CHAPTER IV THE PROGRESSIVE GROUPS’ RESPONSE
A. Introduction On June 1, 2008, a number of pluralist activists in Jakarta affiliated to a group called Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama (AKBB) or National Alliance for the Freedom of Religion, marched along main roads in Jakarta to commemorate and celebrate the birth of Pancasila, the Indonesian state foundation, which is seen as a common platform for plurality and diversity of Indonesian society. The march, meant to be a peaceful action, culminated in violence.1 A group of people that were later identified as the members of Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) attacked the marching group which left several prominent activists injured. Many speculation related to the motives behind the violence emerged. However, most related this incident to MUI’s fatwā that deemed pluralism, liberalism, and secularism forbidden (ḥarām).2 It is pertinent to highlight two issues relating to the fatwā. Firstly, the fatwā aims at guarding the unity of the umma against division and dissent. It intended to serve as guidance for the Muslim community in identifying,
1
Please refer to Ahmad Setiyaji, Tragedi Monas Berdarah (Jakarta: Semesta Investigasi, 2008). 2 Interview with Moh. Shofan, 29 May 2013, in Jakarta. Moh. Shofan is an activist and research fellow at Paramadina Foundation. He was formerly a lecturer of Islamic studies at Muhammadiyah University of Gresik, East Java. However, he was dismissed from the university after he published his article on religious pluralism in a local newspaper. According to university authority, Shofan’s article contradicts Islamic values, and on this basis his dismissal from the university was done.
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dealing with and anticipating any interpretations, discourses and practices of religion which are deemed to potentially threaten the purity of the faith.3 Secondly, in doing so, the fatwā has also induced negative social repercussions that transcend the domain of faith.4 Its negative impact has mainly affected members of the community, many of whom are from the educated class who have the potential to contribute to the development of the society. Moreover, such fatwā has also adversely contributed to cultural stagnation and human creativity.5 This chapter seeks to analyze the response of competing ideas advanced by Muslim social groups and individuals which form the object of the fatwā. In so doing it will attempt to examine their ideas as a function of mode of thought of the groups concerned. The implications on their ideas on the well-being of Indonesia’s plural society will also be examined. To what extent the ideas espoused by these groups reflect values that can creatively synthesize with religious traditions and facilitate Muslims’ response to the changing social milieu and unprecedented social changes that are taking place in Indonesian society, will also be discussed. In prevailing discourse, pluralism as defined by scholars generally encompasses social, political, and cultural domains. Raimundo Panikkar, a leading authority in religious studies, for example, defines pluralism as
3
Tim Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia (ed), Mengawal Aqidah Umat, Fatwā MUI tentang Aliran-Aliran Sesat di Indonesia (Jakarta: MUI-Pusat, 2009). See also Imam Subkhan, Hiruk Pikuk Pluralisme di Yogya: City of Tolerance (Yogyakarta: Impulse, 2007), 31. 4 Dawam Rahardjo, “Dampak Fatwā MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 2-4; and M. Guntur Romli, “Kekerasan Atas Nama Fatwā”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 212-215. See also special report on social violence addressed to Ahmadiyah community in Tempo Weekly Magazine, 5 May 2008 Edition. 5 Husein Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme kepada Mahaguru Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan, 2011), 63.
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“…the awareness of the legitimate coexistence of systems of thought, life and action which on the other hand, are judged incompatible among themselves…” 6 Similarly, Diana L. Eck formulates pluralism as “the dynamic process through which we engage with one another in and through our very deepest difference.”7 Pluralism can also be viewed as an institution. Mohamed Fathi Osman, for example, puts forward the view that pluralism is an institution through which the acceptance of diversity takes place in a certain society. 8 In modern society, pluralism also is what Abdulaziz Sachedina calls a “catchword” for a new world order where many kinds of diversity exist, 9 and have even intensified; and therefore, attempts at encouraging religious communities to accept pluralism is “vitally important.” 10
Many believe that pluralism is not an exclusive modern
phenomenon. Speaking of religious pluralism, Harold Coward argues that other than as “a special challenge facing world religions today,” religious pluralism has always been part of the life of human beings.11 Similarly,
6
Raimundo Panikkar, “Philosophical Pluralism and Plurality of Religion”, in Thomas Dean (ed.), Religious Pluralism and Truth (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 34. 7 Diana L Eck, A New Religious America: How A Christian Country has Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation (San Fransisco: Harper San Fransisco, 2001), 29. 8 Mohamed Fathi Osman, Islam, Pluralisme dan Toleransi Keagamaan: Pandangan al-Qur’an, Kemanusiaan, Sejarah dan Peradaban (Jakarta: Democracy Project, 2012), 2. 9 Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22. 10 David Ray Gruffin, “Religious Pluralism: Generic, Identist and Deep”, in David Ray Griffin (ed), Deep Religious Pluralism (Louisville and Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 3. 11 Harold G. Coward, Religious Pluralism and the World Religions (Madras: Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advance Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1983), 113. In the context of Western academia, pluralism is generally related to the work of Imannuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, see Pamela E. Klassen and Courtney Bender, “Introduction: Habits of Pluralism”, in Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen (eds), After Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engagement, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
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Mahmoud Ayoub maintains that it is “a normal human situation”,12 which precedes the coming of Islam. As a religion, Islam was revealed in a pluralistic situation where many earlier religions, faiths, and beliefs had been practiced by different peoples and tribes in pre-Islamic Arabia.13 As Islam did not emerge in vacuum and the Qurʼān as the canon for Muslims also constitutes a historical response to the social context of that period,14 the idea of pluralism and tolerance are also integral to the Qurʼān as well as the Prophetic tradition (hadith), two most fundamental Islamic sources on law and teachings. However, classical and contemporary Muslim scholars are diversely divided regarding the Qur’anic standing and formulation of religious pluralism both for inter-religious and intra-religious contexts.15 In
12
Mahmoud M Ayoub, “The Qur’an and Pluralism” in Roger Boase (ed), Islam and Global Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and The Pursuit of Peace (Farnham and Burlington: Asghate Publishing, 2010), 273-284. 13 See Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 2nd Edition). See also, Mathew S. Gordon, The Rise of Islam (Westport: Greenwood, 2005). On variety of tribes in the Arab world in the past and present, see Umar Ridho Kahhalah, Mu’jam Qabail al-Arabiy (Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Risalah, 1995) five volumes. On general history of Islam and specially history of pre-Islamic Arabia, see Hasan Ibrahim Hasan, Tarikh al-Islam al-Siyasi wa al-Dini wa al-Thaqafi wa al-Ijtima’i (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdlah al-Mishriah, 1992), in four volumes. In 10 volume, Dr. Jawad Ali has treated the history of pre-Islamic Arabia very extensively. See Jawad ‘Ali, al-Mufashal fi Tarikh al-‘Arab Qabla al-Islam 1-10 (Baghdad: Jami’ah Baghdad, 1993, 3rd Edition). 14 In describing this situation, Ingrid Mattson calls it in a phrase of “God speaks to humanity”, in which it also include “God hears and responds”. See Ingrid Mattson, The Story of the Qur’an: Its History and Its Place in Muslim Life (Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 2nd Edition), chapter 1. The Qur’anic response to specific events is technically called as asbab al-nuzul, which can literally and loosely be translated as the cause of revelation. A popular book on this subject is written by Jalaludin al-Suyuthi (d.1505), Lubab al-Nuqul fi Asbab al-Nuzul (Beirut: Mu’asasah al-Kutub al-Thaqafiah, 2002). See also Muhammad Abdul Adhim al-Zarqani, Manahil al-Irfan fi Ulum al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Arabi, 1995), especially chapter 5, 89-103. 15 For variety of views on Islam and pluralism, these two edited volumes provide important and rich exchanges. Those are: Abdou Filali-Ansary and Sikeena Karmali Ahmed, The Challenge of Pluralism: Paradigms from Muslim Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), and Zulfikar Amir Hirji, Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary Discourses Amongst Muslims (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010). See also Farid Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 1997). For classical Muslim scholars views on pluralism, see Husein Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme pada Mahaguru Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan, 2011).
