples will be victorious if they believe in Allah and will be united in their belief. Qara dawi ended his sermon by blessing the Palestinians, as follows: ―In the name of your Muslim brothers from Egypt, your brothers from Syria, your brothers from Tunis, your brothers from Libya an d your brothers in the Maghreb, your brothers from Yemen and your brothers from Somalia, your brothers from Pakistan and your brothers
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from Bangla desh, and your brothers, the holy warriors everywhere …‖21 According to Qara dawi, all the events of the Arab Spring, such as the fall of secular regimes in Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia and the riots in Syria and other Arab countries, are part of a global struggle that will end when the faithful of the Muslim ummah will rule over a single Islamic state . The Muslim Brotherhood views the Islamic revolution of the past three years (2011-2013) as the fulfillment of the way of Hasan al-Banna: ―This Arab homeland that extends from the Persian Gulf to Tangier, along the length of its lands and the width of its territories, [there is] a geographical unity that is divided neither by natural barriers nor by mountain ranges … this homeland constitutes a linguistic unity by dint of the language of the Arabs and the dispersion of their fighting sons who sanctify it in their prayers and the book of God perpetuates it through signs and won ders …‖22 Like al-Banna, Qara dawi also preached for the unity of the Arab homeland. He maintained, as early as 1968, that it was a se paration from Islam that led to a schism between the people and the authorities. Secular rulers such as the Baath, Nasserism or socialists followed a secular ideology while the masses leaned toward Islam. For Qara dawi, it was the Egyptian government, a secular regime, which was the party responsible for the nakba of 1948 and the defeats in 1956 an d 1967. Since secular governments failed to solve the problems of in the Arab countries, it became clear that Islamic rule must replace them. While Qaradawi speaks in general terms, his statements are influenced by events in Egypt. In the past, before people believed in secular ideologies, all were brothers and shared a common faith and common goals. Secular philosophies arose and created divisions in a unified society and even within the same family. Factions and groups were foun ded that only cared a bout themselves whereas Islamic society must
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be one society that acts out of common values with a single shari‟a.23 For Qara dawi, the Arab Spring represented the opportunity to take down secular, infidel governments in the spirit of Sayyid Qutb. Qara dawi‘s poems, replete with religious anger and fervor, encouraged young people to go out and demonstrate against the authorities. 24 In 2011, Khaled Abu Arfa, former Minister for Jerusalem Affairs in the Hamas government set up by Hamas after the elections of 2006, presented the views of faithful Muslims toward the recent upheavals in Arab countries in his book: Revolutions heral d a new dawn: From the standpoint of Islamic law (Jerusalem, without a name of a publisher, 2011). He was expelled from Jerusalem in 2012, along with three other Hamas officials from East Jerusalem. His pro-Hamas views are based upon the articles and books by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qara dawi. Abu Arfa‘s conclusion links the revolts of the Arab S pring to the Palestinians and to the future of Israel. He quotes from the fatwa published by the Committee of Islamic Scholars of the Islamic Action Front (the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan): ―Support for the struggle against a tyrant is a religious obligation of shari‟a.‖25 According to Qara dawi and the IUMS, the mass demonstrations are an expression of the Muslim rejection and con demnation of existing Arab governments for their totally unconscionable and reprehensible acts: ―The demonstrations [in Arab countries] attest to the solidarity which exists among the Arab an d Islamic peoples who are fighting a Holy War against the infidel leaders in Tunis, Egypt an d elsewhere. God will give us victory over the leaders of the heretics by showing mutual help, h onesty and fear of God."26 Abu Arfa refers to Qara dawi‘s fatwa that encourages the masses to go out an d demonstrate against the secular rulers and justifies their removal. The demonstrations which brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power are clearly described as one of the forms of jihad an d that participation in the
demonstrations in all of the
Arab countries
constitutes a religious obligation. Abu Arfa writes as follows:
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―Going to demonstrations which demand the removal of the American and other military leaders from Islamic countries is a matter of representation. We are speaking of one of the definite forms of jihad and the resistance energizing it on the part of the dominant [Arab] street. [This is] just like the fatwa regarding the demonstrations that require support by Islamic peoples against the Crusader occupation and vanity in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Russians in Chechnya. We must consider this a religious matter and one of the forms of jihad."27 Abu Arfa also regards demonstrations on behalf of the Palestinians of Gaza an d the Hamas government area as another form of jihad and not only as demonstrations calling for a regime change. As far as the Palestinian context is concerned, heretical leaders also include the Palestinian Authority as it collaborates with Israel and the United States: ―I say that the demonstrations that demand the removal of the evil siege of the Palestinians in Gaza and the repudiation of the heretical leaders who collaborate with the evil siege are bringing about the fulfillment of a splendid jihad.‖28 Qaradawi and the revolution in Egypt On 25/1/2011, Hosni Mubarak was forced to end his term as president and an interim government, headed by General Tantawi, took over for a transition period until democratic elections were held. Election results gave the Muslim Brotherhood 127 seats and the Salafist party, Nur, 96 seats. As there are 332 seats in the Egyptian parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood became the largest party. 29 Al-Qara dawi called upon all Egyptians, including those who opposed the Muslim Brotherhood, to show tolerance and respect for the democratic process, the election of Muslim Brotherhood representatives and the president. In a report that appeared on his website on February 2012, Qara dawi referred to the demonstrations by secularist groups against the success of the Islamic parties, as follows:
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―The elections in Egypt are proof that despite the fact that the Egyptian army has been strengthened and has seized power in the wake of the fall of Mubarak, the representatives convince
the
of the masses
army have to
not
support
managed to the
secular
candidates.‖30 Qara dawi was suspicious of the Egyptian army even before Abdel Fatah al-Sisi‘s takeover: ―On the Friday when Mubarak fell from power, the process of the strengthening of the Egyptian army began and [it] has not stoppe d since then….During the elections they harassed the overseers and inspectors about the future of Egypt. What the supporters of the army desired was that there would be a special situation which would grant them an advantage over the others. They separated [themselves] from the main stream of the people because they do not accept the independence of the li berators of Egypt.‖31 As far as Egypt was concerned, Qara dawi was certain that the Egyptian people wanted a change after the sixty years of the dictatorships of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak: ―Behold! After this entire period and through democratic and free e lections, in the freest way possible, the people elected Dr. Muhammad Morsi. Although he was elected by a majority of 51 percent, the elections were free, clear and without any type of com plaint.‖32 Qara dawi is full of a ppreciation for Muhammad Morsi: ―Morsi passed a constitution to which the nation agreed …with 62 percent of those eligible to vote in Egypt giving their
consent
to
the
Constitution
of
the
Muslim
Brotherhood….Morsi brought freedom to the Egyptian people.‖33
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For many writers, this Islamic revolution was the embodiment of the words of Islamic scholars such as Khaled Abu Arfa, who wrote: ―The people rose in revolt against the rule of evil and corruption of Egypt‘s President Anwar Sadat in 1981 an d killed him.‖ 34This may be interpreted as meaning that Sadat‘s murder was not only due to his making peace with Israel but also because he was an evil and corrupt ruler. The new Islamic revolution of 25/1/2011 was considered a continuation from the phase of the death of Sa dat. Qara dawi tried to strengthen the position of President Muhammad Morsi by visiting Egypt to take part in pro-Morsi demonstrations. But this visit di d not take place due to the secular counter-revolution of General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi in early July 2013.35 General al-Sisi‘s counter-revolution brought a bout a drastic change in Qara dawi‘s pronouncements regarding Egyptian rulers. Muhammad Morsi was called the ―elected president‖ while General al-Sisi was a ―rebel.‖ As early as August 2013, Qara dawi referred to al-Sisi and his fellow officers as ―army dogs.‖36 In his program, Al-sharī ʿa wal-Ḥ ayāt, presented in late December 2013, Qara dawi stated as follows: ―The
soldiers of the
revolution are
murderers and
terrorists, and Allah is great, a God of vengeance. [He] lists all of their crimes and the exploitation by which they exploit the public, and the vengeance of Allah will certainly
come
…
and
those
who
say
that
the
Brotherhood is a terrorist organization? You, men of the army, you are murderers and terrorists … a soldier is forbidden to rule over a civilian – [he does so] only during a period of tyranny and since the men of the army got rid of King Farouk (the Officers‘ Revolt of 1952), they have corrupted political, economic, social and religious life in Egypt.‖37 Today, Qara dawi continue s to defend Muhammad Morsi and the revolution of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to him, Morsi is still the president of Egypt an d General al-Sisi and the rest of the current
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ruling party in Egypt are illegitimate and illegal. The demonstrators who died for Morsi are shahids (martyrs) who fulfilled their religious duty.38 Al-Qaradawi, however, remains strong in his convictions that the day will come and there will be a reversal of fortune: ―Morsi is a righteous man, his justice and his Islam angered Zionism and the enemies of Islam [a hint at Sisi]. O Sisi! O Biblawi! O Mansur! O Tartur! [The latter means ―rascal‖ and rhymes with Mansur.]. On Judgment Day, Allah will ask you, who killed these people? Beware of Allah! Beware of Allah!‖39 Qara dawi rejects anyone who presents a different religious position than his own, including his leading opponent, Ali Goma‘ah, the former Mufti of Egypt who supports al-Sisi‘s military rule in order to avoid civil war and needless bloodshed. Qara dawi angrily dismisses Sheikh Goma‘ah. He believes that the revolution led by the Brotherhood was a peaceful revolution and demonstrators were
shot without any justification.
Qara dawi denigrates Goma‘ah and refers to him as a bureaucrat who completed his role as mufti and who has no authority at present. He claims that Sheikh Ali Goma‘ah is not a true Islamic scholar but only someone who possesses a modicum of knowledge from his studies. ―He is one of the servants of the regime and a collaborator with the police. They tell him to say something and he does it…‖40 Al-Qarada wi also critiques the behavior of the current Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmad al-Tayyib, who di d not oppose al-Sisi. He calls his behavior a shame on Egypt, despite his high status throughout the Islamic world. 41 From the fall of Mubarak until the present, Qaradawi has been intensely occupied by the question of who is to blame for the counter -revolution and the failure of the ―Islamic Revolution.‖ Naturally, he blames the Jews and the United States. It is America and Israel who schemed and plotted in order to prevent the success of the Islamic movements in the Arab countries. ―America and Israel do not accept that the president of Egypt be affiliated with Islamic movements….We are in the midst of a tremendous war against Islam.‖42 According to al-Qara dawi, the re -
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accession of secular rulers in Egypt represents an additional stage in the ongoing inter-religious struggle as represented by Israel, which controls America and Islam. After the revolution, al-Sisi accused al-Qara dawi of treason and of spying for Hamas. Al-Qara dawi dismissed this and argued that this idea originated in Israel. 43 Qaradawi and the civil war in Syria Since 2011, a bloody civil war has been raging in Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood has playe d an especially active role against the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Brotherhood and Qara dawi regard victory in Syria as necessary for continuing the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. In a video interview in May 2013, al-Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri argued that: ―The jihad against Israel is a religious obligation that all Muslims must fulfill – whether Palestinian or not. In order to achieve the liberation of Palestine, Muslims must gather in Syria and use it as a launching pa d for jihad activities against Israel. When Assad‘s regime will be destroyed, there
will be
optimal conditions for the
establishment of an Islamic state in Syria that will become a magnet for Muslims who will enlist in the jihad against Israel … the jihad warriors wi ll continue their struggle even after the fall of Assad until the liberation of all of Palestine.‖44 For many years the Muslim Brotherhood was persecuted in Syria. Several members of the Syrian ʿulamāʿ were expelled and left for Qatar where they joined Qara dawi. Syria boasts a Sunni Islamic heritage with figures such as Saad Hawa, Zuhair al-Shawish, Fathi Yakan, etc. According to Qara da wi, the Sunni rebels against Assad are ―men who are fighting for their homes and families and for the future of the Islamic ummah.‖45 Syria is just as important to the Muslims as Jerusalem and Palestine and there is a strong link between the two. Jewish pressure upon Muslims at Al-Aqsa resembles the pressure exerted by Assa d upon the Muslims in Syria.46 Al-Qara dawi calls upon the entire Arab world to
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wake up and fight against Hezbollah and Iran in order to save their Sunni brothers. He sees Russia as playing a role in Syria similar to that of the Americans in Palestine. Russia is an infidel country supplying ammunition, tanks and a dvanced weaponry to Syria in order to kill Muslims.47 Both the Palestinians and the Syrians are unfortunate peoples who are under tyrannical rule which must be destroyed. In both cases, the answer is jihad until the eventual victory of the believers.48 After the Second Lebanon War (2006), al-Qara dawi issued statements embracing Hezbollah and granting it legitimacy because of its struggle against a common enemy. Now, Hezbollah‘s actions in Syria are described as ―criminal act[s] against the Arab nation a nd against Syria and against truth and justice .‖49To al-Qara dawi, Iran is ―immoral‖as it supports Bashar Assad and is waging war with every means at its disposal – military and economic – against the poor Muslims in Syria.50 Al-Qaradawi maintains that Iran is unsatisfied with its own borders and constitutes a threat to all Sunni Muslims (ahl al-Sunna). He refers to what is taking place in Syria as ―slaughter.‖ The Russians and Iranians slaughter Muslims with their weapons and ―Russia blocks all foreign aid to the fighters in Syria.‖ Assad, Russia, Hezbollah an d Iran now all fall un der the category of the enemies of Muslims. 51 Qara dawi says that ―Wh oever engages in such acts … it is not possible to call them anything but close to the devil‖. 52 This means that Hezbollah is not the party of God but the party of the devil. In another speech he argues, ―How is it possible
for 100,000,000 Shiites to overcome
1,700,000,000 Sunnis?‖53 According to al-Qara dawi, the Muslims in Syria are fighting and sacrificing themselves in order to defend their liberty. The forces of the Syrian regime and the Hezbollah are not to be regarded as Muslims but as infidels against whom one must wage war: ―Bashar Assad does not even have a mosque or a Qur‘an…They do n ot acknowledge the principles of Islam concerning prayer and charity…Bashar Assad separates religion from state. He does not believe in religion, does
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not believe in the Qur‘an and does not believe in the sunna.‖54 Early in June 2013, al-Qara dawi stated that ―the Alawites are greater infidels than the Jews.‖55 He prophesized that the Islamic ruling power would be established by jihad against the Hezbollah an d Iranian invasion and thus the Syrian revolution would be accomplished. 56 Al-Qara dawi also came out against the sheikhs and Islamic figures who supported Assad, including Sunni Sheikh Ramadan al-Bouti. Qara dawi denies the accusations against him that he incited his followers to kill Al-Bouti but argues that Al-Bouti ―supported the regime that killed his people‖ and therefore, he was murdered.57 As opposed to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, where regime change took place as a result of an awakening among the civilian population, which was partially led by the Muslim Brotherhood, a civil war continues in Syria. Qara dawi uses his rhetorical skills against the Alawites, the Russian Communists, the Shiite Iranians and Hezbollah who are slaughtering the civilian Sunni population. Qara dawi asserts that ―All Muslims and all countries in the Arab an d Muslim world must do all they can in order to save our Syrian brothers.‖58 This message encouraged Muslim volunteers to fight against the Alawite infidels in Syria. We have the truth and we will win, says Qarada wi. Victory in Syria will come. One must be patient, but eventually Islam will triumph both against the regime of the infidel Assad and against Jewish rule in Palestine.59 Conclusion The revolutions throughout the Arab world, especially in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco an d Yemen, showed the power of the Arab masses in pressing for regime change. Throughout 2012, al-Qara dawi looked upon the process of the Islamization of the masses with satisfaction. For him and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, it seemed as if the Syrian regime would fall momentarily. Then, after the stabilization of a single Islamic government over the Islamic ummah, it would be Israel‘s turn to disappear from the map. While al-Qarada wi believed that the 25/1/2011 revolution that led to Mubarak‘s fall was the epitome of the Arab Spring
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he was left with al-Sisi‘s counter-revolution which overturned this successful trend. To al-Qara dawi, any Islamic religious figure in Egypt wh o opposed Morsi, such as Sheikh Ali Goma‘ah, was to be
regarded as an
ʿamīl
(collaborator) an d not as an ʿālim (Islamic scholar).60 Al-Sisi‘s counterrevolution was seen as an act of terror against a legitimate Islamic ruler and a return to a police state and a dictatorship. Ahma d al-Risuni, an expert and member of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, quotes Dr. Muhammad Amara.61 Despite world events -- in Tunisia the Islamic
government
fell
apart;
in
Libya,
the
Brotherhood
was
unsuccessful in forming a stable coalition and in Egypt, the president, serving in the name of the Brotherhood, was dismissed. Al-Qara dawi contends that the Islami c movement has not been defeated. Those who have patience will triumph, if not now, later on, when Allah will answer the prayers of those whom He has created. 62 Qara dawi feels that is a privilege to fight against rulers acting against Islam, such as al-Sisi, who are supported by Israel and by American terror. ―I stand for truth against lies and for clear justice and not for evil.‖63 Who is to blame for the failure of the Islamic revolutions in the Arab world? To al-Qara dawi the answer is clear. It is Israel and the United States. Representing the world view of the Muslim Brotherhood, al Qara dawi further views the role of Israel and of American imperialism as symbols of the enemy of Islam who plot against it in secret. The Brotherhood‘s we bsite emphasizes that that it is through the Zionist lobby in the United States that Israel prevents America from taking the necessary steps against the undemocratic rule of al-Sisi.64 Blaming Israel is fashionable, like Muhammad Hasanein Heikal said once: "I wish to state out that I detest attempts to involve Israel in matters where it plays no part, only because of the desire to bran dish her name in front of the masses as a scarecrow‖.65 Attacks on Islam in Egypt an d elsewhere, in Tunisia, Libya an d Syria are led by the enemies of Islam who were surprised by the success of the believers who acted against their heretic
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rulers in the Arab Spring. The Democratic Pan Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood failed. Now is the time for an even more violent Pan Islamism -- the Islamic State (ISIS). Al-Qara dawi‘s views are a continuation of conventional ideas regarding Israel and imperialism that were popular in Egyptian Arab society during the 1950s and 60s. He continues to hold anti -Semitic views and believes and hopes that the Islamic revolutions in Arab countries, referred to as the ―Arab Spring,‖ will lead to the destruction of the State of Israel. Hamas‘ commander‘s book on Abdullah Ghaleb Barghouti described the false hope of the "Arab S pring: "I write these worlds in Rimon Prison in southern Palestine, a prison close to borders of revolutionary Arab Egypt of the revolutions. I am writing after the Arab S pring that gives hope that it come like a storm against the Zionists."66 All that happened in the Arab World, according to al-Qaradawi, is part of a religious war: "Every battle that a Muslim enters into to defend rightness, resist falsehood, establish justice or revolt against oppression is a religious battle because it is a battle in the cause of God." 67 The Israeli motive to block the Muslim Brotherhood is clear. According to the Hamas activist Khaled Abu Arfa, Hamas members and other Islamic thinkers believe that the Israel-American conspiracy is the reason why the "Arab Spring" failed. Reference list: 1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
Abu Arfa, Khaled, Thawrāt Tuʾdhin bi-F ajr Jadīd – Naẓrāt Fiqhiyya (Jerusalem, no publisher listed, 2011). Ali, Ahmad, "al-Qarad awi: Mundhu majiʿi Ila Qaṭ ar l am uʿayyid ḥ akiman ẓ aliman" (―Al-Qaradawi: Since I arrived in Qatar, I definitely did not support the evil regime‖), Al-Qaradawi website, 24/12/2013, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7064-2013-12-2311-11-47.html Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Dars al-Nakbah al-Thaniyah: Li-Madha Inhazamna -- Wa-K ayfa N antasir (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1993). Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Ibn al-Qarya w a-al-Kitab (Cairo, Dar alSharuq, 2002). Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, "al-ʿIṣyān Marfūḍ Tamama wal-Misriyun Mutalibun B'aamal Allah B'aamalhoum" [We must totally reject the
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6. 7.
8. 9.
10. 11. 12. 13.
14. 15. 16.
17. 18. 19.
20.
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revolt: The Egyptians must dedicate themselves to worshipping the creator through their deeds], Qaradawi website, 9/2/2012. http://www.qaradawi.net/news/5560-2012-02-10-12-41-56.html Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, "Istiftāʿ al-Inqilāb bāṭ il" [The plebiscite of the revolution has been cancelled], Qaradawi website, 21/1/2014, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7113-2014-01-20-04-42-21.html Al-Rai (Qatar), 10/10/2009, quoted from: ―The Palestinian Authority attacks Qaradawi against the background of his call to stone Mahmoud Habash,‖ MEMRI Website, 25/3/2010, http://www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/s al/sal/pl?lang=he&lD=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=a rticles&dataaid=2330 Al-Sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-J azeera, 2/6/2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0. Al-sharīʿa w al- Ḥ ayāt, Liq āʿ khaṭ ir maʿ al-Sheikh Yusuf alQarad awi Ḥ awl Aḥ adīth al-fitan w a-isq āṭ iha ʿal a al-Waqiʿ (An important speech by Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi concerning the events of the riots and their influence upon the situation], alJazeera, 9 June 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGYlmwV6Sog Al-Sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, al-Khawārij bayn al-Dīn wal-Tarkīh walSiyāsa, al-Jazeera, 25/8/ 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V12zCzozumQ Bargouti, Abdullah Ghaleb, Muhadis ʿala al-Tarīq –Amir al-Ẓill (Dar Al-Bargouti Lanshar wa-al-Toziya, 2013). Baroudi Sami E., "Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi on international relations: The discourse of a leading Islamist scholar (1926– )", Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 50, 2014, pp. 2-26. Gershoni, Israel, Tehiyat Ha-Islam ke-Manof le-Aliyat ha-Arviyut: Ha-S al afiya ha-Mitzrit ve-Tes mihat ha-Arviyut be-Mitzrayim haKdam Mahapkhanit, (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1979). Gold, Dore, Hatred‟s kingdom: How Saudi Arabia supports the new global terroris m (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2003). Harel, Amos, ―The civil war in Syria saved al-Qaeda,‖ Haaretz, 1/13/2014, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium1.2215290 (Hebrew). Ismail, Samir, Al-Lūbi al-Ṣ ahyūni yadʿu Washintun li-Istimr ār daʿm al-Inqilab al-ʿAskari [The Zionist lobby has informed Washington to continue to support the military coupe], Muslim Brotherhood website, 2/8/2013, http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtlD=158773&Sec1D =341 Kedar, Mordecai, ―Hurray for Sisi,‖ Makor Rishon, no. 857, Yoman, 10/1/2014, pp. 19-20. (Hebrew). Khouri, Jacky, ―Final results in Egypt: 70% for Islamic parties,‖ Haaretz, 21/1/2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/middle -east/1.622481 Kramer, Gudrun, "Drawing Boundaries, Yusuf al-Qaradawi on apostasy," in, Gudrun Kramer and Sabine Schmidtke (ed.), Speaking for Islam, religious authorities in Muslim societies (Leiden, 2006). Qutb, Sayyid, Maʿrakatuna maʿ al-Yahūd (Cairo: Dar Al-Sharuq, 1993).
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21. Qutb, Sayyid, Maʿālim fil-Ṭ arīq (Gaza: Hamas Publishers, 2004). 22. Qutb, Sayyid, Milestones (Ma‟alim fi‟l Tareeq) [sic], ed., A-B al-Mehri (Birmingham, England: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006). 23. Ramadan,Madhat, "Al- ʿAlāma al-Qarad awi al-Khurūj ḍ id alInqilābWajeb Shar'ai wa-al-Qoutl a Shuad a bi-Ouzen All ah" (The religious figure Qaradawi: opposing the revolution is a religious obligation and the dead are shahids according to God), Muslim Brotherhood website, 2/1/2014, http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtID=174828&SecID= 230 24. Sivan, Emmanuel, Kanaei Ha-Isl am (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1994). 25. Singh Rashmi, Hamas and suicide terroris m (New York: Routledge, 2012). 26. Tammam, Husan, ―Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The nature of a special relationship, in: Bettina Graf and Jacob Skovgaard-Petersen, Global mufti: The phenomenon of Yusuf al Qarad awi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 27. The Daily News Egypt,‖ 30 ―Al-Qaradawi Returns to Egypt from Qatar,‖ June 2013, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/30/al-qaradawireturns-to-egypt-from-qatar 28. Volker. H., Green, R, and Barkan, L, ―Following Hezbollah‘s announcement that it is fighting in Syria: Calls to Sunni Muslims for jihad against Hezbollah and the Shiites,‖ MEMRI Website, 7/6/2013, http://www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&lD=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=ar ticles&dataaid=3405 Notes 1. 2.
3. 4. 5. 6.
7.
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Ibn al-Qarya w a-al-Kitab (Cairo, Dar al-Sharuq, 2002), pp. 51-57. Sayyid, Qutb, Milestones (Ma‟alim fi‟l Tareeq) [sic], ed., A-B al-Mehri (Birmingham, England: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006), p.91. Sayyid Qutb, Maʿālim fil-Ṭ arīq (Gaza: Hamas Publishers, 2004), p. 92. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, ch. 5, p. 93; Arabic text, Maʿālim fil-Ṭ arīq, pp. 93-94. Sayyid Qutb, Maʿrakatuna maʿ al-Yahūd [Our War with the Jew] (Cairo: Dar Al-Sharuq, 1993), pp. 13-14. Al-Sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, al-Khawārij bayn al-Dīn wal-Tarkīh wal-Siyāsa, alJazeera, August 25, 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V12zCzozumQ Gudrun Kramer, "Drawing boundaries, Yusuf al-Qaradawi on apostasy," in, Gudrun Kramer and Sabine Schmidtke (ed.), Speaking for Islam, religious authorities in Muslim societies (Leiden, 2006), pp. 204-205; Emmanuel Sivan, Kanaei Ha-Islam (The fanatics of Islam) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1994), pp. 100-103 (Hebrew). Ahmad Ali, "al-Qarad aw i: Mundhu majiʿi Ila Qaṭ ar lam uʿayyid ḥ akiman ẓ aliman" (Al-Qaradawi: Since I arrived in Qatar, I definitely did not support the evil regime), al-Qaradawi website, 24 Dec. 2013, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7064-2013-12-23-11-11-47.html
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9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25. 26. 27. 28.
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Al-Rai (Qatar), 10 Oct.2009, quoted from: ―The Palestinian Authority attacks Qaradawi against the background of his call to stone Mahmoud Habash,‖ MEMRI Website, 25 Mar. 2010, http://www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal/pl?lang=he&lD=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles &dataaid=2330 This view contradicts the position of Husan Tammam who tries to present Qaradawi as an opponent of the idea of takfir. Husan Tammam, ―Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The nature of a special relationship, in: Bettina Graf and Jacob Skovgaard-Petersen, Global mufti: The phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qarad awi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 70-71. Sami E., Baroudi, "Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi on international relations: The discourse of a leading Islamist scholar (1926– )", Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 50, 2014, p. 9. See: Ahmad Ali, "al-Qarad awi…" al-Qaradawi website, 24 Dec. 2013, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7064-2013-12-23-11-11-47.html Gudrun Kramer, ―Drawing boundaries: Yusuf al-Qaradawi on apostasy,‖ pp. 212-213. Singh Rashmi, Hamas and suicide terroris m (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 99. Khaled Abu Arfa, Thawrāt Tuʿdhin bi-F ajr J adīd – Naẓ rāt Fiqhiyya [Revolutions herald a new dawn: From the standpoint of Islamic law], (Jerusalem, without publisher name, 2011), p. 16. Emmanuel Sivan, Kanaei ha-Isl am, pp. 100-103. The arguments of Qaradawi and of Qutb are based on the writings of Ibn Tamiyya regarding the right to rebel against a tyrannical ruler. Gudrun Kramer, ―Drawing boundaries: Yusuf al-Qaradawi on apostasy,‖ pp. 212-213. Al- sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0 Dore Gold, Hatred‟s kingdom: How Saudi Arabia supports the new global terroris m (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2003), pp. 55, 74-75, 92-94. See: Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0. Ibid. Al-Aqsa Channel (Gaza) 10 May 2013, http://aqsatv.ps Israel Gershoni, Tehiyat Ha-Islam ke-Manof le-Aliyat ha-Arviyut: HaSal afiya ha-Mitzrit ve-Tes mihat ha-Arviyut be-Mitzrayim ha-Kd am Mahapkhanit (The revival of Islam as an impetus for the rise of Arabism: Egyptian Salafism and the growth of Arabism in pre-revolutionary Egypt), (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1979), p. 79. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Dars al-Nakbah al-Thaniyah: Li-Madha Inhazamna -Wa-K ayfa N antasir [A lesson in the second nakbeh (1967 war) why we were defeated and how we can win] (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1993) , p. 40. Hussan Tammam, ―Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The nature of a special relationship,‖ in: Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qarad aw i, pp. 64-65. Khaled Abu Arfa, Thawr āt Tuʿdhin bi-F ajr J adīd, p. 20. Ibid. Ibid., p. 21. Ibid.
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29. Jacky Khouri, ―Final results in Egypt: 70% for Islamic parties,‖ Haaretz, 21 Jan. 2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/middle east/1.622481 30. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, al-ʿI ṣ yān Marfūḍ Tamama wal-Misriyun Mutalibun B'aamal Allah B'aamalhoum' [We must totally reject the revolt: The Egyptians must dedicate themselves to worshipping the creator through their deeds], Qaradawi website, 9 February 2012, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/5560-2012-02-10-12-41-56.html 31. Ibid. 32. Al- sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, al-Khaw ārij, al-Jazeera, 25 August 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V12zCzozumQ 33. Ibid. 34. Khaled Abu Arfa, Thawr āt Tuʿdhin bi-F ajr J adīd, pp. 7-8. 35. ―Al-Qaradawi returns to Egypt from Qatar,‖ The Daily News Egypt,‖ 30 June 2013. http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/30/al-qaradawireturns-to-egypt-from-qatar/ 36. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, al-Khaw ārij , al-Jazeera, 25 August 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V12zCzozumQ 37. Quoted by Dr. Mordecai Kedar, ―Hurray for Sisi,‖ Makor Rishon, no. 857, Yoman, 10 Jan. 2014, p. 19 (Hebrew). 38. Madhat Ramadan, Al-ʿAlāma al-Qarad awi al-Khurūj ḍ id al-Inqilābetc, (The religious figure Qaradawi: Opposing the revolution is a religious obligation and the dead are shahids according to God), Muslim Brotherhood website, 2 Jan. 2014, http://www.ikwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtlD=174828&Sec1d=230 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Al-Qaradawi, Istiftāʿ al-Inqilāb bāṭ il [The plebiscite of the revolution has been cancelled], Qaradawi website, 21 January 2014, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7113-2014-01-20-04-42-21.html 43. Ahmad Ali, "al-Qarad aw i…," al-Qaradawi website, 24 December 2013, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7064-2013-12-23-11-11-47.html. 44. Amos Harel, ―The civil war in Syria saved al-Qaeda,‖ Haaretz, 13 Jan. 2014, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2215290 (Hebrew). 45. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0 46. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Liq āʿ khaṭ ir maʿ al-Sheikh Yusuf al-Qarad aw i Ḥ awl Aḥ ad īth al-fitan wa-isqāṭ iha ʿal a al-Waqiʿ (An important speech by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi concerning the events of the riots and their influence upon the situation], al-Jazeera, 9 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGYlmwV6Sog. 47. Ibid. 48. Al-Aqsa Channel, Gaza, 10 May 2013, Qaradawi‘s sermon at the Al-Amri Mosque in Gaza, http://aqsatvps 49. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0 50. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, "Liq āʿ khaṭ ir maʿ al-Sheikh Yusuf alQarad awi…," Al-Jazeera, 9 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGYlmwV6Sog 51. Al- sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0 52. Ibid.
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53. H. Volker, R. Green, L. Barkan, ―Following Hezbollah‘s announcement that it is fighting in Syria: Calls to Sunni Muslims for jihad against Hezbollah and the Shiites,‖ MEMRI Website, 7 June 2013, http://www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&lD=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles &dataaid=3405 54. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, "Liq āʿ khaṭ ir maʿ al-Sheikh Yusuf alQarad awi…," al-Jazeera, 9 June 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGYlmwV6Sog 55. Al-Rai (Qatar), 1 June 2013. 56. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0 57. Ahmad Ali, "al-Qarad aw i…," al-Qaradawi website, 24 December 2013, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7064-2013-12-23-11-11-47.html 58. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, "Liq āʿ khaṭ ir maʿ al-Sheikh Yusuf alQarad awi…," al-Jazeera, 9 June 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGYlmwV6Sog 59. Ibid. 60. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, al-Khaw ārij, al-J azeera, 25 August 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V12zCzozumQ 61. Al-sharīʿa w al-Ḥ ayāt, Hudūd Allah, al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cX7C3OkYzQ0 62. Ahmad Ali, "al-Qarad aw i…," al-Qaradawi website, 24 December 2013, http://www.qaradawi.net/news/7064-2013-12-23-11-11-47.html 63. Ibid. 64. Samir Ismail, Al-Lūbi al-Ṣ ahyūni yadʿu Washintun li-Istimr ār d aʿm alInqilab al-ʿAskari [The Zionist lobby has informed Washington to continue and support the military coup], Muslim Brotherhood website, 2 Aug. 2013, http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtlD=158773&Sec1D=341 65. Al-Ahram, 21 December, 1962. 66. Abdullah Ghaleb Barghouti, Muhad is ʿala al-Tarīq – Amir al-Ẓ ill [Engineer on the way: Prince of the shadow] (Dar Al-Bargouti Lanshar wa-al-Toziya, 2013), p. 147. 67. Sami E., Baroudi, "Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi on international relations: The discourse of a leading Islamist scholar (1926– )," Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 50, 2014, p.13.
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(2)Holocaust Revisionism and Revival Of Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Baltic States Dr. K.B. Usha Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (Dr. K. B. Usha is Assistant Professor in Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India. Her main areas of research interest are international relations,globalization, neo-liberalism, political economy, social movements, Holocaust, human security, environment and energy issues, gender etc. She studies the above issues in the context of Russia, Baltic States, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia, and India. She has published seve ral articles and research papers related to the above subjects and areas in various reputed national and international journals. She published her book A Wound ed Afghanistan: Communis m, Fund amentalis m and Democracy in 2004. This book critically analyses the political developments in Afghanistan from Soviet occupation to American occupation with a historical perspective. Her forthcoming book is titled Contemporary B altic States. This book focuses on the developments in post-Soviet Baltic states over the last two and half decades. She teaches a course on ―Politics and Society in the Baltic States‖. She has completed a project on Empowerment of Women in Political Leadership: A Comparative Study of Russia and India, the manuscript of which is under publication. She has been invited to University of Latvia, Vilnius University (Lithuania), Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania) and St. Petersburg State University, Russia to deliver guest lectures.) _______ Abstract:
This article is an attempt to un derstand holocaust revisionism and rise of anti-Semitism, a by-product of nation building and identity politics in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania commonly known as Baltic states. After regaining independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991 the experience of Soviet occupation and historical injustice became the core elements of defining national identity in all the three Baltic states. They are rewriting the history to project their complete victimhood under Soviet Union, by equalising the Holocaust experience which is far more serious crime against humanity committed by Hitler‘s Germany. Massive extermination of almost 95 percent of Jews in Baltic states that did not happen elsewhere in Europe occurred because of the voluntary local participation with the Germans. Afte r twenty-five years of independence Baltic states‘ fail to deal with this dark spot in their own history. Instead, Holocaust revisionism and neo-anti-Semitism expressed by actions like rewriting history, desecration of cemeteries, vandalism, anti -Semitic graffiti and remarks, media articles, repatriation of former Baltic leadership who were German collaborators and commemoration
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HitleriteWaffen SS legions in all major Baltic cities with the permission of governments, etc is increasing despite Jewish protests. Thus, Holocaust revisionism and the Jewish issue become a part and parcel of the larger questions of identity and minorities related to the ethnocentric nation building in these countries. While the state is showing great enthusiasm in bringing communist crimes to justice, their refusal to consider the complicity of local collaborators in holocaust crimes and prosecute them, and the Baltic attempt to hide the dart spot in their own history; do not match with the claim of Baltic states claim that they che rish the democratic values and humanistic traditions of the west. Key words: Anti-Semitism, Baltic legions, Death camps, genocide, Holocaust Revisionism, Jews, Nazism, Ghettos, Soviet occupation
Introdu ction After regaining independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania commonly known as Baltic states began nation building based on the norms and values of western liberal democracy. In
this
process
their
obscured history of
Holocaust
effervesced as a contested issue as the historical injustice experienced by Baltic majority nationality under Soviet occupation based on Molotov Ribbentrop Treaty of 1939 has been emphasised as the core element of defining national identity,citizenship and security. The
―return to
Europe‖ or ―return to west‖ narrative of political elites depicting NATO and EU as guarantors of development and security and neighbouring Russia as enemyconsists of elements of ethno-nationalism. When they define vulnerability, threat and insecurity by two equal gen ocides theory overemphasising thecomplete victimhoodof the Baltic majority nationality under
Soviet occupation
experience
and undermining the
of Jewish minority under Nazi
horrific
Holocaust
Germany‘s invasion, it
demonstrates the virtual underpinnings of hiding the dark spot of their own history in order to earn reputation at the international stage. The history of Holocaust experience unravels a different story of local ethnic Baltic
citizens
being perpetrators
of crime
against humanity by
voluntarily collaborating with Nazis and participating in the mass murder of Jews. When looking at the nation building process of Baltic states through the prism of Holocaust, the history of Jewish experience
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during World War II reveals an untold aspect of ethno-national understanding of nation and national identity asserted by Baltic national majority. The Baltic people had experienced horrendous crimes against humanity under Nazi German and Soviet invasions from 1940 to 1944 during the World War II. Holocaust committed by Hitler‘s Nazi Germany aimed at com plete annihilation of Jewish nation across the world is known
today as
the
most
horrific
crime
against
humanity the
Europe/world has ever experienced. On the eve of the World War II, because of the external influence of Nazism in Germany, anti -Semitism increased in Baltic states. The hatred of Jews was because of the Baltic majority‘s fear of Jewish domination in the economy and culture, and their nationalist perception that Jews were loyal to Russian communists and would betray the Baltic nations. Since 18th century Baltic states, especially Lithuania, compared to other parts of Eastern Europe, had a distinctive history of modern Jewish cultural, religious, artistic, economic and intellectual life. Lithuania‘s capital Vilnius was known as the ―Jerusalem of the North‖1 as the city hosted one of the biggest Jewish settlements in Europe.The apprehensions and hatred towards Jewish minority‘s empowerment transformed into violence during the World War II. A massive extermination of almost 95 percent of Jews took place in Baltic states. Such a high scale of mass murder of Jews di d not ha ppen elsewhere in Europe. The Holocaust occurred in Baltic states was not possible without the voluntary active participation and colla boration of local Baltic nationality with the Nazi Germans. Since Baltic states were incorporate d into the former Soviet Union after the war the Baltic Holocaust history remained unknown as the issue was dealt with by the Soviet authorities. Since independence in 1991, the political elites took the language, culture and territorial homeland of Baltic majority nationalities as salient features of their national belonging. State is seen not only as an aspect of national identity but also an instrument of preserving the Baltic majority ethnicity‘s language and culture.The old hatred of Jews who were
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equated with Russian communists is transformed today into nationalist sentiments against Russian speakers including Jews internally and so into an anti -Russia stance externally. In the ―self/other‖ dichotomy of national identity construction, Russian speakers including Jews are treated as the hostile ―other.‖ The Baltic governments pursued a politics of restrictive citizenship towards minorities. Because, the Baltic national majority view Jewish minority as communists, who were
closely
associated with Soviet occupiers and therefore held responsible for the killings and mass deportation of the Balts to Siberia under Soviet occupation in the past. Apparently, Jewish question becomes a contested issue related to the much larger political questions. In the ethno-nationalist political agenda of Baltic states,rewriting history became an important agenda as a ―truth‖ finding mission. The Holocaust revisionism and rewriting history,apparently, come into use as a political instrument in diluting the crime committed by local Balts against Jews. Obviously, the state supported History Commissions established in the late 1990s came up with ―two Holocausts‖; in other words, ―double genocide‖ theory in effect minimising the Holocaust experience
and
establishing
complete
―victim hood‖
un der
Soviet
occupation. The Baltic attempt of conciliation by asserting the principle of ―equality of victimhood‖ un der the Nazis and the Soviets is something of the denial of genocide of the entire Jewish people and getting rid of Holocaust out of history. Therefore, the Holocaust history reveals the complexity of the Baltic nation building by simultaneously following two irreconcilable political goals of sympathising with both victims and perpetrators. The paradox of the attempts to hide their own crimes for which
they can use
mystification
or
Soviet
crimes as an excuse
ultra-nationalism
calls
into
for
question
Holocaust the
Baltic
democratic system. Consequently, after
twenty-five
years
of independence
the
prejudiced attitudes toward Jews has transformed into a political and ideological anti -Semitism. The process of falsifying Holocaust in the Baltic states is expressed in various forms in government policies and
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the
Holocaust
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masses: education,
legislations,
rewriting
history,
redefining
desecration
of
―double
concepts
monuments,
genocide‖
related
to
theory,
Holocaust,
commemoration
events,
vandalism, anti -Semitic graffiti and remarks, provocative media articles and so on. Commemoration of Combat Support Forces of Waffen SS (Schutzsstaffel,
Armed
Protective
Squadron)
legions
is
regularly
celebrating their commemoration events in all major Baltic cities despite Jewish protests. While the state is showing great enthusiasm in bringing communist crimes to justice, their reluctance to consider the complicity of local colla borators in Holocaust crimes and prosecute them, and the Baltic attempt to hide the dark spot in their own history do not match with the claim of Baltic states that they cherish the democratic values and humanistic traditions of the west.Thus, the Holocaust revisionism and new anti -Semitism have now become a part and parcel of the larger questions of identity and minorities related to the ethnocentric nation building in these countries. The paradoxical situation gives impetus to unde rstand this under-researched aspect of the complex, rightist, ethnonationalist political agenda in the so-called democratic nation building in Baltic states. Framework of Analysis The current Holocaust revisionism in contemporary Baltic states is deeply rooted in the broa der context of revival and rise of the new forms of anti-Semitism and Holocaust obfuscation taking place across Europe. After the post-war UN enforcement of international law to curtail the violation of rights of Jewish community, anti -Semitism used to be considered as a thing of past in Europe. Nazism was defeated and race based anti-Semitism was discredited in Europe
was the common
belief.However, now after seventy years of the horrendous Holocaust, the revival and political manifestations of anti -Semitism/neo-anti-Semitism are a disturbing trend especially in Eastern Europe where the post-Soviet Baltic countries are located. The current trend of revival of anti -Semitism in Europe can be useful for Baltic states as EU members who can use
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the platform for interacting with nationalist groups in other parts of Europe and asserting nationalist politics in EU platform. The transformation and revival of anti -Semitism in Europe has been the focus of many recent studies. Denis MacShane, British Labour Party MP says that anti -Semitism which he refers as neo-anti-Semitism is back as a ―twenty-first century global ideology that has to be understood in political terms if it is to be confronted and contained‖2 and dealt with.Steven Beller, regarding preventing anti -Semitism, says: ―The question is how can this ‗eternal‘ form of antisemitism be kept within minimal and ‗harmless‘ dimensions. In those terms, the answer to antisemitism is ultimately not a Jewish state, but the establishment of a truly global system of liberal pluralism‖. 3 In response to Beller‘s conclusion,MacShaneconcerns that ―neo-anti-Semitism, the development of an old hate into an organized ideology with its thinke rs, organizers, spokespersons, state sponsors an d millions of adherents. Today anti semitism is not about Jews. It is about us‖ 4 Alvin H. Rosenfeld supports the view that the current anti -Semitism is different from the old anti Jewish hatred which was based on racial and religious factors. Today‘s anti-Semitism is transformed as a phenomenon driven by ideological biases.5
Parliamentary
congressional
report
report
foun d
of
the
United growing
Kingdom
and
trend
anti -Semitism
of
the
US
worldwi de. As MacShanewarns, as a new global phenomenon anti Semitism is back with a deadly vengeance. It threatens all humanity.In the Baltic context definitions of a number of concepts such as ―anti Semitism‖, ―genocide‘, ―Holocaust denial‖ and ―Holocaust obfuscation‖ require e laboration as Baltic states are trying to re -interpret such concepts and definitions after becoming members of the European Union. EU‘s working definition of anti -Semitism is relevant in Baltic case as they are EU members. The EU defines, ―Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward
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Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.‖6 Anti-Semitic acts are criminal acts as defined in the provisions of legal instruments of the countries concerned. Anti -Semitic discrimination, therefore, is illegal. Anti-Semitism is expressed in various forms: the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and targeted of attacks on Jewish people or property – such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries. The legal definition of genocide according to Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) refers to ―any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group con ditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [an d] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.‖7 But the Baltic states redefined the concept of genocide diverting from the international customary law provided by the UN with the objective of qualifying Soviet crimes as genocide similar to Holocaust experience. Holocaust is a term of Greek origin which means ―sacrifice by fire‖. Holocaust Encyclopaedia of US Holocaust Memorial Museum defines Holocaust as‖ the systematic, bureaucratic, state -sponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators.‖8 Holocaust denial and distortion are other two concepts that further expose the Baltic politics. Working definition of Ministry of Holocaust denial by Foreign Affairs of Israel refers specifically to any attempt to claim that the Holocaust/Shoah di d not take place. It also includes public denial or doubt over the use of principal mechanisms of destruction (such as gas chambers, mass shooting, starvation and torture) or the intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people. It can be foun d in various forms as an expression of anti -Semitism: blaming the Jews for the responsibility of Holocaust or considering it as the result of
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conspiracy.
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Holocaust
denial
often
aimed
at
the
rehabilitation of an explicit anti -Semitism and the promotion of political ideologies and con ditions that suit to it. 9The Ministry also specified that distortion of the Holocaust refers, inter alia, to: a) Intentional efforts to excuse or minimize the impact of the Holocaust or its principal elements; includi ng collaborators and allies of Nazi Germany; b) Gross minimization of the number of the victims of the Holocaust in contradiction to reliable sources; c) Attempts to blame the Jews for causing their own genocide; d) Statements that cast the Holocaust as a positive historical event. Those statements are not Holocaust denial but are closely connected to it as a radical form of antisemitism. They may suggest that the Holocaust did not go far enough in accomplishing its goal of ―the Final Solution of the Jewish Question‖; e) Attempts to blur the responsibility for the establishment of concentration and death camps devised and operated by Nazi Germany by putting blame on other nations or ethnic groups. 10 DovidKatz,n oted Holocaust an d Yiddish historian of Lithuania, introduced the concept of Holocaust obfuscation to describe efforts currently underway. In his words: Holocaust Obfuscation is the systematic effort to relativize, minimize, obscure,confuse or eliminate the Holocaust, as a distinct historic entity in European history, without necessarily denying any of the documented murders. By the early twenty-first century Holocaust Obfuscation evolved as a major trend of th ought in some governmental, political, press, academic and other elite circles of some new-accession states in the east of the European Union. Its ideas have been packaged in a number of declarations and proposed la ws aimed at eliciting compliance from Western nations and organizations of nations. The most frequent apparatus includes: inflation of the term genocide to encompass a variety of Soviet crimes; the claim that Nazi and Soviet crimes were inherently equivalent; thereby leaving the Holocaust as a conceptual ‗half‘ in the replacement paradigm. At the local level, variants of the model have included claims of overwhelming Jewish complicity in communism; claims that the murder of the Jewish populations in Eastern Europe was a reaction to alleged Jewish communism; claims that the miniscule percentage of Jews who survived by escaping to Sovie t-supported partisan groups in the forests are a priori guilty of ‗war crimes‘(hence they may be investigated with neither evidence nor charges). The Holocaust Obfuscation movement frequently harbor santisemitic and racist undertones.11
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Dovid Katz, calls current scenario of holocaust obfuscation ―double genocide‖ which is inspired by a ―movement in Europe that believes the crimes—morally, ethically—of Nazism and Communism are absolutely equal, and that those ... who ‘don‘t think ‘they‘re absolutely equal, are perhaps soft on Communism.‖12 Interrelationship between current anti -Semitism and ―Symmetric Approach‖ of Holocaust is evidentin the ―red-brown movement‖ of equalising Soviet and Nazi occupation of Baltic states.13 In the light of the above conceptual framework, the following sections try to analyse the factors – social, economic, cultural and political – that led to Baltic enmity and hostile behaviour to Jews, the reason for perpetrating violence against Jews during World War II and the current phenomenon of new forms of anti -Semitism Holocaust revisionism. The period of formation of sovereign Baltic states after First World War, national majority-Jewish minority relation during the inter war period, the current attempts of redefining the past, an d politics of identity, culture, and nation building throw light to understand the Holocaust revisionism and revival of anti -Semitism in Baltic states. Jewish Question in Baltic States before the Second W orld W ar The Jewish community in Baltic states has a history that dates back to more than 700 years. In Lithuania the first Jewish settlements appeared in the 12th century. They were merchants from southern Europe. 14 Historian Abraham ElijahuHarkavi believed that the Jews came to Lithuania in the ninth and e ighth centuries from Babylonia.15 Jews were first mentioned in a document in Livland (Latvia‘s Vindzeme province today) in 1536. Courlan d (Zemgale and Kurzeme provinces of modern Latvia) also had Jewish settlements in the 15th century. In Estonia Jewish
se ttlements
appeared as
early
as
fourteenth
century.As
mentioned in the written archival records (AeltestesDenkelbuch) a man called Johannes Jode, whose name appeared in 1333, is believed to be the first Jew settled in Estonia. However, the permanent Jewish settlements of Estonia began only in the 19th century, when Russian Tsar Alexander II granted them the legal right to enter the region in
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1865. In 1894 an edict of Em peror Alexander III gave the right to reside in the Baltic provinces to all Jews who ha d been living there permanently since 1879. Mostly they lived in the Pale of Settlements16 since the creation of such settlements by Catherine the Great in 1791. Jews flourished through the centuries and became inseparable part of Baltic societies. Main citie s like Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius became important trade
and cultural
centres
of
Jews. 17
Vilnius
city
was
named
Jerusholayim de Lite (―Lithuanian Jerusalem‖) and considered to be the spiritual centre and cultural ca pital of Jews wh o call themselves as Litvaks. Jews were mostly urbanized an d very few of them lived in the countryside.18 However, they faced several hardships due to restrictions imposed by rulers, deportations, confiscation of their property, and difficult situations created by wars, uprisings and the like. They were accused of assassination of Russian Em peror Alexander II. In this connection pogroms were encouraged against the Jews all over Russian empire. During the Russian revolution and World War I Jews were killed in large numbers. Because of the hardships they faced throughout the centuries they participated in and supported the independent movements during 1918-1920 led by Baltic nationals, anticipating some
amount of
autonomy.19 In the independent Baltic states in the interwar years (19181940) Jews enjoyed the rights of national minority. Jewish associations, parties, network of Jewish educational institutions, congregations and places of worships were established. However, the anti -Semitic attitudes, expressions and prejudices against Jews, prevalent in Baltic societies especially since Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent states in 1918 after the First World War (interwar period) set the precon ditions of Holocaust during Second World War. Anti-Semitic feelings against Jews seem to be based on economic, religious and socio-political reasons. When the Baltic states became independent for the first time in the second decade of 20th century, Jews,despite
being deprived, extended great
material
support
in
rebuilding the country after war. Baltic Jewry contributed a fair measure
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of aid in the rebuilding of their native countries. During the difficult transition period from 1919 to 1922 theirs was a great help. In the interwar years (1918-1940) when the new states were formed in 1919, Jews were granted minority rights in Baltic states unlike in other countries in Europe. Lithuania (12 May 1922), Latvia (7 July 1923) and Estonia (17 September 1923) made declarations recognizing the Jewish minority rights in educational and culture spheres.20 Jews enjoyed the rights of national minority in principle in the three Baltic states. After the foundation of the democratic republic of Latvia, Riga, the capital city where 47 percent of Latvian Jews lived, became the political, cultural and social centre of the Latvian Jews. The Jews dominated in trade, businesses, etc. The economic condition of Jews flourished. After the foundation of the democratic republic of Latvia, the upward mobility of Jews in socio-cultural and economic spheres caused discontent among Baltic majority nationality and developed attitude of intolerance towards Jews.However, Bernhard Press says, anti -Semitism during the 1920s in Latvia was not aggressive. In Latvia prejudice against Jews existed in the form of preventing Jews from competing with Latvians on an equal basis on everyday life. Jews were excluded from government employment.21 Estonia was more liberal than Latvia in granting autonomy to Jews but there was restriction for Jews for membership in National
Parliament. The
Jewish
community was
organized and their cultural interests are served through mainly three agencies: a 27 member cultural council elected by Jewish citizens triennially, an executive committee of seven members elected by the council; and local committees. 22 In Lithuania Jewish community had its own National Assembly of Jewish Council with local branches and had a Ministry of Jewish Affairs until 1924. With the Christian Democratic government that assumed power in 1926 Jewish autonomy ended completely. Duri ng the period from 1919 to 1922 the Jews recognised their well-being. They showed patriotism in the newly formed state. Their loyalty to the
state made
them financing industrial development,
fostering economic growth and participating in self-rule.23
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However, Jewish autonomy remained as a crucial political issue in the later interwar years in Baltic countries when democracy changed into dictatorship in 1926 (Lithuania) and in 1934 (Estonia and Latvia).Thereafter,
Baltic
national
majority
broke
the
prom ise
of
autonomy.Although Jews enjoyed minority rights their entry into civil service was fully restricted. More exclusionary policies were followed by all the governments during the period of dictatorship. The perception of the Baltic majority nationality masses and leadership that Jews had monopolized the best jobs and controlle d the national wealth led to further anti-Semitic policies. For instance, the Lithuanianization policies ofAntanasSmetona‘s government carried out the exclusion of Jews. 24 In order to un dermine Jewish socio-economic domination, leading Baltic business people and artisans formed an organization called Verslininki. On 15 January 1939, the organization‘s weekly journal Verslas published the reasons for Lithuanianization programme. It stated that Lithuania had too many Jewish manufacturers, merchants and petty shopkeepers, a situation which was intolerable. Therefore, in order to exclude Jews from economic sphere it suggested transfer of jobs to Lithuanians, immigration to other places, e xclusion of Jews from state owned credit institutions, expulsion of Jews who migrated to Lithuania after 1918, elimination of Jews from restaurants, hotel and liquor industries, and elimination of Jewish university students. The extent of hatred towards Je ws was further expressed by a Lithuanian Premier Jonas Cernius at a conference in 1939 organized by Verslininki that ―the Lithuanian Government will support the efforts of the Lithuanian Merchants Union to eliminate the Jews from trade‖. 25 Again on 20 January 1939 the journal published an article titled ―Let Us Not Adjourn Unless the Jewish Problem Is Solved‖. The government also pursued policies favouring priority to Lithuanians over Jews in entry in the job market, admission to universities and so on. However, although such expressions
existed,
Sutton
says,
―Lithuanian
government
never
instituted anti -Semitism de jure‘.26 In Latvia also state policies were not enacted supporting
anti -Semitism.
83
But
nationalization
of
Jewish
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enterprises had been carried out. By late 1930s expression of anti Semitism had begun to be seen in street violence and vandalism. Perkronkrust (an organization of Baltic-German Hitlerites) was the important source of spreading anti -Semitism among the masses. Unlike in Estonia and Latvia, religious confrontation between Catholicism and Judaism was a source of anti -Semitic feeling in Lithuania. The
anti-Semitism in neighbouring countries like
Germany
impacted such expressions in Baltic states also. Hitler‘s conspiracy against Jews for Sovie t Bolshevism had impact on Baltic nationalists. Hitler described Bolshevik Russia as a ―Slavic-Tatar body with a Jewish head‖. He said: ―In Russian Bolshevism we … see the attempts undertaken by the Jews … to achieve world domination.‖ That attitude was carried forward by Baltic Nazi collaborators during the Final Solution.27 According to Laserson ―There is no doubt that if Hitler had not assumed power in Germany there would have been no dictatorship in Latvia (or in Estonia where it took a moderate form).‖ 28 Having said this, it could be argued that the impact of Nazi ideology and transformation happened in the inter-ethnic relation between Balts and Jews fuelled anti-Semitism. An atmosphere of anti -Semitism prevalent among the masses and nationalistic poli cies of governments accelerated prejudice to Jews and thereby Jewish vulnerability on the eve of World War II. In order to grasp the extent of Holocaust it is relevant to mention the size of Jewish community in Baltic states on the eve of Second World War. According to US
Holocaust Memorial Museum ―The
Jewish
population in the three Baltic states totalled 255,000: 95,600 in Latvia, 155,000 in Lithuania, and 4,560 in Estonia. Here, Jews comprised 4.9 percent, 7.6percent, and 0.4 percent of each country‘s po pulation, respectively and 5percent of the region‘s total population‖ in 1933. 29 In 1935 before the World War II the Jewish population of Latvia was 93,479 people which comprised of 4.8 percent of the total population. In the capital city Riga 43,672 Jews lived.30 In Lithuania around 220,000 Jews were there and in Estonia the size of Jewish population was around
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4,000. According certain other estimates there were around 300,000 Jews in total in Baltic states before the war. Anti-Semitism and Holocaust during Se cond W orld W ar Besides the previously existed anti -Semitism and anti -Semitic Nazi propagan da, Nazi -German policy of Holocaust towards Jews in Soviet territories and wide -scale local collaboration with Nazis made the mass murder of Jews possible. According to Yitzhak Arad, Israeli Holocaust survivor and scholar, the German policy of Holocaust in Baltic states was characterized by three elements: 1. the Jews in the occupied territories of Soviet Union were the first group of Jews in German-occupied Eur ope to face physical and totalextermination; 2. the killing was carried out by shooting, openly and in the vicinity of the localities in which the Jews lived, an d was witnessed by the local population. 3. the German propagan da stressed that Soviet Jewry were the bearers of the Bolshevik ideology an d the ruling elite in Soviet Union, that the target of the war was their elimination and the destruction of the communist state. For the other nations of Soviet Union German propagan da claimed that ―their enemies are not the people of Soviet Union but the Judeo-Bolshevik rulers‖ and the German Army brings them freedom and li beration from Stalin‘s and Jewish yoke. 31 The Holocaust was carried out by Einsatzgruppen (Hitler‘s special action
groups
or
Ordnungspolizei(order
death
squa d),
police).In
Waffen
Latvia
the
SS Arajs
units
and
the
commando
and
Hamman commando in Lithuania led the Holocaust in the Baltic. The vast majority of Jews were exterminated during the end of June -early July 1941 an d end of July -December 1941. Ninth Fort in Kaunus, Poneriai (Ponary) near Vilnius, Rumbuli in Riga, were the main sites where the maximum number of mass killing of Jews took place. In these places and other smaller locations in the Baltic, hundreds or thousands of Jews were rounded up for execution by the Germans and their local collaborators. The number of Jews killed during 1941-42 in Baltic states were reported to be 80,311 in Lithuania, 30,025 in Latvia and 474 in Estonia.32 Estonia was the first country declared as Judenfrei(free/clean of Jews). In Latvia around 90 percent of Jews were slaughtered. In
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Lithuania 95 percent were murdered. A total of a pproximately 300,000 Jews were killed. The specificity of Baltic Holocaust is its highest level of mass killing that has happened in Europe. The question of how such a terrific pattern happened points towards the fact that without local Baltic ethnic majority‘s participation such a massive extermination would not have happened. Local Collaboration and Brutality in Holocaust The role of local nationals of Baltic statesin collaborating with Nazis in the mass murder of Jews is a controversial question. Historical documents, Holocaust literature and survivor‘s testimonies and diaries available in public domain testify the participation of local Balts, i.e., ethnic Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, in Holocaust and their collaboration with Nazi legions. The Baltic states exterminated Jews to such an extent that elsewhere in Europe did not ha ppen. Richard Rushke who reviews the scope and brutality of Baltic colla boration with Nazis confirms: 1) Estonian and Latvian Militia and Police collaborated with Nazis in the execution of their Jewish and Gypsy populations; 2) without their assistance, making those countries Judenfreiwould not have been possible; 3) the motives for this indigenous collaboration were varied; and 4) Estonia and Latvia are still struggling to understand and accept responsibility for their part in the genocide. 33 Because of the problems of limited manpower and communic ation barriers Germans recruited local
population from Baltic, Belarus,
Ukraine, etc. to kill Jews. A lot of testimonies are provided by witnesses and officials regarding the brutal nature of Baltic collaborators in the Holocaust pogroms. As one German officer puts it, ―we are actually frightened at the blood thirstiness of these people‖.Rushkesays that the details of Lithuanian Nazi collaborators‘ degree of complicity with Nazi orders are available in Nazi war crimes testimony and Einsatzgruppen field reports foun d by US Army an d Re d Army in files in Berlin. He cites an example: EinsatzgruppenA received orders in October 1941to liquidate all the Jews in the Belorussian town of Sluzk. The group commander divided
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his battalion into four companies, two of which were made up entirely of Lithuanian volunteers. After the operation was com pleted, the commander reported to Berlin, ―with deepest regrets‖ that the action bordered on sadism … with indescribable brutality on the part of both German police and particularly the Lithuanian partisans.34 G. Reitlinger, the author of The Final Solution: Hitler‘s Attempt to Exterminate Jews of Europe,1939 -1945, himself wrote about the Baltic involvement in the holocaust and brutality: The savagery of Lithuanian and Latvian gangs who carried out the pogroms, coupled with the indifference of nearly the entire population towards the more scientific extermination practiced by Germans, must have given an unusual degree of satisfaction to Hitler and his circle. But to those who i n pre -war days had attributed to an almost Scandinavian respectability to the Baltic republics, the news of the massacres that leaked to was very credible. 35 Historian Bernhard Press who is a survivor of Riga ghetto evacuation explains the brutal extermination incident begun in the chilled morning on 30 November 1941: First the policemen, rolling drunk, forced their way into the old age home and the neighbouring houses. In the old age home they machine gunned old people, sick people and invalids in their beds. They drove out of a partments … people who were still in the midst of their preparations for the supposed evacuation, with truncheon blows, an d shots, curses and threats. Anyone who di d not obey fast enough was shot on the spot. Small children were hurled out of windows onto the street. In the dark of night, Latvian policemen on foot and on horseback … drove people down the street like a panicky herd of animals. According to an eyewitness report Herbert Cukurs (the butcher of Riga) tore an infant from its mother‘s arms and smashed the ba by‘s head against the curbstone. As the mother threw herself with a wild scream on the lifeless, bleeding body, he riddle d her head with bullets from his revolver. Anyone who couldn‘t keep up was killed with a shot in the neck. Some of the old people were pushed into buses and driven off; these unfortunate ones had no idea where they were going.36 About a pogrom which took place in Kaunas on 25 June 1941 it has been described that ―Women with children on their arms pushed their way to the front rows while laughter and shouts of ‗bravo‘ echoed to the sound of the iron rods an d wooden clubs used to be at the Jews to death. At intervals one of the killers struck up the national anthem on
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his accordion, adding to the festive mood of the day‖. 37 Sexual atrocities were also being perpetrated against women. The above testimonies establish that local collaborators were mostly brutal and actively participated. However, there were also isolated incidents that local people saved Jews. The dominant view is local collaboration was through conscription and voluntary participation. In most cases the local people were indifferent and even the intelligentsia kept their silence proba bly out of fear. As Karen Sutton observes, local colla boration with Germany in the Holocaust ―was not a spontaneous response to something that had happened in a short time earlier. It had a history of its own, the result of deeply rooted sentiments that stemmed from the teachings of the Church,
modern
nationalism,
and
political
and
socio-economic
conditions‖.38 After the war Baltic Nazi collaborators were granted permission to immigration to America because Nuremburg Tribunal and the US High Commission in Germany defined the members of Baltic Legion as freedom fighters protecting their homeland from Soviet communist invasion and was not members of criminal Waffen SS. Baltic Nazi collaborators from Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia managed to flee to America after the war as they received a special treatment from the US Displaced Persons Commission (DPC). The Baltic legions were given permission to be immigrants in US and considered that they hadn‘t done anything harmful to US interests. The Jewish protests that the US ruling in favour of Baltic legions was anti -Semitic remained unheard although DPC C ommissioner Harry N. Rosenfield opposed through dissenting vote.39 The Holocaust was largely ignored when the Baltic states were incorporated into Soviet Union after the World War II. The Holocaust history remained unknown and unaddressed during Soviet period. However, many years of Holocaust research established today in detail that the DPC‘s ruling about Baltic legions was wrong. After the Baltic states regained independence they started dealing with the Holocaust issue. Consequent upon such reductive approach and policies of
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respective governments towards Jews, anti -Semitism is reviving in Baltic states. Contemporary Holocaust Revisionism and Revival of Anti -Semitism Policies and practices of state reflect Holocaust revisionism in the attempt of highlighting severity of Soviet crime experienced by Baltic nationalities.
