WHERE DID IT GO RIGHT? ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN INDONESIA Kees van Dijk
Almost a century ago, in June 1916 the Sarekat-Islam (Islamic Union) held its first national congress in Bandung. It was an important event. Founded four years earlier, the Sarekat-Islam had developed into the first Indonesian mass organization. According to its own account 82 branches, with an aggregate membership of 368.374 members, were represented at Bandung (Kaoem-Moeda 22-6-1916). This was about half of the total strength of the Sarekat-Islam, which according to one of the speakers, Wignjadarmadja, at that moment had 161 branches and 900,000 members (De Locomotief 20-6-1916). The spectacular growth of the Sarekat-Islam was as much an indication of the emergence of modern Indonesian nationalism as of an Islamic revival which was also visible, and this goes without saying of an ever-present, but slumbering discontent with Dutch rule. Its leaders, and I am not speaking of the ordinary Indonesians who joined, aimed not only at emancipation. They also wanted to be modern. The one, being modern, would result in the second, emancipation, or as it was often expressed in those day, in transforming Indonesians from only being half human into full human beings. In trying to reach their aims the Sarekat-Islam leaders worked in co-operation with the Dutch colonial authorities. They had to so otherwise they would not be able to function and disseminate their ideas. On the other hand it also should not be forgotten that the Sarekat-Islam had the patronizing sympathy of the most senior civil servants in the Netherlands Indies, the Governor-General and some of his advisors. That other civil servants, Dutch and Indonesian, and many of the Dutchmen who lived in the Netherlands Indies thought differently and were afraid of an Indonesian mass movement is a different matter. The benevolent attitude of the authorities, the desire to be modern and not to be inferior to the Dutch, and the popular support on which the Sarekat-Islam could count, all this was reflected in what happened in Bandung in June 1916. One venue of the meeting was the outstanding example of white colonial life, the club, in this case Sociëteit Concordia, where, I am sure under normal circumstances we would not have encountered many Indonesians, except for the servants. The other venue was the alun-alun, the square
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in the centre of the city, where, if we may belief the Dutch-language newspaper De Locomotief (20-6-1916), as many as 20,000 people had gathered to attend the opening session on Sunday the 18th of June, the first real day of the congress. Sarekat-Islam leaders also wanted to show that they were there. After the opening members marched through the streets of Bandung, passing the houses of the highest Dutch and Indonesian officials in the city, the Resident, the Assistant-Resident, and the Regent (Bupati); in this order, social status and etiquette were important in colonial society. In front went a Dutch military band, another one marched in the rear. Somewhere in between them was a ronzebons, a band of Indonesians with Western instruments. According to De Locomotief (20-6-1916), but I am not so sure that its estimates are correct, some 3,000 'girls, boys, women, and men' participated. All, also in European eyes went well in Bandung; not so surprising as one the condition of the colonial administration to allow the congress to take place had been that nothing should be said that would show the colonial government and its measures in a bad light or could threaten law and order (De Locomotief 20-6-1916). There was, G.A.J. Hazeu, Acting Advisor for Native Affairs, reported to his boss, the Governor-General, 'great public interest, seriousness and complete order' (Sarekat 1916:2). The debates, he also noted, were 'in some instances very animated, though the tone always remained civilized' (Sarekat 1916:2). In an interview in De Locomotief (22-6-1916) his evaluation was a little bit different. Some had expressed themselves in a 'too rough and too blatant' way (De Locomotief 22-6-1916). Sarekat-Islam members had reason to be satisfied. Organizing such a large meeting was an accomplishment, an indication that Indonesians were not inferior to Europeans. In Kaoem-Moeda (23-6-1916), one of the Sarekat-Islam newspapers, Prosi (Pro Sarekat-Islam) left no doubt about this. Never in the city's history had there been such a large festive occasion in Bandung. Sure, there were the horse races and national celebrations, all also well-attended, but this was different. Horse races were mainly a European affair, national festivities were financed and organized by the Government. The Sarekat-Islam meeting had been the work of Indonesians themselves, showing that also natives were good organizers.