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other words, Islam is a battle-field of competing concepts and interpretations although these are based on the same textual sources. The difference is conditioned by religious orientations or perspectives of groups in responding to their socio-historical milieu.16 Debate on the meaning of pluralism in religious discourse abound. While some scholars are of the view that it did not exist, others deem otherwise. Yohanan Friedmann in tracing the evolution of concept and practice of tolerance in Islam opined that the Qurʼān does not explicitly mention the term “tolerance” (Ar. tasamuh).17 In a similar vein, Anis Malik Thoha contends that the term pluralism is not known in Islamic vocabulary until the beginning of the twentieth century. He argues that in classical literature of Islam, the term ta’adudiya, an Arabic word for pluralism, was not found. 18 Similarly, Adnan Aslan argues that in classical Islamic disciplines such as kalam (theology), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), the topic of pluralism did not to exist as an independent theme. 19 However, the absence of this concept in basic terminology of pluralism in the Qurʼān or classical works does not mean that the idea is non-existent in the Qurʼān.20 As Abdulaziz Sachedina rightly argues “…the major argument for religious pluralism in the Qurʼān is based on the relationship between private faith and its public projection in the Islamic polity. Whereas in matters of private faith,
16
Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 84. 17 Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relation in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 18 Anis Malik Thoha, Tren Pluralisme Agama (Jakarta: Perspektif, 2005), 181-183. 19 Adnan Aslan, Religious Pluralism in Christian and Islamic Philosophy: The Thought of John Hick and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), 186. 20 Ibid, 186.
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the position of the Qurʼān is non-interventionist, in the public projection of that faith, the Qur’anic stance is based on the principle of coexistence, the willingness of a dominant community to recognize self-governing communities free to run their internal affairs and coexist with Muslims.21 According to Sachedina, this Qur’anic formulation has been very fundamental in leading the establishment of pluralistic vision of Islam. In his words: “It is important to keep in mind that without the Qur’anic endorsement of the essential guiding principle of a religiously pluralistic society, namely the acknowledgement of salvific value in other religions, the story of Islam’s treatment of its religious minority throughout history would not have been any different than Europe’s treatment of the non-Christian “other”.22 Sachedina’s view is also held by many other Muslim scholars. Ahmad S. Moussalli, for instance, posits that the Qurʼān has clearly mentioned the basic principles of pluralism, among which is “the freedom to believe or not to believe”.23 In agreement with this opinion, Mohsen Kadivar, an Iranian pluralist intellectual also holds the view that the Qurʼān clearly “recognizes people’s right to freely choose their own religions while forcefully renouncing the compulsion to impose specific religion on others.”24 While some scholars mentioned above describe the principle of Islam and pluralism
21
Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23-24. 22 Ibid, 25. 23 Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 84. 24 Mohsen Kadivar, “Freedom of Religion and Belief in Islam,” in Mehran Kamrava (ed), The New Voice of Islam, Reforming Politics and Modernity: A Reader (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 120.
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in very broad terms, Abdou Filai-Ansary goes further to identify five principles that the Qurʼān has laid with regard to pluralism. These are as follows: “each community has been given a way of life and system of rules (content and methods); the diversity of ways of life and systems of rules are a means of testing the capacity of each community to face challenges; Had God willed it, He would have made humanity a singular community; what is strongly encouraged is competition in doing good –not fighting about differences and lastly, God is the final arbiter and it is He who will uncover the ultimate truth behind the difference between communities (at the end of time)”. 25 Since Qur’anic formulations are normative, Filali-Ansary has attempted to relate these principles in a parallel way to contemporary society as follows: that “diversity is a fact and ought to be accepted as such, emphasis to compete to do good things in life; that the various forms of life are like experiments for building the good life; (e)ach community should make the best of its own customs and habits; no community can claim to possess ultimate, most valuable form of life and lastly, “the final words on these matters cannot be determined in history”.26 In similar vein, Roger Boase identifies certain principles of interfaith derived from the Qurʼān, such as: a) that Islam does not impose coercive approach in spreading its faith; b) ridiculing other beliefs is forbidden in Islam; c) the Qurʼān also forbids Muslims to associate with those who ridicule their religion.27
25
Abdou Filali-Ansary, “Introduction: Theoretical Approaches to Cultural Diversity,” in Abdou Filali-Ansary and Sikeena Karmali Ahmed (eds), The Challenge of Pluralism: Paradigms from Muslim Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press and Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations, Aga Khan University, 2009), 4. 26 Ibid, 5 27 Roger Boase, “Ecumenical Islam: A Muslim Response to Religious Pluralism”, in Roger
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These universal principles are the values which are fundamental for Muslim societies in their treatment of other communities of belief. Empirically, it finds evidence in the practice of tolerance in the early history of Islam with the establishment of the Muslim community at Medina under the supremacy of Sahifa Madina (Constitution of Medina) which guaranteed the rights of members of the community regardless of their status and religions.28 On par with this historical precedent is Islam’s treatment of other religious communities which are popularly referred to as ahl al-‘ahd that consists of ahl al-dhimma, ahl al-hudna, and ahl al-amni. The most popular among all these is the concept of ahl al-dhimma which broadly refers to non-Muslim members of community entitled to Muslim rulers’ protection under certain conditions. 29 More specifically, ahl al-dhimmy, is often described as part of the political compromise made between the ruling authorities and minority groups that became subjected to the Muslim sovereign. Anver Emon concludes that the dhimmy rules “were a legal expression of the way in which the Muslim polity contended with the fact of diversity and governed pluralistically.”30 The historical precedence leaves little doubt that the idea of pluralism is part of the inherent teaching of Islam. In contemporary complex societies the Boase (ed), Islam and Global Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and The Pursuit of Peace (Farnham and Burlington: Asghate Publishing, 2010), 247-266. 28 Maher Y. Abu-Munshar, “The Compatibility of Islam with Pluralism: Two Historical Precedents”, Islam and Civilisational Renewal, Vol. 1, Issue 4, July 2010, 613-628. Compare to Muhammad Said Ramadhan al-Buti, “Mu’amalat daulah al-Islamiyyah li ghair al-muslimin: al-Quds namudhajan,” Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1999), 4-5. 29 See Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1985). For a comparison, see Abdul Rahman Awang, The Status of Dhimmi in Islamic Law (Kuala Lumpur: International Book Service, 1994). 30 Anver M. Emon, Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmi and Others in the Empire of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.
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importance of pluralism cannot be underestimated. Hence, Ansary sees an urgency “to address diversity in new ways, and to explore new approach to pluralism.” The positive attitude of agencies in understanding religious pluralism in history has bearing on the freedom of religion and its practice today given the complexity of modern society. Hence Mohamed Talbi, a respected Tunisian intellectual, maintains that “…today religious liberty is, as a matter of fact, definitely rooted in our social life... Moreover, we already live in a pluralistic world, and our world is going to be more and more pluralistic in the near future. In this new world, which is expanding rapidly before our eyes, there is no longer room for exclusiveness. We have to accept others as we are. Diversity is the law of our time...”31
B. Competing Religious Ideas and Orientation Contrary to ideas on Islam and pluralism discussed above, MUI’s fatwā has denounced pluralism as incompatible with Islam. Such reflections on religious pluralism are completely overlooked or negated in the fatwā on pluralism which essentially contradict contemporary realities and social fact. As discussed in Chapter II, fatwā is basically a form of interpretation of fundamental religious sources and traditions in relation to specific issues or problems confronting Muslims in the contemporary period. Studying the mode of thought or religious orientations of groups which formulate fatwā is vital in avoiding the reductive view of fatwā reflects a “pure form” or “true Islam”. As a mode of thinking, the fatwā espoused by MUI can be seen as a
31
Mohamed Talbi, ibid, 107.
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conscious attempt by the agencies that formulate it to conserve and preserve the integrity of its own system of thought and values and secure it against the encroachment of rival or competing ideas. Under the sanctity of religion, it claims the completeness of its thought as justification for self-sufficiency while at the same time dereligionizing its opponents’ ideas. In many ways this group’s thought is marked by conservatism and utopian elements in contrast to the progressive mode of thinking of competing groups and ideas they espouse within Indonesia. For the purpose of the thesis, these competing groups thought are referred to as progressive. Characterizing a group’s thought as progressive requires theoretical clarification. While some scholars such as Omid Safi, for example, identifies such evaluative concept on the basis of ideas advocated on issues such as gender equality, democracy and pluralism,32 the characteristics utilized here include ideas and perspective distinguished for their inclusiveness, respect for diversity and tolerance, emphasis on commonalities of belief and principles, universal humanism based on absolute morality, social dimension of religion, respect for pluralism in religious thought, respect for the dignity of the individual, freedom of belief and thought, significance of reason in understanding and application of religious teachings, belief in distinction between universal principle and value of religion and historically determined expressions of religiosity, accommodation and assimilation of new ideologies deemed compatible with Islam. In the Indonesian context, these distinct traits associated with 32
Omid Safi, “Introduction”, in Omid Safi (ed), Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2003), 1-32.