Baltic
states in
the
late
1990s
appointed History
Commissions to rewrite history in accordance with its nationalist political agenda an d geopolitical imperative.They came up with new interpretations and new narratives of equality of victimhood un der Germans and Soviets. The new narrative on Holocaust known as ―double genocide‖ has now replaced the Holocaust denial.The transformation and redefining of justice system reflect the nationalistic genocide politics. Baltic
states
updated their
criminal
codes
with
new
provisions
interpreting crime s against humanity and punishment for such crimes. However, the criminal codes of all the three Baltic states simply define genocide as ―broa dly directed against a group of people defined by nationality, ethnic origin, race, religion, social or political beliefs‖.40 The Baltic approach of genocide and the legal framework for prosecuting perpetrators
of crimes
during the
Soviet era is
centred on
its
―applicability of repressive acts committed during Soviet occupation‖ 41 They tried to get legal recognition of the crimes and atrocities committed under the Stalinist Soviet regime as genocide so as to escape Holocaust revisionism. They insisted the European parliament to recognise their demand to include a clause to make illegal the ―condoning, denial or trivialization of crimes against humanity‖ committed under the Stalinist Soviet regime but was rejected by other members. 42 The attempt is to cover both Nazi and S oviet crimes as equal genocide and Holocaust denial in the Criminal Code. Likewise, a bill which provides to impose up to two years‘ imprisonment for anyone who might deny or underestimate Nazi or Soviet genocide was passed by the Lithuanian parliament in June 2010. Dovid Katz explains, if a historian will say ―Soviet crimes in Lithuania
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were horrific but they do not rise to genocide; there was only one genocide here, that perpetrated by the Nazis and their partners,‖ he or she is potentially liable to prosecution. 43 This is a dangerous and undemocratic situation restricting freedom of expression and speec h of a person who refuses to signify the Soviet crimes as genocide and expresses a different opinion. Removal and renovation of monuments by changing original inscriptions is another tactic. The controversy over removal of Bronze soldier victory memorial in Tallinn in 2007 was a provocative incident. Another
provocative
event is
the
opening of Bauska
monument
honouring the Waffen SS legion by Latvian government in September 2012.The monument dedicated to ―Bauska‘s Defenders Against the Second Soviet Occupation‖ has another inscription ―Latvia is for Latvian‖44 which invited criticism of rehabilitation of Nazis. Holocaust education is initiated to teach the Holocaust in a local point of view and minimize it as minor evil. Prague
declaration
of 3 June
2008 is
another important
instrument to defend double genocide and falsify history. The main demands in the declaration include: ―recognize Communism and Nazism as a common legacy‖; ―recognition that many crimes committed in the name of Communism should be assessed as crimes against humanity serving as a warning for future generations, in the same way Nazi crimes were assessed by the Nuremberg Tribunal‖; ―ensuring the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination of victims of all the totalitarian regimes‖; ―a day of remembrance of the victims of both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes‖; and ―a djustment and overhaul of European history textbooks so that children could learn and be warned about Communism and its crimes in the same way as they have been taught to assess the Nazi crimes‖. 45 Dovid Katz points out the five occurrences of the word ―same‖ in the declaration indicative of ―double genocide‖ narrative. Association of Lithuanian Jews in Israel in its protest statement condemned the declaration as it is a symptom of new and dangerous of strain of anti -Semitism.46
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Commemoration events organized by the governments reflect ―double
genocide‖.
For
instance,
Lithuanian
President
Dalia
Grybauskaite when she visited the Holocaust memorial at Paneriai, near Vilnius on 9 May 2015 said, "Having divided Europe for half a century, World War II took dozens of millions lives. It was the great pain of the XX century, giving rise to the Holocaust an d Siberia forced labour camps.‖ 47 She equates the two painful events. But she paid silent tribute and did not say that it was liberated by Soviet Union. Holocaust minimization is the effect of such silence.During Russia‘s commemoration of victory day on 9 May 2015 glorification of Nazism occurred in many places in Europe like Ukraine, Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which is a noticeable fact in terms of nationalist political agenda coupled with rise of anti-Semitism. Several questionable incidents are happening in the Baltic which reveals the glorification of Nazism and revival of hatred towards the Jews. A Latvian nationalist political activist, Janis Iesalneiks, argued for the inclusion of ―intelligent anti -Semitism‖ in public discourse in 2010. 48 Honouring of the Waffen SS in Estonia and Latvia and reburial of the Nazi puppet Prime Minister Juozas Ambrazevicius in Lithuania with full state honours in 2012 are ultranationalist neo-Nazi efforts to rehabilitate Nazism. The ultranationalists want ―Lietuvalietuvams‖ (Lithuania for Lithuanians) despite the pluralism in society.Refusal of Lithuania and EU, US, Ukraine and Canada to support the UN resolution moved by Russia on 21 November 2014 for ―Combating Glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms
of
racism,
racial
discrimination,
xenophobia
and
related
intolerance‖ denotes the western support for glorification of neo-Nazism and Nazi perpetrators and collaborators in some of the new EU members like Ukraine, Baltic states and Polan d. In the press appeared anti-Semitic contents. The main topics of these articles were the collaboration of Jews with the Communists in the Soviet period, Jews tarnishing Latvia‘s good name in the West, and Jewish businessmen striving to control the Latvian economy. 49 In 2004 a
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Lithuanian daily newspaper Respulika published anti -Semitic caricature in the front page depicting a globe and two individuals – one gay and the other a stereotypical crooked nosed Jewish individual –and posing the question: ―who controls the world?‖ 50 A stage musical in October 2014 celebrating the life of a notorious Latvian Nazi mass murderer Herbert Cukurs, ‗Butcher of Riga,‘ is an anti -Semitic expression. An Estonian museum exhibition mocking the Holocaust, using phrases such as genocide is even entertainment, and there was humour in the gas chamber experience, was highly provocative event which created a huge controversy.51 Desecration of museums and vandalism are incidents occurring in the Baltic frequently. Every year on 16 March, the Remembrance day of the Latvian legionnaires, Waffen SS organises march in central Riga. On 16 February on Independence Day neo-Nazis organize march in Lithuania. Street names are there in the capital city for honouring the Nazi collaborators of Holocaust. 52 The governments commemorate the Nazi collaborators. Baltic governments are eager to punish Soviet war criminals but as of n ow they failed to punish Baltic perpetrators of Holocaust. Such double standards demonstrate the moral bankruptcy of Baltic democracies. As Yiddish scholar Dovid Katz points out, ―We have to say that the support of Hitler and rewriting history to turn Hitler into a liberator of this area is not a western value…‖ ―If you‘re repatriating Nazi war criminals to be re -buried and honored as part of national history, that is not behaviour compatible with western ethics and values.‖ 53 In the Baltic states 22,800 Jews were there in 2001. Among those 12,300 were in Latvia, 7,500 in Lithuania and 3,000 in Estonia. At that time around thirty five Jewish organizations were functioning in Baltic states. Those organizations aimed at Jewish education, preservation of Jewish culture and traditions, commemoration of Holocaust, combating anti-Semitism and helping the poor.54 But now how Jewish citizens feel about their safety in the newly independent Baltic states is important. Jewish community expressed fears about their security and safety in these countries. Across the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and
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Estonia, Jewish leaders say their communities are fee ling increasingly uncomforta ble as anti -Semitism once again appears to be increasing. In its report a bout Latvia, The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(EC RI)
observed
increasing
anti -Semitic
discourse,―particularly on the Internet, for instance in the context of commemorations of theSecond World War events and the debate around the issue of the draft law on com pensations for confiscated properties‖ 55 ZviGitelman identifies several tactics being used to down play historical anti -Semitism and Holocaust such as denial or ignoring Holocaust, denial of participation, reinterpretation of colla boration with the Nazis as a national liberation struggle against Soviet communism and diluting the genocide of Jews as just a large scale loss of life. 56 DaunisAuers points out that the incidents of anti -Semitism exist in all three Baltic states; although not severe but at times certain disturbing incidents such as occasional attacks on holocaust memorials and Jewish monuments, anti -Semitic media editorials, etc. occur.57 The US State Department report of 2005 observed manifestations of intolerance, xenophobia, racism and anti -Semitism in three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the form of expressions of incitement of hatred, events of commemorations, incidents of desecration of cemeteries, vandalism, and anti -Semitic graffiti and remarks, sending anonymous anti-Semitic proclamations to state institutions, and so on. 58 Such expressions are basically of the sort of ideologically and politically motivated anti -Semitism favouring historical revisionism rather than the old racial and homophobic kind. But it creates a climate of hate towards and distrust on Jews. Jewish communities respon ded an d criticised government policies for the
failure
of governments to confront the
bloody Holocaust
history.Prague declaration invited worldwide criticism and even members of European parliaments criticised it. Jewish organizations in Baltic states and Israel sent protest notes. A Seventy Years Declaration ―that recognises the unique dimensions of Nazism and the Holocaust‖ is propose d.59 A conference on Holocaust debates held in Vilnius University
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in April 2015 organized by RūtaVanagaitė calls for an honest debate on all sides of the history. Conclusion In the modern Jewish history Holocaust remains as the most significant event and one of the most brutal genocides humanity has ever known. Baltic states experienced the crimes against humanity under Nazi German
and
Soviet
occupationsduring
World
War
II.
Although
approximately six million Jews in Europe were murdered by the Nazis, Baltic countries were the only place in Europe where 90-95 percent of the Jews were exterminated. Mass murder in such a large scale happened due to the active local colla boration with the Na zis. Today, nation building politics in Baltic states is to depict the three nations as complete ―victims‖ of S oviet occupation by a dopting two genocide theory in order to whitewash the dark spot in their history. TheHolocaust revisionism remains at the ce ntre of politics as a contested issue related to the larger issues of identity and minorities with internal and external dimensions.The narrative of blaming Russia and her President Vladimir Putin as responsible for the Baltic vulnerability due to which they are forced to depend on NATO, US an d EU for security guaranteeis part of ―return to Europe/west‖identity politics.The current anti -Russian stance seems to have its roots in Hitler‘s conspiracy against the Jews for Bolshevism.
The
on-going
government
sponsored
projects
of
minimization of Holocaust and glorification of Nazi collaborators revived anti-Semitism in Baltic states. Nation building by simultaneously following two irreconcilable political goals of sympathising with both victims and perpetrators for historical reasons contradict with their claim of orientation to principles and norms of western democracy. In the para doxical attempts to hide their own crimes by using Soviet crimes as an excuse for Holocaust falsification or ultra -nationalism calls i nto question the evolving democratic system in the 21st century Baltic states.
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Notes 1. It was Napoleon Bonaparte who named Vilnius the Jerusalem of the North. Vilnius was probably the first and only ―Jewish city‖ Napoleon would ever see where a rich Jewish culture and traditions flourished. Therefore, ―Napoleon named Vilnius ‗Jerusalem of the North‘‖, Vilnews: The Voice of International Lithuania, 9 January 2011, accessed from http://vilnews.com/2011-01napoleon-named-vilnius-%E2%80%98jerusalem-of-the-north%E2%80%99. The existence of mythical Yddishland emerged under the influence of Jewish language, Yiddish. There was a proverb about Yiddishland, ―Tο earn a li ving, gοtο Lodz, Warsaw, or Odessa, but to gain wisdom, gο to Vilnius.‖ For details see Leva, ―Vilnius: Jerusalem of the North – The Center of Litvak Culture, Religion and Art‖, Litvakes, 4 April 2011, accessed from http://litvaks -lithuanianjewish.com/vilnius-jerusalem-of-the-north/. 2. Denis MacShane, Globalizing Weidenfeld& Nicolson, 2008)
Hatred: The New Antisemitis m (London:
3. Steven Beller, A Short Introduction to Anti-Semitis m (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 119. 4. Denis MacShane, op cit. 5. Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ―Introduction‖, in Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed., Resurgent Antisemitis m: Global Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 1-7, p. 2. 6. European Forum on Antisemitism, ―Working Definition of Antisemitism‖, 2012, accessed from http://www.european-forum-on-antisemitism.org/workingdefinition-of-antisemitism/english/. This definition has been removed from the EU website later on. 7. Office Of The UN Special Adviser On The Prevention Of Genocide (OSAPG), ―OSAPG Analysis of Framework of Legal Definition of Genocide‖, accessed from http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_analysis_framework. pdf 8. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, ―Introduction to Holocaust‖, The Holoc aust Encyclopaedia, 20 June 2014, accessed from http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005143 9. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ―A Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and Distortion‖, 23 Oct 2013, accessed from http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/AntiSemitism/Pages/Working-Definitionof-Holocaust-Denial-and-Distortion.aspx 10.Ibid. 11. Dovid Katz, ―On Three Definitions: Genocide; Holocaust Denial; Holocaust Obfuscation‖, in Leonid Donskis, ed., The Litmus Test Case of Modernity: Examining Modern Sensibilities and the Public Domain in B altic States at the Turn of the Century (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2009), pp. 259-278, p. 272. 12. Quoted in Amy Shannon Liedy, ―Holocaust Revisionism, Ultranationalism, and the Nazi/Soviet "Double Genocide" Debate in Eastern Europe‖, 7 March
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2011, accessed from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/holocaust-revisionismultranationalism-and-the-nazisoviet-double-genocide-debate-eastern. 13. EfraimZuroff, ―Eastern Europe: Antisemitism in the Wake of HolocaustRelated Issues‖, Jewish Politic al Studies Review,vol. 17, nos. 1-2, Spring 2005, pp. 63-79. 14.Dov Levin, TheLitvaks: A Short History of Jews in Lithuania (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000). 15. Masha Greenbaum, The Jews of Lithuania: A History of a Remarkable Community, 1316-1945 (Jerusalem: Gefen publishing House Ltd, 1995), p. 2. 16. The Pale of Settlement was the Western region of Imperial Russia to which Jews were restricted by the Tsarist Ukase of 1792. It consisted of the territ ories of former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, annexed with the existing numerous Jewish population, and the Crimea (which was later cut out from the Pale). 17. Eugenia Gurin-Loov and GennadiGarmberg, EestiJuudiKogukond (Jewish Community of Estonia), (Tallin: 2001), p. 9, accessed from http://eja.pri.ee/Community/Community_eng.pdf. 18. Anton Weiss-Wendt, ―Thanks to the Germans! Jewish cultural autonomy in interwar Estonia‖, East European Jewish Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1, April 2008, 89104, p. 90. 19. Eugenia Gurin-Loov and GennadiGarmberg, EestiJuudiKogukond (Jewish Community of Estonia), (Tallin: 2001), accessed from http://eja.pri.ee/Community/Community_eng.pdf. 20. Max M. Laserson, ―The Jewish Minorities in the Baltic Countries‖, Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jul., 1941), pp. 273-284, p. 275. 21. Bernhard Press, The Murder of the Jews in Latvia, 1941-1945 (translated from German by Laimdota Mazzarins) (Illinois: North Western University Press, 2000), p. ix. 22. Max M. Laserson, op cit. 23. Karen Sutton, The Massacre of Jews of Lithuania (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2008) 24. Max M. Laserson, op cit. 25. Quoted in Sutton op cit. 26. Ibid. 27. Quoted in Zvi Gitelman, ―Comparative and Competitive Victimization in the Post-Communist Sphere‖, in in Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed., Resurgent Antisemitis m: GlobalPerspectives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 215-235, p. 218. 28. Max M. Laserson, op cit., p. 282
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29. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, ―Holocaust Encyclopaedia: Jewish Population of Europe In 1933: Population Data By Country‖, 20 June 2014, accessed from http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005161 30. ZviSegel, ―Jewish Minorities in the Baltic Republics in the Interwar years‖, Journal of B altic Studies,Vol. 19, Issue 1, 1988, pp. 60-66, p. 60. 31. Yitzhak Arad, ―The Murder of the Jews in German-Occupied Lithuania (1941– 1944)‖, in AlvydasNikzentaitis, Stefan Schreiner and Darius Staliunas eds., The Vanished World of Lithuanian Jews (Amsterdam: Radopi B. V., 2004), p. 175. 32. LeniYahil, The Holoc aust: The Fate European Jewry, 1932-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 256. 33. Richard Rushke, Useful Enemies: John Demjanjuk and Americ a‟s Open Door Policy for Nazi War Criminals (New York: Delphium Books, 2013) 34. Ibid 35. Bernhard Press,op. cit., p. xi. 36. Ibid, p. 103. 37. Anton-Weiss Went, ―Why the Holocaust Does not Matter to Estonians‖, in Marko Lehti and JorgHackmann eds., Contested and Shared Pl aces of Memory: History and Politics in the Northern Europe (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). 38. Karen Sutton, The Massacre of Jews in Lithuania (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House Ltd., 2008). 39. Richard Rushke, op cit. 40. Eva-Clarita Pettai and VelloPettai, Transitional and Retrospective Justic e in Baltic States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 79 41. Ibid, p. 80 42. TalisSaule Archdeacon, ―European Parliament passes genocide law, rejects Baltic demands‖, The Baltic Times, 25 April 2007, accessed from http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/17737/ 43. Dovid Katz, ―Why Red is not Brown in the Baltics‖, The Guardian, 30 September 2010, accessed from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/30/balticnazi-soviet-snyder. 44. ―Latvia unveils monument to Nazi butchers‖, Pravd a, 18 September 2012, accessed from http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/18-09-2012/122194latvia_waffen_ss_monument-0/ 45. Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, ―Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism‖, 3 June 2008, Prague, accessed from http://www.praguedeclaration.eu/
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46. Dovid Katz, op. cit. 47. ―Lithuanian president pays tribute to WWII victims‖ Delfi (Vilnius), 8 May 2015, accessed from http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/societ y/lithuanian-presidentpays-tribute-to-wwii-victims.d?id=67920764 48.DaunisAuers, Comparative Politics and Government of the B altic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st Century (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 49. Paul Alster, ―Jews in Baltics fear creep of anti-Semitism‖, Fox News, March 12, 2015, accessed from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/03/12/jews -inbaltics-fear-creep-anti-semitism/ 50. DaunisAuers, op. cit. 51. Paul Alster, op. cit. 52. ―Vilnius Street Name Proposed for Rescuer Out in Boondocks; But Please Remove Nazi Collaborators from City Center!‖,Defending History, 6 March 2013, accessed fromhttp://defendinghistory.com/vilnius -street-name-proposed-forrescuer-please-removecollaborators-street-names/50532 53. Paul Alster, op. cit. 54. Dina Porat and RoniStauber eds., Antisemitis mWorldwide, 2000/1, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). 55. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI Report on Latvia, 21 February 2012, accessed from https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Latvia/LVACbC-IV-2012-003- ENG.pdf. 56. ZviGitelman, ―Comparative and Competitive Victimization in the Post Communist Sphere‖, in Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed., Resurgent Antisemitis m: Global Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 215-235, p. 225 Seventy Years Declaration of 2012. 57. Daunis Auers, op. cit., p. 152. 58. US State Department, Report on Global Anti-Semitis m, 5 January 2005, accessed from http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/40258.htm 59. ―The Seventy Years Declaration: Defending Truth in History‖, accessed from http://www.seventyyearsdeclaration.org/ *******
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(3) The Israeli Defense Industry: Its Far-Reaching Threat and Impact Dr. Richard Rousseau American University of Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates (Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor at the American University of Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. Dr. Rousseau‘s more than 800 books, book chapters, academic, scholarly, analytical and opinion articles on various topics in world politics have appeared in numerous publications, including The Jamestown Found ation (Washington, D.C.), Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century (Canada), Foreign Policy In Focus(Washington, D.C.), Open Democracy (UK), Harvard International Review, Diplomatic Courier (Washington, C.D.),Foreign Policy Journal (U.S.), Europe‟s World (Brussels), Political Reflection Mag azine (London), Center for Security Studies (CSS, Zurich), Eurasia Review, Global Asia (South Korea), The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, Journal of Turkish Weekly (Ankara), The Georgian Times (Tbilisi), among others. His research, teaching and consulting interests include Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics, international political economy and globalization.)
Abstract:
In 2007, Israeli arms transfers accounted for 10% of the total world arms exports. In the last ten years Israeli arms producers have been able to compete with some of the largest exporters in the world and to remain among the top ten major world‘s producers. Israel‘s defense factories produce the full range of military products and are leading the way in terms of technologi cal and efficiency development. This article aims to clarify certain aspects of the Israeli arms and security industry and draw attention to the multiple links between the Israeli ―military-industrial complex‖ and foreign states and private companies.
____ For over 60 years, Israel has been at the forefront of the major armed conflicts in the Middle East, a region riven by serious disputes which have had a significant negative impact on regional and global stability. It has therefore evolved into one of the most militarized countries in the world and one of the leading developers and producers of highly sophisticated military and security technologies. This activity consumes vast quantities of the national budget but is also a continual source of profit, as knowledge and ready to use military hardware are major Israeli exports. The permanent state of war with Israel, the occupation of both Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights, which is nominally part of Syria, the expulsion of the Palestinian population and its monitoring in its walled ―ghettos‖, the ―administration‖ of continually growing numbers of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, the maintenance of hundreds of security checkpoints, the ever-intensive border surveillance; all this ensure that Israeli policy is now, an d will remain, focused on expan ding military research and defense industries.
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Israel‘s policy of expansion, aggressive engagement, expulsion and oppression, pursued for decades, violate fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law. According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Israel has committed several war crimes and crimes against humanity. Most governments and international bodies either accept this situation as a matter of fact but sit idly by without lifting a finger or merely make formal statements following Israeli attacks or the illegal expansion of Jewish colonies in the occupie d terrorises. One reason for this inaction is that many states are keen to buy the latest weapons and security systems produce d by Israel. Therefore, in a sense, these buyers can be viewed as complicit in the Israeli policy of repression, and violate thei r own internal laws. States‘ foreign policy is usually based on pragmatic considerations. They place national interests and cynical calculations above moral issues, as these would constantly hinder their normal diplomatic and military activities. In a time of huge migration flows and potential social unrest, Israel has developed extensive expertise in controlling and manipulating foreign governments and both domestic and foreign public opinion. Also, no other country can offer the market more sophisticated and tested weapons and security systems, particularly those specially ada pted for asymmetric warfare, and Israel exploits this situation to the full. The Palestinian population serves more and more as guinea pigs on which military weapons and human behaviour are tested in actual war conditions. The occupied territories have effectively become laboratories to study the efficiency of weapons, various means of exerting power and control over a population, an d the most effective strategies against uprisings. All these things can be profitably exported. This article aims to clarify certain aspects of the Israeli arms and security industry and draw attention to the multiple links between the Israeli ―military-industrial complex‖ and foreign states and private companies. The Israeli Defense Economy The foundations of the Israeli security industry existed before the birth of the State of Israel in May, 1948. Israel Military Industries (IMI) was established in 1933 to produced small-caliber ammunition for the illegal Israeli militia fighting for a Jewish homeland. 2 It still operates under the same name, but has now evolved into one of the largest weapons firms in the world. Between 1933 and today a pproximately 450 aerospace and security industry-related factori es have been established in Israel. At the moment, more than 150 of these are still active. 3 In 2011, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated Israel‘s arms deals with foreign countries to be worth $11 billion in sales.4 According to the Israeli Defense Ministry‘s own
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data, deals worth a total of $6.5 billion were signed in 2013, an d deals worth $5.66 billion in 2014.5 Israel‘s defense factories produce the full range of military products: ammunition, anti -tank grenades, rockets launchers, shells, cluster bom bs, launch vehicles, missiles for light arms, artillery pieces, shells, armoured vehicles, planes, submarine -based rocket launchers, robotic vehicles, drones, radars, simulators, surveillance satellites, etc. The largest state -owned security firms are IMI, as mentioned above, Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd (IAI) and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. (formerly RAFAEL Armament Development Authority). 6 However, it is two private companies that dominate the sector: Elbit Systems Ltd. an d E.M.I.T. Aviation Consult Ltd. The Israeli defense industry employs a pproximately 50,000 people and commands a large portion of Israel‘s GDP.7 Israel has one of the highest military budgets in the world as a proportion of GDP. According to the World Bank (WB), the Israeli defense budget amounted to 5.8% of GDP in 2013 an d 5.2% in 2014, making it the sixth largest in the world as a proportion of GDP after those of Saudi Arabia (10.8%), the United Ara b Emirates (5.7%), S outh Sudan (8.3%), Oman (11.8%) and Li bya (8.0%). By com parison, military spending accounts for 3.4% of GDP in the U.S. and 2.1% of GDP in the UK. 8
Source: Recent trends in arms transfers, Stockholm International Peace Institue (SIPRI), March 2015. Available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/measuring/recent-trendsin-arms-transfers
Approximately 1.5% of Israel‘s military budget is covered by United States military aid to Israel. The U.S. provi des Israel with approximately $3 billion a year in military aid, which Jerusalem uses to buy U.S.
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weapons, including the Lockheed Martin‘s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and other military hardware . This budget heading includes purely military expenditure: another 12% or so of GDP is spent on internal security, the police and the maintenance and a dministration of prisons. 9 The development of a sophisticated arms industry has inevitably boosted Israeli exports. In 2007, Israeli arms transfers accounted for 10% of the total world arms exports. In the last ten years Israeli arms producers have been able to compete with some of the largest exporters in the world. In 2014, however, Israel fell to tenth place in the world arms exports league, sales having fallen by $1 billion compared to 2013, but it still managed to increase exports of weapons to African countries by 40% in 2014 com pared with the previous year. 10 Arms Exporters Per Capita in the W orld in 2012
Source: GSoA - Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee, Die Schweiz weltweit auf Rang 8 beim Waffenexport, March 18, 2014. http://www.gsoa.ch/themen/kriegsmaterial-exporte/02030/schweiz-weltweittop-8-beim-waffenexport
The Israeli Army as a Tool for Apartheid and C olonialism An important proportion of the Israeli defense arsenal is used against the Palestinian population, for example during Operation Protective Edge, launched by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on 8 July 2014 in response to Hamas rocket attacks and in order to monitor the ―Apartheid Wall‖ (as it is called in the occupied territories), a separation barrier built by Israel along the 1949 Armistice Line in the West Bank, and various checkpoints. If the Jewish state is to maintain its years-old militaristic
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policy, a large defense sector is crucial. In that sense, the daily oppression and continuous eviction of the Palestinian populati on from East Jerusalem and the West Bank, as well as the attacks on the Gaza Strip, provi de a good testing ground for the development of specialized military equipment which is then touted by Israeli defense industries as ―seasoned military hardware‖ on their websites and at international arms fairs.11 Israeli defense industry representatives and salesmen are often former IDF soldiers and officers. It has become customary that after every armed conflict and IDF operation in the Gaza Strip Israel‘s production and export of weapons booms. Israeli arms exports have tripled in the last ten years due to Operation ―Summer Rains‖ in the Gaza Strip, which began on 28 June 2006, Operation ―Hot Winter‖ in February 2008, Operation ―Cast Lead‖ of December 2008, Operation ―Returning Echo‖ of March 2012 an d Operation ‗Protective Edge‖ of July 2014, an d particularly in the global context of the fight against terrorism. The U.S. is always willing to enhance Israel‘s arsenals and add financial resources to Israel‘s military budget after any armed confrontation within its borders. 12 Israel‘s Role in Global Anti-Insurgency It is not only the production and export of weapons that rapi dly increases after every Israeli military operation. The day-to-day occupation of Palestinian territories by the Israeli forces gives the latter the opportunity to develop new ideas and effective tools for superior surveillance and control of people at borders. Interest in such cutting-edge equipment and training methods is growing rapi dly in both developing and developed countries. But this is hardly a new development. According to a recent study con ducte d by the International Jewish Anti -Zionist Network (IJAN), Israel has been exporting these technologies and training methods around the world since the foundation of the Jewish State, thereby supporting repressive regimes and torpedoing many popular liberation movements at the same time.13 A case in point is the participation of Kollmann, a subsidiary of Elbit Systems Ltd., in the construction of the ―Border Fence‖ along the border between the U.S. and Mexico and designed to prevent illegal migration.14 The Israeli defense industry growth over the last six decades has also been driven by the myth that small nations must be able to fight on all fronts to survive. Israel can be viewed as a state -fortress, one which isolates itself from the rest of the world an d is hostile to external influences. Israeli academics even claim that Israel is not a state with an army but an army with a state. Sir Thomas Rapp, head of the British Middle East Office in Cairo in the 1950s and a dvisor to the British government for the establishment of di plomatic relations with Israel, cautioned his superiors in London a bout Israel‘s future military trajectory even then: ―The younger generation is being brought up in an environment of militarism, and thus a permanent threat to the Middle
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East tranquillity is thereby being created and Israel would thus tend to move away from the democratic way of life towards totalitarianism of the right or the left‖.15 Involvement of Israeli Universities Israeli defense companies are not the only participants in the armament sector. They enjoy intensive cooperation with state institutions, including the Army, the secret services, universities, private companies, global Zionist organizations and international banks. Technion (the Israel Institute of Technology, the oldest public research university located in Haifa and established in 1912) has done extensive work to help modify the Caterpillar D-9 bulldozer (originally introduced by Caterpillar Inc. in 1954 and known now in Israel as Armored CAT D9) to enable the Israeli military to destroy Palestinian homes and withstand heavy attacks in hostile environments. The university has also signed a cooperation agreement with the state -controlled Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. Furthermore, IDF reservists are given specific advantages during their university studies. Masters students who ch ose military topics (which are particularly encouraged) for their dissertations are granted generous financial scholarships, which are the product of cooperation with IAI and Elbit Systems Ltd. Technion graduates frequently hold, one after the other, important positions in the defense companie s, the government, the administration, the army and the universities. 16 All Israeli research universities and institutes are linked in one way or another to the arms and security industry. One could argue that they are accomplices in, or even instigators of, the violence committed against the Palestinian population. They provide – in awareness of the harm done – research findings, technology, arguments and managers. International Cooperation Although Israel manages to cover most of its military equipmen t needs thanks to its huge arms and defense industry, it also depends heavily on financial contributions from abroa d, particularly from that of the United States. These funds are primarily provided in the form of military aid. 17 According to a Congressional Research Service report, in 2007 the Bush Administration and the Israeli government announced the signing of a 10-year, $30 billion military aid package for the period 2009 -2018. In 2012, un der the Obama Administration, the U.S. slightly upgrade d this from aroun d $3 billion to 3.1 billion a year (an average of $8.5 million a day). Washington also contributed $504 million to the joint U.S.-Israel Missile Defense Program in 2014. 18 The end result is that Israel ―has been the largest annual recipient of dire ct U.S. economic and military assistance since 1976 and the largest total recipient since World War ll‖.19 The 2014 Congressional Research Service report put the cumulative
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U.S. aid to Israel between 1949 and 2014 at $121 billion. This aid is a determining factor in the success of the Israeli defense industry. 20 The European Union (EU) also plays a key role in supporting Israel‘s arms exports. For example, EU members exported weapons an d military equipment worth $677 million to Israel in 2012. Israel is also one of the most important beneficiaries of the EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (RTD); it received $58 million under this program between 2007 and 2013. 21 Under the pretext of the ―fight against terrorism‖, the EU also decided in 2007 that Israeli companies could a pply for EU-fun ded research grants within the framework of RTD. Israeli private companies and academic and government institutions are currently involved in at least 10 of the first 45 of the projects described by the EU as ―research on security issues‖. Those involved include Motorola Solutions Israel, a full subsi diary of the giant electronics and telecommunication corporation Motorola Solutions, which is working on a surveillance program for military purposes, IAI, Aeronautics Defense Systems (which specialized in the manufacture of Unmanned Aerial Systems) and Elbit Systems Ltd., which is engaged in a project to develop a high performance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).22 In addition, various military research programs funde d by RTD are being implemented in partnershi p with Israeli universities, such as the above mentioned Technion. A central focus of future RTD research programs is the ―security industry‖. However, to participate in them Israel resigned itself to accepting the new EU rules for the allocation of fun ds – adopted in the summer of 2013 – which in principle exclude all organisations and institutions which share in the occupation of a foreign territory. Roboti cs and Dehumanization Israel, like the United States, is recognized by com petitors as a leader in the development of robotic, semi -autonomous or remote -controlled air, land an d sea-going vehicles.23 For instance, Switzerland, which would also benefit from the knowledge gained on Israeli battlefields, plans to purchase drones designed and produced in Israel. The purchase of these devices does not only aim to increase Switzerland‘s security against external threats, the argument given to the public; it also intends to monitor the local population in public places and during major events and meetings.24 For n ow, robotic vehicles and drones are still human -controlled devices, but some automated and com puterized machines are already being used for border surveillance, monitoring and protection and combating illegal migration, criminal activity and internal and external enemies. Israel is already engaged in a number of research projects that go further and aim to manufacture a ―killer robot‖, that is, an autonomous, unmanned armoured car that can carry cameras, electronic sensors and weapons
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and be operated by a pilot sitting in a distant command center.25 The Guardium, as it is called, underwent a baptism of fire in November 2012 when it made its debut patrolling the Gaza borders. 26 It is a precursor of fully auton omous weapons which, if deployed, ―would be a ble to select and fire on targets without meaningful human involvement‖. 27 That is why Human Rights Watch and other prominent Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) launched the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which aims to ―pre -emptively ban fully autonomous weapons‖28 , in April 2013. The United Nations (UN) put the issue of the use of drones and autonomous weapons, which should occur un der the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), on its agenda as far back as 2003. The Israeli Nuclear Program and the Use of Illegal W eapons Although it is officially neither confirmed nor denied, the international community estimates that Israel, in addition to its conventional weapons, illegally possesses up to 400 nuclear warheads, making it the only nuclear power in the Middle East. Israel has not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is therefore under no obligation to place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and let IAEA inspectors into its military sites.29 France was the first country to share in the illicit development of Israel‘s nuclear weapons, but in 2014 Germany delivered Dolphin-class diesel-electric submarines (six in total in the last fifteen years), believed to be nuclear armed, to Israel.30 The UN and most world governments tacitly condone Israel‘s undeclared nuclear arsenal. However, in December 2012, the UN General Assembly urged Israel to make public its nuclear program and sign the NPT. Responsibility of the International Community Given the magnitude and number of Israel‘s violations of international law, it is more than surprising to see that governments, who are signatories and depositories of the Geneva Conventions, who have a particular responsibility to monitor compliance with these conv entions, have highlighted very few of these. Similarly, anti -militarist and pacifist organizations have brought also very few to public attention. However, many countries and human rights organizations have put some pressure on Israel to change its behavi our. For example, Amnesty International called on the UN to impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Israel in the wake of the 2008-2009 attack on the Gaza Strip. Also, Norway has imposed a ban on arms trade with Israel; the Belgian government has suspended arms shipments to Israel; Britain has revoked or suspended the arms exports licences of many British arms exporters; and Ireland has cancelled a contract to deliver ten million rifle bullets to Israel.31The international boycott, divestment and sanctions campaign against Israel initiated and led by Palestinian organizations is demanding that stronger measures, in effect a comprehensive and effective arms embargo, are taken.
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As a result of an aggressive business strategy and acumen, its powerful Diaspora and its ability to circumvent many of diplomatic and commercial rules, the Israeli defense industry‘s international stature and prestige is outstanding. This is especially true among low and high income countries. But at the same time Israeli defen se companies and the Jewish State retain overall control of their vast interests and business activities. They usually keep a low profile. Israelis are discrete in their dealings in the arms market and on their network of clients. References Advancing The Debate On Killer Robots: 12 Key Arguments For A Preemptive Ban On Fully Autonomous Weapons. (2014). International Human Rights Clinic. (May, 2014). Available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Advancing%20the%20 Debate_8May2014_Final.pdf Ben-David, Alon, (2009). Israel seeks sixth Dolphin in light of Iranian 'threat'. Intelligence and Insight. (October 1, 2009). Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20091003120045/http://www.janes.com/news/d efense/jdw/jdw091001_1_n.shtml Brooks, James, (2004), Dispersing Demonstrations – Or Chemical Warfare? The Electronic Intifada. (July 12, 2004). Available at: http://electronicintifada.net/content/dispersing-demonstrationsor-chemicalwarfare/5152 COAT (Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade, Canada), (2012), State -owned Israeli War Industries. Press for Conversion. Issue 66. (Spring 2012). Available at: http://coat.ncf.ca/P4C/66/state -owned.pdf Coy, Peter, (2012), Behind the Iron Dome: How Israel Stops Missiles. Bloomberg. (November 21, 2012). Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-11-21/how-to-stop-missiles-thecompany-behind-israels-iron-dome European Arms Export to the Middle East Reaches Record High (2014). Flemish Peace Institute. (January 21, 2014). Available at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/press/european-arms-export-middle-eastreaches-record-high Even, Shmuel, (2011), Israel's National Security Economy: Defense and Social Challenges. Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Tel Aviv, Israel. Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=134051 Feldman, Yotam, (2012), Israels Waffen für die Welt Zeit Online. (Dezember 12, 2012). Available at: http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2012-12/israelwaffengeschaefte-gaza Feldman, Yotam, (2013), Wars on Gaza have become part of Israels system of governance. An interview with filmmaker Yotam Feldman. +972 Blog. ( May 22,
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2013). Available at: http://972mag.com/wars-on-gaza-have-become-part-ofisraelssystem-of-governance-an-interview-with-filmmaker-yotamfeldman/71957/ Germany Sells Israel Dolphin-II Subs, (2014), Defense Industry daily.(September 2). Gordon, Neve, (2009), The Political Economy of Israel‘s Homeland Security/Surveillance Industry. Working Paper. Ben-Gurion University. (April 28, 2009). Available at: http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/The%20Political%20Economy%20 of%20Israel%E2%80%99s%20Homeland%20Security.pdf Is Israel's Iron Dome the precursor to futuristic 'killer robots'? (2015). The Jerusalem Post. (September 4, 2015). Available at: http://www.jpost.com/IsraelNews/Is-Israels-Iron-Dome-the-precursor-to-futuristic-killer-robots-396680 Israel‘s Now One of Top Arms Exporters, (2012). UPI. (September 18). Israel‘s Worldwide Role in Repression. International Jewish Anti -Zionist Network, (IJAN). (2012). Available at: http://www.ipk-bonn.de/downloads/israelsworldwide-role-in-repression.pdf Johnson, Jimmy, (2013), Israeli firm helps NSA spy on Americans and Mexicans. The Electronic Intifada. (June 15, 2013). Available at: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/jimmy-johnson/israeli-firm-helps-nsa-spyamericans-and-mexicans Key Roles. (2014). International Atomic Energy Agency. (October 14, 2014). Available at: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/npt/key-roles Killer Robots. (2010). Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/killer-robots Korge, Johannes, (2013), Waffen für Israel und Saudis: USA planen riesigen Rüstungsdeal im Nahen Osten. Der Spiegel. (April 19, 2013). Avail able at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/israel-und-saudis-usa-planengewaltigen-ruestungsdeal-im-nahen-osten-a-895360.html Mearsheimer, J., J., & Walt, M., S., (2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. (1st ed.). Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign. Boycott Elbit Systems. (2009). Available at: http://stopthewall.org/ Pappe, Ilan, (2009), Disarm Israel. The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel. (28 July, 2009). Available at: http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1059&key=armament Peled, Dan, (2001), Defense R&D and Economic Growth in Israel: A Research Agenda. Samuel Neaman Institute. (March 2001). Available at: http://econ.haifa.ac.il/~dpeled/papers/ste -wp4.pdf Recent trends in arms transfers, Stockholm International Peace Institue (SIPRI), March 2015. Available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/measuring/recent-trendsin-arms-transfers
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Ruebner, Josh (2011), US Weapons to Israel Are Disincentives to Peace. Palestinian Chronicle. (April 22, 2011). Available at: http://palestinechronicle.com/us -weapons-to-israel-are-disincentives-topeace/#.UX7QDErO98E Sharp, Jeremy M., (2014), U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, Congressional Research Service‘s. (April). Weapons Industry Exports Up 40% In 2014 Compared to 2013, But Sales Worldwide Drop by Nearly $1 Billion. (2015). Times of Israel, May 24. Available at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arms-sales-to-africa-mark-steep-rise-inpast-year/ End notes : 1. Feldman, Yotam, (2013), Wars on Gaza have become part of Israel‘s system of governance. An interview with filmmaker Yotam Feldman. +972 Blog. (May 22, 2013). Available at: http://972mag.com/wars-on-gazahave-become-part-of-israelssystem-of-governance-an-interview-withfilmmaker-yotamfeldman/71957/ 2. Peled, Dan, (2001), Defense R&D and Economic Growth in Israel: A Research Agenda. Samuel Neaman Institute. (March 2001). Available at: http://econ.haifa.ac.il/~dpeled/papers/ste -wp4.pdf 3. Even, Shmuel, (2011), Israel's National Security Economy: Defense and Social Challenges. Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Tel Aviv, Israel. Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=134051 4. Recent trends in arms transfers, Stockholm International Peace Institue (SIPRI), March 2015. Available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/measuring/recent -trends-in-arms-transfers 5. Weapons Industry Exports Up 40% In 2014 Compared to 2013, But Sales Worldwide Drop by Nearly $1 Billion. (2015). Times of Israel, May 24. Available at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arms-sales-toafrica-mark-steep-rise-in-past-year/ 6. Coy, Peter, (2012), Behind the Iron Dome: How Israel Stops Missiles. Bloomberg. (November 21, 2012). Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-11-21/how-to-stopmissiles-the-company-behind-israels-iron-dome 7. COAT (Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade, Canada), (2012), State owned Israeli War Industries. Press for Conversion. Issue 66. (Spring 2012). Available at: http://coat.ncf.ca/P4C/66/state -owned.pdf 8. Op. cit., Weapons Industry Exports Up 40%... 9. Op. cit., COAT (Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade, Canada), (2012), State-owned Israeli War... 10. Op. cit., Weapons Industry Exports Up 40%... 11. Brooks, James, (2004), Dispersing Demonstrations – Or Chemical Warfare? The Electronic Intifada. (July 12, 2004). Available at: http://electronicintifada.net/content/dispersing-demonstrationsorchemical-warfare/5152 12. European Arms Export to the Middle East Reaches Record High (2014). Flemish Peace Institute. (January 21, 2014). Available at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/press/european-arms-exportmiddle-east-reaches-record-high
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13. Israel‘s Worldwide Role in Repression. International Jewish Anti -Zionist Network, (IJAN). (2012). Available at: http://www.ipkbonn.de/downloads/israels-worldwide-role-in-repression.pdf 14. Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign. Boycott Elbit Systems. (2009). Available at: http://stopthewall.org/ 15. Pappe, Ilan, (2009), Disarm Israel. The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel. (28 July, 2009). Available at: http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1059&ke y=armament 16. Gordon, Neve, (2009), The Political Economy of Israel‘s Homeland Security/Surveillance Industry. Working Paper. Ben-Gurion University. (April 28, 2009). Available at: http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/The%20Political%20Econ omy%20of%20Israel%E2%80%99s%20Homeland%20Security.pdf 17. Korge, Johannes, (2013), Waffen für Israel und Saudis: USA planen riesigen Rüstungsdeal im Nahen Osten. Der Spiegel. (April 19, 2013). Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/israel-und-saudisusa-planen-gewaltigen-ruestungsdeal-im-nahen-osten-a-895360.html 18. Sharp, Jeremy M., (2014), U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, Congressional Research Service‘s. (April). 19. Mearsheimer, J., J., & Walt, M., S., (2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. (1st ed.). Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 20. See Johnson, Jimmy, (2013), Israeli firm helps NSA spy on Americans and Mexicans. The Electronic Intifada. (June 15, 2013). Available at: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/jimmy-johnson/israeli-firm-helpsnsa-spy-americans-and-mexicans 21. Op. cit., European Arms Export to the Middle East Reaches Record... 22. Op. cit., Gordon, Neve, (2009), The Political Economy of Israel‘s... p. 10. 23. Killer Robots. (2010). Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/killer-robots 24. Feldman, Yotam, (2012), Israels Waffen für die Welt Zeit Online. (Dezember 12, 2012). Available at: http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/201212/israel-waffengeschaefte-gaza 25. Advancing The Debate On Killer Robots: 12 Key Arguments For A Preemptive Ban On Fully Autonomous Weapons. (2014). International Human Rights Clinic. (May, 2014). Available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Advancing%20 the%20Debate_8May2014_Final.pdf 26. Is Israel's Iron Dome the precursor to futuristic 'killer robots'? (2015). The Jerusalem Post. (September 4, 2015). Available at: http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Is-Israels-Iron-Dome-the-precursorto-futuristic-killer-robots-396680 27. Op. Cit., Advancing The Debate On Killer Robots: 12 Key... p. 22. 28. Op. cit., Killer Robots... p. 14. 29. Key Roles. (2014). International Atomic Energy Agency. (October 14, 2014). Available at: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/npt/key-roles 30. Ben-David, Alon, (2009). Israel seeks sixth Dolphin in light of Iranian 'threat'. Jane‘s, Intelligence and Insight. (October 1, 2009). Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20091003120045/http://www.janes.com/ news/defense/jdw/jdw091001_1_n.shtml ; Germany Sells Israel Dolphin-II Subs, (2014), Defense Industry daily. (September 2). 31. Ruebner, Josh (2011), US Weapons to Israel Are Disincentives to Peace. Palestinian Chronicle. (April 22, 2011). Available at: http://palestinechronicle.com/us-weapons-to-israel-are-disincentivesto-peace/#.UX7QDErO98E
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(4)The Bilateral Relations of ISRAEL AND RUSSIA in the conditions of modern geopolitical processes Dr.Rzayeva Nigar Researcher at Chair of International Policy and Foreign Policy,
University of Cologne, Germany
Deputy Head of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Department at the faculty of International Relations and Region Studies
Baku Slavic University, Azerbaijan
EDUCATION: Master in Specialist for the regions of Russian Federation. The translator on the Sphere of professional communication on the specialty of the ―Region studies‖: Volgograd State University, Russian Federation PhD Program in International Relations (5901.01): Baku Slavic University, Azerbaijan WORK EXPERIENCE: October 2014 – Present (DAAD Scholarship) Research Fellow at Chair of International Policy and Foreign Policy, Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences: University of Cologne, Germany May 2007 – Present Lector and Deputy Head of the ―Diplomacy and Foreign Policy‖ at Chair of International Relations and Region studies faculty: Baku Slavic University. Baku, Azerbaijan January 2015 – Present Reviewer: Academic Star Publishing Company, New York
Abstract The Middle East always was an d remains the region where interests of the leading countries of the world are boun d. In foreign policy of Russia the Middle Eastern direction is priority, and Israel takes a key position here. Petroleum politics have been an increasingly important aspect of di plomacy since the rise of the petroleum industry in the Middle East in the early 20th century. However, the following doesn't raise doubts that fight for energy resources and influence in the world oil market will precede further, changing balance of forces and geopolitical situation in the world. Introdu ction The Russian-Israel relations (including the Soviet period) had hardly longer history, than these relations. The course of events has longer chronology, than events themselves since diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, were Severance twice in 1953 and 1967. Despite the "hard" past and "offenses", which are held still by Israel, today it is the state having the powerful military potential, technologies and the weapon. Since XX century the bilateral relations of Israel and Russia had confrontational character, and since 1967 it was the period of "the frozen
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relations", which lasted 24 years. Only on October 18, 1991, during visit of the last Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Boris Pankov di plomatic relations between the countries were restored. Dynamically, the relations began to develop after visit of the president of the Russian Federation V. Putin to Israel on April 28, 2005. That gave a new impulse to the bilateral relations. Political dialogue and development of cultural and economic relations between countries is conducte d in recent years. Disintegration (breakup) of bipolar system and establishment of a "New world order" changed a geopolitical situation in the world in the root. With the advent of new "strong players" on the political map of the world changes a certain balance of distribution of forces, which definitely reforms the international relations. Some researchers believe that Israel and Russia are pulled together by "the offe nse for the past" on the world community, and a factor of their "underestimation" as strong players sometimes leads leaders of the countries to sharp political actions. I am partially discordant with this point of view since when speaking about the past of Russia we mean the colonial country, imperial Russia and the former USSR. This shows its role and influence in the history of the international relations. In recent years political dialogue between Israel and Russia became more active promoted by following reasons: • Residence of "the former citizens of USSR" in Israel and "the Jewish community" in Russia; • Creation of the alternative union in order to preserve certain balance of forces and to prevent USA dominance in the region; • A modern situation in the Middle East an d the amplifying role of the Arab countries, and, first of all, Saudi Arabia. By results of the last census of a populace of the Russian Federation, about 230.000 Jews live on the territory of Russia. 1 At the same time, it is very interesting that this many Jews are officially registered in Moscow only. Today the question of a national identity and religion is very painful for Jews. As realities and development of international events show, the Jewish diaspora has a big influence abroad. S peaking about the supreme bodies of the government of the Russian Federation and its political past, it is only possible to confirm the fact of active presence of the Jewish elite in the country, which played an essential role in foreign and domestic policy of Russia. It is not a secret that there are people in Israel whose extradition is sought by Russian law enforcement agencies, and the question of "businessmen" of the ―Yukos‖ Company drew attention of all world community. As for the following two items, they are interconnected among themselves and have one purpose – preservation of force balance in the Middle East. It is known that the Middle East is the region with the conflict and confrontational character where interests of many countries are concentrated. The political tension and the military conflicts sometimes wash away territorial and religious borders. So, the essence of the Mideast conflict having the "frozen" status is not only in territorial
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claims of Palestine and Israel, but mainly, fight for influence spheres and energy resources in this region. Since article is devoted to the bilateral relations of Israel and Russia, I would n ot want to enlarge on the conflict. At the same time, interests of Russia in the Mi ddle East an d influence of Mideast conflict on relations between Russia and Israel will be detailed. Third countries and first of all, the USA having strategic objectives in the region are involved into settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. Support of the USA to Israel in Mideast conflict became the reason of support of the Arab countries by Russia in "Arab spring" (the financial, military and diplomatic aid), with food and weapon delivery to the Arab countries. The decision of the Russian authorities to not include Hezbollah organization and HAMAS to the list of terrorist organizations caused discontent of Israel, and numerous visits of HAMAS delegation to Russia in 2005 and 2006 a dde d certain "chill" in the relations between the countries. While Russia was strengthening positions in Middle East region, it furnished financial and diplomatic aid to Iran in development of nuclear technologies. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it also repeatedly blocked organization me mbers‘ decisions on sanctions imposition against Iran. The leadership of Israel authorities was quite doubtful on military and technical support of Russia to Iran and Syria - the countries opposed to Israel. Irrespective of the fact that the Iranian and Syrian questions definitely influenced balance of relations between Israel and Russia, nevertheless Israel has been keeping neutrality on any attempts of the West to imposition sanctions against Russia. What is the logic in this political tactic? The reasons of interest of the countries in bilateral cooperation strengthening is in modern geopolitical situation in the world. Today, the role of the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia as actual strategic partner of the USA, on a geopolitical map of the world increases. Nowadays, Middle East is a place of military conflicts, political, national and religious collisions as a result of desires to establish control over regional energy resources. The Fuel - energy complex of the Middle East is the base and the lever of the world oil market. Today, the USA a dministration worries not much about the increasing geo-economics influence of China in the world (as main rival country), as a Middle Eastern matter. Taking into account the latest events in the world oil market (prompt falling of oil price of the leading Brent brand)it is only worth to emphasize a the general instability in the world energy markets. Contrary to expectations and hopes of Israel for active intervention of the White House in the solution of the Mideast conflict in favor of the last, the leadership of the USA is interested in preservation of the existing situation in the Middle East. The USA
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administration has been leading this strategy throughout all history of the international relations, interfering into economy of the clashing countries and provi ding them financial aid. Thereby creating political dependence on the USA. In the eve of the next elections to the 20th Knesset convocation in Israel, which took place in March 2015, the prime ministe r of Israel B. Netanyahu made the statement in the USA about potential danger, a threat to peace, and, first of all, to Israelis, Iran and its nuclear program. Following the results of elections B. Netanyahu ("Likud" party) has gained his fourth victory. T his once again showcases that the Israeli society adheres the right nationalist views and does not agree to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on territorial compromises. Also, the question of ensuring national security is at the head of all political priorities. Israel, perfectly realizing the increasing role of "Islam", is interested in search of the new strategic partners who are on "other party" of the USA camp. Therefore, today Israel authority dynamically develops the bilateral relations with Russia. In turn, interests of Russia in the Middle East are very ambitious and all efforts are directed by the country leaders to participation in the region device. Therefore it is not less interested in partnership with Israel. Commodity turnover between Russia and Israel steadily extends – from 12 million Dollars in 1991 to 2,9 billion Dollars in 2012. By results of 2012 export of Russia made to year more than 2 billion Dollars, import to Russia of Israel – 800 millionDollars.2 The Russian export prevails (considerable part the rough diamonds), making more than $2 billion a year. In turn, Israel delivers agricultural products and also hi-tech goods to Russia. Cooperation in military and technical spheres also develops: Israel delivered UAVs to the Russian army , and also equipped it with avionics and participated in modernization of the Russian aircraft equipment which was exporte d. The proba bility of the conclusion of the trade agreement between Israel and the Customs union fis currently on the agenda, creating discussions among scholars and political scientists. "How real is implementation of this purpose?" By keeping neutrality in economic sanctions against Russia and in currently conflicting Russia and Ukraine, Israel shows very pragmatic policy. It is no doubt that such position influences the bilateral relations between Israel and the USA, creating certain disagreements between the leaders of the countries. Some experts believe that Israel will be compelled to refuse the plans un der pressure of the USA , what the management and the population of Israel precipitately objects. According to the Counsellor on economic and energy affairs of Em bassy of Israel in Moscow Elena Margovski, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are aimed to sign contract this year. If such zone is created, the trade turnover between two countries can reach $6 billion, having made twice more than today's 3 billion dollars. 3 Time will show how real these plans are.
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Conclusion In conclusion, the conditions of modern geopolitical processes, being guided by national interests, Israel and Russia pursue "multifactor" policy in order to maintain specific power balance in region. Realizing the increasing role of the Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia, Israel is interested in development of bilate ral relations with Russia. Meanwhile Russia, interfering with domination of the USA in the Middle East, is not less interested in cooperation with its ally. It is quite likely that the equal, stable and reasonable Russian-Israel relations with their dynami c development can have essential impact on further events in the Middle East region. Notes : 1. The Jewish World/ Режим доступа: Retrieved 30 March, 2015, from http://evreimir.com/91768 2. Economic cooperation between Russian and Israel: Retrieved 20 March, 2015, from http://www.russianembassy.org.il/ 3. Israel for America, but not against Russia: Retrieved 02 April, 2015, from http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/05/13_a_6028793.shtml References : 1.
Alek D. Epstein and Stanislav A. Kozheurov (2011): RUSSIA AND ISRAEL: A DIFFICULT JORNEY Institute of Middle East, Moscow. 2. А.М. Васильев: «Россия на Ближнем Востоке» (2011). Институт изучения Израиля и Ближнего Востока 3. А.Д. Эпштейн, В.А. Кузьмин (2008): Израиль, Россия и мир: история и современность. Под ред. А.Д. Эпштейна и В.А. Кузьмина, Екатеринбург 4. Duma official: Israel-Russian relations strong - if US doesn't intervene, Retrieved 30 March, 2015, from http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-andPolitics/Duma-official-Israel-Russian-relations-strong-if-US-doesntintervene-352702 5. Euro-Asian Jewish /congress (EAJC), from http://library.eajc.org/page70/news13495 6. Israel Ministry of foreign Affairs, from http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Pages/default.aspx 7. Israel and Russia: New Best Friends, from http://www.middle-eastonline.com/english/?id=67989 8. Israeli missions around the world, from http://embassies.gov.il/Pages/IsraeliMissionsAroundThe World.aspx 9. Israel–Russia relations, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93Russia_relations 10. Израиль за Америку, но не против России, from http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/05/13_a_6028793.shtml 11. Российско-израильское экономическое сотрудничество, from http://www.russianembassy.org.il/
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12. Посольство Российской Федерации в государстве Израиль, from http://www.russianembassy.org.il/ 13. The Jewish World: Retrieved 30 March, 2015, from http://evreimir.com/91768 14. ―Израиль, Россия и мир: история и современность», под ред: А.Д. Эпштейна и В.А. Кузьмина. Екатеринбург, 2008. 15. ―Геополитические процессы на Ближнем Востоке (материалы международной конференции МГМИО МИД России от 23 апреля 2009 года)―/Под редакцией А.В. Федорченко; ИМИ МГИМО (У) МИД России, 2010, from http://www.mgimo.ru/news/issues/document162712.phtml
*****
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(5) INDIA AND ISRAEL: A NEW SWING IN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP Dr .Manas Chakrabarty Professor of Political Science University of North Bengal DARJEELING. W.B. 734013
[email protected]
&
Miss Sumita Saha
U.G.C. Project Fellow, Department of Political Science, University of North Bengal, Darjeeling. W.B. INDIA.734013
[email protected] Dr. Manas Chakrabarty
Professor of Political Science University of North Bengal, Darjeeling.W.B.India 734013
[email protected] Dr. Chakrabarty has carried out extensive research and he has to his credit four books, one hundred one published research articles in leading professional national and international journals including some chapters in different books. Dr. Chakrabarty has by now completed four Major Research Projects, one on "Judicial Behaviour and Judicial Decision Making of the Indian Supreme Court " sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research and the other two on "Women and Politics: A Study of Women Parliamentarians" and "Indian Railway Trade Unions", sponsored by the University Grants Commission . One on ―Women Empowerment at the Grass Roots: A Study of Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling Districts ―sponsored by the University of North Bengal. Currently, he is pursuing another Major Research project entitled, ―Self Help Groups: A Tool of Women Empowerment‖, sponsored by the U.G.C. His areas of interest are: Indian Government and Politics, Judicial Behaviour and Judicial Decision Making. Trade Unionism, International Politics and Comparative Politics. He is also the Director of Centre for Nehru Studies and G andhian Studies (sponsored by the UGC), Coordinator of SAP(DRS Phase -lll) sponsored by the UGC. Programme Coordinator, National Service Scheme at the University, Chairperson in Political Science, Directorate of Distance Education, North Bengal University, and Chairman, Sports Board, North Bengal University. He has successfully supervised Twenty Ph.D. scholars and another Eight are in the pipe line. Dr. Chakrabarty is a Life Member of the Indian Political Science Association, Indian Institute of Public Administration and the American Studies Research Center.)
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MISS SUMITA SAHA Sumita Saha is currently UGC Project Fellow working in a UGC sponsored Major Research Project entitled ‗Self Help Groups and Women Empowerment : A Tool of Women Empowerment‖ She has a wide research experience for working under several research projects in the Department of Political Science, University of North Bengal. She has worked under Special Assistance Programme ( SAP DRS Phase-II) sponsored by the UGC and one Research Project sponsored by the University of North Bengal. She has a large number of publications to her credit in journals of national repute.
______ INTRODUCTION Let us begin with the primary concept of international relations. International Relation means the diplomatic-strategic relation of states and the characteristic focus of International Relation revolve on issues of war and peace, conflict and cooperation. Further, it is also cross border transactions of all kinds, political, economic and social. (Chris Brown with Kirsten Ainley 2009). International Relations today refers to both an academic discipline and the field of activity that deals as much with relations between and among states as with transnational global actors, problems and issues. (Basu Rumki (ed), 2012). The study of world politics and international relations has become all the more important and significant due to the fact that World Politics today is in a state of extra ordinary transaction. At the turn of the twenty first century, we li ve in a world that is both fascinating and terrifying, a world that exhibits deep contra dictions yet sometimes high hopes. World politics today poses a real challenge to our understanding, yet we believe there are keys that will open the doors for us. (Duncan W.R. et al- 2002) In
international
society,
relationship
aspect
is
very
significant.
Relationship refers to the bon ds of de pendent or reciprocal relations. (Martin Pierre Marie -1986). So far as international politics is concerned, like all politics, i t is a struggle for power. Whatever may be the ultimate aim of international politics, the power is always the immediate aim. ((Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985). On the other hand, International Relations include the study of all human interactions across nationa l borders and
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factors that affect those interactions. (Pearson F.S. & J.M. Rochester. 1988). There is no denying the fact that in the present day world, International Relationship is of great significance. It is so because it includes a great variety of transitional relationships. (Palmer Norman D and Perkins Howard C. 2011).
It is an agreed fact that the relations of states are
comprehensible against a context, as the relations of individuals are comprehensible against a context . (Bajpai Kanti P. & Harish C. Shukul 1995). We should also keep in mind that there exists a context which gives meaning to an d channels the behaviour of states in their relations with other states and other external entities. (Bajpai Kanti P. & Harish C. Shukul- 1995).
It should be taken into deep consideration that this
context is by no means inscribed forever, nor is there full agreement with all its elements and characteristics. (Bajpai Kanti P. & Harish C. Shukul, 1995). It should be categorically pointed out that relati onship between two countries carry significance to a great extent not only in the matter of the two countries concerned in a particular situation or at a particular time but also for the whole world. It has rightly been said that the present day world is a global village. Again, a man who can live without other beings is either a God or a beast . (Malhotra, V.K. – 2001). In modern times, we can safely say that no nation or country can live in isolation. Coexistence of the nations is the order of the day. (Malhotra, V.K. - 2001). It can therefore be said that international relations is of prime importance in the world society from any aspect that is taken for analysis or consideration. It is all the more important because global politics is in the midst of dramatic and accelerating change. (Mansbach R.W. & Kirsten L. Taylor. 2012). In the present context of international scenario, international relations have assumed all the more great significance. In the twenty first century, we live in a world that is both fascinating and terrifying - one that exhibits deep contradictions and yet manifest high hopes. (Duncan W. Raymon d et al. – 2002).
Further, the terrorist attacks on the World
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international relations have become in the past decade. (Wenger, A. & Doron Zimneramann.2004). It should be stated that the relationship of nations emits a great mark of implications not only in the relationship status of two or more countries but also exerts a tremendous influence all over the region and the world. Therefore, inter-national relationship is significant from all dimensions. (Chakrabarty Manas in Mishra Sylvia(Ed) 2014). This definitely shapes the pattern and dimension of international relations at large. Therefore, there is no denying the fact that International Relations are very significant from all respects. It is more important when the matter is related with two neighbouring countries, and the relationship between the two countries is always significant not only from the regional politics but also from the point of view of world politics at large.
It is very
natural to state that if the relationship of the countries, particularly, the neighbouring countries, is friendly, the atmosphere of the region re mains filled with good oxygen which produces peace but if it is reverse, the entire environment becomes smoky and poisonous Manas in Mishra Sylvia(Ed) 2014).
.( Chakrabarty
We can therefore say that it greatly
affects the international scenario. .
It is therefore natural that the foreign policy of a nation becomes all the more important because it determines the nature of relationship either between two countries or a large
number of countries. As per
international norms, foreign policies are the central objective to preserve the liberty of states and to maintain the balance of power. special
care
should
be
devoted for
un derstanding
Again, a
international
relationship because there has been a paradigm shift in its content. In fact, the disciplinary dimensions of international politics have witnessed quantitative expansion as well as qualitative complexities since 1945. (Jaitly, Anam- 1986). It is also significant to note that a cursory look at the expan ded scope of international relations and politics unambiguously indicate that these have reached the farthest corner of human creativity
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and as such deeply influence mankind. (Jaitly, Anam - 1986). traditional
conceptual
categories
are
no
longer
sufficient
The for
comprehending the dynamics of internati onal politics. (Jaitly, Anam1986). To focus on foreign policy, the foreign policy or so to say, that of foreign relations is the systematic activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment. (Archana- 2011). In fact, all states have some kind of relation with one another and in their behavior, they have a particular manner of self pattern. (Archana - 2011). In the present day international society, one of the utmost significant dimensions is that of relation between nations. It should be kept in mind that the relationship is dynamic in character. It is never permanent. It always changes with the changing conditions of time and the society. With the passage of time and depending on a particular situation or any specific interest, the relationship is affected and un dergoes change.