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As with many political manifestations in Indonesia, then and now, one was not just there to listen to speeches. One also should be entertained. In the afternoons there was a variety of games; not only the inevitable sack races, but also running the hundred metres, and a Sarekat-Islam football competition; the clubs having familiar Dutch names such as D.O.S, Volharding and Sparta. In the evening one could watch wayang performances, Stamboel, a mix of theatre and opera, and movies, or listen to a military band. Being modern implied a lot of things. It meant dressing modern and at one of the meetings the Sarekat-Islam board had donned a tailcoat (rok in Dutch) and white tie (Sarekat 1916:1); a way of festive, formal wear not unusual at important Sarekat-Islam meetings. It also meant behaving modern, for instance no longer being forced to approach superiors and Europeans in a submissive almost slavish way, or being allowed to sit as Europeans and the nobility did in chairs. Perhaps above all, it meant Western education. But there was a but. In becoming modern one might also have to give up a lot. For one, Westerns were not always that civilized. European society in the Netherlands Indies had become a bourgeois society, but leaders of the nationalist movements who visited the Netherlands were at times quite shocked to see, for instance, a mass of drunken Dutchmen celebrating the birthday of Queen Wilhelmina. The World War that raged at that moment also did not improved the image of the West. Apart from this, the own culture had much that was worth preserving; and, and important matter for the members of the Sarekat-Islam and other devout Muslims, what would be the fate of the own religion, Islam? Being a conference of an Islamic organization which felt strongly about modernization it does not come as a surprise that education was one of the main topics discussed. It seemed that a choice had to be made between the devil and the deep blue sea, between religious and secular education. The first turned out religious scholars who devoted all their time and energy to religious study without giving any attention to social and political circumstances of the day. This, one of the speakers said, made 'their work of not much use to the people and their material interests.' Western-educated Indonesian intellectuals, among them we may suppose he included the leaders of the nationalist movement, also had their failings. They did not know much about religion, and because
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of this their 'work and slaving', as he called it, made no impression on the ordinary Indonesian (Sarekat 1916:28,31). Another speaker called the results of traditional religious education at the pesantren poor, gebrekkig was the word he used, certainly when taken into account that such an education might take many years. Did a boy of six or seven years of age opt for a school managed by the Government there was another drawback. There they had to learn so much, that no time remained for religious instructions, which left them with little knowledge of Islam (Sarekat 1916:73-5). Being modern and thus also being influenced by a progressive reform movement in Islam which was gaining ground in the early twentieth century the speakers at the Sarekat-Islam congress not only attacked the ulama for their lack of worldly, useful knowledge. They also had their doubts about their the religious views. One said that most of the ulama were fanatical, which, he added, was forbidden by Islam. Another deplored the wrong religious ideas they taught and the money they made from exploiting superstitious believes among the population (Sarekat-1 1916:31,74). The discussion at the Sarekat-Islam Congress in Bandung in 1916 about the shortcomings of secular schooling aimed at acquiring skills needed for the functioning and further development of society and the disadvantages of an educational system aiming only, or in the first place, at the study or religion has lost nothing of its relevance. Since an increasing number of Muslims in Indonesia and the rest of the world are drawn to a strict interpretation of Islam, and especially after 9/11, Islamic education has acquired a bad reputation in the West. It has become synonymous with religious fanaticism, backwardness and the oppression of women, imposing on their students a radical and anti-Western form of Islam. Many Muslims themselves have also become uncomfortable and stress that the backward, otherworldly orientation of sections of the Islamic community does not fit the requirements of a modern society. From Malaysia to the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia, governments want to reign in radical Islamic instruction; of which they themselves have become an ideological and in some instances also a physical target. In Malaysia it was Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003, who left no doubt about his views. Mahathir is a man who is never afraid to speak his mind, and about a decade ago, after he had visited the United States and Europe in 2002,
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took some pleasure in relating how he had upset his hosts by explaining that Malaysia was not a moderate Islamic country. It was a fundamentalist one where Muslims adhered to the basic Islamic tenets of their faith (by doing so also upsetting the Chinese Malaysians, who do not want to hear about Malaysia being an Islamic state) (New Straits Times Online 21-6-2002). In the same year he and other Malaysia government officials started an offensive against the Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR), the People’s Religious Schools, managed or influenced by members of a strict Islamic political party with a large following aiming to transform Malaysia into an Islamic state, the PAS (Parti Islam seMalaysia, All-Malaysia Islamic Party). Mahatir and other government officials complained about the low standards of education of these schools, and, in line with the Western evaluation, branded them a breeding ground of narrow-minded Islamic fanaticism. Those wanting to do away with these schools did not forget to mention that most of their teachers lacked the proper qualifications, and that at national examinations SAR students performed worse than pupils of national schools, also in religious subjects. Even less happy Mahathir was with Malaysians enrolling at religious schools abroad, in Pakistan and the Middle East. There they would turn into zealots, misfits. Receiving