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progressive mode of thought are seen as threats against the dominant understanding of Islam. MUI’s fatwā is an example of direct challenge and attack against such mode of thinking and social groups which has resulted in serious social repercussions including pejorative labelling and demonizing. Among these groups are Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL),33 Paramadina,34 and many other civil society groups that share common visions with them. Factually, both before and after the issuance of fatwā, these groups have developed counter-discourses to challenge exclusivist and conservative tendencies of Indonesian Muslims based on Islamic religious sources and traditions. While MUI’s fatwā have marginalized and delegitimized them within the context of popular Muslim discourse in the country, they continue to lead in the realm of ideas in discourse on Islam and contemporary issues such as pluralism, liberalism and secularism. Though the whole range and development of progressive thought in contemporary Indonesia extends beyond the birth and ascendance of groups such as Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) which began in 2000s, this development has been misleadingly attributed to this group.35 This identification is inaccurate and misleading
33
For comprehensive study on different aspects of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), please refer to Nicolaus Teguh Budi Haryanto, Islam and Liberalism in Contemporary Indonesia: The Political Ideas of Jaringan Islam Liberal, Master Thesis, Ohio University, 2003; Ahmad Ali Nurdin, “Islam and State: A Study of the Liberal Islamic Network in Indonesia, 1999-2004”, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 7, 2 (December, 2005): 20-39; Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Jaringan Islam Liberal: Towards Liberal Islamic Thought in Indonesia”, Profetika, 2004; Muhammad Ali, “The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia”, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22: 1, 1-27; Zuly Qodir, Islam Liberal: Paradigma Baru Wacana dan Aksi Islam Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003); Sohirin Mohammad Solihin, Emergence and Development of Liberal Islam in Indonesia: A Critical Evaluation (Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press, 2009); Haidar Bagir, “Islib Butuh Metodologi”, Republika, 20 Maret 2002. 34 On Paramadina Institute, please refer to Ahmad Gaus AF, Api Islam Nurcholish Madjid: Jalan Hidup Seorang Visioner (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2010), especially chapter 9, 148-175. 35 There is a tendency among Islamist groups in Indonesia to equate all progressive groups
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since JIL constitutes one among many other Muslim groups that uphold and is committed to the importance of pluralism, and have been struggling to disseminate this belief throughout the modern history of Indonesia. The proponents of the discourse on religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism in Indonesia can be found in many Islamic social groups exist In his study, Budhy Munawar-Rachman, a very close disciple of the late Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Muslim reformer in Indonesia, identifies a number of progressive Muslim circles that share common concerns on religious pluralism and liberalism. Other than Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), they include Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (LSAF), Yayasan Paramadina (The Paramadina Foundation), International Institute for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M), The Wahid Institute, Maarif Institute, Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM), Lakpesdam NU, Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKIS), Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta and Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta.36 It is also pertinent to note that while these groups share common concerns on these issues, variations in their social background into one single entity. For example, although Jaringan Islam Liberal, better known as JIL, is only one group, other progressive groups would be labeled as JIL, although factually they are not part of JIL. On criticism and the tendency to regard all progressive-liberal groups as one, some books on liberal Islam by conservative groups or individual can be easily found. For example, Adian Husaini and Nuim Hidayat, Islam Liberal: Sejarah, Konsepsi, Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002); Adian Husaini, Membedah Islam Liberal: Memahami dan Menyikapi Manuver Islam liberal di Indonesia (Bandung: Syamil Cipta Media, 2003); Adnin Armas, Pengaruh Kristen-Orientalis terhadap Islam Liberal: Dialog Interaktif dengan Aktivis Jaringan Islam Liberal (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2003). Budi Handrianto, 50 Tokoh Islam Liberal Indonesia: Pengusung Ide Sekularisme, Pluralisme, dan Liberalisme Agama (Jakarta: Hujjah Press, 2007). 36 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme (Jakarta: Paramadina and LSAF, 2010); and Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010). For variety of progressive Muslim groups in Indonesia, please refer to Imam Tolkhah and Neng Dara Affiah (eds), Gerakan Keislaman Pasca Orde Baru: Upaya Merambah Dimensi Baru Islam (Jakarta: Balitbang Departemen Agama RI, 2007).
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and ideological affiliation exist. These condition and impact their thought on specific issues.
C. On Diversity and Tolerance The Problem of Semantic Confusion Since MUI’s fatwā on pluralism, secularism and liberalism has directly been addressed to progressive Muslim groups, the fatwā has become one of the most important topics discussed and responded by these groups.37 The factor combined with their positive attitude toward diversity and pluralism and their inclination to promote tolerance has led them to reject and to severely criticize the fatwā. At the same time, they have also offered alternative understanding that challenges MUI’s conception. The most fundamental response to the fatwā is the critique of MUI’s simplified understanding and conception of pluralism. In contrast to MUI’s assumption of pluralism as “unity of religion” or the belief that all religions are the same, which in their understanding is unacceptable in Islam, these competing groups maintain that pluralism is not a philosophy which regards 37
Among many responses, a systematic attempt was made by Yayasan Paramadina and Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (LSAF). They compiled the response of progressive intellectuals in Indonesia to the fatwā on pluralism, liberalism and secularism. This compilation has resulted in two big volumes containing views of prominent progressive Muslims from diverse background. These volume is the first comprehensive work on the subject. In addition some other works are also produced to accompany this work. Those works are: Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1 and 2; Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme (Jakarta: Paramadina and Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat, 2010); Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010); Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Pluralisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010); Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010); and Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Sekularisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010). I take benefit from all these works in identifying the response of progressives to the fatwā.
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all religions as one and the same, since it is clear that from the very beginning, all religions are inherently distinctive. In other words, pluralism takes the reality of difference as its starting point. The aim is not to obliterate these differences or celebrate the diversity. It is to find ways of living with these differences. In this view, differences cannot be taken as a reason for being hostile to nor merely tolerating one another. Rather, paradigms and principles must be worked out to allow for the creation of a harmonious society despite differences and disagreements not only between but within religious communities.38 In this sense, these competing ideas reveal MUI’s partial and selective understanding of pluralism and its implications on the well-being of plural society.39 Its understanding of pluralism as unity suggests a type of thought that parallelizes pluralism with syncretism, which does not objectively capture the thinking of competing ideas that are the target of the fatwā. Another significant aspect of the meaning of religious pluralism emphasized within this competing mode of thinking is inclusivity justified on the basis of theology. Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s explication of the concept illustrates the point. He maintains that pluralism is not about smoothing out differences in religion to ensure sameness or unity of religions.40 Rather, it is an idea that regards all religions have equal opportunity to achieve salvation 38
Maman Imanul Haq Faqih, Fatwā dan Canda Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 149. See also Masdar Farid Mas’udi, “Tentang MUI dan Fatwā Kontroversialnya”, in Ahmad Suaedy (ed), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132. 39 Ibid. 40 Although it is rarely the case that Shi’ism in Indonesia is associated with liberalism, the fact that Jalaluddin Rakhmat is often classified as a liberal Muslim thinker, both before and after his affiliation to Shi’ism, could possibly affect general Muslims’ perception of the parallelism between them. In general, both “liberal” and “Shi’a” are two terms used in a pejorative sense by general Muslims in Indonesia. Therefore, with or without the “liberal” label, Shi’ism is already perceived in negative ways.
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which in academic term is known as soteriology. Integral to this understanding of pluralism is the fundamental acknowledgment of the salvatory value of various religious paths, instead of merely a single path or a single understanding within that one path to God. This clearly opposes dominant view strongly implied in MUI’s fatwā that salvation is just for the Muslims.41 Such competing mode of thinking directly opposes the fatwā which denies the soundness or divinity of other religious traditions. Furthermore, within this mode, commonalities in the realm of values between all religious traditions are not only strongly cherished but provide a pertinent basis for practices that can contribute to meaningful engagement and co-existence. Universal values such as commitment to humanity, equality, social justice, concern for the environment, rendering aid to the weak, needy, the poor and the oppressed and many other virtues found in most religions provide the basis upon which concrete institutions can be realized. 42 Consequently, rather than uniting religion in one single entity, pluralism basically means seeking common platforms and values for human development and progress among different religious traditions. Hence, in this mode of thinking, the concept of common bonds (kalimatun sawāʼ’) or meeting point with other faiths, which is built on the foundation of tawhīd, the oneness of God is overriding. Such an understanding is believed will
41
Jalaluddin Rakhmat, “Percakapan dengan Jalaluddin Rakhmat” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 813. See also Jalaludin Rakhmat’s work on Islam and pluralism which examines important basis of pluralism in Islam in many aspect, Islam dan Pluralisme: Akhlak Qur’an Menyikapi Perbedaan (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2006). 42 M. Amin Abdullah, Dinamika Islam Kultural: Pemetaan Atas Wacana Islam Kontemporer (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 75-79.