Like human relations,
international relations between and among countries become significant particularly when the world is being referred as a global village. (Chakrabarty, Manas- in Mishra Sylvia(Ed) 2014). It is also an important fact that there is no reason that a state should live in isolation. In such a case, it not only deprives the country concerned from multifaceted development but also to exchange ideas on different matters that may be conducive for development of a particular state. It is therefore, perhaps a necessity that no nation should live in isolation. If it remains aloof or away from the dynamic international social order, it shall be deprived from the advancements, developments and particularly, the move towards betterment shall remain unknown and secondly an d more importantly, it is foolish to be away from the international social dynamics which can take a nation in a far advanced position. Under the circumstances, it is essential to remain
within the purview of
international relations and it becomes sine qua non and of prime necessity for a modern state
to remain within the
dynamics of
international relations. In today‘s world, we cannot think of remaining in
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isolation. It is foolish and also not possible at the same time. In the present day society, man is social, not by choice but by necessity. (Chakraborty R. - 1970). Therefore, there is no necessity to point out the importance of international relationship in the modern world. INDIA AND ISRAEL The relationship of In dia and Israel is an important part of international political scenario. India and Israel both represent ancient civilizations and share a British colonial past. They were the first states to become independent (in 1947 and 1948, respectively) in the post–World War II wave of decolonization. Both were born out of messy partitions and have maintained democratic regimes ever since under adverse conditions. But despite the two states‘ similarities, it took more than four decades for them to establish a warm relationship including full diplomatic relations, flourishing bilateral trade, and strategic cooperation. (Inbar, 2003). However, we can trace the vestige of relation between India and Israel from centuries back. Indians and the Jews have maintained relations since ancient period and they called India as ‗Hodu‘. The ties between Indian and Israeli (Jews) people go as far back as the times of the Firs t Temple, when the first Jewish community settled in India and flourished. (Agarwal, 2013). In dia's relations with Israel lay dormant for about four decades. However, the
changes in
the international
geo-strategic
environment compelled India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. At the base of the relationship between India and Israel, there appeared to be a similarity in an understanding of the geo-political situation. Both are surrounded by strong an d hostile neighbours. (Naaz, 2000).In essence, Indo-Israel relations have grown in importance because it is based on very practical considerations. For In dia, Israel is a source of high technology in many areas including military related industries and it is evidently even more vital after post-Pokhran sanctions on India. It is believed that building ties with Israel could be an effective counter balance to Pakistan's military and political tactics. For Israel, India is a
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large and lucrative market. Any meaningful relationship between India and Israel is more likely to cover joint research, joint production and technology transfer. (Naaz, 2000). It is generally said that the bilateral relations between India and Israel hinge on three pegs – economic, defence and people to people contacts. There is no denying the fact that these three areas are very important and significant in the domain of In dia-Israel relationship. As we can see from the historical records that In dia had maintained a safe distance from Israel until late 1980‘s but in spite of that significant bilateral activities were carried out between the two countries and this definitely brought the two countries nearer. In the true sense of the term, the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel dates back to 1992. Right from that time, the multi dimensional relationship between the
two countries started to flourish and the
bon d of
relationship started getting crystalised. The major areas of bilateral relationship
between
India
and
Israel
are:
economic,
military,
agricultural and political. It may be stated that the relationship is in a sense of compulsion because of the fact that both the countries consider their relationship as a resultant of strategic imperative. It is perhaps the compulsion of a situation which he lped to bring the two countries nearer because both the countries have to face the threat of terrorism from the neighbouring countries. The pages of history do not reflect a record of very warm relationship between the two countries at all times. It may be attributed to the fact that India did not subscribe to the Partition of Palestine plan of 1947 an d even voted against Israel's admission in the world body viz. the United Nations Organisation in the year of 1949, although it extended de jure recognition to Israel as a nation on September 17, in 1950. India -Israel Relations, particularly the aspect of political relations, was initiated with the recognition of Israel by India. As a mark of de penda ble relationship, soon after the recognition was extended, the Jewish Agency established
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an immigration office in Bom bay. It was subsequently converted into a Trade Office and the n into a Consulate. As a measure to strengthen the tie between the two countries, Em bassies were opened in 1992 which marked the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Again, India allowed Israel to maintain a Consulate in
Mumbai in order to expedite the voluntary immigration of the Indian Jews to Israel. It should be stated further, on the one hand, India was a champion and pioneer of the non aligned movement and used to maintain a close relationship with the Arab world and the Soviet Union while Israel was mainly linked with the United States of America and the Western Europe. POLITIC AL RELATIONS HIP For all practical purposes it may be said that In dia established official relations with Israel in 1991, although informal ties had long existed between the two countries of India and Israel. To be precise, formally, India established relations with Israel in January 1992 and ties between the two nations have flourished since that time onwards. On diplomatic levels, both the countries have managed to maintain healthy relations with each other in spite of several constraints that existed in the domain of world politics. With regard to the bilateral relationship, the visit of the President of Israel, Ezer Weizman, in the year of 1997 was very significant. He was the first head of the Jewish state to visit India. He also met with the
Indian President Shankar Dayal Sharma, Vice
President K R Narayanan and Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda which definitely helped a lot to take forward the bilateral relationship of the two countries. The visit of Jaswant Singh, the then Foreign Minister of India, who visited Israel in the year of 2000, was also significant in enhancing the bon d of relationship between India and Israel. It is important to note that this was the first Indian Foreign Minister‘s visit to Israel. After the visit, the two countries set up a joint anti -terror commission because both the countries have remained to be infected with the horrors of terrorism.
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It may be stated that
on the Israel front, Ariel Sharon was the
first Israeli Prime Minister to visit India in the year of 2003.The then Indian Prime Sharon's visit
Minister, Atal Behari
Vajpayee voiced confidence
that
paved the way for further consolidating bilateral ties
between India and Israel. In early 2006, many of the Indian government Ministers like Sharad Pawar, Ka pil Sibal and Kamal Nath
paid their
visits to Israel. Again, Narendra Modi , the present Prime Minister of India also visited Israel as Chief Minister of Gujrat. The then External Affairs Minister Shri S M Krishna visited Israel in 2012, which marked the 20th anniversary of establishment of full diplomatic relations between India and Israel. In fact, increased high-level exchanges and ministerial visits on both sides have expanded cooperation in different functional areas such as trade, agriculture, Science and Technology, culture and security aspects. The Israel Prime Minister described this visit by the Indian Foreign Minister as a historical step forward in developing the relations between the two nations. In May 2014 after historic victory of Narendra Modi in 2014 General Election, Israeli
Prime
Minister
Benjamin
Netanyahu personally
congratulated Modi which marked the opening of the avenues of close relationship between the two countries. ‗The sky is the limit‖ is what Prime
Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu
told his
Indian
counterpart
Narendra Modi during their meeting on the sideline of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York during September 2014. The meeting between the two leaders (Prime Minister Level) came after 11 years. The Israeli Premier even invited Modi to visit his country (Singhningthoujam, 2014). The Indian Prime Minister acknowledged that Israel and India have a historic working relationship and stated that India is "the only country where anti Semitism has never been allowed to come up, where Jews have never suffered and lived as an integral part of our society". The political relationship between the two countries further received a
boost
in
the
year
of 2014 when
the
Indian
Home
Minister Rajnath Singh visited Israel to over view the Border security arrangement of Israel. During the tour, he also met Israeli Prime Minister
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Netnyahu. The visit of the Israeli Ex President Shimon Peres is also a significant part of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. The trend of di plomatic or political relationship continued to be close to closer when a high level Israeli dele gation team with Agriculture Minister of Israel Yair Shamir also participated in Vibrant Gujarat summit in 2015.
In
Fe bruary
2015
on
a
historic
visit, Israeli
Defence
Minister, Moshe Ya'alon came to India. During the visit, he participated in Aero India 2015. He also met his Indian counterpart as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In view of all these, we may definitely say that close ties between India and Israel have increased enormously since Narendra Modi took over as the Prime Minister of India. In fact, the relationship of India and Israel received a dramatic and cosmetic touch since 2014.
M ILITARY RELATIONS HIP Since January 1992 when India established full diplom atic relations with Israel, there has been widespread speculation about imminent military cooperation between the two countries. (Kumaraswamy, 1996). The base of military relationship between the two countries lies in the fact that India is the largest customer of Israeli military equipments. On the other hand, Israel is the second-largest military partner of India after Russia. As per record, as of 200 9, the military business between the two nations is worth around US$9 billion. As a result of the military ties between the two countries, it has extended up to
joint military training programmes
undertaken on the part of both the countries. It is significant to note that in the year of 2008, the Indian military officials visited Israel for discussing joint weapons development projects, additional sale of Israeli equipment to the Indian military and anti terrorism strategies. It may be considered as a significant expansion in the India -Israel strategic partnership process. Further, in December 2009, Lt Gen Ga bi Ashkenazi , Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces
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paid visit to India which is regarded as a historic one. The main purpose of the visit was to cement the defence ties between India and Israel. It is seen that India and Israel have increased co-operation in military and intelligence ventures since the establishment of diplomatic relations. It may be said that the rise of the Islamic extremist terrorism in both the countries have paved the way for a strong strategic alliance between India and Israel. A step forward in this relationship is de finitely the launching of a military satellite for Israel through the Indian Space Research Organisation. The relationship between India and Israel definitely took a momentum in 2014 after Narendra Modi took over as the Prime Minister of India. It is really significant that the Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya‘alon along with a team made the first official visit in India in the month of February, 2015. During their stay in India, they attended the Aero India Arms Exhibition in Bangalore. The major purpose of Ya‘alon‘s visit had been mainly to enhance the volume and dimensions of interaction and cooperation between defence industries in Israel and India. In fact, the most important factor that has contributed for growing India -Israeli tie is definitely security and defense .Although the two nations ramped u p security cooperation around a decade ago, India has become the largest customer of Israeli defense exports over the past two years. The annual value of arms deal between the two countries has toppe d $1 billion and makes up nearly 15 percent of all Israeli defense exports. It should be stated that ever since the Modi government came to power, a few important developments have already taken place vis -à-vis IndoIsraeli defense cooperation. The first breakthrough, in terms of arms imports from Israel was the announcement that India would procure the Barak-1 missile, manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries. This was definitely a significant step, particularly considering the defensive
capa bilities
of
the
Indian
depleted warships.
(Singhningthoujam,2014).Amongst other factors, the visit of the Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj who also met her Israeli counterpart
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Avigdor Lieberman paved the way for better ties between the two countries. TRADE AND C OMM ERCIAL RELATIONS HIP In the realm of trade and commerce, India is the second-largest Asian economic partner of Israel. Bilateral trade, which was at $200 million in 2001, grew to $4.1 billion by 2009, in 2010, bilateral trade, stood at US $4.7 billion. The two governments have assisted in creating a highly dealfriendly environment for the development of business. Considerable progress has been achieved in trade relations since 1992. (Naaz, Farah, 1999) Currently, the two nations are negotiating on an extensive bilateral free trade
pact,
focusing
on
are as
such
as
information
technology,
biotechnology and agriculture. Jyotiraditya Scindia, the then Commerce Minister of India visited Israel in February 2010 in order to discuss a free-trade
agreement.
During
the
visit,
he
met
with
Israeli
President Shimon Peres; Industry, Trade and La bor Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, and representatives of Israel's water technology and high tech industries. This visit definitely paved the way for the establishment of close commercial relationship between India and Israel. Due to close commercial relationship between India and Israel, which is the outcome of the diplomatic and political relationship, India has been in a position to acquire the status of one of Israel‘s trading partners. As per record, the leading high tech companies of the world are dedicated for joint ventures of the two countries. Till 2013, India –Israel trade had risen to approximately $6 billion a year which was only $200 million in the year of 1992. Therefore, within a span of 20 years, the figure has definitely gone high to a considerable extent. It should be stated that in the year of 2008, the two countries initiated a $50 million shared agriculture fund which included dairy, farming technology
and micro irrigation.
This
constituted the
important
Agricultural Cooperation Agreement. Further in the year of 2011, the two
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countries signed an agreement to foster cooperation on urban water systems. The
relationship got a new boost when in 2013 Israel
announced that it would extend its helping hand to India to diversify and raise the yield of fruits and vegetable produces through the offering of advanced technology. In this regard, Israel decided to set up 28 Centres of excellence. As an effective step, by March 2014, 10 Centres of excellence started operating throughout the country. It offered free training sessions for farmers with the Israeli technological expertise and know how. Again, India is a buyer of Israeli technology in several areas, including agriculture,
water
treatment,
waste -management
and
recycling,
prompting several Israeli companies working in these areas to expand into India. It is a matter of great significance that Israel has become one of In dia's most important defense suppliers, behind only Russia and the United States. As per record, there has been collaboration between India and Israel in defense technologies to a great extent. Another important factor that should be highlighted is that Israel was a major participant in the 2015 'Vibrant Gujarat' summit which began from 7th January, 2015 with Agriculture Minister Yair Shamir leading the delegation. It should further be stated that India is Israel‘s 10th largest trading partner. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1992, civilian bilateral trade has grown to about $5 billion per year. With the proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in the pipeline, this is expected to be more than double in the near future. It is therefore clear that bilateral relationship in trade and commerce between India and Israel is definitely on a higher track. It is really a matter of significance that whereas in 1992, Economic and Commercial relations recorded to US$ 200 million which comprised primarily trade in diamonds. Further, bilateral merchandise trade has diversified greatly and reached to US$ 5.19 billion in the year 2011. But we must point out the fact that the past few years have seen a decline in total tra de due to the global economic recession. In 2013, the bilateral
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trade stood at US$ 6.01 billion (Source: Dept. of Com merce, GOI) with the balance of trade in Israel‘s favour. Trade in diamonds constituted over half of bilateral trade. In 2013, India was Israel's tenth largest trade partner overall, and Israel's third largest trade partner in Asia after China and Hong Kong. We should also take into account that in recent years, the bilateral trade has diversified somewhat with the inclusion of several sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT and telecom, and homeland security. Potash is a major item of Israel‘s exports to India, with India buying a significant percentage of its requirement from Israel. With regard to the major exports from India to Israel include precious stones and metals, chemical products, textiles and textile articles, plants and vegetable products, an d mineral products. On the dimension of imports, the major imports by In dia from Israel include precious stones and metals, chemicals and mineral products, base metals and machinery and transport equipment. The total bilateral trade in services was about US $ 407 million in 2012. In dia's services exports to Israel were about US$ 317 million, of which US$ 162.6 million was in Research and Development services. It is discernible that in recent years, Israel has taken a strategic decision to strengthen economic relations with China and India. In view of the Free Trade Agreement since 2010, the two sides are negotiating an FTA covering trade in goods an d services and the eighth round of talks was held in Israel in the month of November 2013. It should be highlighted that in the domain of investment during April 2000 to November 2013, Israel ranked 43rd among foreign direct investors with FDI into India of US$ 73.7 million. It is a matter of great significance that Israeli companies have invested in India
in
energy,
renewable
energy,
telecom,
real
estate,
water
technologies, and are also setting up Research and Development Centres or production units in India. CULTURAL TIES The aspect of culture is definitely one of the main areas which help to bring two countries nearer to each other. Further, it is known that
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cultural link helps greatly in binding the relationship between two countries. India and Israel also maintains a cultural link between the two. Cultural links between the two countries go back to the Forties when India and Israel emerged as independent nations. The founder of Israel, David Ben Gurion had immense regard for Mahatma Gandhi whom he
regarded as the
driving force
behind In dia's freedom.
Agreements on cooperation in culture and education an d tourism were signed during Peres' visit in May 1993. This was followed by the finalisation of the detailed Cultural Exchange Programme (CEP) in September
1993. The
second C EP
was
signed during President
Weizman's visit in December 1996. There were also agreements for the exchange of scholars between Indian and the Israeli universities. Various tourism promotion activities as well as the number of Israeli tourists visiting India have also increased steadily. (Naaz, Farah, 1999) Israel's fascination with Indian culture was also reflected in the naming of streets after Rabindra Nath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi in Tel Aviv. It was noticed that Jews in India were never persecuted and as a community lived harmoniously with others. The famous Israeli violinist, Yehudi Menuhin, was chosen to receive the Jawaharlal Nehru award for international understanding in 1968. Likewise, an Israeli dance troupe "Imbal" was invited to perform in India in exchange for a prior visit to Israel by an Indian dancer, Shanta Rao and her troupe, in April 1958. During her visit, Shanta Rao ha d a private audience with David Ben Gurion, then Prime Minister of Israel. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the people of India and Israel have come much closer. Multifarious cultural activities were undertaken by the
Israeli
consulate in Bom bay, which included
symposia, debates, lectures, exhibitions and literary concerts. Leading cultural performers and groups have travelled between Delhi and Jerusalem, Mumbai and Tel Aviv. These visits have covered nearly every
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sphere of culture: music, dance, art, academics, literature and much more. For instance, Zubin Mehta and the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra visited India in 1994. From In dia, Zakir Hussain participated in the Israel festival in Jerusalem in 1996. Other important Israeli activities in India
included the
screening of Israeli
films, Israel's
first ever
participation in the Delhi International Book Fa ir in 1996 and the Shalom India events. From India's side, activities included annual Indian participation in the Jerusalem film festival, the visit of Vikram Seth to the Jerusalem Poets' Festival (1997) which included the publication of the Hebrew transla tion of his book. Further, the visit of Mallika Sarabhai along with her daughter also enhanced the close relationship between India and Israel. In April–May 2011, leading Indian artists hailed at Israel to participate in a three -week-long cultural festival commemorating 20 years of IndoIsrael diplomatic relations.
According to India's ambassador to Israel,
Navtej Sarna, "the idea is to bring the entirety of India, showcasing the multi-layered nature of the country, and to mainstream it into the Israeli society.We can therefore say that it will lead to greater understanding of each other's culture, mindset and impact on all aspects of bilateral relationship." SCIENCE AND TECHN OLOGY With regard to the bilateral relationship between India and Israel, scie nce and technology aspect has also contributed a lot in enhancing the relationship. It is discernible that India is building closer ties with Israel in the areas of nanotechnology, information technology, water technology and biotechnology. In order to boost the relationship, the Indo-Israel Joint Committee of scientists was constituted with the DST (Department of
Science
and
Technology)
an d
In dia
as
Co-chairmen
with
representatives from various research organisations in India and the Ministry of Information Technology as members. It is therefore clear that
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the two countries have kept thei r toes advanced for closer bilateral relationship. Incidentally, it may be said that Israel was interested in strengthening science and technology ties with India considering that the latter had a rich base of scientists and technologists and the two countries could benefit by synergising their activities and by mutual exchange. ANTI TERRORISM COM BATTING The aspect of terrorism is another area which has brought the two countries nearer to each other. India and Israel have come closer with regard to the anti terrorism combating. In fact, Israel and India are enhancing their cooperation on counter terrorism measures. Given the emerging trend of various terrorist activities both in the Middle East and India, this dimension is definitely going to see significant cooperation. India is likely to gain from Israeli expertise in counter terrorism measures, along with surveillance skills at the borders which include both lan d an d the sea. Moreover, the increasing radicalization of a few Israeli Arabs an d In dian Muslim youths un der the influence of Islamic State is a common challenge faced by both the countries and this will drive their cooperation to new levels. (Singhningthoujam, 2014). It is important to note that it was in the year of 2012 when India and Israel steppe d for counter terrorism coordination strategy. This area got a boost with the visit of S.M.Krishna, the then Indian External affairs Minister to Israel. It was agreed by both the countries to work to boost their counter terrorism cooperation. CONCLUSION While concluding it should be stated that despite the upward surge in the relationship, Israel and India has always had what Kumaraswamy called "the third person in the room." It is seen that India has been doing a di plomatic balancing act between Israel and the Palestinians, managing to maintain strong relations with both parties. It further reflected to New Delhi's seemingly unwavering support for the Palestinians at the United Nations. It is further seen that both the countries also had reservations
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about the other's partnerships, such as India's connection to Iran and Israel's relationship with China. But it is a matter of great significance that both the Prime Ministers (Modi and Netanyahu) are aiming for a closer relationship. But at the same time India cannot deny its relationship with the Arab world, an d even though Israel has some reservations regarding India's relationship with Iran, India still considers Iran as an important partner. It is really a matter of great importance that the India-Israel re lationship is also growing stronger in terms of personal engagement by leaders of both the countries. However, it may definitely be said that the bilateral relationship between India and Israel is on a smooth plane which is less likely to receive any jolt. India's relations with Israel lay dormant for about four decades. However, the changes in the international geo-strategic environment compelled India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. It is important to n ote that at the base of the relationship between India and Israel, there appeared to be a similarity in an understanding of the geo-political situation. Both are surrounded by strong and hostile neighbours. In essence, Indo-Israel relations have grown in importance because it is based on very practical considerations. For India, Israel is a source of high technology in many areas including military related industries and it is evidently even more vital after post-Pokhran sanctions on India. It was considered by In dia that building ties with Israel could be an effective counter-balance to Pakistan's military and political tactics. For Israel, India is a large and lucrative market. It may be said in this connection that any meaningful relationship between India and Israel is more like ly to cover joint research, joint production and technology transfer. For India, the rationale for relations with Israel arose from a source for armament imports an d a partner to combat terrorism. Israel had her own interests for cultivating ties with Indi a that ranged from the need for extra regional linkages that small states pursue in their search for security, an export market for her armament industry and an ally in the war against terrorism.
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However, it should be said that India's attitude towards Isr ael has been guided by diplomatic prudence. It is for this reason that India extended a de jure recognition to Israel and left opens the option for full recognition, as the situation demanded. (Naaz, Farah, 1999) Therefore, such a convergence of their mutual interests led to a natural alliance between the two countries, both significant states with strong strategic statures in their respective regions, namely South Asia and West Asia. While India Israel relations remained covert during the Cold War period, they became overt during the post-Cold War period (Chengappa, 2010). But as the practical world situation shows, it can be said that the bilateral relations between India and Israel would remain to be conducive for both the countries and would contribute for development on each side. REFERENCES Agarwal Prashant -India-Israel Relations: An Unlikely Alliance Scholar‘s Voice: A New Way of Thinking Vol. 3, No.1, January -June 2013. Archana- India‘s Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change. Review of Politics. Vol.XIX. No. 1. 2011 P. 103 Bajpai Kanti P. & Harish C. Shukul- Interpreting World Politics. (Sage Publications. 1995). P. 20 Basu Rumki (ed) -International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues.Sage Publications India Pvt.Ltd. 2012 P. XXV Brown, Chris & Kirsten Ainley. - Understanding International Relations Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. P. 1 Chakrabarty Manas: THE KASHMIR ISSUE: BONE OF CONTENTION IN INDIAPAKISTAN RELATIONS Mishra Sylvia(Ed) Studies on Pakistan. (New Delhi: Paragon International Publishers. 2014). P.182 Chakraborty R. - International Relations. (Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd. 1970). P 3. Duncan W. Raymond et al. – World Politics in the 21st Century. (Longman 2002). P. 2. Chengappa, Bidanda M- India-Israel Relations: Politico-Military Dimensions, Claws Journal Summer 2010 Faliero Eduardo- Re.India-Japan Relations. South Asia Politics. vol.13.No.7.2014.
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Ghosh Madhuchanda- India and Japan's Growing Synergy: From a Political to a Strategic Focus: Asian Survey. Vol. 48. No. 2. March- April 2008. HARRETZ APRIL 8, 2015 Inbar, Efraim-The Indian-Israeli Entente HARRETZ July 23, 2003 Jain, Purnendra- Japan‘s Expanding Security Networks: India and Australia. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs. Vol. 22, No. 1-2 June-December, 2009. Jaitly, Anam- International Politics: Major Contemporary Trends and Issues. (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers (P) Ltd. 1986). Preface. Kumaraswamy, P.R. - The Limitations of Indo-Israeli Military Cooperation. Contemporary South Asia. Vol. 5 No. 1 1996. Malhotra, V.K. – International Relations. (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd. 2001). Mansbach R.W. & Kirsten L. Taylor. Introduction to Global Politics. (Routledge. 2012) Martin Pierre Marie – Introduction to International Relations. (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, Pvt. Ltd. 1986). Morgenthau, Hans J. – Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1985). Naaz, Farah - Indo-Israel Military Cooperation,Strategic Analysis Vol. 24, No. 5, 2000. Naaz, Farah- Indo-Israel Cooperation: Agriculture, Trade and Culture ,Strategic Analysis. Vol. 23, No. 3, 1999. Naaz, Farah - Indo-Israel Relations: An Evolutionary Perspective ,Strategic Analysis. Vol. 23, NO. 2, 1999 Palmer Norman D and Perkins Howard C. - International Relations. (New Delhi: CBS Publishers and Distributors, 2011). Pearson F.S. & J.M. Rochester. International Relations: The Global Condition in the Late Twentieth Century. (Mcgraw Hill Publishing Company, 1988). Singhningthoujam, A. - The Jerusalem Post, 19.11.2014 Vivek Pinto- A Strategic Partnership between India and Japan Economic and Political weekly. Vol. 41. N0.52 (December 30, 2006- Jan 5, 2007) Wenger, A. & Doron Zimneramann- International Relations: From the Cold War to the Globalized World. (New Delhi: Viva Books Pvt.Ltd. 2004).
*****
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(6) India-Israel-US Trilateral Cooperation Security Perspective: Challenges and Scope Dr. AMIT MUKHERJEE PBC-Post Doctoral Research Fellowship 2015 National Securi ty Studies Center University of Haifa, ISRAEL Email
[email protected]
Dr. AM IT M UKHERJEE
Presently ,pursuing Post Doctoral Studies Fellowship: PBC (Department of Higher Education, Government of Israel), Post-Doctoral Fellowship 2013- 2015. Title: ―India-Israel Strategic Partnership: A new Leaf in the 21st Century‖. From: National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa, Israel. Title & Fellowship: Israel Asia Leaders Fellow 2014. From : Israel Asia Leaders Fellowship – Israel Asia Center Jerusalem Israel Qualifications: Ac ademic Ph.D. in Defence & Strategic Studies – 2012. Title : ―The Application of GIS for India‘s Defence: To assess battle field conditions and its effects on weapons and weapons systems‖. From : Department of Defence & Strategic Studies, University of Pune -India. Earlier,obtained Masters In Computer Science – M.Sc. Computer Science,from MDU Rohtak University (Rohtak.),2003. Tec hnic al : 1. Fulltime Certified Training in Remote Sensing And GIS Indian Space Research Organization(ISRO) -NRSC Campus 2008-09. Course in Certificate Programming in C Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Mumbai CDEEP. 2. Course in Certificate Programming in Oracle Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Mumbai CDEEP. 3. One Year Diploma in Advanced Software Technology. CMC India ATC – Passed with Grade ‗A‘. ____________ * I acknowledge with thanks the valuable assistance provided by Ms Rachael Cayne, Masters in Political Science with a specialization in National Security, in preparing this article. She works in Max Security Solutions Ltd.
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Publications: 1. Organization: Embassy of India,Tel Aviv, Israel. Title: Arab (League) Boycott of Israel and Its Implications.Year 2 nd April2015. 2. Organization : DefenceNews.in Title: Drone Diplomacy: The High fliers of India-Israel Relationship.Year 2015 3. Organization SAAG – South Asian Analysis Group Title : Application of GIS for Military Cooperation in South Asia Year – 2007. 4. Organization : Yashwantrao Chawan –National Center for International Security and Defence Analysis.(YC-NISDA). Title : A Geo-Strategic and Military Analysis of SWAT terrorism through GIS. Year – 2009. Conferences/Seminars/Lecture Series Attended: Participation in DDSS and CASS Lectures/Seminars: Seminar by Centre For Advanced Strategic Studies held at Southern Command Auditorium on ―India's Strategic Environment & its implications for military modernization‖ by Dr. Bharat Karnad on July 8 2008. Seminar on ―National Integration and Role of Youth‖ by. Dr Asghar Ali Engineer at YC-NISDA Conference Hall on 24th Jan 2008. Guest Lecture on ―Challenges of manpower planning with special references to shortages of officers in the armed forces‖ by Comdr. (retd.) Dilip Mahapatra at YC-NISDA Seminar Hall on 31 Jan 2008. Lecture on ―Network Centric Warfare‖ by Air V Mrshl.(retd.) A. Limaye at College of Engineering - Pune. 2007. National Defence conference on ―National Security and the role of State‖ in DDSS UoP 2006. Seminar by Centre For Advanced Strategic Studies held at YASHDA on ―Environment Challenges ahead‖ 2007. Lecture on ―Emerging Sino-Indian Relations‖ by Nitin Gokhale in DDSS UoP on 27 December 2006. Lecture on ―Training at NDA Challenges ahead‖ at DDSS by Air Mrshl. T.S Randhawa VM 28 Feb 2008. o Seminar on ―Indian Naval Submarines and Underwater warfare‖ at Southern command Auditorium Pune Cantt. 29 July 2008. Prof. S.V Kogekar Memorial Lecture on ―Indian Democratic Strength and Weakness‖ on 25th May 2008. Lecture on ―Indo – US Nuclear Deal‖ by Dr. Srikant Paranjpe 19 march 2008 at Political Science o Department University of Pune campus. Guest Lecture on ―US0South Asia Relations with special reference to Indo – US relation‖ by Dr. Sate Limay, Director East West Centre Washington in Sawarkar Hall DDSS UoP. on 24 March 2008. Cass Seminar on ― US President Barak Obama's AF- Pak Policy and it's implications for India‖ by Lt. Gen o Amitav Mukherjee PVSM, AVSM at YC-NISDA library on 7 may 2009. YashwantRao Chavan - National Center for International Security and Defence Analysis (YC- NISDA) Conferences:
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Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. R. Raghavan 2007NISDA‘s Third Annual Conference ―India in the Global Strategic Calculus‖. NISDA-CSA Workshop on ―Formulating National Security Studies for India‖ (24-25 July 2007) Seminar on ―Peace and Conflict Resolution‖ by. Dr Asghar Ali Engineer at YC-NISDA Conference Hall on 16April 2009. Seminar on ―National Integration and Role of Youth‖ by. Dr Asghar Ali Engineer at YC-NISDA Conference Hall on 24th Jan 2008. Gen. BC Joshi Memorial Lectures, Department of Defence And Strategic Studies University of Pune. i. BC Joshi Memorial Lecture on ― Future of Indian Air Force‖ by Indian Air Chief A.Y Tipnis in 2006. ii. BC Joshi Memorial Lecture on ―Role of Indian Armed Forces‖ by COAS Gen. JJ Singh in 2007. iii. BC Joshi Memorial Lecture on ―Challenges of the Indian Navy in the 21 st Century‖ by CONS Admiral Sureesh Mehta 2008. Professional Ethos & Aim: To study and analyze the military and strategic aspects of defence and its complexity with new light of advancements in science and technology with poignant emphasis to Geographical Information System. To see how a comprehensive scientific and technological framework design and policy can be modeled using GIS to see pattern within the chaos of the changing and modern dimension of defence and military affairs.Last but not the least, to work with diligence and to gain the privileged opportunity to render my e arnest contribution to the institution. To create an environment for growth of experience and newer learning avenues, to quell new challenges in the pursuit of excellence. To give prolific advantage to the orbit of the syndicate and self.
Abstract: The International environment is beset with multitude of challenges that include in the broad spectrum, security challenges, resource challenges, scientific and technological challenges that collate developmental challenges, economic and many more to name a few. India the largest and the US being the oldest and the most modern democracies of the world, and Israel the strongest democracy in the region, would benefit immensely from mutual cooperation in the realm of security.
Key W ords: India-Israel Relations, India-USA Relations, India-Israel-USA Cooperation, International Security, Maritime Security, Anti-Piracy Operations, Trilateral Cooperation, International Relations, Defense Cooperation, China, Security, Cyber-Security, Counter Terrorism, Pakistan, Space, Satellite, Homeland Security. ___________
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Introdu ction: To effectively manage and maintain stability and security, in all of the three most dangerous Security challenge ridden (politico-military) conflict regions, namely the Middle East, the India-Pakistan conflict zone and China-North Korea sphere, it becomes essential that three nations with common and converging interests cooperate with each other with or without treatise of agreements, in all possi ble spheres, as formal or informal partners in trilateral cooperation. To re -iterate its relevance one can mention the intended US role and interests in securing International stability in the South Asian and South East Asian & Pacific region viz. its concerns related to perceived growing hegemoni c tendencies of China, due to the expan ding political and economic ambitions and growth requirements that is perceived as that which can be curtailed largely and counter-balanced with
deterrence,
directly and indirectly
with
a
potentially strong India, (as seen in the recent US efforts in Partnering and engaging India Militarily and Strategically). The recent shift in policy and strategy by the US government to transfer nearly 60% of its naval strength to Asia Pacific in the coming decade 1is also an indicator of the similar concerns. The tested principles of multilateral security cooperation have worked in the past in the first and Second World War. However the best example of multilateral and trilateral cooperation for security was done during the cold war, with NATO and Warsaw alliances. But these were military alliances strictly for war. Though times have changed since the cold war ended, security scenario has become very complicated with Russia‘s growing assertiveness along with China‘s flexing of its te rritorial claims that is pushing converging concerns of International security, by many countries towards engaging into direct or indirect, formal or in -formal, trilateral security cooperation, for long term goals of maintaining peace and sta bility. In this case the parties tied to the trilateral interest were tested in the eighties with the US, European and Ja panese security concerns were made to add to a trilateral commission2 . Theoretically we can explain that present security perceptions lie somewhere between the
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precepts of Globalization perspectives and regional security perspectives. While the former defines international relations in terms of shared resources and profits the later confines to the competition or rivalry of interstate political, economic, and other sources and disagreements that define
the
causes of military and non -military conflicts3 . Recent
conflagration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, India (Border encroachments) and other south Asian and south east Asian neighbors, may give rise to a more serious forms of strategic, political, economic or even military conflict in the later decades of this century, as crucial resources like oil, mineral, water etc. start becoming a competitive commodity and the sources become scarce, no longer available in the same quantity as it is today. India and America have partnerships and agreements in various areas of mutual interest which has a primary aspect of security cooperation. The Defense Technology Initiative 4 is a successful example for the same. Since forming a formal alliance would require surpassing decades of mindset borne out of N on Alignment policy on India‘s part and shifting the traditional base of foreign policy alignment on America‘s part, it would be far-fetched as of now to conceive signing of a formal the agreement of a comprehensive security alliance. Hans J. Morgenthau in his book Politics Among Nations – (1948), defines that alliances must be formed based on expediency of requirements for all partneri ng nations, to overcome the dominating position of rivaling nations, to whom the nation that is seeking an alliance with a powerful partner, alone may not be able to stand in opposition 5 to the threats to its security. As such a regulated cooperation arrangement within the scope of mutual interests and formulated agreements embedde d in the generally agreed principle of democratic establishing
values,
which
relations
meets
towards
a
the
minimum
concept
of
requirements trilateral
for
security
cooperation6 , is the way forward. Since India, Israel and America have varied self-interests and security threats with the commonality on various overlapping ones, going into a binding com prehensive alliance may only be a possibility for the near
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future. This must happen in a way that any cooperation based on interdependence should take into consideration while making policy, the following two constraints, domestic needs and the security perceptions of other nations. However agreements to meet agreed common minimum security and strategic interests and concerns have resulted into several bilateral agreements between India-Israel, India-USA and USA-Israel. India and the USA have about 40 bilateral dialogues conducted on a regular basis. Of these the five major ones of strate gic cooperation include; Energy an d Climate Change, Education and Development; Economy, Tra de and Agriculture; Science and Technology; an d Health and Innovation. In
addition, there
are
Ministerial-level
dialogues
involving home ‗(Homeland Security Dialogue ), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership), commerce (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue), Science & Technology (Joint Commission Meeting on S&T) and energy (Energy Dialogue)‘ 7 . Similarly India and Israel
signed agreements
for
coope ration
on
Homeland an d Public Security, Agreement on protection of classified material, on 27 February 2014, an d many more. 8 The US Israeli relations also has several formal agreements despite the general will and support of the US political, economic, diplomatic, military establishments and mechanisms
towards
the
State
considerations. These i nclude
of Israel
the
for
various
geopolitical
Memorandum of un derstanding
agreement to address common threats to security in the Middle East, cooperation agreements in defense and trade. In 1996 USA an d Israel signed counter terrorism accord9 which included information sharing among other things. A similar formal parlance takes place under the India US strategic Cooperation under which it is stated as ―…counterterrorism partnership is a critical component of our strategic cooperation with India. The U.S. and India share best practices and information with each other through training programs, joint working groups, and a myriad of other interactions at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. We are committed to cooperating with India and other partners to prevent terrorist attacks and bring to justice those
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who commit them‖10 . This section highlights U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation,
and
provides
additional
information
on
U.S.
counterterrorism policy and initiatives worldwi de. India and Israel too have signed agreements of coope ration ‗relating to homeland security, which cover areas such as cooperation in preventing organized crime, human trafficking, cyber-crimes, money laundering, counter-terrorism
and
fight
against
spread
of
fake
currency
notes‘11 . Several new agreements are expected to be signed as India, Israel and US proceed on this newly formed path of cooperation and coalition of friendly relations. Maritime Security and Anti -Piracy Cooperation: Challenges and Scope Both Israel and USA have not yet partnered the UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, agreement for anti -piracy due to their security and other domestic concerns12 . However US and India share a lot of understanding which includes framework for India US Maritime cooperation, which has provisions for joint operations and training other than common objectives and goals for securing threats in the maritime domain13 .This however can be made into a trilateral area for cooperation against a menace that has become a 24.5 billion USD 14 loss to internati onal trade and according to another research is more than 5- 6 billion USD15 annual, for efforts towards countering it. Loss due to damages caused by piracy attacks brings the figure to around 9 billion USD annually16 , according to a data from the Indian Ship Owners Association. According to a World Bank report the loss due to Piracy has been 18 billion USD in the Indian Ocean region alone 17 . Given such information and circumstances the agreement between Indian and the US counterparts in 2006 was the first step in this direction, in which a Maritime
Security
Cooperation
Agreement
which
―commits
both
countries to comprehensive cooperation in protecting the free flow of commerce and addressed a wide variety of threats to maritime security, including piracy and the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and related material,‖18 was formulated. Israel shapes its navy according
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to its security concerns and as a coastal nation, given it is surrounded by hostile elements, states in its neighborhood. Howe ver the chances of it getting directly or indirectly engulfed in the economic consequences of global piracy, if piracy continues to grow unabated at the current trends, more so with possible involvement of anti -Israeli elements that may voluntarily or by design mark ships boun d for the ports of Israel as a viable target for Piracy attacks19 , is high. Israeli security firms have already started to provide professional anti -piracy security options to various ships 20 . It would suit the interests of all three partnering nations with increased coordinated patrol
an d operational activities
for
joint
anti -piracy
missions. It has been done by India, Japan and China, in 2012, in this case, despite being neighbors with conflicting interests21 . Since 2008 the EU has been actively participating in several joint EU mechanisms like CSDP (Common Security Defense Policy), ATLANTA22 , and NATO along with individual member nations to fight the growing dangers and menace of piracy in the world. The most risky areas in any Sea Lanes of Communications are those that have choke points and as such the most notably are the Gulf of Aden, Strait of Hormuz near the Arabian Sea, and Malacca straits in the Indian Ocean. They have become the bane of present and future concerns, in light of Somali piracy which is the largest contributor to this problem, among piracy by other groups. With major part of the world including EU not having any influence beyond the western Indian ocean region for providing security cover, it becomes feasible for major naval powers like US, and In dia, that have the opportunity to tie efforts to reduce cost of anti- piracy operations, by sharing the large area of responsibility, in the area of operations, since as of now and in the past the cost of carrying out anti-piracy operations out-weighs the losses in the Indian ocean region. This would be an extension of the ongoing anti -piracy multilateral effort of the US Combined Task Force CTF- 151, along with European and individual effort from In dia and other south Asia n nations like Japan and South Korea 23 .
Even though the latest data indicates that the
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threat to piracy is reduced in the Gulf of Aden Region off the coast of Somalia 24 the gain could be short-lived if effective counter measures are not kept in place. India and the
USA conduct joint naval exercises called Malabar
Exercises. India also like the USA, carries out joint exercise with France Varuna, Singapore Simbex, Japan, UK-Konkan, among few others in the recent past25 . Dedicated sharing of naval intelli gence and sea borne communication messages could lead in a new era of maritime security operations within the trilateral cooperation gambit26 . The Indian Ocean Rim is the carrier of 65% of oil reserves are located in the Indian Ocean, 40% offshore oil- production comes from areas touching the Indian Ocean region, and 70% of petroleum products are transporte d from this Indian Ocean region. It is also the focus point of shifting US concerns in the vicinity of South China Sea and China‘s growing ambitions for garnering its influence in the region to secure its political, diplomatic, security and resource requirements, as mentioned earlier. The recent remarks made by the G7 nations, 2015, regarding their concerns with the growing tension in the South China Sea27 , reflects similar concerns. This makes the Indian Ocean possibly the hottest contested flash point for conflicting interests and a very opportunistic place for activities that relate to maritime security concerns including piracy, in the future. It draws the ascending interests of USA an d India and in relative terms, the Israeli common interests, and gives it a platform for merging a doctrine or policy among these three nations for integrated naval activity and cooperation for consolidating maritime securi ty interests. Even though India does not officially term or mention the Chinese threats in the international arena, in a recent visit to Japan the Prime Minister reference to counter ―expansionist mindset‖ 28 , has been in many ways construed as a veiled reference to Chinese assertiveness in the Asian region in general. Although India still maintains an official policy not to be seen as grouped in any Anti -China military coalition, its individual effort through the look east policy to make collaborative ventu res on economic and military relations with nations in the South East Asia
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alludes towards a gradual preparedness and creating a deterring effect. This it is attempting to do through colla borations on various collective common interests with partnering nations, of the region (South East Asia), in the
eventuality of an aggression by the
handedness, if it happens in the future.
Chinese
high
For such an eventuality the
American support will be crucial. So even though India refused to officially acquiesce to the American plans of ‗Pivot to Asia‘ 29 , the recent news of India intending to carry out trilateral meeting with Japan and Australia in effect alludes towards similar common concerns viz. China. Israel on its side views growing Indian Maritime strength with the Indian Navy as an asset to create a strategic military naval partnership and a toe hold in the Indian ocean, for prospective tests for missiles and other naval warfare systems, which it may not find con ducive to do in the Mediterranean
neighborhood given
present
European
Eastern political and security concerns and hostile
and Middle watchfulness.
Reports of Israel having tested its missile in Indian Ocean has surfaced in many podiums and research references 30 .
The Israeli concern for
maritime security of trade items routing through the Bab El Man deb Straits sea route as life line for transporting goods, is paramount, since the landed border nations would not allow transit of the goods due to hostile relations31 . The prowess of the Indian Navy was rece ntly seen in Operation Rahat which rescued more than 5600 people were rescued which included 4640 Indians and 960 foreign nationals who belonged to 41 nations 32 . India‘s strategic reach it is what India brings to the table for serving interests during war torn situations for other nations. Maritime security and Naval cooperation is possible in the international waters for joint doctrine and objectives of security, since its functions for common or collective acts of security are permissible in internationa l waters, unlike land or air force. The navy gets to move around in international waters within the United Nations framework of roles and responsibility which cannot be said is the case of any conventional national Army or Air Force unless under UN mandate .
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Defense & Strategic Cooperation: Past Challenges and Scope for the Future India Israel relations and India US relations have a come long way since the days of the cold war. As diplomatic relations between the Israel and India strengthened so has Indi a USA relations gained a lot of cohesion in the recent decade. Initially the United States began exerting its influence over policy, trade and sales between them especially those related to defense, and still does so officially. The United States exerts its control over Israeli weapons and technology sales and transfers to India for a variety of reasons. Although it is not the sole area of interest or region where the United States exerts its influence it is important given India‘s geographical location and rise to global power status. One reason that the United States objects to Israeli weapons and technology transfers even now is due to their collaborative nature and the presence of US technology and equipment they are subject to US export controls an d a pproval. The Arms Export C ontrol Act (AECA) requires
that
no defense
services
be
transferred from
the
U.S.
government to a foreign government unless the recipient country agrees to the terms under the AECA.33 This means that it will not transfer the defense article to a third party or use it for any other purpose other than that which it was intended for without U.S. approval. These restrictions not only a pply to defense articles or services but include dual -use technologies as well that are considered to possess the potential to endanger U.S. security interests under the Export Administrative Act. 34In conjunction with the restrictions under the Arms Export Control Act and Export Administrative Act the US State Departments Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) enacts further regulations. Through the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs the AECA utilizes the International Traffic in Arms Regulation, which contains a munitions list that provides a list of technologies, weapons and services deemed to be detrimen tal to US security interests if exported.35 One example of US influence over Israeli transfer of weapons and technology can be seen with the Lavi controversy. Due to its technologies
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coming from Washington and therefore subject to the AECA export restrictions on the Lavi project prevented sale of technology or joint development even though a significant portion of the technologies were owned by Israel. Israel‘s Defense budget that is around 14 -15 billion USD gives a spot in the top 15 ranked nati on for military spending in the world36 , by IISS analysis. However this position and preparedness comes at a very steep price. Israel nearly spends about 17% of its total budget on defense 37 . This shall have a 10% increase given last year‘s conflict in the budget allocation in 201538 . Although usually not up for debates, Israel is finding it harder to press for higher budgetary allocation for defense over the last few years. Recent political and social movement and development in the European sphere of relations with Israel, it becomes imperative that Israel starts to develop relations with newer partners. In this India can play a crucial role given its steadfast defense relationship since normalization of relations in 1992. As Israel looks to diversify its sources of revenue generation, investing in India would garner a steady an d long term provisioning for sharing this concern. In the past decade India Israel annual defense trade has been pegged aroun d 1 to 1.5 billion 39 USD estimated, with a potential to increase in the future given trends in cooperation and as a result of Free Trade Agreement, which may be signed in the near future. It is estimated to have an impact of increase in annual trade volume to three times the current mark to about 15 billion USD40 . That would amount to equal the current defense budget itself, if successful. India too faced a loss of development and induction time due to US sanctions post Pokhran Nuclear tests in 1998 41 . India‘s LCA program that heavily depended on the GE 404 / 414 Engines caused huge delay in the successful development and deployment of the LCA with the indigenous Kaveri Engine, which is said to have less power than what was envisaged for the LCA 42 . However with the lifting of restrictive sanctions for these engines India shall procure initially the GE 404 and later 414 engines. The subsequent delay caused is one of many reasons
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that Indian decision makers show reluctance to accept newly proposed initiatives for critical hardware that even though proposed by the US A, has not been vigorously sought after due to restrictive transfer of technology clauses, and trust deficit. Such areas of cooperation need clarity and trust which has been dismally low in the past and given best of intentions, needs a lot to be done to convert them into mutually satisfactory deals and ventures. The recent decision in 2009 to halt supply of GE engines for India‘s Stealth Shivalik class Ships, due to its internal considerations, puts doubt in the minds of Indian decision makers about the re liability of the Americans in general, as has been the notion since the sanctions of 1998. Even though this decision to ban GE from facilitating its engines for operational status was not merely meant for India, UK and Australia also faced a similar ban, i t only put strain on the already strongly held notion of un dependa ble reliance in times of critical needs. Even though US went into corrective mode later and offered state of the art fighter jets for the Indian Air force deal of MMRCA the Indians respon ded by removing the American offer on the basis of cost viability keeping the fences of doubts of reliability still intact 43 . These fences of mistrust have to be overcome by mutual consent and joint collaborations within the framework of levels of security, a nd trilateral cooperation must be the higher end game. In this particular case India- Israel relations can play a decisive role as Israel is pivoted in a very trusted position by both India and tra ditionally by the USA, notwithstanding the recent incidents that suggest shift in US approach towards Israel. The start towards change in intent and subsequent action are expected to usher in optimistic trends with the Prime Ministerial visit of Mr. Modi to the US last year. This visit was subsequently reciproc ated by the President of the United States, Barak Obama as chief guest this Year, on India‘s Republic Day. This highlights the changing posture and dynamics which intends to go beyon d pleasantries of India – US relations. The recent negotiations and formation of the Joint venture between India‘s
Kalyani
group an d Israel‘s
149
Rafael for
‗..development
and
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manufacture a wide range of missiles, remote weapon systems and advanced amour solutions‘44 is an era away from the way India & Israel interacted for defense relations among others, keeping everything under wraps. Success stories that need to build further along on the lines of Joint development need clearing mindset and bureaucratic hurdles in all three partnering nations. American concern with the implications of India‘s increased weapons capa bility on the South Asian military balance 45 , is declining albeit gradually. Its fears that if India increases its military power it will seek to expand its sphere of influence through military ventures, is beginning to look like an asset to counter China‘s aggressive moves in the Indian Ocean region and the Pacific. Aside from the US interests to maintain the status quo of the regions military balance and balance of power, its veto of Israeli sales to India have not bee n solely for humanitarian or regional concerns. The United States has pressured Israel to ban the sale of certain weapons an d technologies to other countries including India for fear that it would undermine their ability to enter the market to sell a similar item. Moreover it desires to create a friendlier climate with which it can increase high-tech trade and forge strategic ties with India. The intended objective it would seem would be to increase American influence or ties that it wants to create for Washington to have in the Indian American international relations. However the recent selection of Israeli Spike missiles in the face of American proposal to sell and co-develop Javelin anti-tank missile, and the subsequent signing of renewal of Defense Frame work agreement of 200546 with impetus on defense trade, (joint exercises, co-operation in anti -piracy and maritime security operations 47 , with an element of Defense technology trade initiative), still intact, with four of the 17 offered proposals, namely Raven Minis UAVs, roll on and roll off kits for C-130, mobile electric hybrid power source and Uniform Integrated Protection Ensemble Increment 48 , within the renewed tenets of the agreement, suggests that India‘s market share and size can accommodate security systems, weapons and technology from the US and Israel without exclusivity to anyone. More so as the US has the
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advantage in sharing technology and systems, that remains at present an ‗American only‘ option. As previous mentioned, Israel is a recipient of U.S. aid an d technology and therefore a variety of restrictions are placed on sales or transfers of weapons and technology from Israel to a third party by U.S. exporting laws which restrict such transfers even if there have been alternations done, or the majority of technology is owned by the seller. 49 The U.S policy of persuasion with regards to Israel and has been seen on a number of other occasions where Israel sought defense contracts with other countries to fulfill its interests. This needs to be simplified where India‘s security interest are concerned, with regards to sale and purchase of Israeli weapons and weapons systems, to gather trust potential between the US and In dia. The US understanding and policy towards In dia, its position in the Asia Pacific, security, developments and other scenarios is based off on the US needs and interests in the region. The United States sees India as a rising global power with a similar government structure and the largest democracy in the world, therefore making India a natural partner. 50 From the 2nd Bush administration to the Obama administration the United States policy towards India has gone from a very favorable policy towards India to ones that have favored China over India. Under the Bush a dministration the view was that the U.S. ―must deal wisely with the world‘s largest democracy. Soon to be the most populous country in the world, India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor.‖ 51 This policy was seen to gain significance in mid-2001 when ―India and the United States were building a new relationship that was based on military ties and an increasingly similar world view.‖52 The Obama a dministration policy was one that began with policies that had favored China over India since it viewed China as essential to solving global issues53 , now a changing and challenging proposition to hold on to given recent Chinese escapades to break the status quo of US dominance in the Pacific theatre, security
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concerns with US allies like Japan and South Korea and hostile countries like North Korea. According to congressional reports from 2011, the basis of US-In dia partnership stems from its ―geography o f a now strategically important South Asia region, and its vibrant economy, pluralist society, cultural influence and growing military power‖ which has made it a ―key focus of the U.S.‖54 The recent visit by the Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and his discussions with Indian counterparts including the Defense Minister of India is seen as a favorable element in growing India US trust and cooperation 55 . As India continues to develop its position within the international community its leadership role in the world especially in the Asia-Pacific region with involvement in
South & South-East Asia, and Central Asia
becomes increasingly significant. The
United States views India‘s
presence as having the ability to deter regional conflict, prevent nuclear proliferation into South Asia and as a partner that can aid the U.S. efforts to counterbalance China‘s influence in the region. The United States policy is concerned with ensuring the strategic stability in Asia and believes it gets affected by the penetration of weapons of mass destruction, due to the increase and spread of terrorism and the rise of china as a potential power in the region.56 India‘s ―look east‖ policy, with its economic liberalization has allowed it to expand its commercial, di plomatic and security ties with East an d South East Asia.57 These developments with its eastern neighbors are likely in response to China‘s growing regional influence and will act to further offset China‘s influence. To accomplish this the United States has offered weapons an d weapon systems to India to further develop its military muscle and defense imports while ensuring the strategy does not undermine the willingness of all to cooperate on global issues. 58 Although some Indian officials have been said to be wary of the implications of closer military and strategic ties with the U.S. and the effect it will have on their future related to freedom in designing their own foreign policy, in 2002, we saw some of these fears allayed when the first major arms trade from the U.S. to India occurred.59 This was
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subsequently repeated in numerous defense sales programs that have taken place since that includes USS Trenton, the amphibious landing Ship, 8 P8 Maritime reconnaissance Aircraft, 6 C130J Hercules aircraft, 10 C17 Globemaster Aircraft, and now recently approved purchase of 145 units of US M777 light howitzers 60 , so far, through various deals and provisions specially under Foreign Military Sales. These deals have led to an increase in the much needed sense of security cooperati on and joint military exercises between the two countries. To achieve the transformation of relations the United States sought to lift the restrictions on the India for supply of nuclear fuel. In 2005 the Bush administration lobbied for an d achieved the removal of these restrictions claiming it would ―strengthen nonproliferation in the region.‖ 61 This policy encouraged foreign investors to do business with India but its own American parliamentary policies still restricted the involvement of American companies. In conducting these deals the United States didn‘t require India to ―sign the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or put a moratorium on further production of fissile materials for weapons.‖ 62 This agreement will allow India to carry out trade of nuclear fuel and technologies with other countries and significantly enhance its power generation capacity.
63
Even though the India US deal is still pending its
full fruition due to individual concerns in the agreement entangled in the liability provisions of the act by both parties, it led to the general perception that it would be all-right to allow India to have Nuclear fuel, given its perceived and known status of reliable and responsible nation. This in turn allowed several other countries to conclude deals with India for her to get nuclear fuel. The recently concluded deal with Canada during Prime Minister Modi‘s recent visit to supply India with 3000 metric Tonnes Uranium fuel 63 is one such arrangement among several nations that include Mongolia, Namibia, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Australia, France & Russia who have signed agreements to supply India with Nuclear fuel. When the US India agreement goes through, India is expected to generate an additional 25,000 MW of nuclear power by 2020, bringing total estimated nuclear power generation to 45,000 MW64 .
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International relations and security considerations in the neighborhood between India and Pakistan have effects on American interests in regions such as in Afghanistan. While Indian peacekeeping capabili ties and ties to Afghanistan have the potential to benefit U.S. efforts there, the tensions with India and Pakistan put the U.S in a position that potentially harms relations with both countries. 65 The U.S. sees Pakistan as essential to its efforts in Afghanistan due to its proximity, providing it a strategic position and assets, while India has been the largest contributor to Afghan reconstruction projects. The tensions between the two countries are exacerbated by their desired role in Afghanistan with Pakistan claiming the U.S. should use its influence over India to remove its presence there. India on the other hand claims that it would not be there if the people di d not welcome their presence which is supported by its historical policy of not intervening where it is not welcome. Although the Obama a dministration has refrained from taking a direct role in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, its position is that it is linked to regional peace and stability. However, the greater the involvement of US and Israel in the region with India, politically (US Israel-India), militarily (US-India-Israel, for shared technology an d weapons
and
equipment),
economically
(US-India-Israel),
through
integrated projects and programs, the lesser the chance of mischief by state and non-state actors intending to harm peace and security in the region. India‘s desire to shift imports to co-production ventures with foreign suppliers ensuring it is not totally reliant on any one country, and hence has opened up its options for forming collaboration with Israel and US. In recent years ―Israel has roughly equaled Russia in its value of defense exports to In dia…topping 2 billion dollars annually.‖ 66 And USA has become the largest supplier since then, in 2014 67 . There have also been new joint projects to develop missile technologies. Defense and high tech sectors should continue to succeed and be supplemented by Israeli defense technology and there is reason to believe relations will further strengthen in times to come, gi ven now the First Prime Ministerial visit
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has been declared. U.S policy should work to satisfy interests and needs of self and In dia as well. Due to its growing role within the international community it has the potential to positively influence to world s ecurity and the regional security. Bringing it into the international community has benefits the trilateral interest. Cyber Security: Challenges and Scope It is usually said that the next war would be fought not on battle fields but in the electronic space where bullets will be replaced by bits of data. The increasing cases of cyber-attacks in India alone saw more than 28,481 Indian websites were hacked in 2013 -2014. A home ministry report
listed that
US,
Europe, Brazil, Turkey, China, Pakistan,
Bangla desh, Algeria and the UAE were the nerve centers of cyber -attacks in India. India drafted a new policy for Cyber Security called National Cyber Security Policy 201368 . It catered to 14 objectives that include creation of a cyber-ecosystem in the country for protection of business and
physical
assets
through
public
private
partnerships 69
and
collaborative engagement 70 . It is here that India can merge it‘s requisi te defense requirements against cyber-attacks by allowing Israeli and US integration of cyber defense capabilities that are considered the best in the world. According to a report, personal information of nearly half of American adults, 110 million, has been made public by hackers. Kaspersky Lab USA has revealed in yet another report that over 1 billion USD and more had been stolen from banks in the past year 71 . Repeated attempts by both countries in trying to engage each other in a cyber -security partnership as early as 200272 , with creation of India US cyber security forum, failed to gain much grounds on various issues. These issues included past mistrust and the revelation of US surveillance during 2006 meeting73 . India has skilled technical manpower and US has the infrastructure and money to partner any joint cyber defense collaborative program. Keeping this in view the strategic dialogues in 2010 again re started the discussion on cyber defense partnership. That culminated in the formation of the Strategic Cyber Policy Dialogue 74 . This intended to
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norms
FPRC New Delh i responsible
state
behavior, internet
governance
and
cybercrime cooperation. In 2011 C ERT -IN and US–C ERT ma de a deal for cooperation for countering cyber-attacks. Both these organizations are leading organizations for countering any cyber-attacks75 . In the recent visit of the US President to India a concerted effort was made to emphasize the importance of collaboration on cyber security between both nations.
‗In a joint U.S.-India statement, both le aders expressed
their appreciation of the growing problem of cybercrime and vowed their allegiance toward growing India US commitment to cooperation for battling cybercrime and its ―serious risks to national and economic security from malicious cyber-activity and agreed to cooperate on enhancing operational sharing of cyber threat information, examining how international law applies in cyberspace and working together to build agreement on norms of responsible state behavior.‖ ‗ 76 In September 8th 2013, a cyber-attack shut down the camera system of the Carmel Tunnels, a passageway for motor transport in Haifa city 77 . Such an attack prom pted the authorities to block the passageway of the tunnel for two days. The enormity of the attacks showed that public infrastructure can be brought to a stan dstill and worse can be attacked to create wide spread panic and even damage and destruction. Though Israel is considered to be one of the best locations and systems for cyber security in the world, the constant attacks by hackers makes it a veritable partner to align India‘s security interests with. The Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu in his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on the side lines of the United Nations meeting in 2014, extended his invitation to colla borate in development of cyberdefense78 . India can provide the required manpower to create dedicated cyber security task force that may operate with individual enterprises in the public private and government sphere or they can be combined to for a united and organized body or institution. With the cyber-attacks on DRDO in 2013, an d Eastern Naval command in 2012, it is in India‘s interest to align its technological prowess and manpower towards
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developing a more robust cyber defense capability in collaboration within the trilateral entity of India-Israel-US. With 1.25 lakh cyber experts in China and aroun d 91,000 in the USA, India needs to build its Cyber security infrastructure as well as technological base. India‘s internet penetration is set around at 31.2 Crores or 312 million, on date. It has the fastest growth rate of 17.5% in 2014 among the top three internet user base countries in the world alongside China and USA 79 . Its present world share of internet user is 8.33% is still third highest in terms of proportions in the world.
The ecommerce and online travel booking
market is set to reach the amount of 16 billion USD in 2015 80 . Even though India is not a top ecommerce and online travel booking market yet, it has the potential to grow exponentially81 in less than a decade. The enormous population base and subsequent internet services sector, it is imperative that India develops mechanisms to counter the threats to protect its internet services and infrastructure. Even though India‘s share of financial losses due to cyber-crime is a relatively small amount Rs 34,110 annual 82 compared to the world statistics of 388 billion USD over all
83 ,
it only goes to show how as internet and business grows the
need to secure our interests also would grow. Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism Initiatives: Challenges and Scope Since the 26/11 attack in Mumbai and foun d shortages in India‘s homeland security preparedness has been made a central and state priority. A lot of initiatives have been taken to strengthen coastal security. These include setting up of the Apex body called the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security. As a result setting up of Joint operation Centers at several key places, in coastal cities and towns that are said to be fully operational, took place. According to a Government of In dia report the entire West Coast is under continuous surveillance by Indian Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Police forces. A National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network was set up84 recently, to collate all the data that is generated from these multiple information centers, that include ships and other
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vessels, AIS sensors, radars space based assets, aerial and land based sources. It has facilitated the collation of all information to a central collection, analysis and decision making center, increasing the efficiency of the whole system and purpose. It is called the IMAC 85 or Information Management and Analysis Center. Setting up of hotlines for States and Union Territories with coastal boun daries has been done. Formation of Maritime State boards has taken place. Capacity building is being done and num ber of vessels for Coast Guard is being increased to double in the next few years86 . Automatic identification systems have been setup to provide a continuous chain along with radar for surveillance information. Despite all of this preparedness there are gaps which are being covered and a continuous approach towards improving short comings will be done 87 . It is here that the cooperation with US and Israel on updating India‘s technological prowess and capacity building can get a thrust. India has already shown interest in exchanging homeland security technology and products from Israel in 2014. Israel is a leading expert on surveillance technology. India and the US also concluded their homeland security dialog in 2014, with an emphasis on sharing of US homelan d security technology and as a result ‗less than .02% products require license compared to 24% in 2004‘ 88 . Common Counter terrorism goals have been discussed. The Indian aspersions regarding initial denial and then delay in access to David Headly, for Indian authorities to question him regarding his role in the Mumbai attacks of 26/11/2008, needs to be consequently removed. There is a lot of trust to be gained after such events and both sides are well positioned in showing their intent for cooperation in this area. In 2011 the American Customs sent back to India three stolen artifacts of 11th century, worth 1.5 million USD, in a show of good faith and cooperation89 . However the India US counter terrorism initiative now intends to progress on capa bility building for India through ―sharing of best practices on issues of mutual interest; development of investigative skills;
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of
FPRC New Delh i cooperation
between
forensic
science
laboratories;
establishment of procedures to provide mutual investigative assistance; enhancing capabilities to act against money laundering, counterfeit currency and financing of terrorism; exchanging best practices on mass transit and rail security; increasing exchanges between Coast Guards and Navy on maritime security; exchanging experience and expertise on port an d border security; enhancing liaison and training between specialist Counter Terrorism Units including National Security Guard with their US counter parts‖90 . India also has to deal with local Insurgents for which it shall need defensive systems and surveillance technology, some
of which India is developing on its own, like
surveillance drones and some it shall have to import. The growing influence of ISIS in the West Asian region will require India‘s larger role as a considerable military power, if the security of Indian‘s in the Middle -East, (a bout 7 million91 ), may face serious threat in the future. So far very little is known about number of Indians having joined the ISIS. In case the threat of ISIS reaches in the Indian neighborhood (in Pakistan or elsewhere) and the off chance that a number of Indians get involved in cross border terrorist organizations, like seen in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, India might be drawn into taking a proactive stance, to protect its citizens and its national and international strategic security interests at large. It is in India‘s best interest to keep a close watch on the developments, lest it is drawn in a situation it is unprepared for. This can be done by close sharing of Intelligence and information with Israel and the USA, which is known to have expertise on the issue at hand. The US is directly involved in the conflict and thus has the most information about the region on this issue. Notions of Pakistan getting involved in sale of missiles to Middle Eastern states, and recent concerns about ISIS getting hold of some crude or dirty nuclear device channeled through defeated territories and leaked know how from Pakistan,92 are areas of common concern that make both India, Israel and USA covet growth in Security cooperation.
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Conclusion: India, US and Israel are going to face newer challenges in the changing dynamics of security situation. However the success rate of keepin g one‘s country and society safe may not be singularly possible, as larger threats that amalgamate in the form of conventional and non -conventional security challenges emerge.
US, India and Israel can integrate and
cooperate to contain reduce or eliminate these threats that include Maritime security, Conventional Security, Terrorism and Piracy, cyber security among others. The other advantage is that while India generates revenues from its huge growing security and defense market, one such figure being 100 plus billion (approximate) US dollars in Defense itself, in the next decade, it becomes a huge advantage to India to receive front generation equipment, technology and weapons an d weapon systems, in a time frame which is usually not associated to several indigenous projects. Faster realization of large -scale enterprise products in Defense and homeland security as seen by historic legacy in the last two decades with Israel can increase many folds with US participation. Less political and bureaucratic burden to each partnering nation due to given tacit understanding of each other‘s liabilities and a bilities domestically and internationally through specific agreements and arrangements can be achieved.
Multitudinous
opportunities
to
gain
joint
development
arrangement in research and development and production of the products makes it both Israel and USA a potential player for large orders than what has been gained so far, in some cases, which can become larger in the future. _________ 1. 2.
3.
Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, Panetta describes US shift in Asia Pacific, June, 1, 2012 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116591 Gerard Smith, Chief US Negotiator SALT I, Paolo Vittorelli, Chairman (ISTRID), Kiichi Saeki Chairman Nomura Research Institute, Trilateral Security, Defense & Arms Control Policies, in the 1980s, Library of Congress Catalog, USA, 1983,p13. Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge Studies International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p6- 13.
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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.