religious instruction only they were educated to remain unemployed once they had returned home, or worse being unemployed would set up religious schools of a type Mahathir so detested. More recently, in Tajikistan, one of the former Central Asian Soviet Republics, a 'Parental Responsibility Law' became of force in August 2011 banning children younger than eighteen years of age from visiting mosques; an obvious move to get them out of Islamic schools and into secular ones. As the deputy chairman of the Religious Affairs Committee explained: 'Schoolchildren should be in school. If they all go to the mosques for prayers and cast aside their schoolwork, they will not be a able to learn' (International Herald Tribune 18-7-2011, p.5).1 Women were already barred from mosques in 2004. Indonesia with its boarding schools (pesantren), ordinary schools where children go to in the morning to return home in the afternoon (madrasah) and Islamic institutions of higher education has a well-developed Islamic educational system which gives ample 1
To counter the criticism the law reaped the Head of the Council of Islamic Scholars later announced that special religious courses for children at mosques were planned (http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,TJK,4562d8cf2,4e0b2e4423,0.html, accessed 7-8-2011)
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attention to secular subjects. It mirrors the secular system and certainly measures up with it. There are a number of universities and at the moment the number of registered pesantren is approximately 25,700; that of madrasah some 40,000.2 Generally speaking Islamic education in Indonesia had been a great success. Here in Leiden we are able to observe this from close-by. I am not the only one who has come to this conclusion. A few months ago, during the annual international conference or our Training Indonesia's Young Leaders Programme, Bob Hefner (2011:8) from Boston University even asserted that 'Islamic education in Indonesia ranks among the most vital and innovative in the entire Muslim world.' One indication of its success is the many graduates from Islamic universities who have completed a PhD in the United States, Australia and Europe, including in the Netherlands. Even more students have received a MA certificate in the West. From my own experience I know that many of them were and are engaged in excellent sociological and historical research which will not only deepen our understanding of Islam in Indonesia, but I am sure will also end the dominant role foreign scholars tended to have in this field of studies. This is something that has to be emphasized, exactly because of the general image outside Indonesia of Islamic education it may not be fully realized there that students from Indonesian Islamic universities admitted at universities abroad are good ones who do not only excel in theological debate. I used the word excellent and that sounds a little bombastic but nowadays to recommend your students you have to lay it on a bit. Some of the graduates were or are in the forefront of the intellectual debate in Indonesia, whether it concerns religion or social change and good governance. In order not to insult anyone, I will only mention two persons who had a great share in innovative Islamic debates during the New Order, the Soeharto years: Nurcholish Madjid (19392005) and Munawir Sjadzali (1925-2004). Nurcholish Madjid, apart from being one of Indonesia's most outstanding Islamic thinkers, did command enough respect in society to play a vital role in the negotiations in 1998 leading to the resignation of Soeharto. Munawir Sjadzali was Minister of Religious Affairs between 1983 and 1993, and 2
Figures provided respectively by Hairul Fuad Yusuf, Director of Education and Pesantren of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Firdaus, Director Madrasah Education of the same ministry (MataramNews.com 27-7-2011, Republika Online 10-4-2010; accessed 8-8-2011).
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deserves mentioning because of his leading role in the debate about the secularization and reactualisation of Islamic law; the idea that one should be flexible in applying Islamic law and should disregard those rules which have lost their meaning in society, and are no longer adhered to by most, which admittingly in his days meant something else than it does now. In work and research part of the graduates of the Islamic educational system are inspired by concern over the manifestations of hard-line Islam in Indonesia, we, I suppose, all share. Mullah Omar would be shocked, but the leading feminists in Indonesia have studied at Islamic institutions of higher education. This also makes Indonesia stand out in the Islamic world. As Andrée Feillard argues the religious knowledge such feminists have acquired gives them the confidence to enter into debate with conservative religious scholars. Secular feminists in Indonesia lacking this assurance ' have hesitated to make their voices heard in national religious debates' (Feillard and Van Doorn-Harder 2011:11). And I wonder where else in the Islamic world at conferences organized for and by Muslim intellectuals so much attention goes to HIV and AIDS, and to homosexuals, transsexuals and transvestites, and this not to condemn such persons, but to call attention to their fate and to their religious needs. So, where did it go right? Frankly I don't know. Maybe we have to go back to early last century when reform-minded Muslims dominated the Indonesian nationalist movement and demanded good education for their fellow Indonesians. Initially, for some it seems to have been a matter of form only; still rejecting secular education. What they introduced were benches, chalk and blackboards; part of the contribution the West made to the world. Maybe not so significant a contribution, but how could you forbid ordinary Indonesians to sit in a chair, when at school they sat on benches? As with all innovations reactions were mixed. The new teaching methods created some anxiety but there was also excitement. In China it was observed that in a small village the bench and blackboard were 'delightful things which had never been seen before' (Dikötter 2007:122). And, coming from the West benches may at times be associated with detestable Christianity, a fate which recently, in April 2011, befell the school bell in a city in Somalia. In 1916 Sarekat-Islam leaders knew that form was not enough. What was needed was a mix of religious and secular subjects. Only in this way, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, the