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provide strong encouragement for people of diverse religious traditions to harness, share and develop commonalities with one another towards common good rather than accentuate differences.43 Recourse to this ideal allows for the concretization of religious pluralism on an exoteric level such as in the social dimension rather than confined merely to the esoteric level of theological discourse or rituals or doctrines. In short, the meaning of unity of religions within this mode of thought strongly entails the idea of universal humanism, since it is premised on the belief that all religions do not dispute on what is fundamentally ethically good or bad.44 The distinction and meaning accorded by MUI’s fatwā also strongly connotes that pluralisme (pluralism) is distinguished from pluralitas (plurality), as the former refers to specific ideology, “faham” or “aliran” which in its view, has a tendency to combine different religious tradition into one single entity or practice; while the latter refers to social fact of diversity be it religiously, socially, politically or culturally which is integral to all human societies. Based on such a concept, therefore, it asserts that pluralism is contradictory to Islam. In contrast, competing mode of thought challenges this distinction as arbitrary, and has a tendency to overlook pluralism contained within religious texts and traditions. Rachman’s argument illustrates the point. In his view, pluralism is closely intertwined with plurality, as pluralism is basically the actualization of plurality of society.45
43
Azyumardi Azra, “Toleransi Agama dalam Masyarakat Majemuk: Perspektif Muslim Indonesia” in Elza Peldi Taher (ed), Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama: Bunga Rampai 70 Tahun Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: ICRP and Kompas, 2009), 18. 44 Ibid, 18. 45 Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Pluralisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010), xlix.
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Pluralism as an understanding of diversity or plurality is inseparable from the diversity or plurality itself as both are inexorably linked.46 The progressives’ responses to the meaning of pluralism as mentioned above clearly underlines the point that intellectual capacity is crucial in providing a clear and objective understanding of issues of significance in the religious life of the community. This is in stark contrast to MUI’s penjelasan fatwā in which it stipulated that the concepts of pluralism, liberalism and secularism are empirical and not intellectual definitions. This type of reasoning reveals a clear attempt to distance itself from engaging in an intellectual exchange that is vital in clarifying these concepts. MUI and its opponents provide an interesting case of difference of meaning accorded by groups to the concept of pluralism which has serious social consequences on the lives and well-being of individuals and groups within and between religious communities. MUI’s fatwā does not merely ignore the broader understanding of pluralism such as socio-cultural aspects; it is also simplistically presumed that the concept refers to mixing of teachings of different religions that will obliterate the truth about Islam. It is also presumed to mean that certain teachings and traditions of specific religions must be altered or adjusted to accommodate doctrines of other religions.47 This popular misunderstanding of the concept of pluralism in Indonesia are clearly reflected in MUI’s fatwā.
46
Dawam Rahardjo, “Kala MUI Mengharamkan Pluralisme”, Koran Tempo, 01 August 2005. 47 See Imam Subkhan, Hiruk Pikuk Pluralisme di Yogya: City of Tolerance (Yogyakarta: Impulse, 2007), 28.
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Challenging Authoritarian Competing ideas against religious orthodoxy exemplified by MUI’s fatwā also addressed the issue of authoritarianism in perspectives and ideas on religion among Indonesian Muslim religious leaders. They perceive the fatwā as strongly exemplified by elements of oligarchy and monopoly in the interpretation of religious doctrines. Assuming itself as the fountain of and conferring authority of moral and spiritual legitimacy, MUI’s orientation renders Islam losing its liberating characteristics. In this respect, the progressive mode of thinking emphasizes firmly the belief that Islam should not rest on the meaning defined by custodians who do not uphold or champion religion on intellectual grounds. On the contrary, Muslims should have equal freedom to interpret their religion. Religious texts and experiences in their view are multifaceted and inevitably admit a multitude of interpretations. Furthermore, Islam within this mode of thought does not impose conditions based on the status of the interpreters, but more on the social impact of the interpretations, especially in bringing maslaḥa (public welfare) for human beings. This, they maintain, is the ultimate criterion of religious laws or fatwā and not how textually sophisticated and well-crafted they are. If the fatwā creates public unrest or triggers violence and social tensions among members of the society, it defeats its fundamental purpose in contributing to the well-being of people who are subjected to it.48 That MUI has also restricted the scope of the Qurʼān in its fatwā based on its own selective interpretation with adverse without recourse to effect of fatwā in 48
Abd Moqsith Ghazali, “Oligarki Penafsiran Agama”, Dawam Rahardjo, “Dampak Fatwā MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 23-26.
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society on others, is also highlighted by competing groups.49 In this progressive mode of thought, there is no exclusive authority in interpreting and understanding the Qurʼān or that the Qurʼān can only be read by official religious authority. Lessons from Muslim history are cited in support of their claim whereby all leaders of Sunni legal schools of thought (Hanafi, Malik, Shafi’i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal) derived their authorities as imam not from the state, but from the recognition of the umma.50 In this context, progressive thought critically argued that MUI’s demonstration of its position as the sole custodian of Islamic religious authority negates the plurality of thought within Islam and the multitudes of dimensions of religious experiences, thought and interpretations which the scriptures and traditions upheld,51 since Islam is a religion which pays attention to all dimensions of life. Domination in the interpretation of religion through conferring upon oneself the sole and legitimate authority on Islam is viewed within competing mode of thought as opening the door to religious authoritarianism at the expense of being authoritative. The denial or discrediting of rival ideas of religious legitimacy by declaring them as un-Islamic or deviant without intellectual basis, reinforces the political motives in their orientation. 52 While the idea of the authoritative is commonly
associated
with
wisdom,
49
tolerance,
and
inclusiveness,
Ibid, 23-26. Masdar Farid Masudi, “Perbincangan dengan Masdar Farid Masudi,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1180. 51 Farid Mas’udi, “Tentang MUI dan Fatwā Kontroversialnya”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132. 52 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “Percakapan dengan Budhy Munawar-Rachman” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, lix. 50
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authoritarianism is characterized by the lack of intellectual interest and the desire to assert power using any possible methods and medium.53 In the Indonesian context, it might be debated whether or not MUI is granted with authority over ruling on religious issues in the country. However, the “imagined authority” it resorts to position itself as the authoritarian voice that claims the right to define the validity of interpretations of religion; while at the same time suppressing others who uphold different philosophical or epistemological basis to it. Furthermore, progressives relate the authoritarian nature of MUI’s fatwā to the fact that the fatwā has ignored fundamental social considerations which must be seriously taken into account before a fatwā is finally issued.54 In addition, the fact that Islam does not have a clergy system implies that no single religious body in Islam is privileged to subordinate any kinds of interpretations offered by other Muslim groups.55 Although some within competing groups of activists do not reject religious authority in a paternalistic society governed by patron-client relations such as in Indonesia, they nevertheless maintain that intellectual ability of the authority is the only basis for its justification failing which authoritarianism in religious understanding and thought will prevail to the detriment of the well-being of members of the community. In other words, the holders of authority have to be authoritative and at the same time refrain from being authoritarian.56
53
Budy Munawar-Rachman, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, lix Interview with Moh. Shofan, Jakarta, 29 May 2013. 55 Interview with Khoiruz Zimam, Gresik, 5 June 2013. Khoiruz Zimam is a progressive-minded Muhammadiyah activist in Gresik, East Java, and a strong supporter of JIMM. Interview with Moh. Shofan, Jakarta, 29 May 2013. 56 For a more detailed discussion on these concepts, read Khaled M Abou El Fadl, Speaking 54
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Such a conviction from progressive wing is strengthened by the fact that MUI has failed to evaluate and examine the concepts it declares as ḥarām in its fatwā. Fatwā-making is a serious intellectual endeavour or ijtihād. Hence, MUI should have examined the issues and the implications it bears on society very deeply and seriously. For progressives, the reasons which MUI proposed in labelling pluralism, liberalism, and secularism as ḥarām does not reveal depth in understanding the diversity of thought within the scriptures and contemporary ideas bearing on the problem as well as their relevance for Indonesian Muslims and non-Muslims as a whole. Rather than an intellectual endeavour, it is much more motivated by hatred and political competition with certain groups within MUI.57 While MUI’s members may have the capacity to determine the issues at stake objectively, MUI’s fatwā is marred by its strong ideological stance at the expense of objectivity in dealing with richness and variety of religious expressions in Indonesia.58 M Syafii Anwar, the director of International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) in Jakarta, agrees that the fatwā is partly motivated by political factor. The fatwā, he maintains, has been capitalized by hardliner Muslim groups for the sake of their own interest, or in more exact phrase, for the sake of political interests of certain religious group.59
in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (London: Oneworld Publication, 2001). 57 Ahmad Suaedy, “Perbincangan dengan Ahmad Suaedy,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 163-164. 58 Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, “Perbincangan dengan Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1498. 59 M. Syafii Anwar, “Perbincangan dengan M. Syafii Anwar,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1083.