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US India Security Partnership, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington DC, September 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232330.htm; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www.mea.gov.in/media briefings.htm?dtl/24732/Transcript_of_Media_Briefing_by_Foreign_Secretary_on _President_Obamas_visit_to_India_January_25_2015. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Different Methods of Balance of Power, Alliances, Borzoi book, Alfred A Knopf, Library of Congress File catalog, 1967, USA, p23. Edited by Ken Booth, Is International Security Possible? by Barry Buzan, New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, p 45 Embassy of India, Washington DC, USA, https://www.indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=41 Embassy of India, Tel Aviv, Israel, Bilateral Agreements, http://www.indembassy.co.il/pages.php?id=11# .VXa4SM-qqko http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/1996/Pages/REMARKS%20BY%20PRESIDE NT%20CLINTON%20AND%20ISRAELI%20PM%20PERES-.aspx US Embassy, New Delhi, India, US India Relations, US-India Counter Terrorism Partnership http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/counterterrorism.html. PTI,India, Israel to collaborate in fighting terror, cyber threats, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/india-israel-to-collaboratein-fighting-terror-cyber-threats/article6576886.ece http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/2/399.full Lt. Gen Naresh Chandra, Indo-US Maritime Cooperation, http://www.spsnavalforces.com/story.asp?mid=41&id=2 Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso & Sami Bensassi, The price of modern maritime piracy, 08 Feb 2013. Marinelog, Total cost of piracy: $5.7 billion to $6.1 billion. http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3863:total -cost-of-piracy-$57-billion-to-$61-billion&Itemid=231. PTI,Global shipping suffers annual loss of $9 billion due to piracy: Indian Shipowners' Association, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-1003/news/30238487_1_piracy-annual-loss-pirate-prone. http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/the-indian-oceans-18-billion-piracystakes/ ibid, p. 82 Saleh Al-Nuami The Israeli navy takes Centre stage as major deterrent factor, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle -east/18190-the-israelinavy-takes-centre-stage-as-major-deterrent-factor. http://i-hls.com/2013/02/israel-in-anti-piracy-operations/ http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/07/03/china-aligns-with-india-japan-onpiracy-patrols/ http://eunavfor.eu/ Counterr Piracy Operations NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/changes -shipping-routes-piracy-declineswestern-indian-ocean http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Navy# Equipment Lt. Gen Naresh Chandra, Indo-US Maritime Cooperation, http://www.spsnavalforces.com/story.asp?mid=41&id=2 Ankit Panda, G7 Leaders call for Rule based Maritime Order, Condemn North Korea, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/g7-leaders-call-forrules-based-maritime-order-condemn-north-korea/
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28. http://www.wsj.com/articles/indias -prime-minister-narendra-modi-wantscloser-ties-with-japan-to-counter-china-1409555754 29. S.D Muni, Vivek Chaddha, US Pivot and Asian Security, Asian Startegic Review 2014, IDSA New Delhi. 30. Efraim Inbar, Israel‘s National Security: Issues and Challenges Since the Yom Kippur War, Routledge Publication, New York,2008, p. 183. 31. Ibid.p183 32. http://www.quora.com/Why-is-India-being-praised-by-the-media-across-theworld-for-the-Yemen-rescue-operation 33. Clarke,D. LLC Israel's Unauthorized Arms Transfers. Foreign Policy p. 90 34. ibid. 35. ibid. 36. https://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014- 3bea/februaryf007/defence-spending-a132 37. Reuters, Jun 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/us -israeldefence-idUSKBN0EC1GI20140601 38. http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.619851 39. Amos Harel, Sisters in Arms: The Burgeoning defense trade between Israel and India, Haretz News, Feb 22, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/.premium-1.575486 40. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-0418/news/38647057_1_top-israeli-diplomat-annual-trade-volume-haryana 41. Jerome M. Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for U.S, Lexington Books, Boston, Maryland USA, 2001. p68 42. R.K Bhonsle, India-Security Scope 2006, The new Great Game, Kalpaz Publications, New Delhi, p257 43. Hemal Shah, In US- India‘s Defense, Pivoting the Strategic Partnership Forward, The South Asia Channel, Foreign Policy, Jan 23 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/23/in-u-s-indias-defense-pivoting-thestrategic-partnership-forward/ 44. http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/kalyani-group-signs-jvwith-rafale-to-develop-missile-tech-defence-systems-115021900234_1.html 45. Inbar, E., & Ningthoujam, A. S. (2012). Indo-Israeli defense cooperation in the Twenty-First Century. Ramat-Gan, Israel: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. 46. PTI, India, US renew their 10 year Defence Framework Agreement, Sunday, 25 January 2015 - 7:00pm New Delhi, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/reportindia-us-renew-their-10-year-defence-framework-agreement-2055607 47. Jim Garamone, U.S., India Sign 10-Year Defense Framework Agreement, DoD News, Defense Media Activity, WASHINGTON, June 4, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128973 48. PTI, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-0226/news/59541582_1_dtti-agreements-security-relationship 49. Neuman, S. (2006). Defense Industries and Global Dependency. Orbis p. 448 50. Perkovich, G. (2010). Towards Realistic U.S.-India Relations. Carnegie Endow ment for International Peace, p. 11 51. Gupta, A. (2005). The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?. DIANE Publishing. p. 5 52. ibid, p. 5 53. Perkovich, G. (2010). Towards Realistic U.S.-India Relations. Carnegie Endow ment for International Peace, p. 25 54. Kronstadt, K., Kerr, P., Martin, M., & Vaughn, (2011) B. India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations. CRS Report for Congress, RL33529. p.1
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55.http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/letterfromwashington/why-usdefence-secretary-ashton-carters-visit-to-india-this-week-is-crucial/ 56. Gupta, A. (2005). The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?. DIANE Publishing. p. 10 57. Kronstadt, K., Kerr, P., Martin, M., & Vaughn, (2011) B. India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations. CRS Report for Congress, RL33529. p. 35 58. Perkovich, G. (2010). Towards Realistic U.S.-India Relations. Carnegie Endow ment for International Peace, p. 14 59. Kronstadt, K., Kerr, P., Martin, M., & Vaughn, (2011) B. India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations. CRS Report for Congress, RL33529. p. 85 60.http://www.telegraphindia.com/1150514/jsp/nation/story_20021.jsp#.VX6Xms -qqko 61. Perkovich, G. (2010). Towards Realistic U.S.-India Relations. Carnegie Endow ment for International Peace, pp. 33-38 62. ibid, p. 34 63. http://www.firstpost.com/world/canada-to-supply-uranium-to-india-under-a254-million-five-year-deal-2198002.html 64. Major General Ajay Kumar Chaturvedi, AVSM,VSM (Retd.),Nuclear Energy in India‘s Energy Security Matrix: An Appraisal, Vij Books India Publications, New Delhi, 2014, Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Petroleum Technology, p 127. 65. Gupta, A. (2005). The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?. DIANE Publishing. p. 32 66. Kronstadt, K., Kerr, P., Martin, M., & Vaughn, (2011) B. India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations. CRS Report for Congress, RL33529. p. 60 67. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-pips-Russia-as-top-armssupplier-to-India/articleshow/40142455.cms 68. http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/cyber-crime-continues-to-rise-in-india78-sites-hacked-this-year-103717.html 69. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-announces-cyber-securitycooperation-with-private-sector/article4000136.ece?ref=relatedNews 70. http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/sibal-says-2013-national-cybersecurity-policy-will-be-a-real-task-to-operate-101759.html 71.http://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/02/17/over_1_billion_stolen_from_banks_b y_hackers_41431.html 72. Rahul Prakash, Indian US Cyber Relations, ORF, 14 January 2014. http://orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html ?cmaid=61763&mmacmaid=61764 73. Lisa Curtis, The Cyber Bridge to Improved India-US Cooperation, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/10/the -cyber-bridge-toimproved-india-us-cooperation 74. ibid 75. http://www.deccanherald.com/content/164593/india-us-sign-cybersecurity.html 76. http://samirsaran.com/2015/01/27/obama-discusses-cybersecurity-withindia/ 77. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4446258,00.html 78. http://www.timesofisrael.com/india-israel-set-to-team-up-on-cyber-defense/ 79. http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ 80. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/E-commerce-market-totouch-16-billion-in-India-this-year/articleshow/46864759.cms 81. http://www.ibtimes.co.in/india-not-among-top-10-global-e-commerce-markets636177 82.https://www.google.co.il/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0C B0Q FjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dnaindia.com%2Fmumbai%2Freport -cyber-
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crime-costs-india-rs34110-crore-per-year1588917&ei=8VWCVYTPHMG0UtHLgMgO&usg=AFQjCNHWbvVbTRr4YW8G2gx7Wb wA4Y3ovw&sig2=oKN9YqqpMwxADs23QU2mHg 83. Ibid. 84. http://indiannavy.nic.in/print/2247 85. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Naval -intelligence-network-launchtomorrow/articleshow/45237364.cms 86. Dr. Suresh R, MP Muralidharan, Maritime Security of India: The Coastal Security Challenges and Policy Options, Maritime Coastal Security Concerns, p 87. http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/imac-for-coastal-security-a-reply-to26/11-attack-parrikar_1503736.html 88. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/230049.htm 89. Ibid. 90. Pree Information Bureau, New Delhi, Embassy of India, Washington D.C. USA, https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=1292 91. http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/indias -blind-spot-on-isis/ 92.http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle -east/ISISs-dirty-bombJihadists-have-seized-enough-radioactive-material-to-build-their-firstWMD/articleshow/47626987.cms *******
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(7) The impact of Israeli activities in China on Arab national security (Analytical vision) Dr.Nadia Helmy Visiting senior res earcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University - Lund/ Sweden. Lecturer of Political Science, School of Economic Studi es and Political Science, Beni Suef University, Egypt
E.mail ID:
[email protected] Abstract The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of Israeli activities in China on Arab national security from an analytical vision, analyzing the Israeli contemporary policies towards China, and the influence of these Israeli policies on the Arab nation al security. As the researcher noticed the raising number of Chinese converted Judaism, with regarding to Jewish is not a "Missionary religion" like the Christian or Muslim religion , so the researcher start to ask why are some Chinese converted Judaism?, regarding the Israeli academic activities in China, Now, there are five or six main Chinese academics who teach Jewish religion, history, and culture at various universities. There are such Chinese people who educate, in a positive way, thousands of young Chinese scholars in the knowledge of Judaism and Jewish history. All over China, the Torah and the Jewish principles is studied and the Holocaust is taught. Never before has interest in Jews, Jewish culture and Jewish history been so widespread in the world's most populous nation. Generally, Jewish studies itself has become much more worldly and diverse. The Israeli and Jewish think tanks and the growing numerous of "Chinese converted Judaism" who have a strong connection with "Israel" has a great impact on the "Arab world" represents in broadly knowledge between the Chinese academic and personal Judaic studies in China. In twenty years some of these Chinese students will be in senior positions and are likely to advise their country’s leaders on Jewish and Middle Eastern issues, and this can affect negatively on the "Arab national security", because they will adopt the Israeli points of view. Besides the spread of Chinese young people recruited in the Israeli military and the existence of Sino-Israeli companies under the Israeli leadership and supervision, all of those factors can negatively affect on the Arab national security.
Keywords
Israeli activities, Israeli thinks tanks, Jewish minorities, inter-marriage, Israeli companies, Chinese scholars, research centers, Chinese labour, converted Judaism, recruitment, Arab national security. Introduction Addressing the issue of Chinese Jews or newly converts to Judaism despite the fact that Judaism is not a "missionary religion" like the Christian or Muslim
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religion, is a new phenomenon attracted the Egypti an researcher so much once studying at Beijing. Hence, the researcher began to study and analyze of all aspects of the influence of the Jewish and Israeli policies in China, and the activities of Chinese Jews on Arab national security. Over the las t decade, a network of loosely affiliated pro-Israeli organizations embracing a number of think tanks, universities, lobbyist groups, foundations, activist-scholars as well as donors have successfully established a foothold in Chinese academia. The aim of these groups in China has been to provide a platform for espousing hasbara a Hebrew term for “explanation” denoting the utilization of diplomatic, media, and political mediums to clarify and defend Israel’s positions and actions that would s erve to re -shape Chinese academic perceptions of the Jewish state (1 ). Since the opening of China to Western tourism, there has been a renewed interest in the Chines e Jews. In 1985, Time Magazine ev en had a full page article on the Chinese Jews of "Kaifeng" which effectively anointed them full-fledged Jews seeki ng to preserve thei r Jewish heri tage (2) . Since the es tablishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Peopl e’s Republic of China (PRC), both countries are now celebrating the anniversary of begi nning the relationship between the two countries with many as pects of the bilateral ties fully developed, and the relationship having moved into the mainstream of diplomatic ties. Overcoming the geographical distance, the huge difference in size, and cultural divergence, Is rael and China have succeeded i n developing flourishing rel ations in trade, culture, academia and tourism. This may sound obvious, but it is far from being so. Israel and China established diplomatic relations on January 24, 1992, but tying the formal knot was preceded by nearly four decades of missed opportuniti es and third-party interference (3) . In 2015, though, both sides are looking firmly ahead as the bilateral relationship is booming. Consider, for instance, the economy. Tourism from China is growing, and China is already Israel’s largest trading partner in Asia, with two -way trade exceeding $10 billion. China is interested to learn from Israel in areas such as science, technology and innov ation, whereas Israel needs to diversify away from markets in the West. Indeed, the two economies are so complementary that Is rael and China recently agreed to begin a joint feasibility study for a free -trade agreement. An even more important component is cultural and academic links, the true and long-las ting foundation for future rel ations. Cultural exchanges are flourishing, with theater, classical and popular music groups, as well as dance troupes, bringi ng their art to audiences in both countri es, and piano master-classes being held for young Israeli and Chines e children, further cementing the friendship. In fact, i t has become common for Israeli orchestras, for example, The Israel Symphony Orchestra "Rishon LeZion", to pl ay pieces by Chines e composers.
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There are numerous partnerships in the academic field as well, and "Israel’s Council of Higher Education" is giving scholars hips to Chinese masters and postdoctoral students. Further, "Tel Aviv University" and Beijing’s "Tsinghua University" agreed to invest $ 300 million to es tablish the "Xin Research Center" for Sino-Israeli co-operation, intended to research early-stage and mature technologies in biotech, solar energy, water and environmental technologies. In 2013, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology teamed with Shantou University, in China’s southern "Guangdong" province, to build a Technion campus in China (4). Needless to say, one of the major questions which raised now was, to what extent are there Jews in Chi na? And, if there are any, who are they? What's the impact of currently Chinese converted Judaism on the Arab security as whole, as well as the impact of Sino-Israeli companies on the Arab security ? What follows is I believe the best available answer to these ques tions; one which accurately reflects the current situation and its impact on "Arab national security" as the main spot I will focus on. In this paper, the Egyptian researcher will try to draw some future analyses on the impact of – the mentioned co-operation fields between Chi na and Israel- on the Arab states and Arab national security. Research problem The bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the State of Israel are complex and manifold. Israel was the firs t country in the Middle Eas t, and one of the first in the world, to recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate gov ernment of China. However, due to China's initial refusal to recognize Israel and staunch support of the Arab world, it was not until 1992 that normal diplomatic relations were established. Since then, Is rael and China hav e developed increasingly close commercial and strategic links. On the other hand, Prevailing atmosphere of tension between Israel and the Arab world, besides the increasingly Israeli activities on the Chinese land, and the rising Chinese conv erted Judaism – The researcher noticed this phenomenon since she was studying at Peking University in China – and the Israeli encouragement to the Chi nese Judaism converted people, the inter -marri age between some Jews and Chinese women, besides the es tablishment of many Israeli think tanks in the Chinese Universiti es, finally the existence of many Israeli companies with Chinese coverage name, and the recrui tment of some Chines e young Jews in the Israeli military (IDF), all thos e factors can affect negatively on the Arab national security as whole regarding the Arab-Is rael conflict. - The paper seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is the impact of inter-marriage of Israeli Jewish citizens of Chines e women on Arab national security? (2) What is the impact of the Israeli companies in China with Chinese coverage name on Arab national securi ty?
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(3) What is the impact of the increasing interest between Chinese scholars of Judaism on Arab national security? (4) What is the impact of Establishment some res earch centers for Middle Eastern studies s upported and funded by Israeli government in some Chi nese Universiti es on Arab national security? (5) What is the impact of Chinese labor at Israel on th e Arab national security ? (6) How coul d Israel use the paper of converted Judaism Chines e peopl e to prove historical rights for Chi nese Jewish minorities ? (7) How could Israel use the Chines e "Han" face features for the converted Judaism Chinese people and Chi na's people living in Is rael to spy on the Arab world? (8) How could the existence of some Chines e Jewish figures on decision-maki ng positions in China affect on the decisions made by China to the Arab worl d? (9) How could the existence of some Chinese Judaism in the Is raeli military affect on Arab national security? (10) What are the requests of "Jews" and "Israel" from China? Studying Division The researcher is seeking through the impact of Israeli activities in China on Arab national s ecuri ty from an analytical vision. So the res earcher will identify and study the following aspects, which are themes rel evant to the concerns of the res earcher. - It entails addressing the following: - First: The impact of the inter-marriage of Israeli Jewish citizens of Chinese women on Arab national security - Second: The impact of the Is raeli compani es in China with Chinese cov erage name on Arab national security - Third: The impact of the increasing interest between Chinese scholars of Judaism on Arab national security - Fourth: The impact of es tablishment some research centers for Middle Eas tern studies supported and funded by Is raeli government i n some Chines e Universities on Arab national security - Fifth: The impact of Chinese l abour in Israel on Arab national security - Sixth: Israel can use the paper of converted Judaism Chines e people to prove historical ri ghts for them to influence on the future China's forei gn policy towards the Arab world - Seventh: Israel can us e the Chines e majori ty "Han" face features for the converted Judaism Chines e people and China's people living in Is rael to spy on the Arab world - Eighth: The existence of some Chinese Jewish figures on decision-making positions in China can affect on the decisions made by China to the Arab world - Ninth: Sino-Israeli military ties and the recruitment of some Chinese young Jews in the Israeli Army can affect on Arab national security - Tenth: The reques ts of "Jews" and "Israel" from Chi na - Part (1):- The impact of the inter-marriage of Israeli Jewish citizens of Chinese women on Arab national security The researcher – when she was studying in China – met many Israeli Jewish citizens married of Chines e women and has a child or two of them. But, the
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researcher failed to reach the exactly number of the marriage of Israeli to Chinese woman. But she will analyze its affect on the Arab national security. When Chinese citizens and forei gners (including foreign residents and those who come to China for a short visit, Chinese of foreign nationality, and forei gners who have settled down in China) decide to get married of their own free will within the boundaries of China , both the man and the woman concerned shall appear together at the marri age registration department, designated by the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government, and stationed in the locality where the Chinese citizen has his/her residence registration and apply for marriage registration (5). Both the man and the woman, who apply for marriage registration, shall abide by the Marri age Law of the People's Republic of China and the pertinent articles and items of these Provisions (6). In a meeting wi th a "Chinese woman" married an "Israeli Jewish man", she said: "If you want to talk of marriage between two cultures, well, the Jews and the Chinese have tied the knot - fi guratively - for a long time. Kaifeng became home to a community Sephardic Jews during the Northern Song Dynasty, and they thrived there for more than 700 years. Jews found refuge during the Holocaust in a visa-free Shanghai. For many Jews, Christmas and Chinese food go together like Beijing duck and those thin pancake wrappers. There’s even a magazine called Asian Jewish Life. You might call it, like the website devoted to this group of cross-cultural families, Chinese and Chosen". So it’s no wonder that this study on i nterracial marriage among Chinese It appears that there is a propensity for my interviewees to meet and date Jews in college or in their professional fields and marry them. Eighteen percent of the Chinese and Japanese American women and men we intervie wed were married to Jewish partners. Five described how they shared a cultural affini ty with their Jewish spouses; mos t often they mentioned how both cultures valued strong family ties and educational achievement. Interviewees also described thei r Jewish s pous es as having a sense of “ethnic tradition” and an immigrant legacy found lacking in nonJewish whi tes they had known or dated (7). The researcher also – While she was studying in Beijing – met some Jewish women married also a Chinese man. There are some known cases of these intermarriages such as: Rachel DeWoskin, Anna Sophie Loewenberg, and Susan Blumberg-Kason. They’re all Jewish and all not afraid to tell the world through words, or video that they love (or once loved) Chinese men. But then I thought about all of the Western women I’ve discovered across the Internet, who love Chines e men. If that's true or not, one thing is certain: that the community of Wes tern women who love Chinese men is far more diverse than was ever imagined. If you asked thos e questions : What do you think? Do Jewish women tend to love and marry Chinese men much more? Or is it just a stereotype?
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* The researcher analysis the phenomena of inter-marriage between Jews and Chinese people, and the impact on Arab national security, as follow: A) the dangerous of the inter-marriage, especially among Jewish women to Chinese men represent in having a new mixed generation of wes tern and Chinese blood, as thei r children will talk the two languages (Chi nese, and Hebrew), and according to the Jewish religion, those coming children will be Jews as they go to thei r mother's religious to be Jewish like her not like their fathers religious. And it would make a lot of sens e if the two cultures are more compatible when i t comes to family value and preservation of culture two very important parts of life in a lot of Chinese families. So, the res earcher look to the future analysis to say: with whom we will deal in the future: if we would deal with Chines e or Jews, it's complicated and has its negative as pects on the Arab national security, as a whole. B) The researcher looked also at Asian women as are twice as likely to marry non-Asian men. When Asian men marry a non-Asian woman, it’s usually to Jewish women. Moreover, an increasing number of Asian-American men aren’t getti ng married at all. The real ques tion is why. The researcher s uspects it’s probably a combination of American geography, education, and career choice that can be abused in the future to influence both Chi nese and Arab national security. C) These days more than 70% of Jews marry non -Jews, and since many people in China still don’t follow a religion, there are probably fewer religious issues in a Jewish-Chinese household than in a Jewish-other religion hous ehold. It’s great to think about these issues– So, the issue of Jewish religion education can arouse in confronting the inter-marriage of Jewish and Chinese, as those children will adopt the Jewish religion and this affect on Chines e and Arab national security, as Is rael and the wes t try to produce a mixed Jewish-Chinese generation to pass their resolutions and decisions it's a future game. D) Part of the reason might be because Jews are disproportionately likely to come to China in the first place. So, the researcher suspect on that, as about half of the non-Asian foreigners I know here are Jewish, so it makes sense that there are more Chinese-Jewish coupl es. And could have negative future influences on the Arab and Israeli national security, because they may work in a sensitive Chinese positions that may serve the other nationality they came from, of course, I mean the Israeli and American interests. - Part (2):- The impact of the Israeli companies in China with Chinese coverage name on Arab national security Indicators show that over "250 Israeli companies have business in China", of which many are quite s uccessful. For example, "Solbar", the world’s largest soybean food producer, owns large factories in Chi na. Its products are the favori te of China’s food processing companies. Further, Catalyst, an Is raeli equity firm founded a fund together with Chi na Everbri ght Limited and finished the IPO at 100 million US dollars in M arch 2014.Wi th the on-going efforts of both gov ernments, China is
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expected to supersede the European Union to become Israel’s largest trade partner (8). Recently, high rank officials of "China’s National Development and Reform Commission" led their government and business delegations to visit Israel to meet officials of "Israel’s National Economic Council". The frequent high-rank Sino-Israeli exchanges reflect a strong desire for both sides to enhance co-operations in the fields of business and technology. At present, China has become Israel’s No. 1 trade partner in Asia, ranking the third place globally. In 2013, the bilateral trade volume between Israel and China exceeded 10 billion US dollars in total. The Israel Export & International Cooperation Ins titute (IEICI) proactively holds a vari ety of seminars to help Israeli companies dev elop the Chinese market. In 1992 Israel and China established full diplomatic rel ations. After embassies were opened in Beijing and Tel Aviv, economic and commercial ti es between Is rael and the PRC grew, initially moderately and later more rapidly. Israeli technologies in fields such as: hi-tech, chemical industri es, communications, medical optics, and agriculture were exported from Is rael to mai nland China. Sino-Is raeli trade (ov er three-quarters of which comprises Chines e exports to Israel) climbed quite impressively in 2006, to approximately $3.8 billion (9). In 2008 the figure reached $5.53 billion (including diamonds), catapulting China to a significant position among Is rael’s trading partners. Imports to Israel amount to $4. 24 billion, and Israel’s exports are $1.29 billion. This is a highly significant statistic (10). * The most popular and known Sino-Israel mutual companies are the following: “We see that Israeli companies are not very large, but have hi gh knowl edge and strong growth potential, For example, Israeli side add real-time information to communicate with other us ers. Israeli would like to attract this type of project to China becaus e the market is huge”, including: Business, defense/security and academic alliances between tiny Israel and mammoth China are growing daily, helped along by private Israelis providing liaison packages, said "Eric Zhao", vice di rector of the investment promotion bureau of the Jiangsu "Wujin Economic Zone" (WEZ) in Changzhou, China. "Wujin", s trategically located between Nanjing and Shanghai, is the strongest district in the Changzhou region, "Zhao" explains. Of Changzhou’s 80,000 businesses, 54 are branches of Fortune 500 compani es. There are 25 universities, plus the massive Changzhou Science and Education Town, where tens of thous ands of students study vocational skills needed in the industrial zone, such as weldi ng and machining, IT and animation (11). “The gov ernment has a new capital fund of $ 150 million to encourage forei gn investment,” says Zhao. Tax breaks for the first few years, assistance in recrui tment and patents, and ev en schooling and healthcare plans for forei gn investors’ families are part of the draw.
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“Israel is an important partner to us”, stressed WEZ Chairman "Lu Qiuming". “We both have a long history and culture, and extensive cooperation in both official and non-governmental ways. WEZ is willing to [offer] preferential policies and excellent service to Is raeli investors”. * Mutual projects between China and Israel: In the past year alone, many major initiatives have begun between the China and Israel, which are 12 hours apart by air and es tablished diplomatic relations in 1992. "Israel's IDE Technologies" is building Chi na's largest desalination plant in. Communications processors by Israel’s Broad light will be deployed in China Telecom Corporation's fiber access services. "I CL Fertilizers" is selling Israeli potash to Chinese customers (12). "Gadot Biochemical Industries" is building a new facility in China. Walkie-talkies made by China’s Southwest Integrated Circui t Design are using integrated circui ts from Israel’s Tower Semiconductor. Hamizrach Auto is marketing pick-up trucks in Israel from China's Great Wall Motor Company. Israel Aeros pace Industries is competing to build executive jets with Aviation Industry Corporation of Chi na (13). On the academic front, the "Herzliya Interdisciplinary Institute’s Center for Global Research" in International Affairs recently hosted Chinese schol ars on regional geopolitics, and Sichuan International Studies University (SISU) just launched China’s first-ever Israel studi es program (14). Carice Witte, Executive di rector of Israel-based Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL), said that: “Business opened the door for broader relations between Chi na and Israel”, says Witte. Over the past five years, Israel has developed a strong brand in China for agricultural technology in particular, and has come to be seen as a provider of solutions to many relev ant issues in science and technology”. “There’s a s trong synergy between them”, she adds, “Since a lot of academic innovation ends up in business, and business contributes to i nspiration for academic excellence i n several disciplines. Creating an academic framework for scholars from both nations to share ideas can lead to creative solutions for pressing concerns for both sides”. Says Witte. * The most forefront Israeli businessmen living in China: “Israeli businessmen are clever, hardworking and serious - similar to Chinese businessmen”, says "Eric Zhao", vice director of the i nvestment promotion bureau of the Jiangsu "Wujin Economic Zone" (WEZ) in Changzhou, China. "Zhao" was recently in Tel Aviv wooi ng a group of those very businessmen to invest in a new industrial incubator i nitiative for Israeli compani es in China (15). Here, the researcher will recognize the mos t famous Israeli businessmen in China, as follow:
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1- Amos Yudan: (born Nov ember 5, 1936) is an Israeli businessman, Chai rman of the "Israel-China and Hong Kong chamber of commerce" and CEO of "Comodan", a company that promotes Sino-Israeli business. Yudan was the first Israeli to initi ate trade exchange with China in 1981. In 1984 ini tiated the firs t trade relationships wi th companies in China. In 1987 he was asked by Israel’s Prime Minister "Shimon Peres" to set up the first official Government owned company (Copeco Ltd) to es tablish and foster commercial activities between companies in China and Israel (16). The company was active till 1992, when official diplomatic relationships were announced between Israel and China. During these years, "Yudan" led the first business delegations from Israel to China and managed the first joint projects in the field of Agricul ture and Telecommunication. Since 1992, "Yudan" is the CEO and President of Comodan Far East Ltd, which specialists in business development and trade between Israel and China. Yudan initiated and l ed numerous joint v entures, and implemented large scale projects of Israeli compani es in China, and Chines e companies in Israel. In December 2011, "Yudan" has been awarded the presti ge “Life Achievement Prize” of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce (FICC) as recognition for his many years of contribution to the promotion of trade between Is rael and China. The prize was granted by Israel’s Minister for Trade and Industry "Shalom Simchon" and the Chines e Ambassador to Israel (17). 2- Ronnie C. Chan: Chairman of "Hang Lung Properties", one of the largest real estate developers in China, based in Hong Kong. Chan was one of the guests speakers at Go4Europe 2011, in a panel dedicated to the "Image of Israel abroad" (18) 3- Shaul Bitterman: An Israeli businessman repres enting Chi nese governmentowned companies that plan building the railway to "Eilat", counters the opinions of former Mossad chief "E fraim Halevi". "Bitterman" is working with Chinese compani es building the railway to "Eilat" jus t as there is no problem if Chinese workers were to decorate the private home of "Efraim Halevi", sai d. The Israeli cabinet approv ed the route of the railway to Eilat. The train will travel from "Tel Aviv" to "Eilat" at 250 kilometers an hour in two hours. Trai ns will bring cargo from the Red Sea to the M editerranean on a land bridge bypassing the Suez Canal. Control will be Israeli while implementation, financing and building will come from forei gn governments (19). 4- Zvi Shalgo: Chairman of the "Israeli Chamber of Commerce" in "Shanghai", founded the PTL Group in 2000 to offer Israeli companies many of them exporti ng high-tech products logistics, manpower and financial services to gain a foothold in China. It’s cheaper to do business in China than in the US, partly because 80 percent of the vas t Chinese market is condensed around three major citi es, requiring fewer point people (20). 5- Carice Witte: Executive director of Israel-based Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SI GNAL), innov ated both these projects.
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Table (3): Private Israeli Companies in China (21): Region Company Name China/Middl e East/Africa MAPA - M apping and Publishing Ltd. China/Middl e East/Africa LLD Diamonds Ltd. China/Middl e East/Africa Tesnet Software Testing, Ltd. China/Middl e East/Africa Juvenis Ltd. China/Middl e East/Africa Macro vision Israel, Ltd. * The source: The researcher collected this data of the Private Israeli Companies in China, from "Bloomberg Business" website. * The researcher analysis some bad influences for Sino-Israeli Companies and economic relations on Arab national security, as follow: A) The researcher analysis the phenomenon of raising the Sino -Israeli Compani es and the Israeli growing economic ties wi th China that China’s political-economic and strategic goals in the Middle Eas t are in contradiction to Israel’s interes ts and positions in the region. How could Israel, they ask, trust a country whose need for energy requires it to be more than fri endly wi th Iran, Saudi Arabi a and the Gulf States. China was also charged by this group wi th helping Iran achieve nuclear capability thus endangeri ng Israel’s very existence. They also poi nted out to the fact that China did not fully adhere to the international economic sanctions impos ed on Iran and helped that country evade them. B) The researcher also indicates to another argument contended that since mos t of the China's fi rms investi ng i n Israel are either government-owned or governmentcontrolled, that could play a crucial role in possible future Arab-Is rael hostilities. So, the researcher look with fears at Sino-Is raeli mutual investment and some Israeli Companies i n China working in China's coverage and might have a connection investment with the Arab world in a secret way to negatively affect on the Arab national securi ty, by exporting some things agai nst the Islamic and Arab tradition such as: Toys with the name of "Aisha", Hymen indus trially to make the non-virgin girls be virgin once marriage, and spy tools on the Arab world, and of course all of thes e issues badly affect on the Arab states security in the future. C) The researcher feels that Chi na's growing inves tments in Israel, may seek to pl ay a far greater role in the resolution of the Israel- Palestinian conflict. However, bei ng a member of the Uni ted Nations Securi ty Council, China may want to play a far greater role in the Middle Eas t, based on what Forei gn Minister "Wang Yi" called the “four supports” for resolving the conflict, which consist of a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the region’s issues, achieving a win-win situation, the Arab states playing a larger role and the safeguarding of the legitimate rights and interests of all parties. He added that “China will support the Arab states in their chosen path”. In Israel this was interpreted to mean that China seeks a greater role in the Middle East. There is no doubt that China has become more assertive, more confident and stronger in recent y ears and Is rael cannot i gnore these developments. And all these issues affect directly on Arab national securi ty by entering a new partner like China and evolving in the Arab -Israeli conflict.
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- Part (3):- The impact of the increasing interest between Chinese scholars of Judaism on Arab national security Jewish studies hav e expanded beyond the researches of a small group of scholars into public spaces in Chi na, es pecially the university classroom; its scope has been broadened to cover the world. Henan University's annual essay competition, supported by Len Hew, a Chinese Canadian, has awarded prizes and scholarships to 200 students since 2003, based on the most vari ed essays about Jews. "Lihong Song's course on Jewish civilization" attracts 400 students each year. The year 1992 is unus ual in that China was preparing to establish formal diplomatic relations with three countries that had been at odds with its communist ideological tradition: Israel, South Korea, and South Africa. The government of "Israel "asked the Ministry of Education to suggest a university to train "Modern Hebrew" speakers at "Peking University", which had established a program in 1985, was selected. Therefore, with the efficiency of a centrally planned socialist system, five students (four females and one male) from existing language programs in the Oriental Studies Department were assigned to l earn "Hebrew" in the of the university, the Law Department, seeking three male volunteers to join the Modern Hebrew program (22). Before 1992, other than in the army intelligence, Chines e college s tudents could only find one place to learn Modern Heb rew at Peking University’s Modern Hebrew Program. Today, there are at leas t a dozen Jewish/Hebrew Studies programs in China, including: Peking University, Beijing Forei gn Studies University, Beijing University of Communications, Shanghai Foreign Studies University, Fudan University, Nanjing University, Nanjing Jinling Theological Seminary, Sichuan Forei gn Studies University, Sichuan University, Shandong University, Henan University, Luoyang Foreign Studies University, and The Central University for Nationalities. There are also s everal small Israel Studi es programs, though as yet no notable ones. The studies on Jews i n China probably began as early as the arrival of Jewish settlers in China. Nevertheless, written records of studies on this subject before modern times are almost completely lacking. With the sharp increase in the number of Western missionaries and scholars coming to China and the commencement of new Jewish immigration to Harbin, Shanghai, Tianjin, and other cities after 1840 (23). Studies on ''Chinese Jews'', especially the investigation of the Jewish communi ty in Kaifeng, a city which served as the capital of six different dynasties in ancient China, became a topic of great interest in Europe and North America. After the late 1890s, Chinese scholars also joi ned the res earch and advanced their own academic views on the issue of the Jews residing in China. In the first half of this century, Chinese scholars like: "Ye Han, Chen Yuan, Wu Han, and Pan Guangdan" published a large number of books and articles and reached an advanced level in this res earch area. The main issues Chinese scholars discussed, were (24):
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(1) The earliest time at which and route by which the Jewish people had come to China. (2) The formative period and activities of the Jewish community in Kaifeng and causes of its assimilation. (3) The situation of the Jews elsewhere i n anci ent China. Other Chinese students, however, choose Jewish studies for more practical reasons. "Zhu Lilan", a 21-y ear-old undergraduate Jewish studies student at Shanghai International Studi es University, is currently brushing up her Hebrew on an exchange program at Tel Aviv University, one of some 150 Chi nese students currently studying at Israeli universities. Figuring that the Chi na-Israel trade relations are “getting better and better”, Zhu chose her course of study in part with material rewards in mind. “I think that it’s both interesting and good for future job prospects”, she said (25). There are numerous books on this topic. The shelves of Chinese bookstores have been lined with bestsellers on Jewish subjects, with such ey e-catching ti tles as Talmud (26) : "The Greatest Jewish Bible for Making Money", "Unveiling the Secrets of Jewish Success in World Economy". There were many outs tanding intellectuals and professionals among the Jews coming to Shanghai. Their influx infused the Shanghai Jewish community with a singular level of creativity and variety. Enriched by their contributions, the community organized active and vigorous educational, recreational and sports activities. All the teachers and s tudents of "Mir Yeshiva", a famous "Yeshiva" in Europe, some 400 in number, miraculously survived the Holocaust and continued thei r studies in Shanghai through the war. Particularly, Shanghai Jews had extraordi nary success in the print media. From 1903 to 1949, more than fifty Jewish newspapers and magazine came out in Shanghai in English, Russian, German French, Chinese, Japanese, Polish, Hebrew and Yiddish. From 1939 to 1946, more than thirty German, "Yiddish and Polish" newspapers and magazines were published by Jewish refugees in Shanghai. This intellectual experience would not have even been contemplated by them their authoritarian countries of origin (27). In 2000, "Xu Xin" published "Some Thoughts on Our Policy toward the Jewish Religion - includi ng a Discussion of Our Policy toward the Kaifeng Jews", in Points East, the newsletter of the Sino -Judaic Insti tute, a non-profit organization which supports nearly all of the Chi nese programs discussed above. He argued that the Chinese government should accord Judaism recogni tion as a Chinese religion, as it does with Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Although the government has not yet accepted this idea, it has been more accommodating to foreign Jews who wish to have religious services in China. A year ago, the first ev er bat mitzvah was held in the Ohel Moshe Sy nagogue. During World Expo 2010, the Ohel Rachel Sy nagogue i n Shanghai's former French Concession was opened to Jewish worship, also for foreigners (28).
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* The researcher analyses some bad influences for Sino -Israeli studies On Arab national security, as follow: A) The researcher analysis the phenomenon of raising the Sino-Israeli studies as it will create a new generation of young academic Chinese res earchers' expert in Hebrew and Israeli affairs and have close ties with Israel and will defend on Is raeli policies towards the Arab world and Palestini an issue. B) The res earcher considers this is another step in the ever-widening tolerance for Judaism, which has followed in the wake of the opening toward Jewish studies. That appears to me to be the consensus of students, academics, university administrators and official central government policy. I too expect this process to continue. And it may influence the Arab states as the tolerate s pace of the Israeli and Jewish issues probably to widen and conti nue to affect the Arab national securi ty by wri ting too much and adopting the Is raeli perspective in different aspects against the Arab world. C) In the researcher's opinion, this voyeuristic interest i n the Jewish success reflects the fact that mos t Chines e are not so much i ntereste d in real Jews as the Jew as tropes. The mos t prev alent trope of this kind in China is that the Jew is anyone who is smart, wealthy and successful. As a matter of fact, some non -Jewish celebri ties are widely regarded as Jewish in China, like Rockefeller, for example. And as a result of that we will hav e a new Chines e young generation is more attracted by the Jewish matters rather than the Arab issues, so it's a future game against the Arab world. - Part (4):- The impact of establishment some research centers for Middle Eastern studies supported and funded by Israeli government in some Chinese Universities on Arab national security Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Chines e Middle East studies have gone through three stages: beginni ngs (1949–1978), growth (1979– 1999), and accelerated development (2000–2010). Research institutes evolved from state-controlled propaganda offices into multidimensional academic and non-academic entities, includi ng universities, research institutes, military institutions, government offices, overseas embassies, and mass media. In parallel, publications evolved from providing an introduction to and overview of the Middle East states to in -depth studi es of Middle East politics, economy, energy, religion, culture, society, and securi ty. The Middle East -related research programs funded by provincial, ministerial, and national authorities have increased and the quality of research has greatly improv ed. And finally, China has established, as well as joined, various academic NGOs, such as the Chinese Middle East Studies Association (CMESA), the Asian Middle East Studies Association (AMESA, including China, Japan, and South Korea), and the Arabic Literature Studi es Association (ALS A). Howev er, Chinese Middl e East Studi es remain backward, both in comparison with China's American, European, and Japanese studies at home, and with the Middle Eas t studies in the Wes t. The establishment of Chinese research and teaching centers entails the combination of social sciences and humaniti es, of
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general theoretical studies and the study of specific issues, of purely ac ademic studies and policy-oriented studies. But, the most important point here covered by the researcher, is the existence of some research centers for Middle Eastern studi es are funded and supported by the Israeli government, giving Chi nese students some academic Master, PhD degrees, and Post Doctorate certificates. the res earcher was astonished of that while studying at Beiji ng becaus e the Israeli side teach the Middle Eastern subjects according to the "Israeli point of view" and re-oriented the Chinese students in favor of Is rael policies rather than the Arab world issues (29). The most prominent center for Middle Eastern studies funded and supported by Israel in China is "The School of Middle Eastern Studies at Northwestern University", as one of the first research ins titutes funded by the "Israeli government", and provided some degrees for the Chines e scholars, focusing on Middle East history, and contemporary studies in this field. It became the first school that graduated doctorate students in Middle Eastern Studies (1986). This School/ins titute has a res earch station for "Post-Doctorate" s tudents of World History. The res earcher noticed that all the academic degrees which given to the Chinese students are approved by the Is raeli side, and there also some resident Israeli professors teaching some Middl e eastern subjects to the Chinese st udents in that research centers for Middl e eastern studies. * The researcher analyses some bad influences for research centers for Middle Eastern studies which funded and supported by Israel on Arab national security, as follow: A) The res earcher analysis the existence of some Israeli centers for Middle Eastern Studies funded and supported by Israel as they are giving full play to its internationalized advantage and conducts cross-disciplinary, multinational team research on hot issues in Middle East concerning the Arab Region, Iran and Turkey. But all of these studies are "Israeli-oriented" in favor of "Israeli policies" in the Middle East agai nst the Arab policies. B) The researcher look at the rise of China’s diplomacy in the Middle Eas t raises new policy questions and opportuni ties for Israel. While some have suggested that Israel rebal ance from its Middle East focus towards China, China’s interests in the Middle East have grown considerably. Israel, as a key U.S. ally and with i ts vibrant economy, may be able to play a role in facilitating long -term Sino-American cooperation in the Middle Eas t. As the region remains mired in a dramatic political transition and escalating tension, promoting regional stability and coexistence are in the interests of Israel, China, the United States and the international community, So, establishing some centers for Middle East studies in China can serve both American and Israeli interes ts in the future rather than the Arab states. C) At the pres ent time, the res earch Institutes and res earches supported by "Israel" in some China's Universities has one single focus: to provide policy papers to the
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Chinese government on issues related to the Middle Eas t, especially those related to the Israeli-Pales tinian Peace Process, and i t will of course influence on the Arab national security, as they will serve the Is raeli policies not the Arab issues. D) The considerable cooperation between Israeli and Chinese universities, research institutes, and scientific academies in the area of Middle Eastern studi es from the Israeli perspective brought more knowledge about the evangelical version of the “Promised Land”, which is “pro-Israel”. In general, Israeli visitors receive a warm welcome in China today, so it will harm the Arab national security by raising the China's scholars who are pro -Israel and advocate its policies in the Middl e East. - Part (5):-The impact of Chinese labour in Israel on Arab national security At least 250,000 foreign laborers, about half of them illegal, are living i n the country, according to the Is raeli government. They include Chi nese cons truction workers that estimated as 20. 000 Chinese construction workers i n Israel. As well as other Asians, and Africans and Eastern Europeans, working as maids, cooks and nannies. “Israelis won’t do this work, so they bring us”, said Wang Yingzhong, a construction worker from Ji angsu Province in China who arrived in 2006. But even as foreign workers hav e become a mainstay of the economy, their presence has increasingly clashed with Israel’s Zionist ideology, causing growing political unease over the future of the Jewish state and their place in it. The government has lurched through a series of contradictory policies that encourage the temporary employment of migrants while seeking to impose tight visa and labor restrictions that can leav e them vulnerable to abusive employers, advocates for the workers say (30). Those who overs tay their visas and try to remain in Israel live in fear of the Oz Unit, a recently created division of immigration police officers who hunt down illegal migrants and assist in their deportation. The researcher analyses that the impact of Chinese lab or on the Arab security represents in dismissing the Palestinian l abors and replaces them by the Chinese labors, and of cours e it can affect negatively on thei r life, besides the Israeli government insists it wants unskilled jobs to go to unemployed Israelis, especially Arab citizens and ultra-O rthodox Jews. Cri tics say the policies are hypocritical and racist becaus e they treat forei gn workers as undes erving of legal protection. “All too often we have to fight to make Israelis see that these foreign workers are human beings”, s aid Dana Shaked, the coordinator for Chinese laborers at Kav LaOved, a workers’ ri ghts group. Although the Israeli government issued a record 120, 000 foreign work permits in 2009, the country’s political leaders say they want to phase out migrant labor. “We have created a Jewish and democratic nation, and we cannot l et it turn into a
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nation of foreign workers”, Prime Minister Benjamin Netany ahu s aid at a conference of the Israel Manufacturers Association in January. The first target is the Chinese, who in recent years hav e received nearly all of the construction work permits. Chines e accounted for a quarter of all deportations from 2003 to 2008, more than any other foreign group. The rate was expected to soar as 3,000 of those permits laps ed at the end of June. The Chines e end up in the most desperate straits here partly because they are recruited through a murky network of manpower companies that ri ghts groups say operate like human trafficking rings. Chinese pay up to $31,000 in illegal recruitment fees, the highest fees of all forei gn workers, according to Kav LaOved, which says the money ends up in the pockets of go-betweens and gov ernment agencies in both countries (31). The Chinese must work for an av erage of two years just to repay the money they borrow to afford thos e fees. Unaware of their rights and unable to speak Hebrew or English, many fall victim to a minefield of abuse like squalid livi ng condi tions, withheld wages and the early termi nation of work permits, which make them liable for deportation before they have repaid the recruitment fees or sav ed money for thems elves. Most Chinese endure the injustices more qui etly than the workers who staged the dramatic crane protes ts last year. Some, like "Liu Shiqi", said he showed up to his job as a cook one March morning to find the restaurant closed and the owner gone without paying him. “They know we’re alone and don’t speak Hebrew, so they take advantage of us”, he s aid. - Part (6):- Israel can use the paper of converted Judaism Chinese people to prove historical rights for them to influence on the future China's foreign policy towards the Arab world Under Communist rule, Chinese people received a very secular education. The very idea of religion seemed nonexistent. Although traditionally China is not an atheistic country – there are hundreds of millions of Buddhists, Taoists and Confuci ans – the more recent influence of Communism, nationalism, and even Western consumerism has produced a strong atheist component. Here, the researcher can indicate and analyze some facts, as follow: 1) Chinese converted people according to the "Law of Return" are not Jews Because we were talking about Jews in a cultural sens e. Strictly speaking, we do not regard them as Jews, and that refers to the “Jewish descendents”, too. It is ludicrous that they want to immi grate to Is rael. According to the Law of Return, only if the mother is Jewish, or the individual is converted to Judaism, he or she is a Jew. Based on these standards, they are obviously not Jews, because the descendents of the Kaifeng Jews follow the father’s lineage. But this is a legal definition, and o ne cannot suppress thes e peoples’ traditional ri ght to call
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thems elves Jews. We should not forget that during biblical times the Jewish lineage was patrilineal (From father's side) and only after the exile (586 BCE), the standard changed to matrilineal (32). When China examined i ts defini tion of "national minorities", the status of the Jewish minority was also considered. In 1952, two delegates from "Kaifeng" repres ented the Jews in the "National Minority Day Celebration". But in 1953 the Central Commi ttee reaffirmed the article [of the basic laws] that maintained that there are only 56 minorities in China, and Jews were not among them, yet their rights are protected to preserve thei r tradi tional cus toms (33). Now it appears that the Kaifeng Jewish descendents want to immi grate to Israel. In the 1990s, the Kaifeng descendents became interested in immigration. Among the Seven Surnames of the Kaifeng Jews, the "Jin family" went to Beiji ng and asked to immigrate. The Consulate of Israel, howev er, refused to consider their application because of the "Law of Return". Then they [the Jin’s] went to Israel from a third country (from Russia to Finland and to Israel). Some views said that there is a Christi an organization helped them. But, its doubt that they can become eligibl e to be Israelis according to the "Law of Return" unless they convert (34). "Conversion is not easy", if one wants to convert, the Jews will be the first to tell you that becoming a Jew is not fun. If you insist on converti ng, you need to study, and be under close observation for [at least] a year. Most of the conversions occur because of "marriage". Most Chinese do not understand Israel; they think that immigration is good. But, the advisors said them straightforwardly that immigration is a difficult affair. So, some of Chines e experts do not approve of immigration, coz they do not speak the language, they have no skills and life in Israel is very difficult (35). The researcher here will identify some facts, as follow: A) Israel and the immigrated China's Jews With regard to the subject of migration, Israel is unusual in one very important way: the state is virtually built on immigration. The population of Israel has doubled several times over the past 60 years, in particular as a result of immigration. Today the country has 7.1 million inhabitants. Since 1948 more than three million immigrants have been registered, and in the 1990s Israel was even the country with the highest percentage of immigration worldwide in proportion to the size of its population. At the same time, Israel is also a country with an indigenous Arab-Palestinian population that makes up about 20% of the total population figures. Given the considerabl e number of Jewish Chines e immigrants, questions of integration and of the co-existence of new immigrants with the indigenous population play an important role in Is rael. In recent times, mi gration and integration policy has been f aced wi th newly developing challenges. These include labour migration, refugeeism and illegal residence – challenges with which western immigration countries hav e been typically confronted up to now (36).
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B) Israel and the "Law of Return" towards China's Jews Israel Returns opens the door to all who have decided that Judaism and a return to the Jewish people are central to their fate and their identity. We reach out to “lost” and “hidden” Jews around the world. From Pol and to Peru, and Brazil to China. Israel Returns aims to help descendants of Jews reconnect with the people and State of Is rael (37). Israeli immigration policy is based on what is known as the "Law of Return", adopted on 5 July 1950. This makes manifest the concept of a Jewish-Zionist s tate allowing, indeed suggesting, that every person in the world of Jewish ori gin or of the Jewish faith should return to the land of their fathers. It literally states: “Every Jew has the ri ght to come to this country as an ol eh” [ a person enti tled to immigrate]. Immigration is described as a “return” or “return to their homeland”, literally an ascent (Hebr. aliyah). From the very beginning, however, the virtually unres tricted Jewish immigration did not go undisputed. In consideration of the immense challenges of integration in the early 1950s, the Israeli gov ernment attempted at times to control immigration through regul ations : the young, healthy and potenti ally productive were to be given precedence. In practice, however, the restrictions proved hard to carry out. In order to contend with the realities of family immigration the scope of the Law of Return was even extended, for, according to Jewish law (Halacha), a person is only Jewish if either the mother is a Jew or if the person has been converted to Judaism in accordance with the rulings of the Orthodox rabbinical court. This made family reunification more difficult. If the original version of the Law of Return already reached beyond the "Halachic" defi nition of belonging to Judaism, since 1970 immigration l aw has also included non -Jews if they have at leas t one Jewish grandparent. Spouses are also granted a legal enti tlement to immigration and citizenship whether they are themselves Jewish or not (38). It is not only the laws on citizenship and residence that are oriented towards immigration. In other areas too the s tate offers numerous i ncentives for potenti al immigrants. Thes e include tax relief, customs privileges and material assistance with integration, in particular. Organized actions towards mass immigration of certain Jewish communiti es should also be regarded as part of the Israeli immigration policy. In addition to an active immigration policy, promoting th e family is one of Israel’s important aims in order to secure a medium and long-term “demographic majority” and with it the Jewish character of the s tate against a background of hi gh birth rates among the Arab population. The avoidance of emigration forms a third element in Israel’s population policy rationale. Attempts since the end of the 1960s to persuade, by means of special support programmes, some of the estimated 200,000 Israeli citizens living abroad to return, however, have so far yielded little success (39). Over the years, Israel Returns has been assisting the community in their thi rst for tradition. Israeli government sent emissaries and teachers to "Kaifeng"; helped open a center and a new synagogue just off the historic “Study of Torah Lane”;
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sponsored the first ev er communi ty-wide traditional Passover Seder l ed by a Chinese Jewish immigrant to Is rael (including a Haggadah we translated into Chinese); s et up Torah classes in person and via Skype; and even brought a number of Kaifeng Jews like Yaakov Wang on aliyah to Israel (with more to come soon – watch this space for details). Israel Returns is also translating portions of former Israeli Chief Rabbi Israel Meir Lau’s book “Practical Judaism” into Chi nese. And the Israeli government celebrated the annual construction of Kaifeng’s communal sukkah for the holiday of Sukkot. "Israeli support for activities in China" is always welcome (40). In the end, and according to the "Law of Return", Israeli government permitted some Chinese Jewish families to return thei r "home land" i n Israel. C) Israel and the Integration policies towards China's immigrated Jews In line wi th immigration law there are corres pondi ng s tate measures to promote integration. Historically, the "Jewish Agency" has played an important role here too. Since i ts founding in 1968, however, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption has been responsible for state integration programmes. Integration measures are limited to new Jewish immigrants and members of their family and are directed towards swift, profound and lasting integration. Common governmental parl ance, therefore, adheres to the term “absorption”. After decades of mass immigration from completely different countries and cultures, however, it is apparent that any “ascent” of the immigrants into the new Israeli society in terms of cultural integration as understood by the US American model of a mel ting pot can scarcely be regarded as a realistic concept. In practical parlance, therefore, “absorption” has meanwhile come to be unders tood to a large extent as synonymous with “integration”. New immigrants and their families are entitled to a large number of materi al integration services, and not for this reason alone can the inte gration of newly immigrated Jews be described as a conti nuing success story (41). The citizenship law is based primarily on "jus sanguinis", means, the blood right, and thus follows ethno national or ethno religious pri nciples. As a rul e, Jews who makealiyah, in other words immigrate, to Israel automatically become Israeli citizens. Israeli law does also provide for, as a matter of principle, the naturalization of foreigners; however, this option is tied to a large number of conditions. In addition, it lies within the discretion of the Ministry of the Interior and has, to date, play ed a subordi nate role. With some exceptions, the l atest Is raeli policy tends towards the opposite direction: in July 2003 the Is raeli parliament (Knesset) adopted a law by which the granting of residence permits or of Israeli, even if immigration is to be in the context of family reunification. The law runs counter to both the international practice of family reunification and the civil rights standards of western democracies and peti tions called for the
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Supreme Court to review the plan. The latter, however, approv ed it by a small majority, imposing limiting obligations on the l egislator (42). Israel Returns has launched a new series of translations into Chinese to better familiarize the small Jewish communi ty living in "Israel" and "Kaifeng" China, with various aspects of Jewish observance. The translations cover v arious prayers, blessings and ceremoni es. The first two are now ready: the familiar "Shema Yisrael" prayer and the "Asher Yatzer" blessing, both of which are repeated several times during the day. Israel helped the "Kaifeng community" to recognize the Judaism tradi tions and revive it, which today includes a number of significant projects: a regular newsletter about Jewish topics entirely in Chinese; a scholarshi p for Jews who speak some Chinese to maintain contact with the community in Kaifeng; and soon, the l aunch of a platform for live, interactive, virtual courses ov er the Internet on Judaism in Chinese (43). The new Is raeli translations to Chinese Jews at the "Kaifeng community" have been intentionally designed in a manner that will make them easy to hang on a wall in the home, in order that they can s erve as a visible sign of Jewish life, as well as being easy to access. And encouraging Chinese Jews for the blessing before lighti ng the Shabbat candles (44). We can understand in this regard that Israel plays a big role in "integrating" the Jews Chinese people to Israel and Judaism as possible as they could. 2) Some facts and real meetings with some Chinese people converted to Judaism, and their vision to Israel In a meeting wi th "Belinda" the Chinese wife of "Jack Botwinik " a Jewish Italy man who conv erted to Judaism, "Botwinik " said "We keep a kosher diet and celebrate all Jewish holidays, including the holy Sabbath. We are grateful that my parents, my Chinese in-laws, as well as our secular relatives and friends, are respectful of our Jewish obs ervances. My brother-in-law, who is Protestant, had joined us on several occasions and experi enced Sabbath and Sukkot (Festival of Booths), and ev en had a taste of matzah on Passover". We give lai-si (red packets contai ning money, decorated with characters and drawings symbolizing luck and wealth) to our children on Chi nese New Year. We may catch a dragon boat race during the D ragon Boat Fes tival, or play with Chi nese lanterns around the August Moon Festival. When we are sick, we seek medical treatment and advice from both Chinese and Western doctors. Las t year I had the opportunity to meet many of my wife's relatives and childhood fri ends i n Hong Kong, as well as to visit her schools and converse wi th her former teachers. My wife "Belinda" also enjoyed meeti ng my aunts and cousins in Rome. These experiences are v ery special and memorable to us, he says (45). While we cherish both backgrounds, when we hav e to choose between them Jewish holidays and observ ances take precedence over Chinese holidays and customs. My wife "Belinda" finds Judaism meani ngful and she has learned to love it
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more than Chines e traditions. Judaism is central to us, and i t helps imbue our lives with meani ng and direction. "Jack" says. In another meeting with "Lin" as a Chinese man converted Judaism with his family, he said: “Because of the sensitivity of the immi gration issue, the gov ernment hoped that we would not come to Jerusalem directly from Beijing, therefore we adopted a two stage plan. First we went to Finland and then to Israel. Our expens es in Finland and in Jerusalem were covered by the aid society. For two years after we left Kaifeng we had received about ten thousand US dollars in aid”. They lived in Jerus alem for two years, and received a monthly stipend of US $ 600 (5000 Chinese Yuan) that cov ered the rent. In addi tion, they received 6000-yuan ($700) a month for living expenses and medical insurance equal to the [standard of living of a middle-income family]. They were also provided with furniture and appliances. "Lin" did not work. He spent half days, three times a week, at an ulpan, the rest of the time he had free time. He went for walks, watched TV, read books, surfed the internet and cooked. At l east three times a week, he went to the "synagogue" and used Hebrew to read the pray ers. "Lin" said that once he felt he could communicate, he was able to look for a job. Gradually the aid society decreased the amount of aid and eventually stopped it altogether. No matter to what standards one compares Lin's living conditions, his two-room apartment is not considered small. On the snow white painted walls, hangs a Chinese scroll. Also displayed in the living room are seven or eight picture frames depicti ng the old Kaifeng synagogue and the scenery around it. (46) "Lin" replied on the question of "To what extent did you observe the Jewish tradition in Kaifeng"? As saying: “In the old days, there was a saying that ‘seven surnames and eight fam ilies’ of Jews lived in Kaifeng“. Thes e surnames were bestowed in antiquity by the emperor. Our surname was historic and our ancestors held a fourth grade official rank in the court. The household was rather prosperous. There were also rather many Jews in old Kaifeng who observ ed the tradition. We had our own family tree, which also was a proof that we were Jewish. Before the Cultural Revolution [1966-1969], our family still kept the imperial tablet but later we lent it to a display in Beijing. It was never returned to us, and we lost its trace. There are also stone inscriptions left in Kaifeng that had recorded the deeds of our ances tors. The graves of our Jewish ancestors near Kaifeng are still are in good conditions. There are approximately 30 tombs. Buried among the bodi es of nine generations is [the grave] of my elder brother who recently passed away (47). On the door of our house, we had a special Jewish sign that we touched when we entered or left the house. It was a sign of ‘to go and come i n peace’. Our family observed the Sabbath from Friday suns et until sunset on Saturday. That time we did no work. Our family had also read the Chi nese version of the Jewish pray ers”. "Lin" wife is not of Jewish descent but she said that [since her marriage] she had understood and respected [her husband’s] national identity and traditional customs. L. said, “During the ninety years of living in Kaifeng, our family had not eaten pork or shrimp and these customs had been preserved until today.” Before immigrating to Israel, "Lin" ran a rather small factory and his wife used a room in the house to run a barbershop. "Lin" has an elder sister and a younger brother who
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live near the community housing i n Kaifeng. They also follow the same customs as the L. household (48). "Lin" ended his interview by replying the ques tion: “Do your sister and brother hope to immigrate to Israel? Why did they not come yet?” "Lin" said: “Of course, they would like to immigrate; they also sent in their application. But two main obstacles are in the way: One, there is no organization that is willing to give them the documentation that they are Jews. Two, financing is also a problem. You know, immigrating requi res a lot of money and the organization that helped and financed us is helping other people” (49). In conclusion, the researcher must be added that Lin's family is not the sole Chinese Jews living in Israel. During World War I, many Jews sought refugee in "Shanghai" and other pl aces in China; some of them married to local Chines e. The children of thes e mixed marriages have Jewish blood. After the liberation, some of them went to Is rael with their Jewish mother or father; others came to Israel after the opening of relations between the two countries, in search of their mother or father. In ev ery town or city in Israel, one can find such examples. In another meeti ng with "Zhang Xingwang", the "spokesman for the Jewish community in Kaifeng", and also goes by the Hebrew name of "Moshe". He introduced straightforwardly the long history of the Jews in Kaifeng. “One thous ands years ago”, he sai d, "Jewish ances tors came on the Silk Route from Israel to Kaifeng, capital of the Song Dynasty (960-1279)". After the court received them the emperor said; "You returned to my China. Honor and observe the custom of your ances tors. Bianliang was abandoned". Thes e Jews decided to settle down. At the begi nning, there were 17 families but only 7 exist today : Shi, Gao, Ai, Li, Zhang, Zhao and Jin. All thes e names were transliterations from Hebrew with the exception of Zhao, whose name was bestowed by the emperor. Thus, Li sounded like Levi in Hebrew, while Shi [Stone] and Jin [Gold] were translations in Hebrew language” (50). According to "Zhang Xingwang" there were 618 descendents of the Kaifeng Jews, some of them had left, scattered in Uruguchi, Lanzhou, Xian, Chengdu, Shanghai, Nanji ng, Shenzhen and other citi es (51). In the past, these Jews marked “Jews” as their nationality in the census. In 1952, two Jewish delegates from Kaifeng went to Beiji ng to represent the community at the celebration of the National Day and were received by the leadershi p of the Central Commi ttee (52), as "Zhang Xingwang" said. A few years ago at the time of the census most of the people changed "nationality" to “Muslim ” or “Han” (53). "Zhang Xingwang" was obviously not pleased. He said [that the Jews] were obviously not Muslims or Han Chinese, so why ask them to change their nationality? It is unreasonabl e that they cannot get such recognition. "Zhang Xingwang" also maintains that the descendents of the Kaifeng Jews had forgotten the Jewish culture. The original Kaifeng descendents had congregated near the teaching alley (Hu Tong) but after 1958, they moved out. Only the Zhao family remained there. Looking at this from a daily life perspective, they were no longer observing the Jewish tradition. This year is the first time that [the Jews] have
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celebrated Passover. Although most of the [Jews] are still in the habit of not eati ng pork, there is no Jewish person who is true to the image of “the s ect that extracts the sinew” of the sheep (54). They forgot the tradi tional customs and therefore came here [to Nanjing] to study Hebrew hoping to return and search for thei r historical Jewish memories. These Chinese Jewish descendents at "Kaifeng" repeated after the teacher a Hebrew prayer: “In front of the Lord we sing a new song-Hallelujah!” Everybody made great effort to have the correct pronunciation as each one hoped to annunciate every single word of the hard-to-study Hebrew sentence (55). "Zhang Xingwang" explained many facts about his family who had already immigrated to "Israel", he responded without hesitation: “They are different from us, we are patriots”. He also admitted that there were "Kaifeng Jews" who ran away illegally but this was a matter of purely individual behavior. He also said that just because this family name was Jin, it does not mean that we study Hebrew for the pleasure of the Jin family. “First we are Chinese, but becaus e we have Jewish bloodlines, we are Chines e with Jewish characteristics. We teach this to our children: that first of all we love our country”. Outsiders need to understand that this is a sensitive issue. "Zhang Xingwang" illustrated this point: “We were the littl e birds in the forest, wi thout worries and concerns. Later as the cats [hunters] became numerous, we saw the guns’ fowling pieces and ran. Now, many people are looking for us both from China and abroad”. He repeatedly stated that the majority of the Kaifeng Jewish descendents are patriots (56). "Zhang Xingwang" expressed his disappointment that the Kaifeng descendents cannot immigrate to Israel legally: “We would like to go to see Jerus alem, too.” He expl ained that intermarriage between [Jews in Kaifeng] and Han Chinese was quite common. The descendents of the Kaifeng Jews followed the patrilineal descent in China, and therefore could not immigrate because in Israel the matrilineal descent is followed. “Had the Kaifeng community followed the matrilineal descent, then they would have not encountered any problems. The Jewish community in Spain "Maranos" had a 300 year-old history; they also celebrated Passover, but were not even aware that they were Jews. Only after scholars realized that they were of matrilineal descent, they could immigrate. Jewish blood cannot be forgotten” (57). "Zhang Xingwang" explai ned the value of the Jewish presence in Chi na: “The Kaifeng Jewish community has an impact on the world. They often receive Jews from foreign countries and from Israel. The Israelis consider the Jews of Kaifeng especially important, becaus e it serves a testimony to the fri endshi p between China and Israel. We are saying that the Chi nese people are good toward the Jews; they do not discriminate agains t the Jews. Living circumstances in Kaifeng are favorable, and the Jews can survive and flourish for another thous and years.” In conclusion, he said, “it is not important whether or not the gov ernment recognizes us as Jews, nor is it important that the census cannot be changed, what is important is that we feel that we are Jews in our hearts. Neither this nor the next generation will forget that we are Jews” (58).