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general chairman of the Sarekat-Islam, said, there would emerge a new kind of Islamic religious leaders, well-educated enlightened ones; verlicht was the word used in De Locomotief (20-6-1916). What was not needed, another Sarekat-Islam leader said to his audience, giving us some insight in those who were against, were fanatical Islamic leaders. Everybody should realize that Western science – a word used in Bandung also in the sense of secular subjects at school - was of importance for the development of the Indonesians. After the Sarekat-Islam congress in Bandung Islamic schools where also secular subjects were taught ceased to be a novelty, detested or not because of their association with Christianity and the West. Muslims of all denominations established schools with a mixed curriculum, but the mere fact of their existence does not yet say much about standards, social impact and acceptance by the wider Muslim community. Here the role of the government and social and religious change become important. I will not speak about the Dutch colonial government. I do not think it contributed in any way; except of course in allowing religious schools to exist, and providing a Western model of education. After 1945, when Indonesia became independent, successive Indonesian governments have tried to encourage secular education at religious schools. Legal recognition and subsidies were important instrument in doing so. Initially, with a war of independence to be won, nation-wide rebellions to be suppressed and a few years later an economy on the verge of collapse, the results were not impressive, also not because many Muslims did not yet seem to have been responsive. We have to wait till the New Order of Soeharto for the situation to change. Indonesia and Indonesians started to make money. Development, first and for all economic development, became the main concern of the state. In this drive Islamic education did not escape government attention and interference. Of decisive influence for the success of the Islamic school system was a decision in 1975 to subsidize only religious school where only one-third of the classes was devoted to religious. Next came a joint decree of the Ministry of Education and Culture and that of Religious Affairs in 1984, interconnecting the secular and religious system. Students were allowed to switch from the one to the other. It gave religious education a boost. Students flocked to them (Ichwan 2006:153).
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Again it is a remarkable achievement. For many devout Muslims Islamic education together with family law are the bastions of their religion, often belonging to the few sectors of social life where Islam has had a real impact. As such they may be in the front line of a confrontation between a modernizing state and at least part of the Islamic community, as history in South Thailand and the southern Philippines shows; and when such a state wants to make concessions to the devout Muslims community it usually does so these fields. It was not just the authoritative nature of the New Order that was responsible for the success of religious education. Society also had become more receptive. Parents realized that without secular subjects pesantrens could provide excellent religious education, but did not prepare their children for everyday life in society. They wanted an education for their children which taught them skills with which they later could compete on the labour market and offered them more prospects for a good future (Mastuhu 1994:23-5). But, to conclude, we also have to be aware that there are Indonesian Muslims who do wonder 'Where did it go wrong? The old dilemma did not disappear. Limiting the time devoted to religious subjects could not but have as a consequence that the knowledge most graduates have about Islam has decreased and that many are not well-versed in Arabic. For some this means the modern Islamic schools in Indonesia no longer generate ulama, Islamic scholars. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, drawing the same conclusion responded by establishing special schools, where additional religious instruction is given. This may be a solution, but perhaps we are also at a new beginning, where graduating from an Islamic institution of higher education is becoming an increasingly indispensable element in the education of religious experts. I did not touch upon Islamic education in Indonesia being a breeding place of Islamic radicalism. Generally speaking I do not think that it is. It would be amazing when everything was perfect. There is some concern about some Islamic schools, where a kind of Salafi education is provided not much different from what is taught at the SARs Mahathir targeted. Some also have been linked with radical groups and leaders and with violence. Such schools are limited in number and well monitored by the Indonesian government. Recently also concern has been growing about Islamic universities being a
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recruiting ground for fundamentalists, but we should not forget that up to now secular universities have had a much greater role in the growth of political, strict Islam in Indonesia, than the Islamic ones.
Literature
Dikötter, Frank 2007
Things Modern. Material Culture and Everyday Life in China. London: Hurst & Company.
Feillard, Andrée and Pieternella van Doorn-Harder 2011
How unique is Indonesia's new generation of Muslim feminists? Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference in the framework of the Training Indonesia's Young Leaders Programme, Bogor, 24-26 January 2011 (unp.)
Ichwan, Moch. Nur 2006
Official reform of Islam. State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966-2004. Tilburg Ph D dissertation.
Hefner, Robert W. 2011
Indonesia in the global scheme of Islamic things: the virtuous circle of education, associations, and democracy. Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference in the framework of the Training Indonesia's Young Leaders Programma, Bogor, 24-26 January 2011 (unp.)
Mastuhu 1994
Dinamika sistem pendidikan pesantren. Jakarta & Leiden: INIS
Sarekat 1916
Sarekat-Islam Congres (1e nationaal congres) 17=24 Juni 1916 te Bandoeng. Behoort bij de geheime missive van den Ws. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken dd. 29 September 1916 No. 226. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij.
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