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Progressives and Social Harmony Progressives criticized MUI’s fatwā from the point of view of social and interreligious harmony in a pluralistic Indonesia. In their view, rather than creating harmony among different social groups in a plural Indonesia, MUI has been actively fuelling the fire of disharmony and tensions among them. MUI’s fatwā has played determinant role in creating socio-religious destabilization of the country60 and deterioration of religious harmony. No less than the late Abdurrahman Wahid agreed with this. In his view, the fatwā on the ban of pluralism is a great irony.61 While ideally MUI, consisting of scholars with different background and orientations, has the strong potential to play a mediating role for different and contradicting religious views, it has instead partially taken the side of certain groups at the expense of others62 incurring in the process of serious intra-community conflicts. From this perspective, the fatwā is clearly an error since it fails to internalize the realities of plurality that have been integral to human life and experience. Other groups have concurred with the view that the fatwā has created further negative consequence for intra-religious harmony in Indonesia as well as the larger society more generally.63 The issuance of such a controversial fatwā has contributed to impose risks and vulnerability of certain social groups which easily trigger and perpetrate demonizing and violence against them. The fatwā provides fuel to those who are already prone to violence and serve 60
Muhammad Irsyad, “Kritik Atas MUI”, http://islamlib.com/?site=1&aid=1421&cat=content&title=reportase, accessed on 9 April 2013. 61 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xviii. 62 Interview with Fuad Fanani, Jakarta, 14 December 2012. 63 Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara, p. xxvii.
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as justification and legitimacy for their actions. It is difficult not to point MUI’s fatwā as the fodder for the eruption of social violence based on faith differences.64 Amin Abdullah, the former rector of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, maintains that fatwā issued by religious institutions such as MUI should consider both private and public dimensions that are inexorably linked though different. Abdullah argues that fatwā should rigorously and carefully consider kinds of social implications and consequences it bears on human relationships and interactions among people of diverse religious backgrounds. Religion is not solely a matter of doctrine, but also involves connecting, relating, respecting one another within and between communities.65 The problem of neglect of the social implications of fatwā was also sanctioned by others. Wahid, for instance, argued that MUI should have played a role in assisting the government in finding solutions to alleviate multidimensional problems that Indonesia is facing. However, it has instead exacerbated the problem by its fatwā which has undermined relations within the Muslim community in particular.66 The social impact of MUI’s fatwā has even reached the Muslims in rural areas, who though not seriously impacted by it, are nevertheless joining the bandwagon in labelling, rejecting and severely blaming progressive groups for threatening their faith and unity of the Muslims. The pejorative attacks on liberal Islam illustrate the problem.
64
Masdar Farid Mas’udi, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132. 65 M. Amin Abdullah, “MUI, Fatwā dan Otoritas Keagamaan di Indonesia”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 47. 66 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xviii.
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The term “liberal” used by them is strongly associated with the lack of piety, corrosion of religious belief and devotion, and the absence of commitment to Islam as the sole religion for Muslims. The labelling is intended to socially exclude those who have been labeled as such. It creates a social stigma which obstructs acceptance into community. According to Moh. Shofan of Paramadina Foundation, this problem would not have deteriorated if not for MUI’s fatwā prohibiting pluralism, liberalism and secularism. 67 Shofan himself is an interesting case in point. In 2006, he was dismissed from his position as a lecturer at a university, due to his piece in a local newspaper supporting pluralism. In the same way Dawam Rahardjo lost his membership in Muhammadiyah due to his pluralistic vision.68
In Defence of Freedom of Thought Yet, another significant trait in the mode of progressive thought is the emphasis given to the value of freedom of thought in Islam. Within this discourse, the fatwā is perceived as transgressing this value by banning certain kinds of thought. Hence, Ulil Abshar, the former coordinator of JIL maintained that the fatwā is “the strangest fatwā” that has ever been issued as it disqualifies certain ideas (gagasan) as ḥarām (forbidden). Fundamental legal principles in Islamic legal theory, it is maintained, acknowledges that adult Muslims are morally responsible for their own deeds and thought (khitāb-u Llah-i al-muta’ālliq bi al-afʽāl al-mukallafīn). He questions how
67
Interview with Moh. Shofan, 29 May 2013, in Jakarta. For more detail data and discussion on this subject, please refer to my earlier study, Pradana Boy ZTF, “In Defense of Pure Islam: The Conservative-Progressive Debate within Muhammadiyah,” M.A. Thesis, Australian National University, 2007. 68
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ideas on pluralism, secularism and liberalism can be judged and forbidden.69 In the same vein, Mustofa Bisri, a respected Nahdlatul Ulama’s religious scholar pointed out that as types of thought, it is useless to forbid pluralism, liberalism and secularism. Forbidding these ideas, Bisri argues, is equal to banning people to think, which is impossible. As opposed to banning, he strongly maintains that ideas should be comparatively challenged with ideas. Furthermore, he contends that ideas cannot be judged and tried until they have been implemented in the forms of deeds and actions and their effects on people’s rights and interests are analyzed.70 Rejection and criticism to MUI’s fatwā in defence of freedom of thinking is also expressed by Dawam Rahardjo. He maintains the significance of the use of reason in religion. He argues that banning thought is equal to restricting freedom of thought.71 The progressives also evaluated the fatwā on the basis of the level of intellectual capacity of MUI. MUI through the fatwā has revealed to the public its partiality and limitations in reasoning. Abdurrahman Wahid argued that the narrow-minded thinking of MUI’s elites is adverse to all segments of Indonesia as a nation.72 Rahardjo perceives that the fatwā reflects MUI’s perception of Indonesian Muslims as weak in preserving their identity in all sense of the term. Since they are weak and unable to withstand cultural elements that are constantly impacting upon them in the pluralistic society in 69
Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Fatwā MUI dan Konservatisme Agama”, Media Indonesia, 3 August 2005. 70 Mustofa Bisri, “Fatwā MUI, Refleksi Ketidakpercayaan Diri: Wawancara dengan K.H. Mustofa Bisri”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 253. 71 Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, Jakarta, 12 December 2012. See also Dawam Rahardjo, “Dampak Fatwā MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 2-4. 72 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xviii.
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which they live, MUI’s sees the need to protect them from these potential threats that would undermine and threaten their identity. However, MUI’s very response as exemplified in its fatwā is revealing of its own insecurities and limitations in facilitating the community towards assimilating and adapting to the processes of change constantly impacting upon Indonesian society. Rahardjo sees the fatwā as a strong indication of the lack of confidence on the part of MUI in facing the realities of contemporary influences presented in ideas such as liberal democracy.73 This phenomenon can also be attributed to the reluctance or hostility of Muslim elites and masses in facing the impact of globalization. Generally, Muslims in Indonesia are experiencing insecurity and anxiety in the midst of massive social change. The lack of certainty and deterioration in the rule of law in Indonesia has contributed to lack of trust in government. The distrust is clearly manifested in assertions for Islam as the basis for solution to the problems. In this context, fatwā has become a powerful instrument in providing quick direction and path towards helping the Muslims adjust to deal with issues that they are confronted with. Yet, MUI’s fatwā has impeded this serious challenge. Its fatwā has created a hostile attitude towards the reality of socio-cultural life of the Muslims. Instead of harnessing modern concepts to facilitate Muslims’ adaptation to the modern world, the fatwā has instead impeded the possibility of synthesizing and harmonizing the religious traditions and values with relevant contemporary ideas that will create and improve the well-being of Muslims.
73
Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, 12 December 2012, Jakarta.
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D. Competing Ideas and Mode of Thinking on Liberalism It is important to note that in the context of contemporary Indonesian Islamic landscape, the term liberalism and liberal Islam is often used and understood synonymously. Hence, although liberalism is used more broadly in scholarship to encompass other dimensions of society,74 MUI’s usage of the term liberalism in its fatwā basically refers to the religious aspect or what it perceives as liberal tendency in understanding Islamic doctrines and traditions. This essentialist and monolithic meaning of the terms are, however, incongruent with the broader meaning that has been delineated within the discourse on liberalism in Indonesia which extends beyond the domain of religion or theology. Munawar-Rachman’s delineation of the concept is instructive. For him liberals as those who: a) resist theocracy and any ideas related to the establishment of an Islamic state; b) support the idea of democracy; c) defend the rights of women; d) defend the rights of non-Muslims; e) defend the freedom of thought; and f) and strive for the idea of progress.75 More importantly, it is pertinent to note that MUI’s usage of the term refers essentially to ideas and understanding of Islam upheld by groups that differ or depart from its own selective interpretations or preference. It must
74
In fact, liberalism is not only related to religion, since this term can also be liberally applied to any other field such as politics and economy. For discussion on the dynamics of liberalism as a philosophical concept of freedom, see Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism (San Fransisco: Cobden Press, 2002). Also Paul Kelly, Liberalism (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2005). 75 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Islam dan Liberalisme (Jakarta: Friedrich Nauman Stiftung, 2010), 26. It is important to note that by liberalism, it seems that MUI refers only to Islamic liberalism, in spite of the fact that liberalism is not one. For this reason, in this chapter, the term liberalism and liberal Islam will be used interchangeably.