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3) The Israeli role of protecting Chinese converted people to Judaism , and prove historical rights for them in China Israel plays an important role to encourage some Chinese people to be converted to Judaism. There are many cases of some Jewish and Israeli marri ed Chinese women and converted thei r wives to Judaism. Really, we do not have an exact data for: How many Chines e converted to Judaism? But, the real issue ros e now that "Israel ask China to confess the historical rights for those Chinese converted Judaism", and formed a commi ttee to prov e there are Jewish Chines e p eopl e and to recognize them as a real minority wi thin 56 Chines e minori ties living in China (59). The researcher here indicates the existence of an exi guous group of Jews among the numerous ethnicities in populous China is relatively recent and sparse (60). Academic debate over the "Kaifeng Jewish community" still continues concerni ng thei r place of ori gin, date of entry into China, proclivity to intermarriage, obs ervance of Jewish custom as well as the reasons for its ultimate decline in the 19 th century. The focus here is, however, will exami ne how this group, having commenced to shift language not long after their arrival in Kaifeng during the Song dynasty, synchronized their native culture with that of their host in a manner that managed, paradoxically, to preserve their original identity even after centuries of assimilation(61). Some of Chi nese Jews people immigrated to Israel in 2009 with the help of "Shavei Israel", as an organization that reaches out to descendants of Jews around the world in an effort to strengthen their connection wi th Is rael, and completed their conversion and naturalization processes. The Kaifeng communi ty numbers around 1,000 individuals who, des pite much assimilation, still maintain ties to Judaism (62). Recent years have seen a fascinating awakening among the descendants of the "Kaifeng Jewish community", and especially among the youth, who are seeki ng thei r roots and identity. Some are undergoing conversion and returni ng to Judaism; and there are those, too, who wish to immigrate to Israel. The Israeli side tries to do all the bes t in maintain good rel ationshi p with the Jews Kaifeng people in China, and helped them to travel to Israel to find their real roots at Israel as their homelands. * The researcher analysis some bad influences for converted Judaism Chinese people, and the Israeli attempts to ensure that there are Jewish minorities in China, and prove historical rights for them to effect of China foreign policy in the future towards the Arab world, as follow: A) The res earcher analysis the phenomenon of marring Chines e women, and converted their wives to Judaism before marriage and have children from them, then converted all the family to Judaism as it is wrong to attempt to brainwash your children i nto a particular religion. In any event you can't simply make it up as you go along, had you wanted Jewish children then you must marry a Jewish female, by marrying a non Jew you made a decision. Therefore your a la carte v ersion of religion is nonsense. But, this bad i nfluence can produce a new Chinese Judaism
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generation can adopt the Israeli and Jewish polices adopted against the Arab world, so it has a future influences. B) The researcher will focus also on the couple bringi ng up their children with a religious education ("brainwashing", as we may call it), but rather on the initi al intermarri age, and we can not i gnore the fact that the wife converted to Judaism. So, the new Chi nese converted Judaism will just attracted by thei r Chinese observ ances are cultural, not religious, and thei r previous explorations of other religions were only their path to Judaism, not what they do now with their family. I think that perhaps once you ask the Chi nese wives converted Judaism, you will notice that the first goal to their hus bands once marriage is to encourage their Chinese wives to convert Judaism and be Jewish. So, according to this issue we now hav e a mixed Chinese generation (Both Judaism and Chinese), and the Arab states in the future will be confused as with whom we are now talking? Wi th Jewish or Chinese people? C) The researcher focuses on those particul ar referents within "Han" Chinese majority culture that enabled the Kaifeng Jewish community to maintain i ts identi ty despite its near total accul turation. In today’s global era, where gov ernments strive to pres erve cultural diversity, the ques tion of how a culture can maintain i ts fundamental identity in the wake of language shift is of tremendous importance both in regard to the formation of government policy and as a guide for immi grants thems elves, who seek to become integrated citizens of their host country, while simultaneously pres erving a resilient link to their original ethnicity. More specifically, what follows is an examination of the cross-cul tural aspects in both Han and Jewish cultures that, in the aftermath of language attri tion, contributed to a natural, inescapable absorption of Kaifeng Jewry into the mains tream society of thei r residence, but, more significantly, also managed to sustain a n incontrovertible Judaic identity up until the present day. So, from this regard, the researcher will raise the question: Are there a real Jews in Chi na? Has Israel the ri ght to defend them as a real minority? Is there any historical right for those Chinese conv erted Judaism? If we could answer all these questions honestly, we could identify the impact of these issues on the Arab states in the future. D) The researcher raise another general question of: how Chi nese Jews were able to pres erve their identi ty as a minority cul ture, includi ng the specific question of the Jewish community in "Kaifeng". And the numerous attempts to formulate a general rule of history that the predictable fate of marginal ethnicities was assimilation i nto the host majority and eventual extinction. The Jews, however, were a notable exception to his theory: “the Jews hav e continued to mai ntain themselves [as a distinctive religious body], though scattered throughout the world, whereas the faith of other religious fellowships has usually been fused with the faith of the peopl e among whom they have been scattered. This phenomenon strikes many as so remarkable that they judge it to be impossible according to the nature of things. So, the researcher h ere can indicate the Is raeli role in helpi ng those Chinese Jews and converted Judaism to mai ntain their culture as a minority into the Chinese society, it has a long vision in the future than may affect the Arab national securi ty and try to address some policies supporting the Israeli and Jewish side and
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formulate a general vision and perspective into the Chinese society that supports the Israeli rights in the Palesti ne lands. Chines e people in Is rael comprise sev eral separate groups, including the small groups of Jews from China who have immigrated to Israel making "aliyah", as well as forei gn students studying in Israeli Universities, businessmen, merchants, and gues t workers, along with Is raeli citizens of Chinese ances try (63). In 2001, the number of Chinese workers in Israel was estimated at 23,000, of whom less than half were employed. Many were in the country illegally and working in violation of the terms of their visas (64). Here, the researcher can indicate some facts, as follow: A) Israel can use the Chinese "illegal" workers to spy on the Arab world In the early 2000s it was estimated that around 23,000 Chinese were employed in Israel (less than half of them were employed "illegally" or worked in violation of the terms of thei r visas) (65). Some sources indicated that the real number was actually three times larger (66).The Israeli Ministry of Trade and Labor (now the Ministry of Economy) estimated that from 1995 to 2004, some 30,000 Chinese workers had entered Is rael (67). Late in 2013 negoti ations between the two countries were resumed with the intention of encouraging more Chinese workers to come to Is rael. The number of Chinese employed in Israel had decreased in recent years. However, now it is expected that in 2014 a new agreement will enable the two governments to permit more workers to work here. As wi th other forei gn workers, the presence of so many Chinese in Israel has led to several unfortunate situations, including Israeli police dispersing Chines e demons trators who were protes ting delays in the payment of thei r wages, media cov erage of the physical conditions in which Is rael's Chinese community lives, and raids aimed at expelling Chines e whos e visas have expired (68). In Israel, there are thousands of "illegal" Chinese workers now who are living in very bad economic conditions and in need for money any other resources. The researcher here analysis that it's accordi ng to the psychologist analysis it's likely for those illegal Chinese workers at Israel and under their strict living conditions to be used by the Israeli intelligence device "Mossad" to spy on the Arab world by abusing their face features and send them to the Arab world in different spy missions. According to Kav LaOved (Worker's Hotline), a non-profit organization which promotes forei gn worker interests, Chinese workers pay a $12,000 commission to mediators to receive a permit to work in Is rael (69). Some allegedly pay up to US$ 19,000 for a work visa. This is usually paid by loans to which family membe rs are guarantors. It was estimated that about 70 percent went to Israeli manpower compani es. Wages can be as high as US$ 1,500, al though they are not always paid the full sum (70). Manpower compani es also often retain the passports of workers, allegedly for safekeeping, and force workers to pay to get their passports back (71).
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In April 2011, eight persons involved i n providing Chinese workers for the Israeli construction industry were arres ted on charges of exploiting the workers (72). As Chinese workers have no community in the country to help them, if they have visa problems, are not trai ned for the job for which they were brought to Israel, or find thems elves with an unscrupulous employer, they may be deported (73). According to an Is raeli State Comptroller report in 1998, an employer's failure to pay the requisite fees led to the arres t of his workers as a penalty. If the employer sent workers to a place other than that specified in their visas, the workers were arres ted and deported (74). In a meeting with "Wang Chang Chi", a Chines e worker who was known for having expos ed corrupt practices, helpi ng his fellow workers and serving as a liaison between the Chi nese community, the police and the press was arrested in 2003 in order to be deported after having stayed in Israel for seven years, six of them illegally (75), Interior Minister "Avraham Poraz" stated in response to a letter: "We're not interested in cultivating a local Chinese leadership. They come here to work for a few years and then return to their countries. They don't need to have leadership" (76). The researcher noted that all the China's peopl e living in Israel like it so much and feel loyalty to the holy land "Israel", we have notably example for China’s former Ambassador to Israel, "Zhao Jun", loves the State of Is rael. He claimed that upon arrival in Israel he discovered a wonderful country. Former Ambassador "Zhao Jun" proclaimed in "Yedioth Achronot", “What captured my heart was the residents’ fri endly attitude. The friendship between Israel and the Chinese people has been going on for over 1,000 years.” He continued, “We in China admire you and your Jewish mi nd, which has brought many Nobel prizes… we admire you for creating miracles”. The Chines e Ambassador to Israel in 2013, " Ghao Yaping ", also greatly admires Israel for both China and Israel possess shared values. She declared while visiting the Technion, “Both China and Israel are Asian nations with long histories. Both countries attach great importance to education. So I believe to hav e good friends as well as a partner is important not only for China but also for Israel. By joining hands we can have more contributions to world peace and stability as well as tangible benefits for our two peoples as well as more trade, more inves tments, and more job opportunities”. She claimed that she is looking forward towards working for better relations between Israel and China (77). So, for the mentioned reasons, the researcher analysis that Israeli government adopt s trict policies, especi ally for all Chines e peopl e who are living on its land to attract them to the holy land and its policies. According to this analysis, the researcher believe that Israel can use those illegal Chines e people living in its land and make "brain wash" for them, then send them to the Arab world for "spy purposes", as no can in the Arab world can doubt that the Chines e seller in a Jewish or play in favor of Israel.
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B) Anti-Semitism and Chinese living in Israel Anti-Semi tism is considered alien to Chinese culture. "Yizhak Shichor" the professor of Haifa University’s Department of Asian Studies asserted, “Whatev er anti -Semitism there is in Asia, it is superficial and rootless. Actually, in WWII Asia became a haven, perhaps the only one, for tens of thousands of Jewish refugees who fled Europe and were allowed to settle in Shanghai and Central Asia”. Similarly, "Shalom Wald", a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, claimed in his report titled China and the Jewish People: Old Civilizations in a New Era, “In all languages of the Christian and Muslim world, the word Jew carries heavy emotional and polemical baggage anchored in the founding texts of the two religions the New Testament and the Quran. The Chinese do not carry this baggage”. To the contrary, the Chinese often sympathize wi th Jewish sufferi ng throughout history, particularly in respect to Jewish suffering during the Holocaust. Films such as Schi ndler’s List are widely viewed wi thin China. Wald claims that the Chinese frequently see parallels between Jewish and Chinese history. They apparently view how the west and Russia treated China during the nineteenth century as similar to how Jews were discriminated agains t in European countries prior to the "Holocaust". Additionally, aside from not traditionally possessing anti-Semitism within their culture, the Chinese greatly admire what Jews and Israel have to offer. "Wald" asserted that the Chi nese commonly value Israel’s and the Jewish peopl e’s contributions to world civilization. He declared, “The Jews are s een as contributors to religious, philosophical, and political ideas, and to economic and scientific progress that changed the world. Eins tein is most often mentioned”. However, the Chinese evidently also greatly value Jews such as "Sigmund Freud" and "Karl Marx" (78). Yet Jewish contributions to world civilization are not the only aspect that the Chinese admire in regards to Israel; they also greatly value Is rael as a fellow ancient civilization, which according to American China scholar "Joseph Levenson" is of “paramount importance” due to the tendency to favor “historical thi nking in Chinese culture". "Wald" claims that “this can result in a feeling of affinity that few other nations share”. Indeed, both Jewish and Chines e civilizations are among the oldest on the planet and both nations put great emphasis on remembering thei r rich and vibrant histories (79). These tradi tional Chinese sentiments related to the Jewish people hav e helped Chinese-Israeli relations to improv e in recent y ears. The Chinese are greatly interested in Israeli technologi es, such as drip irrigation, high tech, and medical optics. Additionally, many Chines e students are coming to study in Israeli universities and an increasing number of Israel Studies programs hav e opened up in China. According to "Aron Shai", author of Sino-Israeli Relations : Current Reality and Future Prospects, there are an increasing number of Israeli books that have been translated into Chinese as well. Shichor claims that i n 2002, Israel became China’s sixth most important labor export market. In 2010, China became the
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second largest economy in the world and some analysts’ project that China’s economy will overtake the US’s by 2017. Given all of this, the future of ChineseIsraeli relations possesses great potential (80). So, the research er here believes that Israel can use the sympathy feelings against anti -Semitism for those Chinese people living on its land to spy on the "Arab world" abusing their sympathy wi th Is rael to recruit them by the Is raeli intelligence "Mossad". * The researcher analyses some bad influences for China's working and living in Israel on towards the Arab world, as follow: A) The researcher analysis the phenomenon of raising the number of China's living and worki ng in Israel from the bad aspects on the Arab world, as Israeli gov ernment is more welcome them and help them to know more about Israeli traditions and polices. So, we can notice that some of the Chinese people at Is rael actually converted Judaism and the rest of them are admiring of the Israel as thei r "home land", the res earcher got some photos for them expressing their interest of the Israeli policies and the Is raeli side encouraged them to be a part of the Israeli land by learning then some of the Jewish religious activities, so all these issues have bad affect on the Arab worl d as Is rael can use some of those "Han" China's peopl e to s py on the Arab world, as the res earcher noticed the raising numerous of the Chine "Han" - majority of china's population- who are s erving in the Israeli military. B) The researcher noticed that there are no prejudices against Chines e people; Israelis love to travel to China. They also don't hav e any prejudices against Buddhism. The mistreatment of Chinese people in Israel is related to the fact that they are foreign workers and non-Jewish and Jewish Is raelis see all foreign nonJewish workers as a demographic threat and try to prevent r elations between them and Jews that may lead to children or more non-Jews living permanently in the country. Moreov er, Israel is a very traditional society and a patriarchal society and women are usually seen as representatives of the morality of patri arch al societi es and the possession of men, unable to protect themselves. In traditional societi es a woman becomes part of the men's tribe and family. Men are afrai d that they 'loose' thei r women to other nations and therefore enact laws against relations between them and foreign men. Foreign workers are exploited and kicked around in most countries. And from the res earcher's point of view that there are some Chinese men actually married Israeli Jewish women but they are not welcome from the Israeli society, so if they have children, they should follow their mothers' religion, and once divorcing, children kept wi th their Jewish mothers, so Is rael now has many of those children with thei r Israeli mothers can be used in the future with their China's features to defend the good of Israel against the Arab world. C) The researcher also noticed that Israel has thousands of Chines e and Eas t Asian workers and there are no social problems with them because Chinese are respectful to the host countries they move to, don't cause crime wav es, and don't push their ideas on everyone else. The biggest problem is the illegalities of many ov erstay their visas and never leaving. Chinese and Eas t Asians are model workers, so when it comes to hiri ng labor for odd jobs for Is raeli families, they're the ones who are
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employed. So, the res earcher concluded that Israel may negotiate wi th them on i ts profit to use them in some cases agains t the Arab, such as : talking on the "Heb rew media" in favor of Israel as a s afe land and against the Arab world, so all of these issues can negatively affect on Arab world in the future. - Part (8):- The existence of some Chinese Jewish figures on decision-making positions in China can affect on the decisions made by China to the Arab world. In days past, Jews were more careful to hide themselves in the political arena, preferring to work behind the scenes. But today, Jewish politicians increasingly fill government posts through the power of ethnic networking, the power of media control, and the power of money which can control the outcome of elections by image-crafting (81). - Three Jews who took Communism to China (82) 1) Mikhail Markovich Borodin (1884-1951); Soviet advisor sent to China in 1923. Originally named Mikhail Gruzenberg. A Riga, Latvia Jew. 2) Adolf Abramovitch Joffe (aka Ioffe, Yoffe; 1883-1927); was sent to China in August 1922. Official title: Russian Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to China. Helped create the Sun-Joffe Manifesto of January 1923. 3) Grigorii N. Voitinsky (1893-1953); emissary to China from Soviet Third Communist International (Comintern). Went to China in early 1920(83). o
High-profile Jewish figures in the Chinese Communist party
High-profile Jewish figures in the Chinese Communist Party’s own history, include the following names: 1) "Sidney Shapiro Rittenberg", (August 14, 1921; Chines e name: Lǐ Dūnbái 李敦白), the firs t American citizen to joi n the party. Sidney Shapiro Rittenberg is a Brooklyn Jew who settled in China in 1947 to participate in the Chi nese revolution and have since become a Chi nese citizen and has raised a Chines e family. Since resurfacing in the Wes t a decade ago, he has become a link between China and world Jewry, he has visited the United States several times since former President "Richard Nixon" opened Chines e-American relations in 1971; and pursues the study of the Jews of China as an avocation. Rittenberg's connections and experience hav e enabled him to run a successful consul tancy business repres enting some of the worl d’s biggest brands, such as Intel, Levi Strauss, Microsoft, Hughes Aircraft and Telexes. And the prominent efforts for "Sidney Rittenberg ", are represented in the followin g (84): "Sidney Rittenberg " appointed in the hi gh-l evel decision making i n China, and the forei gn nationals are not allowed to be naturalized as Chinese citizens. So, how did "Sidney Rittenberg" as a Jewish magically do it?
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Rittenberg's "consultancy business" is in fact one of the largest, or l argest, advertising agencies in the world. Was he the actual Chinese minister of propaganda? A note about M ao: "Sidney Rittenberg" was picked up to play a leader role through Yale University ; the location was Yali High school in Changsha, Hunan Province - a branch of Yale. After retirement, they didn't stay idle but continued to participate actively in the discussion and management of state affai rs (85). 2) "Epstein", the journalist Israeli. His parents were Russian Jews who were imprisoned in Siberia for es pionage. Whose funeral was attended by former Chinese President "Hu Jintao" and former Premier "Wen Jiabao"(86). "Epstein" di ed on M ay 26, 2005 in Beijing. His funeral was held at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery (八宝山革命公墓), a resting place for the hi ghes t-ranking revolutionary heroes, high government officials and other important persons (87). 3) "Robert Lawrence Kuhn", another Jewish investment banker "consultant" to the Chinese Communist party (CCP). 4) "Rewi Alley", the man who organized communes in China before Chinese even knew they were to be ruled by Jewish communists (in the 1920's, well before 1949) (88). 5) "Virginius Frank Coe", Jewish operative in China. Where he joined a circle of expatriates working wi th the gov ernment. In 1962, he was joined by "Soloman Adler" in the ci rcle, Coe, participated in Mao's Great Leap Forward; it's a plan for the rapid industrialization and modernization of China. His works include articles justifying "Rectification campaign"(89). * The role of the Chinese figures in China’s politburo circles (Communist Party) in supporting the relationship between China and Israel 1) The Chinese figures in the Communist party start to play a big role to adapt the conditions to be now ripe to fill the vacuum. And to close the demand for knowledge, on both sides, a mutual appreciation by Jews and Chinese for each other’s past, current and potential contributions. Even wi thin China’s politburo circles, there is awareness that "Israel Epstein", "Sidney Shapiro R ittenberg", - all Communist Party supporters in the early days of the PRC - were Jewish. There is a clear unmet need and a key opportunity to i nfluence a future of positive interactions. And the "Jewish figures" in the Chinese high-level decision making in the Communist party encouraged a number of organizations to address this gap including "Sino-Israel Global Network" and "Academic Leadership"(SIGNAL)(90). 2) "Epstein" edited "China Today", an English-language Chinese newsmagazine, translated the sayings and wri tings of "Mao" and "Deng Xiaoping" and advised the Chinese government on how to polish its overseas image. He became a Chinese citizen, joined the Communist Party and s erved on official gov ernment and party
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committees, and l ater he played a bi g role to tight the relationship between China and Israel by organizing different meetings between Israeli decision-makers and Chinese leaders in politburo circles (Communist Party) (91). 3) Jews were behind the rise to power of "Mao Tse Tung", the communist leader of China, The covert Jewish control of Mao and the Chines e Communist Party (CCP) expl ains why convicted Jewish spy Jonathan Pollard, found guilty of stealing thous ands of classified documents from the Defense Department where he worked, gave thes e materials to the "Israeli Mossad" operating in the U. S.A. The Israelis, in turn, transferred these valuable military secrets straight to Chinese l eaders in Beijing. Pollard, a Jew born i n Galveston, Texas, sits in a federal prison today. Recently, when Israeli Prime Minister "Netanyahu" came to America, he visited "Pollard" in prison and assured that the Israeli government was working behindthe-scenes with Obama’s White Hous e to pardon the convicted spy. Meanwhile, "Pollard" is remaining a national hero i n Israel honored for stealing America’s most precious military secrets which Israel gave to Communist China (92)! 4) The Jews in the West established Communism in China by working with the Jews within Asia and China. The Communist Party in China was created by the Jewish Communist International during a meeting in Shanghai between Jews from R ussia and Chinese Jews, and they successfully connected Chinese Communist Party by Israel. (Shanghai has always had a large Chinese -Jewish population) (93). * The researcher analyses some bad influences for Jewish figures in China’s politburo circles (Communist Party) on Arab world, as follow: A) The res earcher analysis the phenomenon of existence of Jewish Chinese figures in decision-making circles and contributions in increasing the Jewish and Hebrew studies in the Chi nese Universiti es, as a result for their efforts, Israeli academia has been ahead of the curve in its commitment to Chines e studies. Hebrew University in Jerus alem opened its first Chinese class in 1958, more than three decades before official relations began between the two countri es were es tablished. Today, Israeli universities hav e waiting lists of Israeli students from around the country wishing to enroll in Chinese classes. There are workshops and semi nars held on an almost weekly basis on issues related to China and Sino -Israel rel ations, topics rangi ng from trade policy to re-assessments of Confucian texts. In line with recent global trends, the Ministry of Education in Israel aims to incorporate Chi na into i ts educational curriculum; it is considering the national incorporation of Chinese language ins truction into primary and middle schools. Already a pilot program has a few hundred children in grammar school and junior hi gh learning Chines e. And the researcher believes that this can badly influence on the national securi ty. B) The researcher analysis that the existence of some Jewish figures in the China's Communist party – and their expected i ncreasing in the future- can negatively affect on the Chi na's decision making towards the "Arab world" by their efforts to encourage the "S ino-Israeli" academic life – as the researcher mentioned before – and this can prepare some Chi nese academic researchers to be a part of "a growing trend of young Chinese academics and business people professionals"
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who desire to learn more about the Middle East i n general and Israel in particular. As China becomes a more active play er in Middle East affairs, starting wi th energy negotiations and expanding to regional stability and other diplomatic issues, Chinese academics and scholars have recognized th e prerogative of enhancing their knowledge of Israel. C) The researcher analysis that the existence of Jews in Chinese decision-maki ng positions will form future orientations in favor of Israel not the Arab world, In particular they will adopt the Israeli point of view towards many issues to form a "Chinese public opinion" against the Arab issues. The researcher here ensures th at it's a future plan to affect on China's decision makers negatively on the Arab world, and this is – of course – will impact and influence on the Arab world national securi ty. - Part (9):- Sino-Israeli military ties and the recruitment of some Chinese young Jews in the Israeli Army can affect on Arab national security Israel's military ties wi th China, especially the upgrading of Harpy surveillance aircraft are undermini ng the Jewish state's securi ty. The dispute goes beyond friendly and short-lived differences of opinion. Rather, the diplomatic row repres ents a clash of strategic outlooks that can hav e lasting consequences. Middle Eastern states, for example, may perceive Was hington's public unhappiness over the Harpy deal and U.S. res trictions on future Israeli military dealings as a sign of wavering support for a country perceived by many to be Washington's chief ally in the region. For many states with strained or adversarial ti es with Washington, Israel's diplomatic importance was as a symbolic gatekeeper to Washington. They perceived the development of relations with the Jewish state as a way to win them goodwill in the White House. But U.S. anger over Sino-Israeli military ties has undercut such a perception (94). In recent years there is an increased i nterest among young Chi nese people to explore thei r Jewish roots and i dentity. Some of them have even decided to officially convert to Judaism. And there are those who are planni ng to move to Israel. o
The researcher here will indicate some facts, as the following:
A) Israel-China Arms Trade After a decade of dormancy, Israel and China are attempting to revive their military cooperation which came to an abrupt end following the 2004-Harpy Drone controversy. Under intense pressure from the George W. Bush administration, Is rael had agreed to cancel its arms sales to Chi na, and even allowed the US to review i ts future weapons transactions. American intervention in the 1990s into the Phalcon AWACS and Patriot anti-missile system controv ersies hindered Sino-Israeli military relations. During these fi ascos, the Congress’ threat to cancel the annual military and economic aid to Israel compelled the latter to halt its arms exports to Beijing.
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For long, the US has played a rather ambivalent role in relation to Israeli arms exports. It has acted both as an advocate and obstacle. On one hand, in pursuit of i ts wider foreign policy and strategic objectives, the US was supportive of Is rael’s arms exports to countri es such as China. Cold War calculations and the resul tant preoccupation with its Soviet-containment policy resulted in the US strengthening SinoIsraeli military ties. However, with the demise of the USSR and end of the Cold War, the US emerged as a major spoiler in Israel-China military ties. Such US influence seems to have some rel evance even today. Since late-2000s, Israel and China have been exploring means to revive their military cooperation. This is evident by mutual visits of defense officials from both countries. In May 2011, the commander of the Chinese Navy Adm. " Wu Shengli" visited Israel and met with Defens e Minister "Ehud Barak" and his Israeli counterpart. The details of the meeti ng were not publicized. However, a source from Israeli Ministry of Defens e insisted that there were “no changes in Israel’s marginal defense trade ties with Beijing”. The Israeli caution is most likely due to the fact that its defense trade had already been subject to an American veto (95). Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) paid a four-day visit to Israel in August 2011, the first ever by a Chi nese military commander. Both countri es discussed the issue of renewing defense cooperation. The Chines e leader toured Israel’s military installations but refrained from discussing arms transfers. During 2012 and 2013, Israel’s Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, and the head of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi’s visited Bei jing, respectively. The Israeli chief did not promote arms exports to Chi na despite an existing cooperation in the field of internal security between the Chinese police forces and elements of Israel’s police. Israel has long desired to revive military cooperation with Chi na but the fear of a backlash from the US has prevented it from making much headway. For instance, the appointment of "Matan Vilnai" as the new ambassador to China in 2013 was a very calculated move. Vilnai, a career military officer had also served as the Israeli Minister of Home Front D efense. Such a gesture poi nts to Israel’s attempt at “unfreezing arms trade”. Additionally, it is likely that “Vilnai would play a significant role in Beijing if and when Is rael moves in that direction”. Amid these developments, the US has resurfaced as the ‘elephant’ in the room. The recent resignation of "Meir Shalit", an Israeli defense export official, is reminiscent of Amos Yaron’s resignation in 2005 ov er military s ales to China. The US stymied Israel’s effort to expand ties with Chi na as Shalit approved the sale of a defense product to France without restricting its res ale, which reportedly ended up in China (96). The US government places tight restrictions on the sale of defense and dual -use technology to China and other countries. Owing to increas ed difficulty in exporti ng arms, various Is raeli defense industries lobbied the government to ease those restrictions to facilitate smooth trade with the Chines e defense market. For now, joint-ventures with China remain uncertain as Israel’s defense ministry continues to oppose any easing of restrictions. However, this might be changed as Israel’s defense ministry recently announced its decision to add more countries for which
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arms exporters would no longer require a “special license for marketing nonclassified weaponry and defens e equipment”. The US is likely to impede any possible Israel-China arms trade. Currently, Washington is working to enhance military exchanges with Chi na. As a result, the US could be worried of a potential competition from Israel in the Chinese defense market. Simultaneously for Israel, dwindling American i nfluence in the region and thei r growing differences over the Iranian nuclear programme has led to thawed relations with China. Is rael could perhaps use China’s expanding influence in the Middle East to eas e tensions arising from Iran’s nuclear programme. When it comes to renewal of arms trade, Israel would have to pursue military security relations wi th China wi th greater secrecy than before to thwart American sabotage. At this juncture, when Asia-Pacific region acco unts for a major portion of Israeli arms sales, tappi ng the Chi nese defense would be of high interes t for Israel. In 2012, out of Israel’s total arms exports es timated at US$7.5 billion, Asia-Pacific region alone accounted for business worth US$4 billion. Israeli sells arms without many political-strings attached. This is likely to be greatly preferred by China. Moreover, Chi na experienced a robust arms trade equation wi th Is rael from 1980s (well before they had established diplomatic relations) and conti nued till late1990s (97). A revived Israel -Chi na military relation would be closely watched by other Asian countries, which also hav e close military cooperation with Is rael. For instance, South East Asian countries such as Vietnam, Philippines, Si ngapore, and South Korea are rapidly enhancing thei r military -security cooperation with Israel. Most of their engagements revolve around arms trade. A similar relation is desired by the Chinese. If Israel and China manage to renew their military ties successfully defying American concerns, the Jewish State will have to tread very carefully consideri ng the delicate balance of power in the wider Asia-Pacific region. This is particularly considering the rivalries each of thes e countri es have amongst themsel ves over territorial issues and South China Sea disputes. With the emerging developments, it is pertinent that a renewed military tie between Israel and China is only a matter of time (98). B) Recruitment of some young Chinese Jews in the Israeli military (IDF) Outside academic communiti es, for millions of young Chinese who are desperately seeking success and money in a rapidly-changing society like "Israel", images of 'successful and rich Jews' hav e become current. A popular series, enti tled Revelations on the Jews' superior intelligence, was launched in 1995. It is divided into four books with subtitles such as: 'The romantic and legendary political and business mani acs', "the extraordinary and unconv entional artists and men of letters", and so on. Even more amazi ng, each back cover is printed wi th the same statement that 'this is a good book which will probably change your life. The editor's page tells readers why thes e books may change thei r lives:
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"The Jews are the smartest, the mos t mysterious and the richest nation/race in the world. If one does not know anything about the Jews, then one will not understand the world". When a Jew sneezes at home, every bank in the world will catch a cold. When three Jews are together they can deal with the global currency market“. Clearly, to the readership of such popular literature, thei r interes t is beyond the 'Jews'. To them the term "Jews" represents money, power and success, the things many of them are seeking (99). As a result of that, a new generation of a Chinese young people admired of the "Jewish" and "Israeli" society and culture. In 2014, three young Chinese men from the ancient assimilated Jewish community in " Kaifeng", China start s erving in the Israeli army. A few years ago they made "Aliyah" and just recently completed their conversion to Judaism. Their dream is to serve in the IDF’s Golani Unit. The three young men were born in the old Jewish community in China, in the ci ty of Kaifeng. The fi rst Jews arrived in Kaifeng more than a thousand years ago, when Jewish merchants from Persia settl ed i n this area. At this time Kaifeng was one of the major cities of imperi al China. Today, the Jewish community in Kaifeng totals a little more than a thousand people who, despi te accel erated assimilation, have pres erved thei r affinity with Judaism and continue to observe some Jewish cus toms, including eating matzah on Passover, saying the blessing over wine on Friday ni ghts and lighting Hanukkah candles (100). Moshe Li, Gideon and Yonatan Fan Xue are the first "Jews from Kaifeng" community who will serve in the Israeli army. "I am the only child in the family, and my parents stayed in China," said Yonatan Xue. Before I made aliyah, I began the process of officially converting to Judaism. In China, I studied dentistry for three years and worked in a hospital. I have always dreamed to serve in the Is raeli army, and I am excited that I will soon be able to fulfill this dream. I want to make new Israeli friends and through my military service to become part of the Is raeli society", said Xue (101). The researcher looks at the phenomenon of increasingly the Jewish Chinese peopl e in the Israeli army that can negatively affect on the Arab national securi ty that Israel can us e them on s pying the Arab world and to fight the Palestinian people by using those Judaism Chinese soldiers in the Is raeli army. * The researcher analyses some bad influences for Sino -Israeli military cooperation and Chinese young in the Israeli military towards the Arab world, as follow: A) The researcher analysis the phenomenon of growing military cooperation between China and Israel as des pite disagreements over the extent of Sino-Israeli military relations, there is a general cons ensus among academics and withi n the intelligence community: military exports played an important role in paving the way for the normalization of relations. Although Israel was the first Middle Eastern country to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in January 1950, Is rael was inhibited from responding to or reciprocating Chi na’s overtures by perceived
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American opposition during the Korean War. And that can bad affect on the Arab world as this military cooperation can close the relationship between China and Israel away of the Arab states, and may push China to support some Israeli military policies agains t the Arab world in the future. B) The researcher look a doubt the raising of the phenomenon of the Chinese young people in the Israeli military as a "big problem " facing the Arab, as here we will not recognize and differenti ate with whom we are fighting, with Israeli or Chinese soldiers? So, i t may affect negatively on the stable relations hip between China and the Arab world. C) The researcher analysis the Chinese military's modernization program complemented the Israeli military's expertise and its willingness to exports arms and technology without political demands. Thus in the late 1970s, both countri es began a series of military contacts that eventually paved the way for political relations in January 1992. Is raeli military exports to China primarily consisted of technology and upgrading rather than hardware. So, the researcher look at Is rael's desire to use military exports to further its political interests in Beijing, combined with China's close ties with Arab and Islamic countries in the Middle Eas t, meant that both countries preferred to keep the military ties under wrap. And of course, it could have bad aspects on the Arab world. D) The res earcher believe the rise of China’s profile in the Middle East means that Israel would have to seek an understandi ng wi th it, and if possible try to influence China's position on a number of issues. In the past Israel could hav e used its perceived influence in Washington to further its interest's vis-à-vis China. This was an effective tool during the Cold War when China was way behind the West. Since the mid-1990s, howev er, the equation has dramatically changed i n favor of China. Moreover, Israel-US relations are not as cordial as they were before, especially under Obama. So, according to the researcher's poi nt of view, it may affect on the Arabs as Israeli will abuse its relations hip with China to pass some resolutions against the Arab, or at least to make China more neutral in some issues concerni ng the Arab world. According to the have mentioned poi nts and analysis, the researcher will raise a dominantly question, entitled: " What are the requests of "Jews" and "Israel" from China"? Here, After indicati ng to the impact of some Israeli polices in China on Arab national securi ty, the researcher here tri es to indicate and raise an important questions, as: What are the requests of "Jews" and "Israel" from China? If one had to summarize all the following recommendations for strengthened links between China and the Jewish people (From the Jewish perspective) in one single word, it would be: communication, better communication. In order to communicate better, and also gain Chi na’s consent and cooperation for such an endeavor, something beyond more visits or money is necessary: a vision and long term policy strategy such as the Jewish people hav e rarely had. In regard to China,
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the "Jews" see that a long-term policy strategy will require at least three steps (102): ■ A definition of the difference between Jewish people and Israeli state policies. Obviously, the two are not the same, although sometimes they will be closely coordinated and often, cooperative. And ask every on to deal with Jewish people policies. ■ An indication of the s pecific tasks of the main branches of the Jewish people. With regard to Chi na, American Jewry is clearly of paramount importance, as American Jews are abl e to achi eve things that no other branch of the Jewish people can achieve. ■ A priority-setti ng mechanism, or at least an agreement on major priorities. This is a difficult step. Priority setting and a comparative cost-benefit analysis of recommendations are essential for a rational policy, but they are s ensitive and often politically impossible or irrelevant because independent decision makers and funding sources will do what they consider mos t important. - Conclusion: The Egypti an researcher added some thing new to the res earchers, in particular who are speci alized in both Middl e eastern or Asian and Chinese studies, as she made a connection between the Chines e affairs and the Middle eas t and Arab world, and try to fi nd out some bad influenced for the existence of Jewish Chinese people, Chinese peopl e conv erted to Judaism, and the raising of the number of Chi nese Jews immigrated to Israel as their "home land", in addition to the growi ng of Israeli and Hebrew studies in the Chines e Universiti es and think tanks, The researcher here concluded some important facts on the relationship between Israel and Jews people in China, we should recognize, as follow: 1) The researcher analysis the phenomenon of raising the Sino -Israeli Compani es and the Israeli growing economic ties wi th China that China’s political -economic and strategic goals in the Middle East and Arab world are in contradiction to Israel’s interests and positions in the region, and China's growing investments in Israel, may seek to play a far greater role in the resolution of the Israel- Palesti nian conflict. So the res earcher concluded that i t may affect on the future relations hip between China and the Arab states. 2) The researcher concluded that the raising the Sino -Israeli studies as it will create a new generation of young academic Chinese researchers' expert in Hebrew and Israeli affairs and have close ties wi th Israel and will defend on Israeli policies towards the Arab world and Pales tinian issue. 3) The res earcher concluded that the establishment some research centers for "Middle Eastern studies " supported and funded by Is raeli government in some Chinese Universities such as, "The School of Middle Eastern Studies at Northwestern University" by giving Chinese students some academic degrees: Master, PhD degrees, and Post Doctorate certificates. The researcher was astonished
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of that while studying at Beiji ng becaus e the Israeli side teach the Middle Eastern subjects according to the "Israeli point of view" and re-oriented the Chinese students in favor of Israel policies rather than the Arab world issues, and it has bad influences on the Arab worl d. 4) The researcher concluded that the Chines e labor i n Is rael hav e a negative aspect on Arab national security, as China's labor at Israel estimated as 20.000, most of them are worki ng in construction sector there, and this phenomenon has bad impact i n the Arab world from the regard of dismissing the Pal estinian labors and repl aces them by the Chinese l abors, and of cours e it can affect negatively on their life, besides the Is raeli government insists it wants unskilled jobs to go to unemployed Is raelis, especially Arab citizens and ultra-Orthodox Jews. Critics say the policies are hypocritical and racist because they treat foreign workers as undeserving of legal protection. 5) The researcher concluded Chinese converted people according to the "Law of Return" are not Jews, but in the same time, Israeli gov ernment permitted some of them to immigrate and live in Israeli lands. But, in all cases "Conversion is not easy", if one wants to convert, the Jews will be the first to tell you that becoming a Jew is not fun. If you insist on converting, you need to study, and be under close observation for [at least] a year. Most of the conv ersions occur because of "marriage". 6) The researcher analysis the Israeli role of "protecting Chinese converted people to Judaism, and try to prove historical rights for them in China. The researcher here indicates the existence of an exi guous group of Jews among the numerous ethnicities in populous Chi na is rel atively recent and sparse. Academic debate over the "Kaifeng Jewish community" still continues concerning their place of origin, date of entry into China, proclivity to intermarriage, observance of Jewish custom as well as the reasons for i ts ultimate decline in the 19th century. 7) Israeli government helped the Chines e Jews immigrated to Is rael to intergraded and be a part of the Israeli society as Israel Returns has launched a new series of translations into Chines e to better familiarize the small Jewish community living in "Israel" and "Kaifeng" China, wi th various aspects of Jewish observance. The translations cover various pray ers, bl essings and ceremonies. The firs t two are now ready: the familiar "Shema Yisrael" prayer and the "Asher Yatzer" blessing, both of which are repeated several times during the day. So, now we are having a new generation of Chi nese Jews who are living in Is rael and adopt i ts policies agains t the Arab world. 8) The res earcher analysis the phenomenon of some Jews marri age to Chinese women, and converted their wives to Judaism before marriage and have children from them, then conv erted all the family to Judaism as it is wrong to attempt to brainwash (as we may call it) your children into a particular religion. So, the researcher h ere raised some important questions as: Are there a real Jews in China? Is Israel has the right to defend them as a real minority? Is there any historical right for those Chinese converted to Ju daism? If
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we could answer all thes e questions hones tly, here we could identify the impact of thes e issues on the Arab states in the future. 9) The researcher raise another general question of: how Chines e Jews were able to preserve their identity as a minori ty culture, including the specific question of the Jewish community in "Kaifeng". 10) The researcher analysis the phenomenon of raising the "number of China's living and working in Israel" from the bad aspects on the Arab world, as Israeli government is more welcome them and help them to know more about Israeli traditions and polices. So, we can notice that some of the Chinese people at Is rael actually converted Judaism and the res t of them are admiri ng of the Is rael as their "home land", the researcher got some photos for them expressing their interest of the "Israeli policies" and the Is raeli side encouraged them to be a part of the Israeli land by learni ng then some of the Jewish religious activities, so all thes e issues have bad affect on the Arab world as Israel can us e some of those "Han" Chi na's peopl e to spy on the Arab world, as the researcher noticed the raising numerous of the Chine "Han" - majority of china's population- who are s erving in the Israeli military. 11) The researcher concluded the existence of some Chines e Jewish figures on decision-making positions i n China can affect on the decisions made by China to the Arab world. As there are high-profile Jewish figures in the Chinese Communist Party’s own history include "Sidney Rittenberg ", the firs t American citizen to join the party, and the journalist Israel "Epstein", whose funeral was attended by former Chinese President "Hu Jintao" and former Premier "Wen Jiabao". As the researcher pointed out the role of the some Chinese fi gures in C hina’s politburo circl es (Communist Party) in supporting the relationship between China and Israel. We can also notice that the "Jewish figures" in the Chinese high-level decision maki ng in the Communist party encouraged a number of organizations to addres s this gap including "Sino-Israel Global Network" and "Academic Leadership" (SIGNAL). 12) The researcher analysis that the numerous of Chi nese academia in Is raeli and Jewish studi es can negatively affect on the China's decision making towards the "Arab world" by encouraging the "Sino-Israeli" academic life – as I mentioned before- and this can prepare some Chinese academic researchers to be a part of "a growing trend of young Chinese academics and business people professionals" who desire to learn more about the Middle East i n general and Israel in particular. As China becomes a more active play er in Middle East affairs, starting wi th energy negotiations and expanding to regional stability and other diplomatic issues, Chinese academics and scholars have recognized the prerogative of enhancing their knowledge of Israel. And this means that their future orientations will be i n favor of Israel not the Arab world, In particular they will adopt the Israeli poi nt of view towards many issues to form a "Chinese public opinion" against the Arab issues. 13) The researcher fi nd out the China's interest in Jewish publications, books, translations, as there is considerable Chines e demand for written i nformation on Jews, Judaism, Israel, and the Middle East. The wri ting and translation of books are better funded, and the availability of publications made more widely known. Lists of five hundred essential Jewish books to be translated into Chinese are drawn up. Additionally, China’s popul ar magazines were encouraged to publish articles on
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Jewish themes. So, this may be cause negatively on the Arab world as now there Chinese scholars are i nterested in Israeli and Jewish writings and publications more than the Arab one, so they will be against the Arab policies in the fu ture. 14) The researcher poi nted out the Israeli support for china's scholars, s tudents, and joint academic seminars the mos t common forms of academic cooperation are support for scholars and s tudents, including s hort- or long-term s tudy visits, and support for seminars. Thes e must be strengthened, with particular attention to the need to help a small number of young Chinese to reach an international level of Judaic scholarship, e.g., in anci ent or Modern Hebrew. So, this indicate that Is rael start to prepare a new Chinese i ntellectual generation who are more known the Israeli polices than the Arab one and can be used by Israel to defend its policies in the future. 15) The researcher concluded that Israel start to use the media to affect on the minds of Chines e people, as Television documentaries, TV documentaries are watched by hundreds of millions of Chinese. Is raeli government annually prepares Jewish film festivals as the successful annual Jewish Film Festival in Hong Kong should be brought to Beijing and other cities as well. More on Jewish themes should be shown, and new ones produced in a form that is adapted to Chinese audiences. One very popular topic, for exampl e, is new agricul tural technologi es from Israel. And all these policies hav e negative as pect on the Arab states. 16) The res earcher concluded that Jews from Chi na in the Is raeli Army can affect on Arab national security. In recent y ears there is an increased i nterest among young Chinese people to explore thei r Jewish roots and identi ty. Some of them have even decided to officially convert to Judaism. And there are those who are planning to move to Israel. In November 2014, three young Chinese men from the ancient assimilated Jewish community in "Kaifeng", China start serving in the Is raeli army. A few years ago they made "Aliyah" and just recently completed their conversion to Judaism. Their dream is to serve in the IDF’s Golani Unit in the Israeli army. So, the researcher look at the phenomenon of increasingly the Jewish Chinese people i n the Israeli army that can negatively affect on the Arab national security that Is rael can use them on spying the Arab world and to fi ght the Palestinian people by using those Judaism Chinese soldiers in the Is raeli army, then we can raise a real question: with whom we are fi ghting: wi th Chinese or Israeli soldiers, so, of course i t wil l absolutely affect on the future relationship between China and the Arab s tates and the whole Middle East. 17) The researcher concluded the rol e of the "permanent delegation of main Jewish organizations" speaking for large parts of the Chinese Jewish people, maintaining relations with the appropriate Chinese government authori ties and institutions and helps them to improve information flow between China and the wider Jewish world, as well as mutual understanding and cooperation. Such relations do exist between Jewish organizations and other countri es and continents. We could also mention a high-level symposium for Chinese policy makers on shared global issues and mutual relations Visits between Chinese and Jewish leaders have in the las t three years been less frequent than before. So, the question raise here is
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the State of Israel and those Jewish organizations represent the entire Jewish people in the world including China? 18) Finally, The researcher noticed that there are growing waves between some of Jews around the world who s tart to ask Chinese people to make difference between "Jewish people and Israeli state policies". Obviously, the two are not the same, although sometimes they will be closely coordinated and often, cooperative. And ask every on to deal with Jewish people policies. - Recommendations: In light of the narrative and thesis presented here, "What policy is recommended for China and the Arab world"? The Chines e should always take into consideration the implications of their relations with Is rael for the Arabs, the Pales tinians, the I ranians, and others. These conflicts limit not only China’s role in the Middle East but also Israel’s access to China. A recent and visible example is Benyamin Netanyahu’s visit to China in M ay 2013. Submi tting to Palestini an demands, Beijing decided to invite "Mahmoud Abbas", Pal estinian Authori ty president, in order to maintain a “balance”. Needl ess to s ay, the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict is one (although by no means the only) source of Middle Eastern instability, which the Chinese dislike. But, on the other hand - as we mentioned in our study- the gradually academic, military, economic, political and cul tural cooperation between China and Israel can negatively affect on the Arab national securi ty. - In light of the likely new realities, Arab world should: 1- Take into consideration the new phenomena of the "Chinese converted recently to Judaism ", besides the role of Zionism and Is raeli organization of converting them to Judaism, des pite the fact that Judaism is not a "missionary religion" like the Christian or Muslim religion. This new phenomenon attracted the Egyptian researcher so much once s he was s tudying at "Beijing". Hence, the Arab governments should send the experts to China to study and analyze of all aspects of the influence of the Jewish and Israeli policies in China, and the activities of Chinese Jews on Arab national security. Becaus e it's a new issue, no one noticed it before, and the Egy ptian researcher faced many problems and challenges to prov e the role of Zionism and Israeli organizations working in China i n converti ng some Chines e to Judaism and facilitating their travel to Is rael to complete the process of conversion to "Aliyah". So, the researcher here recommends the Arab governments to deeply study this new phenomenon. 2- Take into consideration the new phenomena of the "inter-marriage between Israeli Jewish citizens of Chinese women", becaus e they produced a new generation of mixed Jewish-Chines e sons and daughters, and on the long run i t can bad effect on the Arab national security. 3- Take i nto consideration by searchi ng and analyzing the Israeli companies in China with "Chinese coverage name", because the researcher noticed – once studying at Beiji ng- that most of Chinese woman who married an Israeli and Jewish
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man are business woman, and they mange private companies with Chinese names, and - of course - thei r Israeli husbands stir them behind the scenes, and it was a "great shock" for the Egyptian researcher. 4- The Arab gov ernments should "watch and control the roots of the Chinese companies and projects working on their lands" to be sure that they are purely Chinese wi thout an Israeli or wes tern mutual secret supervision that may be used for spy and intelligence purpos es. 5- The Arab governments should watch the activities of the "Chinese workers" on thei r lands, because - as the researcher mentioned before - we hav e a new mixedgeneration of Israeli-Chinese blood, so Is rael can send them for spy purposes. And the Egy ptian researcher remember very well that in Augus t 6, 2014, the customs authori ties at Cai ro International Airport, Seized a helicopter for "spy purposes" held by "Chinese passengers", on the Egypti an lines of "Guangzhou" procedures, searched his luggage and found him on the small helicopter, was liberated report on the incident, and the reservation on the plane and let the passengers enter the country without taking any legal action agai nst him, but the Egyptian researcher viewed wi th suspicion towards this issue. 6- The Arab gov ernments should stand strictly towards founding centers for "Middle Eastern studies" supported and funded by Is raeli government in some Chinese Universities such as, "The School of Middle Eastern Studies at Northwestern University", because the raising of this phenomenon can negatively the Arab national security by teaching the Middle Eastern issues from the Israeli side, and it has a bad effect on the long run. And the Egyptian researcher here recommends the Arab governments to es tablish new centers for "Middle Eastern studies" supported and funded by Arab governments. 7- The researcher recommends the Arab governments to stand strictly towards the phenomenon of "Chinese converted people" that are encouraged by the Is raeli and Zionism organizations at China to be converted Judaism and immigrated to Is rael, as the Arab side should launch a campaign saying that (according to the "Law of Return" those Chinese converted Judaism are not Jews). 8- The researcher recommends the "Arab military defense ministries" to revise the number of Chinese converted Judaism who joined and recrui ted in the Israeli military (IDF), as the Egyptian res earcher discovered that there are some converted Chinese Jews recruited and serving in the Is raeli military, foe example, In November 2014, three young Chinese men from "Kaifeng", China start serving in the Israeli army. A few years ago they made "Aliyah" and completed their conversion to Judaism. And the Egy ptian res earcher viewed with suspicion towards this issue, especially now, we will be confus ed with whom we are fighting, with Is raeli or Chinese soldiers ? 9- The researcher recommends the Arab governments to stand against the activities of Israeli and Zionism organizations working in China, such as: "Shavei Israel", because they try to attract waves of Chinese audience and scholars in favor of Israeli issues, so the res earcher here recommends the Arab side to have some
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working organizations in China to face these Israeli attempts to form Chines e public opinion in favor of their issues. 10- The researcher recommends the Arab governments to send some experts "who can speak Chinese" to go to "Kaifeng" province in China, and study the existence of Jewish minorities there, and make a "Comprehensive survey" of the Jews and Israeli peopl e who are living in both "Kaifeng" and the whole China, and to recognize all the Jewish and Is raeli activities there, including: Synagogues, Israeli Companies in China, and Israeli think tanks and organizations there. 11- Finally, The res earcher recommends the Arab governments to "go to China not wait for China to come to us". As the Arab should change their "mentality" in dealing with issues, as the researcher for example did not find big Arab compani es and inv estments in China rather than the Is raeli side, so the Egy ptian researcher here recommends the Arab side to go to China and to hav e big and huge inv estments there. Arab should also have different and civil organizations worki ng in China like the Israeli and Zionism organization working there… To conclude briefly "Arab should go to China like Israel, and do not wait China to come to our homes"! References: 1. Turki Al-Sudairi, Mohammad. Sep 23, 2014. Pro-Israeli Advocacy in Chinese Academia, jadaliyya. Available: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/19350/the-growing-phenomenon-of-proisraeli-advocacy-in2. J. Elazar, Daniel. Are There Really Jews in China?, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles2/china.htm 3. B. Pevzner, Alexander. 21 January, 2015. Israel-China bilateral relations already ‘mainstream’. The Jerusalem Post. 4. B. Pevzner, Alexander. 21 January, 2015. Israel-China bilateral relations already ‘mainstream’. Op.Cit. 5. Provisions for the registration of marriage between Chinese citizens and foreigners, Approved by the State Council on August 17, 1983 and promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs on August 26, 1983. 6. Ibid. 7. Eikenburg, Jocelyn. February 28, 2011. Are Jewish Women More Likely to Marry Chinese Men?, Journal of Asian Jewish Life. 8. Report: High-rank exchanges enhance Sino-Israeli Business Ties, On: http://www.export.gov.il/eng/Branches/Technologies/TargetMarkets/ChainaNe ws/news,7960/ 9. “Trade Mission to China,” http://www.israeltrade.org.cn; “The China Israel Connection”, Israel High-Tech and Investment Report, February 2007, http://www.ishitech.co.il/0207ar6.htm 10. Indeed, China-Israel trade from January to April 2009 decreased by 18 percent in comparison with the same period in 2008. See Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute, www.export.gov.il/_Uploads/29373china2009.doc. 11. Report: The industrial park in Wujin, Changzhou, has two Israeli businesses and more to come. http://www.flickr.com/photos/25451173@N08/5953934942/in/photostream/ 12. Tianjinhttp://www.israel21c.org/environment/drinking-water-for-china-israelistyle 13. www.gadotbio.com
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14. www.gloria-center.org 15. Klein Leichman, Abigail. October 2014. Israeli business incubator launches in China, http://www.flickr.com 16. http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/81/10/ca7475ef4594a8e57aaaaf 20a6e7/b128e251-4781-4c5f-b509-c01b4f9291e8.pdf 17. Shai, Aaron. 2 October, 2012. Sino-Israeli Relations: Current Reality and Future Prospects, Department of East Asian Studies, Tel Aviv University. 18. Kempinski, Yoni. March 12, 2012. Chinese Businessmen: We Have Much in Common with Israel. Israel National News. 19. Published by Globes (online). October 6, 2013. Israel business news, Available: www.globes-online.com 20. www.ptl-group.com 21. http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=27 3761099 22. Interview: Yiyi Chen (Director - Institute for Hebrew and Jewish Studies at Peking University), April 01, 2013. On: Hebrew/Jewish studies in China and Sino-Israel relations. 23. Shapiro, Sidney. December 7, 2001. The Jews in China, Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 1st Edition. 24. For more details about: "Jewish studies in China", see: http://www.jewsofchina.org/jewsofchina/Templates/ShowPage.asp?LNGID=1&T MID=111&FID=977&IID=1473 25. Jeffay, Nathan. January 26, 2011. The Chinese Discover Jews and Israel and Can’t Seem To Get Enough, Read more: http://forward.com/articles/134962/the-chinese-discover-jews-and-israel-andcan-t- s/#ixzz3TEVS8TkK 26. Song, Lihong. Winter 2011. Feature: Mapping my Judaic Studies Career in China, An Academic Confession, Asian Jewish Life. 宋利红 。 2011年冬季特点:映射我犹太研究事业 在中国的学术 供述,亚 洲的犹太人生活。 27. Guang, Pan. January 2012. Preface to The Jews in Shanghai, Publication: Jews in China Organization. 广泛。2012年1月前言犹太人在上海出版:犹太人在中国的组织。 Hochstadt, Steve. 2012. The Holocaust and the Shanghai Jewish refugees, Shanghai Sino-Judaic Institute, USA: Palgrave Macmillan Press. 29. Degang Sun. November 2011. Middle East & Islamic Studies in China, China: The Middle East Book Review, Volume (2), Issue (1), P.P.15 – 32. 郭德纲 太阳2011年11月中东 和伊斯兰 研究在中国,中国:中东书评 ,卷(2), 28.
第(1),第15 - 32页。 30. Levin, Dan. July 4, 2010. Israel Grows Uneasy Over Reliance on Migrant Labor, The New York Times. 31. Levin, Dan. July 4, 2010. Israel Grows Uneasy Over Reliance on Migrant Labor, Op.Cit. 32. Pan Guang, 2003. The Jews in China. China Intercultural Press, (A view from a Chinese scholar). 33. Eber, Irene. 2008. Chinese Jews Encounters between Cultures. Valentine Mitchell Press (A view from an Israeli scholar). 34. Goldstein, Jonathan. 2000. The Jews of China: A Sourcebook and Research Guide, Volumes (2), M.E. Sharpe, (A comprehensive collection of scholarly articles). 35. Krasno, Rena. 2000. Strangers Always: A Jewish Family in Wartime Shanghai. Pacific View Press, (An account of a young Jewish girl growing up in Shanghai in the 1920s). 36. Central Bureau of Statistics press release about Chinese Jews and other immigrated Jews, 30 July, 2007. Available:
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37.
38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.
44.
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http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/tables_template_eng.html?hodaa=200 720139, 12.12.2007 Moshe, Li. December 1, 2014. Jews from China Defending Israel, Kaifeng Jews Publication. 摩西·李。 12月1日,来自中国的2014年犹太人保护 以色列,犹太人开 封出版。 Entitlement to immigrate and the granting of Israeli citizenship are not, however, synonymous with recognition as a Jew under civil and family law. Arian, A. 1986. Politics in Israel. The Second Generation. Revised Edition. Chatham, NJ. Jao, Chao. September 30, 2014. A Chinese Jewish New Year, Shavei Israel. 饶 宗颐 ,诏 。 9月30日,2014年中国有犹太新年,以色列Shavei。 Bartram, D. 2008. “Foreign Workers in Israel. History and Theory”. International Migration Review, Vol. (32), P.P.303-325. Kemp, A. 2007. “Managing Migration, Reprioritizing National Citizenship: Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Children and Policy Reforms in Israel”. Theoretical Inquiries in Law. No. (8), P.P.663-691. Barzilay, Eran. February 19, 2013. Israel Returns projects for Kaifeng Jews, Kaifeng Jews publication. 伊兰 。 2月19日,2013年以色列返回开 封犹太人,犹太人开 封出版项 目。 Li, Bo. February 18, 2014. Israel Returns translates Shema into Chinese for Kaifeng Jewish community, Kaifeng Jews publication. 立博。 2月18日,2014年以色列返回翻译 成玛 中国对开 封犹太社区,开 封犹太人的出版
物。 45. Interview with "Jack Botwinik", as a Jewish man converted his Chinese wife to Judaism, How We Raise Children in Our Chinese-Jewish Family, June 5, 2014. 46. Interview with "Jack Botwinik", as a Jewish man converted his Chinese wife to Judaism, Op.Cit. 47. An interview with "Lin", Chinese converted man to Judaism with his family, A bout: "Jewish Identity in China: A Chinese View", January 2015. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Some researchers advanced the theory that these names were of Hebrew origin, but as it's showed in The Kaifeng Stone Inscriptions, these names were bona fide Chinese surnames and not transliterations. 51. Zhang’s remarks referred to a sentence in the 1489 stone inscriptions that was believed to say that "the Jews came to China during the Song Dynasty (960 -1279) at the invitation of the emperor". It is evident that Zhang quoted a Chinese missionary who resided in China from 1897 to 1934 and brought the case of the Kaifeng Jews to our attention, especially at (Kaifeng). 52. What "Zhang Xingwang" is referring to was the celebration of the National Minority Day in 1952 when the Kaifeng Municipal Government and Bureau of Central South chose two Jewish descendents from Kaifeng, Ai Fenming and Shi Fenying, to represent the Jewish minority at the national celebration. Both members became ardent Communists and later worked for the government. According to the Chinese experts in Judaism, the reason that these two Jews were chosen was “that the local government was aware of the existence of Jews in the city and wanted to en sure equal rights for any ethnic group living in their region. These two Jewish descendants were introduced as Jews while in Beijing and were well received during the celebration”. (For details see: Xu Xin, March, 2004, “Chinese Policy towards Judaism”, Points East, Vol. (19), No. (1), P.P.3-4 53. Han is the Chinese term for Chinese. 54. This is what the Jews were called in the eighteenth century when the missionaries visited them. For details, see: Pollack, Michael. 1980. Mandarin Jews and
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Missionaries: The Jewish Experience in the Chinese Empire (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society). 55. D. Perednik, Gustavo. March 2008. “The Chinese of Jewish Descent at Kaifeng”, Points East, Vol. (23), No. (1), P.4. 56. An interview with "Zhang Xingwang", the spokesman for the Jewish community in Kaifeng and also goes by the Hebrew name of "Moshe", January 2015. 57. This is Moshe Zhang’s interpretation of the Maranos in Spain. 58. An interview with "Zhang Xingwang", the spokesman for the Jewish community in Kaifeng, Op.Cit. 59. Weisz, Tiberiu, 2008. The Covenant and the Mandate of Heaven: An In -Depth Comparative Cultural Study of Judaism and China. Universe Journal. 60. M.A. Ehrlich, and P. Liang, 2008. The contemporary condition of the Jewish descendants of Kaifeng. In The Jewish-Chinese Nexus: A Meeting of Civilizations, New York. Routledge, P.P.278-315. 61. Xu, Xin. 2003. The Jews of Kaifeng China: History, Culture and Religion, Beijing. 许 昕。 2003年中国开 封的犹太人:历 史,文化和宗教,北京。 62. Eichner, Itamar. January 1, 2015. Jews from China, Kaifeng Jews Publications. 63. Wang & Li, Jian. September 9, 2006. "A Chinese Jew's tale of adversity and triumph", China Daily. 王李坚 。 9月9日,2006年。“一位中国的犹太人的故事逆境和胜 利的”,中国日报 。 64. "Appeal to international organizations - Stop the China-Israel migrant worker scam!" (Press release). (Kav LaOved). September 3, 2006. 65. LaOved, Kav. September 3, 2006. "Appeal to International Organisations - Stop the China-Israel Migrant Worker Scam!" (Press release), See also: "Assembly 259", On: Knesset.gov.il 66. Boso, Nimrod. July 4, 2012. A Raise in Chinese Construction Workers Salary Following the Lack of Workers, The Marker. 67. Bar-Zuri, Roni. June 2005. "Chinese Workers Working in Israel without Permission", Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor Website. 68. Sinai, Ruth. January 19, 2012. "Government Urged to Stop Bringing in Chinese Workers", Haaretz. 69. Puder, Joseph. September 9, 2012. "The Growing Chinese-Israeli Relationship", FrontPage Magazine. 70. Sinai, Ruth. January 19, 2012. "Chinese workers are harassed as they protest unpaid wages". Haaretz. 71. Leibovich-Dar, Sarah. January 19, 2012. "I came with nothing, I leave with nothing", Haaretz. 72. Weiler Polak& Dana; Zarchin, Tomer. April 28, 2012. "Police nab 8 for exploitation of Chinese workers". Haaretz. 73. Meiri, Oron& Rappaport, Meron; Petersburg, Ofer. December 7, 2012. "You Have So Many Unemployed, What Do You Need Us For?". Yedioth Acharonot, Weekend Supplement. 74. Kruger, Martha. September 3, 2006. "The foreigners among us". The Jerusalem Post. 75. Weiler-Polak, Dana& Zarchin, Tomer. January 19, 2012. "Police Nab 8 for Exploitation of Chinese Workers", Haaretz. 76. Urquhart, Conal. April 9, 2006. "Chinese workers in Israel sign no-sex contract". The Guardian. 77. Avraham, Rachel. March 17, 2013. China's positive view to the state of Israel, http://unitedwithisrael.org/chinas-positive-view-of-the-state-of-israel/ 78. Avraham, Rachel. March 17, 2013. Op.Cit. 79. Ibid. 80. Report: United with Israel. 2013, available: http://unitedwithisrael.org/
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81. Jews in China, available: www.jewsofchina.org 82. Jews Who Took Communism to China, available: http://www.thebirdman.org/Index/Others/Others-Doc-Jews/+Doc-JewsCommunism/ChinaWasCommunizedByJews.htm 83. Ibid. 84. Special Report: The Secret Role of Jews in China, http://jewishfaces.com/china.html 85. Ibid. 86. Li Changlin, November 1997. “The Present Day Chinese Attitude towards Jews”, Points East, Newsletter, Vol. (12), No. (3), P.11. 李长 林,1997年11月“现 今的中国的态 度犹太人”,点东 ,通讯 ,卷。 (12),第(3),第11页 。 87. Wu, Carol. May 13, 2013. War journalist Israel Epstein and his dedication to China, Available: http://www.sino-us.com/242/War-journalist-Israel-Epstein-and-his-dedicationto-China.html 88. Special Report: The Secret Role of Jews in China, Op.Cit. 89. Ibid. 90. Witte, Carice. 2010. A Vision of China - Israel Academic Interchange, Asian Jewish life, Issue (6). This article was contributed by "Carice Witte", the Founder/Executive Director of SIGNAL, along with "Aurora Carlson", SIGNAL’s Head of Strategic Research. 91. Martin, Douglas. June 2, 2005. Israel Epstein, Prominent Chinese Communist, Dies at 90, Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/international/asia/02epstein.html?_r=0 92. Hendrie, Edward. September 2011. Enemies Foreign and Domestic, USA: Lulu Publishing house. 93. Jews Created Communist China, Available: beforeitsnews.com/war-and-conflict/2013/09/russia-china-hold-large-scalewargames-2449002.html? 94. P.R. Kumaraswamy. April, 1994. "The Military Dimension of Israel-China Relations", China Report. 95. Singh Ningthoujam, Alvite. April 11, 2014. Sino-Israel military relations, ISSSP Reflections No. 13, (India: School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi). 96. Ibid. 97. http://isssp.in/tag/sino-israeli-military-relations/ 98. Mu Chunshan. December 06, 2013. Israel’s military toughness is attractive for many Chinese, but its foreign policy stance isn’t feasible for Beijing, The Diplomat. 99. Zhou Yun. 2014. YouTai: The mythical Jew, Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU), SACU's magazine China in Focus, Issue 4. 的周韵。 2014年佑泰:神话 中的犹太人,盎格鲁 中国的了解(SACU),南部非洲关 税同盟的杂 志中国焦点,第4期。 100. Rudolph, Ariel. November 12, 2014. Jews from China soon in the Israeli Army, Israel Today. http://www.israeltoday.co.il/SupportIsrael/SupportIsraeliSoldiers/tabid/239/po st/jews-from-china-soon-in-the-israeli-army/Default.aspx 101. Rudolph, Ariel. November 12, 2014. Jews from China soon in the Israeli Army, Op.Cit. 102. Executive Report: Annual Assessment No. (1), Between Thriving and Decline, The Jewish People, (The first annual assessment that lays the foundation for professional strategic thinking and planning), 2004.
*********
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(8) Jinnah’s Jews: a Jeremiad Burzine K. WAGHMAR School of Oriental and African Studies University of London (Great Britain) (Burzine Waghmar specialises in Iranian and Central Asian Studies at SOAS, Univ. of Lon don, where he is also a Senior Library Assistant and Senior Teaching Fellow. He is affiliated there with the Centre for Iranian Studies, Centre for the Study of Pakistan, South Asia Institute, and the Lon don Middle East Institute. Burzine has presented reports and briefings for the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lon don. He is a regular commentator on BBC World Service, BBC News 24, Monocle Radio, Al -Jazeera English, Channel 4, Voice of America and Press TV.) Disclaimer: The opinions expressed herein neither imply nor suggest the orientation, views, current thinking or position of the university, school or affiliated regional and research study centres. _______
Pakistan is our Israel. — Chinese official 1 Verily the word of God teaches us, and we implicity believe this … that for a Muslim to kill a Jew, or for him to be killed by a Jew ensures him an immediate entry into Heaven and into the august presence of God Almighty. What more then can a Muslim want in this hard world … —Ibn Sa„ud, 19372 Two states came into existence in 1947 an d 1 948: one, Pakistan; two, Israel. The two are threats to each other. Ultimately, only one of them will survive. — Lt.-Gen. Hami d Gul, Lahore, April 2008 3 Remember, a captive Jew is worth fifty non-Jewish ones. —Lashkar-eTaiba(LeT) — handler, Chabad Housesiege, Bombay, November 2008 4 ‗Pakistan,‘ so the Israeli sociologist Shalva Weil opines in the opening of a summation, ‗was never traditionally anti -Semitic. In fact it
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may come as a surprise that Pakistan hosted small, yet thriving, Jewish communities from the 19th century until the end of the 1960s.‘ 5 Her contention is incorrect on two counts. There was no Pakistan until August 14, 1947 and th ose Jews domiciled in Karachi, Lahore and elsewhere, during the ‗19th century‘ as well as the early twentieth, belonged to British India. It is a truism that in South Asia, as the Far East, the attitudes of local peoples or their rulers (Hindu dynasts, Mughals),towards Jews were neither predicated nor animated byanti Semitisms stemming from either deicide or distrust charges. Weil correctly states elsewhere that, ‗In pre -partition India, the Jews are treated with tolerance and equality.‘ 6 Credit where credit due, the Raj— not devlet, mamalakat or saltanat thus putting paid any lachrymose nostrums
nurtured
by
part -time
islamophilesqua
semites(or vice -versa?) of a ‗golden age‘ or
full-time
convi vencia.7 Chesterton
antionce
quippe d that the golden age only comes to men when they have forgotten gold. The second objection, understandably overlooked by Weil, to say nothing of historians of South Asia generally, is that the germ of anti Semitism
among Indian
Muslims
turned Pakistanis
overnight is
detectable right away in the Jinnah Papers, the official pronounce ments and correspon dence of its founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah (18761948). One cannot conjecture why it has escaped the attention of those routinely engaged in a close, critical combing of primary sources for Jinnah or Pakistan Studies. Therein one discovers, on the eve of the Quaid-e Azam‘s (‗Great Leader‘) death, a telegram designated ‗TOP S ECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE‘ wired by its first ambassador to the United States, M. A. Hassan Ispahani, from Washington DC to Karachi, notifying that arrangements were afoot for a certain Dr. McLeod Riggins, ‗very renowned chest and lung specialist‘, to be
despatched swiftly to the ailing Jinnah in
Balochistan, now the shadow of a ‗terrific dandy‘ wh ose ‗monocle completed the picture of some suntanned eccentric from a Michael Arlen
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novel‘.8 Seventy-two hours prior to his demise — in Karachi where he was flown from Quetta —is a rejoinder appende d alongside a reply tersely telegrammed to Ispahani by one F. Amin, Assistant Private Secretary to the Governor-General: ‗Continuation my telegram of September 8. Kindly intimate immediately names of specialists selected by you. Needless to say they should not repeat not be Jews.‘ 9There is, subsequently and ironically, anecdotal evidence for European Jewish physicians recruited by the newly formed Pakistan army.10 What can be dispelledis a dying Jinnah havingexpressed any such preference prior to being treated. As Margaret Bourke -White presciently prophecised, it was left to the messiah‘s minions, for ‗now that his new nation had been achieved the bigots were in a position of authority.‘11 Jinnah, as reminisced by Frank Moraes following his death, ‗more surely understood the Muslim mass mind of India, nor knew better how intuitively to appeal to it, to cajole and rouse it. With Paki stan Mr. Jinnah rang a bell which acted like a tocsin.‘12It went down as a tonic with Indian Muslims in 1946 whose ‗[i]ncreased popular support for the Pakistan demand was reflected in the growing number of people who directly participated in League processions and rallies, not all of wh om were eligible to vote in the elections themselves. In provinces such as Punjab,
there
was
clear
evidence
of
a
newly-emerging
popular
consciousness linked to greater awareness of the possibility of some kind of separate political future for the subcontinent‘s Muslims.‘ 13 One swallow does not make a summer. Two do. An ominous forerunner
of
Pakistani
mentality
was,
publicly
and
wrathfully,demonstrable in thecapital, Karachi,with the burning of its central synagogue, May 15, an d assault on the American embassy, May 21, 1948 —the first of many such down the years.14 (Pakistan remains the sole country whose populace successfully and thoroughly razed to the ground an American chancery, November 21, 1979. 15 ) What invited the ire of Muslim Pakistanis was the caesarean birth of its surrogate, Israel, on the distant shores of West Asia. A mob of some 3,000 marched
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to the American chancery in Karachi and, in violation of diplomatic sanctities, perorated whilst perched on its window ledges, against Truman and the Americans. A besieged Ambassa dor Alling, through an Urdu interpreter, assuaged that he would convey their message. 16 In New York, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan‘s articulate representative at the newly convened United Nations, was haranguing home just that. Israelis recall him as,‗undoubte dly one of the ablest and most impressive delegates present from any country.‘ 17 Sir Zafrullah‘s legal sophistry in those years (1947-54) impressed not a few, especially less lettered Arabs, who could n ot bless or a dulate him enough for his yeoman‘s service to Islam and Ara bism. 18 Khan‘s
carapace
of
casuistrycould
scarcely
shield
his
factitiousness. It ought be borne in on the thoughtful that such treasured blind-spotsonly impair those whose sights are set on dilating their pre -conceived prejudices. In remonstrating against a guilt-racked Occident, Khan passionately queried how could the U.N. ‗insist upon the breaking up of a homeland or shatter the political, geographical and economic unity of a country wi thout the consentand against the wishes of the majority [emphasis mine].‘19 That the Indian empire had been vivisected into two dominions, to the voluble, vehement opposition of its Hindu majority, left him unfazed. Khan, uncharitable and con tradictory, next tried to live down the story that the majority had reluctantly agreed to such a division. Partition of the subcontinent, a posteriori, was permissible because only where Muslims were prepon derant did those territories become the contiguous borders of Pakistan, and because they were already indigenes, not emigrants, over a historical continuum, unlike what was happening in mandated Palestine. Khan ran true to form, as did other Pakistanis, for ‗partition to Muslims was anathema elsewhere.‘20 Freudian transference is observable as Khan railed against his birthplace aboutKashmir, another iron in his General Assembly fire: ‗[T]he objective of the policy of the Government of Indiatowards Pakistan
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through all these months has been to punish Muslims for their temerity in demanding the partition of India.‘ 21 More Muslims resided withoutthis ‗moth-eaten‘ homeland than within. It was those from British India‘s Muslim -minority districts, Zionist footmen, who decamped to erect it. Indian Muslims, a congeries of sects and denominations, hadno common consciousness, language, dress, diet, observancesor outlook to show for themselves, unlike Jews, who
constituted a
‗nation‘
and ‗spiritual
principle‘
through
the
‗possession in common of a rich legacy of memorie s [and] the present consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to validate the heritage that has been jointly received.‘ 22 Risible, had the gravity of the matter been lighter, to remind that Jews conquered Palestine ca. 1020 BC an d held sway until 587 BC. An interregnum a part, Jewish control resumed in 164 BC an d ended in AD 63. 23 Pre-Islamic Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians and Byzantines, to the discomfiture of Muslims, might also be adduced wh o came and cleared the decks. Naturally the arrival of the next marauders, Islamised Arabs, is laudable, doctrinally and politically. But history, as the Mughal historian Bada‘uni recounts, has many by -ways. Ambassa dor Alling‘s fellow American, Lifemagazine‘s celebrated correspon dent Margare t Bourke -White, had grasped the nettle: ‗Jinnah‘s most frequently used technique in the struggle for his new nation had been the playing of opponent against opponent. Evidently this technique was now to be extended into foreign policy. Not only the tension between the great powers but the Palestine situation as well held opportunities for profiting from the disputes of others. Pakistan was occupied with her own grave internal problems, but she still found time to talk fervently, though vaguely, of sending a liberation army to Palestine to help the Arabs free the Holy Land from the Jews.‘ 24 Waziri tribesmen from the NWFP were spoiling for a scrap westward ho. A telegram sent by North Waziristan‘s honcho, Malik Jahangir Khan, addressed to Jinnah went like this:
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‗We the Waziri tribes are very anxiously waiting the end of the Palestine war. Our sympathies are with the Arabs. We the Waziris will never give the Holy Land to the Jews. We appeal to the Muslim world to declare war against the Jews. Weare ready to go to Palestine to help our Arab brothers. Kindly arrange for our transport to Palestine, so that we may join the holy war. We congratulate the Arabs on their unity in the war. Please send our message to the Arabs.‘ 25 Bourke -White was spot on — Pakistan, broke but belligerent, a week following Jinnah‘s burial, appealed to the Food an d Agricultural Organisation‘s International Emergency Food Council for 160,000 tons of grains on September 20, 1948. That very day the Pakistan Central Palestine Aid Commission announced it was disbursing £20,000 to Palestine.26 The leading English broa dsheet, Dawn, foun ded by Jinnah, and staffed by articulate, semi -anglicised Muslims, could exhort in one editorial the liberation of Palestine for, ‗That way lies the salvation of Islam.‘27 Clearly its op-ed writers had totted up priorities and the settlement of millions of refugees still pouring in from India; a practically bankrupt treasury at home, given New Delhi‘s refusal to honour its transfer of assets, with the onset of the First Indo-Pakistan war in October 1947; and the exodus of Pakistan‘s non -Muslimswith their acumen, bullion and capital were anything but pressing. The stridency and bellicosity of despairing Muslims is a given in Islamic history. What with the ‗bankruptcy of i deas‘ in a ‗nation drawing its spurious warmth from the embers of an antique religious fanaticism, fanned into a new blaze‘, itwould instinctively impel them to berate in time-honoured fashion. Six decades on, a foregone conclusion. 28
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the failure of the Arab armies to prevent it — was a climactic event … It was ba d enough to be dominated by the Franks, but they were after all the invincible masters of the world, … It was a very different matter, and an intolerable humiliation, to submit to the Greeks or Jews, to local dhi mmīs whom the Muslims had long been accustomed to despise as inferiors. The Franks, moreover, would, sooner or later, go back whence they came. But the Greek Great Idea — megal ē idea— of a revived Byzantine empire and the Zionist idea of a Jewish state were clearly intended to be permanent. The same sense of outrage coloured the Kemalist reaction against the Greeks, and the Arab reaction against Israel.29 A sharp-eyed BBC reporter, visiting three years later, exclaimed: ‗The attitude of Pakistanis tends to be aggressive and austere because they feel themselves threatened from all sides, and also because they are determined to protect their new freedom and nationhood. …You find yourself in the middle of a mutual admiration society which you must accept with due solemnity.‘ 30 Solemnity ought not be accorded valuation over sobriety. It certainly gives the rise among Israe lis and Pakistanis ‗because of their embattled, now nuclear armed, military rivalries with their neighbours and their own populations, and their entanglement with global rivalries‘ when they inspire analogies ‗compelling as it may seem to outsiders‘ but not ‗particularly welcome in either country.‘ 31 Farzana
Shaikh‘s
learned
distillations
are
anything
but
unwelcome. For ‗both countries shared a vision of themselves as refuge for
the
persecuted;
both
attracted the
219
hostility of the
religious
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establishment; both sought to balance the expression of communal interests with demands to justify them on religious grounds; and both held to the vision of impregnable fortresses dedicated to the creation of just and humane societies.‘ 32 Shaikh, knowing her constituents only too well, cuts through the cant and pa bulum of those reticent to bring into sharper relief the well-springs of piety propelled by power, divinely bestowed an d vouched in perpetuum, lest they be
castigated for
pan dering to essentialism and orientalisi ng tendencies. Professionally fatal in academe and commentariat today. Shaikh is not one to hitch her wagons with the fatuous and baldly points out that where Pakistan differs from the Israeli case is that Muslims,
votaries
of
an
unabashedly
triumphalist
credo,remain
conscious of their SitzimLeben an d that ‗an essential part of being Muslim‘ was predicated ‗on their pre -eminent claim to power‘ which ‗flowed from the experience of Muslim dominance.‘ 33 As past masters of the Old World, from the Pyrenees to Panjab, Muslims have always been self-assured by the Qur‘anic injunction (3:110) that they are the best of community raised among mankind e xpected to establish a social order with implicit legal concepts. Setbacks, past or present, do not vitiate their vivid identities or complaisancies as is amply discernible among Pakistanis — Jews are not the only chosen ones. Unchosen and unmentioned, however, are Pakistani Jews in a quasi-official dedicated to
booklet, Hindus,
Minorities in Christians,
Pakistan, Parsis
wherein
chaptersare
and Buddhistscheerfully
ensconced in an Islamic idyll.34 There is a smidgen of truth for Pakistani non-Muslims did not find con ditions entirely unendurable. It was more than tolerable and such Pakistanis played their part in national li fe, a point in fact not unnoticed or unappreciated by some of their then Muslim compatriots. Pakistan and its western neighbour, Pahlavi Iran, for a while, were two heterogeneous societiesbecause inhabiting both, unlike anywhere else in the Muslim oecumene , were adherents of practically all traditional faiths, namely, Zoroastrians, Jews, Bahais,
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Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and Animists. A perilous, penurious remnant remains in both Islamic republics where social apartheid, informallyself-imposed and formally enshrined, has come to stay.35 Honed from formative years, it is integral to the national curriculum as one Pakistan Studies‘ textbook clarifies: ‗The Islamic state, of course, discriminates between Muslim citizens and religious minorities and preserves their separate entity. Islam does not conceal the realities in the guise of artificialities or hypocrisy.‘ 36 Disgraceful, half a century on, that Jews do not merit mention in two cyclopaedic com pilations conceived, pre pared an d published under the aegis of Oxford University Press, Pakistan. 37 No entries appear in either volume on Pakistani Jewry. After all, in the ensuing years, Pakistani Jews have quietly departed for Israel or the West with each international crisis (1956, 1967, 1973). Pakistan is the only Islamic polity whose Jews deliberately dissimulate and pass off as Parsis or Christians to avoid attention and potential persecution. 38 This is simply unimaginable, not just the Perso-Turkic but even Arab worlds, right through wars an d intifadas. It only vindicates how Pakistan has transmogrified into a living nightmare for a community contemptibly, if disputa bly, num bering 300 souls. Pak istan‘s Election Commission, according to a recent news report, registered,to the contrary, ‗800 Jewish voters‘.39 Even Pakistan‘s two million odd Hindus, fifth columnists of its Indian nemesis, precariously exist but have not en masse resorted to identifying as anything else. Pakistani Muslims, rootless and driftless, are driven to anchoring their Islamic moorings in anti -Semitisms reminiscent of medieval-minded Europeans baying for Jewish blood. In his
ground-breaking
study,
Dr.
Rusi
Jaspal,
a
British-Panjabi
psych ologist,demonstrated:40 There was a desire not to com pel Israel to enter into peace negotiations with the Palestinians but rather to destroy the Jewish state, highlighting the destructive orientation of their anti -Zionist stance.
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Respon dents were unable to accept the notion of a Jewish state, although they did see the logic in state buildingalong ethnic and religious lines in other contexts. This highlighted double standards an d the singling out of the Jewish state [as Zafrullah Khan‘s Pakistanissupra]. In his research into antisemitism and anti -Zionism among Muslims in North America, Baum and Nakazawa (2007) foun d that Pakistani Muslims appeared to score highly on the antisemitism and anti-Zionism scales. The present study suggests that some British Pakistani Muslims may believe there is a historical clash between Islam and Judaism, which is currently reflected in the form of the Israeli -Arab conflict, and that Islam must, and eventually will, defeat Israel, a tangible outcome of Jewish self-efficacy (Jaspal, 2013)..Given the Islamicisation of anti -Zionism and the social desirability of taking an anti -Israel stance .. [it] was cynically perceived as an unifying thread between Pakistani Muslims and Muslims of other ethnic backgrounds.
Written in 1984, during Haq‘s heyday, is an apologia whose matter-of-fact tone is in consonance with the confident, unquestioned axioms of Muslim thinking and sentiment typically dismissed or ignored by a poplectic, western liberals. (Islamophobia now too can be loa ded to the ballast of racialising orientalism.)The author breezily declaims: ‗It is no use to work un der the pretence that a non-Muslim can become head of the state or head of government in Pakistan where the bulk of the population consists of Muslims because real power will always remain with Muslims [Farzana Shaikh‘s assertion supra]. Furthermore, Pakistan is based on the Islamic Ideology and as such the nominal head of the state
(the president) and the working head of the state (the prime
minister of the country) must be Muslims so that the ideological nature of
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the state is not compromised in the name of toleration or liberalism [emphasis mine].‘41 When the shoe, obviously, is on the other foot, Muslims are only too quick to slip into patched soles. Bernard Lewis recalls how Muslims at a gathering in Berlin could belabour, ‗―In a thousand years they [the Germans] were unable to accept 400,000 Jews. What hope is there that they will accept two million Turks?‖ They sometimes use this line, playing on German feelings of guilt, to a dvance their own agenda.‘ 42 That ‗most superb an d patriotic liar‘, Zia ul-Haq, forthrightly declared: ‗Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would colla pse. For the past four years we have been trying to bring Islamic values to the country. Not because Zia ul-Haq wants it. We would n ot have last lasted four months if we were not acting in accordance with the aspirations of the people of Pakistan.‘
Immediately
following
this
praeparatio islamica
is
the
correspon dent‘s gem, ‗May be so. But the system Zia has built in these four years provides no channels for gauging popular aspirations for Islam or for anything else.‘ 43 Zia, compared to his democratically inclined detractors, comprehended that ‗an Islamic state is not necessarily a political and social democracy‘, even though Muslims ‗are conscious of their responsibilities to a community which is the raw material of nationhood.‘44 The raw reality, as that journalist concluded, after announcing the startling presence of 800 Jews remaining in Pakistan, was that, ‗[T]here is no political party that has tried to woo the Jewish voters for the coming elections. Perhaps there will never be. No party has dared challenge the conspiracy theories either … .‘45 Another perceptive Pakistani writes: ‗If we are to trust our political mullahs and some non-mullah politicians, this Yahood-o-
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Hunood Ki Laabi [‗Judaeo-Hindu web‘] is responsible for everything going wrong in Pakistan. From supplying of dead donkey meat to our fleshpots, attacks on polio vaccinators to the almost daily dose of suicide bom bings, the Jews and the Hindus are behind everything. We have to thank our stars that Israel is a long way away with brotherly Muslim countries between them and us that prevent their death-dealing agents from infiltrating our sacred land more frequently or they would have undone our poor country years ago.‘46 Scholarship, thankfully, is obliged to challenge ugly, domestic verities. Ayesha Jalal, regrettably, did not during her editorship of The Oxford Companion to Pakistani History (OCPH), 2012.47 (I eschew discussing Hafeez Malik‘s near-similar scissors-and-paste project lest one dignifies carping mediocrity.) Plainly answerable for such lacunae are the successive project e ditors at Oxford University Press, Pakistan. During the six years it took this volume to gestate, Nadia Ghani and her team, including earlier project managers, Salma Mahmud and Fah d Raza, were unable to locate any academic anywhere for an entry on Israeli-Pakistani relations or Pakistani Jewry? 48 Ghani was not at a loss to submit her entry on ‗Palestine‘ (p. 404). Nor di d she pause to cogitate how germane would an entry commissioned on ‗Camp David Summit‘ (p. 84) be for Pakistan Studies. A Pakistani reviewer did. 49 I might afford some leads here on the limited albeit extant body of literature available on Israel-Pakistan relations over and above those cited infra on the history of Pakistani Jews.50 Ghani‘s piece, rather plaint, on Palestine petulantly ascribes ‗injustices perpetrated against the Palestinians, and the West‘s support for Israel, particularly American, is a deeply emotional issue for most Pakistanis and a major cause for their disaffection with Pakistan
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government‘s pro-American foreign policy.‘ 51 Foua d Ajami, recently deceased, summed up Ghani and kindred spirits: ‗If Muslims truly believe that their long winter of decline is the fault of the United States, no campaign
of
public
di plomacy shall
deliver
them
from
that
incoherence.‘52 Miss Ghani may be recommended a period of silent reading of Bernard Lewis: ‗In the theater of Middle Eastern politics, the United States is cast in several roles — sometimes as arbiter and enforcer, i.e., as suzerain; more often, and more popularly, as villain and scapegoat — and is variously denounced, sometimes by the same people, for claiming and shirking an imperial mission. The range of American policy options in the region is being reduced to two alternatives, both disagreeable: Get tough or get out.‘53 Or Sir Muhammad Iqbal, her founding father: ‗Cheapened like water is the blood of Muslims/Disquietened are you for your hearts knows not the secret.‘54 The Ispahanis, Burkis, Amins and their like may rest well knowing their esteemed Quai d rested his case with history, without encountering Jewish physicians, or in his elegant edifice designed by a Jew and Lahorite, Moses Joseph Somake (1875-1947):55 Flagstaff House, Karachi,
a
buff-stone,
colonial
mansion
was
designed
by
the
aforementioned architect. Jinnah purchased it from Sir Kavasji Katrak, an old Parsi family, in March 1944. 56 A local historian, Gul Hasan Kalmatti, lamented that the Jew built Karachi while Muslims build shopping plazas over their razed synagogues. The last one, Magen Shalom, was destroyed on the express orders of General Zia -ul Haq on July 17, 1988.57 Zia went to his condign judgement, exactly a month to the day, on the afternoon of August 17, 1988. 58 Having departed for the Holy Land, Pakistani Jews, unlike others of the Pakistani diaspora, are ineligible for dual citizenship. 59 A recent aliyah to Israel was laconically made public by the Jewish Agen cy in November 2010 following an ‗undercover‘, ‗complicated‘ an d ‗confi dential agreement‘ between Islamabad an d Jerusalem.60 Duplicity and cupi dity
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always override piety and sincerity. 61 It merits no asseveration that money must have changed one too many grabbing Pakistani hands for ‗contacts were more than diplomatic niceties or polite conversations; they often involved a
degree
of convergence
of Israeli
and Pakistani
interests.‘62 Notes: 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Thalif Deen, ‗China: Pakistan is our Israel,‘ Al Jazeera English, Oct. 28, 2010, online: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/10/ 20101028135728235512.html; attributed to now retired General Xiong Guangkai, and cited in Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics (Oxford, 2015), pp. 1, 192-93 and n. 1. Habib Jalib, a left-wing activist and Pakistani poet composed a cautionary verse: ‗China now our dearest friend/On it does our life depend/But the system that there prevails/Do not go near it,/Salute it from afar/Salute it from afar.‘ Quoted in Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive: the Death of a State (London, 1983), p. 223, n. 21; idem, The Duel: Pakistan on the flight path of Americ an power, repr. with a new afterword (New York 2008; repr. 2009), p. 204. Pakistanis tactfully ignore Sir Muhammad Iqbal, their national poet and spiritual founder‘s appeal, <
> ‗Unite Muslims towards overseeing the [Meccan] sanctuary, from the banks of the Nile to the sandy wastes of Kashgar.‘ Muhammad Iqbal, Bang-e d ara (Lahore, 1930), p. 301. Translation mine. Text of Colonel H. R. P. Dickson‘s meeting with King Ibn Sa‗ud, Riyadh, 1937 (F.O. 371/20822 E7201/22/31) reproduced in extenso, Elie Kedourie, ‗Ibn Sa‗ud on the Jews,‘ idem, Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies (London, 1980), p. 70. Quoted in the Urdu daily, Roznama N aw a-i Waqt (Apr. 25, 2008), cited in Tufail Ahmad, Pakistan‟s Jewish Problem, Inquiry & Analysis Series Report no. 676, MEMRI (Mar. 13, 2011), pp. 6, 10 and nn. 52, 104; Shalva Weil, ‗A Jewish Presence in Pakistan – Karachi in another time,‘ Jewish Times Asia (Dec. 2013 Jan. 2014), online: http://www.jewishtimesasia.org/community-spotlight-topmenu43/pakistan/544-pakistan-communities/2806-a-jewish-presence-inpakistan-karachi-in-another-time As revealed in transcripts of intercepted VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) phone conversations in real time between Lashkar-e Taiba handlers, at their Malir control room, Karachi, and their trained terrorists in Bombay, November 2008. Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Siege (New York, 2013; London, 2014), p. 267. Shalva Weil, ‗What happened to Pakistan‘s Jews?,‘ Journal for the Study of AntiSemitis m, 3, 2 (2011), p. 603; eadem, art. cit., 2013-14. Journalistic reportage, with a liberal bias, all too often sustains fallacies as this erroneously entitled encomium by Gabe Friedman, ‗When Jews found refuge in an unlikely place: Pakistan,‘ Forward (Oct. 18, 2014), online: http://forward.com/articles/207415 when-jews-found-refuge-in-pakistan/
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6.
Shalva Weil, ‗Jews in Pakistan,‘ Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora: Origins, Experiences, and Culture, vol. 3, ed. M. Avrum Ehrlich (Santa Barbara, 2009), p. 1229. 7. Mark Cohen, Under Crescent & Cross: the Jews in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1994), pp. xv-xvi, 6-14. 8. Richard Hough, Mountbatten: Hero of our Time (London, 1980), p. 218. 9. Document 507: M. A. Hassan Ispahani to M. Ikramullah, Telegram, F. 178 (2)- GG/30, dt. September 10 1948, Washington DC, no. C-243, designated TOP SECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE. For the rejoinders, including that quoted in full supra, are Annex I and Annex II to No. 507, F. Amin to M. A. Hassan Ispahani, dt. September 8, 1948, from Governor-General‘s Camp, Quetta and marked TOP SECRET. Consult Pakistan: Struggling for Survival, 1 January – 30 September 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, ed. Z. H. Zaidi, first series, vol. VII (Islamabad, 2002), pp. 730- 31. M. Ikramullah (1903-63) was Pakistan‘s first foreign secretary. More renowned was his wife, Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah (1915- 2000), a woman of Urdu letters, SOAS alumna and first Muslim woman with a London University doctorate, and later diplomat as well as mother-in-law of Jordan‘s Prince Hassan bin Talal. Her obituary is in Nicolas Barker, ‗Begum Shaista Ikramullah,‘ The Independent (Mar. 29, 2001), p. 6. The Suhrawardys, like Ambassador Ispahani, hailed from Calcutta. Her cousin, H. S. Suhrawardy (1892-1963), sometime Prime Minister of (undivided) Bengal and Pakistan, failed at both stints and died, disgraced and dejected, in Beirut. M. Ikramullah, like these Calcuttans, was a Muslim Zionist who belonged to that cadre of educated, committed Indians enthralled by Jinnah‘s clarion call of a homeland as the manifest destiny of Muslims. For a counter-factual analysis see Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Politic al Idea (Cambridge, MA and London, 2013). Two earlier critical works which explore the psycho -social aspects Devji examines are Francis Robinson, Separatis m among Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United Provinc es‟ Muslims 1860-1923, South Asian Studies 16 (Cambridge, 1974; repr. 2008); and David Lelyveld, Aligarh‟s First Generation: Muslim Solid arity in British India (Princeton, 1978; repr. New York, 2012). An insightful, lucid and candid rendition is in Brig. A. R. Siddiqi, Partition and the Making of the Mohajir Mindset: a N arrative, foreword by Manzoor Ahmad (Karachi, 2008). Siddiqi, one of a dying generation of Pakistanis, who grew up in a pluralist Raj — multicultural in the truest sense sans its debased, loaded cache — retains a magnanimity towards the Other in thinking and conduct, personal and professional, something unobtainable among contemporary Pakistani youth fostered on the poisonous politics of difference in an exclusionary, monochromatic mullacracy. Siddiqi‘s recent sketch complements that of an earlier one by an illustrious Muslim who stayed on and rose to public office in Nehruvian India, M. R. A. Baig, In Different S addles, foreword by Frank R. Moraes (London, 1967). Both Muslims owed their gifts, cultivation and success, pre- and post-partition, in no mean measure to the Raj whose imperial custodians moulded their character, sense of duty and outlook. 10. Shahid Javed Burki apud Kenneth Robbins, Western Jews in India: from the Fifteenth c entury to the Present, eds. Kenneth X. Robbins and Marvin Tokayer (New Delhi, 2013), p. 15 and n. 2. Burki was a former Pakistani finance minister. Robbins, a South Asian art collector and
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independent scholar, also happens to be a practicing psychiatrist, and would do well to see through the posturings of Pakistanis, superficially westernised Muslims. One is reminded here of Hassan Ispahani‘s 1946 missive to Jinnah that, ‗I have learnt that sweet words and first impressions count a lot with Americans. They are inclined to quickly like or dislike an individual or organization.‘ Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an epic history of Misunderstanding (New York, 2013), p. 33. Robbins, however, soundly states (loc. cit.) that Pakistani society is one where ‗antiSemitism is endemic and there is no longer a Jewish community.‘ In Robbins and Tokmayer, op. cit., 2013, p. 19, fig. 8, note the misprint in a bi-lingual, commemorative sheet marking the 75th anniversary of The Jewish Religious Union, Bombay. The building, in Hindi, is incorrectly spelt as ‗Rofed Shelom‘ but correctly in English as ‗Rodef Shalom‘. It is, as the post-code reveals, at Byculla in central Bombay, a locality traditionally housing Jews, including a synagogue, as well as Anglo-Indians, Christians, Parsis and Muslims. 11. Margaret Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom: a report on the new India in the words and photographs of Marg aret Bourke- White (London, 1949), p. 101. Jinnah‘s physician at the time of his death, Lt.-Col. Dr. Ilahi Bakhsh penned a slim memoir, With the Quaid-i-Azam during his last days, foreword by Fatima Jinnah (Karachi, 1949). This first hand account is not only commemorative but also controversial for the author‘s initial draft was excised to gloss over Jinnah‘s acrimonious relationship with his lacklustre deputy, Liaquat Ali Khan. As po inted out in the foreword to the third edition (Karachi, 2011) by his son, M. Nasir Ilahi Bakhsh, who tacitly refers (p. xvii) to Jinnah‘s ‗difficult meetings with his close political allies who he felt were departing from the cardinal concepts of the state of Pakistan [which] emphasized the guiding principles of equality, justice, and fair play for all the citizens of the new State‘. But the principal text reprinted here is that lifted from the second edition (1978) published to mark Jinnah‘s 1976 birth centennial under the aegis of the Quaid-i-Azam Academy. Its director, Sharif al-Mujahid, a Madras muhajir (‗immigrant‘) and, obviously, ardent nationalist, has toiled long and hard towards marshalling primary and secondary sources on Jinnah Studies. Mujahid, unsurprisingly, was not averse to expunging passages to fit Pakistan‘s Procrustean palate. Skewering such historical fare has only burnished his credentials in officialdom. Laden with state honours and retired, he remains Distinguished National Professor, Higher Education Commission (HEC), Pakistan. As Akhtar Balouch, ‗The deleted bits from Fatima Jinnah‘s ―My Brother,‖‘ Dawn (Dec. 27, 2014), online: http://www.dawn.com/news/1153284/the -deleted-bits-from-fatima-my-brother notes, Mujahid is on record for e xclaiming that Fatima Jinnah‘s biography of her brother had to be bowdlerised since some of its ‗pages were against the ideology of Pakistan and I had to take care of it.‘ The said extracts concern Liaquat Ali Khan‘s visit to Jinnah at the hill station resort of Ziarat, Balochistan sometime towards the end of July 1948. At this residency of the Governor-General‘s agent, Dr. Bakhsh recalls being closely questioned by Liaquat Ali Khan about Jinnah‘s ill health. The former refused to divulge his condition to t he latter as a breach of confidentiality. Fatima Jinnah recalls as well how Jinnah, feeble yet alert, told her that a supposedly solicitous Liaquat had arrived only for, ‗He wants to know how serious my sickness is.
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12.
13. 14.
15.
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How long will I last.‘ All of the aforementioned has now been reinserted in the posthumous autobiography of Qudratullah Shahab, Shahabnama (Lahore, 1987; repr. 2012), pp. 291-93. Apparently the author sought amends for his censorious zeal since Mujahid declared to Balouch that Shahab, in the first place, had ‗played a pivotal role in getting these pages removed back then.‘ Frank R. Moraes, ‗Jinnah: he willed a State into being,‘ Ceylon Times, repr. Decc anTimes, Oct. 14, 1948. Sourced from Sharif al-Mujahid, ‗Jinnah‘s place in History,‘ Journal of the Pakistan Historic al Society, XIV, II (April, 1966), p. 143 and n. 3. Sarah Ansari, ‗The Pakistan Movement 1940-1947,‘ A History of Pakistan, ed. Roger D. Long (Karachi, 2015), p. 405. Ahmad, op. cit., 2011, p. 2; Weil, art. cit., 2011, p. 604; eadem, art. cit., 2009, p. 1229; Encyclopaedia Jud aic a, s.v. ‗Pakistan‘ (by Walter Fischelet al.), vol. 13 (Jerusalem, 1971), pp. 14-15; repr. Encyclopaedia Judaic a, 2nd ed., vol. 15 (New York and London, 2007), pp. 571-72. The very little revision to the entry but demonstrates the state, actually absence, of research, about Pakistani Jewry. H. G. Reissner, ‗IndianJewish Statistics (1837-1941),‘ Jewish Social Studies, 12, 4 (October, 1950), p. 365. Liel Leibovitz, ‗Pakistan‘s Jewish Ghosts,‘ The Tablet (Apr. 4, 2013), online: http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-andpolitics/ 128459/pakistans-jewish-ghosts; Patrick Belton, ‗Karachi‘s forgotten Jews,‘The Jewish Chronicle (Aug. 16, 2007), online: http://website.thejc.com/home.aspx? AId=54702&ATypeId=1&search=true2&srchstr=karachi&srchtxt=0&src hhead=1&srchauthor=0&srchsandp=0&scsrch=0 Haqqani, op. cit., 2013, pp. 11, 242f., overlooks mentioning that the attack, Nov. 21 1979, was also the first day of the new Islamic century, 1400. Its messianic signification was not lost on Juhayman al -Utaybi and his cohort of Saudi, Sunni fanatics responsible for defiling the Meccan sanctuary. Pakistanis, as Muslims universally, bought into Khomeini‘s calumny broadcast that the Americans and their Zionist agents were responsible for the desecration. Plainly ignorant then they were that the Saudis mulled bringing in Pakistani special forces. See John Kifner, ‗Khomeini accuses U.S. and Israel,‘ The New York Times (Nov. 22, 1979), p. 1; ‗Pak mob burns US embassy,‘ The Times of India (Nov. 22, 1979), p. 1; ‗Embassy burnt: the United States,‘ The Times (Nov. 22, 1979), p. 1; ‗US anger after Muslim ―outrages‖ spread,‘ The Guardian (Nov. 22, 1979), p. 1; Harold Jackson, ‗Waves of fury in US against the Ayatollah,‘ The Guardian (Nov. 22, 1979), p. 8; Martin Woollacott, ‗New politics of the Muslim world,‘ The Guardian (Nov. 22, 1979), p. 17; Burzine Waghmar, ‗Complaisant Pakistanis, Condescending Persians: Orientalist observations on Irano -Pakistan relations,‘ Studies on Iran: Articles, Reports (New Delhi, 2013), p. 187, nn. 3, 4. Peter Niesewand, ‗Police prevent new Islamabad attack on Americans,‘ The Guardian (Nov. 24, 1979), p. 6, recounts the harrowing, pre-dawn evacuation of Americans, including documentless diplomats whose passports were destroyed in the burnt building, and escorted by military personnel, alongside other American expatriates, to fly out in ‗no more than the clothes they stood up in‘. A Muslim mob, following prayers and a whipped up sermon in Rawalpindi, wanted to attack them to avenge two fundamentalist students as well as two embassy employees killed, by Pakistani forces, three days earlier.
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16.
17. 18.
19. 20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25. 26. 27.
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Indian Muslims were no less agitated as 3,000 stoned Calcutta‘s American consulate, one of the oldest US missions in the world since 1792. An authoritative account is Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecc a: the forgotten uprising in Islam‟s holiest shrine (New York, 2007; repr. London, 2008). Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia & the House of Sa„ud (New York: 1981; repr. 1983), pp. 478-91, repays reading as one of the earliest narratives. Utaybi and his lot would assuredly be in the higher echelons of ISIS today. Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies: the United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 (Washington DC, 2001) is silent about the 1948 occupation but does discuss the 1979 destruction (pp. 242- 45). Kux‘s descriptive, diplomatic history, a sound standby, is now complemented by a far more rigorous analysis of the entire question in Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer, How Pakistan neg otiates with the United States: riding the rollercoaster, foreword by Stephen Cohen (Washington DC, 2011). Chronology of International Events and Documents, 4, 11 (21 May, 1948 - 3 June, 1948), p. 365. Haqqani, op. cit., 2013, p. 41, does not furnish the exact date, May 21, 1948; his colleague does from the Pakistan Foreign Service, Afrasiab [Mehdi Hashmi Qureshi], Encyclopaedia of Dates, Quotes, & Documents on China, US, India & Pakistan & their relations 7000 B.C. to 2013 A.D., vol. 1 (Dhaka, 2013), p. 298; q.v. additional references supra n. 15. P. R. Kumaraswamy, Beyond the veil: Israel-Pakistan rel ations, Memorandum 55, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2000, pp. 23, 69 and n. 21. M. J. As‘ad, ‗Chaudhry Muhammad Zafarullah Khan's Services to Pakistan and The Muslim World,‘ online: https://www.alislam.org/library/zafar2.html Kumaraswamy, loc. cit. Ibid. Q.v. S. M. Burke, Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy: an Historic al Analysis (London, 1973), p. 66. ‗Pakistan‘s Attitude: Consideration of Issues,‘ The Times (Jan. 2, 1948), p. 3. Ernest Renan, ‗What is a Nation?,‘ Lecture delivered at the Sorbonne, March 11, 1882. Repr. in Shlomo Sand, On the N ation and the „Jewish People‟, tr. David Fernbach (London and New York, 2010), p. 63. Pakistanis must wince as they read these words. It would be cruel to conjure the chasm between the headiness of the late 1940s and the grimness of the present. S.v. ‗Palestine‘, Cyril Glasse, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, fourth edn. (London, 2013), p. 414. This is the most balanced, comprehensive, one-volume reference work on Islam in the anglosphere. It is an admirable evidence of industry. Glasse, compared to the superficial drivel of Muslims purportedly producing such compact works, is nothing if not superior. Himself a learned Muslim, he is a promising, honourable exception, given the depressing options available to researchers and students. It is pleasant to note his generosity in placing at my disposal galley proofs of the aforementioned volume. Bourke-White, op. cit., 1949, p. 93f.; Haqqani, op. cit., 2013, p. 22f. ‗Waziri tribes‘ offer,‘ The Times of India (Jun. 9, 1948), p. 7. Chronology of Pakistan, June 1947 – June 1953 (Karachi, 195[?]), p. 37. Bourke-White, op. cit., 1949, p. 94.
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28. Ibid. C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the end: the Pakistan army‟s way of war (New York, 2014) has now skilfully surveyed and confirmed Pakistani intentions since inception. 29. Bernard Lewis, The Shaping of the Modern Middle East (New York and Oxford, 1994), p. 149. Earlier edn., idem, The Middle East and the West, Weidenfeld Goldbacks (London, 1964; repr. 1968), p. 125f. 30. Lionel Fielden, Four Talks on Pakistan: Broadc ast in the Third Programme of the B.B.C. (Karachi, [1950]), pp. 30-32. 31. David Lelyveld, ‗An Exercise in Moral Philosophy,‘ The Book Review, XXXVIII, 2 [South Asia no. XXIII], (February, 2014), p. 13. Review essay of Devji, op. cit., 2013. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People‟s Power (London, 1970), p. 25; idem, op. cit., 1983, p. 223f., n. 1; Lewis, op. cit., 1994, p. 92. 32. Barbara Metcalf apud Farzana Shaikh, Making S ense of Pakistan (London, 2009), pp. 15, 214 and n. 2. 33. Ibid. 34. Minorities in Pakistan (Karachi, 195[?]). Absent in this work, alongside Jews, are Jains, Sikhs and Animists, the last mentioned then not only in East Pakistan‘s Hill Tracts but also as the Kalash of the Trans-Indus basin. The literature remains frequently scant, inaccessible and apologetic. A recent contribution, a full tome on t he topic, is Haroon Khalid, A White Trail: Journey into the Heart of Pakistan‟s Religious Minorities (New Delhi, 2013). Was no Pakistani publisher willing that it had to come to pass across the 1947 divide? Small wonder the author had to rename interviewees in order not to compromise their security. Or his: Khalid defines an Ahmadi mosque as ‗place of worship‘. Quite a few Hindus and Christians have adopted Islamic names so as to deflect suspicion or duress. Reviewed by Kishalay Bhattacharya, ‗Truth about Minorities,‘ The Book Review, XXXVIII, 2 [South Asia no. XXIII], (February, 2014), p. 23. Shaikh, op.cit., 2009, pp. 46-80 is a scathing indictment on the ‗mirage of citizenship.‘ 35. Soli Shahvar, ‗The Islamic Regime in Iran and its attitude towards the Jews: the religious and political dimensions,‘ Immigrants & Minorities, 27 1 (2009), pp. 82-117. Jamsheed Choksy, ‗Antisemitism‘s Permutations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,‘ Resurgent Antisemitis m: Global Perspectives, ed. Alvin H. Rosenfeld, Studies in Antisemitism (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2013), pp. 337-61. I acknowledge the author for this offprint. Rusi Jaspal, ‗Anti-semitism and anti-Zionism in Iran,‘ IsraelAffairs, 19, 2 (2013), pp. 231-58;idem, ‗Representing the ―Zionist Regime‖: mass communication of anti-Zionism in the Englishlanguage Iran press,‘ British Journalof Middle Eastern Studies, 41, 3 (2014), pp. 287-305. 36. Yvette Claire Rosser, Islamis ation of Pakistan: Social Studies Textbooks , Observer Research Foundation Monograph (New Delhi, 2003) , p. 49. A classic, incisive examination is Ayesha Jalal, ‗Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining,‘ Int. Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 27, 1 (February, 1995), pp. 73-89. Amir Mir, ‗Primers of Hate,‘ Outlook, XLV, 40 (October 10, 2005), pp. 54-57. 37. The Encyclopedia of Pakistan, eds. Hafeez Malik and Yuri V. Gankovsky (Karachi, 2006) and The Oxford Companion to Pakistani History, ed. Ayesha Jalal (Karachi, 2012). I must point out here that Jalal‘s fellow alumnus and Cambridge collaborator, Sugata Bose, His Majesty‟s Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India‟s Struggle ag ainst Empire (Cambridge, MA 2011; repr. 2012), sidesteps stating Subhas Chandra
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38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Bose, president of the Indian National Congress (1937-39), was deadset against Nehru‘s proposal that Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi-occupied Europe be allowed to seek asylum in India. See Encyclopaedia J ud aic a, 2nd ed., s.v. ‗India‘ (by Nathan Katz), vol. 9 (New York and London, 2007), p. 775. It is deplorable that Harvard University‘s Press website situates an irascible, imperious anti-imperialist, in cahoots with Axis imperialists, ‗among the giants of Indian and world history.‘ How rich then to stumble upon Aryan hosts in the streets of Munich sneering him a ‗neger‘. Bose, op. cit., 2012, p. 95. It, naturally, led him to protest self-righteously against legislation in the offing against coloureds and Jews. Not a whimper from Bose against his Japanese allies, once translated to Singapore, about the hellish conditions endured by fellow, colonised coloureds never mind allied PoWs. Political expediency, obviously, played its part. But orientals, then as now, habitually turn a Nelson‘s eye to regional racism and xenophobia. The bar must be raised, perennially and severely, for whites whose slovenly standards, unter uns, are acceptable. Belton, art. cit., 2007; Leibovitz, art. cit.., 2013; Weil, art. cit., 2013-14. Rashna Singh, ‗Jewish Parsi Relations in India and Pakistan,‘ Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora: Origins, Experiences, and Culture, vol. 3, ed. M. Avrum Ehrlich (Santa Barbara, 2009), p. 1225. Malte Gaier, ‗Jews in Pakistan in the context of estranged Pakistani -Israeli Relations,‘ Between Mumbai and Manil a: Jud ais m in Asia since the Founding of the State of Israel, Proceedings of the Intl. Conference, held at the Dept. of Comparative Religion at the Univ. of Bonn. May 30, to June 1, 2012, ed. Manfred Hutter (Goettingen, 2013), p. 140; Fishel Benkhald, ‗Observing Passover as the last Jew in Pakistan,‘ The Huffington Post (Apr. 1, 2015), online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fishel-benkhald/observing-passingas-the-_b_6981120.html; Mahim Maher, ‗The Jews built Karachi, but we built shopping plazas on their synagogue,‘ The Express Tribune (Nov. 3, 2013), online: http://tribune.com.pk/story/626468/secrethistories-the-jews-built-karachi-but-we-built-shopping-plazas-on-theirsynagogue/ 300 in Weil, art. cit., 2009, p. 1228. 800 in Abdul Majeed Abid, ‗The Jewish vote,‘ The News (Apr. 3, 2013), p. 9; online: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays -News-9-169038-The-Jewish-vote; they were enumerated as 427 females and 327 males. Naumana Amjad and Alex Wood, ‗Identifying and changing the normative beliefs about aggression which lead young Muslim adults to join extremist anti-Semitic groups in Pakistan,‘ Aggressive Behaviour, 35, 6 (November-December, 2009), pp. 514-19; Ahmad, op. cit., 2011. Rusi Jaspal, ‗―I‘m not AntiSemitic but… ‖: Perception of Israel and Jews among British Pakistani Muslims,‘ idem, Antisemitis m and AntiZionis m: Representation, Cognition and Everyd ay T alk, foreword by Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Studies in Migration and Diaspora (Farnham, 2014), pp. 175-76. Muhammad Nazeer Kaka Khel, ‗Status of Non-Muslim Minorities in Pakistan,‘ Islamic Studies, 23, 1 (Spring, 1984), p. 51f. Farzana Shaikh‘s contention rings truer than ever. Remarks supra and nn. 32, 33. Bernard Lewis, Europe and Islam, 2007 Irving Kristol Lecture, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy (Washington DC, 2007),
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p. 15. Article repr. in idem, Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (New York, 2010), pp. 10-38. 43. ‗An engaging dictator who wants to stay that way,‘ The Economist, 281 (December 12-18, 1981), p. 48.On Zia‘s perfidy Haqqani, op. cit., 2013, p. 226. 44. ‗The Rise of Pakistan: a National Conscience borne of Responsibilities,‘ The Times (Feb. 26, 1948), p. 5. 45. Abid, art. cit., 2013. Gaier, art. cit., 2009, p. 140 remarks that only ‗around a dozen‘ remain in Karachi. 46. Salman Rashid, The funny side of … national survival,‘ The Herald, 48, 2 (February, 2015), p. 81. 47. Vide n. 37. 48. Shalva Weil and Nathan Katz, for example, are two scholars of South Asian Jewry. Not impossible to communicate in this internet age. For it is the internet which must have made it possible for the OCPH to invite and include four submissions by Prof. Yohanan Friedmann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Caveat lector that the entry on ‗Ahmadis‘ (pp. 12-13), authored by Friedmann, has been misattributed to Nadia Ghani. See ‗Yohanan Friedmann: List of Publications,‘ (p. 5), online: http://academy.ac.il/data/persons__data/156/list_of_publications_20 13.pdf 49. Rightly questioned in a review by Ali Raza, Dawn Books & Authors (Apr. 7, 2013), online: http://www.dawn.com/news/800452/reviewthe-oxford-companion-to-pakistani-history-edited-by-ayesha-jalal. He asks, ‗Precisely how this [2003] summit was relevant to Pakistan — as opposed to other Camp David summits, for example — remains a mystery. It could of course be the case that it was important for Pakistan, but then a case should have been made for it.‘ 50. Paul Rockower and Aneeq Cheema, ‗Dancing in the dark: pulling the veil off Israel-Pakistan relations,‘ Muslim attitudes to Jews and Israel: the ambivalenc es of rejection, antag onis m, tolerance and c ooperation, ed. Moshe Ma‘oz (Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2010), pp. 186-214; Farzana Shaikh, ‗Across the Divide,‘ The World Today, 61, 10 (October, 2005), p. 14; P. R. Kumaraswamy, ‗The strangely parallel careers of Israel and Pakistan,‘ Middle East Quarterly, 4, 2 (June, 1997), pp. 3141; idem, ‗Israel and Pakistan: strange bedfellows or natural allies?,‘ Strategic Analysis, 23, vi (1999), pp. 873-93; idem, Beyond the veil: Israel-Pakistan rel ations, Memorandum 55, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2000; idem, ‗Nuclear Pakistan and Israel,‘ World Affairs, 6, ii (2002), pp. 126-34;idem, ‗Israel and Pakistan: Public Rhetoric versus Political Pragmatism,‘ Israel Affairs, 12, 1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 123-35;id em, ‗The Pakistani-Israeli courtship: the underlying logics,‘ South Asian Survey, 14, i (2007), pp. 31-43; idem, ‗Indian Muslims and the three Js: Jews, Jerusalem and the Jewish state,‘ Ma‘oz, op. cit., 2010, pp. 215-29. 51. S.v. 'Palestine' (by Nadia Ghani), Jalal, op. cit., 2012, p. 404. S.v. 'Minorities' (by M. R. Kazimi), pp. 339-40, is a conspectus where the only mention anywhere of Jews is cursorily given as: 'There were also a sizeable number of Marathi-speaking Jews in Pakistan at the time of Partition with their synagogue in Karachi, but with the creation of Israel and Pakistan's refusal of accept it [sic], they felt threatened and almost all of them left.' Kazimi, a Bombay-born, Karachibased muhajir, knows full well the score. Compared to the vitriol federally prescribed for the Social Studies' syllabi, his writings are
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52. 53.
54. 55.
56.
57. 58.
59.
60.
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shorn of bigotry. See M. R. Kazimi, Pakistan Studies: for B.A./B.Sc./B.Com./B.Sc. (Home Economics), introd. by Massarrat Abid and foreword by Stanley Wolpert (Karachi, 2007; repr. 2014). Fouad Ajami, ‗The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,‘ Foreign Policy, 138 (September-October, 2003), p. 60. Bernard Lewis, ‗Did you say ―American Imperialism‖? Power, Weakness, and Choices in the Middle East,‘ National Review, 53, 24 (December 17, 2001), p. 30. Article repr. in idem, From B abel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (New York, 2004; repr. 2005), pp. 343-50. Khizr‘s response <> in Muhammad Iqbal, Bang-e dara (Lahore, 1930), p. 300. Translation mine. Somake died in London in April, 1947. Robbins and To kayer, op. cit., 2013, p. 264; Palash Ghosh, ‗Karachi Yahudi: Pakistan‘s vanishing (or vanished) Jewish community,‘ Int. Business Times (Nov. 16, 2013), online: http://www.ibtimes.com/karachi-yahudi-pakistans-vanishingor-vanished-jewish-community-1472832; ‗Somake‘s Karachi,‘ Dawn (May 22, 2011), online: http:// www.dawn.com/news/630841/somakes -karachi; Somake was also responsible for the B(ai) V(irbaiji) S(oparivala) Parsi High School. Pointed out in Robbins and Tokayer, loc. cit., but not in Jehangir Framroze Punthakey, The Karac hi Zoroastrian C alend ar: a Record of important events in the growth of the Parsi community in K arac hi ([Karachi], 1989), pp. 86- 90. The author‘s granddaughter, Firoza Punthakey Mistree, gifted me this valuable primary source of Sind‘s Parsi history. Document 174: Yusuf Haroon to M. A. Jinnah, F. 1127/321, Karachi, dt. March 10, 1944. Consult Quest for Politic al Settlement in India 1 October 1943 – 31 July 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, ed. Z. H. Zaidi, second series, vol. X (Islamabad, 2004), p. 195. It was not, as often noted, purchased from Sir Kavasji‘s son, Sohrab Katrak, a former mayor of Karachi. Contra Danial Shah, ‗Quaid-e-Azam House: Living History,‘ The Express Tribune (Mar. 15, 2015), online: http://tribune.com.pk/story/851575/quai d-e-azam-house-livinghistory/ Weil, art. cit., 2009, p. 1229. Peerzada Salman, ‗Role of Jews in Karachi‘s uplift highlighted,‘ Dawn (Nov. 3, 2013), online: http://www.dawn.com/news/1053650; Maher, art. cit., 2013. A point in fact hitherto not highlighted. Zia‘s death produced a cottage industry of canards and culprits. Pakistan‘s disgruntled Twelver Shia are one of the usual suspects. This might well lead some fetid, febrile, fervent Sunnis to adumbrate a Jewish complot. On historical Sunni polemics against the Shia see Steven Wasserstrom, ‗‗‗The Šī‗īsare the Jews of our Community‘‘: an Interreligious Comparison within Sunnī Thought,‘ Israel Oriental Studies, 14 [Concepts of the Other in Near Eastern Religions], (1994), pp. 297-324. As pointed out by me in Waghmar, art. cit., 2013, n. 23, p. 193f.: ‗Pakistan extends visa-free travel by issuing a Pakistan Origin Card to those individuals who were born and/or resided previously in Pakistan. But former Pakistanis currently holding citizenship or nationality of Israel or India are debarred. Online: http://www.pakmissionuk.gov.pk/nadra/poc_eligibility_details.asp Gaier, art. cit., 2012, p. 140.
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61. Former Prime Minister Gilani, at the time of writing, has come under scrutiny for salting away a precious necklace, once a wedding gift, belonging to Turkish First Lady, Emine Erdo ğan, and donated by her towards Pakistani flood victims in 2010. Gilani claimed that, ‗The necklace belongs to my sister and is with me.‘ See Iftikhar Khan, ‗Missing necklace found, but plot thickens,‘ Dawn (Jun. 13, 2015), pp. 1, 5. 62. Kumaraswamy, op. cit., 2000, p. 10.
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(9) Dynamics of political, economic and security partnership between India and Israel Dr. Sanjay Kumar Associate Professor Department of Defence Studies Meerut College, Meerut & Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain Post Doctoral Fellow Department of Defence Studies Meerut College, Meerut Dr. Sanjay Kumar is an Associate Professor in the D epartment of Defence Studies, Meerut College, Meerut. He is a keen researcher in the fields of International Relations and National Security. He has completed a number of mi nor and major research project funded by UGC & ICSSR, New Delhi. At present, he is associated with UGC major res earch project. He is a Visiting Fellow of the Indi a Studies Center, Thammas at University, Bangkok, Thailand, under Scholar Cultural Exchange Programme of ICSSR-NRCT. He is the chi ef editor of two refereed research journal, Suraksha Chintan and International Journal of Social Science. His recent publications include Naxal Problems in India: Present and Future Challenges (New Delhi, G. B. Books Publishers and Distributors, 2014) (Co -author); India-China: Conflict or Cooperation (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2015) (co-author); Internal and External Security Environment of India: Present and Future Challenges (New D elhi: G. B. Books Publishers and Distributors, 2015) (Co -author). Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain is a Pos t-Doctoral Fellow of ICSSR in the Department of Defence Studi es, Meerut College, Meerut. He has received his Doctorate from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studi es, University of Pune. His research expertise includes: International Relations with special reference to Indo-US relations and national security. He has authored two books – ‘Indo-US Strategic Relations: Prospects and Challenges in the 21 st Century’ and ‘Redefining India’s Opportunities and Challenges in Central Asia’ and has contributed chapters in many edi ted books. He has published res earch papers in various national and international journals such as Journal of Political Science, Punjab Journal of Politics, Dialogue Journal, South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies, International Journal of Social Sciences and Journal of Political Studies, Lahore. Moreover, he is also a recipient of doctoral fellowship awarded by the Indian Council of Social Science Res earch, New D elhi.
_____
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Introdu ction The present paper concentrates on the dynamics of political, economic and security partnership between India and Israel. In consonance with its growing economic and military prowess, India is expan ding its footprint well beyond its borders to serve its national interest. From the national security and interest‘s point of view, Israel holds immense significance for India and vice -versa. India‘s eme rging ties with Israel has become an important element of In dia‘s foreign relations. In the twentyfirst century, both sides have developed common perceptions about the future of the world at large and Asia in particular. The growing convergence of interests, common approaches and strategies in the changing global environment formed the basis for close engagement between India and Israel. India has enduring political, economic, trade, defence and security ties with Israel. 1 Although the State of Israel was established in 1948, but the full di plomatic relations between the two was developed only on 29 January 1992. The post cold war development at the domestic, regional and global level contributed to closer engagement between India and Israel. Since the end of cold war and the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, there witnessed a paradigm shift in Indian approach towards Israel. India attaches significant importance to its relations with Israel and vice -versa. The long-term national strategic interests of both countries
have
led to
an
enduring
strategic
partnership which
encompasses political, economic and strategic ties. According to P. R. Kumaraswamy, a well-known expert on the Middle East, ‗The decision by India‘s Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, in January 1992, to establish full and n ormal di plomatic relations with Israel was partly influenced by an appreciation of the potential security cooperation between the two countries.‘ In the post cold war scenario, India perceived Israel as an important partner for military cooperation. 2 The deepening strategic military engagement between the two sides can be reflected from the fact that India is the third largest importer of Israeli weapons after China and Turkey.3
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Where there are convergences, there are also divergences. The same is the case with Indo-Israel relations. India‘s strategic interests converged with Israeli on a range of issues such as combating terrorism, defence collaboration, increasing trade and cooperation mainly in the field of agriculture while attempting to keep it out of public view. On the other hand, there are also factors that hinder the bilateral relations from freely progressing. They include the Palestinian issue and Iranian factor. 4 Political Dimension The political understanding between India and Israel started gained momentum after the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War era. After several decades of neglect, India‘s bilateral relations with Israel have started gaining momentum in recent years. The post cold war global strategic developments have its impact on the relationship between India and Israel. Relations between the two countries have improved significantly in recent times owing to the significant potential that lies with each other. Today, both sides are wellplaced to expand their cooperation. They do not have any bilateral territorial disputes, security fears or any sort of conflicts. The end of Cold War bi polar politics was a turning point in the history of political engagement between India and Israel. Both sides taking into account the changing world scenario and to need to ca pture the lost opportunity took the bold decision to establish diplomatic relations. As a result of which, Israel opened its Em bassy in New Delhi in February 1992 an d India opened its Embassy in Tel Aviv in May 1992. It has shown the way for the development of economic, military and political cooperation between the Republic of India and Israel. Since then relations have seen rapid growth across a broa d spectrum. The
turn
of
twenty-first
century
further
provides
great
opportunities to expand a cooperative agenda that will in turn enhance their common good as well as individual autonomy, leverage and status in the global order. Both sides will need to maintain peace and expand prosperity through an uncertain and complex post -Cold War security
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and strategic climate. Besides, political understanding has improved on various regional and global issues. The gaining political understanding is reflected in the increasing frequency of high-level official visit from India to Israel and vice versa. Over the last more than one decade or so, there witnessed an enormous rise in the frequency and intensity of contacts between India and Israel at the highest levels of government and among officials and non-officials. This emerging trend has reflected a heightened awareness on both sides of the massive potential for enhancement of multi-lateral cooperation encompassing political, economic, defence and security. From the Indian side, Justice K G Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of India visited Israel in December 2008. This was followed by Chief Minister of Punjab, Shri Parkash Singh Badal an d Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, Shri Prem Kumar Dhumal in November 2009; Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Shri. Jyotiraditya Scindia in February 2010; Minister of State (I/C) Science & Technology, Shri Prithviraj Chavan in March 2010; Members of Parliament in July 2010; Chief Minister of Haryana, Mr. Bhupinder Singh Hooda in April 2011; Comptroller and Auditor General, Shri Vinod Rai in May 2011; Minister of State for C ommunications and Information Technology, Mr. Sachin Pilot in May 2011 an d former Reserve Bank of India Governor, D. Subbarao in June 2011.5 The latest visit to Israel is by In dian Home Minister Rajnath Singh in November 2014. 6 From the Israel side, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Shalom Simhon in January 2008; Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour, Binyamin Ben Eliezer in January 2010; Minister of Agriculture Orit Noked in May 2011.7 Minister of Energy & Water Resources, Uzi Landau visited New Delhi in February 2012.8
List of Signed Bilateral Agreements 29 January 1992 May 1993 December 1993
Establishment of Full Bilateral Diplomatic Relations. Agreement for Cooperation in Science and Technology. Agreement for cooperation in Agriculture.
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April 1994
Agreement for T rade and Economic Cooperation.
29 January 1996
Agreement for the P romotion and Protection of
Investments.
Convention for Avoidance of Double T axation and P revention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to T axes on Income and on Capital. Bilateral
Agreement
regarding
Mutual
Assistance
and
Cooperation in Customs matters. 28 October 2002 9 September 2003
Agreement on Cooperation in Peace Uses of Outer Space. Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Health and Medicine. Agreement on Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Agreement on Cooperation in the field of P rotection of the Environment. Agreement on Exemption of Visa requirement for holders of diplomatic, official and service passports.
30 May 2005
Memorandum of Understanding on India-Israeli Research and Development Fund Initiative.
10 January 2012
Inter Governmental Work Plan on Agriculture Cooperation. Extradition Treaty. Agreement for T ransfer of Sentenced Prisoners.