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be made clear that as with the case of pluralism, those who are deemed liberals or identify themselves as such, do not discard Islam as major source of their philosophy. While they uphold competing views and orientations on specific issues relating to the above, these are consciously supported by recourse to religious sources and traditions. It is on this basis that the competing groups whose views are targeted in the fatwā base their responses to the very understanding of the term by MUI. For example, liberalism in MUI’s concept is equated with al-ibaḥiyya or permissiveness or relativist ideology.76 This equation is based on the presumption that since that the basic value of liberalism is freedom, it must admit relativism. Interestingly, although both MUI and competing groups agree that the basic value of liberalism is freedom, the articulation of the term and the expression of underlying meanings of the value by both parties differ. MUI equates freedom with absolute freedom or freedom without restriction. As such it assumes that liberalism allows people to do as they please without bounds or restrictions. In other words, freedom is pejoratively perceived as permissiveness. In contrast, competing mode of thought perceives freedom as a positive element of human beings and society. Liberalism within this mode has nothing to do with permissiveness. More accurately, liberalism is perceived as a philosophy that seeks to extend the areas of individual freedom and enhance social progress. It accords human beings the right of choice subject
76
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwā MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: MUI Pusat and Penerbit Erlangga, 2011), 93.
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to certain fundamental principles,77 namely mutual respect for the rights of the members of society and the rule of law. In line with this conviction, liberalism emphasizes the cultivation of reason and social awareness of individuals in fulfilling their obligations. It also aims at building an independent society without excessive state intervention.78 It is reiterated that these competing views on liberalism captured in responses of progressive Indonesian Muslims are grounded in perceptions of Islamic values and tradition. Such alternative discourse finds no place in the thinking of MUI which misleadingly presumes that a society adopting liberalism is unbounded by restraints and values thereby instilling fear and anxiety and opposition to it. In Ulil Abshar Abdalla’s analysis, this fear basically stems from distrust of human beings apart from a humiliation of man’s rational and intellectual abilities. The fear of liberalism and freedom also carries the connotation that human beings are unable to think, to manage and to control their ability if they are granted freedom.79 Moreover, the meaning of liberalism as freedom is often pejoratively equated to moral decay such as free sex practice and non-obedience to religion. Zuly Qodir, for example, strongly resists this perception by arguing that liberalism is fundamentally about revealing the liberating forces of Islam often hidden by Muslims themselves. 80 More fundamentally, the ethics of freedom or liberation is a fundamental value in 77
Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Islam dan Liberalisme (Jakarta: Freidrich Naumann Stiftung, 2011), 3. 78 Ibid, 3. 79 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Islam dan Kebebasan”, in Hamid Basyaib, Membela Kebebasan: Perbincangan tentang Demokrasi Liberal (Jakarta: Freedom Institute and Pustaka Alvabet, 2006), 228. 80 Interview with Zuly Qodir, Yogyakarta, February 2013.
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Islam, and it is human beings that are granted with this freedom, including freedom of choice and free will. Therefore, the doctrine of freedom or liberation is nothing alien to Islamic tradition since it can be traced from the classical Islamic disciplines such as theology and philosophy.81 This basic meaning of freedom underlines competing groups’ positive attitude of the concept. However, since “freedom” itself is negatively viewed and forms a major reason for rejecting liberalism, it is pertinent to have a clearer understanding of what it means. Conceptually, the most important element of freedom is the absence of coercion both external and internal that requires people to do or abstain from. This external force could possibly come from an authority outside of an individual such as politics, religion, tradition, community or others. Moreover, the concept of freedom is also associated with obedience. This view is contested by competing progressive thought which submits that freedom, in whatever meaning, does not contradict obedience since obedience is basically an initial condition and freedom is the result of this initial situation. Consequently, contrasting freedom with obedience does not make sense. According to Ulil while emphasizing obedience, the Qurʼān also pays considerable attention to the idea of freedom as the initial condition for being obedient.82 On this basis, he opines that freedom in Islam can be expressed in at least in three contexts: a). freedom to embrace any certain religion or to leave it; b) the absence of coercion in adopting any religion also
81
Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 145. 82 Ulil Abshar Abdalla, “Argumen Islam untuk Kebebasan”, paper presented for Public Lecture, Freedom Institute, Jakarta, July 15, 2013.
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suggests the freedom of corporation; and c) freedom of interpretation. 83 Underlying all these is overriding principle of the freedom of the human being. The misunderstanding of freedom will lead people to rebel against religion and revelation, thereby, restrict freedom that has been doctrinally endorsed by revelation. Ulil further maintains that such an understanding will restrict what has been acknowledged in religion and erroneously confine its application.84 The challenge to understanding liberalism as an absolute freedom also comes from Maman Imanulhaq, a leader of al-Mizan Islamic Boarding School, in Majalengka, West Java, who strongly believes that liberalism is not absolute freedom. It would be more accurate to comprehend it as an attempt to place individual rights in a sacred position as God has granted all individuals with fundamental rights such as right to live, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion. Maman maintains that if liberalism is understood in this way, it will not be perceived as a threat but will turn religion into a living force (élan vital) for positive changes. 85 Although freedom in Islam is a virtue, Muslims themselves have ignored or misunderstood this. According to competing mode of thought, this fact basically betrays historical precedence as exemplified by the liberating attitude of earlier generation of Muslims who had suffered from misery in
83
Saidiman Ahmad, “Argumen Islam untuk Kebebasan”, Koran Tempo, 15 April 2011. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Agama, Akal dan Kebebasan: Tentang Makna ‘Liberal’ dalam Islam Liberal”, Foreword in Abd Moqsith Ghazali (ed), Ijtihad Islam Liberal: Upaya Merumuskan Keberagamaan yang Dinamis (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2005), xvii. 85 Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, “Perbincangan dengan Maman Imanulhaq Abdulfaqih”, in Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1105. 84
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Mecca for thirteen years. As they experienced this misery, they understood the meaning of and appreciated freedom well. However, when Muslims came into power and assumed a position as a ruling class, they committed the same fault as other power holders, namely oppression. For this reason, progressives believe that Islamic liberalism and the value of freedom must be revived in society. More than a virtue, competing groups often describe the teaching of freedom in Islam as a pearl of wisdom. 86 Related to this point is the connection between liberalism and happiness. The progressives maintain that earlier generation of liberal Muslim believed in the correlation between liberalism and happiness. Freedom is seen as the key to happiness, not only for individual, but also happiness for communities and even a state.87 The above discussion on freedom signifies the moral autonomy of the individual in Islamic tradition and teachings. Competing ideas maintain that in Islam the individual subject is fully responsible for himself and that based on this responsibility, individuals gain freedom. As the individual is a responsible subject who has consciousness, he cannot be forced. Freedom, in their thought, necessitates responsibility. Therefore, progressives argue that when people are granted freedom, they at the same time do not ignore their responsibilities.88 The basis of the concept of freedom and responsibility, according to progressives, can also be traced through Islamic legal tradition. Legally speaking, Islamic legal provision states that those who are under coercion do not have any obligation. In such a context, awareness of the 86
Hamid Basyaib (ed), Membela Kebebasan: Percakapan tentang Demokrasi Liberal (Jakarta: Alvabet, 2006), 225. 87 Luthfi Assyaukani, “Dua Abad Islam Liberal”, in Bentara Kompas, 2 Maret 2007. 88 Hamid Basyaib (ed), Membela Kebebasan: Percakapan tentang Demokrasi Liberal (Jakarta: Alvabet, 2006), 225.