Economi c Dimension Economic and trade cooperation forms a key component of the growing multi-dimensional partnership between India and Israel. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Israel and India have witne ssed tremendous growth in their economic relations and have implemented many measures to promote them . Israeli-Indian trade grows significantly every year, concentrating, among other areas, on high -tech, software, telecommunication,
medical
equipment,
bio-technology,
pharmaceuticals, machinery, agricultural equipment, and chemicals; there is also the traditional diamond tra de. India offers a huge market for Israel.9 India is Israel‘s 8th largest trading partner and the third largest trading partner in Asia after China and Hong Kong.10 The major items of exports from India to Israel include precious stones and metals, chemical products, textile and textile articles, plants and vegetable products, mineral products, rubber and plastic products, base metals and machinery. While, the major items of exports from Israel
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to India include precious stones and metals, chemical and mineral products, base metals, machinery, and transport equipment. Economic
relations
between
India
and Israel
have
grown
significantly in the last one decade or so. In recent years, there has been a diversification of the trade basket, with addition of several new sectors such as agriculture, IT and telecom, pharmaceuticals and water management. The trade volume between the two countries has exceeded US$ 6675.86 billion in 2011-12, up from US$200 million in 1992-93.11 However, the total trade in the year 2013-14 was over US$ 6058.52 billion. For Israel, India is the 5th largest market for its exports, accounting for more than 4.5% of its global exports as of 2011. In terms of imports by Israel, India is the 10th largest source of import of Israel‘s total imports as of 2011. However, much need to be done to improve the present level of trade volume. In this regard, both sides will need to engage in economic dialogue
to open more
and more
areas for
cooperation. Table 1: India-Israel M erchandise Trade From 2001-02 to 2013-14 (in US $ M illions) Year India‘s Growth India‘s Growth Trade Exports to Rate Imports from Rate Turnover Israel (%) Israel (%) 2001428.02 -9.37 -1.09 855.77 427.75 02 2002634.54 48.25 602.68 40.90 1237.22 03 2003723.98 14.10 11.13 1393.73 669.75 04 20041,005.76 38.92 988.11 47.53 1993.87 05 20051,201.50 19.46 1,031.19 4.36 2232.69 06 20061,322.45 10.07 1,080.59 4.79 2403.04 07 20071,604.36 21.32 1,425.94 31.96 3030.30 08 20081,458.55 -9.09 2,090.41 46.60 3548.96 09 20091,968.59 34.97 1,885.06 -9.82 3853.65 10
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20102,919.78 48.32 19.55 5173.29 2,253.51 11 20114,040.52 38.38 2,635.34 16.94 6675.86 12 20123,739.71 -7.44 2,356.66 -10.57 6096.37 13 20133,746.94 0.19 2,311.58 -1.91 6058.52 14 Source: Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. Figure 1: India-Israel M erchandise Trade From 2001-02 to 2013-14 (in US $ M illions) 7000
6000 5000
India’s Exports to Israel
India’s Imports from Israel Trade Turnover
4000 3000
2000 1000 0
Source: Refer to table 1. From the above table, it can be observed that since India‘s exports to Israel have outpaced those of its imports, the balance of tra de has been largely in favour of India. But the important aspect is that the volume of the trade continues to improve since 2001-02 despite global financial crisis. Defence and Security Dimension Defence and security offer tremendous scope for engagement between India and Israel. The crux of partnership between India and Israel has and always been military engagement. India perceive Israel as a reliable partner in the 21st century challenges touch security challenges India faced both from within and beyon d the borders. Israel can be pretty
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useful in acquiring weapon platforms and weapons that India was prohibited from procuring in the international market. India cannot forget the support extended during the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan in which Israel respon d positively to the Indian requirement for artillery munitions and other critical war stores. After Russia, Israel has emerged as one of the biggest military suppli ers for our country. With estimated sales of US$11 billion in the period 1999 -2011, Israel is the second largest defence equipment and service supplier to India. India is also the number one export target of Israel's defence industries. 12 Indian need for a partner which can offer military equipment to deal with the challenges of the 21 st century and the Israel‘s expertise in build-up of latest military equipment complement each other. Israel‘s developed an d research-oriented industrial-military complex is viewed by India as a good option answering some of its defense and security needs. Israel‘s sophisticated expertise in manufacturing and upgra ding high combat aircraft, anti -tactical ballistic missiles, electronic warfare and communication equipment, as well as security technology are particular interest to India. Indian military officials are
of
not only
interested in Israeli weapons and technology, but they have also shown interest in the Israel Defense Forces‘ successful warfare strategies and concepts. Nota bly, Israel does not have any objections to sell its arms and technologies to India, as it regards India as a responsible country with similar long-term interests. Some of the major arms sales from Israel include: 1. Two Dvora fast attack boats equipped with modern surveillance systems and a sophisticated gun system. Four more will be manufactured as a joint venture of Goa Shipyard Limited and Ramta of Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI). 2. An undisclosed num ber of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) made by IAI, including the recent deal estimated at $230 million. 3. The EL/M-2080 search acquisition and fire -control radar, which was developed for Israel‘s Arrow anti -ballistic missile program by Elta Electronics Industries Ltd.,
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4. Electronics suites for upgrades of the Indian Air Force‘s Su-30, MiG-27 an d Jaguar aircraft, as well as for Mi -35 helicopters. 5. Thirty sea-to-sea Barak missiles in a $270 million deal with Rafael. 6. Hi-tech sensors to help manning the Line of Control (LOC) along the India-Pakistan border. 7. A large quantity of artillery and rifle ammunition, 155mm shells and other sophisticated radars. 13 Besides, Israel has equippe d India with sea -to-sea missile radar and other similar systems, border monitoring equipment, and night vision devices.14 On the key issue of counter-terrorism, India and Israel have developed close understanding on the need to jointly combat the menace of terrorism. Both perceive terrorism as a serious threat to the peace and security of the community. India, owing to its religious com munity and its protracted rivalry with Pakistan has resulted in a series of terrorist attacks in different parts of our country. Such a convergence has brought India and Israel closer to each other. Under the joint working group on counter terrorism, both sides have condemned all acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by wh omsoever, as a profoun d threat to international peace and security. Since the terrorist activities are transnational in nature, both
sides express
the
need to strengthen international
cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner without any discrimination. To deal the changing nature of the threats of terrorists, both sides have agreed to strengthen intelligence sharing and terrorist financing information sharing. 15 In a bid to strengthen the defence and security ties, there witnessed exchange of military visits from India to Israel and vice -versa. In June 2006 two Indian warships paid goodwill visit to Israel. In June 2007 Israel‘s Deputy Chief of General Staff, Major General Moshe Kolinsky led an Israeli military delegation to India, and in January 2008 Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chairman of the Indian Chiefs of Staff
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Committee, visited Israel and on 6 December 2009 Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ga bi Ashkenazy paid a reciprocical visit to India.16 In a move that would a ppease the Israeli counterpart, In dia‘s former Air Force Commander, Air Marshal N. A. K. Browne visited Israel in January 2013 to bolstered de fence ties.17
Conclusion India and Israel remain committed to sustaining the close engagement and not allow any sort of issue to disturb the bilateral relations. The mutual trust and understanding and the convergence of interests on most of the regional and global of issues brought these two countries close to each other. From the futuristic point of view, India and Israel will need to find more and more avenues for cooperation that would bring tremendous benefits for both sides. The present level of en gagement between
the
two sides
is
not
satisfactory requiring more
solid
commitment from both countries at the political, economic and defence and strategic level. By closely engaging on areas of common interests, India and Israel will need to ensure that third factor does hamper the progress of bilateral relations that would definitely have regional and global ramifications. From the economic point of view, there is a need for economic dialogue at the
highest level to diversify the
areas of
comprehensive economic engagement. The prospects for tra de and investment are very huge with Israel emerging as one of India‘s largest investors. On the defence side of the coin, India will continue to rely on Israel for defence systems and advanced equipments of the 21 st century. References 1.
2.
3.
Zahid Ali Khan, ―Development in Indo-Israel Defence Relations Since 9/11: Pakistan‘s Security Concern and Policy Options‖, South Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, January-June 2011, p. 134. Itzhak Gerberg, ―India-Israel Relations: Strategic Interests, Politics and Diplomatic Pragmatism‖, Israel National Defense College (IDF), February 2010, pp. 8- 12. Dinesh Kumar, ―India and Israel: Dawn of a New Era‖, Jerusalem Institute for Western Defence, December 2001, available at .
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4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
10. 11. 12. 13.
14. 15.
16.
17.
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Harsh V. Pant, ―India Israel partnership: Convergence and constraints‖, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 1279, New Delhi, 2005. Refer to, ‗India-Israel Relations‘, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2011. Taruni Kumar, ―India and Israel: Reinforcing the Partnership‖, Observer Research Found ation Special Report, Issue No. 7, December 2014, p. 1. Refer to, ―India-Israel Relations‖, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2011. Refer to ―India-Israel Relations‖, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 2012. Itzhak Gerberg, ―India-Israel Relations: Strategic Interests, Politics and Diplomatic Pragmatism‖, Israel National Defense College (IDF), February 2010, pp. 55-6. Taruni Kumar, ―India and Israel: Reinforcing the Partnership‖, Observer Research Found ation Special Report, Issue No. 7, December 2014, p. 5. Malvika Kareer, ―Indo-Israel Trade Reach New Heights‖, Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs Mag azine, New Delhi, July 2013, p. 13. Taruni Kumar, ―India and Israel: Reinforcing the Partnership‖, Observer Research Found ation Special Report, Issue No. 7, December 2014, pp.1-3. Dinesh Kumar, ―India and Israel: Dawn of a New Era‖, Jerusalem Institute for Western Defence, December 2001, available at . Joshua Falk, ―India‘s Israel Policy: The Merits of Pragmatic Approach ―, Stanford Journal of International Rel ations,Vol. X, No. 2,Spring 2009,p. 4. Itzhak Gerberg, ―India-Israel Relations: Strategic Interests, Politics and Diplomatic Pragmatism‖, Israel National Defense College (IDF), February 2010, pp. 57-8. Zahid Ali Khan, ―Development in Indo-Israel Defence Relations Since 9/11: Pakistan‘s Security Concern and Policy Options‖, South Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, January-June 2011, p. 135. Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, ―India-Israel Defence Cooperation‖, BESA Center Perspectives, Paper No. 236, 27 January 2014.
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(10) Israel and the ‘New’ Middle East Priya Singh Fellow Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata E-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
(Priya Singh is a Fellow at the Maulana Abul Kal am Azad Ins titute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, India. Her area of interes t and specialization is West Asia/Middle East in general and Israel in particular. She has authored, co -authored, edited and co-edited books and articles on the region. Her research areas include the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli society and politics, comparative ethnic rel ations i n the region, nationalism and post nationalism and comparative politics and democracy.) The ‗Ru pture‘ and the ‗New‘ M iddle East The term ‗New Middle East‘ was possibly referred to for the first time in June 2006 in Tel Aviv by the then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (who was credited by the Western media for coining the term) as a replacement for the older and more imposing term, the ‗Greater Middle East.‘ Con doleezza Rice stated during a press conference that ―[w]hat we‘re seeing here [in regards to the destruction of Lebanon an d the Israeli attacks on Lebanon], in a sense, is the growing—‗birth pangs‘—of a ‗New Middle East‘ an d whatever we do we [meaning the United States] have to be certain that we‘re pushing forward to the New Middle East [and] not going back to the old one.‖ 1 In the aftermath of what has come to be known as the Arab S pring/Uprisings/Revolution,(December 2010 onwards) there is again a debate regarding the emergence of a ‗New Middle East.‘ The events have been described as creating a psychological and epistemological rupture in the Arab Middle East that has shaken the authoritarian orde r to its very foun dation and introduced a new language and a new era of contentious politics and revolutions. It has also challenged the conventional ways and dominant thinking about the region, such as the durability and resilience of authoritarianism and ability of autocratic rulers to conserve the status quo. As such there is an invigorated academic interest in bottom -up politics, workers, ordinary people, social movements, public space and resistance, the decay of hegemony, the crisis of authority and the role of agency in general, a departure from the past fixation with top-down politics and the elite. 2 The Arab S pring was a series of events that caused great political tremors in the Middle East. Mass demonstrations in many Arab states challenged the political status quo and the existing political and cultural systems in the region. The uprisings were a collective expression of economic and social grievances with limited democratic vision. From an international relations perspective, regional uncertainty has increased as
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a result of the Arab uprisings. 3 After years of atrophy, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) sprung into life as a result of the Tunisian uprising of 2010. The recurrent cycle of conventional truths about the Middle East was replace d by multiple layers of fresh debates. The Arab Spring elicited enthusiasm and preoccupation in equal measure. Adjustment seemed concurrently to be for the better and for the worse. The Arab awakening engendered wi de variation in reform processes between different MENA states. The divergence between reform states and regime types widened. In some countries, relatively unified opposition cohered to oust regimes; in others, a cosmetic process of reform merely took a few modest steps forward; in others, fracture and violence reined.4 After 2010, a sustained period of political and social effervescence incrementally redrew the Middle East. The trail-clearing Tunisian revolt unfastened the doors to a series of fundamental changes in the Arab world. Elements of democratization advanced in a number of states. Predictably, the process of political change was far from smooth. At times, the Arab Spring threatened to subsi de into instability and polarization. For those states that reformed, democracy was forged in the shadow of multitude of deaths. In others a degree of backlash ensued. Authoritarianism resisted firmly in most of the Gulf, Algeria, Iraq and Iran. To many, the tragic turmoil in Egypt an d Syria in the second half of 2013 risked leaving the early enthusi asm of the popular revolts mortally woun ded. The Arab Spring certainly did not produce linear, uniform, democratic progress across the region; but it did usher in a ‗New‘ Middle East in the form of more vibrant political debate, open contestation and in some places violent debate. Analogous to national level political change, the strategic contours of the Middle East ebbed. The balance of power between the Arab states shifted. As reform took contrasting turns in different states so it nourished regional rivalries and conversely opened the way to new alliances. The Gulf States became markedly more engaged and influential in North Africa. A more ebullient Egypt initially competed with resource -laden Saudi Arabia but since the second coming of the army, the nation under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi embarked on an alliance with Saudi Arabia, whereby it colla borated in joint military endeavours (Yemen) and benefited in the economic sense in return. Sunni Gulf leaders, nervous of their own Shia populations, adopted a harder line against Tehran; this incited considerable tension as the West explored a new rapprochement with Iran since the second half of 2013. Syria‘s turmoil affected the balance between political factions in Lebanon and in the larger picture created a major refugee crisis in the region. Turkey appeared to be one of the earlier beneficiaries of the reform dynamics in the Middle East, only to be relegated to the slot of one of the lesser players in the region, losing out to the likes of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Regional politics became more Islamist as Islamist-led governments became elected. The region was beset by more intense tension and rivalry between Sunni and Shia, as well as rising Salafi
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groups and more ‗mainstream‘ forces centred on the various formations of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the midst of the prevalent chaos emerged the phenomenon called the ‗Islamic State‘—a group that does not seek to capture the power of one or more existing state apparatuses; instead, it sets itself up as constituting a new state. It is not, by its own definition, an Islamic political party or Islamic militia; it is, as inscribed in its name, an ‗Islamic State.‘ The changed configuration of the Middle East with its ramifications fed into a new phase in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the aftermath of the Arab S pring presented challenges to Israel, while also sparking social pressure for better governance of the Palestinian authority. 5 Israel and the ‗Arab Awakening‘ When the Arab Spring first broke out in T unisia in late 2010, Israel adopted a wait and watch attitude. In fact one of the first statements made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the wake of the Arab uprisings was an indirect reference to Tunisia wherein he expressed his concern for the volatile situation in the Middle East an d wished that ‗stability is restored.‘ 6 He also emphasised that the region‘s instability further proved that Israel‘s focus should remain on preserving its own national security. Beyond a concern for regional stability, several Israeli officials addressed the regime change in Tunisia more directly voicing fear that Tunisia would begin to drift toward the ‗extremist forces in the Arab world,‘7 referring to groups such as the Hamas and the Hezbollah. From an Israeli perspe ctive, the shift toward a political arena controlled or heavily influenced by political Islam is seen with an inherent suspicion, as the common understanding is that such parties will display strong anti-Israeli attitudes, further complicating Israel‘s sta nding in the region. Similar concerns were voiced by the media and think -tank, where the regime change was also considered a proba ble source of regional stability, especially in light of the potential ‗demonstration effect‘ of the protests on Israel‘s neighbours, especially Jordan and Egypt. 8 In contrast to the relative understated reaction to the protests in Tunisia, Israel‘s response was unambiguous when the demonstrations sparked by the Arab Spring spread to Egypt. The relationship between Israel and the Mubarak regime was far from perfect as he was known to cultivate and even foment anti -Israeli feelings among his population to deflect criticism of his regime. Yet, despite the problematic relationship, the Israeli government largely credited Mubarak with having preserved peace and stability for roughly three decades. Therefore, it is no surprise that at the beginning of the anti -government demonstrations Israeli officials largely refrained from making public statements about the crisis or supporting any of the warring parties. 9 With escalating protests, more Israeli officials went on record to express their concerns over the stability and security of the region. They highlighted the importance that Israel places upon preserving the peace treaty with Egypt.
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A review of the reportage of Israel‘s place in the region, post Ara b S pring throws light on the changing equations in a state of flux. The editorial from Qatar‘s Peninsula ma de a telling statement vocalizing the state of affairs in the context of the Egypt-Israel relations in the post Ara b Spring era: ―Relations between Egypt and Israel, which started fraying after the revolution in Cairo, have now developed serious ruptures, much to the discomfort of the Netanyahu government in Tel Aviv. It‘s become a matter of great concern to Israel that a country they could rely on to ensure their security has suddenly started giving it a severe headache....Thursday‘s incident unleashed a wave of anti -Israel feeling in Cairo. Protesters gathered outside the Israeli embassy following Friday prayers, waving Palestinian flags and chanting ―Death to Israel.‖ In the future, any Israeli highhandedness will further alienate Egyptians. The cozy relationship which the Jewish state enjoyed with Cairo is a thing of the past. The new government and the Egyptian public think differently.... Israel must take note of the new realities and launch peace talks with Palestinians.‖10 Writing for Arab News, Linda Heard commented, ―The diplomatic flare -up between Cairo and Tel Aviv over Israel's killing of Egyptian security officers who were chasing down militants in the Sinai Peninsula may have been dampened for now, but it has served to highlight the tenuousness of the Camp David Peace Treaty in the aftermath of Egypt's popular uprising....In recent days, Egyptian presidential hopefuls and politicians have been falling over themselves to condemn the Israeli actions....Conversely, the Benjamin Netanyahu -led government has proved its eagerness to protect the status quo with a swift verbal apology delivered by Defense Minister Ehud Barak and its acceptance of a joint Israeli -Egyptian probe into the incident....It's interesting, too, that Israeli columnists have overwhelmingly criticized their own government for condemning the Egyptian military as being unable to preserve security throughout eastern Sinai.‖ 11 For Moshe Arens, the developments highlight the need for Israel ‗to adjust to a changing Middle East‘ but not necessarily in terms of becoming more flexible. On the contrary, Arens suggeste d in a Haaretz article that ―We have little choice but to prepare for a continuation of an unpleasant situation and hope that whoever rules Egypt in the years to come will adhere to the peace treaty with Israel, and will realize that putting an end to the chaos in the Sinai is of common interest to both countries. But most important, we must realize that the facts on the groun d aroun d us are changing, and that there may yet be more changes in the wind. It is time for a reappraisal of pre -conceived ideas.... It is a time to think how we are going to assure the security of Israel's citizens in the southern part of the country from daily rocket attacks, and make sure that those living in the north and the centre of the country do not share their fate.‖12 Others argued that rather than become more insular, Israeli politicians should a da pt to the changing circumstances by becoming more flexible. For example, George Semaan opined on al Hayat: ―The Arab action has started to cast its sha dows over Israel, while the security repercussions of the Eilat operation on the Gaza Strip an d the killing of the Egyptian soldiers with the bullets of the Israeli army on the border
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between the two countries might lead to political repercussions that could make the Hebrew state come face to face with a blunt strategic flaw….If Israel shows its usual arrogance and fails to a dopt measures to unburden the military council in Cairo, it will risk the adoption of the demand put forward by a wi de faction among the revolutionaries: to change the nature of the relations with Tel Aviv. It will consequently have to face a critical challenge, which will not be the first in the history of its relations in the region.‖13 The growing anxiety over the state of the peace treaty, the calm along the Israeli-Egyptian border, and the rising influence of Iran gradually diminished in the days following Mubarak‘s resignation. Nevertheless, few months into the Arab S pring, the emerging consensus within the Israeli political establishment was still deeply pessimistic. In addition to the threat to regional stability, there was growing scepticism over the revolts‘ potential to lead to a true democratization process. When looking at the evolving Arab S pring and the subsequent regime changes occurring in both Tunisia and Egypt, Tel Aviv‘s concerns included regional stability, an opening for Tehran to increase its influence, a potential challenge to the peace treaty with Egypt, an d, last but not the least, the rapid rise of political Islam in the Middle East. Furthermore, the possibility that the ‗troubles‘ could spread to Jordan, the second regional player to have signed an official peace treaty with Israel was also considered as a threat resulting from the Arab awakenings. However, not all political commentators/observers were pessimistic about uprisings. Some even referred to the upheavals as a potential opportunity for Israel. Israeli President Shimon Peres stated, ―Poverty and oppression in the region have fed resentment against Israel and the better our neighbours will have it, we shall have better neighbours,‖ arguing that regional democratization is exactly what Israel needs to be more secure and prosperous.14 Within the media and the think tank world, many analysts argued along the same lines, stressing how none of the deposed regimes, including in Egypt, had ever been genuinely interested in building a positive relation with Israel. Furthermore, they commented that the Arab Spring had so far not empowered regional foes, like Iran, and it had also negatively affected the popularity of other anti -Israeli groups like Hezbollah.15 Moreover, political observers within Israel began asserting that political Islam is not monolithic in its attitude towards Israel, while also debating whether, once in a position of power, Islamist parties will be forced to ―being rather more ambivalent about their hostility to Israel, or at least about the urgency with which they intend to act on it.‖ 16 The Corollaries The destabilization of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and even Jordan ha d triggered alarm bells in Jerusalem. However the question that came to one‘s mind was will that translate into bigger threats than in the past? The unraveling of sta bility on its borders and the empowerment of
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Islamic radicals were believed to be indicators of grave setbacks for Jerusalem. New York Ti mes columnist Thomas L. Friedman, for example, wrote that ‗Israel is facing the biggest erosion of its strategic environment since its foundi ng.‘ He was joined by Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, who penned a column titled ‗Israel‘s Arab Spring Problem.‘ Middle East experts Fawaz Gerges and Graham Fuller respectively dubbe d Israel ‗the biggest loser‘ and ‗the biggest single loser, hands down.‘ Analyses from prominent think tanks also echoed this assessment. The domestic changes resulting from the Arab S pring among other things had an important effect on at least four crucial issues as far as Israel was concerned: the Iranian nuclear threat, the Palestinian issue, the supposed security threat and Israel-Turkey relations.17 The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu‘s primary concern upon entering office was the Iranian nuclear issue. Having for some time alerted the public to this perceived existential threat, even before assuming office, his priorities were clear: any existential threat precedes the Palestinian question. In his June 2009 speech at the Begin-Sadat(BESA) Centre at Bar-Ilan University, Netanyahu clearly emphasized the pr imacy of the Iranian threat, ―I believed and I still believe that unity was essential for us now more than ever as we face three immense challenges: the Iranian threat, the economic crisis, and the advancement of peace.‖ 18 Ever since the 1979 Iranian revolution put a ra dical Islamist government in power, Israeli foreign policy makers have been wary of an existential threat stemming from Tehran. From an Israeli perspective, the most worrying effect of the Middle East turmoil was the strengthening of Iran. 19 While President Shimon Peres expressed optimism about the ‗Facebook revolution‘ during a visit to Washington, Netanyahu had warned that the Arab S pring could turn into an ‗Iranian Winter.‘20 For Israel, the ramifications of a strengthened Iran went beyond regional politics, creating a major obstacle additionally in the domestic political arena. Netanyahu, at the same time, did not want to undervalue the importance of the US alliance to Israel‘s survival as he put it when he declared that he ―fully support [ed] the idea of a regional peace that [Obama] is leading…..[a] desire to bring about a new era of reconciliation in our region.‖21 The accomplishment of a framework agreement between Iran and six world powers (April 2015) to end the Islamic republic's nuc lear weapons programme opened the door to a new era of policy in the Middle East with potentially far-reaching implications. As expected Israel‘s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continued to oppose the agreement. In a speech to the US Congress on March 3, 2015 he argued that the agreement would pave the way for Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb. He reiterated his opposition again on April 1, 2015. "The concessions offered to Iran in Lausanne would ensure a bad deal that would endanger Israel, the Middle East an d the peace of the world," Netanyahu said in a statement.22 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to accuse world powers (June 15, 2015) of stepping up concessions to Iran
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to enable a deal, "To our regret, the reports that are coming in from the world powers attest to an acceleration of concessions by them in the face of Iranian stubbornness.‖23 In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, partially to placate President Obama, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to an un precedented freeze of settlements. However, the evolving Arab uprisings added further obstacles to the peace process. The upheaval in the Middle East, accompanied by the impending UN Assembly vote on the recognition of a Palestinian state, created an atmosphere of an impending ‗third Intifada.‘ Even more relevant for Israel was the impact sustained by the Palestinians as a result of the disarray suffered at the time by neighbouring states. The Palestinians were disappointed to see the Arab Spring deflecting attention from their cause. The Israeli leadership was more pessimistic than the West about the domestic upheavals in the Middle East. Daniel Byman 24 in an article succinctly summarised the various Israeli concerns. Byman contends in the first scenario, Israel is forced to e valuate a failing regime, such as Egypt, with whom it has signed a peace treaty. Naturally, Jerusalem is unhappy to see its collapse. In the second scenario, the endangered rulers are hostile to yet familiar with the Jewish state, taking a similar approach to that of the Syrian regime. In this case, Israel still prefers the ‗devil she knows‘ over a possible Islamist-controlled government. The most critical outcome of the Arab S pring for Israel was the potential further derailment of the peace process. How could an Israeli administration justify territorial withdrawals in exchange for peace treaties when those signing for the other side may soon be replaced an d the treaty rendered voi d? The domestic instability emanating from the Arab S pring cemented Netanyahu‘s position that a return to the 1967 lines would result in a third Iranian state on Israel‘s borders. Netanyahu repeatedly pointed out that Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon an d Gaza ha d resulted in respective takeovers by Hizballah an d Hamas, two groups that are close to Tehran. In September 2011, the Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas formally requested full United Nations membership for Palestine. The winning of full membership con ditioned by the subsequent approval in the UN Security Council was improba ble due to the expected US veto. Nonetheless in the West Bank, the initiative was greeted as a symbolic step toward international recognition of statehood that many Palestinians also saw as a form of peaceful defiance against Israel.25 The Palestinians scored a clear victory in the voting in the UN General Assembly but failed to bring their case to the UN Security Council. Unlike the first bid of September 2011, the Palestinians decided to go through the UN General Assembly repeatedly with a more modest ca ll for the observer status in the UN in November 29, 2012; the second bid was a di plomatic success. The Palestinians won an unprecedented support from the world community. 138 UN Member States voted for upgra ding the status of Palestine as ‗entity‘ to UN ‗observer non-member state.‘ However, the Arab Spring di d not have any positive impact on the
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continuation of the Arab-Israeli (namely Palestinian-Israeli) peace process. The disarray in many of the Arab states pushed the case of Palestine into the background. The overthrow of authoritarian regimes in several Arab countries brought vocal anti -Zionist elements (Muslim Brotherhood etc.) to power and the ‗hard core‘ among the Palestinians were encouraged to deviate from the Oslo Accords and to seek the solution of the Israeli -Palestinian problem unilaterally and with the help of the international community at the cost of direct negotiations with Israel. The successful achievement of the UN non -member observer status complicated the peace negotiations even more a nd voices claiming that the Oslo Accords are ‗dead‘ became more vocal even in Israel. Nevertheless, two things cannot be disregarded. First, the role of the USA, Israel‘s strategic ally in the Middle East has become weaker as the consequence of the Arab S pring and the US will have to build up a bran d new diplomatic structure of its relations with the Arab world, especially with the Palestinians. The second bit of information is not very surprising: the authoritarian regimes and dictatorships were a better security shield for Israel than the unstable new democracies in the Middle East, because unlike the incomprehensible new revolutionaries they were more transparent and predictable. A consequence of the Arab S pring that adversely effected Israel was as an offshoot of the weakening of Ara b regimes, which gave what Israel perceived ‗terrorist‘ groups a free hand. There was a concrete deterioration in Israel‘s security, as the implosion of the ancien regime transformed the Sinai into a hotbed of terrorism. On April 7, 2011, a cross-border attack on a school bus resulted in the death of a child. In August of the same year, eight Israelis were killed in a spree of similar attacks. A year later, Israel used airpower on its own territory for the first time to end what it perceived as another ‗terrorist‘ assault. Later in 2012, an Israeli soldier was killed while patrolling the Sinai, and rockets have spora dically fallen on the southern city of Eilat. In addition, following the repeated sabotage of the trans-Sinai pipeline, Egypt cancelled its natural gas contract with Israel. What was once Israel‘s quietest border precipitously degenerated into the most dangerous. Apparently some of the public frustration in Egypt as the population awaited the anticipated results of the Tahrir Square revolution was redirected against Israel; the Egyptian provisionary military government postponed the reinstitution of the Israeli flag over the Israeli embassy. 26The mayhem and its anti -Israel bearings reached a new climax on September 9, 2011, when a mob attacked the Israeli embassy; the embassy security guards were rescued and evacuated at the last minute by Egyptian commando forces. Even after the July 3, 2013 military coup that removed Morsi from power, Egypt‘s ongoing civil strife disconcerted Israel. The army takeover and ensuing crackdown increased jihadi violence in the Sinai and created the potential for an Islamic insurgency across Egypt. Jerusalem was also troubled by the Obama administration‘s reaction to the coup. While it conducted business as usual with the Brotherhood, since the coup, the
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administration cancelled bilateral military exercises, suspended the delivery of fighter planes, and placed military aid ‗un der review.‘ Consequently, while the military takeover improved Egyptian-Israeli relations, it destabilized Egyptian-American relations. Israelis found it challenging to un derstand this. Furthermore, the Arab revolutions also strengthened Hamas as it hosted the Turkish and Tunisian foreign ministers, the Malaysian and Egyptian prime ministers, and the ruling emir of Qatar, the first head of state to visit Gaza since the Hamas takeover. Despite tense relations, both Jordan an d the Palestinian Authority sought a rapprochement with Hamas. Jordanian officials met with Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal for the first time in a decade and Mahmoud Abbas permitted Hamas rallies in the PA-controlled West Bank. The breakdown of government authority in Libya and Egypt created an arms smuggling route that floode d Gaza with sophisticated weaponry. The situation to Israel‘s north was no less volatile. The Syrian civil war and the emergence of jihadi groups as a major force among the rebels awoke a border on the Golan Heights that had been relatively quiet for four decades. 27 The other major Israeli policy issue related to the Arab S pring was the collapse of what had been dubbe d the Israeli -Turkish entente.28 Turkey's relations with Israel have by and large been good since 1952, when Turkey joined NATO. After the Justice and Developme nt Party (AKP) came to power, relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have remained decent but there have been disagreements. Turkey, being a largely Sunni country, has sought to have good relations with the Sunni Arab countries and peoples for cultural, religious, economic and trade purposes. It has also supported the Palestinians, including Hamas. Although the Israeli -Turkish relationship had already shifted from a strategic alliance to one of hostility following the ascendance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Arab Spring further deteriorated the situation. The religious element in the Arab demonstrations enhanced Ankara‘s aspirations for a growing role in the Middle East international politics. The Israeli domestic scene did not ignore the inimical rhetoric coming from Ankara. Domestic considerations partly influenced Netanyahu‘s decision not to a pologize for the 2010 storming of the Mavi Marmara an d the killing of nine Turkish citizens. Turkey demanded an end to the embargo over Gaza. Israel was not only worried about Turkey‘s behaviour under Recep Tayyip Erdogan‘s leadership but also Turkish public opinion. The demonstrations in the Arab streets exacerbated passions in Turkey. As expected, Turkey decided to expel Israel‘s ambassador to Ankara and downgra ded relations to second-secretary level. What startled Israel was Erdogan‘s decision to cancel all military and economic relations between the two countries. In its turn, on December 26, 2011, the Israeli Knesset Education Committee debated the issue of the Armenian Holocaust, despite the objection of the Foreign Ministry, lest such a declaration further erode relations with Ankara. 29 The deleterious rhetoric
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continued as the Turkish Foreign Ministry urged the international community and the United Nations particularly to take the required initiatives to stop Israel‘s military operation in Gaza on late 2012, which it described as another example of Israel‘s hostile policies and its foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu saw in this attack another example of Israel‘s ‗crimes of humanity.‘ 30 Erdoğan described Israel as a ‗terrorist state‘ that ‗massacres innocent children.‘31 During his speech in Vienna on March 1, 2013 at a United Nations event, he went on to describe Zionism as ‗a crime against humanity‘ saying, ‗It is necessary that we must consider— just like Zionism, or anti -Semitism, or fascism—Islamophobia.‘ 32 In response, both Benjamin Netanyahu and Shimon Peres condemned the remarks and argued that Erdoğan‘s statements were based on ignorance and they would ignite the flames of hatred. 33 On March 20, 2013, Erdoğan began an official visit to Denmark with an effort to clarify his remarks he made on February 27 at a UN conference in Vienna referring to Zionism as a crime against humanity. ―Let no one misunderstand what I said. Everyone knows that my criticism [of Israel] focuses on some critical issues. It‘s directed especially toward Israeli policies on Gaza,‖ as such his comments were not anti -Semitic but rather a criticism of Israel‘s policies.34 In the meantime, the U.S. became decidedly involved in resurrecting the relationship of its two key Middle East allies. In March 2013, during his publicized trip to Israel, President Barack Obama persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to call Erdoğan and apologize for the deaths of the Turkish citizens aboard the Mavi Marmara. Conclusions Conventional wisdom apprehended that Israel would be the biggest loser of the revolutionary wave known as the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring substantially preoccupied Israeli domestic and foreign policy. Yet despite the negative spin-offs of the Arab S pring, Israel had suffered no major political damage. The threats of a massive uprising in the West Bank accompanied by a third Intifada di d not occur, nor di d the UN acceptance of Palestine as a member state transpire. While the Iranian threat was still on the horizon, an Egyptian-Turkish-Iranian coalition did not come into being. 35 As relations with Israel attained normalcy with the prime actors in the region post Ara b spring, a new Israeli ambassador was instituted in Cairo on December 12, 2011 an d post Muhammad Morsi, Israel‘s equation with President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi‘s Egypt seems to be acquiring some degree of normalcy as indicated by an enhanced security cooperation between Israel and the current Egyptian regime. Over the past few years, Egypt has experienced dramatic shifts as the country has been rocked by multiple rebellions and transitions of power. Its violent upheavals have not only led to domesti c destabilization, but have also considerably impacted the dynamic of the region. In particular, Egypt‘s
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key relationships with Palestinians and Israelis have transformed, as Sisi‘s government embarks on the development of a dramatically different Egyptian foreign policy. Cairo currently views Gaza‘s ruling party, Hamas, as a militarist extension of the Muslim Brotherhood and an illegitimate governing body. Sisi‘s dismissal of the current Hamas government has greatly altered the relationship between Egypt a nd Gaza. The Egyptian government closed the Rafah border crossing, stopping the flow of goods an d individuals that traveled between Egypt and Gaza during Morsi‘s rule. Sisi also targeted the tunnels connecting Egypt an d Gaza, which previously enabled widespread smuggling. Cairo has further ignored other Arab nations‘ requests to open the border and aid Gaza: Egypt‘s relationship with Israel, in contrast, has become stronger under President Sisi. Egypt is considering an agreement by which Israel would supply up to 6.25 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to Egypt a deal that would be far larger than Israel‘s previous contract with Jordan. Additionally, Israel and Egypt are rumored to have a military agreement in the Sinai Peninsula, by which Israel attacks terrorist groups in the area via drones and the Egyptian government takes responsibility so as to avoi d the accusation that Israel is violating Egyptian airspace. 36 In the meantime Turkey and Israel seem to have found a common meeting point in the form of ‗threat‘ from Iran. President Erdoğan is reluctant to accept Iran‘s efforts to exert its hegemony over the Middle East. Turkey‘s perception is that Iran is only taking action against the Islamic State to advance its interests in the region and to wrest control of Iraq and Syria. This was the crux of the message delivered March 26, 2015 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in expressing his support for Saudi Arabia's military actions in Yemen to prevent the Houthis from seizing control of the country. The Shiite Houthis are considered by many to be the ‗long arm of Tehran.‘ In that sense, Erdogan‘s remarks were practically a reiteration of an assertion made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his March 3, 2015 speech to the US Congress: ‗Your enemy‘s enemy is your enemy.‘ Netanyahu's comment was intended to convince the Americans that Iran poses an existential threat not only to Israel but also to the entire region, if not the world.37 Moreover from an understanding and analysis of the vacillation in the Israel-Turkey relations over the last two decades or so, it can be inferred that one of the reasons for the endurance of the Turkish-Israeli relations despite far-reaching changes in Turkey‘s foreign policy in the decade of the 2000s is that the two states have no serious problems at the bilateral level. The reason for optimism in Turkish -Israeli ties can be attested by the fact that despite the lows in terms of political rhetoric, trade and business ties between the two countries has consistently continued to multiply. Understanda bly, none of this should be taken as reasons for buoyancy with regard to the long-term threats to Israel‘s survival and prosperity.
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Nonetheless the Arab Spring has compromised strategic rivals and upset a number of these threats. While its neighbours have been stirred by anarchy and violence, Israel remains resilient. By exercising restraint, keeping a low profile, and strengthening its defences, Israel is perhaps in a better position now than it was several years ago. I n fact, Israel may be the only real long-term winner of the Arab S pring.38 ENDNOTES 1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
17.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Special Briefing on the Travel to the Middle East and Europe of Secretary Condoleezza Rice (Press Conference, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., July 21, 2006). http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm Fawaz. A. Gerges, The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p.1 Efraim Inbar, (Ed) The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and international ramific ations, London and New York: Routledge, 2013, p.1. Richard Youngs, Europe in the New Middle East: Opportunity or Exclusion, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014, p.1. Richard Youngs, Europe in the New Middle East, p.2. Herb Keinon, ―Monday Region‘s Events Show Why Ironclad Security Deal Is So Necessary,‖ Jerusalem Post, January 17, 2011;http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-188587361.html ―Netanyahu: Tunisia—A Proof that we must Retain Security,‖ Israel Armed Forces Radio Website, J anuary 16, 2011. Shlomo Brom, ―The Toppling of the Tunisian Regime: Ramifications for the Arab World,‖ INSS Insight No.238, January, 2011. http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291295508858.PDF. Ian Black, ―Egypt Protests: Israel fears Unrest May Threaten Peace Treaty,‖The Guardian, January 31, 2011. ―Rupturing Relations,‖ The Peninsul a August 21, 2011.http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/views/editorial/162177/rupturingrelations Linda S. Heard ―Israel and Egypt on dangerous ground,‖ August 24, 2011, www.arabnews.com/ Moshe Arens, ―Israel must adjust to a changing Middle East,‖Haaretz, August 23, 2011http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israelmust-adjust-to-a-changing-middle-east-1.380154 George Semaan, New Strategic Flaw Affects Israel? Dar Al-Hayat (Opinion), August 22, 2011. http://www.daralhayat.com/portal articlend ah/300193 ―Mideast revolutions could be good for Israel, says Peres,‖ The Associated Press, March 28, 2011. Benedetta Berti, ―Can Hezbollah Cope with a Changing Middle East?‖ Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 2011. http: //www.fpri.org/enotes/2011.berti.hezbollah.html Mark Heller, ―Israeli responses to the Arab Spring,‖ in One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, Guzansky, Yoel and Heller, Mark A., eds. (INSS Memorandum No. 113, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, March 2012), p.76. Efraim Inbar, (Ed) The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramific ations, New York and London: Routledge, 2013.
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18. Haaretz, June 14, 2009 19. P. Wolf, ―Lieberman: Declaration of Palestinian state is a red line.‖ 2011 Available at: http://news.walia.co.il/?w=/9/1804612 20. R. Medzini, ―Peres: This Will Continue, and Iran will be Stopped by its Own People,‖ Ynet News. 2011. Available at: www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4029376,00.html. 21. Haaretz , June 14, 2009 22. William Roberts, ―Analysis: What does the Iran nuclear deal mean?‖AlJazeera 03 Apr 2015 23. Dan Williams, ―Israel accuses world powers of yielding to Iran for nuclear deal.‖ Reuters, June 14, 2015 24. Daniel Byman, ―Israel‘s Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring,‖ The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2011, pp.123-36. 25. Palestinians Request U.N. Status; Powers Press for Talks. New York Times, September 23, 2011. In: http://www.nytimes.com. 26. S. Zezna, Israel Hayom August 25, 2011, p.2. 27. Gabriel Scheinmann, ―The Real Big Winner of the Arab Spring,‖The TowerMag azine, October 2013. 28. Efraim Inbar, The Israeli-Turkish Entente, London: King‘s College Mediterranean Program, 2001. 29. T. Valmer, ―The Armenian Holocaust: Foreign Office vs. Historians,‖ Ynet, December 26, 2011. 30. ―Turkish FM Defines Israeli Attack on Gaza as A Crime of Humanity,‖ The Journal of Turkish Weekly, November 16, 2012; http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/144847/turkish-fm-defines-israeliattack-on-gaza-as-a-crime-of-humanity.html 31. Emre Peker, ―Turkey Labels Israel a Terrorist State,‖ The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2012; http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732335320457 8128880612421650?mg=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB100014 32. Nathaniel Botwinick, ―Turkish PM Erdogan: Zionism Is ‗a Crime Against Humanity‘ Like ‗Anti-Semitism or Fascism‘,‖ National Review Online, February 28, 2013; http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/341877/turkish-pm-erdoganzionism-crime-against-humanity-anti-semitism-or-fascism-nathaniel-b; Joe Sterling and Jill Dougherty, ―Kerry calls Turkish prime minister‘s remark about Zionism ‗objectionable‘,‖ March 1, 2013, CNN; http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/01/world/meast/turkeyisrael/index.html?iref=allsearch 33. ―Israel: Turk‘s Remarks Criticized,‖ The New York Times, February 28, 2013; http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/world/middleeast/israel turks-remarks-criticized.html?_r=1& 34. Gavriel Fiske, ―Turkish PM says Zionism comments misinterpreted,‖The Times of Israel, March 20, 2013; http://www.timesofisrael.com/turkishpm-says-zionism-comments-misinterpreted/ 35. Efraim Inbar, (Ed) The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramific ations, New York and London: Routledge, 2013.
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36. Edyt Dickstein, ―A New Role for Egypt: Sisi‘s Government and the ArabIsraeli Conflict,‖Harvard International Review, January 10, 2015 36(2) Fall 2014/Winter 2015, Africa, Global Notebook, Middle East, North Africa, Politics 37. See: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/israelturkey-erdogan-silent-netanyahu-electioncampaign.html# ixzz3dVUD9lrH 38. Gabriel Scheinmann, ―The Real Big Winner of the Arab Spring,‖The TowerMag azine, October 2013.
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(11) Indo-Israel strategic relations- Dawn of new hope Balaji Chandramohan (Balaji Ch andramoh an is a Visiting Fellow with Future Directions International, a policy think tank based in Perth. He alternatives his life between New Zealand and India. ) As two countries facing core security threats and from threats from non state actors, India and Israel are in many ways natural partners if not allies. The partnership has got new vigour especially from India‘s side with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi extending to include the framework of better bi-lateral foreign policy with Israel as a part of New Delhi‘s foreign policy calculus 1. Indo-Israel Strategic Partnershi p Israel could benefit greatly from crafting a strategic partnership with India that at least attempts to approach the kind of relationship it currently has with the United States. Proba bly no other large country offers Israel such an opportunity – certainly not Russia, which is still pro-Ara b; certainly not China, which is still smartin g from the abrupt cancellation of arms deals in the early 2000s; and certainly not Brazil, which still lacks the economic clout or global political-diplomatic reach to be of much use to Israel. In this respect, India stands alone in its potential to be a strategic partner of Israel, which only makes the unlikelihood of such a bon d all the more frustrating for the Israelis . The gap between the two countries with regard to Iran is a mirror image of their respective approaches to China. The Indians regard Chi na as a significant rival, huge and sophisticated, whose plans are hard to predict but are certainly not benign. Israel, for its part, discerns mainly commercial possibilities in China. If China is an elephant in the room, so is the United States. America n foreign policy, with the bewilderment it projects an d its extreme fluctuations in recent years, is viewed with puzzlement and scepticism by both India and Israel. Additionally, the Obama administration is hoping for co-production and co-developments of items such as drones and missiles with India as a part of much-talked-a bout ―Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI)‖ with New Delhi. As it is, the US-made Javelin missile was in a face-off with Israeli -made Spike anti -tank guide missiles in a contract meant for the Indian Army. If the US succeeds to enter the Indian
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defence market by supplying missiles, anti -missiles systems and drones, then a stiff competition to Israel cannot be ruled out. In September 2014 Modi met the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in New York - the first meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries in more than a decade. Simultaneously, minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj also met her Israeli counterpart Avigdor Lieberman there. Swaraj had earlier led the Indo-Israeli Parliamentary Friendship Group an d had visited Israel in that capacity. Soon after, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security gave the nod to the procurement of 262 Barak -I air defense missiles from Israel for the Indian Navy for its combat effectiveness. Coming on the heels of that deal was another for the acquisition of 8,356 Israeli Spike anti -tank guided missiles and 321 launchers, trumping America‘s Javelin missile. This was significant as the Americans had greatly lobbied for it even offering joint development. These two deals alone account for $662 million. What makes Israeli arms so attractive to India is 'technology and the reliability - they deliver what they promise,' a source in the military told this author. Much of this technology is border management and surveillance systems - India's prime requirements. A little later the two countries tested the second generation Barak missiles which is being jointly manufactured. Indo-Israel relations under new governments Most importantly, however, the new government through meetings and visits has imparted visibility to bilateral relations - a sharp de parture from the previous Congress led United Progressive Government (UPA) which for political expediency preferred to keep the relationship in the closet.2 In keeping with the landmark bilateral Homeland Security agreement signed during the UPA government, the Israeli National Security Advisor visited India last October. However, despite these public calls for closer engagement, the bilateral relationship has yet to be publicly la belled as a strategic partnership. The current government‘s position is no more than the continuation of a consensual pro-Israel tilt which consolidated following the Kargil crisis in 1999. The conflict served a critical juncture in the bilateral relationship as India decisively turned towards Israel‘s defence industry after finding itself short of crucial surveillance and military equipment to cope with
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Pakistani infiltrations. Given the veri fied benefits of this military partnership, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government resumed and even increased defence purchases from Israel after its election in 2004. While there were fewer bilateral visits and public announcements at the ministerial level during the two Congress governments (2004-2014), there was however an intensification of direct exchanges between the defence establishments. An important example of this policy continuity is that many of the defence deals signed since the Modi government came to power had been negotiated by the previous governments. During his visit in India, Ya‘alon also mentioned that bilateral military ties were already strong but that the Modi government had shown a new willingness to bring them ―out of the closet.‖ Most accounts of strengthened Indo -Israeli relations have mainly discussed the increasingly publicized nature of the relationship while not emphasizing any actual substantial changes. For instance, as bilateral trade seems to reach its limits, there has been no significant progress in the Free Trade Agreement negotiations after eight years of discussions. India will preserve a solid buyer-seller relationship with Israel, separate and insulated from its open and parallel political support to Palestinian grievances. The announced para digmatic change might still happen, especially if Modi decides to visit Israel during his tenure as prime minister. However, the immediate benefits of changing this multi alignment policy are not clear, while the costs are visible as India tries to engage multiple actors in the Middle -East. Given the emerging trend of various terrorist activities both in the Middle East an d In dia, this dimension is definitely going to see significant cooperation. India is likely to gain from Israeli expertise in counterterrorism measures, along with surveillance skills at the borders (both lan d an d sea). Moreover, the increasing radicalization of a few Israeli Arabs an d In dian Muslim youths un der the influence of Islamic State (IS) is a common challenge faced by both the countries and this will drive their cooperation to new levels. These issues were discussed thoroughly during the visit of Israel‘s national security advisor Joseph Cohen to India in October 2014.Israel‘s security relationship with India is out in the open after years of being under wraps, the Israeli defence minister said on Thursday, vowing to play a bigger role in Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s drive to build an industrial base. Israel has emerged as one of India‘s top three arms suppliers, delivering items such as ship defence missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, but such transactions have been unpublicised, largely because of India‘s fear of upsetting Arab countries and its own large Muslim population.
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But Modi, whose nationalist party has long seen Israel as a natural ally against Islamist militancy, has openly cultivated warmer ties, beginning with a meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in New York last year. Since then, ministers and top officials have been exchanging visits and on Wednesday, Moshe Ya‘alon arrived in India, the first visit by an Israeli defence minister since the establishment of di plomatic ties in 1992. Though both were established as independent state in 1948, In dia has had diplomatic relations with Israel only since 1992, when bilateral trade initiated that year amounted to $100 million. Today, it stands in excess of $5 billion. India's policy goal of moving closer to countries like Israel, Japan and the United States, are aimed at furthering the nation's economic development. India's military needs are likely to grow. There are tremendous constraints on upgra ding and modernising the armed forces. Though the Indian policy makers have decided to be self-sufficient in core technologies like missiles, tanks and air craft, there is a vast need for inputs, import of components and colla boration. Moreover, the cost of doing research and development can be crippling in economic terms. The major problems encountered in producing indigenously developed weapons are, first, the indigenous projects rely to a large extent on technical assistance from abroa d, an d secondly, they have a long research and development gestation period an d the delayed produ ction has led to the manufacture of weapons that were already obsolete by the time series production started. The hope to move gradually from the import of arms via licence production towards indigenous development and production of arms has so far not bee n realised. There is a definite business potential for new entrants to supply military equipment to the Indian armed forces. Here, besides other countries, Israel is engaged in supplying India with state -of-the -art equipment and technologies. The biggest benefit of military cooperation with Israel can be in the areas of electronics, missile technology and intelligence. Israel has vast experience of fighting in both stony and san d dune waste areas. Given a similar desert terrain in India, a regular interacti on between the two armies can be useful. In essence, Indo-Israel relations have grown in importance because it is based on very practical considerations. For India, Israel is a source of high technology in many including military related industries and i t is evidently even more vital after post -Pokhran sanctions on India. Building ties with Israel could be an effective counter-balance to Pakistan's military and political tactics. For Israel, India is a large and lucrative
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market. Any meaningful relationship between India and Israel is more likely to cover joint research, joint production and technology transfer. While it may appear to be a rosy relationship, the lack of political will, which is primarily based on India‘s geo-strategic alliances with the Gulf states and its own Muslim minority, is starting to become a thorny issue. As India plays a wider role in the International comity, its relationship with arch Israeli foes including Iran, would be a concern for both countries. Allegations that the Iranian secret service was behind a 2012 attack on an Israeli diplomat in New Delhi has not been given public closure. Furthermore, the traditional Indian position on the question of a Palestinian state is a factor which successive governments must face, especially in times of great humanitarian distresses caused by the conflicts in the region. India is both a regional power and an emerging market and it serves Israel's interest to maintain close political as well as economic ties with India. Both have adopte d similar positions on various arms control issues, and Islamic radicalism does pose a serious threat to both countries. However, the real scope for Indo -Israeli strategic partnership can be found in India's search for technological independence and Israel's quest for qualitative superiority. India's substantial difficulties in upgrading and modernizing its armed forces, due to lack of suitable technology and financial constraints, compel India to seek long-term collaboration with Israel. The framework for a sustained and substantial security dialogue and strategic partnership involving the military/security establishments is particularly likely to revolve around the areas of light com bat aircraft, main battle tanks, aircraft upgra ding, and missile development, while in the absence of immediate monetary gains, the same cannot be said of other financially attractive military transactions nor of the transfer of earlier generation Israeli technology. Indo-Israel Defence and Arms C o-operation Arms export remain an essential and integral part of Israel's security, since they reduce the unit cost of production, offset the cost of research and development, reduce Israel's balance of payment deficits, provide employment to significant portion of the labor force and moderate the 'brain drain'.14 In the words of one analyst. In a broa d sense, exports [of a dvanced weapons, including missiles and technology] are necessary to offset the high cost [of strategic deterrence] and the overall cost of maintaining Israel's te chnology-intensive weapons industry. ... Although sales of small arms and ammunition to a number of states in Asia and Western Europe provide some income, they are not nearly as profitable as advanced weapons and technology. India has 2 different programs that could use the new longer-range Barak missile. The naval Barak -NG, or LR-SAM deal, was the first.
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Signed in 2006, it‘s worth INR 26.06 billion (about $591 million at then conversion) as of December 2009. India‘s Navy has decided as a matter of policy that it will only mount medium-long range surface -to-air missile systems on future warships, as oppose d to depending on short range systems that might protect a ship, but don‘t offer layered defence for the rest of the fleet. This was an early sign of its transition to a more of a ―blue water‖ navy that can reach into high-threat areas, and a logical complement to India‘s establishment of a serious carrier force beginning with INS Vikramaditya (ex Admiral Gorshkov external link). Hence the 2006 Barak -NG naval agreement, which gives India an upgrade d version of a familiar system, extends India‘s technological capa bilities, fosters economic ties and integration at sub-com ponent levels, and helps the Israelis build a new system that meets some of their own emerging requirements. The new system would reportedly have a range of 50-60 km. Making that happen required some loosening of bureaucratic constraints on India‘s defence industry. Based on projections of need and the high cost of air defence systems, India‘s Ministry of Defence began initiatives under which Indian state -owned agencies can forge joint co-development and co-production ventures with foreign companies. The rationale is that under these partnerships, much of the underlying technology will remain in India. Israel has risen to become one of India‘s largest defence industry partners, and may be on its way to surpassing Russia as India‘s largest partner. That rise, India‘s previous positive experiences with Barak, and the opportunity to help develop new technologies instead of buying them, all led India toward Israel for its next-generation naval SAM partnership. Israel Aerospace Industries will be the key partner, and will contribute most of the applicable technology, just as Russia did for the BrahMos by offering its SS-N-26 Oniks missile as the base platform. 2011 Barak -8 materials show Indian firms contributing the dual-pulse rocket motor, associated motor arming/safing mechanisms, and the pneumatic actuation system. On the other hand, India Defence reports that IAI and its Israeli partners have agreed to transfer all releva nt technologies and manufacturing capabilities to India. The LR-SAM project is now slated for com pletion by December 2015, which would be about a deca de from its 2005 project approval to fielding. Israel will be ahead of that schedule, as they began steps to field Barak-8 in their navy in mid-2013. India has been actively buying Israeli weapons; last year it approved the purchase of 15 Heron drones.
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The two countries are also involved in joint military projects, with Israel developing the Barak 8 advanced missile in cooperation with India, further pointing to the strong military ties. Reportedly Israel is also looking to sell its Iron Dome anti -missile defense system to India as well, as India is interested in using the system to defend its key assets. Recent Israeli transfers to India include: • Searcher and Heron surveillance UAVs • Harpy an d Harop loitering anti -radiation drones • The Popeye air-to-groun d missile • The Python-4 air-to-air missile • The Spike anti -tank missile • The SPYDER air-defence system (which employs both the Derby and Python -5 missiles) • The Barak-1 air-defence missile (outfi tted to Indian naval vessels) • The Green Pine multifunctional (search, detection, track, and guidance) missile -defence radar • The Phalcon EL/M-2090 airborne early-warning and control (AEW+C) ra dar, fi tted on Russian Il-76 transport aircraft • The Litening night/adverse weather precision-targeting pod (for fi ghter jets)4 Indo-Israel counter-terrorism co-operation With regard to counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency, India and Israel have started their co-operation with India already using Israeli equipment along the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir, and the 2008 Mumbai terror attack stirred a growing in terest in Israeli counter-terrorism techniques. In the past, Israeli counter-terrorism training was limited to technology an d equipment transfer. However, since the late -2000s, Israeli commandos have offered to provi de training to In dian troops at various locations in India, including jungles, mountains, and highly populated urban zones. Amid this, what remains as a major challenge is the extent to which India can deploy Israeli tactics while combating terrorism and insurgency problems along the territori al borders and within. India is still recalcitrant about a dopting Israeli methods while dealing with terror activities. There are fears that close ties with the Jewish state, or an intensive military cooperation, could lead to the strengthening of ra dical Islamist movements and its support bases in India. For instance, there already have been reports of Indian Muslim youths joining the Sunni fighters Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq. It is also believed that these Indian youngsters will not only fight for the ISIS but also against their nation. Further, as a mark of solidarity, several Kashmiri citizens staged violent protests against the ongoing Israeli offensive in
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Gaza Strip. These developments may constrain India‘s efforts in terms of co-operating with Israel in adopting their method of combating terrorism.3 In conclusion, As both India and Israel embark on a complicated relationship among them which includes co-operation in both international security and regional security they will be having some outstanding issues such as India‘s stance towards Palestinian issue in the years to come. Notes
1) Israel-India strategic ties are no longer a secret, Haaretz, February 18. 2015 http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.643024 2)Coming out of the Closet : India-Israel Ties under Narendra Modi, May 7. 2015 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/07/coming-out-of-the-closet-indiaisrael-ties-under-narendra-modi/ 3)Reinvigorated Indo-Israel military ties: Modi Phenemoneon November 19, 2014 http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Reinvigorated-Indo-Israeli-military-tiesThe-Modi-phenomenon-382292
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(12) Jewish Settlement and Arab Dilemma: The Root of Arab- Israeli Conflict Suhita Saha Maulana AbulKalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata [email protected]
Suhita Saha Joined MAKAIAS Kolkata : 3 rd April, 2013 Expertise/ Research Interests: West Asia, Comparative Politics and International Relations, Social Movements, Peace and Conflict Studies Education: Doctoral Candidate in the Department of International Relations ,Jadavpur University ( 2014 onwards) Completed M.Phil Dissertation in International Relations (2013) from the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata- 700032 Publications ; Book Reviews 1. Kevin Dwyer, “The Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle- East”, Indian Journal of Adult Education, Vol.75, no.4. October – December 2014 2. Laurent Gayer& Christophe Jaffrelotedited , “ Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation”, Asia Connect, Issue No. 4, October-December 2014 , MAKAIAS
_____ Introduction: The relations between the Arab world an d Israel have a strong historical legacy. The Israel- Palestine conflict is undoubtedly one of the most complicated and protracted conflicts in the present world. This multi layered conflict has changed its character over time. The larger context of this conflict presents a much complex scenario of Middle Eastern politics, specifically and world politics in general. The conflict between the Arab states and Israel has been still evolving through many faces where different types of element played a role to shape its dynamics. The Jewish settlement based on Zionist nationalism di d strike a blow in Arab lan d. Later, the clash began to emerge over land between Jewish and Arab people. After Second World War, the armed clash followed by the 1948 Arab- Israeli war changed the dynamics of West Asian Politics. Later, 1967 War between Israel and Arab States with special reference to Egypt, Syria and Jordon got emphasis as, it the war has strengthened the position of Israel in this area. Following the 1973
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Ramadan War, the Camp David Accord initiated by USA received a special dimension with special reference to peace building effor t. This initiative tried to cool off the antagonistic posture between Israel and Egypt. The first Intifada, and the second Al- Aqsa Intifada followed by Oslo Accord ha d been initiated over the condition of the occupied territories like West Bank and Gaza. Later, the turn of events over the Gaza strip an d rise of Hamas coiled up the situation by a dding upto different dynamics altogether in this process. On the onset of the rise of Zionism around the time of late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a small number of Jews were energized by the idea of relocating to Palestine.There were several emigration steps to Palestine. The first wave of some 35,000 Jewish immigrants from Russia took place in the years between 1882 to 1903. The second wave comprised of individuals fleeing Tsarist Russia from 1904 to 1914, bringing with them the
techniques of first collective
agricultural
settlements. The third wave also numbered 40,000 new immigrants from East European Jews.
The fourth wave was a result of increased
economic hardships in Eastern Europe, the anti -Semitic policies in Polan d and, strict immigration quotas applied by the United States. They were largely middle class Jews with modest sums of capital that permitted the Jewish community in Palestine some economic growth. The subsequent wave of emigration was primarily consisted of German Jews. (Aly, Feldman an d Shikaki, pp.11-12) The main objective of this pa per is to un derstand the relationship between Jewish settlement in the Arab area and its impact on th e Arab nationals. This pa per intends to deal with the question that whether Jewish settlement can be treated as the root cause of this complex and protracted Ara b-Israeli conflict or not. In this context, it is also important to delve throughsome otherhistorical parameters which played a major role in understanding the root cause of this complicated conflict.
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Histori cal Evolution and Tracking Down the Roots of Conflict: During First World War, the economic conditions in Palestine and the neighbouring provinces of the Ottoman Empire were very harsh. The foreign subjects were expelled from Palestine by the Ottoman authorities. (Aly, Feldman and Shikaki, p.12)During World War I, Jewish fighting force joined the British army in liberating Palestine from the Turks. In this process, Dr. Haim Weizmann, a leader of the Zionist movement invented a chemical substance that figured highly in the manufacture of explosives. Later, he played a key role in Britain‘s decision to issue Balfour declaration. At this time, Great Arab Revolt led by Hussein strengthened the Arab-British partnership. (Aly, Feldman and Shikaki, p.13)An important development during this period was the decision of the League of Nations. The San Remo conference on April 24, 1920 endorsed the Balfour Declaration and granted Britain and France a mandate to govern the areas carved out by Sykes Picot Pact. (Aly, Feldman and Shikaki, p.14)At the Paris Pace Conference, Al-Hussein bin Ali and Dr. Weizmann met and formulated the secret Weizmann - Faisal Agreement. Theagreement sought to harmonize the interest of Arab nationalists at the post war Paris Peace Conference. This was established by excluding Palestine from the nationalists demand for an Ara b state. Faisal agreed to the implementation of the Balfour Declaration in Palestine, as well as to allow a massive influx of Jewish immigration into Palestine as long as the rights of local farmers were secured and they received assistance in further developing their land. (Aly, Feldman and Shikaki, p.16) The anti-Zionist riot was prevalent in Jerusalem in 1920. The Arab Higher Committee attempted to provide overall direction during the initial
stages
of the
rebellion, true
command belonged to local
committees that emerged in Jerusalem, Nablus, Jaffa, Tulkram and elsewhere. These committees had been financed through a combination of voluntary an d involuntary donation.
( Gelvin James L, p.110) The
Great Revolt marked a broa d sector of the indigenous population of
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Palestine in a pragmatic and coordinated movement to construct Palestinian identity and national narrative. The Great Revolt was the first in a series of events that eventually led to a British withdrawal from Palestine. ( Gelvin James L, p.113) The two most important political situations to the Palestinian problem attempted by the British are noteworthy. In 1937, the British government appointed a Royal Commission under the direction of Early Peel. According to the
Royal
Commission‘s
prediction, the
Palestinian
population would acquiesce to the Balfour De claration. Ironically, the indigenous population of Palestine resisted Zionist settlement. Thus, the commission conclude d to divide Palestine into three parts. Twenty percent of Palestinian territory would go to a Jewish state; most of the rest would go to an Arab Palestine that would be united with Trans Jordon. Finally, the commission recommended that the British retain a mandatory zone in Jerusalem, Nazareth, and perhaps other places that would be linked by a corridor to the Sea. ( Gelvin James L, pp. 116-117) Simultaneously,
during
this
period
of
time,
European
Jewish
immigration to Palestine increased dramatically after Hitler‘s rise to power in Germany in 1933, leading to new land purchases and Jewish settlements. Palestinian resistance
to British
control
and Zionist
settlement climaxed with the Arab revolt of 1936–1939, which Britain suppressed with the help of Zionist militias and the complicity of neighbouring Arab regimes. After crushing the Arab revolt, the British reconsidered their governing poli cies in an effort to maintain order in an increasingly tense environment. They issued the 1939 White Paper to limit future Jewish immigration and land purchases. The Zionists regarded the White Paper as a betrayal of the Balfour Declaration and a particularly egregious act in light of the desperate situation of the Jews in Europe, wh o were facing extermination. The 1939 White Paper marked the end of the British-Zionist alliance. At the same time, the defeat of the Arab revolt an d the exile of the Palestinian political leadership meant that the Palestinians were politically disorganized during the crucial
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decade in which the future of Palestine was decided. (Middle East Research and Information Project) From the end of the First World War until 1948, the spora dic violent struggle between the Jewish community and the indigenous Palestinians had been majorly over the issue of land. Palestine had been under the rule of the British mandate and Britain asked the United Nations to find a solution. Accordingly, in 1947, the UN adopted the Partition Plan, which did not materialise as the Palestinians refused to accept the plan. As a corollary of this anti -Israeli posture, armed clashes between Jewish forces and the disorganized Palestinian fighters ensued. Despite the fact that the Palestinians enjoyed the demographic advantage, but, lack of unity and poorly equippe d force compelled them to drive from their homes. This turmoil followed by thousan ds of refugees, the
fall
ofPalestinian villages and the consequent tremendous public pressure on the Arab World created con ditions that made the war between Israel and the Arab States inevitable. After securing victory in the 1948 war, Israel expande d beyon d the parameters allocated to it in the Partition Plan. ( Barari Hassan A, p.10) Conclusion : It is noteworthy to mention that this long protracted conflict has its own dynamics. It is indeed clear from the above mentioned analysis that the Jewish settlement spurred insecurity in the mind of the Arab people. In this context, colonial powers, particularly Britain played dubious role, at one level, they issued Balfour declaration in favour of the Jewish settlement, on the other hand, they issued White paper to limit Jewish land purchase. From the above mentioned study, it can be said that Jewish settlement was definitely a reason behind the Arab dilemma. If the other side of the coin can be analysed, every society has gone through the impact of marginalisation in their own way. In the case of Israel- Arab conflict, the deep roote d fear and misperception have given a different shape
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altogether. The Jewish settlement in Arab area was a result of Anti Semitic policies in Europe. In this context, it is also important to mention that the Zionism meant for Palestinians their eviction from their homeland and their replacement with foreign settlers. (Aly, Feldman and Shikaki, p.30) This type of ideologue was definitely propa gating Palestinian national destruction. It can be said that in reality, the Jewish settlement was definitely not synonymous with Zionist ideologue posture, but this was definitely a source of insecurity in the minds of normal Ara bs. This issue of insecurity has got the perfect catalyst with the role of colonial power, particularly British influence in the initial days. References: 1,
Aly,
Feldman
and Shikaki
Khalil, “Arabs
and
Israelis:
Conflict and
Peacemaking in the Middle East”, Palgrave Macmillan:USA, 2013 2. Barari Hassan A, “Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, 19882002‖, Routledge: New York, 2004 3. Gelvin James L, “The Israel-Palestine C onflict: One Hundred Years of War‖, Cambridge University Press: New York, 2005 4. “Primer on Palestine, Israel and Arab-Israeli Conflict”, Middle East Research and Information Project http://www.merip.org/primer-palestine-israel-arab-israeli-conflict-new Accessed on 21st June, 2015 at 22.30 IST.
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(13) The relationship between Jewish minorities in China and Israel Dr.Nadia Helmy Visiting senior res earcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University - Lund/ Sweden. Lecturer of Political Science, School of Economic Studi es and Political Science, Beni Suef University, Egypt E.mail ID: nhm_ambassado [email protected]
Abstract The purpose of this study is to examine the relations hip between Jewish minorities in China and Israel. In recent years, research into the history and culture of the Chines e Jews and Chinese conv erted Judaism, and their contemporary relationship wi th home land "Israel" has been carried out not only in China, but in other countries as well. Increasing academic interes t in related subjects is also expected i n the future. This research paper will contribute to the international discussions of the ques tions mentioned above. It will concentrate on the relationship between Chines e Jews and Is rael, and the situation of Chinese government towards them, and the divisions of Jews into Chi nese society. On the basis of the l atest sources and research resul ts, the following questions will be systematically discussed and analysed: The current status of the descendants of the Chinese Jews (es pecially Chinese recently converted Judaism) in modern Chinese society, which is now heavily influenced by different factors, Pres entation of related questions, such as the Chi nese perception of the Jews and Judaism, not only in society itself, but also among scholars, from the historical, sociological, religious, ethnic and ethnological perspectives, in addition to the self-reflection of the older and the younger generations among the descendents of the Kaifeng Jews. Finally, the debate on the implications associated with Jews and Judaism as an 'Other', "a distant mirror in the construction of the 'Self'" in the context of an emergent national identity and self-contemplation amongst various social groups in modern China. Moreover, the contemporary vision of Chinese to Israel and Judaism, and the contemporary vision to the Chinese government from the Chinese Jews and converted Judaism.
Keywords Jewish religion, Jewish minorities, Judaism, Jewish communities, Chinese converted Judaism, Israel, Zionism and Israeli organizations.
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Introduction Jewish policies have responded to some opportunities and needs in China, but not to others. This shortcoming results, first of all, from the fact that the “Jewish people” is not a state or a coherent entity. It has neither a government nor a parliament. It is a complex, mul tinational, self organizing entity with many cooperating but also competing branches and bodi es. Can such a protean people have “policies”? Can it define and carry out a coherent policy supported by many Jews? Or could it only have different, conflicting policies? The las t hundred years have demonstrated that both single and multiple policies are possible (1). Today, both the State of Is rael and Jewish people bodi es have policies. These are rarely identical. More often, they are somewhat coordinated, but distinct. There is not enough information coordination and cooperation between Jewish groups worldwide, between the United States and Israel, and also between groups inside the Uni ted States. The multiplicity of Jewish interests and initiatives testifies to the vitality of Jewish life. Inevitable as this multiplicity is, it can put Jews at a disadvantage when dealing with a better-coordinated and hierarchical country that has long-term political objectives. How often in history was the Jewish people prepared to take a long-term view, anticipate ev ents, and prepare for the future? An astute Chinese observer of Jewish history, the Bi ble scholar "Qiu Zihua", examined in 1990 the general characteristics of the “Hebrew national spirit”. Although he did not us e the word “policy”, his conclusion amounted to saying that Jews were never good at policy-making: The Hebrew nation exercised patience, and was of a tough and persevering character, but it was often passive in a ttendi ng to business, and often neglected taking the initi ative in dealing with challenges in its surroundi ngs. With regard to China, there was Is rael’s forward looking recognition of the People’s Republic in 1950, and Ben-Gurion’s efforts to establish links with the great civilizations of Asia. But apart from these early visionary moments, the policies of Jewish people bodies hav e been mostly short-term and pragmatic, which was inevitable in a context of almost continuous emergencies and threats (2). These policies were concerned with Jews where they lived, and with the problems and dangers they faced, rather than with the long-term strategic importance of remote powers. This seems to be changing now, albeit slowly. Coherent long -term policies to respond to threats as well as opportunities are still not well developed. It must also be s aid that many Jewish leaders and most Jews are still completely unaware that there is considerable Chines e interest in Jewish issues. Research problem: Jewish Communiti es in Chi na were active in cultural activities. Social life was at i ts peak and of course Jews were active in business. Many were very involved in Zionist activities, and established youth organizations like Betar and Maccabi. Howev er, due to Chi na's initial refus al to recognize Is rael, the Chinese Jews and who converted recently Judaism tried to maintai n their identity as Jewish minority in China (by the assistance of Israeli and Zionism organizations) still working on China. As, Israeli government helped those Chines e Jews and converted Judaism to establish thei r own schools, hospitals, banks and clubs wi th theaters for the performing arts,
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homes for the aged and provided financial assistance to those in need, and of course Synagogues and different religious services. That was the background to the immigrants from China decision to emulate in Is rael thei r Chi na model, although on a smaller scale and to provide mutual assistance. On the other hand, the continuation of Chinese's governmental refusal to the Jewish religion and Jewish people as a minority within the Chinese society, still raise a big dilemma to the contemporary vision to Chinese Jews in China, and if there are purely Jews and converted Judaism by the assistance of some Israeli and Zionism organizations working in China and encouraging some sects of those Chinese converted Judaism to immigrate to their home land in "Israel".
The paper seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is the meaning of "Jewish" and "Judaism" in the Chi nese language? (2) What are the concentrations of China's Jewish communi ties? (3) What is the differentiate between the Jews and Is rael in China? (4) What is the main role of Zionism and Israeli organizations working in "China"? (5) Why are some of Chinese people converted to Judaism? (6) What is the situation of the Chinese government of the Jewish minoriti es? (7) What is the contemporary vision of Chines e people to the Jews? Studying Division
Where the researcher is seeking through the study of the relationship between Jewish minori ties in Chi na and Is rael, and the role of some Israeli and Zionism organizations working in China to encourage some Chines e to convert Judaism to immigrate to "Israel". So the res earcher will identify and study the following aspects, which are themes relev ant to the concerns of the researcher, it entails addressing the following: - First: An overview of the situation of the Jews in China - Second: The Jewish contemporary presence in China - Third: The relationship between the Jewish minorities in China and Israel , and the mainly cooperation fields between them - Fourth: The role of Zionism and Israeli organizations working in China - Fifth: The differentiate between the Jews and Israel in China - Sixth: An analytical vision for: Why are some of Chinese people converted to Judaism? - Seventh: The situation of the Chinese government of the Jewish minorities? - Part (1):- The meaning of "Jewish" and "Judaism" in the Chinese language There are many Chinese characters for "you-tai" in Chinese Simplified, or Jew, but the combination that is currently bei ng us ed refers to an animal of the monkey species, and has the connotation of parsimoniousness, "Chien Hsi-chieh", director of the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan, said: "the biased Chines e characters were
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devised by Christi an missionari es in Chi na around 1830, when they were translati ng the Old Tes tament and New Testament into Chinese and needed a term for Jews" (3). “A better choice for the word ‘Jews’ in Chinese wri ting would be one that is pronounced the s ame, but written with a more neutral character”, he said. A) Idiomatic meaning of Judaism in the Chinese language The term for Jews i n contemporary Chinese use simple today called Youtairen (Simplified Chinese: 犹太人; Pinyin language or what is known as Pinyin called: Yóutàiren) in Mandarin Chinese, We find that Youtai Chines e term meaning: Judea, or Judah (4). To distinguish between a M uslim and a Jew, and historically have not been well recognized by the majority of the population known as the domi nant Han. Have shown modern translation of "Steles Kaifeng" Jews referred to the existence of a synagogue or temple of the Jews as "pure truth", which is essentially the s ame term used in China to refer to the modern Muslim mosques (清真寺). According to tradition oral dictated by the "Shu-chen" Director of the Center for Jewish Studies at the University of "Nanjing" i n China, in his book Legends Jews Chinese Kaifeng, where he says: "The Jews called to Kaifeng Jewish" Yīcìlèyètiao (一 赐乐业教) in reference to the existence of the Jewish in the territory "Kaifeng" China. Religion i n Is rael, known in Chines e as Yīcìlèyè is a transliteration and parti al translation of "Israel". Xu Xin translates this phrase as: "God's chosen peopl e, and endowed by God and feel better about their lives and work" (5). In China, the Jews are meeting a great civilization not shaped by Biblical religion or its offspring's Christianity and Islam. The Chinese can look at Jews with a minds et not condi tioned by Christian or Moslem mental baggage: in Chinese, the word for Jew (Youtai), and its earlier equival ents, has no negative connotation anchored in holy books. This is why a Jewish community could flourish in Kaifeng, the capital of the Northern Song dynas ty (960- 1126), from the twelfth to the nineteenth century, without encountering religious or political discrimination, and why in the twe ntieth century, Harbin and Shanghai became havens for tens of thousands of Jews fleei ng Russia and Nazi Germany (6). After the Cultural Revolution (1976), a new generation of Chines e Judaic scholars began to satisfy growing Chinese curiosity about Jews and Israel. They are few in number, and active in less than a dozen universities and academic centers. Their outreach is vast, through teaching, workshops, hundreds of books and articles, and exhibitions. Scholars are also likely to play an important advisory role on Jewish and Middle Eastern issues for China’s leaders, most of whom are today university graduates themselves. Howev er, academic work is constrained by financial limits, lack of internal and external cooperation, and some political restrictions. The broader Chinese public gets its information on Jews and Israel from television, movies, and increasingly, the Chinese Internet. Many appreciate the latter as an
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alternative source of information that, although it can be censored, is less uniform and controlled than the official media (7). B) Youtai Minzu: The Jewish nationality or ethnicity There are fifty-six recognized nationalities i n China, but Jews are not among them. This situation is similar to that of other groups whose nationality status is not clear. In 1953, the Chinese authoriti es rejected a request by local authoriti es in the Henan province to grant Jewish descendents of Kaifeng nationality status. The term "Minzu" would normally not be used for Jews in China, but could be used for Jewish minorities abroad. It has occasionally been translated as “race”, which gives the term an unfortunate Western connotation that it does not carry in today’s Chinese. Youtai ren: the Jewish people, the Jews, this is the term most commonly used in daily language. It is a convenient term that has no negative connotation. Youtai guo: the Jewish nation or state, this term is often used for the State of Israel, also Israel guo. Youtai wenhua: the Jewish culture Wenhua is a respectabl e term, but less comprehensive than wenming, “civilization”, of which wenhua only a part is. Youtai wenming: the Jewish civilization Wenming is the most prestigious of all terms; Ming means “radiance”, “brightness”. The Ming dy nasty is the “Radiant Dynasty”. Being called a “civilization” would put the Jews on a par with the Chines e who like to refer to thems elves as (Zhong Hua) “Middle Kingdom” (8). The Chi nese don’t have and nev er had a clear answer to the “Who is a Jew?” question, much less than the West. It is no coi ncidence then that there are Chinese books such as Israel the Mysterious Country (Yang Menzu, 1992) or Jews, a People of Mystery (Xiao Xian, 2000) (9). For this reason also, it is difficult in China to place the study of Judaism, the Jewish religion, nationality, people, nation, culture, civilization, or whatever into the existing academic structures. But, the study of the meaning of "Judaism" in China began to flourish, as they opened many Institutes for Jewish studies and Judaism Li terature. In "Nanjing", the Institute for Jewish Studi es was, until 2003, part of the Institute of Forei gn Literature because the founding di rector s tarted as professor of modern American literature. But i t has since been mov ed to the Ins titute of Religious Studies. In "Kaifeng", in contrast, the Ins titute of Jewish Studies belongs to the College of History and Culture, but the s ame university also has a center for biblical Jewish literature that is part of the very presti gious Chinese Literature College. In "Jinan", the Institute for Jewish Studies is part of the School of Philosophy and in other
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academic and res earch insti tutes studies concerning Jews and Israel are located in the International Relations departments. The book of "Judaism as a Civilization" by "Mordechai Kaplan", first published in 1934 in the United States, argues that i t was a fatal mistake of the Enlightenment to pres ent Judaism as a creed only and not as a cul ture or civilization that is expressing the full life of the Jewish people. This programmatic book was translated into Chines e in 1995 (University of Shandong in Jinan), using wenming, “Civilization”, in the title (10). The researcher look at the increasingly phenomenon of establishment many Institutes for Jewish studies, Judaism Literature, and translations into Chinese as a big step to understand the "Judaism " and "Jewish religion", especially between the young Chinese academic people, who began to present for us different meaning for Judaism in the Chinese culture and Literature. - Part (2):- China's Jewish communities China's Jewish communiti es hav e been ethnically diverse ranging from the Jews of Kaifeng and other places during the history of Imperial Chi na, who, it is reported, came to be more or less totally assimilated into Chinese culture, to 19th- and 20thcentury Ashkenazi Jews, to Baghdadis, to Indians (11). The pres ence of a community of Jewish immigrants in Chi na is consistent with the history of the Jewish people during the firs t and second millennia CE, which saw them disperse and s ettle throughout the Eurasian landmass, with an especial concentration throughout central Asia(12). By the 9th century, "Ibn Khordadbeh" noted the travels of Jewish merchants called "Radhanites", whose trade took them to China via the "Silk Road" through "Central Asia" and "India". Jacob, the supposed author of a book of travels, was a scholarly Jewish merchant who wrote in vernacular Italian, and reached China in 1271, although some authors question it (13). During the period of international opening and quasi-colonialism, the first groups to settle i n China were Jews who arrived i n China under British protection following the Fi rst Opium War. Many of these Jews were of Indi an or Iraqi ori gin, due to British colonialism in these regions, and became the larges t deal ers in opium. The second communi ty came in the firs t decades of the 20th century when many Jews arrived in Hong Kong and Shanghai during those citi es' periods of economic expansion (14). Many more arrived as refugees from the Russian Revolution of 1917. A surge of Jews and Jewish families was to arrive in the late 1930s and 1940s, for the purpose of seeking refuge from the Holocaust in Europe and were predominantly of European origin. Shanghai was notable for its volume of Jewish refugees, most of whom left after the war, the rest relocating prior to or immediately after the establishment of the Peopl e's Republic of Chi na (15).
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Over the centuries, the "Kaifeng community" came to be virtually indistinguishable from the Chinese population and is not recognized by the Chinese government as a separate ethnic minority. This is as a result of having adopted many Han Chines e customs including patrilineal descent, as well as extensive intermarri age with the local population. Si nce their religious practices are functionally exti nct, they are not eligible for expedited immigration to Israel under the Law of Return unless they explicitly convert (16). Today, some descendants of the Jews still live in the Han Chinese and Hui popul ation. Some of them, as well as international Jewish communities, are beginni ng to revive their interest i n this heri tage. This is especially important in modern China becaus e belonging to any minori ty group includes a variety of benefits includi ng reduced restrictions on the number of children and easier admission standards to tertiary education (17). The researcher thinks that The study of Judaism in China has been, like other "Abrahamic religions", a subject of interest to some Westerners, and has achi eved moderate success compared to other Wes tern studies in China. - Part (3):- The differentiate between the Jews and Israel in China The researcher met many Chinese citizens since studying at "Beijing", she found that for the Chi nese, Jews and Israel are the same. They see the Jews as an old peopl e with a long history, and view Israel as its center. One often hears from Chinese that theirs and the Jewish civilization are the oldes t surviving ones. This expresses respect for the continui ty of the Jewish people” (18). The first parallel between the Chines e and the Israeli and Jews appears, apparently, in Baruch Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (1679), in which he attributes the success of the Jews i n preserving their identity and uniqueness to the fact that they are differenti ated from other peoples by thei r customs. Spi noza compares the Jews to the Chinese: "They, too, have some distinctive mark on their heads which they most scrupulously observe, and by which they keep thems elves apart from everyone else, and have thus kept thems elves during so many thousand years that they far surpass all other nations in antiquity" (19). In recent years, qui te a few works of Israeli literature have been translated i nto Chinese. These were preceded by translations from the Jewish writer "Yiddish". In the article "Translated Literature in Modern China: The Yiddish Wri ter and his Story", Eber rel ates that duri ng the 20th century, approximately 40 works of Yiddish literature were translated into Chines e. What attracted Chines e writers to this literature, is its image as representative of a society that is oppressed by its own tradition and hostile surroundings and also expresses universal human values. In modernist poetry in Yiddish, the Chi nese, and especially the Chines e immigrant, appears as a representative of an oppressed and exploited society, like the Jewish immigrant. Poet Jacob Glatstein, for exampl e, wrote: "I came wi th all the baggage / of my people, / like a water-carrier / and I asked impatiently / in cynical anger / Can I stop being a Chinaman for a while" (20).
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The antiqui ty of the two cultures – the Jewish and the Chinese - their historical continui ty and the fact that they are both cultures of the book have, since Spinoza's time, given rise to quite a number of statements about the similarities between the Chinese and the Jews (or the Israeli Jews), who seem like "distant brothers," even though there has been no historical and cul tural encounter between them. The distance and the difference, apparently, make i t easy to make such statements (21). What was known i n Israel about the culture of China, that remote l and, before the Maoist revolution apart from the fact that they had tea and rice there? How could Jewish culture and Chines e culture have met before the departments for East Asian studies in universities in Israel filled up and Chinese students came to study in Israel, and before China opened i ts gates to the Israeli tourist and merchant? Indeed, thes e two cultures never met, unless we are talking about the small Jewish community in Kaifeng, which began in the 12th century, or about the small communities of Jewish immigrants and refugees in a few citi es (Shanghai, Harbin and Tienjin) in the 20th century. It is difficult to call this an encounter and certainly not a cultural encounter that has left any impression and certainly any mark on the two sides (22). The first three articles in the volume Chinese and Jews deal with the history of the three communities mentioned above, which have been described extensively in research literature and memoirs. In her article on the Kaifeng community, where the renovated synagogue has become a tourism site, Irene Eber (professor emeritus of East Asian studies at Hebrew University in Jerusalem) writes that the research has not devoted sufficient attention to the process of the "Signification" of the community, which i n her opinion did not lead to its assimilation and complete disappearance. It is possible to dispute this description (23). A) The beginning roots of interest in Jews and Israelis in China “The interest in Jews and Israelis goes way beyond business, way beyond technology, to a wish to understand what the Jewish nation is all about”, said "Ilan Maor", joint vice president of the Israel-Asia Chamber of Commerce and a former Israeli consul general in Shanghai. Israel and some American Jewish groups have been eager to encourage the Chinese interest i n things Jewish. For the visit by the Chinese academics, Israel’s Forei gn Ministry partnered with the Charles and Ly nn Schusterman Family Foundation and the American Jewish Committee’s Project Interchange, which organized the trip. A few days after the academics returned home, it was announc ed that China Central Television has just produced, in cooperation with Israel’s embassy in Beijing, a 12-part series intended to introduce Chinese audiences to the history of Israel and the Jewish peopl e. The Israel Project, a Washington-based advocacy group, has propos ed building on this interes t to create a strong base of support for Israel in China. Last year it conducted a focus group on opinions toward Is rael in Shanghai (24).
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“Because China’s interes ts in the Middle East are relatively rece nt, and Israel is still largely a bl ank slate to most Chinese, we have a real opportunity to make a significant impact on its decision-maki ng and views concerning us and the wider Middle Eas t”, Laura Kam, the group’s executive director for global affairs, wrote recently in The Jerusalem Post. While growing closeness between China and Israel on the diplomatic and trade fronts can be explained in terms of the mutual interes ts of both countries, the Chinese public’s interest in Judaism is more puzzling. According to "Song Lihong", deputy director of the "Glazer Institute of Jewish Studies" at "Nanjing University", a glance at the shelves of Jewish-interest books in Chinese bookstores provides a clue as to why Judaism fascinates. Popular titl es include “The Talmudic Wisdom in Conducti ng Business” , “Talmud”, “The Greatest Jewish Bible for Making Money” and “Unveiling the Secrets of Jewish Success in World Economy: What’s Behind Jewish Excellence?” While Song acknowledges that the nature of this interest may seem “ominous” to Westerners, he insists that there is nothi ng sinister about it. Divorced from the Christi an context that bred conspiracy theories about Jews in finance and the Muslim context that perpetuated them, it is simply driven by a natural curiosity about a group that appears to pl ay a significant rol e in world affairs. In Song’s telling, the curiosity reflects “Judeophilia” rather than “Judeophobia”. As the Chi nese nation has embarked on a process of economic and technological advancement, it looks upon Jews, another ancient peopl e that seem to have excelled in this area while maintaining a disti nctive identi ty, as a “model it can employ to modernize its elf,” he explai ned. "Song" said that Judaism is perceived by Chinese people as being part of the foundation of Wes tern civilization. As a result, they see Judaism as synonymous with “Western,” and many take the view that to learn about the West, one should become familiar with Judaism. Indeed, "Song" obs erved that Judaism is not just seen as Wes tern, i t is seen as the best of the West. In China, he said, many erroneously believe that John Rockefeller and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart were Jewish. “Every thing that is successful, smart and rich is regarded as Jewish,” he s aid. B) Rising of the Jews Chinese generations immigrated to Israel Two generations of Jews immigrated to Israel from China. Very few of the elder generation are still in Israel. Of the second generation, all are i n their fifties and sixties by now. These people are the only ones who can still contribute to the perpetuation of the glorious heritage of the Jews from China. Plans also exist in China, which are in v arious stages of execution, to establish museums in Shanghai and Harbi n to perpetuate the memory of the Jews who resided in China. There is a wide interest in the academic world and by the press in
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China on this subject. In Israel, however, nothi ng is being done on this matter to perpetuate the memory of this Jewry so that i t will be easily accessible to anyone who is interested and especi ally to the younger generation who were born in Israel to former residents of China (25). Recently, The Chinese Jewish people decided to es tablish a fund to this end, "The Fund to Perpetuate the Memory of the Heritage of the Jews of China". The money that will be contributed to this fund will be us ed solely for this purpos e in China and in Israel. These were the years of the biggest ingathering of the exiles from around the world to Israel, and among them the Jews from Chi na, most of the immigrants were settled temporarily in transit camps, "Maabarot", that were put up all over the country. The Jewish immigrants left China during the final stages of the Chines e civil war, as a res ult of which its economy was goi ng through a period of very deep inflation. This caused the Jews to arrive in Israel with no financi al means at all and in addition to this, with no useful profession. The ages of these immigrants were comparatively high (average age over 40). Here, we can recognize the main aspects and routes for the Jews Chines e generations immigrated to Israel, as the following: The First rout: Those from Shanghai traveled by s ea, and thei r journey nearly circled the world. There were three main departures from Shanghai direct to Haifa, two by the ship "Wooster Victory" and the other by the ship "Anna Salen". There were also other s ailings from Shanghai, but these ships did not sail direct to Haifa and changes of ships had to be made at several transit ports, eventually all those immigrants arrived to Haifa from Italy on Is raeli Ships. The Second rout: The Jews from Harbi n travel ed by s everal means of transportation: Firs t by train, to Tientsin, by sea to Hong Kong and from there by air via various countries to Israel. C) The m ost popular Jewish and Israeli subjects in China While the mos t popular Jewish subjects in China are those related to Jews in finance and contemporary Jewry, some Chi nese want to go back to basics and learn about scripture. The study of the Bible has nev er been particularly popular in China, where the dominant faiths have been Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, and where religion was repressed by the communist authoriti es. In today’s era of openness, however, it is the focus of much curiosity. Since Christiani ty and Judaism are both regarded as foreign fai ths, there is no reason that studying the Bible through the Christian tradition would necessarily seem more natural than through the Jewish tradition. And ev en among Chinese Christi ans there is an interest i n studying Judaism. Many Jewish s tudi es students are Christi ans who “think that they could do with understanding Judaism to understand Christi anity” (26).
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A common basic assumption in China and the world is that Jews hav e money and power. The difference is in the approach towards this assumption. While in many parts of the world the Jews' businesses and dominance are viewed with a feeling of disgust, the Chinese hav e developed great admiration, even idolization, for the Jewish mind. What is the main reason for this? China doesn’t feel, and nev er felt, threatened by the Jews. On the contrary, China views Judaism as an ancient and wise culture like its own, and respects the high moral and family values emphasized in the Bible. Thus, the global suspicion/hatred/jealousy towards Jews' money and dominance has been replaced i n China by another phenomenon: Curiosity. The question "why are the Jews so dominant in the world?" is asked by many Chi nese (27). There a proof in the local bookstore. In the business section, that any visitor to China can catch sight of one book with an interesting ti tle: "The Jewish road to wealth". If you asked the s alesman if there were similar books, he will refer to an enti re section of business books using the "Jewish motif" to attract readers. Another book, which you can immediately catch sight of, includes an illustration of Moses grasping the Tables of the Cov enant and carri es the titl e, "The ancient and great Jewish writings for getting rich". If you asked the salesman which of these books was a best seller, he will hand you the book "The Jews' business wisdom and the art of proper behavior according to the Talmud". I do not recall learning how to become rich in school, but this is definitely an original way to make the lessons more interesting. Other books you can find on the shelves include: "The most effective methods for Jewish businesses", "Interpreting the Jewish merchants – how they sell and succeed" and "The Jews – why are they rich?" It is very likely that books with similar ti tles published in Chi na, as a proof of their admiration of "Jews". In China, however, they can be viewed as a sort of distorted compliment to thei r heritage. After all, if you told the Chi nese s alesman that "you are a Jewish", he will immediately utter, "Wow, you're smart! (28)" - Part (4):- The role of Zionism and Israeli organizations working in "China" Over the last decade, a network of loosely affiliated pro-Israeli organizations embracing a number of think tanks, universities, lobbyist groups, foundations, activist-scholars as well as donors have s uccessfully established a foothold in Chinese academi a. The aim of thes e groups in China has been to provide a platform for espousing hasbara a Hebrew term for “explanation” denoting the utilization of diplomatic, media, and political mediums to clarify and defend Is rael’s positions and actions that would serv e to re-shape Chinese academic perceptions of the Jewish state. 1) The role of "Shavei Israel" organization in China
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"Shavei Israel", played an important role in recognizing the Jews people every where, especially from "China", and helpi ng the Jewish people in the world to visit Israel, and giving them all the required facilities to know more about "Israel" as thei r home land. The researcher watched a famous video on "You Tube" for "Michael Freund", founder and chairman of "Shavei Israel" who asking the Chinese Jews to back their "home land" in Is rael. In October 2009, "Shavei Israel" (29) received permission from the Ministry of Interior to bring seven Kaifeng men to Israel so that they could explore the possibilities of conversion and aliyah. (The seventh member of the group was able to complete the conv ersion process sev eral weeks ago, since unlike the others, he was already circumcised and therefore did not need to wait the extra time to recuperate). The Israeli rabbi nate ty pically refrai ns from converting individuals who are not eligible for citizenship under the Law of Return – in other words, individuals who do not hav e at l east one Jewish grandparent. Indeed, a request by another young member of the Kaifeng community, Wang Jiaxin, who arrived in Israel at about the same time as the current group, was rejected by the rabbinate. "Jiaxin" subsequently underwent a Conservative conversion in the United States and then applied for Is raeli citizenship under the Law of Return. Two months ago, his request was denied by the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior did not respond to a question about why his application had been rejected. In summer 2012, however, a special exemptions committee did approve the conversion reques ts submitted by Yaakov, Shai, Yonatan, Moshe, Tzuri, Gideon and Hoshea – as they are known today – who have been studying for the pas t several years at Givat Hamivtar, a yeshiva i n the Gush Etzion settlement of Efrat. Two months ago, they all passed their oral examinations at the rabbinical court, and six of them were subsequently circumcised. In typical Yeshiva-boy s tyle, the young Chinese all have the tassels of thei r fourcornered tzitzi t hanging out of their shirts as they enter the small building that houses the mikveh. An employee of the Hod Macaroon Religious Council hands them nail clippers and instructs them to clip both their fingernails and toenails. One by one, they are guided by three rabbinical judges to the ri tual bath that lies behind a closed door. After they affirm their commitment to observe all the mitzvot, they are greeted with big hugs and cries of “mazal tov”! From their friends and teachers, who have come from the yes hiva to share this big day with them? “I feel as if I hav e been reborn”, said 25-y ear-old Yonatan, formerly "Xue Fei", who has jus t rushed out to call his friends in Efrat to inform them that he is now officially a member of the tribe. Now that they hav e completed their studies, "Yonatan" and his friends plan to move to Jerusal em before joining the Is raeli army. Yonatan, who practiced dentistry in China, says he then wants to become certified as an Israeli dentist. Tzuri wants to
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become a Jewish ritual slaughterer, and then perhaps open an authentic Chinese restaurant in Jerusalem (30). Waiting for them on a small picnic table outside th e mikveh are shots of whiskey in plastic cups. They raise their glasses i n unison, but don't drink a sip until Tzuri recites the appropriate blessing, and Freund makes the following promise: “Our next job is to find you all nice Jewish woman” (31). The M ain Concentrations in Israel of the Jews from Chi na were in "maabaroth" located in "Migdal Haemek", "Ramat Yishai", "Beit Shearim", "Atlit", and "Pardess Hanna". A small group es tablished an agricultural settlement in "Amikam " and other groups in "Suchmata" and "Kfar Tabor". Housing projects were initiated in "Givat Olga" and "Shikun Shanghai", today known as "RamatHachayal"(32). The role of "Shavei Israel" to convert some Chinese to Judaism and inviting them to their home land "Israel" In 2005, "Shavei Israel" was founded. The privately funded conservative religious organization, bas ed in Jerusalem, specifically targets descendants of Jews who have lost thei r connection to the religion, such as those forced to convert to Catholicism during the Inquisition in Spain. "Chinese have a strong reverence for ancestry," s aid "Michael Freund", founder and chairman of Shavei Israel. "Even though they don't know how to read the Torah, they know they're Jewish". So far the organization has helped 14 Jews, out of an estimated 3,000 who live in Kaifeng, move to Is rael. But Freund complained that Is rael's bureaucratic and religious red tape has prevented Shavei Is rael from bringing ov er more of these Chinese Jews (33). Because the community "intermarried" and based Jewishness on matrilineal heri tage rather than matrilineal, the norm in Judaism, Kaifeng Jews who want to move to Israel need to undergo Orthodox conversions under Israeli law. The process takes a year or more of study at an Orthodox yeshiva, and requires a final examination before a rabbinical court. In a meeting with "Yecholya Jin" Chinese woman converted Judaism by the assistance of "Shavei Israel", Jin and her relatives belong to a communi ty of Chinese Jews that was established in the 9th century by Persian traders who traveled along the Silk Road to Kaifeng, at the time Chi na's capital. Records documenting the group's history are spotty, but experts do know th at some of the Jewish traders settled in Kaifeng and eventually built a synagogue wi th official recognition from the emperor. After the l ast rabbi in Kaifeng died in 1809, many began to forsake their religious practices while holding on to certain traditions, like the prohibition against pork and the celebration of a communal meal on Passover.
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Jin was brought to Is rael with three others from her hometown by Shavei Is rael specifically to begin the conversion process. Once converted, she was eligible to remain in Israel under the country's Law of Return. The statute allows Jews to claim citizenship, which she did along with her three Chines e classmates. Jin's father remains in China, although she said he hopes to join her soon. At firs t, Jin and others were indi gnant about the need to formally "convert to Judaism "(34). "According to me and my family, we were always Jewish," she said. "I was confused why we needed to go through the conversion process". But after she started studying in Jerus alem, Jin said, she realized how little she knew of Jewish traditions and rules. "Jin" eventually became such an expert in prayers before meals, Freund said, that she stumped him at a dinner with other Jews from Kaifeng at a kosher sushi restaurant, where they discussed which prayer s hould be uttered first: the one for the rice or for the fish. "This is something that I, or most Jews for that matter, would never hav e given a second thought," Freund said. "It shows how much they can add to Judais m". The first family of Kaifeng Jews to immi grate to Is rael was almost sent back to China. "Shlomo" and "Deena Jin" (no relation to Yecholya Jin) had overstayed thei r tourist visas in 2005. As they faced deportation, Shavei Israel worked with authori ties to allow them to stay after going through the conversion process. Shlomo, at the time in his late 40s, endured a circumcision to complete the conversion (35). More recent arrivals have been in their early 20s and mos t have felt more at home in Israel than in Kaifeng. In another meeting wi th "Wang Yage", Chinese man who converted to Judaism by the assistance of "Shavei Israel", "Wang" said he stood out his whole life. His house was filled with Hebrew books, a language no one in his family understood, and ev en his name was different: It's the transliterated version of Jacob, a biblical name (36). After studying one y ear at "Henan University " in "Kaifeng", the 25-y ear-old jumped at the opportuni ty to move to Israel. He hasn't looked back. "I feel Israel is my home and I'm more comfortabl e here," said Wang, who now refers to himself as Yaakov. "Israelis help you out when you need it; it's like belonging to a big family". After his conv ersion, "Wang" plans to become a "rabbi" to help Kaifeng Jews immigrate to Is rael. If he succeeds, he will be the first Chinese rabbi in almost 200 years (37).
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But, the researcher wonder here if those Chinese converted Judaism -according to the mentioned real meetings- by the assistance of "Shavei Israel" are really Jews and have the right to return to "Israel" according to "right of return law", and the researcher also wonder also about the reason behind the raising of interests of "Shav ei Israel" to those Chinese converted Judaism although there are many old Jewish civilizations around the world, and if this because of the prominent emergence of "China" economically on the international stage, and "Shav ei Israel" would like to benefit of that emergence, and make some pressures on the Chinese government to confess them as a real minority? 2) Association of Former Residents of China in Israel The Association of Former Residents of China in Israel (AFRC) is a unique phenomenon. It is unique amongst dozens of other organizations of Jews arriving in Israel from all over the world. The association maintai ns a vibrant and active role that binds the traditions of the past wi th pres ent the present needs of the community and continues the traditions established in China. The story of this association date back to June of 1951 when a group of Jewish leaders of sev eral communities of former China residents in Israel founded, "Igud Olei Sin", which was later changed to "Igud Yotsei Sin" The association of former residents of China. A small office was rented at M r. King's law offices, on Rothschild Boulvard in "Tel Aviv"(38). During the initi al years of its activities the "Igud" had branches operating in places according to the dispersion of the former Chi na residents in Israel. The largest concentrations during this period were in "Nathanya" and "MigdalHaemek" where clubs functioned ev ery evening for meetings and social activities (39). * Founders of Igud Yotzei Sin (40): In 1996 a group from the Sephardi community of Shanghai, consisting of about 120 people, joined the Igud; this group too convenes from time to time in the "Ponve" Hous e and also publishes s everal pages in the English supplement of the Bulletin. And the most prominent founders for "Igud" are the following (41): From Harbin: 1. Teddy Kaufman 2. Boris Kotz 3. Zvi Nehamkin Niv 4. Esther Yelkin From Tianjin: 5. Zelig Belokami n 6. Henrich Davidovich 7. Yosef Fligel 8. Michael Klaver 9. Jimmy Mens 10. Lev Piastunovich 11. Vladimir Zlotnikov
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From Shanghai: 12. Mara M arguleov 13. David Rabinovich 14. Albert Veinerman 15. Vulla Zubitski From Dairen: 16. Yosef Gliberman The association maintains a head office i n Is rael, with branches in the Unit ed States and Aus tralia. It is an active organization that binds the traditions of the past history of the community in China with the present needs of the communities in Israel, the US and Australia and continues the tradi tions established in China namely assistance to students, senior citizens and the distribution of the Bulleti n that disseminates information on past and present lives of the former residents of China (42). The mainly activities of the (Association of Former Residents of China in Israel), are (43): 1. To organize all former residents of China in the State of Israel for mutual assistance and cooperation in all fields of the Israel culture and society. 2. To keep contact with all former residents of China i n Israel and abroad. For this purpose, we issue the Bulletin biannually. This is a very important function in keepi ng the v arious groups informed of what is happening worldwide. 3. Foster and preserve the legacy of generations of Jews in China. 4. In addi tion the association provides ann ual scholarships to about 110 students (1st university degree to students attending higher education insti tutions). 5. Provide monetary assistance to between 60 -70 elderly residents to supplement thei r social security income. 6. All moneys are from donations. We do not receive any support from the government. 7. All activities are carried out by volunteers who do not receive any remuneration. Recently, The (Association of Former Residents of China in Israel) have established a website dedicated to preserving the past history (of the modern age) and at the same time serve as a repository of records of current activities and a place where surfers can access historical data and all this in addi tion to the Bulletin that continues to be published twice a year. Annual activities of (Association of Former Residents of China in Israel), consist of (44): A.
Providing much needed monetary assistance to elderly former residents of China living in Israel. This assistance often means the difference between
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purchasing medication and going without. As of this writi ng some 60 single persons and marri ed couples are being helped. The distribution of scholarshi ps to descendants (second and third generation) of former residents of China who atten d recognized institutions of higher learning studying for their first degree (some 90-100 students annually). Providing scholarships to Chi nese students studying in Israel, who do not receive scholarships from China. Thes e students attend classes in Agricul ture, Jewish History, Social Sciences etc. (some 10 -12 students annually). The scholarships are funded by family trusts established by former residents of China and individual donations (45).
3) China-Israel Friendship Association As a result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Chi na and Is rael and with the initiative of the Igud "The Israel-China Friendship S ociety" was formed. This organization carries out various social activities and hosts delegations from China visiting Israel. It publishes a supplement to the Bulletin under the name of "The Voice of Friendship". This supplement reports on its activities and is distributed to our friends in China and contributes to strengthen the friendship with the Chinese peopl e (46). "Igud Yotsei Sin" is registered at the registrar of societi es at the Ministry of Justice as an "association" A non-profit organization, its financial activities are controlled by an auditor as specified by the law (47). The activities of the association are performed mai nly by volunteers, except for the secretary and a technical aide for the publication of the Bulletin, The "Igud" is able to function thanks to the donations of former China residents in Israel and around the world, which are channeled to various funds by means of which the Igud carri es out the following activities (48). 4) The role of the Israeli organization "Stand With Us" (S WU) in China It's a pro-Israeli American advocacy group that coordinates its activities closely with the Israeli government in China, finally unveiled an SWU-China division for its organization in an event that marked a joint cel ebration of the Chinese New Year and Jewish "Tu B’Shvat" i n Jerusalem (involving, interestingly enough, talks by three Is rael Defense Force soldiers from China’s Kaifeng Jewish community). SWU’s Director is "Michael Dickson"(49). Stand Wi th Us (S WU) was established in 2002, international, non-profit Is rael education organisation that supports people around the world es pecially "China" who want to educate their own local campuses and communities about Israel (50). "Stand With Us" educates through social media, hosts speakers, programmes and conferences in cities around the world, offers website resources and creates brochures and materials about Israel in a variety of l anguages and on a v ariety of topics that are distributed globally. The organisation now has 12 chapters worldwide (51).
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The creation of S WU-China follows years of tentative public diplomacy and engagement that started around 2009, and in which China has increasingly been identified by the SWU leadership “as a country in which we can make a difference” (52). Here, we can indicate the major role of S WU in China, as the following (53): A. Combating “misinformation in the Chinese media about Israel” and “Islamic anti-Israel propaganda on university campuses”. This would be accomplished, according to Ay ala Sherman-Oren, the SWU-Asia director, by “utilizing social media, university programs, and networking events” that would serve “to connect and cultivate relationships between Israel’s and Asia’s business professionals and social leaders” effectively, “the next generation of the Chinese leadership”. B. SWU’s outreach into China is but the l atest manifestation of a growing decadelong trend in which a network of loosely affiliated pro -Israeli organizations – largely Jewish American in character – and embracing a number of think tanks, universities, lobbyist groups, philanthropist foundations, and activist-scholars, are actively seeking to alter Chinese perceptions of Israel, with a particular focus on effecting this change among influenti al academic and policymaking institutions and universities there. The assumption underlying this approach is that in the abs ence of tradi tional channels for lobbying in China, i nfluencing such centers of knowledge production becomes the only effective means of "reshaping Beijing’s views in ways that may serve Israeli interests over the long run". Many of these groups have tradi tionally been involved in pro-Israeli advocacy outreach i n the United States and bring with them considerable logistical, organizational, and even ideational experi ence not to mention s pecific models of advocacy that they seek to reproduce within China (54). - Part (5): Why are some of Chinese people converted to Judaism? In modern China, the term "Jew" or "Youtai", can be a symbol for money, deviousness and meanness; it can also represent poverty, trus tworthi ness and warm heartedness. It has religious as well as secular meanings. While it represents individualism, it also stands for a collective spirit. On the one hand it symbolizes tradition; on the other hand it can equally invoke moderni ty. One day the 'Jew' is a stateless slave; another day is the dominant power in the world. The 'Jew' is nationalist and at the same time cosmopolitan. He can be a filthy capitalist or an ardent communist, a committed revolutionary or a spineless loser. In other words, anything which the Chines e aspire to is Jewish, and, at the same time, anything which they despise is also Jewish. Although these representations seem to correspond to images of the 'Jew' in Europe, it would be superficial to reduce them purely to 'Western influence'. Representations of the 'Jew' were endowed with indi genous meaning by modernizing Elites at the turn of the century. The images of the 'Jews' for i nstance, were and still are, generated by the difference of the 'Jewish' race, which is marked by its "non-Chineseness", and more specifically because Jews are seen not to be
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direct descendants of the Yellow Emperor. As a matter of fact, the animal radical of Youtai, the received character for 'Jew' or 'Jewish' in Chinese, indicates the imagined physical difference between the 'Chinese' and the 'Jews', which is rooted in the tradition of picturing the alien groups living outside the pale of Chinese society as distant sav ages hoveri ng on the edge of bestiality (55). By creating the 'Jews' as a homogeneous group the Chinese were abl e to project thei r own anxieties onto outsiders, following the well-known pattern found in other cultures and societies: the fear as well as the need of an 'other'. And the researcher here tries to point out some factors encouraged some Chinese people to convert Judaism, as follow: 1) Some converts to Judaism describe the conversion process as “gaining a new identity”. Ironically, today there is a growing Chinese fascination with Judaism. Three universities have departments of Jewish studies, with probably a few hundred Master’s and doctoral candidates, all of whom are Chinese. 2) In operating on a purely academic level, however, these studies tend to miss out on the spiritual core driving the Jewish peopl e. The "Talmud" in particular has gained a reputation as the “grand repository of secret business advice”. With popular Chinese ti tles like Crack the Talmud: 101 J ewish Business Rules, this fauxTalmudic wisdom has now become a guide for those seeking fortunes (56). 3) The rise of China as a major trading force has attracted a new wave of Jews, and encouraged some of the Chinese people to be "converted to Judaism". Professionals, businessmen and entrepreneurs from diverse backgrounds are lured by lucrative opportuniti es. Others come to teach English and s tudy Chinese. 4) There are thousands of Jewish visitors annually, among them former residents eager to share their memories with their families, and they encourage some of Chinese peopl e to be "converted to Judaism". Although Judaism is not one of the five religions officially permi tted to cater to forei gners, the authoriti es turn a blind eye to incipi ent Jewish communities of some 500-700 permanent residents in Shanghai, 700-900 in Beijing and 50-60 in Guangzhou. Jewish rituals including the slaughter of animals and circumcision are unrestricted. Emissaries of the ChabadLubavitcher movement - rabbis Sholomo Greenberg, who arrived in Shanghai in 1998, and "Shimon Freundlich", who moved to Harbin in 2001 hav e established the infras tructure for vibrant Orthodox communi ties: synagogue services, kosher café and bakery, library, informal study groups, preschool facil ities, Youth Club, Bar and Bat Mitzvah classes. Well attended services and the convivial atmosphere at Sabbath meals are evidence of Chi na’s Jewish revival (57). 5) China is also rediscovering its Jewish heritage. Municipal authorities are considering the preservation of some historic buildings from developers eager to transform the former "Jewish ghetto" in Hongkou into a complex of skyscrapers. A small park in the area displays a plaque dedicated to the refugees from Nazi pers ecution. In 1998, the municipality allocated $60, 000 for the restoration of the Ohel Rachel Synagogue, Sir Jacob Sassoon’s gift to the Baghdadi communi ty in 1920. The World Monuments Fund has declared it a building worthy of preservation and
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plans, sponsored by an American called Seth Kaplan, are afoot to restore and pres erve the synagogue as a museum and a site for religious services. A small Jewish museum is hous ed in the synagogue constructed by the Russian community in 1941. 6) Israel and the "Jewish organizations" encouraged some Chines e people, especially "young Chinese" to convert Judaism and build many synagogues and many Hebrew research centers for them, we can mention here to "Xinhua News Agency" recently announced that the "Jewish Academy and Research Centre" are restoring two synagogues and a Jewish school, at the cost of $3. 5 million, with funds provided by the Chinese government. The Harbi n municipality is shoulderi ng part of the reconstruction costs of the Jewish New Synagogue (constructed in 1921) to house a Mus eum of Jewish History and Culture. Harbin’s Jewish cemetery, with ov er 600 graves, has been fai rly well restored and pres erved. Shanghai’s four Jewish cemeteries were mov ed out of the city to Qingpu County i n 1956 and 1957. What happened to them between then and the Cultural Revolution is unknown, but today Israeli journalist and tour guide Dvir Bar-Gal has restored some 70 headstones discovered in villages surrounding Shanghai, where they were being used as washboards, floors, tables, steps and house foundations. 7) China's political role in Afro-Asian solidarity since the 1960s meant that the Jews in Israel, as the enemy of the oppressed Palesti nians, could no longer be defined as oppressed people. Ins tead their image was reconfigured/reconstructed into the 'instrument' of the 'American imperialists' and into the image of the 'poisoned knife which the American imperialists pushed into the heart of Pales tine'. Closely associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Communist China termi nated all official diplomatic contacts wi th the state of Israel. By then, the last group of Jewish residents together with the res t of the remaining forei gn population had left China (58). Generally speaking, l argely due to the i nfluence of official media propaganda, the 'Jew' was no more than an imaginary and distant 'enemy', who was associated with one of China's most dangerous enemies the Americans- as well as one of China's closest allies - the PLO. 8) Howev er, the image of the 'superior Jewish race' continued to fascinate China's scholars, such as "Pan Guangdan". Pan, once China's foremost eugenicist, had become a professor of ethnicity studies, focusing his research on the 'ethnic minorities' of the PRC. His eugenic theories, however, continued to play an important part in his approach to ethnicity studies. In order to build a 'great superior race' (weida youxiu de zhonghua minzu) as commissioned by Mao, Pan pointed out that the 'Han' must live in harmony with other minority groups in order to absorb the 'goodness' (youdian) of these groups and pass on to them the 'superiority (changchu) of the Han, so that they would eventually form a 'great superior Chinese race'. Pan wrote a famous case study on the 'Jewish ethnic group' in ancient China: the assimilation of the 'Jews' into the 'Han' became the example par excellence of his 'ethnic harmony' theory (59).
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So, the researcher believes that all the previous mentioned factors encouraged a new generation of young Chines e to convert "Judaism", and some of them are actually immigrated to Israel. - Part (6):-The situation of the Chinese government of the Jewish minorities Officially, the Chinese government does not recognized Judaism as a minori ty religion, a status that would allow Jewish citizens to frequent synagogues and potenti ally have more than one child. A recent Chinese documentary on the ancient Jewish community in China interviewed families in Kaifeng with Jewish ti es and concluded that Chinese Jews simply no longer exist (60). Jews started to settle in China ov er 1,000 y ears ago, but the Chi nese gov ernment still doesn't recognize them to be a l egal ethnic minori ty, which means they are treated like Han Chi nese wi th no privileges that other minorities have. Today there are more and more Chinese and Jews are helping Jews in Chi na, the revival of their traditions. This is particularly important in contemporary China, because Chi nese citizens belonging to national minorities any, can enjoy the exemption of family plan ning, the one-child policy, and lower the threshold for higher education, and many other preferential treatments. The Chinese government does not recognize the Jews in China as an independent minority (61). Nor do "Kaifeng Jews" meet the criteria for Is rael's Law of Return, in which at least one grandparent must be Jewish. So thos e that consider themselves to be “Chinese Jews” still have to compl ete a lengthy conversion process in order to become an Israeli citizen. Even "Yecholiya Jin", the Kaifeng Jew profiled by Tablet, concedes that Kaifeng Jews did not abide by religious laws throughout much of their history. “It’s only in the last 10 years that we began to pick up more of our condition and understand the traditions. Before then, are right in that we didn’t really keep kosher or know Hebrew or much of the beliefs we only knew we were Jewish and we di dn’t eat pork”. Though Kaifeng citizens of Jewish descent are not recognized as Jewish by the Chinese government, Jin says that on a local level, members of her family and other members of the communiti es are able to pray together and meet regularly for Shabbat and holiday meals in Kaifeng. Her father even wears atzi tzit (62). Regardless of thei r hazy history, once converted, Chines e Jews are considered Jewish by the Is raeli Rabbinate, and several have been granted Israeli citizenship. 26-year-old "Yuguang Shi" is one of a handful of Kaifeng Jews that arrived i n Is rael in 2009 with the help of "Shavei Israel", an organization that assists “Hidden Jews” seeking to return to the Jewish communi ty. He is one of just ov er a dozen Kaifeng Jews to convert in Is rael after several years of studying. He became an Israeli citizen earlier this year.
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“My identity as Jewish, from the time my grandmother told me about it when I was a child in China, was the start of ev erything in my life today”, he said: “I feel Israel is special. It is the place I should live because it is a Jewish country and I am above all Jewish”. Perhaps Shi and others like him have a reason to feel special. Being from Kaifeng and of ancient Jewish descent - whether or not Beijing or Israel recognize him- still makes him, at least s tatistically, one in a million (63). Accordingly to the s tated mentioned of the Chinese gov ernment situation of refusing to confess and recognize the Judaism as a minority religion, and the way of dealing with the other religious minorities, the ruling Chi nese Communist Party accused officially as an atheist organisation. China’s constitution provides for freedom of religious belief, but the government actively restricts any religious expression that could potenti ally undermine its authority. Only five religious groups Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, Catholics and Protestants can re gister with the government and legally hold services. Adherents of unregistered faiths and folk religions often worship illegally and in secret. Ui ghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists and Falun Gong practi tioners have faced particularly severe repression i n recent years, including forced conversion, torture and imprisonment (64). - Part (7): The contemporary vision of Chinese people to the Jews Here are a few things many Chines e people believe about Jews, according to a piece i n Tablet Magazi ne by "Clarissa Sebag -Montefiore" (65): The Jews run the United States of America. The Jews control the international media. The Jews control the world’s money. These tropes are obviously familiar. What makes them unusual in this instance is that the Chinese see these as features, not bugs. “Scan the shelves in any bookstore i n China,” Sebag-Montefiore writes, “and you are likely to find bes t-selling s elf-help books based on Jewish knowledge. Most focus on how to make cash. Titles range from 101 Money Earning Secrets from Jews’ Notebooks to Learn to Make Money with the Jews.” She reports, from a place of deep discomfort, that the Chinese recognize, and embrace, common characteristics between their culture and Jewish culture. Both races have a large Diaspora spread across the globe. Both place emphasis on family, tradi tion, and education. Both boast civilizations that date back thousands of years. In Shanghai, I am often told with nods of approval that I must be intelligent, savvy, and quick-wi tted, simply because of my ethnicity. Prof. Xu Xin, director of the Diane and Guilford Glazer Ins titute of Jewish and Israel Studi es at Nanjing University and the “pioneer of Jewish studies in China,” has made it his mission to challenge the stereotypes and pres ent a more “nuanced” view of Jews to the Chinese not to undermine Chinese admi ration for Jews, but to
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base that admiration on sound scholarship. He started the Institute of Jewish Studi es in 1992, and his students have gone on to open similar programs across China. Judaica has prov en a popular subject, with healthy enrollments in classes rangi ng from Rabbinic Literature to Holocaust Studi es to Judaism and the Study of Monotheism. Xu’s History of Jewish Culture is a bes tseller. Xu’s personal history sheds an interesting light on the desire to connect with and understand the Jews: Like many teenagers at the time, Xu was a Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution, one of the zealous youths who helped des troy much of Chi na’s own heri tage. “I participated i n the Cultural Revolution. We all went t hrough the Great Leap Forward,” Xu said, referri ng to M ao’s push for indus trialization that helped lead to a famine in which more than 30 million perished. “We started to feel from the bottom heart there is something wrong with society. China needed new ideas”. As China began to open up agai n to the West, Xu read Wes tern literature, which had been banned under Mao. He’d soon realized that his favori te writers J.D. Salinger, Saul Bellow, Philip Roth were Jewish (today, many of their works are translated i nto Chinese and studied by college and graduate students in China). As psychology became popular, Xu delved into Freud; he also held immense respect for Henry Kissinger, who orches trated the s tart of American relations with China. Like Salinger, Bellow, Freud, and the godfather of Communism Karl Marx, Kissinger was a Jew. “He was a refugee and an immigrant to the U. S., but withi n 20 years he had made his way to become secretary of State. How come?” Xu wondered (66). There are another perspective of Chi nese scholar called "Liu Nanyang", a doctoral student in the Jewish roots of Christianity, found himself wonderi ng sev eral things: firs t, how it is that Israel is still standing after so many wars?; and s econd, how have Jews have made so many cultural and scientific adv ances ? Liu believes the key to the Jews’ success is their tolerance of one another and encouragement of debate (67). Conclusion China has a long and storied J ewish history dati ng back to at leas t the 18th century. Many Jews also came to China seeki ng refuge from Nazi Europe. Today, the Jewish population in China is approximately 20, 000. During the past decade, Jewish and Chinese students have met on academic exchange programs to Is rael and elsewhere. A small Jewish Museum exists in "Kaifeng", though most remnants of the Jewish communi ty lie in Shanghai. Israel and China es tablished formal rel ations in 1992. Today, China’s Jewish community numbers around 4,000 i n some different cities, though nearly most of them are living in "Shanghai". Led by Chabad-Lubavitch Rabbi "Shalom Greenberg", efforts are underway to revive the Jewish community. The researcher here conclu ded some important facts on the relationship between Jewish minorities in China an d Israel, as follow: 1) For the Chinese, Jews and Israel are the same. They see the Jews as an old people
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with a long history, and view Israel as its center. 2) Jews have lived in China for nearly 1000 years, Jewish traders from western Asia had settl ed in "Kaifeng" in China. 3) The China's government look at the Jews as ethnicity not nationality (Youtai Minzu), in 1953, the Chinese authorities rejected a request by local authori ties in the Henan province to grant Jewish descendents of Kaifeng nationality status. As The term "Minzu" would normally not be used for Jews in China, but could be used for Jewish minorities abroad. It has occasionally been translated as “race”, which gives the term an unfortunate Western connotation that it does not carry in today’s Chinese. 4) In Chinese, we should differenti ate the following aspects, as: Youtai ren: the Jewish people. Youtai guo: the Jewish nation or state. Youtai wenhua: the Jewish culture. Youtai wenming: the Jewish civilization. 5) Today, there are about 2,000 Jews living in Beijing, A handful of Jewish communists came to this city decade ago but a growi ng number of secul ar and then Orthodox Jews have settled there recently, bringing along their families and their traditions. For the past 30 y ears, the world’s Jews have bee n coming to China to take part in the rapid transformation and surging economic development. 6) Officially, the Chinese government does not recognized Judaism as a minori ty religion, Jews started to settle in Chi na over 1,000 years ago, but the Chinese government still doesn't recognize them to be a legal ethnic minority, which means they are treated like Han Chinese with no privileges that other minorities have. Today there are more and more Chinese and Jews are helpi ng Jews in China, the revival of their traditions. 7) A common basic assumption in China and the world is that Jews have money and power. The question "why are the Jews so dominant in the world?" is asked by many Chinese. 8) The researcher poi nted out the role of some Zionism and Israeli organizations working in China, such as, the role of "Shavei Israel" in i nviting Chi nese Jewish peopl e to their home land "Israel", and giving them all the required facilities to know more about "Israel" as their home land. In October 2009, "Shavei Israel" received permission from the Ministry of Interior to bring seven Kaifeng men to Israel so that they could explore the possibilities of conversion and "aliyah". 9) The researcher met in fact some Chi nese converted Judaism and analyzed "Why some of Chinese people converted to Judaism "?, Some converts to Judaism describe the conversion process as “gaining a new identity”. 10) The researcher analysis the contemporary vision of Chi nese people to the Jews, as: The Jews run the United States of America, The Jews control the international media, and The Jews control the world’s money.
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11) The researcher analysis the vision of Chinese media to the Jews. Chines e state media has long championed positive portray als of the Jews, in part because Judaism, with its ethnically based and non-evangelical nature, has prov ed less of a threat to the Communist Party than other foreign monotheistic religions, like Christianity or Islam. In light of the narrative and thesis pres ented here, what policy is recommended for China and Israel in the future? Here, the Egyptian researcher recommends the Chinese government is to prove to the Israeli side that there are no purely Jewish minorities in Chi na by evidence, as they assimilated by inter-marri age wi th the "Han" Chines e majority, al though there were few Chinese Jewish communities were living there, and the Israeli gov ernment should clarify to the world the most important remarkable point was found out by the Egyptian researcher – while studying at Beijing – is there really Jews Chinese are still in China? According to "Law of return", thos e Chi nese converted Judaism are not really Jews, but some of them successfully recently to immigrate to their home land in "Israel" by the assistance of some Israeli and Zionism organizations worki ng in China such as: Shavei Israel and Stand Wi th Us, So the main important analytical questions raised by the Egypti an researcher is: what is the role of Chinese government towards this phenomenon? And how could Israeli government prove to the Chinese side that those Chinese immigrated to Is rael are really purely Jews ? References: 1. 2.
Yeagar, Moshe. 1999. “The Establishment of People’s Republic of China-Israel Relations: Broader Implications for Southeast and South Asia”, in China and Israel: A Fifty Year Retrospective, ed. Jonathan Goldstein, WestPoint/London, P.128. Liang Gong. 2000. “Twenty Years of Studies of Biblical Literature in the People’s Republic of China (1976-1996)”, Bible in Modern China, Beijing, P.395. 梁工。 2000年“二十年圣经文学在中国人民共和国(1976年至1996年)研究”,圣经在当代
3. 4. 5.
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中国,北京,第395页。 Bloom, Dan. September 5, 2005. A controversy over the way ‘Jew’ is written in Chinese, Languagehat Organization. Jews in China (overview), China News. August 15, 2010. 作者:犹太人在中国(概述)2010年8月15日,中国新闻网。 For more details, see: Shu-chen, Chinese legends Jews "Kaifeng", Center for Jewish Studies, (China: Nanjing University, 2008). 有关详细信息,请参阅:吴淑珍,中国神话传说中犹太人的“开封府”,犹太研 究中心(中国:南京理工大学,2008年)。 Xu Xin, September 2003. “Chinese Policy towards Judaism”, paper presented at the International Symposium Youtai: Presence and Perception of Jews and Judaism in China, School of Applied Linguistics and Cultural Studies, P.P.19-23. 许昕,2003年9月“中国政策走向的犹太教”,在国际研讨会佑泰提出:存在与犹太
7.
人和犹太教在中国,应用语言学,文化学,第19-23页。 Xu Xin, 2000. “Some Thoughts On Our Policy Towards the Jewish Religion: Including A Discussion of Our Policy toward the Kaifeng Jews”, Monumenta Serica Monograph
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Series (XLVI), Nettetal, P. 673. 许昕,2000年“的几点思考在我们的对华政策犹太宗教:包括讨论我们的政策朝开 封犹太人”华裔学志专着系列(XLVI),第673页。 8. Pan Guang (Ed), The Jews in China, Beijing, 2001. 9. See: Xiao Xian. 2000. Jews in China: A People of Mystery, Beijing. 10. Kaplan, Mordechai. 1934. Judaism as a Civilization, Translated to Chinese. 1995. Jinan: University of Shandong. 11. Philips, J.R.S, 1998. The Medieval Expansion of Europe. Oxford University Press, P.289. 12. Jump, up, 2000. "Jewish Communities in Asia". Asia Society. P.84. 13. Chang, Wen, 2011. "An Early Chinese Source on the Kaifeng Jewish Community", Folklore Studies, Vol. 4, P.P. 327–331. 张,文,2011。 “一个中国早期源上的开封犹太社区”,民俗研究,卷。 4,第327-331页。 14. Minter, Adam. 2006. "Return of a Shanghai Jew". Los Angeles Times. 15. Ehrlich, M. Avrum, 2008. The Jewish-Chinese Nexus: A Meeting of Civilizations. Routledge, UK. 16. Weisz, Tiberius, 2006. The Kaifeng Stone Inscriptions: The Legacy of the Jewish Community in Ancient China, New York University. 17. Alfred, Edelstein, 2004. History of the Jewish Nation after the destruction of Jerusalem under Titus. Kessinger Publishing, P.71. 18. See more at: http://jcpa.org/article/chinas-interaction-with-israel-and-the-jewishpeople/#sthash.GlpyCwr7.dpuf 19. Shavit, Yaacov. Confucian fusion. December 13, 2002. Ha`aretz English edition. 20. Ibid. 21. Shavit, Yaacov. Confucian fusion. Op.Cit. 22. Eber, Irene. 2002. Chinese and Jews: Encounters between Cultures, Bialik Institute, Jerusalem. 23. Ibid. 24. Jeffay, Nathan. January 26, 2011. On: http://forward.com/articles/134962/the-chinese-discover-jews-and-israel-and-cant-s/ 25. Kaufman, Teddy. 2011. The "big aliah" of Jews from China started in the year 1949 and ended in 1952, Harbin. 26. http://forward.com/articles/134962/the-chinese-discover-jews-and-israel-andcan-t-s/ 27. Medzini, Ronen. April 13, 2008. "The Jews: why are they rich?", Israel Jewish Scene, On: YNet news.n 28. The researcher collected some stories of the vision of Chinese to "Jews" from different Jewish people living in China and some Jewish sites. On: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3531164,00.html 29. "Shavei Israel", It's an Israeli organization responsible for recognizing the Jews people every where, and helping the Jewish people in the world to visit Israel, and giving them all the required facilities to know more about "Israel" as their home land. 30. Maltz, Judy. February 22, 2013. Made in China, blessed in Israel, Haaretz: English edition, on: http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-features/made-in-chinablessed-in-israel.premium-1.505007 31. Ibid. 32. Report: association of former residents of China in Israel, 2011. On: http://www.jewsofchina.org/jewsofchina/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1 &LNG ID=1&TMID=84&FID=851
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33. Haas, Benjamin. October 16, 2011. Chinese Jews feel more at home in Israel, Los Angeles Times. 34. Ibid. 35. Haas, Benjamin. October 16, 2011. Chinese Jews feel more at home in Israel, Op.Cit. 36. Ibid. 37. Haas, Benjamin. October 16, 2011. Chinese Jews feel more at home in Israel, Op.Cit. 38. About past history the "big aliah" of Jews from China started in the year 1949 and ended in 1952, available: http://www.jewsofchina.org/jewsofchina/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1 &LNGID=1 &TMID=84&FID=851 39. Ibid. 40. About past history the "big aliah" of Jews from China started in the year 1949 and ended in 1952, Op.Cit. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. For more information about: Association of Former Residents of China, see: Jewish communities in China, On: http://www.jewsofchina.org/organization.asp?DBID=1 44. http://www.jewsofchina.org/organization.asp?DBID=1 45. Ibid. 46. For more information about: Association of "The Israel-China Friendship Society", see: http://www.jewsofchina.org/jewsofchina/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1 &LNG ID=1&TMID=84&FID=851 47. The role of "China-Israel Friendship Association", see: http://en.cpaffc.org.cn/content/details28-22396.html 48. Ibid. 49. For more information about "Stand With Us" (SWU), See: http://www.standwithus.co.il/swu-uk-counters-israel-apartheid-week-2014/ 50. The role of "Stand With Us" (SWU) in China and Asia, February 25, 2015. available: http://www.standwithus.com/news/article.asp?id=3799 51. Ibid. 52. The role of "Stand With Us" (SWU) in China and Asia, February 25, 2015. Op.Cit. 53. Al-Sudairi, Mohammed. April 30, 2015. A growing pro-Israeli advocacy within China. The Diplomat. 54. Ibid. 55. Zhou Yun. 2000. on stereotypes of Jewishness in China, SACU's China in Focus magazine. 的周韵。2000年在犹太的焦点杂志在中国,南部非洲关税同盟的中国的成见 56. http://www.aish.com/sp/so/My-Journey-from-Chinese-to-Jewish.html 57. Meyer, Maisie. Spring 2005. A Great Leap Forward?: the complexities of Sino-Jewish relations, Op.Cit. 58. Mezzofiore, Gianluca. May 7, 2013. Netanyahu in China: Jews no Longer Need to be Rescued, IBTimes. 59. Stormer, Daily. November 30, 2014. What do Chinese People Think about Jews?, http://www.dailystormer.com/what-do-chinese-people-think-about-jews/ 60. Fishbane, Matthew. March 1, 2014. China’s Kaifeng Jews Rediscover Their Heritage, The Daily Beast, Available: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/03/china-s-kaifengjewsrediscover-their-heritage.html 61. Read more about: The situation of Chinese government from the Jewish minority, at: http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=0f0_1397233824#s6YS10YcKDR0BqgX.99
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62. Report: Chinese Jews try to earn legal status of independent minority: hey are sing Israeli anthem to show their unique ethnic identity, Read more at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=0f0_1397233824#s6YS10YcKDR0BqgX.99 63. Fishbane, Matthew. March 1, 2014. China’s Kaifeng Jews Rediscover Their Heritage, Op.Cit. 64. Pellot, Brian. January 3, 2014. The worst countries for religious freedom, Xindex Organization, On: http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/01/worst-countries-religious-freedom/ 65. Sebag, Clarissa. September 2014. What Chinese people believe about Jews?, Tablet Magazine. 66. Levy, Judith. September 28, 2014. What the Chinese see in the Jews?, Richochet Magazine. https://ricochet.com/archives/chinese-see-jews/ 67. Interview with "Liu Nanyang", about his vision to the Jews, September 2014. https://ricochet.com/archives/chinese-see-jews/ *********
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