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importance of individual rights, the maintenance of pluralism and tolerance, the limitation of state’s role, and willingness to regulate political activities as a rational contract between the rulers and the ruled will emerge.89 According to Ahmad Sahal, the former activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), this is the essence of liberalism.90 Other than freedom, progressives also relate liberalism to independence. As Dawam Rahardjo posits that in the field of economy, liberalism has resulted in capitalism or free market economy system that will bring prosperity to the nations, which has brought about exploitation of the strong against the weak. Liberalism can also be manifested in the idea of freedom and independence. The difference between freedom and independence is that the former touches more on micro-individual, while the latter operates more on macro-collective level. Therefore, it is not surprising that liberalism is basically an inspiration for independence.91 Yet, another dimension of the meaning of liberalism which relates to freedom advanced by competing groups is the freedom of thought. Amien Rais, the former leader of Muhammadiyah in 1990s, maintains that liberalism is an inspiration for freedom of thought for members of society who seek for solutions to variety of problems confronting it. 92 Therefore, if there is competition of ideas and rivalry in dealing with or concrete problems, it
89
Ibid, 225-228. Ahmad Sahal, “Anti-Liberalisme dari Kanan: Untung Ada Mas Dawam”, in Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, et.al (eds), Demi Toleransi, Demi Pluralisme (Jakarta: Yayasan Abad Demokrasi, 2012), 411. 91 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Kritik Nalar Islamisme dan Kebangkitan Islam (Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2012), 6. 92 Amien Rais, “Perbincangan dengan Amien Rais”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1016. 90
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should be praised and even advisable. 93 Returning to history, competing groups maintain that that freedom of thought is an integral aspect of Islamic teachings that has its roots in the earliest practice of Islam. Quraish Shihab, a leading exegete in Indonesia, contends that thinking is a religious obligation. In Islam, he suggests, it is not the validity of thought that becomes a central issue, but the seriousness in thinking, responsibility and benefits carried by certain thought. Allah will not punish any thought, even though it is wrong, when these three basic considerations have been fulfilled.94 By referring back to the history of earlier generation of Muslim philosophers, progressives reveal the significance Islam paid to the freedom of thought. The practices of liberalism in the meaning of freedom of thought have been introduced since the classical era as exemplified by Muslim philosophers, legal scholars and theologians. 95 In an Islamic context, liberalism refers to freedom of thought and expression. In Islamic philosophy, for example, freedom of thought emerged as an alternative to orthodox understanding. In Islamic mysticism, the same doctrine also exists. Therefore, it is inevitable that some scholars maintain that the root of Islamic liberalism could be traced to these two disciplines: Islamic philosophy and mysticism. Philosophy gives intellectual and rational basis, while Islamic mysticism serves as the spiritual foundation.96 Freedom of thought is also seen as a
93
Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam, 430 M. Quraish Shihab, Secercah Cahaya Ilahi: Hidup Bersama al-Qur’an (Bandung, Mizan, 2013, 2nd edition), 451. 95 Zuly Qodir, Islam Liberal: Varian-Varian Liberalism Islam di Indonesia 1991-2002 (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2010), 84-85. 96 Luthfi Assyaukani, “Perbincangan dengan Luthfi Assyaukani,” in Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1002-1004. 94
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medium through which more progressive understanding of Islam can be achieved. Through the project of liberalism, progressive Muslims aim at presenting a liberal-progressive type of Islam through the employment of certain method which includes hermeneutics.97 Liberalism can be treated as a focus in the study of Islam, in order to make Islam contextual and perform dialogues with all contexts and contemporary realities productively.98 Closely associated with the basic concept of freedom of thought, competing groups also advance how religious texts are understood in Islam. Being liberal within this mode also means to understand religious texts by way of rational-contextual reading. A liberal Muslim, within this view, is not imprisoned and bound by texts. Rather, he will comprehend the text rationally. Rationality is any organization of knowledge which is in accordance with logic. As long as the ideas are based on the application of reason as opposed to dogmatic and emotive influences it should not be denied, but encouraged.99 Therefore, progressives declare that if what is understood by liberalism is atheism, it should be rejected. It is reiterated that the ideas and mode of thinking of those who defend and uphold liberal Islam reveals evident attempt at creatively synthesizing basic teachings, doctrines and values of Islam with other philosophies or selective aspects of them that are compatible with it. It is through such assimilation and synthesis that Islam is able to respond to undeterred social changes that are taking place within the
97
Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 68. 98 Luthfi Assyaukani, Islam Benar versus Islam Salah (Depok: Kata Kita, 2007), 60. 99 Zainun Kamal, “Perbincangan dengan Zainun Kamal,” in Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1704-1705.
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context of modern society. 100 It must be highlighted that MUI’s attitude towards liberalism and its presumption of what it means strongly conditioned by its notion that liberalism is a western concept. This view has been analysed within competing group thought. Luthfi Assyaukanie, for example, argues that liberal Islam is basically a rejuvenation of Islamic reform movements in nineteenth century in almost all parts of the world. Identical to Assyaukani’s position, Rahardjo goes further back in history to support his view that the roots of Islamic liberalism (in the meaning of freedom of thought) lies in the Prophetic tradition. Utilising religious sources such as hadīth, he argues that the fundamental values of freedom of thought based on reason and moral responsibility and accountability underlying liberalism can be found in the dialogue between the Prophet and Mu’adz bin Jabbal when the latter was appointed a governor in Yemen which emphasized and endorsed the significance of ijtihād. Another hadīth used by Rahardjo relates to the Prophet’s dialogue with a farmer who had misunderstood his opinion. The hadīth narrated that the Prophet had asserted antum a’lāmu bi umūri dunyākum (you are more knowledgeable in your worldly issues). 101 The reference to basic Islamic doctrines and principles consistent with the values of liberalism is also evident from Imanulhaq’s interpretation of the term. He views that the basic spirit of liberalism has been laid down by the Prophet himself, by liberating his people, and understanding their individual rights. In this context, he sees that liberalism is fundamental to the purpose of Islamic
100
Ibid, 1704-1705. M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme (Jakarta: ), xxxvi. 101
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religiosity.102 Differing from Assyaukani, Rahardjo and Imanulhaq, Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Masdar Mas’udi acknowledges that liberalism, be it politically or economically defined, did not originate from Islam. They, however, maintained that this does not mean that Islam does not have any correlation with liberalism. 103 In its most basic meaning, liberalism is a challenge to the dogma that the scripture can only be read and interpreted by church authority. It does not mean unbounded authority as strongly implied in MUI’s thinking.104 By and large, it can be concluded that while MUI sees liberalism as a potential danger for Indonesian Muslims, progressives perceive it as a necessity. It is not surprising, as a consequence, that in contrast to MUI that labelled liberalism as ḥarām, the progressive mode of thought views it as basically part of Islamic teachings. In this respect, an important question to be posed is that if the meaning of liberalism as understood by progressives is more positive rather than negative, what factors could have led to the rejection of the concept. Tholhah Hasan, the former minister of religion offers a hypothesis. He views that the pejorative meaning of liberalism in Indonesia as followed by MUI is a result of simplistic way of thinking.105 In
102
Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, “Perbincangan dengan Maman Imanulhaq Abdulfaqih”, in Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1105. 103 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 13. 104 Masdar Farid Mas’udi, “Perbincangan dengan Masdar Farid Mas’udi,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1179. 105 Muhammad Tholhah Hasan, ““Percakapan dengan Muhammad Tholhah Hasan”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1281.
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other words, MUI’s position and progressives’ stand reflect contrasting styles of thought. In summary, liberalism is not a monolithic or simplistic concept as resumed by MUI and reflected in its fatwā. On the contrary, it comprises a variety of meanings captured in competing modes of thinking in discourse of Indonesian Muslim groups. Essentially for MUI, liberalism is taken to mean anti-religion. This understanding is not only simplistic but partial as MUI has arbitrarily and dogmatically presumed it to mean only that which is negative regardless of its variety of meanings and nuances in discourse on the concept. At the same time, its understanding is also elusive without recourse to serious analysis and systematic research of its meaning and application even in Muslim history and religious traditions. MUI’s views and mode of thinking has been strongly critiqued by competing ideas, based on historical precedents and alternative ways of interpreting Muslim history and traditions. The simplistic and elusive understanding of liberalism as shown by MUI’s fatwā induces and reinforces fear and tension of what it deems as potent threat to Islam and the Muslims. On the one hand, competing views reveal contrasting conceptual understanding of liberalism. Grounded in religious traditions, they challenge the simplistic notions of the concept and metaphorically bridges religious teachings with contemporary challenges through rational and contextual interpretation of Islam. In this way, they attempt to ensure the relevance of Islam and its dynamism within changing condition of Indonesian society. The perspectives they offer attempt to adapt religious traditions to contemporary
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world in which Muslims live.106
E. Progressives on Secularism in Indonesia The third important aspect of MUI’s fatwā is secularism. It is evident that in the fatwā, secularism is perceived as the separation of state and religion as well as marginalization of religion from public life. In contrast, competing views maintain that MUI’s understanding of secularism is misleading, if not erroneous. Within this mode of thinking, secularism is elucidated as not synonymous with anti-religious attitude or the marginalization of religion from public life. It is an exaggeration to perceive secularism as anti-religion. Those who oppose MUI’s understanding explain that the concept is theoretically not tantamount to a denial of religion but admits that religion should be separated from the state. This does not automatically mean that secularism is anti-religion in concept and practice.107 According to Azyumardi Azra, misperception of the proper meaning of secularism emerges, among other factors, from the fact that it is basically a theory of separation of religion and state. This basic formulation carries meaning that religion is part of private dimension of society, on the one hand, and that state should refrain from regulating religious issues, on the other. By this understanding, Azra argues, it should not be understood that in a state which adopts the principle of secularism, religion will decline, become 106
Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “Perbincangan dengan Budhy Munawar-Rachman”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, xlix. 107 A. Munir Mulkhan, “Percakapan dengan A. Munir Mulkhan”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1.
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marginalized, and oppressed. 108 In support of his understanding, Azra compares the nature of religious practice in Turkey and the United States. Although both are declared as secular countries, the significance of the influence of religion in the lives of people remains pervasive. Furthermore, differences exist in the way the states manage religion in the public sphere. While in Turkey secularism is implemented in the form of elimination of religious symbols in public life; in the United States, secularism is manifested in the state refraining from active intervention and management of religious affairs which opens possibilities for the expression of religious practices and symbols in public life.109 This means that secularism does not inevitably involve the marginalization of religion from public life. A similar perception is found in the thinking of Husein Muhammad who strongly disagrees with the presumption that secularism is negative because it means the separation of religion and state. Muhammad maintains that this does not mean that Islam rejects secularism. For Muhammad a key ingredient in secularism is the orientation towards the reality of the world and its significance to man’s existential conditions.110 He argues that Islamic teachings and texts acknowledge the fundamental differentiation between worldly life and hereafter,111 and the importance of man’s rootedness and his struggle in his specific socio-historical condition which is the major element 108
Azyumardi Azra, “Percakapan dengan Azyumardi Azra,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 192. 109 Azyumardi Azra, Dari Harvard Hingga Makkah (Jakarta: Republika, 2005), 10-11. 110 A. Syafii Maarif, “Percakapan dengan A. Syafii Maarif”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 172. 111 Husein Muhammad, “Percakapan dengan Husein Muhammad”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 676.
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of secularism. While MUI views secularism as a dangerous force for Indonesian Muslims, the competing groups perceive the concept from a broader socio-political dimension, argues for stress its vital importance in Indonesian society. Quoting Indonesian founding father Sukarno, Rahardjo maintains that secularism is basically an important and a fundamental element which binds Indonesia as a nation. The basis for this argument is that only through secularism can there be equal opportunity for different social groups to live and unite despite the vast diversity of its people.112 In this context, Rahardjo points out that rather than understanding secularism from a religious point of view, secularism should be understood from a wider perspective which encompasses the values of freedom, rights, democracy and equality within Indonesia’s plural society.113 Furthermore, Rahardjo explains that secularism as a matter of principle, secularism has ensured freedom of religion and conscience and justice to all religions and beliefs as long as they do not violate the constitution, the creation of laws on the basis of social consensus and moral and ethical norms and tolerance amongst different beliefs, worship and religious practices.114 Based on this conviction, Rahardjo denounces its presumption that secularism is anti-religion or inherently leads to the decline and marginalization of religion. 115 Like Azra, Rahardjo pointed out that
112
Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), xxix-xxx. 113 Rahardjo in Rachman, Ibid. 114 Ibid, xxxi. 115 Dawam Rahardjo, “Percakapan dengan Dawam Rahardjo”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 9.
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secularism is managed in various ways such as in the case of Turkey.116 The notion that secularism is not incompatible with religion also finds support in the view of Komaruddin Hidayat who maintains that secularism is essentially a rational approach in understanding state dynamic and political activity through modern political theory. In this sense, religion stands on moral ground. Seen in this way, secularism is not incompatible with Islam.117 Others maintain that secularism is intertwined strongly with democracy. Djohan Effendi’s view illustrates the point. He views that as far as democracy is concerned, secularism is an essential element, since the principles of democracy cannot be fully implemented without secularism. He argues that secularism places all religions on equal position without any particular religion being privileged or having the upper hand. This equality in the treatment of religions, he emphasized, is a fundamental principle of democracy. 118 Furthermore, Effendi also contends that secularism is a pre-requisite for achieving more subtle values of civic life.119 Some Indonesian scholars have attempted to distinguish between secularism and secularization and their relationship with Islam. Although some aspects of their views appear to support the understanding that secularism creates distance between man and God and in that sense is incompatible with religion, conceptual distinctions and categorization of 116
Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme, Paradigma Baru Islam Indonesia (Jakarta: LSAF dan Paramadina, 2010), lx. 117 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Sekularisme, 29. 118 Djohan Effendi, “Percakapan dengan Djohan Effendi”, Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 291. 119 See also Husein Muhammad, “Percakapan dengan Husein Muhammad,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 676.
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thought reflected in their views reveal sophisticated nuances that cannot be said to be similar to MUI’s simplistic over-generalisation and judgement. The debate over the distinction between secularization and secularism and its consequences on Islam dates back to the 1970s in the midst of the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia in which the clamour for the rejection of secularism was rife. Deemed a western philosophical model that has contributed to the decline and degeneration of the Muslims, the scare of secularism was accompanied by the demand for the return to Islam as al-dīn. It was in this context that the late Nurcholish Madjid distinguished secularization as a process of change from secularism as a philosophy and urged for Indonesian Muslims not to reject the former as it is an inevitable process of change induced by modernization. According to Madjid who is popularly known as Cak Nur, secularization is not an ideology as is the case with secularism which potentially creates distance between self and the God.120 Furthermore, Madjid also evaluates secularization as a “liberating development.” This liberation is urgently needed for Muslims as consequence of Islam’s historical progress. It is inevitable that this process has contributed to the dynamic evolution of Muslims as they confront new conditions and challenges. As a result, many Muslims are no longer able to differentiate values that are thought as Islamic, which is transcendental and which one is temporal.121 Although this type of distinction is often criticized by those who reject secularism and secularization, Madjid’s differentiation of secularization and secularism can be theoretically validated. Jose Casanova, a leading 120
Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), 221. 121 Ibid, 207.
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sociologist of religion, for example, emphasizes the importance of clarity in understanding
secularization
and
secularism
to
avoid
confusion.
Secularization usually refers to actual or alleged empirical-historical patterns of transformation and differentiation of ‘the religious’…, while secularism “refers more broadly to a whole range of modern secular worldviews and ideologies which may be consciously held and explicitly elaborated into philosophies of history…”122 An important point that can be drawn from the discussion on Islam and secularism in Indonesia is that in the Indonesian context, secularism is a contested concept with a variety of meanings attributed to it. MUI’s fatwā that denounces secularism as with the case of pluralism and liberalism overlooks and ignores this complexity and sophistication of thought and ideas pertaining to this issue. Mulkhan argues that the attitude of MUI on secularism rests on its imagination of its roots in western European history. Stemming from the West it has been essentialized as atheistic and rejected on the ground that it threatens the identity and belief of Muslims. This type of thinking has created a paradox for Muslims in Indonesia. While on the one hand they are trying to modernize by employing reason, taking benefit of tradition as well as experience of Western countries, on the other hand, they reject the west which they have caricatured as irreligious.123 The fatwā in effect denies the reality of historical context which has created the need for man to understand and manage the condition of his life and adapt to it. The ambivalent attitude towards reason and empiricism, that are imbued into the 122
Jose Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms”, in Craig Calhoun, et. al. (eds), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 54-55. 123 Ibid, 104.
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concept of secularism in association for human action are presumed as working to overthrow religion. In conclusion, it can be asserted that the fatwā on pluralism, secularism and liberalism substantially contradicts contemporary realities as well as contributions of Islam in human development. It has basically revealed the conservative streak of MUI and groups alike. It cannot be denied that far from allowing religious principles and values to help adapt Muslims to the realities of the world in which they live and contribute to its progress, the fatwa, on the contrary, has ignited, provoked and contributed to unfounded suspicions and mistrust amongst Muslims which basically contradicts the teachings and values Islam.124 It is also clear that MUI’s understanding of pluralism, liberalism and secularism is ideological in the sense that it is functions to guard its position against competing groups’ ideas. It ignores and overlooks intellectual thought and reasoning on the subject matter widely debated and discussed by scholars and thinkers both within and beyond Indonesia. The critical understanding of these concepts from progressive Muslim scholars in Indonesia basically represents different religious perspectives and orientations in interpreting and making sense of contemporary concepts and ideas, its compatibility with religious traditions and principles and their relevance to Indonesian society. Essentially, they reveal a more inclusive, rational and humanistic orientation based on the centrality of man and his moral judgment and responsibility. In further contrast to the revivalist mode of thinking reflected in MUI’s fatwā, the
124
Ibid, 61.
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competing mode is socio-historically grounded when upholding the eternal values of Islam.
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